{"document_id": "1981_2_166_184_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "TATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS\n\nWORKMEN EMPLOYED AND VICE-VERSA\n\nNovember 13, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK & 0. CIUNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nIndustrial disputes-Tribunal making Gn award prescribing revised grades/ scales of pay to different categories with retrospective effect fro1n 1st .Tanuary, 1976-Validity of retrospectivity of the award.\n\nIndustrial Disputes (Bonibay) Rules, 1957-Rule 31, scope of-Whether the clarification n1ade by the Tribunal prescribing that a flat increase of Rs. 150/- in the category of Dra11ghtsn1en and Rs. 100!- in the case of the other categories payable \"to cacl1 oj its e111pfoyl'!es\" an1011nts to a supplC'rnr'nfary award not pennissible under Rule 31.\n\nDismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court.\n\n}{ELD : Per Pathak, J. (Krishna Iyer and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. concu1Ting)\n\n(1) Having regard to the financial capacity of M/s. Tata Consulting Engineers, the appellant, and the , material on the record and the various olher considerations \\rhich prevailed with the Tribunal, the granting of revised wa.ge scales is in order. Although the V.'age scales were introduced as long ago as 1973 they were maintained at that level except for a slight revision some tilne thereafter. No dearness allowance \\Vas paid until the beginning of 1977 and the house rent allowance also was introduced about that time.\n\nThe cost of living had gone on increasing from 1972 onwards and the dearness 1ilowancc and house rent allowances made no appreciable impact in neutralising the increasing cost. During all these years, the appellant had continued to enjoy increasing profits; nonetheless the en1oluments received by the workmen did not receive the impress of the appellant's growing prosperity. The Charter of Demands was presented by the Union in July, 1974 and when conciliation pro- F ceedings failed the State Government made a reference to the Industrial Tribunai in 1975. The several considerations which prevailed with the Tribunal giving retrospectivity to the revised pay scale~ and referred to by it cannot be ignored. [174C-G]\n\n(2) It is not a universal rule that the dearness allowance should in all cases be correlated with the cost of Jiving index.\n\nThe Tribunal, in the present case, considered the matter and found it sufficient and in acoorc1 \\\\ith justice that the wage sca1es should be restructured with suitable incren1ents provided therein.\n\nJt noted that dearness allowance was being granted by !he appellant at 10% of the salary subject to a minimum of Rs. 50/- and house rent allowance at 30% of the basic salary.\n\nHaving regard to the not inconsiderable improvement in the level of the basic \\vage, it observed th:i.t there v.:ould be a consequent increase in the dearness nllowance and house rent a11owance.\n\nIn view of the increase so secured, the Tribunal rejected the \"uggestion that a slab system houkl be, introduced in the dearness allowance or that there should be any other modification of the principle on which dearness aliowance\n\nV.'as being presently granted.\n\nJt declared that the cumulati, rc effect of an im-\n\n. .,\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS V. WORKMEN 167\n\nproved wage structure together with dearness allowance operating on a slab system would throw an impossible burden of about Rs. 1 crore on the financial\n\ncapacity of the appellant.\n\nIt was open to the Tribunal to adopt the position which it did. If the dearness allowance is linked with the cost of living index;· the whole award \\Vi11 have to be reopened and , the entire basis on which it has been made will have to be reconsidered. The award is a composite docu~ ment in which the several elements of increased wage scales, larger increments, longer span of 20 years for earning increments, dearness allowance at 10% of the basic wage, besides several Other benefits, have been integrated into a ha.lanced arrangement in keeping with what the Tribunal has found to be the financial capacity of the appellant. It is not possible to maintain one part of the award and supersede another.\n\n[179 EF]\n\nThe Hindustan Ti111es Ltd., l•./cw Del/ii v. Their Work1ne11, [1964] 1 SCR 234, 247 and Bengal Che1nical & Phannace1t1; cal Works Linii<ed v. Its Work men, [19691 2 S.C.R. 113. distinguished.\n\n(3) The jurisdiction given to the Tribunal by rule 31 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957, is closely circumscribed. It is only a clerical mistake or error which can be corre1.:ted and the clerical mistake or error must arise from an accidental slip or omission jn the award. An accidental slip or omis::1ion implies that something was intended and contrary to that intention what should not have been included has been included or what should have been included has been omitted. It must be a mistake or error amenable to clerical correction only. It must Ilot be a n1istake or error which calls for rectification by modification of the conscious adjudication on the issues involved.\n\n[175 A-CJ\n\nPer contra\n\nThe order of 22nd Dccen1ber, 1978 is invalid so far as it amends paragraph 23 of the original award. The amendment hasi resulted in the Tribunal mak~ ing, as it were, a supplementary a.ward, whereby a further relief is being granted beyond that granted in the original award. The original award was completed and signed by the Tribunal, and it cannot be reopened now except for the limited purpose of Rule 31. In travelling outside and beyond the tenns of the original a.\\vard, the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error.\n\nThe evidence contained in the award throughout provides incontrovertible proof that this flat increase (adhoc) was never originally intended in the award.\n\nThere was only one increase contemplated in the award, in paragraph 23 of the award and it is more than plain that the increase was the one incorporated in the revised pay scales pertai11ing to different categories. No second flat increase \\\\.'as envisaged at all. The an1endment made by the Tribunal has the effect of providing a second increase, this time to each individual workmen.\n\nIf, ns the Tribunal ha.s stated in the amendment order, the increase in para graph 23 was intended to , apply to each individual workmen, there is nothing in the body of the award to forn1 the foundation on which the actual figures in the restructured pay scales can be made to rest. There will be no explanation ·~1hy the initial start of the revised pa.y scales has been increased by Rs. 150/- in the' case of the category of Draughtsmen and Rs. 100/- in the case of other categories. Considering the fitment of the workmen in the revised scales, it was stated in the award that workman found drawing a salary less than the beginning of 1he gra.de would be' stepped up to the beginning of the grade and if his pay fell between two steps in the reclassified pay scales the\n\nbasic pay \\vas to be fixed at the s.tep higher in the revised scale. Further the award was made on the basis that the overall :financial load according to paragraph 33 of the award would be to the tune of about Rs. 5 lakhs. It was that figure which the Tribunal had in mind against the backdrop of the gross annual figures when it made the revised pay scales restrospective from 1st January, 1976.\n\n[176 D-G, 177A, 178 D-F]\n\nThe statement, Exhibit C-51 afforded an indication merely of what the additional financial load would be if a flat increase \\\\'as given to the individual workmen on the alternative basis set forth therein.\n\nNone of the alternatives was actually adopted by .the Tribunal, because when the award was made the 1\"ribunal proceeded instead to restn1ctnre the wage scales by the addition of Rs. 150/- in the case of the category of Draughtsmen and of Rs. 100/~ in the case of other categories to the initial pay in the wage scales pertaining to these categories. The addition was integrated as a feature of the wage scales, it was not regarded as an addition to the pay of each individual workmen. [l 78A-C]\n\nIt is an accepted principle that consent by a party cannot confer jur.isdiction on a court. What is \\Vithout jurisdiction will remain so. [178 E-Fl\n\nPer 0. C. Redd)', J. (Majority view, Iyer and Reddy, JJ.)\n\nThe order dated December 22, 19i8 of the IndustriaJ. Tribunal which purports to correct the award dated December 20, 1978 cannot be considered in effect to be a fresh award and it is in order. The omission of the words \"to each employee\" after the figure Rs. 150/- and again after the figure Rs. 100/- v..as clearly an accidental slip or omission which the Tribunal \\Vas entitled to correct.\n\nThe application for the correction was made immediately, that is to say, two days after the Award, while iron \\Vas still hot or when everything must have been fresh to the minds of the Tribunal. Even the endorsement n1ade on the application by the Advocate for the Company to the effect \"submitted to whatever this honourable Tribunal desires to do\", does not indicate that the Company had any objection to the award being corrected as sought by the enlployees union.\n\nOn the other hand the endorsement reads as if there was tacit agreement on the part of the Company to the correction sought by the union; it cannot possibly be doubted that an Industrial Tribunal deciding upon the v.•age scales of the employees of an establishment would have full liberty to propose ad-hoc increase of salaries as part of the revision of pay scales, not can it be doubted that fitment into the revised pay scales is ce1tainly a part of the revision of pay scales. This is elementary a.nd fundamental to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in revising wage scales. If without any fiat or ad-hoc increase of salary the workmen were to be fitted into revised scales of pay, it would, obviously, result in serious anomalous situations. In the case of several senior employees, the revised scale would yield but a ve1y small and almost a token increase in the size of the pay packet whereas the junior employees would get a large benefit While workmen mi.sing industrial disputes for revision of wage scales are certainly minded about their future prospects in the matter of wages, they, surely would be more concerned with the immediate benefit accruing to them. That was why the Industrial Tribunal thought that all round fiat increase of Rs. 150/~ in the case of Draughtsmen and Rs. 100/- in the case of other workmen-to each employee-was called for.\n\n[180C,\n\n1810-E, G-H, 182A, 183D-E, G-H, 184A-BJ\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS v. WORKMl'jN (Pathak!.) 169\n\n( 4) While it is true that Dearness Allowance linked to cost of living index A is ordinarily the best and the most scientific method of computing dearness allowance, it cannot always be said that an illegality warranting interference under Article 136 is committed if some other method is adopted. In the ins-ta.nt case, the 1'ribunal has given satisfactory reasons for adopting a different mode.\n\n[184 F-GJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICT!Ot\\ : Civil Appeals Nos. 2299 and 2300 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Award dated 20-12-1978 of the Industrial Tribunal Maharashtra in Reference (IT) No. 292 of 1975, published in Maharashtra Government Gazette dated 15th February, 1979.\n\nG. B. Pai, Manick K. Gagrat, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and K. J. John for the Appellants in CA No. 2299 and Respondents in CA 2300/79.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, P. H. Parekh, S. R. !Deshpande and Miss Manik Tarkunde for the Respondents in CA 2299 and Appellants in CA No. 2300/79.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\n. PATHAK, J .-This appeal by special leave has been preferred by E Tata Consultancy Engineers against an award dated 20th December, 1978 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Bombay revising the wage scales of certain categories of employees and granting various other benefits.\n\nTata Consultant Engineers, at its inception, was a partnership firm but subsequently the partnership was dissolved and in 1974 the undertaking became one of the divisions of Tata Sons Limited. It functions as a consulting organisation and a service industry, and does not manufacture any product or carry on trade.\n\nIts workforce consists of engineers and supervisors and different categories of workmen. Out\n\nof 665 employees at Bombay, the draftsmen and the administrative staff number 306. These workmen are members of the Tata Consultant Employees Union.\n\nThey served a Charter of Demands in July, 1974, on the appellant, and as their demands were not accepted and conciliation proceedings proved fruitless, the State Government made\n\na reference of the dispute under s. 10(1) (d), Industrial Tribunal, H Maharashtra for adjudication.\n\nThe Reference was numbered I. T.\n\nNo. 292 of 1975.\n\nThe Union filed a statement before the Tribunal claiming an upward revision of the wage scales and dearness allowance and an increase from fifteen years to twenty years in the span for earning annual increments. It was urged that the Efficiency Bar, as a feature of the wage scales, should be removed.\n\nThe dearness allowance, it was claimed, should be granted on a slab system.\n\nThe claim of the Union was resisted by the appellant, who maintained that the existing wage scales were fair and reasonable on a region-cum-industry basis and that it would not be possible for the appellant to bear the additional financial burden if the demands of the Union were accepted.\n\nReference was made to the political uncertainty in Iran which had placed an appreciable part of the appellant's business in jeopardy and to various other factors, peculiar to an engineering consultancy business, beyond the appellant's control There was fierce competition also, it was asserted, from other similar organisations.\n\nThe appellant had introduced various pay scales in 1973 and some time later they were revised.\n\nThere was no separate dearness allowance until January, 1977 when it was introduced for the first time.\n\nHouse rent allowance was also paid.\n\nDearness allowance became> payable at 10% of the basic wage subject to a minimum of Rs. 50/-\n\nand house rent allowance at 30% of the basic salary.\n\nNothing those facts, the Tribunal observed that compared with the increased paying capacity of the appellant, an inference drawn from the prosperity enjoyed by the appellant over the years, there was definite need for revising the wage scales. It was pointed out that the dearness allowance and house rent allowance granted by the appellant made little impact in neutralising the cost of living.\n\nThe need for revising the wage scales was not disputed by the appellant. In proceeding to revise the wage structure the Tribunal took into account the two principles involved in the process, the financial capacity of the industry to bear the burden of an increased wage bill, and the prevailing wage structure on an industry-cum-regi0n basis.\n\nWage scale statements were filed by the parties before the Tribunal pertaining to several engineering consultancy organisations but in the absence of pertinent information concerning the strength of their labour force, the extent of their business, the financial position for some years, the capital invested, the precise nature of the business, the position regarding reserves, dividends declared and future prospects of the company, the Tribunal found that it was unable to rely on them as comparable concerns.\n\nHolding it impossible in the circumstances to apply the principle of industry-cum-region basis, the Tribunal turned to a consideration of the financial capacity of the company to bear an additional burden.\n\n..,\n\nI-..\n\n~ •\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS v. WORKME; N (Pathak J.)\n\nI 71\n\nfn this connection, it proceeded on the footing that the appellant was a separate and independent division of Tata Sons Limited and had no \"functional integrality\" with the other .divisions.\n\nHaving regard tcJ the net profits earned by the appellant from 1968 to 1977 it found that the acceptance of the demands of the. Union would result in an increased burden of Rs. 7 crores, a burden which would dry up the appellant's resources and would be impossible for it to bear.\n\nThe Union modified its demands but even the modified terms, according to the Tribunal, appeared to be on the high side inasmuch as the resulting total burden of Rs. 1. 70 crores was much higher than the average profits could sustain.\n\nThe particular character of the appellant, tha~ it was a service industry and not a manufacturing concern, was taken into account and it was observed that unlike a manufacturing business there was little scope for diversification in the case of an engineering! consultllncy,, Nonetheless, the Tribunal obseyved, ther~ was eveey reason to expect that the appellant would be able to earn sound profits in the future, and the instability in its business activities occasioned by the turbulent political situation in Iran, would be, it was expected, compensated by contracts secured in different developing countries.\n\nFor the purpose of determining the financial capacity of the appellant, the Tribunal followed Unichem Laboratories v. Their Workmen(')\n\nwhere it was held that the gross profits should be computed without maiking deductions on account of taxation, development rebate and depreciation.\n\nIt decided also that there was no ground for deductin, i?l the notional value of gratuity.\n\nRevising the figures on that basis, it computed the annual gross profits for the years! 1968 to 19n and determined the annual average at Rs. 26.69 lakhs.\n\nThe Tribunal took note of the elaborate scales of wages already existing in the wage structure of the appellant and decided \"to modify the existing structure of the scales with flat increases in each category.\" It also observed that the category of Draughtsmen needed a special increase.\n\nBut it rejected the demand of the Union for dearness allowance on the basis of a slab system, because that would have imposed an unacceptable burden on the appellant's financial capacity and thi:re was no reason why theexisting scheme of dearness allowance should be disturbed when a substantial increase was being made in the level of the basic wage.\n\nTaking into account the circumstance that besides the staff of 306 workmen represented by the Union there were several other employees who would also have to be paid, the Tribunal considered it fair, in paragraph 23 of the award, to give a flat increase of Rs. 150/- in the category of Draughtsmen and Rs. 100/-\n\nin the case of other categories. It rejected the demand of the Union\n\n(I) [1972] I L.L.J. 576.\n\n12-1281SCI/80\n\nfor abolishing the Efficieny Bar, but the span cif 15 years for oorningi increment was expanded in some grades to 20 years and some adjustments were also made in specific grades.\n\nThe Tribunal also noted that after the salllries of the employees had been fixed in the respective scales, senior employees would have to be given some more incrern~'llt~ in the new scales according to their completed years of service. Taking\n\nall these factors into consideration, it made an award dated 20th December, 1978 prescribing the following revision in the existing scales1 of wages:\n\nGrade & Category Existing Grade/Scale.\n\nRevised Grade/\n\nScale\n\nI Peon/Helpor/Sweeper Rs. 250-10-300-EB- Rs. 350-10-450-15- 10-400. 600.\n\nII Driver/Asst!. House-keeper/ Rs. 300-10-420-EB- Rs. 400-15-520-20- Caretaker. 15-540.\n\n660-EB-25-785.\n\nIII Jr. Clerk-cum.-Typist/Jr. Steno/ Rs. 350-15-425-EB- Rs. 450-20-550-25- Tel. Optr./Receptionist/Asstt.\n\n20-625-EB-25-725.\n\n800-EB-30-950.\n\nRecord Keeper/Yeh. Mechanic/ Jr. Librarian. '\n\nIV Sr. Clerk/Steno/Record Keeper/ Rs. 450-20-530-EB- Rs. 550-25-675-30- Tix. Operator/Xerox Operator.\n\n30-860-EB-35-IOOO.\n\n975-EB-40-1175.\n\nV Office Asstt./Lib. Asstt./ Cost Rs. 590-30-740-EB- Rs. 690-35-865-40- Asstt./Administrative Asstt./\n\n35-1020-EB-40-1300\n\n1265-EB-45-1490.\n\nPersonnel Asstt./Comm. Asstt./ Canteen Asstt.\n\nVI Draughtsman/Site Supervisor/ Rs. 380-30-620-40- Rs. 5 30-40-7 30-50- Surveyor/(Diploma Holder).\n\n1020-EB-50-1320.\n\n1230-EB-60-1530.\n\nVII Junior Architect Rs. 760-40-1000-50- Rs. 860-50-1160-60- (Engineering Graduate) 1300. 1700.\n\nVIII Sr. Draughtsman (Diploma Rs. 1000-50-1300-60- Rs. 1100-60-1340-70- Holder)\n\n1600-7S-1750. 1690-80-2010.\n\nThe Tribunal maintained the existing schemes of dearness allowance and house rent allowance, and observed that in viw of the revised basic wages there would be a resultant increase in the dearness allowance and house rent allowance.\n\nThe revised wage scales, the Tribunal directed, should take effect retrospectively from 1st January, 1976. It also laid down th~ principle enabling the actual fitment of the workmen in their respective H wage scales as on that date and also provided for the number of increments to which they would be entitled having regard to the period of completed service.\n\n-..\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS v. WORKME, N (Pathak J.) 173\n\nTwo days after the award was made, an application was made by A the Union stating :\n\n\"In the said award, your Honour has observed, at the end of para 22, \"In view of the increase that is, being allowed in the basic pa, y, I do not propose to revise the existing scheme of Dearness Allowance.\" Further, it appears that the Tribunal intended to grant the increase of Rs. 150/- to each draughtsman and Rs. 100/- 1 to all other workmen in their basic pay.\n\nHowever, this is not clearly mentioned anywhere in the award due to accidental slip or omission.\"\n\n~The Union prayed that the position may be clarified and the award corrected accordingly.\n\nOn the same date, the Tribunal disposed o~ the application by the following order :\n\n\"There can be no doubt that a flat increase of Rs. 150/- to each of the employees in the category of Draftsmen and of Rs. 100/- to each employee in the other categories has been granted under my award.\n\nThe same has been made clear in paragraph No. 23, but it appears that the words \"to eacl1 employee\" after the figure \"Rs. 150/-\" were omitted.\n\nSimilarly, the same words \"to each employee\" after the figure\n\n\"100\" were omitted. When the award is sent for publication, a necessary corrigendum be made in the award and the aforesaid words after the figures1 Rs. 150/- and Rs. l 00/- be added. It may be mentioned that only from that point of view viz. to grant fiat increase of Rs. 150/- and of Rs. 100/- to the empl9yees in the category of Draftsmen and the other categories respectively that a burden statement was called for from the company and the same was submitted (vide Ex. C-51). The fitment has also to be done only after the fiat increase is added to the present basic salary of each employee. I do not think that any problem would oarise for interpretation of the award. Since\n\nthe award has been already signed, I do not think anything further can be added to this award.\n\nsd/- K. N. Wani\n\nINDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL.\"\n\nIn this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant had covered\n\na wide field, but in the end he stoates that the appellant is aggrieved H by two matters only. One is the retrospectivity attached to the revised wage scales, and the other is the fiat increase given to each\n\n-----~~ ---\n\nA employee of Rs. 150/- in the category of Draughtsmen and Rs. 100/-\n\nin other categories resulting from the order dated 22nd December, 1978.\n\nThe workmen have filed an appeal by special leave, Civil Appeal No. 2300 of 1979, in which they have challenged the rejection by the B Tribunal of their claim in respect of dearness allowance which, they contend, should be pegged to the cost of living index and should not be a fixed amount.\n\nConsidering the appeal of Tata. Consulting Engineers first, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that having rega\" to the financial capacity of the appellant the Tribunal erred in making , the wage scales retrospective and, in any event, in ranging the retrospectivity back to 1st January, 1976. We have been taken through some of the material on the record in the attempt to support the contention, but after giving careful thought to the matter, I think there is ample justification for what the Tribunal did.\n\nIt must be remembered that although the wage scales were introduced as long agd as 1973 they were maintained at that level except for a >light revision some time thereafter.\n\nNo dearness allowance was paid until the beginning of 1977 and the house rent allowance also was introduced about that time. The cost of living had gone on increasing from 1972 onwards and, as the Tribunal has found, the dearness allowance! and house rent allowance made no appreciable impact in neutralising! the increasing cost.\n\nDuring all these years, the appellant had continued to enjoy increasing profits; nonetheless the emoluments received by the workmen did not receive the impress of the appellant's growingi prosperity. The Charter of Demands was presented by the Union in July, 1974 and when conciliation proceedings fuiled the State Government made the reference to the Industrial Tribunal in 1975. The Tribunal has referred to various 'considerations which prevailed with..J it in giving retrospectivity to the revised pay scales. They are consi•\n\nderations which cannot be ignored.\n\nAccordingly, the contention raised on behalf of the appellant against retrospectivity of the wage scales must be rejected.\n\nThe challenge embodied in the second contention against the amendment of the award is more serious. It is urged that the amendment results in the inclusion of a flat increase of Rs. 150/- to each • workman in the case of Draughtsman and Rs. 100 /- to each workman in the case of othclr categories, a result wholly unwarranted, it H is said, by the intent of the original award and, therefore, falling beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In making the application of 22nd December, 1978, the Union invoked the jurisdiction of the\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS v. WORKMEN (Pathak J.) 17 5\n\nTribunal under rule 31 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, A\n\n1957. Rule 31 provides:\n\n\"3 l. The Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may correct any clerical mistake or error arising from an accidental slip or omission in any award it or he issues.\"\n\nThe jurisdiction given to the Tribunal by rule 31 is closely circumscribed. It is only 11 clerical mistake or error which c.-an be corrected, and the clerical mistake or error must arise from an accidental slip or omission in the award.\n\nAn 11ecidental slip or omission implies that. something was intended and contrary to that intention wlrat should t have been included has ben included or what should have been included has been omitted. It must be a mistake or error amenable to clerical correction only. It must not be a mistake or error which calls for rectification by modification of the conscious adjudication;\n\non the issues involved.\n\nIs the instant case one where the amendmept made by the Tribunal in the original award can be said to correct a mere clerical mistake or error arising from an acciden!'al slip or omission? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine the basis of the award a.nd the intent which flows from that basis.\n\nThe terms of reference in the State Qovernment's order required the Tribunal to revise the scales of pay and dearness allowance, and there was no mention of givingi any ad hoc increase in the basic pay of individual workman. It would do well to recall that the claim of the Union filed before the Tribunal also centred on the nee.d to revise the wage scales. Thut was the main issue between the parties. It is to the task of revising the pay scales that the Tribunal addressed itself, and throughout the material part Of the award it is that msk which held its focussed attention.\n\nThe financial capacity of the appellant, and the related study of its annual profits from 1968 to 1977, were examined from that view\n\nint. The sufficien_cy of the existing pay scales was considered in detail, and regard was had to their original structure and the accretions made subsequently by way of dearness allowance and house rent allowance.\n\nFor the purpose of restructuring the P'ay scales the Tribunal ruled on the paying capacity of the appellant, both with reference to the profits of the preceding year as well as the prospects of the future.\n\nThe finandal capacity, as the Tribunal observed, constituted one of \"the principles which are required to be followed in the fixation of the wage structure.\" A clear statement of its inten~ tion is found iri paragraph 22 of the award, where the Tribunal stated :\n\n\"I only propose to modify the existing structures of the scales with flat increases in each category.\"\n\nNo ad hoc increase to the paY of each individual workman was intended.\n\nAnd that is confirmed by what was stated in paragraph 23 of the award:\n\n\"Considering this outgoing the flat increase of Rs. 150/- in the category of Draughtsman and Rs. 100/- in the case of the other categories would be fair.\"\n\nIt will be noted that the pay scales of different categories were being restructured, and the flat increase envisaged there related to an increase in the general pay scales of different categories.\n\nIndividual workmen were not present to the mind of the Tribunal.\n\nThat the increase was ' pertinent to the general pay scales in the revised wage structure is patently clear from a comparison of the existing pay scales and the revised pay scales.\n\nThe compara_tive table of existing pay scales and the revised pay scales has been reproduced earlier. The revised pay scales of all categories, except the category of Draughtsmen, shows an increase of Rs. 100/- in the initial pay fixed in each scale, the increase in the case of the category of Draughtsmen being Rs. 150/-.\n\nThere was only one increase contemplated in the award, in paragraph 23 of award, and it is more than plain that the increase was the one incorporated in the revised pay scales pertaining to different categories.\n\nNo second flat increase was envisaged at all.\n\nThe amendment made by the Tribunal has the effect of providing a second in•' crease, this time to each individual workmen.\n\nIf, as the Tribunal hM stated in the amendment order, the increase in paragraph 23 was intended to apply to each individual workmen, there is nothing in the body of the awdrd to form the foundation on which the actual figures\n\nin the restructured pay scales can be made to rest.\n\nThere will be nq explanation why, the initial start of the revised pay scales has been increased by Rs. 150/- in the case of the category of Draughtsmen and Rs. 100/- in the case of other categories. Considering the fitment of the workmen in the revised scales, it was stated in the award that a workman found drawing a salary less than the beginning of the grade would be stepped up to the beginning of the grade and if his pay fell between two steps in the reclassified pay scales the basic pay was to be fixed at the step higher in the revised scale.\n\nConspicuous by its absence is any reference to a fiat increase in the pay of an individual workmen.\n\nEven when considering the range of permissible retrospectivity the Tribunal stated in the award :\n\n\"In view of the revision of the wage scales, there would be consequent increase in the dearness allowance and the house rent allowance.\"\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS v. WORKMEN (Pathak!.) 177\n\nAnd the clinching circumstances of all is that the award was made on the basis that the overall financial load according to paragraph 3 3 of the award would be to the tune of about Rs. 5 htkhs. It was that figure which the Tribunal had in mind against the backdrop of_ the\n\ngr<M>s annual figures when it made the revised pay scales retrospective from !st January, 1976.\n\nThis liability taken with the liability accruing on the need to increase the salaries of the other staff determined the Tribunal's deliberations in regard to the several fea.tures of the award, including the grant of increments rellited to completed periods of ervice, the expansion of the span from 15 years to 20 years' for .< earning increments, and other benefits. It cannot be the case oi the\n\nUnion that the figure of Rs. 5 lakhs mentioned in paragraph 33 o~ the award represented the result of adding a flat increase to the pay of each workman in addition to the benefits .conferred by the revised pay scales and other awarded reliefs. ·\n\nIn its order of 22nd December, 1978, the Tribunal has referred to the statement (Exhibit C-51) filed by the appellant when called upon to indicate the increased financial burden apprehended by it.\n\nThe Tribunal has relied on this statement as evidence showing tha~ the appellant knew that a flat increase of Rs. 150/- and Rs. 100/- was intended to each of the employees in the category of Draughtsmen and the other categories. In so construing the statement, Exhibit C-51, the Tribunal has grievously erred. It seems from a perusal of the document, Exhibit C-51, that it is a statement giving trial figures of the increased financial load on different bases.\n\nOn the basis that a sum of Rs. 150/- per month was added to the pay of each Draughtsman and a sum of Rs. 100/- was added to the pay of every other workman, who belonged to the Union staff, the financial load would increase to Rs. 9,22,032/-. Likewise, if a flat increase of Rs. 100/- was given to individual workmen of all categories, including Draughts- men, the increased financial load would total Rs. 7,64,256/-.\n\nThe statement then goes on to indicate that if a flat increase of Rs. 75/- per month were given to individual workmen of all categ9ries the toi'al increase would be Rs. 5,78,220/-.\n\nAgain, if the flat increase is Rs. 65 /- per month to the individual workmen of all categories, the additional load would total Rs. 4,97,772/·. Finally, on the basis that the individual Draughtsman would be given an increase of Rs. 75/- per month and the individual workmen of other categories Rs. 50/- per month, the additional load was calculated at Rs. 4,63,092/-.\n\nIt will be noted that the statement, Exhibit C-51, was prepared on the basis of the employees' strength as in December, 1971. A similar statement was prepared on the basis of the employees' strength as in Septeriber, 1978.\n\nThese statements cannot be regarded as evidenctj\n\n--- ----~--!!:O:r~~----- Sl'T ~-\n\nthat the appefunt was cognizant of the intention of the Tribunal to provide a fiat increase to the pay of each workman.\n\nThe statement. afforded an indication merely of what the additional financial load would be if a fiat increase was given to the individual workman on the alternative basis set forth therein.\n\nNone of the alternatives was actually adopted by the Tribunal, because when the award was made the Tribunal proceeded instead to restructure the wage scales by the addition of Rs. 150/· in the case of the category of Draughtsmen and Rs. 100/- in the case of other categories to thf! initial pay in the wage scales pertaining to those categories. The \"addition was integrated as a feature of the wage scales; it was not regarded as an addition to the pay of each individual workman.\n\nIt seems that the Tribunal was betrayed by a CU!\"ious confusion in accepting the plea of thi Union that ii fiat increase to the pay of each workman was intended in the original wage and, consequently, it fell into the error of amending the awrd. The evidence contained in the award throughout provides incontrovertible proof thatl this flat increase was never originally intended in the award. The amendment! has, resulted in tho Tribunal making, as it were, a supplementary award, whereby a further relief is being granted beyond that granted in the origimtl award.\n\nThe original award was completed and signed by the Tribunal, and it cannot be reopened now except for the lin1ited purpose of Rule 31. In travelling outside and beyond the terms of the original award, the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error.\n\nOur attention has been drawn to what purports to be an endorsement by counsel for the appellant on the application dated 22nd December, 1978 filed by the Union before the Tribunal to the effect that the appellant\n\nwould submit to whatever the Tribunal decided, and it is urged that the appellant is bound by the order made on the application. It is an accepted principle that consent by a party cannot confer jurisdiction on a court.\n\nWhat is without jurisdiction will remain so. In the circumstances the order of 22nd December, 1978 is invalid so far as it amends paragraph 23 of the original award.\n\nThe corrigendum amending the award in consequence is liable to be quashed. The second contention of the appellant is entitled to succeed.\n\nI shall now consider Civil Appeal No. 2300 of 1979 filed by the workmen.\n\nThe only contention of the workmen is that the Tribunal should have fixed the dearness allowance in communion with the costi of living index. It is wrong in principle, it is said, to provide a fixed dearness allowance.\n\nReliance was placed on The llindustali, Times Ltd., New Delhi v.\n\nTheir Workmen(') where it was observed by this Court that dearness allowance should no~\n\n(1) [1964] I S.C.R. 234, 247.\n\n~.\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS V, WORKMEN 179 (Chinnappa Reddy !.) remain fixed at any figure but should be on a sliding scal€l A in order to neutralise a portion of the increase in the cost of living.\n\nReference was also' made to Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Limited v. Its Workmen(~). Now, it is not a universal rule that the dearness allowance should in all cases be. correlated with the cost of living index.\n\nThe Tribunal, in th~ present case, considered the matter and found it sufficient and in accord with justice that the wage scales should be restructured with suitable increments provided therein. It noted that dearness allowance was being granted by the! appellant at 10% of the salary subject to a minimum of Rs. 50/· and •· house rent allowance at 30% of the basic salary.\n\nHaving resard to the not inconsiderable improvement in the level of the basic wage, it observed that there would be a consequent increaso in the dearness\\ allowance and house rent allowance. In view of thC: increase so secured, the Tribunal rejected the suggestion that a slab system should be introduced in the dearness allowance or that there should be any other modification of the principle on which dearness allowance wail being presently granted.\n\nIt declared that the cumulative efiect of an improved wage structure together with dearnesli.allowa11ce operating on a slab system would throw an impossibl~ burden of about Rs. 1 crore on the financial capacity of tho appellant.\n\nIt W11S open to the Tribunal to adopt the position which it did. It the dearness allowance is. >Jinked with the cost of living index th~ whole award will have t<> be reopened and the entire basis on which it has been made will have to be recon\n\nsidered.\n\nThe award is a composite document in which the severa] elements of increased wage scales, larger increments, longer span ot 20 years for earning increments, dearness allowance at 10% of the basic wage, besides several other benefits, have been integrated into a, balanced arrangement in keeping with what the Tribunal has found to be the financial capacity of the appellant. It is not possible to ' maintain one part of the award and supersede another.\n\nAccordingly, the appeal filed by the workmen must fail.\n\nIn the result, Civil Appeal No. 2299 of 1979 is allowed in part insofar that the order dated 22nd December, 1978 of the Industria~ Tribunal, Maharashtra Bombay is quashed to the extent that it modifies the original award dated 20th December, 1978, and the corrigendum made consequent thereto is also quashed.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2300 of 1979 is dismissed.\n\nThere is no order as to costs.\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nWe have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by our learned brother Pathak, J. we agree with\n\n(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 113.\n\nhim that Civil Appeal No. 2300 of 1979 should be dismissed.\n\nWe also agree with him that Civil Appeal No. 2299 of 1979 should also be dismissed iu so far as it relates to the award dated December 20,\n\n1978. However, we do not agree' with our learned brother that Civil Appeal No. 2299 of 1979 should be allowed iu so far aQ it relates to the order dated December 22, 1978 of the Industrial Tribunal which purports to correct the award dated December 20,\n\n1978. In our opinion Civil Appeal No. 2299 of 1979' should be dismissed in its entirety.\n\nWe do not propose to give our reasons to the e.tent we are iu agreement with Pathak, J. and we propose to state our reasons for the C disagreement only.\n\nIt is needless to recapitulate all the basic facts which have been set out in the judgment of Pathak, J.\n\nThe Award of the Industrial Tribunal was made on December 20, 1978. On December 22, 1978, that is to say, two days after the Award was made and when everything must Ii.ave been fresh to the minds of the Tribunal, the respective parties and their Advocates, the, employees Union made, an applicati0!1i under Rule 31 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 seeking a correction of an error, which it was claimed, had crept into the Award.\n\nThe application was as follows : \"In the above reference yonr honour was pleased to pass an award on 20th December, 1978.\n\nIn the said award, Your Honour has observed, at the end of Para 22, 'In vie\"\". of the increase that is being allowed in the basic pay, I do not propose, to revise the existing scheme of Dearness Allowance'.\n\nFurther, it appears that the Tribunal intended to grant the increase of Rs. 150/- to each drnnghtsman and Rs. 100/- to all other workmen in their basic pay.\n\nHowever, this is not clearly mentioned anywhere in the award due to accidental slip or omission.\n\nThe Union therefore prays the honourable Tribunal to clarify the position and correct the award accordingly\".\n\nOn this application, the Advocate for the employer company made the following endorsement :\n\n\"Submitted to whatever this Hon'ble Tribunal desires to do\".\n\nThereafter the Tribunal made an order on the same day in the follw H ing terms:\n\n\"There can be no doubt that a flat increase of Rs. 1 SO/· to each of the employees in the category of Draftsme~ and\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS V. WORKMEN\n\nI BI ( Chinnappa Reddy !.) of Rs. 100/- to each employee in the O'ther categories has been granted under my award.\n\nThe same has been made clear in paragraph No. 23, but it appears that the words \"to each employee\" after the figure \"Rs. 150/-\" were omitted.\n\nSimilarly, the same words \"to each employee\" after the figure \"100\" were omitted.\n\nWhen the award is sent for publication, a necessary corrigendum be made in the award and the aforesaid words after the figures Rs. 150/- and Rs. l 00/- be added. It may be mentioned that only from that point of view viz. to grant flat increase of Rs. 150/- and of Rs. 100/- to the employees in the category of Draftsmen and the other categories respectively that a burden statement was called for from the company and the same was submitted (vide Ex. C-51).\n\nThe fitment has also to be done onl)I after the fiat increase is added to the present basic salary of each employee.\n\nI do not think that any: problem would arise for interpretation of the award.\n\nSince the award has hem already signed, do not think anything further can be added to this award\".\n\nThis order was made in the presence of Shri Manak Gagrat, Advocate for the Company and Shri N. P. Mehta, Advocate for the workmen.\n\nThe endorsement made on the application by the Advocate 'for the company does not indicate that the company had any objection to the E award being corrected as sought by the employees union.\n\nOn the other hand the endorsement reads as if there was tacit agreement on the part of the Company to the correction sought by the union.\n\nThe order dated December 22, 1978 of the Tribunal also does not reveal that there was any opposition by the company to the application for correcting the award.\n\nEven so we propose to examine whether the F correction sought by the employees, union was within. th<J bounds of the authority of the Tribunal or whether it was, in effect, a fresh award.\n\nThe primary and basic question considered by the Industrial Tribunal, in making the award dated December 20, 1978 was the ques\" tion a& revision of the wage-scales.\n\nImplicit and intrinsically connect- G ed with the question of revision of the wage-scales were the questions of fitment of employees into the' wage-scales and flat or ad-hoc increase of salaries of workmen wherever considered necessary.\n\nIt. cannot possibly be doubted that an Industrial Tribunal deciding upon the wagescales of the employees of an establishment would have full liberty to\n\npropose ad-hoc increase of salaries as part of the revision of wages. ff Nor can it be doubted that fitment int() the revised pay scales' is certainly a part of the revision of pay scales.\n\nThis in our opinion is\n\nelementat:y and fundamental to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in revising wage-scales.\n\nIn the present case the Industrial Tribunal on a consideration of the material placed before it came to the conclusion that the company was in an ur.doubted position to bear the additional financial burden.\n\nAt the encl of paragraph 15 of the Award, the Tribunal stated : \"But there can be no doubt that the company can very well bear the additional burden.\n\nThe question is what should be the extent of such a burden?\" At the end of paragraph 18 of the award the 'Tribunal said: \"A mere reading of Exhibit U-15 will immediately dispel thtj mis-givings about the future of the present company.\n\nFor some years to come this is likely to be one of the few Consulting Engineers who will be securing major contracts\".\n\nAgain in Paragraph 19 it was said: \"I have no doubt that the present Company would be able to bear the additional burden for the years to come.\n\nThis is further borne out from the trading results of the Company for the, year 1968-69 to 1977.\n\nThe profits have increased all along.\n\nThe copy of the letter datecJ July 23, 1973, alongwith the Annexures from the Company to the Director General, Posts & Telegraphs, Delhi (Ex. C-27) indicates the important projects the Company was handling in India and abroad, and the amount of foreign exchange earned and repatriated.\n\nI will; therefore, proceed on the ground that the present Company can bear the additional financial burden\".\n\nFinally at the end of paragraph 21 the Tribunal said : \"In view of thi~ position, the Company can easily bear some burden that might fall as a result of the upward revision of the wage-scales.\n\nThe question is to what extent the relief should be giveu to the employees ?\"\n\nAfter expressing himself in categoric terms about the capacity of ·-.f the company to bear the additional financia~ burden, the Tribunal went on to say : \"I only propose to modify the existing 5tructure of the scales with flat increases in each category\".\n\nThe Tribunal then con- G sidered the question whether Draftsmen should get a higher flat increase and the question whether the existing scheme of Dearness Allowance should be revised.\n\nThe Tribunal then observed : \" ..... . the flat increase of Rs. 150/- in the category of Draftsmen and Rs. 100/- in the case of the other categories would be fair''. Thereafter various other matters were considered and finally the Tribunal H revised the wage scales in the manner already mentioned by my brother Pathak, J.\n\nThe question of \"Fitment\" was then considered in the following manner :\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS V. WORKMEN\n\n(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n\"34. Fitment :-\n\nIf as on !st January, 1976, an employee is drawing a salary less than the beginning of the respective grade, he should be first stepped up to the beginning of the grade. If the pay of an employee does not coincide with any step in the revised pay scale, and falls between two steps in the reclassified pay scales, the basic pay of that employee! shall be fixed at the step higher in the revised scale.\n\n35. After fixing the salary of the employees in the scales as above, the employees should be given increments1 in, the new scales as noted below :-\n\n(i) Employees who have completed 5 years or. more as on 1st January, 197 6, 3, increments.\n\n(ii) Employees who have completed 4 years of service as on !st January, 1976, 2 increments.\n\n(iii) All other employees with more than one year's ser- D vice shall be given one increment\".\n\nNow, if, without any flat or ad hoc increase of salary, the workmen were to be fitted into the revised scales of pay, it would obviously result in •erious anomalous situations.\n\nIn the case of several senior employees, the revised scale would yield but a very small and almost a token increase in the size of the pay packet whereas the junior employees would get a large benefit.\n\nWhile workmen raising industrial disputes for revision of wage-scales are certainly minded about their future prospects in the matter of wages, they, surely would be more concerned with the immediate benefits accrning to them That was why the Industrial Tribunal thooght that an all round !lat increase of Rs. 150/- in the case of Draftsmen and Rs. 100/- in the case of other workmen was called for.\n\nIt was clearly so intended by the Tribunal as is evident from the reference to \"flat increase of Rs. 150/~ in the, category of Draftsmen and Rs. 100/- in the case of the other ca; tegories''.\n\nSince there was to be a' flat increase of Rs. 150/- and Rs. 100/- in the case of draftsmen and other workmen respectively, the revised wage scale had necessarily to commence with fignres Rs. 150/- and Rs. 100/- above the existing wage scales.\n\nImmediately after the award was pronounced, while the iron was still hot as it were, the employees apparently realised that the employer might take advantage of the circumstance that it was not clearly mentioned in, the award that all the employees were to get additional pay of Rs. 150/- and Rs. 100/• respectively and might contend that the Tribunal had only revised the wage scales by increasing the salary on entry into the service and restructuring the scale of pay and never granted any ad hoc increase of salary to all employees.\n\nTherefore, they filed an application before the Tribunal for correcting the award so as to bring out what was intended.\n\nAs it has now turned out what the employees apparently suspected the employer might contend, is precisely what the employer is not contending, though the employer did not choose to so contend before the Industrial Tribunal itself when the employees filed the application for rectification.\n\nThe application before the Tribunal was filed under Rule 31 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Rules 1957, which is as follows :\n\n\"A Bqard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, at any time, suo moto or on an application made by any of the parties concerned, may correct any clerical mistake or error arising from an accidental slip or omission: in any proceedings, report, award or as the case may be, decision\".\n\nThe omission of the words to each employee first after the figure Rs. 150/- and again after the figure Rs. 100/- was clearly an accidental slip oc omission which the Tribunal was entitled to correct. We\n\nare unable to see how it can be held to be otherwise.\n\nWe ar~ not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the Company that the corrigendum was in effect a fresh award'.\n\nWe, therefore, see no ground for quashing the order dated December 22, 1978 of the Tribunal.\n\nThe result of the foregoing discussion is that Civil Appeal No. 2299 of 1979 has to he dismissed in its entirety.\n\nWe have already indicated that we agree with our brother Pathak, J., 'that the appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2300 of 1979) filed by the workmen should also be dismissed.\n\nWhile we find lot of force in the F submission of Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the workmeri that Dearness Allowance Jinked to cost of living index is ordinarily the best and the most scientific method of computing dearnes~ allowance, it cannot always be said that au illegality warranting interference under Article 136 is committed if some other method is' adopted. The G Tribunal has given satisfactory reason for adopting a different model and we are not disposed to interfere with the award of the; Tribunal.\n\nIn the result both the appeals are dismissed without any order as to\n\ncosts.\n\nORDER\n\nIn view of the opinion of the majority both the appeals are dismissed and there is no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "November 13, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS\n\nWORKMEN EMPLOYED AND VICE-VERSA\n\nNovember 13, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK & 0."}}, {"text": "Tata Consulting Engineers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "concu1Ting)\n\n(1) Having regard to the financial capacity of M/s. Tata Consulting Engineers, the appellant, and the , material on the record and the various olher considerations \\rhich prevailed with the Tribunal, the granting of revised wa.ge scales is in order."}}, {"text": "[1964] 1 SCR 234", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4090, "end_char": 4106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st January, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was that figure which the Tribunal had in mind against the backdrop of the gross annual figures when it made the revised pay scales restrospective from 1st January, 1976."}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Redd)', J. (Majority view, Iyer and Reddy, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8113, "end_char": 8118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Redd)', J. (Majority view, Iyer and Reddy, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "December 22, 19i8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8142, "end_char": 8159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order dated December 22, 19i8 of the IndustriaJ. Tribunal which purports to correct the award dated December 20, 1978 cannot be considered in effect to be a fresh award and it is in order."}}, {"text": "IndustriaJ. Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8167, "end_char": 8187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order dated December 22, 19i8 of the IndustriaJ. Tribunal which purports to correct the award dated December 20, 1978 cannot be considered in effect to be a fresh award and it is in order."}}, {"text": "Draughtsmen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10274, "end_char": 10285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "150/~ in the case of Draughtsmen and Rs.", "canonical_name": "Draughtsmen"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10707, "end_char": 10718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, Manick K. Gagrat, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Manick K. Gagrat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11164, "end_char": 11180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, Manick K. Gagrat, J. B. Dadachanji, 0.", "canonical_name": "Manick K. Gagrat"}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11182, "end_char": 11198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, Manick K. Gagrat, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11201, "end_char": 11212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, Manick K. Gagrat, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11217, "end_char": 11227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and K. J. John for the Appellants in CA No."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11294, "end_char": 11308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P. H. Parekh, S. R. !", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11310, "end_char": 11322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P. H. Parekh, S. R. !"}}, {"text": "S. R. !Deshpande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11324, "end_char": 11340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P. H. Parekh, S. R. !"}}, {"text": "Manik Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11350, "end_char": 11364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deshpande and Miss Manik Tarkunde for the Respondents in CA 2299 and Appellants in CA No."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11475, "end_char": 11481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J .-This appeal by special leave has been preferred by E Tata Consultancy Engineers against an award dated 20th December, 1978 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Bombay revising the wage scales of certain categories of employees and granting various other benefits.", "canonical_name": "PATHAK"}}, {"text": "Tata Consultant Engineers", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11756, "end_char": 11781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Consultant Engineers, at its inception, was a partnership firm but subsequently the partnership was dissolved and in 1974 the undertaking became one of the divisions of Tata Sons Limited.", "canonical_name": "Tata Consultant Engineers"}}, {"text": "Tata Sons Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11930, "end_char": 11947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Consultant Engineers, at its inception, was a partnership firm but subsequently the partnership was dissolved and in 1974 the undertaking became one of the divisions of Tata Sons Limited."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12186, "end_char": 12192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out\n\nof 665 employees at Bombay, the draftsmen and the administrative staff number 306."}}, {"text": "Tata Consultant Employees Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12282, "end_char": 12313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These workmen are members of the Tata Consultant Employees Union."}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12528, "end_char": 12536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iran", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13370, "end_char": 13374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the political uncertainty in Iran which had placed an appreciable part of the appellant's business in jeopardy and to various other factors, peculiar to an engineering consultancy business, beyond the appellant's control There was fierce competition also, it was asserted, from other similar organisations."}}, {"text": "20th December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18978, "end_char": 18997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking\n\nall these factors into consideration, it made an award dated 20th December, 1978 prescribing the following revision in the existing scales1 of wages:\n\nGrade & Category Existing Grade/Scale."}}, {"text": "K. N. Wani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22746, "end_char": 22756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sd/- K. N. Wani\n\nINDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL.\""}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23191, "end_char": 23210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100/-\n\nin other categories resulting from the order dated 22nd December, 1978."}}, {"text": "Tata. Consulting Engineers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23532, "end_char": 23558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Considering the appeal of Tata."}}, {"text": "Draughtsman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25456, "end_char": 25467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "150/- to each • workman in the case of Draughtsman and Rs.", "canonical_name": "Draughtsmen"}}, {"text": "Industria~ Tribunal, Maharashtra Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39387, "end_char": 39426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2299 of 1979 is allowed in part insofar that the order dated 22nd December, 1978 of the Industria~ Tribunal, Maharashtra Bombay is quashed to the extent that it modifies the original award dated 20th December, 1978, and the corrigendum made consequent thereto is also quashed."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39654, "end_char": 39669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nWe have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by our learned brother Pathak, J. we agree with\n\n(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 113."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39758, "end_char": 39764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nWe have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by our learned brother Pathak, J. we agree with\n\n(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 113.", "canonical_name": "PATHAK"}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 113", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 39788, "end_char": 39807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 20, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40664, "end_char": 40681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is needless to recapitulate all the basic facts which have been set out in the judgment of Pathak, J.\n\nThe Award of the Industrial Tribunal was made on December 20, 1978."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40686, "end_char": 40703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 22, 1978, that is to say, two days after the Award was made and when everything must Ii.ave been fresh to the minds of the Tribunal, the respective parties and their Advocates, the, employees Union made, an applicati0!1i under Rule 31 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 seeking a correction of an error, which it was claimed, had crept into the Award."}}, {"text": "Manak Gagrat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43292, "end_char": 43304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was made in the presence of Shri Manak Gagrat, Advocate for the Company and Shri N. P. Mehta, Advocate for the workmen.", "canonical_name": "Manick K. Gagrat"}}, {"text": "N. P. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43340, "end_char": 43351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was made in the presence of Shri Manak Gagrat, Advocate for the Company and Shri N. P. Mehta, Advocate for the workmen."}}, {"text": "July 23, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45961, "end_char": 45974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The copy of the letter datecJ July 23, 1973, alongwith the Annexures from the Company to the Director General, Posts & Telegraphs, Delhi (Ex."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46062, "end_char": 46067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The copy of the letter datecJ July 23, 1973, alongwith the Annexures from the Company to the Director General, Posts & Telegraphs, Delhi (Ex."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46140, "end_char": 46145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C-27) indicates the important projects the Company was handling in India and abroad, and the amount of foreign exchange earned and repatriated."}}, {"text": "TATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47440, "end_char": 47465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter various other matters were considered and finally the Tribunal H revised the wage scales in the manner already mentioned by my brother Pathak, J.\n\nThe question of \"Fitment\" was then considered in the following manner :\n\nTATA CONSULTING ENGINEERS V. WORKMEN\n\n(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n\"34.", "canonical_name": "Tata Consultant Engineers"}}, {"text": "1st January, 197 6, 3,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48126, "end_char": 48148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "more as on 1st January, 197 6, 3, increments."}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Disputes Rules 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50587, "end_char": 50624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51766, "end_char": 51780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While we find lot of force in the F submission of Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the workmeri that Dearness Allowance Jinked to cost of living index is ordinarily the best and the most scientific method of computing dearnes~ allowance, it cannot always be said that au illegality warranting interference under Article 136 is committed if some other method is' adopted.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52031, "end_char": 52042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_1_51_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "W AMAN RAO & ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nMay 9, 1980/November 13, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA JyER,\n\nV. D. TULZAPURK, AR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nMaharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 of 1961 as aniended by Amendtnent Acts 21 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976-Whether violates Articles 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution-Right to challenge, if a consti tutional provision wliich deprives any person/ citizen of the benefit and protec aon of Article.J 14, 19 and 31 is invalid, any law on the ground it is inconsis tent with or :that it takes away or abridges the right conferred by Part Ill of the Constitution-Constitution of India, Article 13(2), scope of-Constitution ali; y of .Articles 31A, 31B and the unamended Article 31C of the Constitut.fon Doctrine ci stare decisis, applicability to Articles 3 lA & 31 B-l-Iouse of the People (Extensioll of Duration) Act (30 of 1976) section 2 and House of the People (Exti'nsion of Duration) Act (Act 109 of 1976) section 2-Proclaniation of Emergency dated Decen1ber 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975, Constitution (Fortie1h Amendment) Act, 1976-Validity of.\n\nA ceiling on agriculturaJ holdings v.•as imposed in Maharashtra by the ùlaharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 27 of 1961, which\n\nW<l:l brought into operation on January 26, 1962.\n\nThe ceiling fixed by the Act (Principal Act) was lov\"ered and certain other amendments ¥.'ere made to tlrnt Act by Acts 27 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976.\n\nThe validity of 1hcse Acts was challenged in the Bombay High Court.\n\nThe Division Bench at Nagpur repelled that challenge by its judgment dated August 13, 1976 in Vd!ialrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. Slate of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 Bombay 99.\n\nTI1e appeals filed against the said decision were dismissed by the Supreme Court by its judgment in Dattanaya GO\\'ind Mahajan v.\n\nStale of Maharashtra, [19771 2 SCR 790.\n\nThe only point urged in these appeals \\\\1as that the Jlrincipal Act, as amended, was void .. being violative of the second pro viso to Article 3lA(1), tn so far as it created an artificial \"family unit\" and fixed the unit on the agricultural holdings on such family units.\n\nThe argu n1ent that the violation of the particular proviso deprived the impugned laws of the protection conferred. by Article 3 lA \\vas rejected by the Cotut on the view 1bat even if the impugned provisions were violative of the second proviso they y-; ould receive the protection of Article 31B by reason of the inclusion of the Principal Act and the amending Acts in the Ninth Schedule.\n\nThe Court con£idered whether, in fact, the provisions of the impugned Acts Vi'ere violative of the second proviso and held that it was entirely for the Legislature to decide\n\nwhat policy to adopt for the purpose of restructuring the agrarian system and the Court could not assume the role of an economic adviser for pronouncing\n\nupon the wisdom of such policy.\n\nThe second proviso to Article 31A(l} was\n\ntherefore held not to have been contravened.\n\n'fhe judgment of this Court in these appeals \\Vas delivered on January 27, 1977 while the proclamation of emergency was in operation.\n\nOn the revoca ticn of that proclamation, petitions were filed in this Court by the appellants\n\nA praying for the review of the judgment in Dattaraya Govind Mahajan on\n\nrhe ground that .several contentions, which were otherwise open to them for\n\nassailing the constitutional validity of the impugned Acts, could not be made\n\nby reason of the emergency and that they should be permitted to make those\n\ncontentions since the emergency was lifted.\n\nFresh Writ Petitions were also\n\nfiled in this Court in \\Vhich those contentions were put forward.\n\nThe Court\n\nacceded to the request for the review and hence the peititions.\n\nB Dismissing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : (Majority view)\n\nPer Chandrachud, C.J. (On his O\\Vll behalf and on behalf of Krishna Iyer,\n\nTulzapurkar and Sen, JJ.)\n\nC A. (I) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced\n\nArticle 31A into the Constitution with retrospective effect and sec. 3 of the\n\nConstitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 \\vhich substituted a new clause (lJ, subclauses (a) to (e) for the original clause (1) with retrospective effect,\n\ndo not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or\n\nits basic structure and are valid and constitutional being within the constituent\n\npower of the Parliament. [9 F-G=45 H, 46 A-BJ\n\n(2) The Agricultural Ceiling Acts, fall squareĥy within the terms of clause\n\n(a) of Article 31A(I). Those Acts provide for the extinguisbment and modi\n\nfication of rights in an ''estate'\", the expression \"estate\" being defined by\n\nclause (2) (a) (iii) to mean \"any land held or let for purposes of agriculrure or for purposes ancillary thereto . . .... \".\n\nIt must follow, as a necessary\n\ncoroJlary, that the. impugned Acts are entitled to the protection of Article E 3JA(l )(a} with the result that their provisions cannot be deemed, and there\n\nfore cannot be declared, to be void on the ground that they are inconsistent\n\n'vith or tale away or ::bridge any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19\n\nor 31. [17 A-CJ\n\n(3) If a constitutional provision, which deprives the peuuoners of the\n\nbenefit and protection of Articles 14, 19 and 31 is invalid, the petitioners will\n\nF be entitled to challenge the impugned laws on the ground that they are inĦ\n\nconsistent with or that they ta.ke away or abridge the rights conferred by Part Ill of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 13(2) has a sensitive touchstone.\n\nNot only\n\ndoes it mandate that the State shall not make any law which takes away or\n\nabridges the rights conferred by Part III but, it provides that any law made in\n\ncontravention of the clause shall, to the extent of the contravention. be void.\n\n:r-, fere abridgement, that is to say curtailment, and not necessarily abrogation,\n\nG rthnt is to say total deprivation, is enough to produce the consequence pro\n\nvided for by Article 13(2). (17 C-E]\n\n(4) Though the withdrawal of the application of Articles 14, 19 and 31 in\n\nrespect of laws which fall under clause (a) is total and complete, that is lo say,\n\nthe application of those articles stands abrogated, not mere1y abridged, in resħ\n\npcct of in1pugned enactments \\Vhich indubitably fall within the ambit of clause (a), every ca.se in which the protection of a fundamental right is withdrawn\n\nwill not neceĨsarily' result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the\n\nConstitution.\n\nThe question as to whether the basic structure is damaged or\n\ndestroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular Article of\n\nWAMAN RAO v. UNION 3\n\nPart 111 is in issue and. whether what is withdrawn is quint-essential to the A basic structure of the Constitution. [18 BD]\n\n(5) The true position of Jav..· on the subject of Parliament's power to amend ŝhe Constitution is that though the Parliament has the power to amend each and every Article of the Constitution including the provisions of Part III the amending power cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. [19 G-H] B H. H. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Supp. SCR 1; Stnt.\n\nIndira Nehr11 Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976] 2 SCR 347 and Minerva Mills Ltd.\n\n\\'. Union of India & Ors., [1981] I SCR p. 206, referred to.\n\n(6) If Article 31A were not enacted. so•ne of the main purposes of the Con:; titution would have been delayed and eventually defeated and that by the First Amendment, the constitutional edifice \\Vas not impaired but strengthened.\n\nC The First and the Fourth An1endn1ents, especially the First were made so closely on the heels of the Constitution that they ought indeed to be considered as a rart and parcel of the Constitution itself.\n\nThese amendments are not born of second thoughts and they do not reflect a fresh look at the Constitution in order to deprive the people of the gains of the Constitution.\n\nThey are in the truest sense of the phrase, a contemporary practical exposition of the Constitution. [26 E-F, G-H, 27 Al D\n\n(7) Article 39 of the Constitution directs by clauses (b) and (c) that the ownership and control of the n1ateri:; il resources of the community are so dis trihuted as best to subserve the common good; that the operation of the eco nomic system does not result in the concentration of wea.lth and means of production to the common detriment.\n\nThese twin principles of State policy \\; i.:ere a part of the Constitution as originally enacted and it is in order to effec- E tuate the purpose of these Directive Principles that the First and the Fourth Amendments \"\\Vere passed. {27 A-B]\n\n(8) Article 31A(l) could e<:.sily have appeared in the original Constitution itself as an illustration of its basic philosophy.\n\nWhat remained to be done in\n\nthe hope that vested interests will not distort the base of the Constitution1 had to be undertaken 'vith a sense of urgency and expediency.\n\nIt is that sense and sensitivity which gave birth to the impugned amendment.\n\nThe progress in the F degeneracy of any nation can be rapid, especially in societies riven by econoŞ 1nic disparities and caste barriers.\n\nWe embarked upon a constitutional era\n\ny holding forth the promise that \\Ve will secure to all citizens justice. social, eco ... nornic and political; equality of status and of opportunity; and, last but not the least, dignity of the individual.\n\nBetween these promises and the First Amendment there is discernible a nexus, direct and immediate.\n\nIndeed, if there is one place in an agriculture-domina.ted society like ours where citizens G can hope to have equal justice, it is on the strip of land which they till and Jove, the land which assures to them the dignity of their persons by _providing to them a near decent means of livelihood. [28 .E-H]\n\n(9) The First Amendment has made the constitutional ideal of equal justice\n\na living truth.\n\nIt is like a n1irror that reflects the ideals of the Constitution,\n\nit is not the destroyer of its basic structure. l\"fhe provisions introduced by it and the Fourth Arnendn1ent for the extinguishment or modification of rights in lands hekl or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, •trengtben rather than weaken the basic structure of the Constitution. [29 A-Bl\n\nA The First An1endment is aimed at removing social and economic disparities in the agricultural sector.\n\nIt ma.y happen that while existing inequalities are being removed, new inequalities may arise marginally and incidentally.\n\nSuch marginal and incidental inequaliti..::s cannot damage or destroy the basic struc t;.ue of the Constitution.\n\nIt is impossible for any Government, howsoever ex pertly advised, socially oriented and prudently managed, to remove every econo n1ic disparity without causing some hardship or injustice to a class of persons B who also are entitled to equal treatment under the law.\n\nThus, the adoption of ''family unit\" as the unit of application for the revised ceilings may cause incidental hardship to n1inor children and to unmarried daughters.\n\nThat can not, however, furnish an argument for assailing the impugned laws on the ground that they violate the guarantee of equality.\n\nIt seems ironical indeed that the laws providing for agricultural ceilings should be stigmati<; ed as des troying the guarantee of equality when their true object and intendment is to C remove inequalities in the matter of agricultural holding,<;. [29 B-El\n\nThe note of the Panel set up by the Planning Commission in May 1959 on the adoption of \"family unit'\" as the unit of application for the revised ceilings and the counter-affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Ơ1aharashtr::i. show the relevance and efficacy of the family being treated as the real ope rative unit in the movement for agrarian reform.\n\nConsidering the Indian social D tnilieu, the Panel ca.me to the conclusion that agricultural ceiling can be most equitably applied if the base of application is taken as the family unit consist ing of husband, wife and thn::e minor children.\n\nIn vieiw of thi:s expert data\n\na L.i\\V passed truly for in1plementing the objective of Article 3lA(1) (a) can not be open to chnllenge on the ground that it infringes Articles 14. 19 or 31.\n\n[29 EG]\n\nE B. (1). The An1endment introduced by sec. 4 of the Constitution (First\n\nAmendment) Act, 1951 dues not dn.mage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nThat :\\tnendment 1nust, therefore, be upheld on its o\\.\\ n merits.\n\n[29 HI\n\n(2) The validity of Article 31A. cannot be upheld by applying the doctrine of stare deci:ls, though the Article has continued to be recognised a<; valid ever sin.; e it -was introduced into the Constitution.\n\nThe constitutional validity of Article 31A has been n.:cugnised in the four deciƣdons, namely, Sliunkari Prasad\n\nv. Union of India, [J.952] SCR 89. 95; Sajjan.1•fngh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965j I SCR 933; l. C. Golaknath v. Union of India & Or,., [1957] 2\n\nSCR 762 and H. H. Kesava11a11da Bltarati Sripada[.?alavaru v. State of Kera/a, [1973J Suppl. SCR 1. sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly and sometimes inciden tally.\n\nIt mơ be mentioned, though it has no relevance on the applicability of the rule of stun: dccisi!>, that in none of the three earlier decisions was the validity of Article JlA tested on the ground that it damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nThat theory was el::iborated for the first time in Kesa1a11anda Bharati and it was in the majority judgment deliver ed in that case that the doctrine found its first acceptance.\n\nEven in the two latest cases, namely, Atnhif..:u Prasad Mishra v. S1ure of U.P .. [1980] 3\n\nSCR p. 1159, Thurnuti Venkaiah v.\n\nState of A.P., [19801 3 SCR 1143 the ques tion as to whether Article 3 lA C<Ƣn be upheld by applying the doctrine of\n\nstare deci.\\is was never decided.\n\nNor was the question of vire-; of Articles 3L\\, 318 and 31C (unamended) considered in these decisions. [30 G-H, 31 A-B, C, 32 BCl\n\nWAMAN RAO V. UNION 5\n\nIt is true to say that for the application of the rule of stare decisis, it is Anot necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of long standing should have considered and either accepted or rejected the particular a.rgument which is advanced in the case on hand.\n\nWere it so, the previous decisions could more easily be treated as binding by applying the law of precedent and it will be unneceąsary to take resort to the principle of stare decisis.\n\nIt is, therefore, 3ufficicnt fOl\" invoking the 1ule of stare decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question v,.hich arose or was argued, no matter on what reason n the decision rests or \\Vhat is the basis of the decision.\n\nIn other words, for the purpose of applying the rul_e of stare dccisis, it is unnecessary to enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis.\n\nTherefore, the reason why Article 3 lA was upheld in the earlier decisions. if indeed it was, are not germane for the purpose of deciding whether this is a fit and proper case in which to apply that rule.\n\n[34 CG] C\n\nBut there are four principal reasons for not invoking the rule of stare\n\ndecisis for deciding upon the constitutionality of Article 3 lA.\n\nIn the first place, Article 31A breathes its ov.n vitality, drawing its sustenance from the basic tenets of our Constitution.\n\nThe second reason is that neither in\n\nSlzankari Prasad, nor in Saijan Singh nor in Golak Nath and evidently not in\n\nKesavananda Bharati, was the question as regards the validity as such of Arti cle 31A raised or decided. 111irdly, the history of the World's constitutionM law shows that the principle of stare decisis is treated as having a limited application only.\n\nThe fourth reason is that on principle rules like stare decisis should not be invoked for upholding constitutional devices like Articles 3 lA, 31B and 31C which are designed to protect not only past laws but future lav.rs also.\n\nThe principle of stare decisis can apply, if at all, to laws protected by these articles, if those laws have enjoyed the protection of these articles for a long time, but the principle cannot apply to the articles themselves.\n\nThe principle of stare decisis permits the saving of hnvs the validity of which has been r.ccepted or recognised over the years.\n\nTt does not require or sanction that, in future too, la\\VS m<Jy be passed even though they a.re invalid or un constitutional.\n\nFuture perpctrJ, tion of illegality is no part' of the doctrine of\n\nstare dcci5is. [34 F-H, 35 A-B, D, 36 B-E]\n\nBurnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 US. 393, 406; Tramways Case (No.\n\n1) 1914 (CLR) 54@ 58; Bengal Immunity Case [1955] 2 SCR 603; Income\n\nTax Officer, Tuticorin v. T. S. D. Nadar, AIR 1968 SC 623; New York v.\n\nUnlfed States, 326 U.S. 572, 590-591 [1946]; U.S. v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236. 249 [1955]; Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391 [1916]; State of Woshington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 [1924] James Morwroe v. Frank Pape, 5 L.Ed. 2nd U.S. 492, 523, 528, quoted with approval.\n\nC., ( 1) All amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulation therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they. or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure in view of the JudgĆ\n\nmen.t in Kesavananda Bharati. If any Act or Regulation included in the Ninth Schedule by a; constitutional amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 3 IA, or by Article 31 C as it stood prior to its amendment by the. Forty Second Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant co\"stitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the Ninth Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution.1 or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose. [IO C-F=46 C-FJ\n\n(2) Article 31B provides that the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge ahy of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. The provisions of the Article are expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions i.n Article\n\n31A and the concluding portion of the Article supersedC\"..s any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary. This Article wa<> introduced into the Constitution by section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Article 31A having been introduced by section 4 of the san1e Amendment. Article 31B bas to be read along with the Ninth Schedule because it is only those Acts and Regulations which are put in that Schedule that can receive the protection of that article. The Ninth Schedule was added to the Constitution by section 14 of the First Amendment Act, 1951. The device or mechanism which sections 5 and 14 or the First Amendment have adopted is that as and \\V'hen Acts and Regulations are put in.to the Ninth Schedule by constitutional amendments made from time to tin1e, they will automaticaJly by reason of the provisions of Article 31B, receive the protection of that article. [36 F-H, 37 A-B].\n\nThe view of the Court that it would not be proper to invoke the doctrine of stare decisis for upholding the validity of Article 31A, must govern the question of the validity of Article 31 B. But just as there are significant similarities between Articles 31A and 31B, there is a significant dissimilarity too. Article 3 lA enables the passing of Jaws of the description mentioned in clauses (a) to (e), in violation of the guarantee afforded by Articles 14 and 19. In so far as Article 31B is concerned, it does not define the category of laws which are to receive its protection, and secondly, it affords protection to Schedule-laws against all the provisions of Part III of the Constitu~\n\ntion. No Act can be placed in the Ninth Schedule except by the Parliament and since the Ninth Schedule is a part of the Constitution, no additions or alterations can be made therein without complying with the restrictive provisions governing amendments to the Constitution. Thus, Article 31B. read with the Ninth Schedule provides what is generally described as, a protective umbrella to all Acts which are included in the Schedule, no matter of what character, kind or category they may be. Putting it briefly, whereas Article 31A protects laws of a defined category, Article 3 lB empowers the Parliament to include in the Ninth\n\nSchedule such laws as it considers fit and proper to include therein. Thus the fourth reason for not applying the rule of stare decisis to Article 3 lA that any particular law passed under clauses (a) to (e) can be accepted as good if it has been treated as valid for a long number of years but the device in the form of the Article cannot be upheld by the application of that rule, applies to Article 31B read with the Ninth Scheduie by the self-same test.\n\n[37 G-H, 38 B-D, E-FJ\n\n(3) The decision in Kesavananda Bharati must be treated as a landmark.\n\nThe theory that the Parliament cani; iot exercise its amending power so as to\n\nWAMAN RAO v. UNION 7\n\ndamage or destroy the basic stJ.ucture of the Constitution, was propounded and A accepted for the first time in Kesavananda Bharati. This is one reason for holding the laWli incorporated into the Ninth Schedule before April 24, 1973, on which date the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati was rendered. The second reason for drawing a line at a convenient and relevant point of time is that the first 66 items in the Ninth Schedule, which were inserted prior to the decision in Kesavananda Bharati, mostly pertains to laws of agrarian reforms.\n\n[38 GH, 39 A, BJ B\n\nD. (1) Article 31C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act. 1976, is valid to the extent to which its. constitutionality was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati.\n\nArticle 31C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. Once it is held that Article 3 lA is valid on its own merits, it must follow logically that the unamended Article 31C is also valid. The un amended portion of Article 31C is not like an unchartered ship. It gives protection to a defined and lin1ited category of la\\vs which are passed for giving\n\neffect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause_ (c) of Article 39. It is impossible to conceive that any law passed for such a purpose can at all violate Article 14 or Article 19. In fact, far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive principles contained in clause\n\n(b) and (c) of Article 39 will. fortify that structure. [10 F-0, 40 GH, 41 A-CJ\n\nE. (!) The normal term of the Lok Sabha expired on March 18, 1976. On April 2, 1976, the Lok Sabha passed the Fortieth Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra I.and Ceiling Amendment Acts were put in the Ninth Schedule as Items 157, 159 and 160.\n\nOn November 24, 1976 the House of People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act was passed extending the term of the Parliament for a further period of one year. The Forty Second Amendment Act was passed on November 12, 1976. The Lok Sabha was dissolved on January 18, 1977 and both the emergencies dated December 3, 1971 and lune 25, 1975 were revoked on March 21, 1977. [43 EG]\n\nIn so far as the proclamation of December 3, 1971 is concerned, there was\n\nmanifest justification for that coufse of action. The danger to the security of F the country was clear and present. From the various dates and events mentioned and furnished to the Court, it may be possible for a layman to conclude that there was no reason to continue the state of emergency at least after the formality of exchanging the prisoners of war was completed. But Courts have severe constraints which deter them from undertaking a task which cannot judicially be performed. [44 D-F, HJ\n\n(2) The two Acts, the House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act, Act 30 of 1976 and the House of the People (Extension of Duration) Amend, ment Act 109 of 1976, by which the duration of the Lok Sabha was extended are valid and lawful. The Fortieth and the Forty Second Constitutional Amendments cannot, therefore, be struck down on the ground that they were passed by a Lok Sabha which was not lawfully in existence. [45 FG]\n\nSection 2 of the first of these Acts, Act 30 of 1976, which was passed on Febru; iry 16, 1976, provided that the period of five years in relation to the then House of. the People shall be extended for a period of one year \"while the Proclamation of Emergency issued on the 3rd day of December, 1971 and on the 25th day of June, 1975, are both 1n operation.\" The second Act of Extension continue! to contain the same provision.\n\nBoth the proclamations of emergency were in fact in operation on February 16, 1976 when the first Act was passed as also on November 24, 1976 when the second Act, 109 of 1976, was passed.\n\nNeither the first Proclamation can be deemed not to be in existence, nor can the second Proclamation be held to have been issued mala fide and, therefore non est, since the evidence produced before the Court is insufficient for record~\n\ning a decision on either of these matters. [45 C-F]\n\nPer Bhagwati, J. (Contra)\n\nThe doctrine of stare decisis can be invoked for sustaining the constitutional validity 'of Article 3 lA. (50 El ·\n\nMinerva Mills v. Union of India, (1981] 1 SCR p. 206 reiterated; Ambika ·\"\"*{ C Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P., (1980] 3 SCR p. 1159, followed.\n\nPer Krishna Iyer-, 1:- (Contra)\n\nApplying the principle of stare decisis. Article 3 lA is valid. In constitu- _tional issues over stress on precedents is inept. Even so, great respect and binding value are the no1mal claim of rulings until reversed by larger Benches.\n\n(51 C-D] D Ambika Prasad MislITa v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR p. 1159 reiterated.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 656-660, 512-533 and 503-511 of 1977.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nAND Review Petitions Nos. 34, 62-65, 66-72, 73-74, 75-77, 78-81, 82,\n\n83-84, 85, 86-87, 88, 89-90, 91-92, 93-94, 95, 95A, 96, 103-107, 110, 120, 121, 122-130 of 1977.\n\nAND Writ Petition No. 63 of 1977. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution).\n\nM. N. Phadke,\n\nN. M.\n\nGhatate (Dr.), S.\n\nN. Bapat a11d S. V.\n\nDeshpande for the Petitioners in RPs. 34, 62-95, 95A. 96, 103-107,\n\n120-123 & WPs. 656-660, 503-511/77.\n\n'111 S. Gupta for the Petitioners in RPs. 110, 122-130/77.\n\nG S. N. Kherdikar, M. N.\n\nIngle, A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi and C. K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs. 512-533/77.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Att. Genl. K. H. Bhatt, R. N. Sacthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for R 1 in WPs. 503-511, 512-533, 656-660 & RPs. 34, 62-65/77.\n\nH S. V. Gupte, Att. Genl. C. J. Sawant, M. C. Bhandare, M. B. Bor & M. N. Shroff for R. 2 in WPs. 503-533 and for RR. 2 & 3 in WPs.\n\n656-660/77.\n\nWAMAN RAO V. UNION 9\n\nS. V. Gupte, Att. Gen. and Miss A. Subhashiniri.or the Att. Genl.\n\nR. K. Rastogi, J. S. Rastogi and Bardridas Sharma for the State of Rajasthan in WP No. 656/77. ·\n\nG. N. D.ikshit and M. V. Goswami for the State of U.P.\n\nAltaf Ahmed for the State of Jammu & Kashmir in WPs. 533 &\n\nM~~ B\n\nFOR THE ADVOCATES GENERAL :\n\nU. P. Smgh and Shambhunath Iha (State of Bihar).\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader and K. R. Nambiar (State of Kerala)·.\n\nB. M. Patnaik and R. K. Mehta (State of Orissa).\n\nK. M. K. Nair and N. Nettar (State of Karnataka).\n\nK. M. K. Nair and N. Nettar (State of Tamil Nadu).\n\nFOR THE JNTERVENERS:\n\nV. N Ganpu/e for Pratap Rao in W.P. 503.\n\nR. K. Garg for Shyam Narain Tiwari in RP 34/77 & WP 512/ 77.\n\nR. N. Bannerjee, J. S. Sinha and J.B.D. & Co. for Panch Valley Coal Co. and Shri Bimal Poddar in WP. 512/77.\n\nG. L. Snnghi, Miss Bhubnesh Kumari, K. J. John and J. B. D. & E Co. for the Appellant Intervener Lt. Col. Himmat Singh & Ors.\n\nS. B. Wad for the Applicant/Intervener in WPs. 342 & 343 of 77 and RP. 63/77.\n\nThe following Order was delivered on 9th May, 1980.\n\n(1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 3 lA into the Constitution with retrospective effect, and section 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new clause (1), sub-clauses (a) to ( e), for the original clause ( 1) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic\n\nor essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and are G valid and constitutional, being within the constituent power of the Parliament.\n\n(2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 introduced Article 31 B into the Constitution which reads thus :\n\n\"3 lB. Without prejudice to the generality of the provi- H sions contained in article 3 lA, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any df the provisions thereof •all be deemed to be void, or ever to have\n\nbecome void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, auy provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\"\n\nIn Kesavananda Bharati (1973, Suppl. SCR 1) decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority th.at Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 3 lA, or by Article 31C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose.\n\n(3) Article 31C of the Constitution, as it stood pridr to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in G Kesavananda Bharati. Article 31C, as it stood prior to the Constitution ( 42 Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure.\n\nl4) All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts are dis- H missed with costs. The stay orders granted in these matters will stand vacated. We quantify the costs at Rs. five thousand which will be borne equally by the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 656-660 of\n\n•• (\n\n~ .. • .. . '\n\n1977; 512-533 of 1977; and 503 to 511 of 1977. The costs will be A payable to the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra in equal measure.\n\n(5) Writ Petition No. 63 of 1977 (Baburao Samant vs. Union of Jndia) will be set down for hearing.\n\n( 6) Reasons for this Order will follow later.\n\nThe following Jndgments were delivered :\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. A ceiling on agricultural holdings was imposed in Maharashtra by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 o~ 1961, which was bi:ought into operation on January 26, 1962. The ceiling fixed by that Act (the Principal Act), was lowered and certain other amendments were made to that Act by Acts 21 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976. The validity of 1hese Acts ws challenged in the Bombay High Court in a large group of over 2660 petitions. A Division Bench of the High Court silting at Nagpur repelled that challenge by a judgment dated August 13, 1976, 1n Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttanvar v.\n\nState of Maharashtra('). The High Court held that the provisions of the aforesaid Acts were not open to challenge on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, since those Acts were placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution 17th Amendment Act, 1964, and the Constitution 40th Amendment Act, 1976, and also because of the promulgation of Emergency as a result of which, the rights under Articles 14 and 19 of 1he Constitution could not be enforced. The High Court also repelled\n\nthe challenge to the validity of Article 3 lB itself by holding that far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which introduced Article 31B into the Constitution, fortified that structure by subserving a fundamental contitutional purpose. Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Acts, particularly the concept of 'family unit' were challenged before the High Court on the ground, inter alia, that they were outside the purview of Article 3 lA On an overall consideration of the movement of agrarian reforms, with particular reference to the relevant statistics in regard to Maharashtra, the High Court rejected that challeng.e too on the ground that those provisions formed a part of an integral scheme of agrarian reforms under which large agricultu-\n\n{I) ATR' 1977 llombay 99.\n\n2-1281 SCl/80\n\nral holdings had to be reduced and the surplus land distributed amongst the landless and others.\n\nThe appeals filed against the decision of the Bombay High Court were dismissed by this Court by a judgment dated January 27, 1977 in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra('). The only point urged in those appeals was that the Principal Act, as amended, was void being violative of the second proviso to Article 31A(l), in so far as it created an artificial 'family unit' and fixed the ceiling on the agricultural holdings of such family units. The argument was that the violation of the particular proviso deprived the impugned laws of the protection conferred by Article 31A. That argument was rejected by the Court on the view that even if the impugned provisions were violative of the second proviso, they would receive the protection of Article 3 lB by reason of the inclusion of the Principal Act and the Amending Acts in the Ninth Schedule.\n\nThe Court considered whether, in fact, the provisions of the impugned Acts were violative of the second proviso and held that it was entirely for the legislature to decide what policy to adopt for the purpose of restructuring the agrarian system and the Court could not assume the role of au economic adviser for pronouncing upon the wisdom of such policy.\n\nThe second proviso to Article 31A(l) was therefore held not to have been contravened.\n\nThe judgment of this Court in the appeals aforesaid was delivered on January 27, 1977 while the proclamation of emergency was in operation.\n\nOn the revocation of that proclamation, petitions were filed in this Court by the appellants praying for the revi•\"w of the judgment in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan (Supra) on the ground that several contentions, which were otherwise open to them for assailing the constitutional validity of the impugned Acts, could not be made by reason of the emergency and that they should be permitted to make those contentions since the emergency was lifted.\n\nFresh Writ Petitions were also filed in this Court in which those contentions were put forward.\n\nTlTe Court having accepted the request for the review of the judgment in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan, (supra) these matters have coine before us for consideration of the other points involved in the appeals.\n\nIn these proceedings, the. main challenge now is to the constitutionality of Articles 3 lA, 3 lB and the unamended Article 31 C of the Constitution. The various grounds of challenge to the Principal Act and the Amending Acts were met on behalf of the respondents by rely-\n\n-(1) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 790.\n\n''\"'[)\n\n) <\n\ning on the provisions of these Articles which throw a protective doak\n\naround Jaws of a certain description and variety, by excluding challenge thereto on the ground that they are violative of certain articles of the Constitution. The reply of the appellants and the petitioners to the defence of the respondents is, as it could oruy be, that the very provisions of the Constitution on which the respondents rely for saving the impugned laws are invalid, since these particular provisions of the Constitution, which were introduced by later amendments, damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution within the meaning of the ratio of the majority judgment in Keshavananda Bharati.(1)\n\nArticles 14, 19, 31A. 31B, 31C (as unamended) and 368, which are relevant for our purpose, are familiar to lawyers and laymen alike, so great is their impact on Jaw and life.\n\nArticle 14, the saviour of the rule of Jaw, injuncts that the State shall not d•ony to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the Jaws within the territory of India.\n\nArticle 19 confers upon the citizens rights like the fredom of speech and expression, the right to assemble peaceably, the right to form associations, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, the right to reside and settle in any part of India, and the right to practise any profession or to carry on any trade, business or calling.\n\nThese rights make life meaningful and, without the freedoms conferred by Article 19, the goal of the Preamble wi!J remain a dr•cam unfulfilled.\n\nThe right to property conferred by Articles 19 ( 1) ( f) and 31 was deleted by the 44th Amendment with effect from June 20, 1979.\n\nArticle 31A(l) (a) provides that:\n\nNotwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no Jaw providing for-\n\n( a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred liy article 14 or article 19 .\n\nArticle 3 !B provides that :\n\nWithout prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 3 lA, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is\n\n(!) [1973] (Supp.) SCR I.\n\nA inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the\n\n contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\n\nArticle 31C, as it existed prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment Act, which came into force on January 3, 1977, provided that:\n\nNotwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to sw:h policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy.\n\nArticles 31A and 31B were introduced into the constitution hy the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the former with retrospective effect from the date <If the enactment of the Constitution.\n\nE Article 31C (unamended) was introduced by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, with effect from April 20, 1972. The fast clause of that article, which gave conclusiveness to the declaration regarding the policy of the particular Act, was struck down as invalid jn Kesavananda Bharati (supra). That part now lives an italicized existence in official publications of the Indian Constitution.\n\nThe !F words \"the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of artlc:e\n\n39• were substituted by the words \"all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV\", by the 44th Amendment, with effect from June 20,\n\n1979. We are concerned with Article 31C as it stood originally but, of course, without the concluding part struck down in Kesavarwnda Blwrati (supra).\n\nArticle 368 of the Constitution reads thus:\n\n\"368. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constituticn, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.\n\n(2) x x x x\n\n.), j\n\nI '\n\n.. 1'\n\n(3) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.\n\n( 4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article (whether before or after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second B Amendment Act 1976) shall be ca'lled in question in any court on any ground.\n\n(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that them shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article.\"\n\nClauses ( 4) and (5) above were inserted by section 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act 1976 with effect from January 3, 1977. Those clauses were declared unconstitutional, as being beyond the amending power of the Parliament, by a very recent decision of this Court in Minerva Mil/s,( 1) which was pronounced on July 31, 1980.\n\nThe judgment of the Court on the invalidity of clauses ( 4) and (5) was unanimous.\n\nTh~ question as to whether Articles 31A(l) (a), 3 lB and the unamended Article 3 lC are valid shall have to be decided on the basis that clause (5) of Article 368 is ineffective to enlarge the Parliament's amending power so as to empower it to make amendments which will damage or destroy any of the basic features of the Constitution and Clause ( 4) is ineffective to take away the power of the courts to pronounce a constitutional amendment invalid, if it damages or destroys any of the basic features of the Constitution. Thus, the main question arising before us has to be decided by applying the ratio of Kesavananda Bharati (supra), in its pristine form. It is quite auother matter that learned counsel led by Shri M. N. Phadke ques- .tion whether any ratio at all is discernible from the majority judgments in Kesavananda (supra).\n\nThe first question to which we have to address ourselves is whether in enacting Article 31 A ( 1) (a) by way of amendment of the Constitution, the Parliament transgressed its power of amending the Constitution.\n\nAs stated earlier, Article 31A was inserted in the Constitution by section 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 with retrospective effect from the commencement of the Constitution.\n\n\nArticle 31A(l), as introduced by the 1st Amendment on June 18, l 951, read thus : 3 lA. ( 1) N otwithstauding anything in the foregoing provisions of this part, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part.\n\nArticle 31A wa~ amended, with the same degree of retrospective effect again, by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.\n\nTwo alterations, not substance-wise material, were made by the 4th Amendment.\n\nThe opening non-obstante clause which originally extended to \"anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part\", that is to say Part III, was substituted by a clause restricted. to \"anything contained in Article 13\"'. Secondly, whereas under the Article as conceived originally, the challenge to laws of agrarian reform was exclllded on the broader ground of their inconsistency, abrogation, or abridgement of any of the rights conferred by \"any provisions of\" Part III, under the amended article the challenge is excluded in relation to the violation of the three specific articles, namely, Articles 14, 19 and 31.\n\nThe 4th Amendment introduced clauses {a) to {e) in Article 31A, the content of clause (a) being the same as that of old clause ( !) . Clauses\n\n(b) to (e) were added newly by the 4th Amendment, comprehending laws of four other categories like laws providing for the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period, laws providing for amalgamation of two or more corporations, laws providing for extingnishment or modification of rights of persons interested in corporations; and laws providing for extinguishment or modification of rights accruing under any agreement, lease or licence relating to minerals, We are not concerned in these matters with the provisions of clauses (b) to ( e), though we would like to state expressly and specifically that whatever is relevant on the question of the validity of clause {a) will apply with equal force to the validity or otherwise of clauses (b) to (e).\n\nBy section 7 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 the reference to Article 31 was deleted from the concluding portion of Article 31A(l) with effect from June 20, 1979, as a consequence of the deletion, by section 2 of the 44th Amendment, of clause\n\n(f) of Article 19(1) which gave to the citizens the right to acquire, lI hold and dispose of property. The deletion of the right to property from the array of fundamental rights will not deprive the petitioners o'f the arguments which were available to them prior to the coming into\n\n'\"' ' '\n\nforce of the 44th Amendment, since the impugned Acts were passed A before June 20, 1979 on which date Article 19(1)(f) was deleted.\n\nThere is no doubt, nor indee~ is it disputed, that the Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts, which are impugned in these proceedings, fall: squarely within the terms of clause (a) of Article 31A(l). Those .A:cts provide for the extinguishment and modification of rights in an 'estate', the expression 'estate' being defined by clause (2) (a) (iii) to mean \"any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto .... \". It must follow, as a necessary corollary, that the impugned Acts are entitled to the protection of Article 31A(l) (a) when the result that their provisions cannot be deemed, and therefore cannot be declared, to be void on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 or 31.\n\nThis is the reason why and the contest in which the validity of Article 31A(l) (a) is itself assailed by the petitioners. If a constitutional provision, which deprives the petitioners of the benefit and protection of Articles 14, 19 and 31, is invalid, the petitioners will be entitled to challenge the impugned laws on the ground that they are inconsistent with or that they take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 13(2), bas a sensitive touchstone. Not only does it mandate that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III but, it provides that any law made in contravention of the clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Mere abridgement, that is to say curtailment, and not necessarily abrogation, that is to say total deprivation, is e_nough to produce the consequence provided for by Artide 13(2).\n\nThe validity of the constitutional amendment by which Article F 31A(l) (a) was introduced is challenged by the petitioners on the ground that it damages the basic structure of the Constitution by destroying one of its basic features, namely, that no law can be made by the legislature so as to abrogate the guarantees afforded by Articles 14, 19 and 31. It is tantologous to sayso but, if we may so put it, the obliteration of the rights conerred by these Articles, (; which Article 31A(l) (a) brings about, is. total and complete because, as the clear and unequivocal language of that Article shows, the application of these three articles stands1 totally withdrawn in so far as laws falling within the ambit of clause (a) are concerned. It is no argument to say that the withdrawal of the application of certain articles in Part III in respect of laws of a defined category is not total H abrogation of the articles because they will continue to apply to <l!her situations and other laws.\n\nIn any given case, what is decisive\n\nis whether, in so far as the impugned law is concerned, the rights available to persons affected by that law under any of the articles in Part III i~ totally or substantially withdrawn and not whether the articles, the application of which stands withdrawn in regard to a defined category o~ laws, continue to be on the Statute Book so as to be available in respect of laws of other categories. We must therefore conclude that the withdrawal of the application of Articles 14, 19 and 31 in respect of laws which fall under clause (a) is total and complete, that is to say, the application of those articles\n\nstands abrogated, not merely abridged, in respect of the impugned enactments which indubitably fall within the ambit of clause (a}. We would like to add that every case in which the protection of a fundamental right is withdrawn will not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nThe question as to whether the basic structure is damaged or destroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular Article of Part III is in issue and whether what is withdrawn is quint-essential to the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nThe judgment of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) provoked in its wake a multi-storied controversy, which is quite understandable.\n\nThe judgment of the majority to which seven out of the fhirteen Judgs were parties, struck a bridle path by holding that in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 368, the Parliament cannot amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The seven learned Judges chose their words and phrases to eixpress their conclusion as effectively and eloquently as language can do. But, at this distance of time any controversy over F what was meant by what they said is plainly sterile. At 'this distance of time', because though not more than a little less than eight years have gone by since the decision in Kesavananda Bharati\n\n(supra) was rendered, those few years are packed with constitutional events of great magnitude.\n\nApplying the ratio of the majority judgments in that epoch-making decision, this Conrt has since struck G down constitutional amendments which would otherwise have passed muster. For example, in Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain(') Art. 329A(4) was held by the Court to be beyond the amending competence of the ParliaJUent siQce, by making separate and special provisions as to elections to Parliament of the Prime Minister and the Speaker, it destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nH Ray C.J. based his decision on tM ground that the 39th Amendment by which Art. 329A was introduced violated the Rule of Law\n\n(1) [1976] 2 SCR 347.\n\n. ~\n\n(p. 418); Khanna J. based his decision on the ground that democracy was a basic feature of the Constitution, that democracy contemplates that elections should be free and fair and that the clause in question struck at the basis of free and fair elections (pp. 467 and 4 71) ; Mathew J. struck down the clause on the ground that it was in the nature of legislation ad hominem (p. 513) and that it damaged the democratic structure of the Constitution (p. 515); while one of us, Chandracbud J., held that the clause was bad because it violated the Rule of Law and was an outright negation of the principle of equality which is a basic feature of the Constitution (pp. 663-665).\n\nMore recently, in Minerva Mills, (supra) clauses\n\n(4) and (5) of Article 368 itself were held unconstitutional by a unanimous Court, on the ground that they destroyed certain basic features of the Constitution like judicial review and a limited amending power, and thereby damaged its basic structure.\n\nThe majority also struck down the amendment introduced to Article 31 C by section 4 of the 42ud Amendment Act, 1976.\n\nThe period between April 24, 1973, when the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) was delivered and now is of course a short span in our constitutional history but the occasional challenge~ which evoked equal responses have helped sett)e the controversy over the limitations on the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution. Khanna J. was misunderstood to mean that fundamental rights are not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution when he said in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) :\n\nI have no doubt that the power of amendment is plenary and would include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles including those relating to fundamental rights. (p. 688)\n\nBut he clarified the true position in his judgment in the Election Case\n\n(supra) (pages 497---499), by drawing the attention of doubters to\n\na significant qualification 'which he had engrafted on the above statement, at pages 688 and 758 of his judgment in Kesavananda Bharati (supra).\n\nThe qualification was that subject to the retention of th!!' G. basic structure or framework of the Constitution, the power of amendment was plenary. The law on the subject of the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution must now be taken as well-settled, the tnie position being that though the Parliament has the power to amend each and every article of the Constitution including the provisions of Part III, the amending power cannot be exercised so as to damage H' or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. It is by the application of this principle that we shall have to decide upon the\n\nA validity of the Amendment by which Article 31A was introduced.\n\nThe precise question then for consideration is whether section 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31A into the Constitution damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nIn the work-a-day civil law, it is said that the measure of th~ permissibility of an amendment of a pleading is how far it is consistent with the original : you cannot by an amendment transform the original into the opposite of what it is.\n\nFor that purpose, a comparison is undertaken to match the amendment with the original. Such a comparison can yield fruitful results even in the rarefied sphere of constitutional law. What were the basic postulates of the Indian Constitution when it was enacted? And does the 1st Amendment do violence to those postulates ? Can the Constitution as originally conceived and the amendment introduced by the 1st Amendment Act not endure in harmony or are they so incongruous that to seek to harmonise them will be like trying to fit a square peg into a round aperture ?\n\nIs the concept underlying section 4 of the 1st Amendment an alien in the house of democracy ?-its invader and destroyer? Does it damage or destroy the republican framework of the Constitution as originally devised and designed ?\n\nThese questions have a historical slant and content : and history can furniSh a safe and certain clue to their answer. The relevant part of the statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1st amendment says :\n\nDuring the last fifteen months of the working of the Constitution, certain difficulties have been brought to light by judicial decisions and pronouncements specially in regard to the chapter on fundamental rights.\n\nThe citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 (I) (a) has been held by some courts to be so comprehensive as not to render a person culpable even if he advocates murder and other crimes of violence.\n\nIn other countries with written constitutions, freedom of speech and of the press is not regarded as debarring the State from punishing or preventing abuse of this freedom. The citizen's right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business conferred by article 19(1) (g) is subject to reason able restrictions which the laws of the State may impose \"in the interests of the general public.\" While the words cited are comprehensive enough to cover any scheme of nationalisation which the State may undertake, it is desirable to place\n\n·~\n\nthe matter beyond doubt by a clarificatory addition to article 19(6). Another article in regard to which unanticipated difiicultics have arisen is article 31.\n\nThe validity of agrarian reform measures passed by the State Legislatures in the last three years has, in spite of the provisions of clauses ( 4) and\n\n(6) of article 31, formed the subject-matter of dilatory litigation, as a result of which the implementation cf these important measures, affecting large numbers of people has been held up.\n\nThe main objects of this Bill are, accordingly, to amend article 19 for the purposes indicated abcve and to insert provisiom fully securing the constitutional validity of zamindari abolition laws in general and certain specified Statci Acts in particular.\n\nThe opportunity has been taken to propose a few minor amendments to other articles in order to remove difficulties that may arise.\n\nIn Shankari Prasad v. Union of India('), Patanjali Sastri, C.J. explained the reasons that led to the insertion of Articles 3 lA and 3 lB by the 1st Amendment thus :\n\nWhat led to that enactment is a matter of common knowledge.\n\nThe political party now in power, commanding as it does a majority uf \\Oles in the several State Legislatmes as well as in Parliament, carried out certain measures of agrarian reform in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh by enacting legislation which may compendiously be referred to as Zamindari Abolition Acts.\n\nCertain Zamindars, feeling themselves aggrieved, attacked the validity of those Acts in Courts cf law on the ground that they contravened the fundamenta! rights conferred on them by Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court at Patna held that the Act passed in Bihar was unconstitutional while the High Courts at AJlahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of the corresp@ding legislation in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively.\n\nAppeals from those decisions are pending in this Court. Petitions filed in this Court by some other zamindars seeking the determinations of the same question are also pending. At this stage, the Union Government, with a view to put an end to all this litigation and to remedy what they considered to be certain defects brought to light in the working of the Constitution, brought forward a Bill to amend the Constitution, which after undergoing am.endments in various particulars,\n\n(1) [1952] SCR 89, 95.\n\nwas passed by the requisite majority as the, Constitution\n\n(Erst Amendment) A.ct, 1951.\n\nArticle 31A was further amended with retrospective effect by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) A.ct 1955, the object of which was\n\nexplained as follows in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of that B Amendment :\n\nIt will be recalled that the z:unindari abolition laws which came first in our programme of social welfare, legislation were attacked by the interests affected mainly with reference to article 14, 19 and 31, and that in order to put an end to the dilatory and wasteful litigation and place these laws above challenge in the courts, articles 31A and 3!B and the Ninth Schednle were enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act.\n\nSubsequent judicial decisions interpreting articles 14, 19 and 31 have raised serious difficulties in the way of the Union and the States putting through other and equally important social welfare legislation on the desired lines, e.g., the following :-\n\n(i) While the abolition of zamindaries and the numerous intermediaries between the State and the tiller of the soil bas been achieved for the most part, our next objectives in land reform are the fixing of limits to the extent of agricultural land that may be owned or occupied by any person, the disposal of any land held in excess of the prescribed maximum and the further modification of the rights of land owners and tenants in agricultural holdings.\n\n(ii) x\n\n(iii) x\n\n(iv) x\n\nx x\n\nx x\n\nx x\n\nx x\n\nx x\n\nx x\n\nIt is accordingly proposed in clause 3 of the Bill to extend the scope of article 31 A so as to CO!ver these categories of essential welfare legislation.\n\nThe Constitution (First Amendment) A.ct was moved in the Provisional Parliament on May 12, 1951 as Bill No. 48 of 1951. It was referred to a Select Committee and after the receipt of its report, it was debated in the Parliament on various dates in May and June. It received the Presidential assent on June 18, 1951.\n\nThe speeches made in the Provisional Parliament by Jawaharlal Nehru and other national leaders who had participated in the freedom\n\nmovement show, in a significant measure, the genesis of the 1st Amend A ment and its avowed purpose.\n\nWhile moving that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee, Jawaharlal Nehru said :\n\nThis Bill is not a very complicated one : nor is it a big one.\n\nNevertheless, I need hardly point out that it is, of intrinsic and great importance.\n\nAnything dealing with•the Constitution and change of it is of importance.\n\nAnything dealing with Fundamental Rights incorporated in the Constitution is of even greater importance.\n\nTherefore, in bringing this Bill forwmd I do so and the Government does' so in no spirit of\n\nJight-l1eartedn, ess, in no haste, but after the most careful thought and scrutiny given to this problem.\n\nI might inform the House that we have been thinking about this matter for several months, consulting people, State Governments, Ministers of Provincial Governments, consult- . ing when occasion offered itself, a number of J\\:!embers of this House, referring it to various Committees and the like and taking such advice from competent legal quarters as we could obtain, so that we have proceeded with as great care as we could possibly give to it.\n\nWe have brought it forward now after that care, in the best form that we could give it, because we thought that the wnendments mentioned in this Bill are not 011/y necessary, but desirable, and because we thought that if these changes are not made, perhaps not only would great difficulties arise, as they have arisen in the past few months, but perhaps some of the main purposes of the very Cmstituti011 may be defeated or delayed.\n\nThe Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Volumes XII and XIII (May 15-June 9, 1951) contain the record of the speeches made while thei 1st Amendment was on the anvil.\n\nWe reproduce below the relevant extracts from the speeches of the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru:\n\nThe real diJliculty which has come up before us is this.\n\nThe Constitution lays down certain Directive Principles of State Policy and after long discussion we agreed to them and they point out the way we have got to travel.\n\nThe Constitution also lays down certain Fundamental Rights.\n\nBoth are important. The Directive Principles of State Policy represent a dynamic move towards a certain objective.\n\nThe Fundamental Rights represent something static, to preserve certain\n\n.,,, ..\n\nrights which exist.\n\nBoth again are right.\n\nBut somehow and sometime it might so happen that that dynamic movement and that static standstill do not quite fit into each other.\n\nA dynamic movement towards a certain objective necessarily means certain changes taking place that is the essence B of movement. (p. 8820)\n\nNow I shall proceed with the other article, the important one, namely article 31.\n\nWhen I think of this article the whole gamut of pictures comes up before my mind, because this article deals with the abolition of the zamindari system, with land laws and agrarian reform.\n\nI am not a zamindar, nor I am a tenant.\n\nI am an outsider.\n\nBut the whole length of my public life has been intimately connected, or was intimately connected, with agrarian agitation in my Province.\n\nAnd so these matters came up before me repeatedly and I became intimately associated with them.\n\nTherefore l have a certain emotional reaction to them and awareness of them which is much more than merely an intellectual appreciation. If there is one thing to which we as a. party have been committed in the past generation or so it is the agrarian reform and the abolition of the zamindari system. (p. 8830)\n\nNow apart from our commitment, a survey of the world E today, a survey of Asia today will lead any intelligent person to see that the basic and the primary problem is the land problem today in Asia, as in India.\n\nAnd every day of delay adds to the difficulties and dangers, apart from being an injustice in itself. (pp 8830-8831)\n\n.... it is patent that when you are out to remedy inequalities, you do not remedy inequalities by producing further inequalities.\n\nWe do not want anyone to snffer.\n\nBut, inevitably, in big social changes some people have to suffer. (p. 8831)\n\nHow are we to meet this challenge of the times ? How are we to answer the question : For the last ten or 20 years you have said, we will do it.\n\nWhy have you not done it ?\n\nIt is not good for us to say : We a!e helpless before fate and the situation which we are to face at present.\n\nTherefore, we have to think in terms of these big changes, and changes and the like and therefore we thought of amending article 31.\n\nUltimately we thonght it best to propose additional articles 31A and 31B and in addition to that there is a Schedule\n\nattached of a number of Acts passed by State Legislatures, some of which have been challenged or might be challenged and we thought it best to save them from long delays and these difficulties, so that this process of change which has been initiated by the State shoµld go ahead. (pp. 8831-8832)\n\nThe other day I was reading an article about India by a very eminent American and in that article which contained many correct statements and some incorrect statements, the author finished up by saying that India has, very difficult problems to face but the mosb acute of them he said can be put in five words and those five words were : l?nd, water, babies, cows and capital.\n\nI think that there is a great deal of truth in this concise analysis of the Indian situation. (pp. 8832--8833)\n\nNow I come to articles 31, 31A and\n\n3JB.\n\nMay I remind the House or such Members of the House as were\n\nalso Members of the Constituent Assembly of the long D debates that we had on this issue.\n\nNow the whole object of these articles in the Constitution was to take away and I say so deliberately to take away the question of zamindari and land reform from the purview of the courts.\n\nThat is the whole object of the Constitution and we put in some proviso etc. in regard to article 31-. (p. 9082) E\n\nWhat are we to do about it ? What is the Government to do? If a Government has not even the power to legislate to bring about gradually that equality, the Government fails to do what it has been commanded to do by thi~ Constitution.\n\nThat is why I said that the amendment~ I have placed before the House are meant to give effect to this Constitution.\n\nI am not changing the Constitution by an iota; I am merely making it stronger.\n\nI am merely giving effect to the real intentions of the framers of the Constitution, and to the wording of the Constitution, unless it is interpreted in a very narrow and legalistic way.\n\nHere is a definite inlention in the Constitution.. This question of land reform is under article 31(2) and this clause tries to take it away from the purview of the courts and somehow article 14 is brought in That kind of thing is not surely the intention of the framers of the Constitution. Here again I may say that the Bihar .\n\nHigh Court held that view bl!t the Allahabad and Nagpur High Courts held a contrary view.\n\nThat is true.\n\nThere is confusion and doubt. Are we to wait for this confusion and\n\ndoubt gradually to resolve itself, while powerful agrarian movements grow up ? May I remind the House that this question of land reform is most intimately connf!\\; ted with food production.\n\nWe talk about food production and growm0re-food and if there is agrarian trouble and insecurity of land tenure nobody knows, what is to happen.\n\nNeither the zamindar nor the tenant can devote his energies to food production because there is instability.\n\nTherefore these loud a:guments and these repeated appeals in courts are dangerous to the State, from the security point of view, from the food production point of view and from the individual point of view, whether it is that of the zamindar or the tenant or any intermediary. (pp 9082-9084)\n\n(Emphasis is supplied in the passages above)\n\nThese statements were made by the Prime Minister on the floor of the House after what is correctly described as the most careful deliberation and a broad-based consultation with diverse mtcrests.\n\nThey were made in order to resolve doubts, and difficulties and not with the intemion of creating confrontation with any other arm of the Government or with the people.\n\nThey stand in a class apait and convey in a language characterised by logic and directness, how the Constitution was failing of its purpose and how essential it was, in order to remove glaring disparities, to pour meaning and content into the framework of the Constitution for the purpose of strengthening its structure.\n\nLooking back over the past thirty years' constitutional history of o'ur country, we, as lawyers and Judges, must endorse the claim made in the speeches above that if Article 31 A were not enacted, some of the main purposes of the Constitution would have been delayed and eventually defeated and that by the l st Amendment, the constitutional edifice was not impaired but strengthened.\n\nConscious as we are that though extraneous aids to constitutional . interpretation are permissible. the views of the mover of a Bill are not G conclusive en the question of its objects and purposes, we will consider for ourselves the question, independently, whether the 1st and the 4th Amendments damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution in any manner.\n\nBut before doing that, we desire only to state that these amendments, especially the 1st were made so closely on the heels of the Constitution that they ought: indeed to be considered H as a part and parcel of the Constitution itself.\n\nThese Amendments arc not born of second thoughts and they do not reflect a fresh look at the Constitution in order to deprive the people of the gains of the Constitution.\n\nThey are, in the truest sense of the phrase, a contemporary practical exposition of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 39 of the Constitution directs by clauses (b) and (c) that~ the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the commoni good, that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth anci means of production to the co=on detriment.\n\nThese twin principles of State policy were a part of the Constitution as originally enacted and it is in order to effectuate the. purpose of these Directive Principles that the 1st and the 4th Amendments were passed.\n\nIn his address to the Allahabad Session of the Agri-Economics Conference, Dr. D. R. Gadgil put a home-truth succinctly by saying :\n\n\"Among all resources, the supply of land is the :m'tlst limited and the claimants for its possession are extremely numerous. It is, therefore, obviously unjust to allow the exploitation of any large surface of land by a sing).e individual\n\nunless other over-whelming reasons make this highly desirable.\n\nFurther, in the light of !he available supplies of land, labour and capital, it would be undesirable to encourage capital-intensi\".e meti).od of production. Moreover, whatever the economics of large-scale management, they should, in the congested state of our countryside, accrue to collective or co-operative bodies of cultivators rather than an individual family. Lastly, in the context of the current. socio-political climate, re-distribution of land would rather appear to be imperative.\"\n\nAs stated in the Report of the Committee of. the Panel on Land Reforms. (Government of India, Planning Commission, 1959), the policy of imposition of ceiling on agricultural lands tulfils the follow ing objectives :-\n\n\"(i) meeting the wide-spread desire to possess land;\n\n(ii) reducing glaring inequalities in ownership and use of land;\n\n(iii) reducing inequalities in agricultural incomes, and\n\n(iv) enlarging the sphere of self-employment.\"\n\nThe Report of the Working Group on Land Reforms, 1978 (Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Department of Agriculture) says that\n\nit was widely recognised that the imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings and tenancy reforms constituted the snbstance of the agrarian H reform movement and that, concentration of land in the hands of a 3-l28lSCI/80\n\nsmall group inhibits production, encourag,, s mcealed m irregular tenancies and 1esults in unequal accesses to \"- :ilities of production in\n\nthe rural sector.\n\nIn any economy with a preponderant agricultural\n\nsector, overall growth of the economy is largely determined by growth\n\nin agricultural production and elimination of constraints on production has to be a major national priority.\n\nStudies in certain developing\n\ncountries have established that the productivity of smaller holdings can conceivably be higiier than that of larger holdings, primarily because the intensity of farn1ing operations varies inversely with the size of the holding.\n\nThe Report of the Working Group says in paragraph 2.1 that whe\\her or not this is true in aJ! sitnations, the production system that denies opportunities of gainful employment to large nmnbers of workers and leads to pronounced distortions in the distribution of economic disadvantages, needs imperative over-hauling.\n\nIn paragraph 2.2, the Report proceeds to say that in a predominantly agricitltural society, there is a strong linkage between ownership of land and the person's status in the social system.\n\nThose without land mffer not only from an economic disadvantage, but a concomitant social dis advantage has also to be suffered by them. In the very nature of things, it is not pC'osiblc to provide land to all landless persons but that can not furnish an alibi for not undertaking at all a programme for the redistribution of agricultural land.\n\nAgrarian reform thecefore requires, inter alia, the reduction of the larger holdings and distribution of the excess land according to social and econon1ic considerations.\n\nThese then are the objectives of the Constitution and these the reasons that formed the motive force of the 1st Amendment Article 31A (1) could easily have appeared in the original Constitution itself. as an illustration of its basic philosophy.\n\nWhat remained to be done in the hoj)e that vested interests will not distort the base of the Consti tution, had to be undertaken with a sense of urgency and expediency.\n\nIt is that sense and sensitivity which gave birth to the jmpugned amend ment.\n\nThe progress in the degeneracy of any nation can be rapid, especially in societies riven by economic disparities and caste barriers.\n\nWe embarked upon a constitutional era holding forth the promise that we will secure to all citizens justice, social, economic and political, equality of status and of opportunity; and, last but n')t the least, dignity of the individual.\n\nBetween these promises and the 1st Amendment there is discernible a nexus, direct and immediate. Indeed, if there is\n\none place in an agriculture-dominated society like ours where citizens can hope to have equal justice, it is on the strip of land which they\n\ntill and love, the land which assures to them and digtrlty of their person by providing to them a near decent means of livelihood.\n\nf I r\n\nThe First Amendment has thus made the constitutional ideal of A. equal justice a living truth. It is like a mirror tha, t reflects the ideals of the Constitution; it is not the destroyer of its basic structure. The provisions introduced by it and the 4th Amendment for the extinguishment or modification of rights in lands held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, strengthen rather than weaken th~ basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nThe First Amendment is aimed at removing social and economic disparities in the agricultural sector. It may happen that while existing inequalities arc being removed, new inequalities may arise marginally and incidentally. Such marginal and incidental inequ.1.litics can- C not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. It is impossible for any Government, howsoever expertly advised, socially oriented and prudently managed, to remove every economic disparity without causing some hardship or injustice to a class of persons who also are entitled to equai treatment under tlie law.\n\nThus, the :>doption of 'family unit' as the unit of application for tlie revised ceilings D may canse incidental hardship to minor children and to unmruried daughters.\n\nThat cannot, in o'ur opinion, furnish an argument for aiSailing the impugned laws on tlie ground that they violate the guarantee of equality. It seems to us ironical indeed t)lat the laws providing for agricultural ceilings should be stigmatised as destroying the guarantee of equality when their true object and intendment is to E remove inequalities in the matter of agricultural holdings.\n\nThe Note of the Panel set up by the Planning Commission in May 1959 on the adoption of 'family unit' as the unit of application for the revised ceilings and the counter affidavit of Sbri J. G. Karandikar, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra show the relevance and efficacy of the family being treated as the real operative unit in the movement for agrarian reform.\n\nConsidering the Indian social milieu, the Panel came to the conclusion that agricultura! ceiling can be most equitably applied if the base of application is taken as the\n\nfamily unit ccnsisting of husband, wife and three minor children. In view of this expert data, weJ are unable to appreciate how any law passed truly for implementing the objective of Article 3lA(1 ){a) can be open to challenge on the ground that it infringes Articles 14, 19 or 31.\n\nFor these reasn:s, we are of the view that the Amend:nent introduced by section 4 of tlie Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 R does not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nThat Amendment must, therefore, be upheld on its own merits.\n\nThis makes it unnecessary to consider whether Article 31A can be upheld by applying the rule of stare decisis.\n\nWe have, however, heard long and studied arguments on that qnestion also, in deference to which we must consider \"the alternate submission as to whether the doctrine of stare decisis can save Article 3 lA, if it is otherwise .violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. In Shankari Prasad v.\n\nUnion of India (supra) the validity of the 1st Amendment which introduced Articles 3 lA & 3 lB was assailed on six grounds, the fi!th being that Article 13 (2) takes in not only ordinary laws but constitutional amendments also.\n\nThis argument was rejected and the 1st Amendment was npheld. In Sajjansingh v. State of Rajasthan(I), the Court refused to reconsider the decision in Sha.nkari Prasad (supra), with the result th:; t the validity of the 1st Amendment remained unshaken. In Golaknath('), it was held by a majority of 6 : 5 that the power to amend the Constitution was not located in Article 368. The inevitable result of this holding should have been the striking down of all constilu'ionr, J amendments since, according to th\"' view of the majority, Parliament had no power to amend the Constitution in pursuance of Art\\cle. 368. Bcit the Court resorted to th\" doctrine of proopective overruling and hdd that the constitutional amendment~ which were already made would be left undisturbed and that its decision will govern the future amendments only.\n\nAs a result, the I st Amendment by which Articles 31A and 31B were introduced remained inviolate.\n\nIt is trite knowledge that Golaknath(') was overruled in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) in which it was held unanimoosly that the power to amend the Constitution was to be found in Article 368 of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioners produced before us a copy of the Civil Misc.\n\nPetition which was filed in Kesavananda Bharati, (supra) by which the reliefs originally asked for were modified. It appears thereform that F what was challenged in that case was the 24th, 25th and the 29th Amendments to the Constitution. The validity of the 1st Amendment was not questioned Khanna J., however, held-while dealing with the , aJidity of the unamended Art\\cle 3 IC that the validity of Article 31A was upheld in Slwnl:ari Prasad, (supra) that its validity could not be G any longer questioned because of the principle of starg decisis and that the ground on which the validity of Article 3 lA was sustained will be available equally for mstaining the validity of the first part of Articie 3JC (page 744).\n\nThus, the constitutional validity <Jlf Article 3 lA bas been recognised in these four decisions, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly and H sometimes incidentally. We may mention in passing, though it has\n\n(1) [1965] 1 SCR 933. '-..\n\n(2) [1967] 2 SCR 762. ..,\n\n---------~\n\nno relev[\\11ce on the applicability of the rule of stare decisic, that in none of the three eatlier. decisions was the validity of Article 3 lA tested on the ground that it damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the Constituticn.\n\nThat theory was elaborated. for the fir.<l time in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) and it was in .the majority jndgment delivered i;; that case that the doctrine found its fim acceptance.\n\nThough Article 3lA has thus continued to be recognised as valid ever since it was introduced into the Constitution, we find i~. somewhat difficult to apply the doctrine of stare decisis for upholding that Article.\n\nJn Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P.(') this very Bench delivered its judgment on May 9, 1980 rejecting the challenge to the validity of the 'Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960'. But, the question as to whether Article 31A can be up~ held by applying the doctrine of stare decisis was 'hot decided in that case. In fact, the broad consensus among the members of the Court that the question of vires of Articls 31A, 31B & 31C (unamended) will be decided in the other cases, is reflected in the following observation specifically made by one of us, Brother Krishna Iyer, J., who spoke for a unanimous Court : '\n\n\"In this judgment, we side-step the bigger issue of the vires of the Constitutional amendments iu Articles 31A, 31B and 31C as they are dealt with in other cases disposed of recently\". (p. 721). •\n\nSince the question of vires of these three articles was not dealt with by Brother Krishna Iyer in bis judgment on behalf of the Court, we\n\nare, as previously arranged amongst us, dealing with that question in F this judgment.\n\nAt page 722 of the report (paragraph 5), Brother Krishna Iyer has reaffirmed this position in these words :\n\n\"Thus we get the statutory perspective of agrarian reform and so, the constitutionality of the Act has lo be tested on the touchstone of Article 31-A which is the relevant prdtective armou~ for land reform Javis.\n\nEven here, we must state that while we do refer to the range of constitutional immunity Article 31A confers on agrarian reform measures we do not rest our decision on that provision.\n\nIndependently of Article 31-A, the impugned legislation can withstand constitutional invasion ab<l so the further challenge to Article 31-A itself is of no consequence\".\n\n(I) [1980] 3SCR1159.\n\n\nA Krishna Iyer J. has observed in the same paragraph that\n\n\"The extreme argument that Article 31-A itself is void as violative of the basic structure of the Constitution has been negatived by my learned Brother, Bhagwati J., -in a kindred group of 'cases of Andhra Pradesh\".\n\nthe citation of that group of cases being Thumati Venkaiah v.\n\nState of A .P. ( 1). But, in that judgment too, one of us, Brother Bhagwati, who spoke for the unanimous Court, did not refer to the vires of Articles 31A, 31B and 31C. It will thus be clear that neither the one or the other of us, that is to say neither Brother Bhagwati nor Brother Krishna Iyer, dealt with the question of vires of Articles 31A, 3 lB and 31 C which we are doing by this judgment. It has become necessary to make this clarification in view of an observation by Brother Krishna Iyer in the very same paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment in Ambika Prasad Mishra that the decision in Kesavananda Bharati (Supra) on the validity of Article 31A, \"binds, on the imple score of stare decisis . ... \" Brother Krishna Iyer clarified the position once again by a further caveat in the same paragraph to this effect :\n\n\" ...... as stated earlier, we do not base the conclusion on Article 31A\".\n\nE The doctrine of stare decisis is the basis of common law. It originated in England and was used in t)le colonies as the basis of their judicial decisions. According to Dias('), the genesis of the rule may be sought in factors peculiar to English legal history, amongst which may be singled out the absence of a Code. The Normans forbore to impose an alien code on a halfconquered realm, but sought instead to F win as much wide-spread confidence as possible in their administra-\n\n-~.\n\ntion of law, by the application of near uniform rules. .The oldec the decision, the greater its authority and the more truly was it accepted ->· as stating the correct law.\n\nAs the gulf of time widened, says Dias, Judges became increasingly reluctant to challenge old decisions. The learned author cites the example of Bracton and Coke who always G preferred older authorities. In fact, Bracton had compiled a Notebook of some two thousand cases as material for his treatise and employed some five hundred of them.\n\nThe principle of stare decisis is also firmly rooted in American Jurisprudence. It is regarded as a rule of policy which promotes pre- H dictability, certainty, uniformity and stability.\n\nThe legal system, it is\n\n\n(2) 'Jurisprudence' by R.W.M. Dias, 4th Ed. (1976) p. 166.\n\n-i......-~--------------~\n\n. J,--\n\nsaid, should furnish a clear guide for conduct so that people may plan their affairs with assurance against surprise. It is important to further fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every proposition in every case('). When the weight of the volume of the decisions on a point of general public . importance is heavy enough, courts are inclined to abide by the rule of stare decisis, leaving it to the legislature to change long-standing precedents if it so thinks it expedient or necessary. In Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.('), Justice Brandeis stated that 'stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right' .\n\nWhile dealing with the subject of stare decisis, Shri H. M. Seervai in his book ou 'Constitutional Law of India('), has pointed out how important it is for judges to conform to a certain measure of discipline so that decisions of old standing are not overruled for the reason merely that another view of the matter_ could also be taken. The learned author has cited an Australian case in which it was said that though the court has the power to reconsider its own decisions, that should not be done upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the later court may arrive at a different conclusion if the malt>r were res integra( 4 ). The learned author then refe~.s to two cases of our Supreme Court in which the importance of adherence to precedents was stressed. Jagannadhadas J. said in the Bengal Immunity Case(•) that the finality of the decisions of the Supreme Court, which is the Court Of last resort, will be greatly weakened and much mischief done if we treat our own judgments, even though recent, as open to reconsideration.\n\nB. P. Sinha J. said in the same case that if the Supreme Court were to review its own previous decisions simply on the ground that another view was possible, the litigant public may be encouraged to think that it is always worthwhile taking a chance with the highest Court of the land. In I.T.O. Tuticorin v. T.S.D.\n\nNadar( 6), Hegde J. said in his dissenting Judgment that the Supreme Court should not ovemtle its decisions except under compelling cil'- Cllmstances. It is only when the Court is fully convinced that publitl\n\ninterest of a substantial character would be jeopardised by a. previous\n\n(I) See Introduction to Law and the Legal System, by Harold J. Griliiot, 2nd Ed. (1979), p. 132.\n\n(2) 285 u. s. 393, 406.\n\n(3) 2nd Edition [19751, Vol. I, pages 59--61.\n\n(4) The Tramways Case (No. l)-[1914] 18 C.L.R. 54, per Griffith C. J.\n\nm e\n\n(5) [1955] 2 SCR 603.\n\n(6) AIR 1968 SC 623.\n\ndecision, that the court should overrule that decision. Reconsideration of the earlier decisions, according to the learned Judge, should be confined to questions of great public importance. Legal problems should not be treated as mere subjects for mental exercise.\n\nAn earlier decision may therefore be overruled only if the Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong, not upon a mere suggestion that if the matter were res integra, the members of the later court may arrive at a different conclusion.\n\nThese decisions and texts are of high authority and cannot be overlooked. In fact, these decisions are themselves precedents on the binding nature of precedents.\n\nIt is also true to say that for the application of the rule of stare dccisis, it is not necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of long standing should have considered and either accepted or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in the case on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could more easily be treated as binding by applying the law of precedent and it will be unnecessary to take resort to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore, sufficient for .invoking the rule of stwe decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question which arose or was argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose of applying the rule of stare decisis, it is unnecessary to enquire or determine as to wha~ was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis. Therefore, the reason why Article 3 lA was upheld in the earlier decisions, if indeed it was, are not germane for the purpose of deciding whether this is a fit and proper case ih which to apply that rule.\n\nF But, there are four principal reasons why we are not disposed to invoke the rule of stare decisis for deciding upon the constitutionality\n\nof Article 31A. In the first place, Article 31A breathes its own vita- / lity, drawing its sustenance from the basic tenets of our Constitution.\n\nIts unstated premise is an integral part of the very making of the Constitution and it holds, as it were, a mirror to the ideals which inSplred G the framing of the Constitution.\n\nThe second reason why we do not want to resort to the principle of stare decisis while determining the validity of Article 31A is that neither in Shankari Prasad(Supra) nor in Sajjall Singh(Supra), nor in Golak Nath(Supra) and evtidently not in Kesavananda Bharati(Supra) H was the question as regards the validity as such of Article 3 lA raised or decided.\n\nAs .stated earlier, Shankari Prasad(Supra) involved the larger question as to whether constitutional amendments fall within\n\nthe purview of Article 13(2) of the Constitution. It was held that\n\n.iiey did not. In Sajjan Singh(Supra), the demand for reconsideration of the decision iu Shankari Prasad(Supra) was reject¢, that is to say, the Court was not inclined to consider once again whether constitutional amendments are also coIUprehended within the terms of Article 13(2). Golak Nath (Supra) raised the question as to where the amending power was located and not whether this or that particular amendment was valid. In none of these decisions was the validity of Article 31A put in issue. Nor indeed was that question considered and decided in any of those cases. A deliberate judicial decision made after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, and tlle precedent by long recognition may mature into st(Jre decisis.\n\nBut these cases cannot be considered as having decided, reasons apart, that the 1st Amendment which i.ntroduced Article 31A into the Constitution is valid.\n\nThirdly, the history of the World's constitutional law shows that the principle of stare decisis is treated as having a limited application only.\n\nJustice William Douglas said in New York v. United States(') that it is a wise policy to restrict the principle of stare decisis to those areas of the law where correction can be had by legislation. Otherwise, tke constitution loses the flexibility which is necessary if it is to serve the needs of successive generations. It is for that reason again that Justice Frankfurter said in U.S. v. International Boxing Club(2 ) that the doctrine of stare decisis is not 'an imprisonment of reason'.\n\nOlder the standing of a d_ecision, greater the provocation to apply the rule of stare decisis.\n\nA possible mischief arising out of this posifion was pointed out by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.(') by saying that precedents drawnfrom the days of travel by stage-coach do not fit the conditio~~ of travel today. And alive to . that possibility, Justice Brandeis said in State ot Washington v. W; C.\n\nDawson & Co.(4) that stare decisis is merely a wise rule of actiOJ! and is not a universal, inexorable command. \"Th~ instances in which the court has disregarded its admonition are many\". In fact, the full form of the principle, \" stare decisis et non quieta movere\" which means \"to\n\nstand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled\", was put by Coke in its classic English version as : \"Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace\". Such being the justification of the rule, it was said inJ.Emes Monroe v. Frank Pape(5) that the rele- -\n\n(1) 326 U.S. 572, 590-5~1946].\n\n(2) 348 U.S. 236, 249 [1955].\n\n(3) 217 N. Y. 382, 391 [1916].\n\n(4) 264 U.S. 219, 238 [1924].\n\n(5) 5 L. Ed. 2nd l!· s-. 492, 523, 528.\n\n.. .............. .-~~\n\nvant demands of stare decisis do not preclud\" .1sideration of an inter pretation which started as an unexamineu assumption.\n\nWe have already pointed out how the constitutional validity of Article 3 lA has to be deemed to have been upheld in Shankari Prasad (supra) by a process of inferential reasoning, the real question therein being whether the expression 'law' in Article 13(2) includes law made in the exercise of constituent power.\n\nThe fourth reason is the one cited by Shri Tarkunde that on prin ciple, rules like stare decisis should not be invoked for upholding con stitutional devices like Articles 31A, 31B and 31C which are designed to protect not only past laws but future laws also.\n\nSupposing Article 3 !A were invalid on the ground that it violates the Constitution's basic structure, the fact that its validiy has been recognised for a long time cannot justify its protection being extended to future laws or to laws which have been recently passed by the legislature.\n\nThe principle of stare decisis can apply, if at all, to laws protected by.these articles, if those laws have enjoyed the protection of these articles for a long time, but the principle cannot apply to the articles themselves.\n\nThe princi ple of stare decisis permits the saving of laws the validity of which has been accepted or recognised over the years.\n\nIt does ndt require or sanction that, in furture too, laws may be passed even though they are invalid or unconstitutional. l':uture_p.erpe1rati.ofl of illegality, is no part oI the doctrine of stare <J.ecisis.\n\n. . ··· --··\n\nOur disinclination to invoke the rule of stare decisis for saving Aiticle 3 IA does not really matter because we have upheld the consti tutional validity of that Article independently on its own merits.\n\nComing to the validity of Article 3 !B, that article also contains a device for saving laws from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights.\n\nPutting it briefly, Article 3 !B provides that the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule shall not be G deemed to be void or ever to' have become void on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights confer red by Part III of the Constitution. The provisions of the article are expressed to he withont prejudice to the generality of the pro'visions in Article 31A and the concluding portion of the article supersedes any\n\njudgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrar1.\n\nH This article was introduced into the Constitution by section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, Article 31A having been\n\nintroduced by section 4 of the same Amendment.\n\nArticle 3 lB has to be read along with the Ninth Schedule because it is only those Acts and Regulations which are put in that Schedule that can receive the protection of that article. The Ninth Schedule was added to the Constitution by section 14 of the 1st Amendment Act, 1951. The device or mechanism which sections 5 and 14 of the . 1st Amendment have adopted is that as and when Acts and Regulatrons are pnt into the Ninth Schedule by Constitutional amendments made from time to time, they will automatically, by reason of the provisions of Article _3 lB, received the protection of that article. Items 1 to 13 of the Ninth Schedule were put into that Schedule when the 1st Amendment was enacted on June 18, 1951. These items are typical instances of agrarian reform legislations. They relate mostly to the abolition of various tenures like Maleki, Taluqdari, Mehwassi, Khoti, Paragana and Knlkami Watans and of Zamindaris and Jagirs. The place of pride in the Schedule ios occupied by the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which is item no. 1 and which led to the enactment of Article 31A and to some extent of Article 31B. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 appears as item 2 in the Ninlh Schedule.\n\nItems 14 to 20 were added by the 4th Amendment Act of 1955, items 21 to 64 by the 17th Amendment Act 1964, items 65 and 66 by the 29th Amendment Act of 1972, items 67 to 86 by the 34th Amendment Act 1974, items 88 to 124 by the 39th Amendment Act 1975 and items 125 to 188 by the 40th Amendment Act 1976.\n\nThe Ninth Schedule is gradually becoming densely populated and it would appear that some planning is imperative. But that is another matter. We may only remind that Jawaharlal Nehru had assured the P!lrliament while speaking on the 1st Amendment that there was no desire to add to the 13 items which were being incorporated in the Ninth Schedule simultaneously wi1h the 1st Amendment and that it\n\nwas intended that the Schedule should not incorporate Jaws of any F other description than those which fell within items 1 to 13. Even the small list of 13 items was described by the Prime Minister a~ a 'long schedule'. ..\n\nWhile dealmg with the validity of Article 31A we have expressed the view that it would not be proper to invoke the doctrine of stare\n\nG _ decisis for upholding the validity of that article. Though the same considerations must govern the question of the validity of Article 31B, we would like to point out that just as there are significant similarities between Articles 31A and 31B, there is a significant dissimilarity too.\n\nArticle 31A enables the passing of laws of the description mentioned in clauses (a) to ( e) , in violation of the guarantees afforded by Artkle H 14 and 19. The Parliament is not required, in the exercise of its constituent power or otherwise, to undertake ail examination of the law8\n\nwhich are to receive the protection of Article 31A. In other words, when a competent legislature passes a law within the purview of clauses (a) to (e), it automatically receives the protection of Article 3 lA, with the result that the law cannot be challenged on the ground of its violation of Articles 14 and 19. In so far as Article 31B is concerned, it does not define the category of laws which are to receive its protection, and secondly, going a little further than Article 3 lA, it affords protection to Schedule-laws gainst all the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. No act can be placed in the Ninth Schedule except by the Parliament and since the Ninth Schedule is a part of the Constitution, no additions or alterations can be made therein without complying with the restrictive provisions governing amendments to the Constitution.\n\nThus, Article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule provides what is generally described as, a protective umbrella to all Acts which are included in the schedule, no mat(er of what character, kind or category they may be. Putting it briefly, whereas Article 31A protects laws of a defined category, Article 31B empowers the Parliament to include in the Ninth Schedule such laws as it considers fit and proper to include therein. The 39th Amendment which was passed on August 10, 1975 undertook an incredibly massive programme to include items 87 to 124 while the 40th Amendment, 1976 added items 125 to 188 to the Ninth Schedule in one stroke.\n\nE The necessity for pointing out this distinction between Articles 31A and 31B is the difficulty which may apparently arise in the application of the principle of stare decisis in regard to Article 3 lB read with the Ninth schedule, since that doctrine has been held by us not to apply to Article 3 lA. The fourth reason given by us for not applying the rule of stare decisis to Article 3 lA is that any particular law F. passed under clauses (a) to (e) can be accepted as good if it has been treated as valid for a long number of years but the device in the\n\nform of the Article cannot be upheld by the application of that rule. We Ji+-\n\npropose to apply to Article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule the selfsame test.\n\nWe propose to' draw a line, treating the decision in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) as the landmark. Several Acts were put in the Ninth schedule prior to that decision on the supposition that the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution was wide and untrammelled. The theory that the parliament cannot exercise its amending power so as to damage o'i destroy the basic structure of the Constitution, was propounded and accepted for the first time in Kesavananda Bharat! (snpra).\n\nThis is one reason for upholding the laws incorporated into the Ninth schedule before April 24, 1973, on which date the judgment in\n\n• Ӧ\n\nIVAMAN RAO v. UNION (Chmulrachud, C.J.) 39\n\nKesavananda Bharati (Supra) was rendered. A large number of proper\n\nties must have changed hands_ and several new titles must have come into\n\nexistence on the faith and belief that the laws included in the Ninth\n\nschedule were not open to challenge on the ground that they were vio\n\nlative of Articles 14, 19 and 31.\n\nWe will not be justified in upsetting\n\nsettled claims and titles and in introducing chaos and confusion into\n\nthe lawful affairs of a fairly orderly society.\n\nThe second reason for drawing a line at a convenient and rele\n\nvant point of time is that the first 66 items in the Ninth Schedule,\n\nwhich were inserted prior to the decision in Kesavananda Bharati,\n\n(Supra) mostly pertain to laws of agrarian reforms.\n\nThere are a few\n\nexceptions amongst those 66 items, like items 17, 18, 19 which relate to\n\nInsurance, Railways 1md Industries.\n\nBut almost all other items would\n\nfall within the purview of Article 31A (1) (a).\n\nIn fact, items 65 and\n\n66, which were inserted by the 29th Amendment, are the Kerala\n\nLand Reforms (Amendment) Acts of 1969 and 1971 respectively,\n\nwhich were specifically challenged in Kesavananda Bharati (supra).\n\nThat challenge was repelled.\n\nThus, in so far as the validity of Article 3 lB read with the Ninth\n\nschedule is concerned, we hold that all Acts and Regulations included\n\nin the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 1973 will receive the full\n\nprotection of Article 3 !B.\n\nThose laws and regulations will not be\n\nopen to challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or\n\ntake away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provi\n\nsions of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nActs and Regulations, which are\n\nor will be included in the Ninth Schedule o'n or after April 24, 1973 will\n\nnot receive the protection of Article 3 lB for the plain reason that in\n\nthe face of the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) there F\n\nwas no justification for making additions to the Ninth schedule wnh\n\na view to conferring a blanket protection on the laws included therein.\n\nThe various constitutional amendments, by which additions were\n\nmade to the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973, will be valid\n\nonly if they do not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Cons\n\ntitution.\n\nThat leaves for consideration the challenge to the constitntional\n\nvalidity of the unamended Article 31 C.\n\nAs we have stated at the\n\nbeginning of this judgment, Article 31 C was introdued by the Cons\n\ntitution (Twents-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971.\n\nInitially, it sought to\n\ngive protection to those Jaws only which gave effect to the policy of H\n\nthe State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and\n\n(c) of Article 39 of the Constitution.\n\nNo such law could be deemed\n\nA to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges the rights conferred 1J¥ Articles 14, 19 and 31. The concluding portion of the unamended article which gave conclusiveness to certain declarations was struck down in Kesavananda Bharati, (supra)\n\nShri M. N. Phadke, who Jed the argument on behalf of the petitioners, built a formidable attack against the vires of Article 31C.\n\nBut, with respect to the learned counsel, the effort is fruitless because the question as regards the validity of Article 31C is no longer res integra.\n\nThe opning clause of Article 31 C was upheld by the majority in Kesavananda Bharati (Supra) and we do not quite see ho\"{ the petitioners can be permitted to go behind that decision. The learned counsel addressed to us an interesting argument on the principles governing the theory of precedent, and he argued that, in the welter of judgments delivered in Kesavananda Bharati, '(Supra) it is impossible to discern a ratio because different learned fodges gave different reasons in upport of the conclusions to which they came. It is wellknown that six learned Judges who were in minority in Kel'!{lvananda Bharti (Supra) npheld the first part of Article 31C, which was a logical and inevitable consequence of their view that there were no inherent or implied !imitations on the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution.\n\nKhanna,. J. did not subscribe to that view but, 'all the same, he upheld the first part of Article 31C for different reasons.\n\nThe question of validity of the Twenty-fifth Amendment by which the unamended Arti.cle 31 C was introduced into the Constitution was specifically raised before the Conrt and the arguments in that behalf were specilfically considered by all the six minority Judges and by Khanna, J. It seems to us difficnlt, in these circumstances, to hold that no common ratio can be culled out from the decision of the majority of the seven Judges who upheld the validity of Article 31 C. Putting it simply, and there is no reason why simple matters should be made complicated, the ratio of the majority judgments in Kesavananda /Jharati\n\n(Supra) is that the first part of Article 31C is valid.\n\nApart from this, if we are right in upholding the validity of Article 3 lA on its own merits, it must follow logically that the unamended Article 31 C is also valid.\n\nThe unamended portion of Article 31 C is not like an unchartered ship. It gives protection to a defined and limited category of laws which are passed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the princ:iples specified in clause\n\n(b) or clause (c) of Article 39. These clauses of Article 39 contain tlirective principles which are vital to the well-being of the country and the welfare of its people. Whatever we have said in respect of the\n\ndefined category of law~ envisaged by Article 3 lA must hold good, A . perhaps with greater in respeci of laws passed for the purpose of gilving effect to clauses (b) and ( c) of Article 3 9. It is impossible to conceive that any law passed for such a purpose can at all violate Article 14 or Article 19. Article 31 is now out of harm's way.\n\nIn fact, far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive principles con- B tained in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 will fortify that structure.\n\nWe do hope that the Parliament will utilise to the maximum its poten.Yal to pass laws, genuinely and truly related to the principles contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. The challenge made to the validity of the first part of the unamended Article 31 C therefore fails. <;\n\nA small, though practically important, clarification seems called for at the end of this discussion of the validity of Article '.31A, 31B and 31C. We have held that Jaws included in the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973, will not receive the protection of Article 31B ipso facto.\n\nThose laws shall have to be examid individually for J) determining whether the constitutional amendments by which they were put in the Ninth Schedule, damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution in any manner. The clarification which we desi!re\n\nto make is that such an exercise will become otiose if the laws included in the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973 fall within the scope and purview of Arlkle 31A or the unamended Article 31C.\n\nI: If those laws are savedby these Articles, it would be unnecessary to determine whether they also receive the protection of Article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule. The fact that Article 3 lB confers protection on the schedule laws against \"any provisions\" of Part IIIand the other two Articles confer protection as against Arucles 14 and 19 only, will make no real difference to this position since, after the F deletion of Article 31, the two provisions of Part III, which would\n\ncrally come into play on the question of validity of the relevant laws, are Articles 14 and 19.\n\nApart from these challenges to the various constitutional amendments, the petitioners have also challenged the validity of the Consti- G tution (fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976, by which the Amending Acts 21 of 1975, 41 of 1975 and 2 of 1976 were placed in the N\"mth Schedule. It may be recalled that the Principal Act was amended by these Amending Acts. The normal term of five years of the Lok Sabha was due to expire on March 18, 1976 but, its life was extended for one year by the House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act, 1976.\n\nH Yet another Act was passed by the Parliament, The House of the People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act, 1976, by which the\n\nterm of the Lok Sabha was further extended by another year. The 40th Amendment was passed by the Lok Sabha on April 2, 1976 during its extended term. Since by the aforesaid two Acts, the life of the Lolc Sabha was extended while both the proclamations of emergency were in operation, the petitKiners challenge the proclamations of the state of Emergency, dated December 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975 as also the two Acts by which the term of the Lok Sabha was extended.\n\nThe 42nd Amendment inserted clauses 4 and 5 in Article 368 with effect from January 3, 1975.\n\nWhich was also during the extended term of the Lok Sabha.\n\nThat Amendment too is challenged for that reason. We have struck down that amendment unanimously by our judgment in Minerva Mills (supra) for the 'reason that it damages the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nThus, we are now left to consider the validity of :\n\n( 1) The Promulgation of the state of Emergency by the proclamations dated December 3, 1971 and June 2:5, 1975;\n\n(2) The House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act, 1976;\n\n(3) The House of People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act, 1976, and\n\nE ( 4) The Constitution (Fdrtieth Amendment) Act, 1976.\n\nThe validity of all these is inter-connecte~ and 'the focus of the challenge is the aforesaid proclamations of Emergency.\n\nThe validity of the proclamations of Emergency is challenged mainly by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri M. N. Phadke, Dr. N. M. (Jhatate and\n\nby Shri P. Il. Sawant who appeared in person in Writ Petition No. 63 of 1977. It is contended by the learned counsel and Sbri P. B.\n\nSawant that the Courts have jurisdiction to enquire whether the power conferred on the President by Article 352 to proclaim an emetgency is properly exercised as also the power to determine whether there are any -circumstances justifying the continuance of the emergency. There may sometimes be justification for declaring an emergency but if an emergency, properly declared, is allowed to continue without justification, the party in power, according to counsel, can perpetuate its rule and cling to power by extending the life of the Parliament from time to time.\n\nThe provisions of Article 352 should, tlierefore, be interpreted in a liberal and progressive manner so that the democratic ideal of the Constitution will be furthered and not frustrated. It is urged that the threat to the security of India having completely disap-\n\n'4L...\n\npeared soon after the Pakistani aggression in December 1971, the continuance of theemergency proclaimed on December 3, 1971, must be held to be unjustified and illegal.\n\nA list of dates has been furnished to us by counsel in support of their argument that the emergency declared on December 3, 1971, could not legitimately be continued in operation for a period of more than six years. On December 3, 1971 the President issued the proclamation of emergency in face of the aggression by Pakistan, stating that a grave emergency existed whereby the security of the country was threatened by external aggression. Both the Houses of Parliament approved the proclamation on the 4th, on which date the Defence of India Act, 1971, came into force. The Defence of India Rules, 1971, framed under section 22 of the Defence of India Act, came into force on the 5th.\n\nOn December 16, 1971; the Pakistani forces made an unconditional surrender in Bangladesh and on the 17th the hostilities between India and Pakistan came to an end.\n\nIn February 1972, General Elections were held to the State Assemblies.\n\nOn August 28, 1972 the two countries entered into an agreement for the exchange of prisoners of war, and by April 30, 197 4 the repatriation of the prisoners of war was completed.\n\nOn August 16, 1974 the Presidential Election was held in India. On June 25, 1975 came the second proclamation of emergency; in the wake of which a notification was issued under Article 359 on June 27 suspending the enforcement of the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22. On February 16, 1976 the House of People (Extension of Duration) Act was passed. The normal term of !he Lok Sabha expired on March 18,\n\n1976. On April 2, 1976, the Lok Sabha passed the 40th Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Amendment Acts were put in tl)e Ninth Schedule as Items 157, 159 and 160.\n\nOn November 24, 1976 the House of People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act was passed extending the term of the Parliament for a further period of one year. The 42nd Amendment Act was passed on November 12, 1976. The Lok Sabha was dissolved tin January 18, 1977 and both the emergencies were revoked on March 21, r977.\n\nThe question as to whether a proclamation of emergency issued by the President under Article 352 ( 1) of the Constitution raiss a justiciable issue has bee'n argued in this Conrt from time to time but, for some reason or the other, though the question has been discussed briefly and occasionally, there is no authoritative pronouncement upon it.\n\nWe do not propose to enter into that question in this case also partly lncause, there is good reason to hope that in future, there will be ho occasion to bring before the Court the kind of grievance\n\n4-1281SCI/80\n\nwhich is now made in regard to the circumstances in which the proclamation of emergency was issued on June 25, 1975. Section 48 of the Consti\\ution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, which came into force on January 3, 1977, has inserted clanses (2) to (8) ill Article 352 which afford adequate insurance against the misnse of power to issue a proclamation of emergency.\n\nBy the newly added clause ( 3), the President cannot issue a proclamation under clause ( 1) unless the decision of the Union Cabinet of Ministers that such a proclamation may be issued has been communicated to him in writing.\n\nUnder clause (4), every proclamation issued under Article 352 has to be laid before each House of :rarliament, :µid it ceases to operate at the expiration of one month, unless before the expiration of that period, it has been approved by a resolution of both the Honses of Parliament. Clause ( 4) provides that the proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the passing of the second of the resolutions approving the proclamation.\n\nThe question as to whether the issuance of a proclamation of emergency is justiciable raises issues which are noi easy to answer.\n\nIn any event, that question can more appropriately and squarely be dealt with when it arises directly and not incidentally as here.\n\nIn so far as the proclamation of December 3, 1971 is concerned, it is not disputed, and indeed it cannot be disputed, that there was manifest justification for that course of action.\n\nThe danger to the security of the country was clear and present. Therefore, the attempt of the petitioners has been to assail the continuance of the state of emergency under that proclamation. From the various dates and events mentioned and furnished to us, it may be possible for a layman to conclude that there was no reason to contillue the state of emergency at least after the formality of exchanging the prisoners of war was completed. But we are doubtful whether, on the material furni&hed to us, it is safe to conclude by way of a judicial verdict that the continuance of the emergency after a certain date became unjnstified and unlawful.\n\nThat inference is somewhat non-judicious to draw.\n\nNewspapers and public men are entitled to prepare public opinion on the need to revoke a proclamation of el, llergency. They have diverse sources for gathering information which they may not disclose and they are '.neither bound by rules of evidence nor to observe the elementary rule of judicial busilless that facts on which a conclusion is to be based have to be established by a preponderance of probabilities. But Courts have severe constraints which deter them from undertaking a task which cannot judicially be performed. It was suggested that the proclamation of June 25, 1975 was actuated by mala fides. But there\n\n' '\n\ntoo, evidence placed before us of ma!a !ides is neither clear nor A cogent.\n\nThus, in the first place, we are not disposed to decide the question as to whether the issuance of a proclamation of emergency raises a justiciable issue. Secondly, assuming it does, it is not possible in the present state of record to answer that issue one way or the other.\n\nB And, lastly, whether there was justification for continuing the state of emergency after the cessation of hostilities with Pakistan is a matter on which we find ourselves ill-equipped to pronounce.\n\nComing to the two Act~ of 1976 by which the life of the Lok Sabha was extended, section 2 of the first of these Acts, 30 of 1976, which was passed on February 16, 1976, provided that the period of five years in relation to the then House of the People shall be extended for a period of one year \"while the Proclamation of Emergency issued on the 3rd day of December, 1971 and on the 25th day of June, 1975, are both in operation\". The second Act of Extension continues to contain the same provision. It is contended by the petitioners that the proclamation of December 3, 1971 should have been revoked long before February 16, 1976 and that the proclamation of June 25, 1975 wholly uncalled for and was mala fide.\n\nSince the precondition on which the life of the Parliament was extended is not satisfied, the Act, it is contended, is ineffective to extend the life of the Parliament. We find it difficult td accept this contention. Both the proclamations of emergency were in fact in operation on February 16, 1976 when the first Act was passed as also on November 24, 1976 when the second Act, 109 of 1976, was passed. It is not pos- 11\"ble for us to accept the submission of the petitioners that for the various reasons assigned by them, the first proclamation must be deemed not be in existence and that the second proclamation must be held to have been issued mala fide and therefore non-est. The evide'nce produced before ns is insufficient for recording a decision on either of these matters. It must follow that the two Acts by which the duration of the Lok Sabha was extended are valid and lawful. The 40th and the 42nd Constitutional Amendments cannot, therefore, be struck down on the gronud that they were passed by a Lok Sabha which was :not lawfully in existeuce .\n\nThese theu are our reasons for the order which we passed on May 9, 1980 to the following effect :\n\n\"(1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which H introduced Article 31 A into the Constitution with retrospective effect, ·,... and section 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955\n\nwhich substituted a new clause (1), sub-clause (a) to (e), for the original clause (1) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and arc valid and constitutional, being withiu the constituen_t power of the Parliament.\n\n( 2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 19 51 introduced Article 31B into the Constitution which reads thus\n\n''31B x x x x x x\n\nIn Keshvananda Bharati (197.3, Suppl., SCR 1) decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure.\n\nWe hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made befone April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulatiohs therein, are valid and constitutional.\n\nAmendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are ope'n to challegge on the ground that they, or\n\nany one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Con- E stitution or its basic strncture. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if.\n\nany Act Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a Constitutional amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is s, ived by Article 31A, or by Article 31 C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act or Regnlation is put in the 9th Sch~ dule, on the gronnd that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitntional or its basic structnre as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, wil! become otiose.\n\n(3) Article 31C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to itS amendment by section 4 of the Constitution ( 42nd Amendment), Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Keshvananda Bharati.\n\nArticle 31C, as it stood prior to the Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act does not damage any of tbe basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic. structure.\n\n(4) All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts are dismissed with costs.\n\nThe stay orders granted in these matters will\n\nii I d:Ja:a -- -\n\n. ) .\n\nWAMAN RAO v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 47\n\nstand vacated. We quantify the costs at Rs. five thousand which will A be borne equally by the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 656-660 of 1977; 512-533 of 1977; and 505 to 511 of 1977. The costs will be payable to the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra in eqnal measure.\n\n(5) Writ Petition No. 63 of 1977 (Baburao Samant v. Union of B rndia) will be set down for hearing\" .\n\nBHAGWATI, J.(1) This Court made an Order on 9th May, 1980 disposing of the writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra ;\\gricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 of 1961 as amended from time to time by various subsequent acts.\n\nThis Order was in the following terms :\n\n\"(1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31A into the Constitution with retrospective effect,\n\nand &>..ction 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 D which substituted a new clause (1), sub-clause (a) to (e), for the original clause(!) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and are valid and constitutional, being within the constituent power of the Parliament.\n\n(2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 introduced A1ticle 3 IB into the Constitution which reads thus\n\n\"3 lB : x x x x x\n\n<t In Keshvananda Bharati (1973, Suppl., SCR 1) decided on April F 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend tb~ Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or\n\nessential features or its basic structure.\n\nWe hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and constitutional.\n\nAmendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was arnnded from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the\n\n(I) The Judgment ofBhagwati J. should be read along with his reasons reported in the case published in [1981] l S.C.R. P.206.\n\nti:\n\nA Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 3 lA, or by Article 31 C as it stood prior to its ame'ndment B by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put iu the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or\n\ndestroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic -l...< structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose.\n\n(3) Article 31C of the Co'nstitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Keshvananda Bharati. Article 31C, as it stood prior to the Cons\n\ntitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure.\n\n( 4) All the writ petitions and Review Petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts are dismissed with costs.\n\nThe stay orders granted in these matters will stand vacated.\n\nWe quantify the costs at Rs. five thousand which will be borne equally by the petitio'ners in Writ Petitions Nos. 656-660 of 1977; 512-533 of 1977; and 505 to 511 of 1977. The costs will be payable to the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra in equal measure.\n\n(5) Writ Petition No. 63 of 1977 (Babumo Sawant v.\n\nUnion of India) will be set down for hearing\".\n\nNo reasons were given F ' in support of this Order but it was stated that reasons would be given later.\n\nWhile delivering my dissenting judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 on 31st July 1980, I gave my reasons for subscribing to this Order. It is therefore not necessary to reiterate those reasons over again but they may be treated as\n\nG formi'ng part of this judgment and a copy of my judgment in Minerva Mills case may be attached as an annexure to this judgment. I may point out that pages 1 to 6 and pages 17 to 96 of the judgment in Minerva Mills case set out the reasons for the making of the order dated 9th May 1980 and I re-affirm those reasons.\n\nB I have had the advantage of reading the judgment just delivered by the learned Chief Justice, but I find my6e!f unable to agree with him that \"it is somewhat difficult to apply the doctrine of stare decisis\n\nWAMAN RAO V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 49\n\nfor upholding \"Article 3 lA and that it would not be proper to invoke the doctrine of stare decisis for upholding the validity of that Article.\"\n\nI have given reasons in my judgment for applying th~ doctrine of stare decisis for sustaining the constitutional validity of Article 31A, but apart from the reasons given by me in support of my view, I find that in Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P.(') the same Bench which is deciding the prese\"rlt writ petitions has upheld the constitutional validity of Article 31A by applying the doctrine of stare decisis.\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of a unanimous court said in that case :\n\n\"It is significant that even apart from the many decisio\"rlS upholding Article 31A, Golak Nath case decided by a Bench of 11 Judges, while hold?ng that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act exceeded the constituent power still categorically declared that the said amendment and a few other like amendments would be held good based on the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. The result, for our purpose, is that even Golak Nath case has held Article 3 lA valid.\n\nThe note struck by later cases reversing Golak Nath does not militate against the vires of Article 31A.\n\nSuffice it to say that in the Kesava:nanda Bharati case Article 3 lA was challenged as beyond the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid.\n\nBut after listening to the Marathon erudition from eminent counsel, a 13 Judge Bench of t.1:1is Court upheld the vires of Article 31-A in unequivocal terms.\n\nThat decision binds, on the simple score of stare decisis and the constitutional ground of Article 141.\n\nEvery new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. In this view, other submissions sparkli\"ng with creative ingenuity and presented with high-pressure advocacy, cannot persuade ns to reopen what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemn proposition by the epic Fundamental Rights case.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied.) These observations show byond doubt that this very Bench held Article 31-A to be constitutionally valid \"on the simple score of stare decisis\".\n\nIt is true that Krishna Iyer, J. stated in the beginning of his judgment in Ambika Prasad Mishra's case :\n\n\"In this judgment, we side-step the bigger issue of the vires of the constitutional amendments in Articles 31-A,\n\n\n· ;\n\nA 31-B and 31-C as they are dealt with in other cases disposed of recently.\"\n\nThis statement was made presumably recause the learned Judge must have thought at the time when he prepared his judgment in this case that the judgment ih the present writ petitions would re given before his judgment came to be delivered and on this assumption, the learned Judge did not consider it necessary to discuss the entire range of arguments relating to the constitutional validity of ArJicles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C.\n\nBut so far as Article 31A was concerned, the learned Judge did proceed to hold that Article 31A was constitutionally valid \"on the simple score or stare decisis\" and the other four learned Judges subscribed to this view.\n\nIt is also true that Krishna Iyer, J. did not rest his judgment entirely on the protective armour of Article 31A and pointed out that \"independently of Article 31-A, the impugned legislation can withstand cohstitutional invasion\" and sustained the validity of the impugned legislation on merits, but even so he did hold that Article 31-A was constitutionally valid on the\n\nprinciple of stare decisis and observed that \"the comprehensive vocabulary of that purposeful provision obviously catches within its protective net the present Act, and broadly speaking, the undisputed elfect of that Article is sufficient to immunise the Act against invalidation to the extent stated therein\".\n\nI cannot, therefore, despite the high regard and great respect which I have for the learned Chief Justice, agree with him that the doctrine of stare decisis cannot be invomd for upholding the validity of Article 31-A, since that would be in direct contradiction of what has been held by this very Bench in Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. (supra).\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. While I agree with the learned Chief Justice, I must state that certain observations regarding Arts. 31A, 31B and 31C are wider than necessary and I do not go that far despite the decision in Minerva Mills case.(') I also wish to add a rider regarding the broader observations with the application of stare decisis in sustai'ning Art. 31A.\n\nI have expressly upheld Art. 31A by reliance on stare decieis and cannot practise a volte face without convincing juristic basis to convert me to a contrary position.\n\nI know that Justice Holmes has said : \"Don't be\" consistent, \"but be simply true\".\n\nI also remind myself of the profound reflection of Ralph Waldo Emernon :\n\n(1) [1981] I S.C.R. p. 206.\n\nWAMAN RAO v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, l.)\n\nA foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do.\n\nHe may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall.\n\nSpeak what you think now in hard words and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said today.-\"Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstdod.\" Is it so bad then to be misunderstood ? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh.\n\nTo be great is to be misunderstood.\n\nAnd yet, I hold to what I have earlier stated in Ambika Prasad Misra.(') What the learned Chief Justice has in mind, if, with respect, I may venture to speak is that in constitutional issues\n\nover-stress on precedents is inept because we cannot be governed by voices from the grave and it is proper that we are ultimately right rather than be consistently wrong.\n\nEven so, great respect and binding value are the normal claim of rulings until reversed by larger benches. That is the minimum price we pay for adoption of the jurisprudence of binding precedents. I leave it at that because the learned Chief Justice has held the impugned Act good in its own right.\n\nEnough unto the day is the evil thereof.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n{1) [1980] 3 SCRp. 1159", "total_entities": 605, "entities": [{"text": "W AMAN RAO & ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WAMAN RAO & ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343, "end_char": 358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 675, "end_char": 696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 31A, 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 746, "end_char": 763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 859, "end_char": 869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1570, "end_char": 1587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of 1hcse Acts was challenged in the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1612, "end_char": 1618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench at Nagpur repelled that challenge by its judgment dated August 13, 1976 in Vd!ialrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. Slate of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 Bombay 99."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1825, "end_char": 1838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TI1e appeals filed against the said decision were dismissed by the Supreme Court by its judgment in Dattanaya GO\\'ind Mahajan v.\n\nStale of Maharashtra, [19771 2 SCR 790."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2064, "end_char": 2073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2322, "end_char": 2331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2488, "end_char": 2499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2577, "end_char": 2591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dattaraya Govind Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3318, "end_char": 3342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the revoca ticn of that proclamation, petitions were filed in this Court by the appellants\n\nA praying for the review of the judgment in Dattaraya Govind Mahajan on\n\nrhe ground that .several contentions, which were otherwise open to them for\n\nassailing the constitutional validity of the impugned Acts, could not be made\n\nby reason of the emergency and that they should be permitted to make those\n\ncontentions since the emergency was lifted.", "canonical_name": "Dattatraya Govind Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Dismissing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : (Majority view)\n\nPer Chandrachud, C.J. (On his O\\Vll behalf and on behalf of Krishna Iyer,\n\nTulzapurkar and Sen, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer-"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3937, "end_char": 3948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Dismissing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : (Majority view)\n\nPer Chandrachud, C.J. (On his O\\Vll behalf and on behalf of Krishna Iyer,\n\nTulzapurkar and Sen, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Dismissing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : (Majority view)\n\nPer Chandrachud, C.J. (On his O\\Vll behalf and on behalf of Krishna Iyer,\n\nTulzapurkar and Sen, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3977, "end_char": 4017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C A. (I) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced\n\nArticle 31A into the Constitution with retrospective effect and sec."}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4036, "end_char": 4047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4100, "end_char": 4106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4445, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of the\n\nConstitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 \\vhich substituted a new clause (lJ, subclauses (a) to (e) for the original clause (1) with retrospective effect,\n\ndo not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or\n\nits basic structure and are valid and constitutional being within the constituent\n\npower of the Parliament. 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State of U.P., (1980] 3 SCR p. 1159, followed.", "canonical_name": "ofBhagwati"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26186, "end_char": 26195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26359, "end_char": 26372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Krishna Iyer-, 1:- (Contra)\n\nApplying the principle of stare decisis.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer-"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26429, "end_char": 26438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26798, "end_char": 26808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27040, "end_char": 27050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. 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Kherdikar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27301, "end_char": 27318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. N. Kherdikar, M. N.\n\nIngle, A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi and C. K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "M. N.\n\nIngle", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27320, "end_char": 27332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. N. Kherdikar, M. N.\n\nIngle, A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi and C. K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27334, "end_char": 27352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. N. Kherdikar, M. N.\n\nIngle, A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi and C. K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nRatnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27357, "end_char": 27375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. N. Kherdikar, M. N.\n\nIngle, A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi and C. K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27417, "end_char": 27428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Att.", "canonical_name": "S. V. Gupte"}}, {"text": "K. H. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27441, "end_char": 27452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. H. Bhatt, R. N. Sacthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for R 1 in WPs."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sacthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27454, "end_char": 27467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. H. Bhatt, R. N. Sacthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for R 1 in WPs."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nSubhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27477, "end_char": 27491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. H. Bhatt, R. N. Sacthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for R 1 in WPs."}}, {"text": "H S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27556, "end_char": 27569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H S. V. Gupte, Att."}}, {"text": "C. J. 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Patnaik and R. K. Mehta (State of Orissa)."}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28199, "end_char": 28212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. K. Nair and N. Nettar (State of Karnataka)."}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28217, "end_char": 28226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. K. Nair and N. Nettar (State of Karnataka).", "canonical_name": "N. Nettar"}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28268, "end_char": 28277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. K. Nair and N. Nettar (State of Tamil Nadu).", "canonical_name": "N. Nettar"}}, {"text": "V. N Ganpu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28324, "end_char": 28334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FOR THE JNTERVENERS:\n\nV. N Ganpu/e for Pratap Rao in W.P. 503."}}, {"text": "Pratap Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28341, "end_char": 28351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FOR THE JNTERVENERS:\n\nV. N Ganpu/e for Pratap Rao in W.P. 503."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28366, "end_char": 28376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg for Shyam Narain Tiwari in RP 34/77 & WP 512/ 77."}}, {"text": "Shyam Narain Tiwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28381, "end_char": 28400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg for Shyam Narain Tiwari in RP 34/77 & WP 512/ 77."}}, {"text": "R. N. Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28428, "end_char": 28443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Bannerjee, J. S. Sinha and J.B.D. & Co. for Panch Valley Coal Co. and Shri Bimal Poddar in WP."}}, {"text": "J. S. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28445, "end_char": 28456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Bannerjee, J. S. Sinha and J.B.D. & Co. for Panch Valley Coal Co. and Shri Bimal Poddar in WP."}}, {"text": "Bimal Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28509, "end_char": 28521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Bannerjee, J. S. Sinha and J.B.D. & Co. for Panch Valley Coal Co. and Shri Bimal Poddar in WP."}}, {"text": "G. L. Snnghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28538, "end_char": 28550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Snnghi, Miss Bhubnesh Kumari, K. J. John and J. B. D. & E Co. for the Appellant Intervener Lt."}}, {"text": "Bhubnesh Kumari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28557, "end_char": 28572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Snnghi, Miss Bhubnesh Kumari, K. J. John and J. B. D. & E Co. for the Appellant Intervener Lt."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28574, "end_char": 28584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Snnghi, Miss Bhubnesh Kumari, K. J. John and J. B. D. & E Co. for the Appellant Intervener Lt."}}, {"text": "Himmat Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28644, "end_char": 28656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Himmat Singh & Ors."}}, {"text": "S. B. Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28665, "end_char": 28674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Wad for the Applicant/Intervener in WPs."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28863, "end_char": 28872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28929, "end_char": 28938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29297, "end_char": 29306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29365, "end_char": 29375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29498, "end_char": 29507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29562, "end_char": 29576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30122, "end_char": 30130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SCR 1) decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority th.at Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31193, "end_char": 31202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31213, "end_char": 31224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31329, "end_char": 31385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31555, "end_char": 31570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31603, "end_char": 31614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31674, "end_char": 31683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "G Kesavananda Bharati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31801, "end_char": 31822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Article 31C of the Constitution, as it stood pridr to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in G Kesavananda Bharati.", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharati(Supra"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31824, "end_char": 31835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32438, "end_char": 32452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The costs will be A payable to the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra in equal measure."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32461, "end_char": 32481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The costs will be A payable to the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra in equal measure."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32691, "end_char": 32702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Jndgments were delivered :\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. A ceiling on agricultural holdings was imposed in Maharashtra by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 o~ 1961, which was bi:ought into operation on January 26, 1962.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "August 13, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33267, "end_char": 33282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the High Court silting at Nagpur repelled that challenge by a judgment dated August 13, 1976, 1n Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttanvar v.\n\nState of Maharashtra(')."}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33602, "end_char": 33616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33642, "end_char": 33661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33689, "end_char": 33708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33799, "end_char": 33817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33924, "end_char": 33933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34082, "end_char": 34093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34193, "end_char": 34256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34404, "end_char": 34413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Act", "statute": "Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34548, "end_char": 34559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Acts, particularly the concept of 'family unit' were challenged before the High Court on the ground, inter alia, that they were outside the purview of Article 3 lA On an overall consideration of the movement of agrarian reforms, with particular reference to the relevant statistics in regard to Maharashtra, the High Court rejected that challeng.e too on the ground that those provisions formed a part of an integral scheme of agrarian reforms under which large agricultu-\n\n{I) ATR' 1977 llombay 99."}}, {"text": "January 27, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34980, "end_char": 34996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals filed against the decision of the Bombay High Court were dismissed by this Court by a judgment dated January 27, 1977 in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra(')."}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35182, "end_char": 35196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Act", "statute": "Certain provisions of the Principal Act and of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35443, "end_char": 35454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35620, "end_char": 35629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35710, "end_char": 35724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36107, "end_char": 36121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dattatraya Govind Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36449, "end_char": 36474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the revocation of that proclamation, petitions were filed in this Court by the appellants praying for the revi•\"w of the judgment in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan (Supra) on the ground that several contentions, which were otherwise open to them for assailing the constitutional validity of the impugned Acts, could not be made by reason of the emergency and that they should be permitted to make those contentions since the emergency was lifted.", "canonical_name": "Dattatraya Govind Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Articles 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37140, "end_char": 37150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37178, "end_char": 37188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 S.C.R. 790", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37341, "end_char": 37360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Keshavananda Bharati.(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38047, "end_char": 38070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reply of the appellants and the petitioners to the defence of the respondents is, as it could oruy be, that the very provisions of the Constitution on which the respondents rely for saving the impugned laws are invalid, since these particular provisions of the Constitution, which were introduced by later amendments, damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution within the meaning of the ratio of the majority judgment in Keshavananda Bharati.(1)\n\nArticles 14, 19, 31A. 31B, 31C (as unamended) and 368, which are relevant for our purpose, are familiar to lawyers and laymen alike, so great is their impact on Jaw and life.", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharati(Supra"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19, 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38073, "end_char": 38093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38249, "end_char": 38259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38431, "end_char": 38436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 14, the saviour of the rule of Jaw, injuncts that the State shall not d•ony to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the Jaws within the territory of India."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38439, "end_char": 38449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38865, "end_char": 38875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38972, "end_char": 38983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39052, "end_char": 39065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right to property conferred by Articles 19 ( 1) ( f) and 31 was deleted by the 44th Amendment with effect from June 20, 1979."}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39068, "end_char": 39082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39141, "end_char": 39151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39436, "end_char": 39446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39450, "end_char": 39460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39464, "end_char": 39473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39561, "end_char": 39570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39625, "end_char": 39639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40155, "end_char": 40166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 3, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40257, "end_char": 40272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 31C, as it existed prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment Act, which came into force on January 3, 1977, provided that:\n\nNotwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to sw:h policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy."}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40328, "end_char": 40338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40461, "end_char": 40471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40600, "end_char": 40610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40614, "end_char": 40624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40807, "end_char": 40827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41008, "end_char": 41019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 20, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41114, "end_char": 41128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E Article 31C (unamended) was introduced by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, with effect from April 20, 1972."}}, {"text": "June 20,\n\n1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41615, "end_char": 41629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F words \"the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of artlc:e\n\n39• were substituted by the words \"all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV\", by the 44th Amendment, with effect from June 20,\n\n1979."}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41653, "end_char": 41664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kesavarwnda Blwrati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41747, "end_char": 41766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned with Article 31C as it stood originally but, of course, without the concluding part struck down in Kesavarwnda Blwrati (supra)."}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41777, "end_char": 41788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42120, "end_char": 42130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42365, "end_char": 42375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Forty-second B Amendment Act 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42397, "end_char": 42430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42775, "end_char": 42785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Forty-second B Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Forty-second B Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42798, "end_char": 42816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 31, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43037, "end_char": 43050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those clauses were declared unconstitutional, as being beyond the amending power of the Parliament, by a very recent decision of this Court in Minerva Mil/s,( 1) which was pronounced on July 31, 1980."}}, {"text": "Articles 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43164, "end_char": 43179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43208, "end_char": 43217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43288, "end_char": 43299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43858, "end_char": 43870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite auother matter that learned counsel led by Shri M. N. Phadke ques- .tion whether any ratio at all is discernible from the majority judgments in Kesavananda (supra).", "canonical_name": "M. N. Phadke"}}, {"text": "Kesavananda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43954, "end_char": 43965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite auother matter that learned counsel led by Shri M. N. Phadke ques- .tion whether any ratio at all is discernible from the majority judgments in Kesavananda (supra).", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharati(Supra"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44056, "end_char": 44066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44207, "end_char": 44218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44255, "end_char": 44264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44384, "end_char": 44398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 18, l 951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44438, "end_char": 44452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 31A(l), as introduced by the 1st Amendment on June 18, l 951, read thus : 3 lA. ( 1) N otwithstauding anything in the foregoing provisions of this part, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part."}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44854, "end_char": 44865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45266, "end_char": 45276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45654, "end_char": 45676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45730, "end_char": 45741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46613, "end_char": 46622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46695, "end_char": 46705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46749, "end_char": 46763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46833, "end_char": 46842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46884, "end_char": 46897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47272, "end_char": 47288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47481, "end_char": 47495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47845, "end_char": 47859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48066, "end_char": 48081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48154, "end_char": 48168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48307, "end_char": 48329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48542, "end_char": 48555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49339, "end_char": 49361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49484, "end_char": 49498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50502, "end_char": 50524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51524, "end_char": 51535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 329A(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52362, "end_char": 52374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52626, "end_char": 52631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Ray C.J. based his decision on tM ground that the 39th Amendment by which Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 329A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52702, "end_char": 52711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 SCR 347", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 52757, "end_char": 52773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52791, "end_char": 52797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\n(p. 418); Khanna J. based his decision on the ground that democracy was a basic feature of the Constitution, that democracy contemplates that elections should be free and fair and that the clause in question struck at the basis of free and fair elections (pp."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53057, "end_char": 53063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "467 and 4 71) ; Mathew J. struck down the clause on the ground that it was in the nature of legislation ad hominem (p. 513) and that it damaged the democratic structure of the Constitution (p. 515); while one of us, Chandracbud J., held that the clause was bad because it violated the Rule of Law and was an outright negation of the principle of equality which is a basic feature of the Constitution (pp."}}, {"text": "Chandracbud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53257, "end_char": 53268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "467 and 4 71) ; Mathew J. struck down the clause on the ground that it was in the nature of legislation ad hominem (p. 513) and that it damaged the democratic structure of the Constitution (p. 515); while one of us, Chandracbud J., held that the clause was bad because it violated the Rule of Law and was an outright negation of the principle of equality which is a basic feature of the Constitution (pp.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Minerva Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53475, "end_char": 53488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "More recently, in Minerva Mills, (supra) clauses\n\n(4) and (5) of Article 368 itself were held unconstitutional by a unanimous Court, on the ground that they destroyed certain basic features of the Constitution like judicial review and a limited amending power, and thereby damaged its basic structure."}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53522, "end_char": 53533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53818, "end_char": 53828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53834, "end_char": 53843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53856, "end_char": 53875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55504, "end_char": 55515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55588, "end_char": 55597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55663, "end_char": 55674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56593, "end_char": 56602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57288, "end_char": 57298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57735, "end_char": 57748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58075, "end_char": 58088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58167, "end_char": 58177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58338, "end_char": 58348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58579, "end_char": 58589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58952, "end_char": 58968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shankari Prasad v. Union of India('), Patanjali Sastri, C.J. explained the reasons that led to the insertion of Articles 3 lA and 3 lB by the 1st Amendment thus :\n\nWhat led to that enactment is a matter of common knowledge."}}, {"text": "Articles 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59026, "end_char": 59036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59325, "end_char": 59330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The political party now in power, commanding as it does a majority uf \\Oles in the several State Legislatmes as well as in Parliament, carried out certain measures of agrarian reform in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh by enacting legislation which may compendiously be referred to as Zamindari Abolition Acts."}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 59675, "end_char": 59694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court at Patna held that the Act passed in Bihar was unconstitutional while the High Courts at AJlahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of the corresp@ding legislation in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively."}}, {"text": "High Courts at AJlahabad and Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 59760, "end_char": 59795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court at Patna held that the Act passed in Bihar was unconstitutional while the High Courts at AJlahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of the corresp@ding legislation in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively."}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60494, "end_char": 60505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60896, "end_char": 60917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31A and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61043, "end_char": 61061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61187, "end_char": 61209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61940, "end_char": 61948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61984, "end_char": 61994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 12, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62148, "end_char": 62160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution (First Amendment) A.ct was moved in the Provisional Parliament on May 12, 1951 as Bill No."}}, {"text": "June 18, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62366, "end_char": 62379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received the Presidential assent on June 18, 1951."}}, {"text": "Jawaharlal Nehru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62433, "end_char": 62449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The speeches made in the Provisional Parliament by Jawaharlal Nehru and other national leaders who had participated in the freedom\n\nmovement show, in a significant measure, the genesis of the 1st Amend A ment and its avowed purpose."}}, {"text": "May 15-June 9, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64174, "end_char": 64193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Volumes XII and XIII (May 15-June 9, 1951) contain the record of the speeches made while thei 1st Amendment was on the anvil."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65255, "end_char": 65265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Asia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66141, "end_char": 66145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 8830)\n\nNow apart from our commitment, a survey of the world E today, a survey of Asia today will lead any intelligent person to see that the basic and the primary problem is the land problem today in Asia, as in India."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67046, "end_char": 67056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67111, "end_char": 67131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31, 31A and\n\n3J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67978, "end_char": 68002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68438, "end_char": 68448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69173, "end_char": 69186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69268, "end_char": 69278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad and Nagpur High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 69450, "end_char": 69482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court held that view bl!t the Allahabad and Nagpur High Courts held a contrary view."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71230, "end_char": 71240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72333, "end_char": 72343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72906, "end_char": 72915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his address to the Allahabad Session of the Agri-Economics Conference, Dr. D. R. Gadgil put a home-truth succinctly by saying :\n\n\"Among all resources, the supply of land is the :m'tlst limited and the claimants for its possession are extremely numerous."}}, {"text": "D. R. Gadgil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72962, "end_char": 72974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his address to the Allahabad Session of the Agri-Economics Conference, Dr. D. R. Gadgil put a home-truth succinctly by saying :\n\n\"Among all resources, the supply of land is the :m'tlst limited and the claimants for its possession are extremely numerous."}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76416, "end_char": 76427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sbri J. G. Karandikar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79376, "end_char": 79397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Note of the Panel set up by the Planning Commission in May 1959 on the adoption of 'family unit' as the unit of application for the revised ceilings and the counter affidavit of Sbri J. G. Karandikar, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra show the relevance and efficacy of the family being treated as the real operative unit in the movement for agrarian reform."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 79423, "end_char": 79448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Note of the Panel set up by the Planning Commission in May 1959 on the adoption of 'family unit' as the unit of application for the revised ceilings and the counter affidavit of Sbri J. G. Karandikar, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra show the relevance and efficacy of the family being treated as the real operative unit in the movement for agrarian reform."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79928, "end_char": 79937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80004, "end_char": 80019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80100, "end_char": 80109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80338, "end_char": 80349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80596, "end_char": 80605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80781, "end_char": 80791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80852, "end_char": 80862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81300, "end_char": 81311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81811, "end_char": 81831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Golaknath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81896, "end_char": 81905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is trite knowledge that Golaknath(') was overruled in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) in which it was held unanimoosly that the power to amend the Constitution was to be found in Article 368 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Golak Nath(Supra"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82047, "end_char": 82058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82544, "end_char": 82555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ari Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82576, "end_char": 82586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the 1st Amendment was not questioned Khanna J., however, held-while dealing with the , aJidity of the unamended Art\\cle 3 IC that the validity of Article 31A was upheld in Slwnl:ari Prasad, (supra) that its validity could not be G any longer questioned because of the principle of starg decisis and that the ground on which the validity of Article 3 lA was sustained will be available equally for mstaining the validity of the first part of Articie 3JC (page 744)."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82738, "end_char": 82747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82903, "end_char": 82912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1965] 1 SCR 933", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 83078, "end_char": 83094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 762", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 83106, "end_char": 83122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83272, "end_char": 83281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83569, "end_char": 83578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83863, "end_char": 83874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P.(') this very Bench delivered its judgment on May 9, 1980 rejecting the challenge to the validity of the 'Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960'."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83923, "end_char": 83985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84020, "end_char": 84031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "statute": "Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Articles 31A, 31B and 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84517, "end_char": 84542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "statute": "Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84699, "end_char": 84711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the question of vires of these three articles was not dealt with by Brother Krishna Iyer in bis judgment on behalf of the Court, we\n\nare, as previously arranged amongst us, dealing with that question in F this judgment.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer-"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85090, "end_char": 85100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85255, "end_char": 85266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85368, "end_char": 85378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85478, "end_char": 85488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85545, "end_char": 85559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Krishna Iyer J. has observed in the same paragraph that\n\n\"The extreme argument that Article 31-A itself is void as violative of the basic structure of the Constitution has been negatived by my learned Brother, Bhagwati J., -in a kindred group of 'cases of Andhra Pradesh\"."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85631, "end_char": 85641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85803, "end_char": 85817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Krishna Iyer J. has observed in the same paragraph that\n\n\"The extreme argument that Article 31-A itself is void as violative of the basic structure of the Constitution has been negatived by my learned Brother, Bhagwati J., -in a kindred group of 'cases of Andhra Pradesh\"."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85951, "end_char": 85959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in that judgment too, one of us, Brother Bhagwati, who spoke for the unanimous Court, did not refer to the vires of Articles 31A, 31B and 31C. It will thus be clear that neither the one or the other of us, that is to say neither Brother Bhagwati nor Brother Krishna Iyer, dealt with the question of vires of Articles 31A, 3 lB and 31 C which we are doing by this judgment.", "canonical_name": "ofBhagwati"}}, {"text": "Articles 31A, 31B and 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86026, "end_char": 86051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 31A, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86218, "end_char": 86233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ambika Prasad Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86442, "end_char": 86462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has become necessary to make this clarification in view of an observation by Brother Krishna Iyer in the very same paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment in Ambika Prasad Mishra that the decision in Kesavananda Bharati (Supra) on the validity of Article 31A, \"binds, on the imple score of stare decisis . ... \"", "canonical_name": "Ambika Prasad Mishra"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86531, "end_char": 86542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86772, "end_char": 86783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 86864, "end_char": 86871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It originated in England and was used in t)le colonies as the basis of their judicial decisions."}}, {"text": "Bracton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87593, "end_char": 87600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned author cites the example of Bracton and Coke who always G preferred older authorities."}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87605, "end_char": 87609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned author cites the example of Bracton and Coke who always G preferred older authorities."}}, {"text": "R.W.M. Dias", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 88027, "end_char": 88038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legal system, it is\n\n(2) 'Jurisprudence' by R.W.M. Dias, 4th Ed. ("}}, {"text": "Brandeis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88673, "end_char": 88681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.('), Justice Brandeis stated that 'stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right' ."}}, {"text": "H. M. Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88908, "end_char": 88921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While dealing with the subject of stare decisis, Shri H. M. Seervai in his book ou 'Constitutional Law of India('), has pointed out how important it is for judges to conform to a certain measure of discipline so that decisions of old standing are not overruled for the reason merely that another view of the matter_ could also be taken."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89632, "end_char": 89645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagannadhadas J. said in the Bengal Immunity Case(•) that the finality of the decisions of the Supreme Court, which is the Court Of last resort, will be greatly weakened and much mischief done if we treat our own judgments, even though recent, as open to reconsideration."}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89905, "end_char": 89916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Sinha J. said in the same case that if the Supreme Court were to review its own previous decisions simply on the ground that another view was possible, the litigant public may be encouraged to think that it is always worthwhile taking a chance with the highest Court of the land."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90233, "end_char": 90238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In I.T.O. Tuticorin v. T.S.D.\n\nNadar( 6), Hegde J. said in his dissenting Judgment that the Supreme Court should not ovemtle its decisions except under compelling cil'- Cllmstances."}}, {"text": "Harold J. Griliiot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90558, "end_char": 90576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only when the Court is fully convinced that publitl\n\ninterest of a substantial character would be jeopardised by a. previous\n\n(I) See Introduction to Law and the Legal System, by Harold J. Griliiot, 2nd Ed. ("}}, {"text": "s. 393, 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90614, "end_char": 90625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 SCR 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 90755, "end_char": 90771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1968 SC 623", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 90778, "end_char": 90793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92399, "end_char": 92408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92723, "end_char": 92734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92756, "end_char": 92767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93161, "end_char": 93172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shankari Prasad(Supra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93192, "end_char": 93213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second reason why we do not want to resort to the principle of stare decisis while determining the validity of Article 31A is that neither in Shankari Prasad(Supra) nor in Sajjall Singh(Supra), nor in Golak Nath(Supra) and evtidently not in Kesavananda Bharati(Supra) H was the question as regards the validity as such of Article 3 lA raised or decided.", "canonical_name": "Shankari Prasad(Supra"}}, {"text": "Sajjall Singh(Supra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93222, "end_char": 93241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second reason why we do not want to resort to the principle of stare decisis while determining the validity of Article 31A is that neither in Shankari Prasad(Supra) nor in Sajjall Singh(Supra), nor in Golak Nath(Supra) and evtidently not in Kesavananda Bharati(Supra) H was the question as regards the validity as such of Article 3 lA raised or decided.", "canonical_name": "Sajjall Singh(Supra"}}, {"text": "Golak Nath(Supra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93251, "end_char": 93267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second reason why we do not want to resort to the principle of stare decisis while determining the validity of Article 31A is that neither in Shankari Prasad(Supra) nor in Sajjall Singh(Supra), nor in Golak Nath(Supra) and evtidently not in Kesavananda Bharati(Supra) H was the question as regards the validity as such of Article 3 lA raised or decided.", "canonical_name": "Golak Nath(Supra"}}, {"text": "Kesavananda Bharati(Supra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93291, "end_char": 93316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second reason why we do not want to resort to the principle of stare decisis while determining the validity of Article 31A is that neither in Shankari Prasad(Supra) nor in Sajjall Singh(Supra), nor in Golak Nath(Supra) and evtidently not in Kesavananda Bharati(Supra) H was the question as regards the validity as such of Article 3 lA raised or decided.", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharati(Supra"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93372, "end_char": 93381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93545, "end_char": 93558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sajjan Singh(Supra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93616, "end_char": 93634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sajjan Singh(Supra), the demand for reconsideration of the decision iu Shankari Prasad(Supra) was reject¢, that is to say, the Court was not inclined to consider once again whether constitutional amendments are also coIUprehended within the terms of Article 13(2).", "canonical_name": "Sajjall Singh(Supra"}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93866, "end_char": 93879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94071, "end_char": 94082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94504, "end_char": 94515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "William Douglas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94704, "end_char": 94719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice William Douglas said in New York v. United States(') that it is a wise policy to restrict the principle of stare decisis to those areas of the law where correction can be had by legislation."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95060, "end_char": 95071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is for that reason again that Justice Frankfurter said in U.S. v. International Boxing Club(2 ) that the doctrine of stare decisis is not 'an imprisonment of reason'."}}, {"text": "Benjamin Cardozo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95362, "end_char": 95378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A possible mischief arising out of this posifion was pointed out by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.(') by saying that precedents drawnfrom the days of travel by stage-coach do not fit the conditio~~ of travel today."}}, {"text": "S. 572, 590", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96196, "end_char": 96207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 236, 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96228, "end_char": 96239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 219, 238", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96291, "end_char": 96302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96565, "end_char": 96574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shankari Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96618, "end_char": 96633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already pointed out how the constitutional validity of Article 3 lA has to be deemed to have been upheld in Shankari Prasad (supra) by a process of inferential reasoning, the real question therein being whether the expression 'law' in Article 13(2) includes law made in the exercise of constituent power.", "canonical_name": "Shankari Prasad(Supra"}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96745, "end_char": 96758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96859, "end_char": 96867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth reason is the one cited by Shri Tarkunde that on prin ciple, rules like stare decisis should not be invoked for upholding con stitutional devices like Articles 31A, 31B and 31C which are designed to protect not only past laws but future laws also."}}, {"text": "Articles 31A, 31B and 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96978, "end_char": 97003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97086, "end_char": 97095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98177, "end_char": 98186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98329, "end_char": 98338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98398, "end_char": 98412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98715, "end_char": 98726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98909, "end_char": 98918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98967, "end_char": 98978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99006, "end_char": 99015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99040, "end_char": 99049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99083, "end_char": 99097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99228, "end_char": 99242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99276, "end_char": 99286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99298, "end_char": 99317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99349, "end_char": 99366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99461, "end_char": 99475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99662, "end_char": 99676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Maleki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99885, "end_char": 99891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They relate mostly to the abolition of various tenures like Maleki, Taluqdari, Mehwassi, Khoti, Paragana and Knlkami Watans and of Zamindaris and Jagirs."}}, {"text": "Taluqdari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99893, "end_char": 99902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They relate mostly to the abolition of various tenures like Maleki, Taluqdari, Mehwassi, Khoti, Paragana and Knlkami Watans and of Zamindaris and Jagirs."}}, {"text": "Mehwassi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99904, "end_char": 99912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They relate mostly to the abolition of various tenures like Maleki, Taluqdari, Mehwassi, Khoti, Paragana and Knlkami Watans and of Zamindaris and Jagirs."}}, {"text": "Khoti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99914, "end_char": 99919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They relate mostly to the abolition of various tenures like Maleki, Taluqdari, Mehwassi, Khoti, Paragana and Knlkami Watans and of Zamindaris and Jagirs."}}, {"text": "Paragana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99921, "end_char": 99929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They relate mostly to the abolition of various tenures like Maleki, Taluqdari, Mehwassi, Khoti, Paragana and Knlkami Watans and of Zamindaris and Jagirs."}}, {"text": "place of pride in the Schedule ios occupied by the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99983, "end_char": 100062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100118, "end_char": 100129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The place of pride in the Schedule ios occupied by the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "The place of pride in the Schedule ios occupied by the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100152, "end_char": 100163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The place of pride in the Schedule ios occupied by the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "The place of pride in the Schedule ios occupied by the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100169, "end_char": 100216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100346, "end_char": 100364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100444, "end_char": 100462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1975", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100492, "end_char": 100510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100544, "end_char": 100562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100569, "end_char": 100583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100896, "end_char": 100910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101220, "end_char": 101231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101451, "end_char": 101462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Articles 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101547, "end_char": 101567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101612, "end_char": 101623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101937, "end_char": 101948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102094, "end_char": 102103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102192, "end_char": 102210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102225, "end_char": 102236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102370, "end_char": 102379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102510, "end_char": 102524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102564, "end_char": 102578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102757, "end_char": 102768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102783, "end_char": 102797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102996, "end_char": 103007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103045, "end_char": 103056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103099, "end_char": 103113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 10, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 103214, "end_char": 103229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 39th Amendment which was passed on August 10, 1975 undertook an incredibly massive programme to include items 87 to 124 while the 40th Amendment, 1976 added items 125 to 188 to the Ninth Schedule in one stroke."}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103360, "end_char": 103374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103449, "end_char": 103469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103581, "end_char": 103590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103680, "end_char": 103689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103770, "end_char": 103779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104050, "end_char": 104061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104076, "end_char": 104090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kesavananda Bharat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 104566, "end_char": 104584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The theory that the parliament cannot exercise its amending power so as to damage o'i destroy the basic structure of the Constitution, was propounded and accepted for the first time in Kesavananda Bharat! (", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharati(Supra"}}, {"text": "Chmulrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104755, "end_char": 104766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is one reason for upholding the laws incorporated into the Ninth schedule before April 24, 1973, on which date the judgment in\n\n• Ӧ\n\nIVAMAN RAO v. UNION (Chmulrachud, C.J.) 39\n\nKesavananda Bharati (Supra) was rendered."}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105071, "end_char": 105093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105371, "end_char": 105385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105697, "end_char": 105708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106000, "end_char": 106009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106112, "end_char": 106126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106188, "end_char": 106197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106481, "end_char": 106495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106560, "end_char": 106569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106886, "end_char": 106900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107119, "end_char": 107129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107188, "end_char": 107198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107451, "end_char": 107461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107620, "end_char": 107642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107908, "end_char": 107919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108036, "end_char": 108047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108096, "end_char": 108106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108720, "end_char": 108731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108990, "end_char": 109001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109486, "end_char": 109496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "/Jharati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109640, "end_char": 109648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question of validity of the Twenty-fifth Amendment by which the unamended Arti.cle 31 C was introduced into the Constitution was specifically raised before the Conrt and the arguments in that behalf were specilfically considered by all the six minority Judges and by Khanna, J. It seems to us difficnlt, in these circumstances, to hold that no common ratio can be culled out from the decision of the majority of the seven Judges who upheld the validity of Article 31 C. Putting it simply, and there is no reason why simple matters should be made complicated, the ratio of the majority judgments in Kesavananda /Jharati\n\n(Supra) is that the first part of Article 31C is valid."}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109684, "end_char": 109695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109769, "end_char": 109778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109845, "end_char": 109855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109899, "end_char": 109909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110144, "end_char": 110154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110173, "end_char": 110183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110373, "end_char": 110382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110514, "end_char": 110523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110614, "end_char": 110624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110628, "end_char": 110638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110640, "end_char": 110650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110860, "end_char": 110870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111070, "end_char": 111080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111152, "end_char": 111162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111372, "end_char": 111386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111450, "end_char": 111461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111610, "end_char": 111624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111815, "end_char": 111829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111922, "end_char": 111933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112062, "end_char": 112073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112088, "end_char": 112102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112118, "end_char": 112127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112364, "end_char": 112374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112497, "end_char": 112515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113153, "end_char": 113172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113575, "end_char": 113583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since by the aforesaid two Acts, the life of the Lolc Sabha was extended while both the proclamations of emergency were in operation, the petitKiners challenge the proclamations of the state of Emergency, dated December 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975 as also the two Acts by which the term of the Lok Sabha was extended."}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113702, "end_char": 113713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "January 3, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113731, "end_char": 113746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 42nd Amendment inserted clauses 4 and 5 in Article 368 with effect from January 3, 1975."}}, {"text": "House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act, 1976;", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 114194, "end_char": 114248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, we are now left to consider the validity of :\n\n( 1) The Promulgation of the state of Emergency by the proclamations dated December 3, 1971 and June 2:5, 1975;\n\n(2) The House of the People (Extension of Duration) Act, 1976;\n\n(3) The House of People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act, 1976, and\n\nE ( 4) The Constitution (Fdrtieth Amendment) Act, 1976."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114298, "end_char": 114317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114580, "end_char": 114589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the proclamations of Emergency is challenged mainly by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri M. N. Phadke, Dr. N. M. (Jhatate and\n\nby Shri P. Il."}}, {"text": "N. M. (Jhatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 114614, "end_char": 114628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the proclamations of Emergency is challenged mainly by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri M. N. Phadke, Dr. N. M. (Jhatate and\n\nby Shri P. Il.", "canonical_name": "N. M.\n\nGhatate"}}, {"text": "P. Il. Sawant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114642, "end_char": 114655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the proclamations of Emergency is challenged mainly by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri M. N. Phadke, Dr. N. M. (Jhatate and\n\nby Shri P. Il."}}, {"text": "P. B.\n\nSawant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114760, "end_char": 114773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended by the learned counsel and Sbri P. B.\n\nSawant that the Courts have jurisdiction to enquire whether the power conferred on the President by Article 352 to proclaim an emetgency is properly exercised as also the power to determine whether there are any -circumstances justifying the continuance of the emergency."}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114867, "end_char": 114878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115352, "end_char": 115363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 116095, "end_char": 116103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 3, 1971 the President issued the proclamation of emergency in face of the aggression by Pakistan, stating that a grave emergency existed whereby the security of the country was threatened by external aggression."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116305, "end_char": 116331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116354, "end_char": 116382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116397, "end_char": 116407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Defence of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "The Defence of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "December 16, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 116469, "end_char": 116486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 16, 1971; the Pakistani forces made an unconditional surrender in Bangladesh and on the 17th the hostilities between India and Pakistan came to an end."}}, {"text": "Bangladesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 116544, "end_char": 116554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 16, 1971; the Pakistani forces made an unconditional surrender in Bangladesh and on the 17th the hostilities between India and Pakistan came to an end."}}, {"text": "August 28, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 116706, "end_char": 116721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 28, 1972 the two countries entered into an agreement for the exchange of prisoners of war, and by April 30, 197 4 the repatriation of the prisoners of war was completed."}}, {"text": "April 30, 197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 116811, "end_char": 116824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 28, 1972 the two countries entered into an agreement for the exchange of prisoners of war, and by April 30, 197 4 the repatriation of the prisoners of war was completed."}}, {"text": "August 16, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 116887, "end_char": 116902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 16, 1974 the Presidential Election was held in India."}}, {"text": "June 25, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 116951, "end_char": 116964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 25, 1975 came the second proclamation of emergency; in the wake of which a notification was issued under Article 359 on June 27 suspending the enforcement of the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22."}}, {"text": "Article 359", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117061, "end_char": 117072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Defence of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "The Defence of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117143, "end_char": 117165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Defence of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "The Defence of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "March 18,\n\n1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 117292, "end_char": 117307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Lok Sabha expired on March 18,\n\n1976."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117357, "end_char": 117422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117441, "end_char": 117455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Amendment Act", "statute": "Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "March 21, r977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 117791, "end_char": 117805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lok Sabha was dissolved tin January 18, 1977 and both the emergencies were revoked on March 21, r977."}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117893, "end_char": 117904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Amendment Act", "statute": "Amendment Act by which the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118486, "end_char": 118496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118631, "end_char": 118642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119019, "end_char": 119030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121896, "end_char": 121905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123763, "end_char": 123773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123835, "end_char": 123844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124200, "end_char": 124209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124269, "end_char": 124280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Keshvananda Bharati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124343, "end_char": 124362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 19 51 introduced Article 31B into the Constitution which reads thus\n\n''31B x x x x x x\n\nIn Keshvananda Bharati (197.3, Suppl.,", "canonical_name": "Keshvananda Bharati"}}, {"text": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124686, "end_char": 124776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125488, "end_char": 125499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125507, "end_char": 125517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Amendment by which that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125640, "end_char": 125667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125854, "end_char": 125869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act", "statute": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125902, "end_char": 125913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act", "statute": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125973, "end_char": 125982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act", "statute": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126123, "end_char": 126134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act", "statute": "Constitutional\n\nAmendment by which that Act"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126945, "end_char": 126953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI, J.(1) This Court made an Order on 9th May, 1980 disposing of the writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra ;\\gricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 of 1961 as amended from time to time by various subsequent acts.", "canonical_name": "ofBhagwati"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127318, "end_char": 127329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act", "statute": "All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127749, "end_char": 127758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keshvananda Bharati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127895, "end_char": 127914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 introduced A1ticle 3 IB into the Constitution which reads thus\n\n\"3 lB : x x x x x\n\n<t In Keshvananda Bharati (1973, Suppl.,", "canonical_name": "Keshvananda Bharati"}}, {"text": "April F 24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 127948, "end_char": 127964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SCR 1) decided on April F 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend tb~ Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or\n\nessential features or its basic structure."}}, {"text": "ofBhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128718, "end_char": 128728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was arnnded from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the\n\n(I) The Judgment ofBhagwati J. should be read along with his reasons reported in the case published in [1981] l S.C.R. P.206.", "canonical_name": "ofBhagwati"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129170, "end_char": 129179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule to the Constitution was arnnded from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Schedule to the Constitution was arnnded from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129190, "end_char": 129200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule to the Constitution was arnnded from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Schedule to the Constitution was arnnded from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129310, "end_char": 129366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129544, "end_char": 129559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129592, "end_char": 129603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129664, "end_char": 129673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "Article 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129812, "end_char": 129823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation", "statute": "Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation"}}, {"text": "(1980) 3 SCC 625", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 130754, "end_char": 130770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st July 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 130774, "end_char": 130788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While delivering my dissenting judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 on 31st July 1980, I gave my reasons for subscribing to this Order."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131518, "end_char": 131527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131774, "end_char": 131785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132009, "end_char": 132020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132214, "end_char": 132225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132586, "end_char": 132595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132698, "end_char": 132709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kesava:nanda Bharati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 132742, "end_char": 132762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The note struck by later cases reversing Golak Nath does not militate against the vires of Article 31A.\n\nSuffice it to say that in the Kesava:nanda Bharati case Article 3 lA was challenged as beyond the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid.", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharati(Supra"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132768, "end_char": 132777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132989, "end_char": 132999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133116, "end_char": 133127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133572, "end_char": 133582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133860, "end_char": 133871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134399, "end_char": 134410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134469, "end_char": 134480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134708, "end_char": 134719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134759, "end_char": 134769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134932, "end_char": 134942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135496, "end_char": 135506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135646, "end_char": 135658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J. While I agree with the learned Chief Justice, I must state that certain observations regarding Arts.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer-"}}, {"text": "Arts. 31A, 31B and 31C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135758, "end_char": 135780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135993, "end_char": 136001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136028, "end_char": 136036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136192, "end_char": 136198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I know that Justice Holmes has said : \"Don't be\" consistent, \"but be simply true\"."}}, {"text": "Ralph Waldo Emernon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136307, "end_char": 136326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I also remind myself of the profound reflection of Ralph Waldo Emernon :\n\n(1) [1981] I S.C.R. p. 206."}}, {"text": "Pythagoras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136866, "end_char": 136876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh."}}, {"text": "Socrates", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136900, "end_char": 136908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh."}}, {"text": "Jesus", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136914, "end_char": 136919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh."}}, {"text": "Luther", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136925, "end_char": 136931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh."}}, {"text": "Copernicus", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136937, "end_char": 136947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh."}}, {"text": "Galileo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136953, "end_char": 136960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh."}}, {"text": "Newton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136966, "end_char": 136972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pum and wise spirit that ever took flesh."}}, {"text": "Ambika Prasad Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 137113, "end_char": 137132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet, I hold to what I have earlier stated in Ambika Prasad Misra.(')", "canonical_name": "Ambika Prasad Mishra"}}, {"text": "Chief Justice has held the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137664, "end_char": 137703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_417_443_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "• 417\n\nNEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS.\n\nlam/pry 6, 1981\n\n[R. s. SARKARIA AND R. s. PATHAK, JJ.] 1J I\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Articles 19(6) clauses\n\n(i) & (ii)-Clauses I whether distinct and separate-Law covered by the clauses whether to satisfy the test of reasonableness.\n\n~ Article 19(1) (g)-Citizen's right to enter into contract with State-Whether fundamental right can be enforced though contractual.\n\nBihar Ke11du Leaves (Control of Trade) Act 1973 & Bihar Ken.du Leaves (Control of Trade) Rules, 1973-Clause 13 and Clause 4(bb) of agreement • prescribed by rules-Whether unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 19.\n\nKendu leaves used in the manufacture of bidis are grown oo forest produce in several States.\n\nOn March 10, 1972 the State of Bihar issued the Bihar D Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972, which was replaced by the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973. The purpose was to create a State monopoly in the matter of sale of Kendu leaves to the manufacturers of bidis to regulate the trade in relation to the grower of Kendu plants and their collection and sale through the agency of the State to the registered manufacturers of bidis. Section 4, empowered the State Government for the purpose of purchase and sale of Kendu leaves on its behalf, to appoint E agents in respect of different units.\n\nSection 9 provided that the authorised aSents will be bound to accept delivery of all those Kendu leaves which are fit for the purpose of mannfacture of bidis.\n\nIn exercise of its ru.Ie-.making powers the State Government notified the Bihar Kendu LeavOB (Control of Trade) Rules, 1972, which was continued by Section 23 of the Act even after the repeal of the Ordinance. Provisions regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves were made in Rule 9.\n\nSub-rule (I) -provided that Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected shall be sold ror otherwise disposed of by tender on terms and conditions spocified in the Tender Notice. The Tender was required by sub-rule (2) to be advertised in newspapers. Sub-role (9) provided that the successful tenderer or successful bidder shall be appointed as purchaser and the entire quantity of Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected or such lesser quantity out of it as may be offered to him by the State shall be purchased by him on terms and conditions in the agreement to be executed by the purchaser. Sub-rule (10) required the purchaser to execute an Agreement in Form 'M' within 15 days of the receipt of the order o:E appointment.\n\nBy a Notification dated January 16, 1974 the Rules were amended and sub-clause (bb) after clause 4(b) was added in Form 'M' of the Agreement which provided that the purchaser shall not raise any objection against the quality of Kendu leaves or shortage of leaves.\n\nCondition 13 of the Tender Notice was a1so incorporated in the statutory Agreement, Form 'M' providing\n\n• \"\n\nA that for every unit a minimum royalty will be 'payable by the purchaser,' and that this amount shall be payable by the tenderer even if by the end of the season, the price of Kendu leaves at the offered rate, collected und delivered to the purchaser, fell short of this amount, the amount being payable before the leaves are utilized or taken out and if not paid, realisable as arrears of land revenue.\n\nB In their writ petitions the petitioners who were carrying on trade in enu leaves, assailed the Rules framed under the Act and clause ,13 and clause 4(bb) of the Tender Notice and the Statutory Agreement and the notices of demand issued demanding royalty in respect of the undelivered quantity of Kendu: leaves.\n\nc It was contended that : (i) the provisions and conditions contained in clause 4(bb) and clause 13 amount to an unreasonable restriction on freedom to carry on trade or business in Kendu leaves guaranteed under Article 19 (I) {g) of the Constitution and that they are not within the protection of sub-clause\n\n(ii) i)l the second part of clause (6) of Article 19; (ii) that the provisions in their immediate operation and effect, are harsh, unconscionable, arbitrary, unfair and oppressive, thereby violating Article 14, (ill) the foreclosure of the right of the purchaser to refuse delivery Oil the ground of the \\eaves offered, not being of requisite quality, is inconsistent and ultra vires of the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act and (iv) that the auctions are held in January, while the Agents are not appointed till March or April, the plucking season, and consequently, no reasonable estimate of the expected yield is possible.\n\nThe respondents argued that (i) there is a paucity of skilled people who could be employed as Agents and the prevailing practice is that the persons appointed as Agents, are sponsored by the purchasers and that the terms of' the Agreement, taken as a whole are not one-sided, (il) if a person voluntarily takes upon himself under the terms of a contract, such risks and chances of benefit, he has no right in the, event of suffering a loss to be compensated for it even under the ordinary law in a suit, much less the Court of writ jurisdiction can grant any such relief, ,(iii) the right to enter into a contract on parti cular terms with the State is not a fundamental right, (iv) as the petitioners bad not paid amounts required to be adjusted against the remunera lion of the Agents they are not entitled to relief under Article 32, and (v) the provisions l(' are directly and essentially related to the operation of monopoly and, as such are wtihin the protection of sub-cloose (ii) of claus (6) of Art 19.\n\nDismissing the petitions and appeal\n\nHFLD: !. The condition in 4(bb) in the Tender Notices and the statutory agreement is couched in peremptory, drastic and absolute language, not qua1ified by any words showing that the bar envisaged in it will be attracted only in cases where the purchaser bas had an earlier_ opportunity to raise his objec tion but failed to do so, or, where he had on an earlier occasion raised such an objection which was heard and overruled by the competent Forest Officer.\n\nCondition 4(bb) therefore is inconsistent with and repugnant to Section 9(1), proviso of the Act which contains a built-in-warranty, that the Kendu leaves offered would be fit for manufacture of bidis; that is to say, the leaves would be of merchantable quality and as such, invalid. [4420-H]\n\n. •\n\n- •\n\nBIR! LEA YES V. BIHAR 419\n\n2. The scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules and Forms including that A of the impugned condition 13 was designed remove the deficiencies, infirmities and vices pointed out in Rashbihari's Panda v. State of Orissa [1969]\n\n3 S.C .. R. 374.\n\nThe impugned condition 13 satisfied the test of reasonableness under the first part of Articles 19 ( 6). The contention, that in actual operation, the impugned provision (clause 13) creates a n1onopoly in favour of a class of middlemen consisting of 'Agents' and purchasers, and enables them to earn unduly large profits at the cost of the public or pluckers and growers is not accept- B able.\n\n[4390-H, 440A-B]\n\n3. (i). Clause (6) of Article 19 falls into two parts, indicating that the two parts of the clause are intended to be distinct and separate.\n\nThe words \"reasonable restrictions\" which find pivotal mention in the first part, have not been repeated in the second part which omission makes. it clear that a law covered by sub-clause (ii) is not required to satisfy the test of reasonableness under the first part of the clause and no objection to have validity of such a law is tenable on the ground that it infringes the right guaranteed under Article l9(l)(g). Sub-clause (ii) is thus an exception to the main substantive provision in clause (1) of the Article. (4310-H, 432A-BJ\n\n3(ii). The basic and essential features which are directly and immediately connected with the creation of the State monopoly are found in the body of\n\nthe Act itself. The provisions incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice D and Agreement are merely subsidiary or incidental prov1s1ons, therefore, do not fall within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of Article\n\n19(6). [432E-F]\n\n3(iii). \\Vhere the business to be carried on by a citizen is in a commodity, the sale of which is a State monopoly,- conditioned by some statutory terms,\n\n(analogous to the impugned conditions) which in operation, have a direct and immediate impact on the fundamental freedom of the citizen guaranteed under E Article 19(1) (g), the citizen cannot enter into a contract with the Government for purchase of such a commodity except on the statutory terms laid down by the seller-State. The Tender Notice and the Agreement \\Vhich the purchasers enter into with the Government, although couched in statutorv Forms, are therefore, not bereft of their contractual character. [432G-H, 433A & C]\n\n4. The minimum royalty or price payable being fixed on the basis of 7 5 r cent of the estimated annual yield in standard bags from the unit multiplied \"9' ~Y the rates offered and accepted. Such an estimate, is made on the basis of the average actual yield from that unit for the preceding three years.\n\nSuch\n\nan estimated yield is notified and published in the Tender Notices every year.\n\nPurchasers in the trade, know beforehand as to what they are bidding for, and they are generally persons who have been in the trade for several years and, as such have a special knowledge of forming their own estimate-s of the expect\n\nted yield and the chances of profit and loss from that particular nnit in a particular year. [433F-OJ\n\n5. As the chances of profit and risks of loss are evenly divided between the seller-state and the purchasersi it cannot be said that the impugned condition in clause 13 of the Tender Notice and the Agreement is manifestly nnreasonable. The impugned condition 13 is a restriction imposed in the general public H interest. [434B-C]\n\n6. Although the Act alld the Rules contemplate that the Agents appointed by the qovernment will be under its foll control and liable to compensate\n\nj ! i t\n\nA the Government for any shortage, damage or loss caused in collection or delivery or any defect in the quality of the leaves collected, to the Government, yet, in actual practice, the real position is that the Agents are generally persons sponsored by and otherwise, deeply interested in the purchasers. [435B-C]\n\n7. The agents are to be appointed every year at short notice when the plucking season is at hand and as there is a dearth of suitable persons having adequate experience. and skill of work as efficient agents, the Government is dril'en into a situation in which they have to appoint persons sponsored by the purchasers as Agents. The rules framed under the Act envisage a strict and exclusive control of the Government over the Agents and iheir activities, and provide for their liability to compensate the Government for the loss occasioned by their misconduct or neglect. The condition in condition 13 far from creating a monopoly in the trade in favour of middlemen, operates as an ironclad safeguard against leakage of the public revenue by assuring a minimum return to the public exchequer from the sale of Kendu leaves. The. provision is aimed to secure the full benefit from the trade to the State leaving chances of making reasonable, marginal profit to the purchasers.\n\n[435C-D. 439B-E]\n\n8. It is a fundamental principle of general application th.1t if a person of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the: terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms of the same contract which might be disadvantageous to him.\n\nThe maxim is qui approbat non reprobat. A party to an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the resL\n\n[441EHl\n\nVerschures Crean1eries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. [1921] 2 K. B .. 608 and Douglas Menzies v. Umphelby [1908] A.C. 224 at p. 232 referred to.\n\nIn the instant case the petitioners had by offering highest bids at public auctions or by Tenders, accepted and Vlo'orked out the contracts in; the past but are now resisting the demands or other action, arising out of the impugned condition 13 on the ground that this condition is violative of Articles 19(1){g) and 14 of the Constitution. The impugned conditions though bearing a statutory complexion, retain their basic contractual character. Though a person coo.not be debarred from enforcing his fundamental rights on the ground of estoppel or waiver, the principle which prohibits a party to a transaction from approbating a part of its conditions and reprobating the rest, is different from the doctrine of estoppel or waiver. [442A-C]\n\nG ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 2222-2252/77 &\n\nI • -'1 •\n\n... •\n\n121 to 125/79, 405 & 441174, 46 & 47 /75. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)\n\nAND\n\nCRIMINAL APPEAL No. 300 OF 1974.\n\nH Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-2-1974 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction No. 68/73.\n\nBIRl LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, !.) 421\n\nF. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. , S.\n\nA Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs. Nos. 121-125/1 79, 2222-2252/77 & 46-47175.\n\nY. S. Chitale, K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 405 & 441/74 and Cr!. A. No. 300/74.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Balak Mahto, B and U. P. Singh for the Respondents Nos. 1-2 in all W.Ps. and Appeal.\n\nMiss A .. Subhashini for Respondent No, 3 in WP Nos. 2222-2252/ 17.\n\nThe Jlldgme'.nt of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAJUA, J.-The common question that has been seriously pressed itito argument in this batch of writ petitions and criminal appeal mentioned in the title, relates to the constitutiopal validity of certain Rules framed under the State of Bihar under the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') p:irticularly clause 13, clause 4 (bb) of the Tender Notice and of the sµtutory Agreement notified by the Bihar Government in the Bihar Government Gazette,. and the notices of demand issued under the impugned provisions demanding \"royalty\" from tl1e petitioners in respect pf the undelivered quantity of K endu leaves.\n\nAll these writ petitions will be disposed of by this common judgment. The basic question being common, it will suffice to state E the facfs giving rise to Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, filed by the NejV Bihar Bidi Leaves Co.\n\nThe petitioners in all these writ petitions are either firms or individuals: carrying on trade in Kendu leaves in the State of Bihar. However, Retitioner No. 31 is an association of traders in Kendu leaves, of which the other petitioners are members.\n\nKndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States, including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh. Under the old system in Bihar, the right to pluck and extract Kendu leaves from a forest: coupe carved out by the Forest Department, was auctioned by the Sate Government.\n\ndn March 10, 1972, while the State of Bihar was under the Presitlent's rule, the Governor of Bihar issued the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972. The provisions of this\n\nOrdlimnce were continued under successive Ordinances and ultimately\n\nreplced by the aforesaid Act of 1973. This Act created State monopoly: in the matter of sale of Kendu leaves to the manufacturers of\n\n11-~7 SCI/ SJ\n\n' !\n\nbidis. Its purpose is to regulate this trade in relation to the grower :if Kendu plants and the collection and sale of the same through the agency of the State to the registered manufacturers of bidis. Under its scheme, a specified area of Kendu leaves is divided into units. The 'grower' is defined as 'a grower who holds lands on which Kenda plants grow or who is in possession of such lands under a lease or otherwise, and includes the State Government.' Under Section 3, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any area to be a specified area for the purposes of the Act and divid_e every such specified area into such number of units as it may deem fit. 'Unit' means a sub-division of a specified area constituted under Section 3. Under Section 4, the State Government may, -1\n\nfor the purpose of purchase and sale of Kendu leaves on its behalf, appoint agents in respect of different units and any such agent may be appointed in respect of more than, any one unit but not more than\n\nthree units. The terms, conditions and the procedure ior appointment of agents have been prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act, which we sh•ll presently notice. Section 5 places restriction on purchase or transport of Kendu leaves. Section 8 mandates the Forest_ Officer incharge of a Division to set up in each unit a number of depots. Section 9 is important and its material part runs as under:\n\n\"(I) The State Government or its authorised officer or agent shall purchase Kendu leaves offered for sale and deliver at the depot during the bus_iness hours at the rates fixed under Section 7:\n\nProvided that it shall be open to the State Government or its authorised officer or agent, for reasons to be communicated in writing, to refuse to purchase or accept delivery of any Kendu leaves which, in their opinion, are not fit for the purpose of manufacture of bidis.''\n\nIt will be seen that the proviso to sub-section ( 1) contains a built-in -~ warranty inasmuch as it says that the authorised agents will be bound to accept delivery of all those Kendu leaves which, in their opinion, are fit for the purpose! of manufacture of bidis. In other words, the Kendu leaves to be purchased by the authorised agents of thel Government must be of merchantable quality. •\n\nThe next relevant provision is to be found in Section 11 which is as follows\n\n\"(1) Every manufacturer of bidis within the State shall get himself registered within such period on payment of such\n\nfee and in such manner as may be prescribed.\n\nBIRI LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, !.) 423\n\n(2) Every manufacturer of bidis within the State A registered under sub-section (I) shall furnish a declaration in snch form by such date and in such manner as may be prnscribed.\"\n\nSection 12 provides that Kendu leaves purchased by the State Government or by its authorised officer or agent, shall be disposed of in B such manner as the State Government may direct. Section 20 of the Act gives the State Government the power to make rules subject to the conditions of previous publication, to carry out all or any of the\n\npurposes of this Act. Sub-section (2) of that Section provides that -\"Such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters,\n\n namely:- C\n\n\" (a) procedure to be followed in making appointment of\n\nants;\n\n(b) to (d) ............ ,\n\n( e) the manner of registration under Section 1 O;\n\n{ f) the manner of registration, the period within which such registration shall be made and the fee payable thereof under sub-section (1) of Section 11 ;\n\n(g) form of declaration, authority to whom, date by which and the manner in which the .ckclaration shall be furnished under sub-section (2) of Section 11;\n\n(h) \"\n\nIn exercise of its powers under the then extent Ordinance analogous to those under Section 20, the State Government of Bihar notified the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Rules, 1972 (for short the 'Rules'). These rules were, as already noticed, continued by\n\nlion 23 of the Act, event after the repeal of the Ordinance con- ' cemed.\n\nRule 2(8) defines 'Purchaser' to mean a person to whom Kendu leaves have been sold by the State Government under Section 12 Under clause (1) of the same Rule, 'Standard bag' means a bag conlaining 1000 standard gaddis of Kendu leaves and where the standard gaddis are not bagged, reference to standard bag . shall be construed as a reference to 1000 standard gaddis or 50,000 leaves.\n\nUnder clause ( 11) , \"Standard gaddi\" -means a bundle containing 50\n\nKendn leaves .\n\nRule 3 provides the manner of appointing agents. The applica-\n\n- tion for agency is to be submitted in Form \"A\". This Fonn requires\n\nthe applicant for appointment as Agent to make a Declaration .. inter aNa, to this effect:\n\n\"I/We ........ hereby declare that I/We have read and understood all the provisions of the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972 and the rules made thereunder and the conditions of agency mentioned in the notice issued under rule 3 (1) and I/we agree to abide by the same. , I/we have personally inspected the unit No ..... if I/we am/are appointed as an agent for the unit mentioned above, I/we undertake lo purchase from growers and collect from land of State Government and ___, deliver a quantity of Kendu leaves on both counts, which shall not be less than . . . . . . Standard bags as mentioned in the notice. I/we shall execute the agreement witlt the State Government in Form 'C' within 15 days.\n\nWitness:\n\nSignature of the applicant.\"\n\nUnder sub-rule (7) of Rule 3, if, in the opinion of the State Government, it is not possible to select a suitable agent for the purpose out of the persons who had applied for appointment as agent, or where any agency is terminated and there is not sufficient time for calling fresh applications, the State Government may appoint any person as agent who in their opinion is suitable for the work. Such a person to be appointed as Agent is required to furnish a declaration in Form 'B'. Sub-rule (9) requires that on appointment as an agent, the person so appointed shall execute an agreement in Form\n\n'C' within fifteen days of the receipt of the order of appointment, failing which the appointment shall be liable to be cancelled and upon such cancellation, the security deposit shall be forfeited; and the aget\"; shall be liable to pay the loss, if any, incurred by the State Government as a result of such cancellation of the appointment. Then, a formula has been provided as to how such loss on cancellation of the appointment shall be calculated. The loss so determined shall be recoverable from the agent or surety as arrears of land revenue. Sub-rule (10) requires the agent so appointed for a particular unit to deposit security before signing the Agreement. Jt also provides how the amount to be deposited shOllld be calculated. Sub-rule ( 11) provides that the agent shall purchase Kendu leaves from growers and from such labourers who pluck Kendu leaves from the Government forests and other lands at the depot opened by him or ordered to be opened by the Divisional Forest Officer. Clause (ii) of sub-rule (11) lays\n\n' •\n\nBIR! LEAVES v. BUIAR ( Sarkaria' I.) 425\n\ndown that unless ordered by the Divisional Forest Officer or an officer authorised by him in writing, the agent shall not slacken or stop the purchase or collection in any depot within the unit. Sub-rule (12) requires the agent to deliver immediately the Kendu leaves purchased\n\nor collected by him to the purchaser appointed for the unit. Sub-rule\n\n(13) provides :\n\n\"The agent shall maintain such account and submit such periodical returns to thei Divisional Forest Officer or to any other officer authorised by him as may be directed by the Divisional Forest Officer.\"\n\nSub-rule (14) requires the agent to furnish a list of persons employed by him with the unit, immediately to the Divisional Forest Officer, and he is bound to remove any such person whose employment is objected to by the Divisional Forest Officer. Sub-rule (15) is material and reads as under :\n\n\"If the agent during the period of agency has duly observed and performed all the terms and conditions of the agency to the satisfaction of the State Government and if the\n\nState Government is satisfied that he has done his best to collect maximum quantity of leaves from the unit, it may grant to the agent yearly renewal of agency for a period to be fixed by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be decided upon for each year.\"\n\nSub-rule (16) provides that the agent shall be advanced such money for the performance of agency as may be directed by the State Government from time to time.\n\nRule 6(7) Jays down the procedure of enquiry about rejected , du leaves. According to this procedure, on receipt of a complaint (under sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Act, the officer shall hold\n\nthe enquiry after the necessary notice to the person concerned and pass such orders in terms of sub-section (3) or (4) of Section 9 as he deems fit.\n\nRule 9 makes provision regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves.\n\nG Under sub-rule ( 1), Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected by the State Government or by its authorised officer shall ordinarily be sold or otherwise disposed of by tender on such terms. and conditions as are specified in the Tender Notice and Tender Form issued by .the State Government or by an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf. The Tender Notice is required by H sub-rule ( 2) to be advertised in newspapers and in such other manner as the State Government may deem-fit.\n\nSub-rule (8)\n\nA provides : \"Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions, the State Government may sell or otherwise dispose of Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected by it or by its officers or agents by auction on such terms and conditions as may be decided by it.\" Sub-rule (9) reads as under :\n\n\"The successful tenderer or successful bidder, as the case may be, shall be appointed as purchaser for the particular unit, and the entire quantity of Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected from such unit or such lesser quantity out of it may be offered to him by the State, its officer or agent in such unit, shall be purchased by him in such manner and on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the agreement to be executed by such purchaser under sub-rule (10).\"\n\nSub-rule ( 10) requires the purchaser to execute an Agreement in Form 'M' within 15 days of the receipt of the order of appoint- \" ment. Sub-rule (11) requires such purchaser before signing the agreement to deposit the security calculated as, provided in that subrule. Sub-rule (13) provides that the purchaser, if he desires to consume the leaves within the unit or to remove the leaves delivered to him outside the unit immediately or at any time before the 30th June, shall pay the purchase price in full for the quantity of leaves delivered E to him calculated at the rate specified in the purchaser's agreement.\n\nIf the purchaser agrees in writing to keep the delivered leaves within\n\nthe unit under his supervision and risk and under insurance against theft, fire and wastage at his expense but under the custody and control of the Divisional Forest Officer he may at the time of delivery of leaves pay only such part of the purchase price of the delivered leaves, F as may be specified in the purchaser's agreement. The balance of tl:i!!,.r purchase price may be paid in instalments on the dates specified in 1 the purchaser's agreement or on any earlier date before the leaves are removed outside the unit or are delivered for consumption within the unit. In no case the purchaser shall be allowed to remove all the G leaves unless full price has been paid.\n\nBy NotiJicati()n, dated January 16, 1974, published in the Extraordinary Gazette of Bihar Governrnen\\ of the same date, the Rules were amended, and sub-clause (bb) after clause 4(b) was added in Form 'M' of the Agreement. This sub-clause (bb) reads as under :\n\n\"The purchaser shall not raise any objection against the quality of Kendu leaves or shortage of leaves in the standard gaddis.\"\n\n• ...\n\nBIR! LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, l.). 427\n\nThis is one of the impugned provisions.\n\nThe other impugned provi- A -sion is to be found in condition (13) of the Tender Notices published in the Bihar Government Gazette, every year inviting tenders for the puchase of Ken du leaves. This condition ( 13) which is also incorporated in the statutory Agreement (Fonn-M), runs as follows :\n\n\"For every unit a minimum royalty will be payable by the purchaser. The amount of minimum royalty will be 75% of the amount arrived at by multiplyihg the notified yield in standard bags by the offer made by the purchaser per standard bag.\n\nThis amount shall be payable by the tenderer even if by the end of the season, the _ price of Kendu leave\" at the offered rate, collected and delivered to the purchaser, fell short of this amount. This whole amount will be payable before the leaves are utilized or taken out and, if not paid, will be realised as arrears of land revenue.\"\n\nThe first proposition ca:nvas&ed by Mr. Nariman appearing for the\n\npetitioners in Writ Petitions 405 and 441 of 1974, is the Petitioner• D argued that the aforesaid impugned provisions/conditions comprised in the aforesaid clause 4(bb) and clause (13) amount to alli unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' fundamental freedom to carry on trade or business in Kendu leaves; guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution; that the impugned provisions are not within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of claus~ E ( 6) of Article 19 because the impugned provisions are not \"integrally and essentially connected\" with the creation of the monopoly in favour -Of the State, but are only incidental or subsidiary to the operation of the monopoly.\n\nIn support of this proposition, learned counsel has referred to the decisions of this Court in Akadesi Padhan v. State of Orissa(') and Rashbihari Panda etc. v. State of Orissa. (')\n\nThe second proposition propounded by Mr. Nariman is that the impugmd provisions violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners' 1lUaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution, becausei in their immediate operation and effect, they are harsh, unco'nscionab]e, arbitrary 11'nfair and oppressive; that even where the quantity offered to the vurchaser is far less than 75% of the notified estimated yield, or the leaves offered are not of merchantable quality, the impugned provisions unreasonably obligate the purchaser to pay royalty for 75 per cent of the estimated yield irresp;:ctive of whether the shortfall in the quantity\n\n(l) [1%3] Supp, 2 S.C.R. 691\n\n(2) (1969] 3 S.C.R. 374\n\n...\n\noffered/delivered or the unmercha'n(l!ble quality of the leaves offered is due to the fraud or negligence of the Agent who, under the Rules, iS supposed to be independent of the purchaser and under the exclusive control of the Government; that the impugned provisions operate irrationally and unfairly as they make no discerning distinction between honest purchasers who are not blamable for the shortfall and dishonest purchasers who through their fraud or collusion with the agent or officers of the Government contribute to the sh01; tfa:I1.\n\nThus, the impugned provisions tar honest and dishonest purchasers with one and the same brush which results in procrustean cruelty. .__.,,\n\nThird, the impugned provision which forecloses the right of the purchaser to refuse delivery on the ground of the leaves offered, not being of requisite quality, is incqnsistent with and ultra vire.• of the Proviso to Section 9 ( l) of the Act which contains a built-in warranty that the leaves offered or delivered shall be fit for the purpose of manufacture of bidis. - Dr. Chitale, appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions 121 to 125 of 1979, has by and large adopted the argnments of Mr. Nariman.\n\nHe has drawn our attention to Annexure 'C' to Writ Petition 47 of 1975, wherein quite a large number of instancs are given to show that the shortfall in the actual delivery of the Kendu leaves to the purchasers as against the estimated yield is considerable.\n\nLearned counsel has emphasised that the auctions are held in January, while the Agents are not appointed till March or April, which is the plucking season, and i'n January, no reasonable estimate of the expected yield is possible.\n\nIt is maintained that the allegations in the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the State to the effect, that the purchasers inspect the nnits and make their own estimates of the expected yield is factually incorrect because in Jauuary no such estimate is possible.\n\nDr. Dewan, who has appeared for some of the petitioners, cited Maneka Gandhi's case(') in support of his contention, that the impugned provisions in their direct and inevitable effect, impinge upon the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution.\n\nLearned counsel contrasted the impugned provisions with the Rules in vogue in the State of Andh.ra Pradesh, which, according to him, have a reasonable basis.\n\nMr. K. S. Sinha, appearing for the appellant i'l1 Criminal Appeal 300 of 1974, submitted that the validity of the impugned provisions was indirectly involved in this appeal, though in a different context.\n\nIt is pointed out that the permit to remove the leaves was refused to\n\n(I) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621\n\n. -\n\n• -\n\nBIR! LEAVES v. B111AR (Sarkaria, !.) 429\n\n' the appellant on the ground thait he had taken away the leaves with-\n\n Aout paying 75 per cent of the royalty and had contravened Rule 16.\n\nThe point sought to be made out is that if the impugned Rules are not held to be valid, this app~ mus!, in consequence, succeed.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. L. N. Sinha, learned Attorney-General submits on behalf of the respondents that there is a paucity of skilled R: people who could employed as Agents; that in actual practice the persons appointed as Agents are sponsored by the purchasers.\n\n,.._,_\n\n(i) It is submitted that the terms of the Agreement, taken as a whole, are not one-sided.\n\nWhereas under the conditions of the Tender Notice and the Agreement the purchasers voluntarily binc\\ themselves to pay the full price of the unit which is fixed according to the Rules, irrespective of any shortfall in the quantity offered and delivered, they, under the terms of the same Agreement get the benefit of purchasing Kendu leaves offered in excess of 75 per cent of the estimated yield at the concessional rate of 55 per cent only of the purchase price. It is argued that if the conditions of the Tender Notice and the statutory Agreement are considered as a whole, it is evident that the risks of loss and chances of benefit are equally divided between the purchasers and the State.\n\n(ii) It is stressed that what is sold at the time of auction is the estimated produce from a unit, as such, and the highest bidder or tenderer gets the contract to purchase that unit al' a price the minimum of which is fixed at 75% of the amount arrived at by multiplying the notified estimated yield in terms of standard bags from that unit. It is urged that (if a person volnntarily takes upon himself under the tcnns of a contract, such risks and chances of be'nefi.t, he '?\"- - has no right in the event of suffering a loss to be compensated for it\n\n< even under the ordinary law in a suit, much less the Court of writ jurisdiction can grant him any such relief). It is pointed out that actually, in llO out of 1000 units, that yield exceeded in the notified estimates, ami as a result, the purchasers reaped full benefit of the\n\nxcess supply at concessional rates.\n\n(iii) (a) It is emphasised that the liability of the petitioners to pay the whole price for the unit arises from the contract and, as such, it cannot be considered to have a direct impact on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their trade or business; that the right to enter into a contract on particular terms with the State is not a fundamental right.\n\nEven this Court-proceeds the argument-cannot reCQnstruct the terms and conditions voluntarily agreed between the petitioners and the State .\n\n. E\n\n, ff\n\n(iii) (b) It is argued that it is not a. fit case to be decided under Article 32 of the Constitution, because in several of these petitions the purchasers (petitioners) were in default, inasmuch as they did not pay the amounts required to be adjusted against the remuneration of the Agents; that in most of the cases the purchasers reaped that full benefits of the contract and only in stray cases, they suffered loss; that since they had availed of the chance of reaping and advantage, they could not turn round and attack the validity of the terms and conditions of the contract which they had voluntarily made and worked out. ·\n\n(iv) Another point sought to he made out is that the impugned provisions are directly and essentially related to the operation of the monopoly and, as such, fall within the protedion of sub-clause (ii) of clause (6) of Art. 19.\n\n(v) In the alternative, it is submitted that the impugned provisions satisfy the test of reasonableness under the fir>t part of clause (6) of the said Article~ and in applying that test the voluntary nature of thco contract and the oblig2tions willingly undertaken by the purchaser with all the risks of loss and chances of gain should not be lost sight of; that a purchaser who acts on a -ntract voluntarily entered into by him is precluded from repudiating some of its conditions which involve risk of loss and to accept those which are advantageous to him .\n\nIn support of the proposition that one who has received the benefits of statute is precluded from attacking the constitutionality of a condition attached by the statute, the learned Attorney-G.cneral has referred to these decisions of the Supreme Court of United States : Berth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission of the Stale of Wisconian('); St. Louis Casting Co. v. Consrmc1ion Co.('); and United\n\nFood Fuel Gas Co. v. Rail Road Commission.(\")\n\nJn reply, Mr. Nariman submits that writ petitions have been filed from 1973 onwards by various purchasers to challeniic the validity of the impugned provisions, as notified every yeat for inviting tenders,\n\nin the High Court or in this Court, and from time to time interim ordeT' staying the operation of the impugned provisions have been issued either by the High Court or this Court; that in \\iew of this, it cannot be said that the petitioners are precluded from challenging the validity of the impugned provisions on the ground of acquiescence. waiver or estoppel. It is maintained that fundamental rights cannot be waived, ------\n\n(!) 71 L.Ed, 908\n\n(2) 1923 us 469\n\n(3) 102 us 415\n\nBIR! LEAVES v. B!HAR (Sarkaria, l.) 431\n\nparticularly those under Article 14 of the Constitution and the principle of estoppel enunciated in the American decisions is not applicable in India.\n\nIn support of this argument, reference has been made to the decision of this Court in Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi & fuliasthan & Anr. (')\n\nTI1e learned Attqrney-General further submitted that his argu- B ment was not to the effect that the petitioners were incompetent to enforce their fundamental right on the ground of waiver or estoppel; but that a person who voluntarily enters into a contract cannof retain the benefit accrued to him thereunder and repudiate the other part of the contract which might have occasioned loss to him; that this prin- -ciple is different from that of waiver or estopl.\n\nThe first question for consideration is, whether the impugned provisions fall within the protection of sub-Clause (ii) of Article 19(6) and therefore, it is not necessary for those provisions to satisfy the test of rcasonablene$S under the first pi:t of clause (6) of the Article.\n\nThe relevant part of clause ( 6) reads thus :\n\n\"(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said crause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, rasonble restric- E tions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said subclause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,-\n\n(i) .......................... .\n\n(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.\"\n\nIt will be seen that clause ( 6) falls into two parts. The first part commences with the phrase : \"Nothing in' sub-clause (g) of the said clause (1) of the Article\".\n\nPhmse to the same effect, with the addition of pre-fixed words \"and, in particular\" are repeated at the commencement of the second part, also. This indicates that the two parts of the clause are intended to be distinct atid separate.\n\nFurther, the words \"reoasonablc restrictions\" which find pivotal mention in the\n\n(l) [1959] Suppl, I S.C.R. ;2s\n\nfirst part, have not been repeated in the second part, which ommission\n\nmakes it clear that a law covered by sub-clause (ii) is_ not required to satisfy the test of reasonableness under the first part of the clause and no objection to the validity of such a law is tenable on the ground that it infringeS the right guaranteed under Article 19 ( 1 )(g). Subclause (ii) is thus in the nature of an exception to the main substantive provision in clause ( 1) of the Article.\n\nIts! language therefore, which is explicitly restrictive, has to be strictly construed. The protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part is, in terms, available te> the law only \"in so far as it relates to\" the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by !he State, of any trade, business, industry, or service to the exclusion, complete or partial of the citizens or otherwise.\n\nThe ambit of the words \"in so far as it relates to\" in the context of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of clause ( 6), came up for consideration before this Court in A kadasi Padha11's case (ibid). Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, held that only !hose provisions of the law which are o \"integrally and essentially\" connected with the creation of the monopoly are protected under the second part of clause (6), but those provisions which are not absolutely essential for creating the monopoly, but are merely incidental, subsidiary or helpful to the operation of the monopoly do not fall under the second part of clause ( 6) and\n\ntheir validity must be judged, under the first part of Article 19 ( 6).\n\nNow, let us apply this test to the provisions which are impugned in the instant case.\n\nThese provisions are incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules framed under \\he Act.\n\nThe basic and essential features which arc directly and immodiately connected with the creation of the State monopoly are to be found in the body of the Act, itself.\n\nIn any case, the impugned provisions are merely subsidiary or incidental provisions relating to the operation of the monopoly.\n\nThe impugned provisions, therefore, do not fall within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part ol Article\n\n19(6).\n\nThe question, however, still remiiins whether the right to enter into a contract with the State on particular terms is a fundamental right falling within the purview of Article 19 ( 1 )( g) . The learned Attorney-General maintains that it is not.\n\nWhatever may be the position with regard to contracts relating to other matters, where the business to be carried on by a citizen is in a commodity, the sale of which is a State monopoly, conditioned by some statutory terms, analogous to the impugned conditions, which, in operation, have a direct and immediate impact on the fundamental\n\nBllU LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, I.) 433\n\nfreedom of the citizen guaranteed under Article 19 ( 1) (g), the citizen eannot enter into a contract with the Government for pnrchase of such a commodily except on the statutory terms laid down by the seller-State.\n\nSale of Kendu leaves for manufacture of bidis being a State monopoly, the petitioners-purchasers could, if they so desired, purchase the Kcndu leaves only in the manner prescribed by the statutory rules on terms and conditions notified in the Tender Notices.\n\nEven so, these conditions leave sufficient room to the free volition of the intending purchasers, particularly in the matter of fixing the rates and the minimum price payable for the estimated yield from a particular unit in terms of standard bags.\n\nThe Tender Notice and the -Agreement which the purchasers enter into with the Government, although couched in statutory Forms, are not bereft of their contractual character, either.\n\nSince the impugned provisions do not, as already noticed, fall withi11 the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of clause\n\n( 6), they must satisfy the test of being a reasonable restriction under D the first part of that clause.\n\nThe first point in this connection to be determined is, what actually is sold to the purclrasers under the terms of the Tender Notice and the statutory Agreement? Is it an estimated yield of a unit in terms of standard bags which is sold or the actual yield in terms of standard bags offered or delivered?\n\nFrom the scheme of the Rules, particularly Rule 9(9) extracted in a foregoing part of this judgment, it is cle-ar that what is sold to the successful bidder at the annual auction is the entire quantity of Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected from a particular unit or such lesser quantity out of that unit as may be offered to him by the State or its agent or officer for a particular year at a price m!led 'roy!llty'. The minimum royalty or price payable being fixed on the basis of 75 per cent of the estimated annual yield in standard bags from the unit multiplied by the rates offered and accepted.\n\nSuch an estimate, as it appears from the counter-affidavit is made on the basis of the average actual yield from that unit for the preceding three years. Such an estimated yield is notified and published in the Tender Notices every year.\n\nPurchasers in the trade, therefore, know before-hand as to what they are bidding for. Purchasers are generally pttsons who have been in the trade for several years and as such, have a specraI knowledge of forming their own estimates of the expegted yield and the chances of profit and loss from that particular unit in a particular year.\n\nWhile it is true that the bidders have to enter into Agreement on the terms and conditions notified by the Government, yet it cannot be lost sight of !hut in spite of the fact that\n\nthe impugned provisions in Condition 13 of the Agreement and the Tender Notice in 1973 and the impugned Condition 4(bb) has been notified annually since the amendment of the statutory Forms in January 1974, the petitioners and their fellowmen in the trade hav~ been offering rates of bids and entering into agreement on the notified terms and conditions, including the impugned provisions. Only a few writpetitions have been filed now and then by certain purchasers who suffered loss, to challenge these impugned provisions sit1ce 1973. In view of the fact that the chances of profit and risks of loss are evenly divided between the seller-State and the purchasers and in the light of the aforesaid historical background, it cannot be said that the im- . pugned condition in clause 13 of the Tender Notice and the Agreement is manifestly unreasonable. The impugned Condition 13 is a restriction imposed in the general public interest. Fixation of a minimum price on the basis of estimated yield from a particular unit in a particular year operates as an insurance against loss or leakage of public Revenue due to connivance or collusion between purchasers on the one hand, and the servants and agents of the seller-State on the other.\n\nThis method also assures a minimum wage to the pluckcrs of the Kendu leaves who, as has been affirmed in the counter-affidavit of the respondent-State, are generally Adivasis or persons belonging to economically backward classes.\n\nE We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the impugned provisions are harsh and unreasonable inasmuch as they obligate the purchasers to pay for the undelivered shortfall of Kendu leaves even where such shortfall is due to the negligence or fraud of the Agent of the Government.\n\nThe real position has been explained in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of F the State in Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, thus :\n\n\"Technically speaking the Agents were appointed by the State Government but the persons so appointed were actually sponsored by the respective purchasers. The Agents were the persons of the purchasers and were loyal to their old masters.\n\nThis is an incontrovertible fact.\n\nIn most of the cases the agents got the full amount of their commission and handling charges adjusted towards the purchase price of the units at the end of collection season. Specific instances are on record that in many cases the Agents were close relatives such as father, sons, brothers of the purchasers. In the case of firms, the Agents were partners in the same firm.\n\nIn some cases the purchasers and the Agents interchanged their positions.\n\nPurchasers became Agents while the latter\n\nBIR! LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, J.) 435\n\nbecame purchasers.\n\nThis was a common trick of the trade A which is still in vogue .\n\nSome of the instances showing the relationship between the petitioners/purchasers and the Agents are tabulated in Annexure 'A' hereto.\"\n\nAlthough the Act and the Rules noticed earlier contemplate that the Agents appointed by the Government will be under its full control and liable to compensate the Government for any shortage, damage or loss caused in collection or delivery or any defect in the quality of the leaves collected, to the Government, yet, in actual practice, the ,___ real position is that the Agents are generally persons sponsored hy and otherwise, deeply interested in the purchasers.\n\nIn their counteraffidavit, the Government has explained that there is a dearth of suitable persons having adequate experience and skill of work as efficient Agents.\n\nThe Agents are to be appointed every year at short notice when the plucking season is at hand. Circumstances being what they are, the Government is driven into a situation in which they have to appoint persons sponsored by the purchasers as Agents. From this real factual position, viz., the close bond and rapport between the purchasers and the agents, two inferences arise. First, that at the time of auction, the intending purchasers are in a position to form a reason- 'able estimate of the return which they are likely to have for the year concerned from that particular unit or units for which they offered the rates. Second, that if the purchase price wore to be fixed not on the basis of any estimated annual yield from a particular unit but on the basis of the quantity actually delivered, the risk of loss or leakage of public revenue by reason of fraud and collusion between the purchasers and the agents will manifestly increase. Looked at from this angle also, against the real factual background, the impugned Condition 13 cannot be said to be unreasonable. \"t'-- Mr. Nariman contended that if the factual position, s stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behall of the State, is correct, then the impugned condition 13 will be hit by the ratio of this Court's decisions in Rashbihari Panda etc. v. State of Orissa (ibid) and Akadasi Padhan's case (ibid), bec:iuse in that situation the conclusion would be ineluctable that the monopoly is being worked by the State not for its exclusive benefit or in the public interest but to benefit a class of profiteers comprised of the purchasers al]d their agents, thereby creating a monopoly within a monopoly.\n\nIn ordr to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to notice H Rashbihari Panda's case. To regulate trade in Kendu leaves and prevent exploitation of growers and pluckers, the State of Orissa enacted\n\nthe Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act. 1961. By Section 3 of that Act, which is analogous to Section 3 of the Bihar Act, no person other than the Government, an authorised officer of the Government, or an agent appointed by the Government, is entitled to purchase or transport Kendu leaves; and under Section 4 of that Act, the Government is authorised to fix the price at which the leaves shall be purchased from the growers by the officer or agent of the Government.\n\nSection 10 of that Act provided that the Kelldu leaves purchased shall be sold or disposed of in such manner as the Government may direct, and under Section 11, at least one-half of the net profits derived by the Gvernment is to aid to Samitis and Gram Pancha- __. yats.\n\nIn Akadas1 Padhan's case (1b1d), a grower of Kendu leaves ' challenged Sections 3 and 4 and Rule 7 ( 5) made under that Act on the ground that it contravened his fnndamental right under Articles 14 and 19 (1 )(a) and ( g) in this Court. It was heW that Sections 3 and 4 did not infringe Article 19(6) (ii), but the State Government was incompetent to implement the provisions of the Act and give effect to its monopoly, because the agents appointed were not really agents pf the Government but were authorised to carry on trade in the leaves purchased not on behalf of the Government but on their own account, and that it thus gave rise to a monopoly in favour of the agents which was not protected by Article 19(6)(ii) since the Jaw cannot be used by tffe State for the private benefit of agents. After the decision in A k\"'lasi Padhan' s case, the Orissa State made some changes in the implementation of its monopoly. fn 1966, it invited tenders from persons desirous of purchasing Kendu leaves purchased by the officers and agents of the Government. During the years 1966 and 1967, the prices of Kendu leaves ruled very high and when sales were effected by public auction, prices considerably in excess of those at which tenders were accepted were realised.\n\nEarly in 1968, the State evolved another scheme under which, it offered to renew the licences of those . trad•ors who in the State's view had worked satisfactorily in the pre- \"i vioys year and had paid the amounts due from them regularly.\n\nThe scheme was objected to, and realising that, the scheme arbitrarily excluded many persons interested in the trade, a'nd hence was objectionable, the Government decided to invite offers for advance purchases of Kendu leaves but restricted the invitation to those individuals who had carried out the contracts in the previous year without default and to the satisfaction of the Government that is, the existing contractors w; ore given the exclusive right to make offers to purchase Kendu leaves.\n\nThis new method of offering to enter into agreements for advance purchases of Kendu leaves by private offers in preference to open competition, was challenged by writ petitions ill the High Court as\n\nBIRI, LEAVES v, BIHAR (Sarkaria, J,) 437\n\nviolative of the petitioner's fund:i, rnental rights under Articles 14 and A\n\n~··\n\n19(1 )(g).\n\nReversing the decision of the High Court, this Court, in appeal, held,\n\nThe validity of a law by which the Statsassumed the monopoly to trade in a giwn commodity has to be judged by lhe test whether the entire benefit arising therefrom is to cnure to the State, and the monopoly is not used as a cloak for conferring private benefit upon a limited class of persons.\n\nThe monopoly of purchasing Kendu leaves under Section 3 may be held to be valid .if, it be administered only for the benefit of the State. Similarly, the right to sell or dispose of Kcndu leaves by the State under Section 10, in such manner as the Government may direct, would be valid if it be exercised in public interest and not to srve the private interest' and not to serve the private interests of any person or class of persons. The profit resulting from the sale must be for the public benefit and not for private gain. Section 11 also emphasises the concept that the machinery of sale or disposal of the leaves must also be geared to serve the public interest. If the scheme of disposal creates a class of middlemen who could purchase from the Government at concessioruil rates and earn large profits disproportionate to the nature of the service rendered or duty performed by them, it cannot claim the protti{)n of Article 19(6)(ii) as it is not open to the Government to create a monopoly in favour of third parties from its own monopoly.\n\n(Head-note.of the Official Report)\n\n)I . .:it was further held ·\n\n\"The right to make offers bei11g open to a limited class of persons the schemes effectively shut out all other persons carrying on trade in Kendu leaves as well as new entrants into the trade.\n\nBoth the schemes, evolved by the Government, namely, the one of offering to enttr into contracts with certain named licencees, and the other of inviting tenders from licencees who had in the previous year carried out their contracts satisfactorily gave rise to a monopoly in the trade in the leaves to certain traders and singled out other traders for discriminating treatment.\n\nTherefore, they were violative of the fundamental right of the Jl'\"titioners under Articles 14 and 19 (1 )(g) and as the schemes were not 'integrally and\n\n12-51 SCI/81\n\nessentially' conp.ected wi!h the creation of the monopoly, they were not protected by Article 19(6)(ii).\n\nIt was further observed that if the only anxiety of the Government was to ensiire due performance by those who submitted tenders, Gov-, ernment could devise adequate safeguards. But the classification B based on the circumstance that certrun existing contractors had carried out their obligation in the previous year regularly and to the satisfaction of the Government, is not based on any real and substantial distinction bearing w just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved namely, the effective execution of the monopoly in public interest, the prevention of exploitation of pluckers and growers of C Ken du leaves, or the securing of the fuJJ benefit from the trade, to the State.\n\nOn the basis of this reasoning, it was finally held that the scheme\n\ncould not be supported on the ground that it imposed reasonable restric- • lions, within the meaning of Article 19 ( 6), on the fu.ndamental rights D of traders to carry on business in Kendu leaves.\n\nHence, the plea that\n\nthe action of the Government was bona fide could not be an effective answer to that challenge.\n\nIt may be noted that the decision of this Court in Rashbihari's case\n\n(ibid) was announced on January 16, 1969. The Bihar Act, with which we are concerned, was passed in 1_973.\n\nThe Bihar Legislature, therefore could not but be aware of the unconstitutional features pointed out by this Court in the schemes of the Orissa Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Care has been taken by the Bihar Legislature, and the Government to exercise the scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules and Forms framed or prescribed thereunder, of the vices from which the schemes of Orissa Legisl, ation suffered. This will be clear from a cCllD.parative study of the Orissa schemes and the Bihar scheme. Firstly, under the Orissa schemes, the monopoly was not being worked for the \"\\ entire benefit of the State or in the general public interest, but was being used as a cloak for conferring private benefit upon a limited class of persons. The offers for purchasing Kendu leaves were restricted to a particular class of contractors and were not open to the general public.\n\nThis vice does not exist in the Bihar scheme including the scheme of the impugned provisions.\n\nThe notified estimate annual yield for a unit or units is sold either by inviting tenders from the public by publishing a Tender Notice or by public auction after a similar notice.\n\nAny person .who wants to carry on the business of purchasing Kendu leaves for the purpose or manufacture of Bidis is entitled to submit his offer in the prescribed Tender Form in response to the public notice inviting tenders, or offer his bid at the auction, if the disposal is by public\n\nBIR! LEAVES v. BJJfAR (Sarkaria, J.) 439\n\nauction. Secondly, the scheme of disposal envisaged by the impugned provisions of the Orissa Act and the Orissa rules created a class of middlemen who could purchase from the Government at concessional rates and earn large profits disproportionate to the service rendered or duty perfomI_ed by them. In contrast with t)lis, the Bihar scheme in question does not operate to cre'!lte any monopoly in favour of any particular class of purchasers. Nor does the Bihar scheme enable the purchasers to make unduly large profits at the cost of the public revenue or others. Even if the agents, in actual practice, are persons sponsored by the purchasers, then also, the rules_ framed under the Bihar Act envisage a strict and exclusive control of the Government over the Agents and their activities, and provide for their liability to compensate the Government for the loss occasioned by their mlsconduct or neglect.\n\nUnder the impugned Condition 13, the minimum price payable for the unit or units concerned by a purchaser is 75 per cent <JI the notified estimated yield from that Ul)jt or units, in terms of standard bags multiplied by the rates or bid offered by the purchaser and accepted by the Government, even if the actual yield from that unit or units falls short of 75 per cent of the estimated yield.\n\nThis condition far from creating a monopoly in the trade in favour of middlemen, operates as an ironclad safeguard against leakage of the public revenue by assuring a minimum return to the public exchequer from the sale of Kcndu leaves.\n\nThe provision is aimed to secure the full benefit from the trade to the State leaving chances of making reasonable, marginal profit lo the purchasers.\n\nIt was observed in Rashbihari's case, that it would be in the interest of Stale to invite tenders in the open market from all persons irrespective of their having taken contracts in the previous year. This suggestion has been adopted by the scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules 3ud the Forms of Tender Notice and Agreement prescribed thereunder. )t Some other defects pointed out by this Court in the operation of the\n\n< Orissa schemes, were that the Government had not estimated the crop and the prevailing prices of Kendu leaves about the time when offers were made, nor the conditions in the market, nor offers of higher prices and. the likelihood of offerors of higher prices carrying out their obli- . gations. The scheme of the Bihar Act and .the Rules, and Forms inducting that of the impugned condition 13 is designed to remove the deficiencies, infirmities and vices pointed out by this Court in Rash~ bihari's case. · ·\n\nFor these reasons, we are unable to accept the contention, that in -it actual operation, the impugned provision (clause 13) creates a moiiopoly in favour of a class of midd/emeh consisting of 'Agents' and pur-\n\nA cbase£S, and enables them to earn unduly l'Jrge profits at the cost of the public or pluckers and growers. •\n\nThe impugned Condition 13 satisfies the test of reasonableness under the first part of Article 19(6). We, therefore, repel the challenge to the validity of that condition on the ground of Article 19 ( 6).\n\nThe next question is whether the impugned provisions arc violati\"' of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 14 of tht: Constitution.\n\nThe argument is that these provisions treat unequal; as equals, even where crying dissimilarities exist and thus their operation results in Procrustean cruelty. ~\n\nThe point sought to be made out is that even if the shortfall in the quantity supplied or the substandard nature of the quality offered to the purchaser is solely due to the fraud, negligence or misconduct of the Agent or sefV'ant of the Government, the Joss due to such shortfall or deficiency in quality must fall on the purchaser, notwithstanding the fact that he {purchaser) was in no way privy or contributory to that fraud, negligence or misconduct of the Agent or Government servant and thus the impugned provisions do not make any discerning distinction between honest purchasers and dishonest purchoasers, but tar those dissimilarly situated classes with one and the same brush.\n\nThe argument though attractive, does not stand a close examination.\n\nAt the time of inviting Tenders in the prescribed Form or inviting: purchasers to bid at the publication, all tendercrs or bidders are treated equally in the sense that they can offer their rates or bids subject to the statutory conditions including the impugned provisions. While accepting the highest Tender of rates per standard bag or the highest bid, it is not possible to classify the purchasers whose offers/bids have been accepted into 'honest' purchasers and 'dishonest' purchasers.\n\nEvery- \"'-, body whose offer or hid is accepted, is assumed to be honest.\n\nSecondly, in entering into a contract of purchase of the notified G estimated yield in terms of standard bags, the discretion and volition of the tenderer or bidder, also, plays an important part in calculating the minimum price payable for the estimated yield from the particular unit. According to the impµgned Condition 13 of the Tender Notice. which also forms a part of the prcstribed Form in which tenders are invited, the successful tenderer or bidder whose tender or bid is H ccepted by the Department, has to pay a minimum royalty. also described as 'revenue' or price, which will be 75 per cent of the notified !estimated yield iri terms of stanpard bag by the tenderer or bidder .\n\n- •\n\nBIR! LEAVES v. BllIAR (Sarkaria, I.) 441\n\nThus, the volition of the purchaser lllso plays a prominent part in lilting the rate or price payable by him. By means of his offer in the\n\nTen<Jer Form p'r by bidding at the auction, the purchaser binds himself to pay this minimum royalty even if by the _end' of the year, the number of bags collected is less than the notified estimated yield, Tli.c' pui:chasers form their own estimates of the expected yield from a!. pw:ticular unit for a particular year and then make their offers of' Ii rates in the prescribed Tender Forrn, or when the dis¢sal is by public auction, the purchasers make their bids stlbjeCt to the terms publisJied iu the Tender or Auction Notices. H, according to the estim_ate of an f intending purchaser, the unit concerned is not likely to yield th'e' qlllllltity notified, it is open to him' eitliet not to submit any tehder or\n\nofl'er or rates at all, or not to offer a bidor an amount higher' than\n\nthat which, according to his own estimate or calculaJion, wpuld be a reas-onabfo price of the bargain. Iti oilier words, if a person with his' eyes open tenders the highest riltes per standard bag or offers tlie' highest bid at public auction, as the case may be, of his owti accilril,\n\nit will be assumed that he did so because in his own estimation' the acceptance of the contract at those rates and S'Ubject to the notified terms and condition would afford him a reasonable scppe for making. profit.\n\nFurthermore, under the schenie of. the Bihar Act and. RultlB',\n\nthe sale is not restricted to any particular class of persons as in Rashbihari' s case. Anyone who wants to do busi!!ess of purchase of Kendu leaves can submit h'R tender of rates in the prescribed Form, or offer his bid at the auction, as the case may be, subject to the notified con\"\n\nditions of th~ Tender Notice/ Auction Notice.\n\nIf is a fundamental principle of general application that if a pel'Son of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out • the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of\n\nme terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and' ! rtjindiale the other terms of the same contract which might be disadvntagcous to him.\n\nThe maxim is qui approbat non reprobat, (due who approbates cannot reprobate). this principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law, is now firmly embodied in English Common L1W.\n\nAccording !o it, Ii party to an instfument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or trans acti'on and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and reject the S11me instrument or transaction (Per Scrufton L, J. Verschures Creameries, Lid. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co.('}; See Douglas Menzies v. Umphelhy('); See also &roud's Judicial Dictionary,\n\nVol. I, page 169, 3rd Edn.).\n\n(I) [192112KB.608. •\n\n(2) [1908] A.C. 224 at r. 2n.\n\n~·--------\n\nThe aforesaid inhibitory principle squarely applies to the cases of those petitioners who had by offering highest bids at public auctions or by Tenders, accepted and worked out the contracts in the past but are now resisting the demands or other action, arising out of the im- pugned Condition 13 on the ground that this condition is violative of Articles 19 (1 )(g) and 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIn this connection, it will bear repetition, here, that the impugned conditions though bear a statutory complexion, retain $eir basic contractual characte& also. It is true that a person cannoJ be debarred from enforcing his fnnda-· menal rights on the gronnd of estoppel or waiver. But the aforesaid principle which prohibits a party to a transaction from approbating, a: part of its conditions and repo'bating the rest, is different from the doctrine of estoppel or waiver) .\n\n. For the foregoing reasons, the challege to the impugned Conditi&n No. 13, ou the ground of Article 14, also, is unsustainable and is rejected .\n\n. Now, we take up the impugned Condition 4 (bb). It provides that no objection from the purcha5er with regard to the quantity or quality of the leave in the gaddis (bundles) offered would be tenable.\n\nThis condition is couched in peremptory, drastic and absolute langu~ ·\n\nage. It is not qualified by any words showing that the bar envisaged in it will be attracted only in cases where the purchaser has had an earlier opportunity to raise thi5 objection but failed to do so, or, where he had on an earlier occasion raised such an objection which was heard and overruled by the competent Forest Officer.\n\nWe have already noticed that Section 9 ( 1 ) , proviso, of the Act contains a bnilt-in-warranty, that the Kendu leaves offered would be fit for manufacture of bldis; that is to say, the leaves would be of mercruint~ able quality.\n\nCondition 4(bb) therefore, is inconsistent with and ' repugnant to Section 9(1), proviso of the Act and, as such, invalid'.\n\nIt is, therefore, not necessary to test its validity on the ground of Articles 19 and 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the light of the above discussion, we would dismiss all the Writ petitions, namely, Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, Writ Petitions 121 to 125 of 1979, Writ Petitions 405 and 441 of 1974, Writ Pe1itions 46 and 47 of 1975, excepting to this extent that the aforesaid clause 4(bb) in the Tender Notices and the statutory Agreement in question. being inconsistent with the proviso to Section 9 (I) of the Act, is declared to be invalid.\n\nIn Criminal Appeal 300 of 1974, the prose<:ution of the appellants for an offence under Section 3 79, Penal Code has already been quash-\n\nBIRI LEAVES v. BIHAR (Sarkaria, !.) 443\n\ned by the High Court by its judgment dated February 14, 1974; but the Ordr dated September 11, 1973 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,\n\nSaheb Ganj, taking cognizance of a case instituted by the Divisional Forest Officer, Dumka, for offences under Section 409, Penal Code and Section 5(2) read with Section 16 of the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance ( 46 of 1973) was not quashed.\n\nThe main co'ntention of appellant 1, Shankar Prasad Bhagat, was that he received only 650 standard bags as against the notified estimated 1500 bags, and the Condition 13 of the statutory Agreement under which he was required to pay for the undelivere_d or unoflered quantity of the leaves was unconstitutional .\n\nSince we have held that the aforesaid Condition 13 is valid, this contention must fail.\n\nWe, therefore, dismiss this appeal. The case shall now go back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for disposal in accordance with law.\n\nWe advisedly abstain from making any obser vation with regard to the merits of the case.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nPetitions and Appeal dismissed.\n\n\n- --- ---\"'", "total_entities": 161, "entities": [{"text": "417\n\nNEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 538, "end_char": 547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Clause 4(bb)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 552, "end_char": 564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 10, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 756, "end_char": 770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 10, 1972 the State of Bihar issued the Bihar D Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972, which was replaced by the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 10, 1972 the State of Bihar issued the Bihar D Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972, which was replaced by the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1212, "end_char": 1221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1374, "end_char": 1383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1683, "end_char": 1693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provisions regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves were made in Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1745, "end_char": 1812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 16, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2582, "end_char": 2598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Notification dated January 16, 1974 the Rules were amended and sub-clause (bb) after clause 4(b) was added in Form 'M' of the Agreement which provided that the purchaser shall not raise any objection against the quality of Kendu leaves or shortage of leaves."}}, {"text": "clause 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2648, "end_char": 2659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provisions regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves were made in Rule", "statute": "Provisions regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves were made in Rule"}}, {"text": "clause 4(bb)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3481, "end_char": 3493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4(bb)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3742, "end_char": 3751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4364, "end_char": 4376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5415, "end_char": 5425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6165, "end_char": 6177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6759, "end_char": 6770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7107, "end_char": 7117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article\n\n19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8139, "end_char": 8153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8475, "end_char": 8488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9741, "end_char": 9750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12369, "end_char": 12383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12947, "end_char": 12957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "F. S. Nlitiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13197, "end_char": 13211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "421\n\nF. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. , S.\n\nA Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "B. Devan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13218, "end_char": 13226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "421\n\nF. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. , S.\n\nA Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13228, "end_char": 13244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "421\n\nF. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. , S.\n\nA Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13246, "end_char": 13256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "421\n\nF. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. , S.\n\nA Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nA Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13263, "end_char": 13274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "421\n\nF. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. , S.\n\nA Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "Tarini Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13279, "end_char": 13292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "421\n\nF. S. Nlitiman, Anil B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, l. , S.\n\nA Sinha and Tarini Prasad for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13366, "end_char": 13379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "K. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13381, "end_char": 13392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "S. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13397, "end_char": 13408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13480, "end_char": 13496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Balak Mahto, B and U. P. Singh for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Ram Balak Mahto", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13525, "end_char": 13540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Balak Mahto, B and U. P. Singh for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13548, "end_char": 13559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Balak Mahto, B and U. P. Singh for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "A .. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13620, "end_char": 13635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A .. Subhashini for Respondent No, 3 in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "SARKAJUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13731, "end_char": 13739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jlldgme'.nt of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAJUA, J.-The common question that has been seriously pressed itito argument in this batch of writ petitions and criminal appeal mentioned in the title, relates to the constitutiopal validity of certain Rules framed under the State of Bihar under the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') p:irticularly clause 13, clause 4 (bb) of the Tender Notice and of the sµtutory Agreement notified by the Bihar Government in the Bihar Government Gazette,."}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14086, "end_char": 14095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14097, "end_char": 14105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14178, "end_char": 14194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jlldgme'.nt of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAJUA, J.-The common question that has been seriously pressed itito argument in this batch of writ petitions and criminal appeal mentioned in the title, relates to the constitutiopal validity of certain Rules framed under the State of Bihar under the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') p:irticularly clause 13, clause 4 (bb) of the Tender Notice and of the sµtutory Agreement notified by the Bihar Government in the Bihar Government Gazette,."}}, {"text": "NejV Bihar Bidi Leaves Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14597, "end_char": 14623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The basic question being common, it will suffice to state E the facfs giving rise to Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, filed by the NejV Bihar Bidi Leaves Co.\n\nThe petitioners in all these writ petitions are either firms or individuals: carrying on trade in Kendu leaves in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14967, "end_char": 14973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States, including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14975, "end_char": 14989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States, including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14991, "end_char": 15002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States, including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15004, "end_char": 15011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States, including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15013, "end_char": 15027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States, including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15042, "end_char": 15055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kndu leaves are grown as forest produce in several States, including the States of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Forest Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15171, "end_char": 15188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the old system in Bihar, the right to pluck and extract Kendu leaves from a forest: coupe carved out by the Forest Department, was auctioned by the Sate Government."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16105, "end_char": 16114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16401, "end_char": 16410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16418, "end_char": 16427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16833, "end_char": 16842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16904, "end_char": 16913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17009, "end_char": 17018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17253, "end_char": 17262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17982, "end_char": 17992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18400, "end_char": 18410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18585, "end_char": 18595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19018, "end_char": 19027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19174, "end_char": 19184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19331, "end_char": 19341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19434, "end_char": 19444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19450, "end_char": 19475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section (2) of that Section provides that -\"Such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters,\n\n namely:- C\n\n\" (a) procedure to be followed in making appointment of\n\nants;\n\n(b) to (d) ............ ,\n\n( e) the manner of registration under Section 1 O;\n\n{ f) the manner of registration, the period within which such registration shall be made and the fee payable thereof under sub-section (1) of Section 11 ;\n\n(g) form of declaration, authority to whom, date by which and the manner in which the .ckclaration shall be furnished under sub-section (2) of Section 11;\n\n(h) \"\n\nIn exercise of its powers under the then extent Ordinance analogous to those under Section 20, the State Government of Bihar notified the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Rules, 1972 (for short the 'Rules')."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19804, "end_char": 19814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24454, "end_char": 24463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24622, "end_char": 24631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27578, "end_char": 27589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28806, "end_char": 28813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first proposition ca:nvas&ed by Mr. Nariman appearing for the\n\npetitioners in Writ Petitions 405 and 441 of 1974, is the Petitioner• D argued that the aforesaid impugned provisions/conditions comprised in the aforesaid clause 4(bb) and clause (13) amount to alli unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' fundamental freedom to carry on trade or business in Kendu leaves; guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution; that the impugned provisions are not within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of claus~ E ( 6) of Article 19 because the impugned provisions are not \"integrally and essentially connected\" with the creation of the monopoly in favour -Of the State, but are only incidental or subsidiary to the operation of the monopoly."}}, {"text": "clause 4(bb)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28989, "end_char": 29001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kendu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29131, "end_char": 29136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first proposition ca:nvas&ed by Mr. Nariman appearing for the\n\npetitioners in Writ Petitions 405 and 441 of 1974, is the Petitioner• D argued that the aforesaid impugned provisions/conditions comprised in the aforesaid clause 4(bb) and clause (13) amount to alli unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' fundamental freedom to carry on trade or business in Kendu leaves; guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution; that the impugned provisions are not within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of claus~ E ( 6) of Article 19 because the impugned provisions are not \"integrally and essentially connected\" with the creation of the monopoly in favour -Of the State, but are only incidental or subsidiary to the operation of the monopoly."}}, {"text": "Article 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29162, "end_char": 29178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29317, "end_char": 29327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29871, "end_char": 29881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1969] 3 S.C.R. 374", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30388, "end_char": 30407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31318, "end_char": 31327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31476, "end_char": 31483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chitale, appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions 121 to 125 of 1979, has by and large adopted the argnments of Mr. Nariman."}}, {"text": "Dewan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32373, "end_char": 32378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Dewan, who has appeared for some of the petitioners, cited Maneka Gandhi's case(') in support of his contention, that the impugned provisions in their direct and inevitable effect, impinge upon the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32432, "end_char": 32445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Dewan, who has appeared for some of the petitioners, cited Maneka Gandhi's case(') in support of his contention, that the impugned provisions in their direct and inevitable effect, impinge upon the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32626, "end_char": 32644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. S. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32838, "end_char": 32849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K. S. Sinha, appearing for the appellant i'l1 Criminal Appeal 300 of 1974, submitted that the validity of the impugned provisions was indirectly involved in this appeal, though in a different context.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 S.C.R. 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 33115, "end_char": 33134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33483, "end_char": 33494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. L. N. Sinha, learned Attorney-General submits on behalf of the respondents that there is a paucity of skilled R: people who could employed as Agents; that in actual practice the persons appointed as Agents are sponsored by the purchasers."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35985, "end_char": 35995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36766, "end_char": 36773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Attorney-G.cneral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37520, "end_char": 37537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the proposition that one who has received the benefits of statute is precluded from attacking the constitutionality of a condition attached by the statute, the learned Attorney-G.cneral has referred to these decisions of the Supreme Court of United States : Berth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission of the Stale of Wisconian('); St. Louis Casting Co. v. Consrmc1ion Co.('); and United\n\nFood Fuel Gas Co. v. Rail Road Commission.(\")"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37577, "end_char": 37607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the proposition that one who has received the benefits of statute is precluded from attacking the constitutionality of a condition attached by the statute, the learned Attorney-G.cneral has referred to these decisions of the Supreme Court of United States : Berth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission of the Stale of Wisconian('); St. Louis Casting Co. v. Consrmc1ion Co.('); and United\n\nFood Fuel Gas Co. v. Rail Road Commission.(\")"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38542, "end_char": 38552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38661, "end_char": 38666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LEAVES v. B!HAR (Sarkaria, l.) 431\n\nparticularly those under Article 14 of the Constitution and the principle of estoppel enunciated in the American decisions is not applicable in India."}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39423, "end_char": 39436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41203, "end_char": 41213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A kadasi Padha11", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41920, "end_char": 41936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ambit of the words \"in so far as it relates to\" in the context of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of clause ( 6), came up for consideration before this Court in A kadasi Padha11's case (ibid)."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41952, "end_char": 41966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, held that only !"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42465, "end_char": 42475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "These provisions are incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42570, "end_char": 42660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article\n\n19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43090, "end_char": 43104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These provisions are incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules", "statute": "These provisions are incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43276, "end_char": 43286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These provisions are incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules", "statute": "These provisions are incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43775, "end_char": 43785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47345, "end_char": 47354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Akadasi Padhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51514, "end_char": 51528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of Orissa (ibid) and Akadasi Padhan's case (ibid), bec:iuse in that situation the conclusion would be ineluctable that the monopoly is being worked by the State not for its exclusive benefit or in the public interest but to benefit a class of profiteers comprised of the purchasers al]d their agents, thereby creating a monopoly within a monopoly.", "canonical_name": "Akadasi Padhan"}}, {"text": "H Rashbihari Panda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51907, "end_char": 51925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In ordr to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to notice H Rashbihari Panda's case."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52022, "end_char": 52037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To regulate trade in Kendu leaves and prevent exploitation of growers and pluckers, the State of Orissa enacted\n\nthe Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52104, "end_char": 52113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52149, "end_char": 52158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52357, "end_char": 52366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52526, "end_char": 52536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52675, "end_char": 52685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Akadas1 Padhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52801, "end_char": 52815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Akadas1 Padhan's case (1b1d), a grower of Kendu leaves ' challenged Sections 3 and 4 and Rule 7 ( 5) made under that Act on the ground that it contravened his fnndamental right under Articles 14 and 19 (1 )(a) and ( g) in this Court.", "canonical_name": "Akadasi Padhan"}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52869, "end_char": 52885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52984, "end_char": 53002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53051, "end_char": 53067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53085, "end_char": 53098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53500, "end_char": 53517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A k\"'lasi Padhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53618, "end_char": 53634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the decision in A k\"'lasi Padhan' s case, the Orissa State made some changes in the implementation of its monopoly."}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55101, "end_char": 55112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55550, "end_char": 55559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55718, "end_char": 55728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56032, "end_char": 56042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56429, "end_char": 56446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57277, "end_char": 57295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57449, "end_char": 57466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58351, "end_char": 58361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rashbihari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58616, "end_char": 58626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that the decision of this Court in Rashbihari's case\n\n(ibid) was announced on January 16, 1969.", "canonical_name": "Rash~ bihari"}}, {"text": "January 16, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58659, "end_char": 58675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that the decision of this Court in Rashbihari's case\n\n(ibid) was announced on January 16, 1969."}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58747, "end_char": 58764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bihar Legislature, therefore could not but be aware of the unconstitutional features pointed out by this Court in the schemes of the Orissa Act and the Rules framed thereunder."}}, {"text": "Court in the schemes of the Orissa Act and the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58852, "end_char": 58904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Legisl", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59125, "end_char": 59138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Care has been taken by the Bihar Legislature, and the Government to exercise the scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules and Forms framed or prescribed thereunder, of the vices from which the schemes of Orissa Legisl, ation suffered."}}, {"text": "Rash~ bihari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62828, "end_char": 62840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scheme of the Bihar Act and .the Rules, and Forms inducting that of the impugned condition 13 is designed to remove the deficiencies, infirmities and vices pointed out by this Court in Rash~ bihari's case. · ·", "canonical_name": "Rash~ bihari"}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62967, "end_char": 62976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63264, "end_char": 63277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63365, "end_char": 63375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63501, "end_char": 63511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68339, "end_char": 68342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68976, "end_char": 68987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69597, "end_char": 69607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70285, "end_char": 70294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70554, "end_char": 70566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 19 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70682, "end_char": 70700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 4(bb)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70996, "end_char": 71008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71111, "end_char": 71120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71253, "end_char": 71262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71267, "end_char": 71277, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Saheb Ganj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71479, "end_char": 71489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "443\n\ned by the High Court by its judgment dated February 14, 1974; but the Ordr dated September 11, 1973 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,\n\nSaheb Ganj, taking cognizance of a case instituted by the Divisional Forest Officer, Dumka, for offences under Section 409, Penal Code and Section 5(2) read with Section 16 of the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance ( 46 of 1973) was not quashed."}}, {"text": "Dumka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 71564, "end_char": 71569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "443\n\ned by the High Court by its judgment dated February 14, 1974; but the Ordr dated September 11, 1973 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,\n\nSaheb Ganj, taking cognizance of a case instituted by the Divisional Forest Officer, Dumka, for offences under Section 409, Penal Code and Section 5(2) read with Section 16 of the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance ( 46 of 1973) was not quashed."}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71590, "end_char": 71601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71603, "end_char": 71613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71618, "end_char": 71630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71641, "end_char": 71651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shankar Prasad Bhagat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71776, "end_char": 71797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main co'ntention of appellant 1, Shankar Prasad Bhagat, was that he received only 650 standard bags as against the notified estimated 1500 bags, and the Condition 13 of the statutory Agreement under which he was required to pay for the undelivere_d or unoflered quantity of the leaves was unconstitutional ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_444_458_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RAMA NAND AND ORS.\n\nSTATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH\n\nJanuary 6, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK. JJ.]\n\nClrcumstantial evidence, \"alue of-Corpus delicti not found in tlu case- Wllether inference of guilt of murder could be drawn l1/ie11 rhe othr cil'cum.f'- tances established 011 record were sufficient to !Cad to the coriclusion lfiot ltn\"lhin all liun1a11 p1obability the rictini was murdered by the accust'd.\n\nDismissing the appeal and maintaining the conviction and sentences of the appellants, the Court\n\nHELD : (I) It is well settled that where the inference of guilt of an accused PeriiOn .is to be drawn ftoin circumstantinP evidence only, thoSe circutrtstances must, in the first place, be cogently established. Further, those cin:umstances should be of a definite rendency pointin, g towards the guilt of the accused, and in their totality, must unerringly lead to the conclusion that within an huma11 probability, the offence was committed by the accused and none else.\n\nIn the instant case-, the following circumstances had been correctly found to have been established by the prosecution: (i) Rama Naud accused bad a stroiit motive to murder bis wife, Sumitra. (ii) Sumitra \\Vas last seen alive \"ith Rama: Nand, appellant inthe family house at Jherwin on the night between 13th and 14th May, 1972.\n\n(iii) (a) Rama Nand and the other co-accused falsely gave out that she had committed suicide by jumping into the river. They 'planred' o Sa/war and a pair of shoes on the bank of the Sutlaj and gave out that they belcnged to the deceased, and Shish Ram lodged a folsc report with the police to the effect that she had committed suicide by jumping into the river. The Salwar and the shoes, which had been 'planted' there to manufacture false clues by the accused, did not beiong to Sumitra, and the accused falsely ;:tiserte.d that these articles belong to the deceased.\n\n(b) The story given out by the accused persons that upto 11 a.n1. on May 14, 1972, Sumitra was planting chillies along with Sheela and other members of the family of the accused, was false. (iv) Tue. gold chain (Ex. P-1) and the watch (Ex. P-2) \\Vhich Sumitra ued to \\Vear on her person all the 24 hours, and the clothes (Ex, P-5 to P-10) which she had on her person and lhc basket (fu. P-11) and umbrella (Ex. P-12) which sho was carrying \\Vhcn on the evening of May 13, 1972 she came to the house of the accused at Jhen.vin, \\Vere recovered: from the house: of thoaccued. (v) Somo days after the occurrence, one Paranda was found from the jungle near this village. There was a bunch of hair in the plated tail of this Paranda. The tail :ippeared to have been cut. These hair sticking in the paranda and those found: entangled in the Dupatta of the deceased were according to the Forensic Expert of one and the san1c person. (vi} A legless decomposed corpse \\\\'as. recovered from the Sutlej near village Randol in a mutilated condition.\n\nBut its identity\n\n[4510-H, 452A-E, 453A-BJ\n\n(2) Even o nthe assumption that the dead body of the victim was not found, circumstances (i) to (v) mentioned above in their cumulative effect includably and ra.tionally compeJ the conclusion that Sumitra had died and it 'n'as, Rama\n\n- ..\n\nRAMA NANO v. H.P. (Sarkaria, J.) 445\n\nNand accused who had intentionally caused her death. Ordinarily, the recovery of the dead-body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence is sufficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. Even so, discovery of the dead-body of the victim bearing physical CiVidence of vio1encci, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder.\n\nIndeed ve.ry many cases arc of such a nature where the discovery of the dead-body is in1possible.\n\nA blind adherence to this old doctrine of Sir Mathew Hale that \"for a conviction of murder atlcast the bcxly was found dead\" would open the doer \\\\'idc open for many a henious. murderer to escape \\Vith impunity simply because they were: a cunning and cleYer enough to destroy the body of their victim.\n\nJn the context of our law, Haolc's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a: murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory prOOf of hon1icidal dlath of the victim must be adduced by the prosecuti.on.\n\nSuch proof may be the dir(\"Ct ocular account of an eye-witness, or by circurnstantial evidence, or by both: But \\vhere the fact of corpus delicti, i.e. 'homicidal death' is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone. the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerried has met ahomicidal death. f, ven so, this principle of caution cannot be pushe'cl too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is se; ldom to be .had in this imperfect \\VOrld, and absolute certainty is a myth.\n\nThat is \\vhy under Section 3, Evidence Act, a fact is said to be \"proved'', ir tlie Court coru; idering the matters beforeit, considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought. under the circumstanCts of the paorticular case, to act up-On the sllpposition that it exists. The corpl1s delicti' or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances \\vhich definitely lead to the conclusion that within alt human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned. [457 D-H, 458AD1\n\nCRIMINAi. APPllLLATE JuR1smcnoN: Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n7-6-1974 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal F r~ No. 40/73.\n\nflardya/ Hardy and P. P. Juneja for the Appellants .\n\nBadri Das Sharma and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated June, 7, 1974, of the High Cour~ of Himaehal Pradesh, whereby it upheld the conviction of Rama Nand accused under Section 302, Penal Code. and that of the co-accused Sbish Ram and Kali Datt under Section 201, Penal Code, and also the sentences awarded to each of them by the learned Sessions Judge,\n\n\nA Mandi.\n\nThe prosecution story, as it emerged from the record, was as follows:\n\nSumitra deceased, aged 19 yearn, was }he daughter of Som Krishan (P.W. 33). Rama Nand, appellant is her husband and Shish Ram, appellant 2, is her father-in-law while Kali Datt appellant ii 3, is the younger brother of Rama Nand.\n\n. b\n\nSumitra's father wished to see his daughter highly educated, and employed in Government service and married to a suitable, highly educated person, settled in life.\n\nSumitra had passed Higher Secondary Examination and wanted to pursue her studies further according to the wishes of her father.\n\nAbout two years before Sumitra's reported death, Shish Ram appellant approached Som Krishan (P, W. 33) and persuaded him to give Sumitra in marriage to hi~ son, Rama Nand.\n\nWhile negotiating this matrimonial alliance, Shish Rama told Som Krishan that his son was suitably employed on a Government job in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kasumpti.\n\nHe further falsely represented to Som Krishan that his son, Rama Nand was a graduate.\n\nBelieving this representation to be true, Som Krishan about 1 t or 2 years before Sumitra's murder in question, married her to Rama Nand. Before this marriage it was settled by Som Krishan with Shish Ram and Rama Nand accused that even after her marriage, Snmitra would continue to pursue further stu.dies and take up employment as a teacher.\n\nAfter the marriage, her father got his daughter, Sumitra, employed as a teacher in Village Nursery School at Chanyana which was situated near her parents' village.\n\nWhile teaching at Chnayana, she continued to reside with her parents. She used to visit village Jherwin occasionally to be in the society of her husband who. also used to come to Jherwin from Kasumpti. The accused persistently demanded that Sumitra should give up her employment at Chanyana, and start residing permanently and continuously in her matrimonial home at Jherwin.\n\nSumitra tenatiously refused to do so.\n\nRama Nand wrote several letters to Sumitra urging her to give up her adamant attitude.\n\nThese letters furnished evidence of a stron~ motive for Rama Nand to put an end to the life of Sumitra.\n\nRama Nand was employed as a Clerk in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner Kasumpti.\n\nOn May 12, 1972, he came to Jherwin from Kasumpti. He had earlier written to his wife, Sumitra, strongly H urging her to come to village Jherwin.\n\nOn May 13, 1972, Sumitra came to Rama Nand's house at Jherwin and stayed with him in his room on the night between 13th and 14th May, 1972.\n\nThe other\n\nRAMA NANO v. H.P. (Sarkaria, !.) 447\n\nrooms of the house were in occupation of the other members of Shish Ram\"s family.\n\nThereafter, on May 14, 1972,. she disappeared from the house of the accused.\n\nThe accused gave. out that Sumitra had gone towards the Sutlej river on the pretext of attending to the call of nature; that thereafter her Salwar and shoes were found on the bank of the river, which indicated that she had jumped into the river and committed suicide.\n\nAfter pretending to make a search for her body in the river and nearabout, Shish Ram on May 16, 1972, went to Police Station Karsog at 5.30 p.m. and lodged a report (Ex. PAQ). It was recorded by Head Constable Nand Lal.\n\nAfter recording it in the Roznamacha, the Head Constable read it in the presence of one Inder Pal to the informant, who, after hearing the same. to be correct, signed it in Hindi and his companion lnder Lal signed it in English.\n\nAs this report, according to the prosecution, shows that an attempt was made by Shish Ram accused to lay a false trail and manufacture false clues as to the cause of the death of Sumitra and to screen the offence, it is necessary to reproduce the material parts of that report (rendered into English) , hereunder :\n\n...... \"my dauglxteI1-ilaw Smt.\n\nSumitra Devi aged about 18/19 years, was married about H years ago, to my son Rama Nand who is employed in the office of D.C.\n\nKasumpti as a clerk. Sumitra Devi herself was employed as a Mistress in Nursery School, Chanyana and was residing with her parents. Whenever my son used to come home on leave, she also used to visit her house at such time.\n\nSimilarly my son Rama Nand had come on leave to his house on 12-5-72 and in the evening of 13-5-72, my daughter-in-law, Smt. Sumitra Devi had also come to his house. As usual, because of Sunday holiday, in the morning on 14-5-72, myself, my daughter-in-law and other members of the family\n\nwere planting chiliy seedlings in the fields near our house.\n\nMy son (Rama Nand) was lying in bed on account of stomach trouble.\n\nAfter plantation work, at about 9/10 a.m. my daughter-in-law, Smt. Sumitra Devi along with Sheela Devi aged about 7 years, who is daughter of my brother, had gone downward on the pretext of easing herself.\n\nAfter some time, Sheela returned home and reported that she had been turned back from the way by her aunt. Sumitra Devi, who had gone ahead towards the river side. For some time it was believed that she might have gone to answer the call of nature.\n\nThe. river is about 2 furlongs from my ho\\lse towards downside. When sufficient time passed and she did\n\nnot return home, then cails were given hither and thither and search was also started but her whereabouts could not be known.\n\nAfter a thorough search on the Sutkj river bank, the Sa/war and shoes of Smt. Suntitra were found which Smt. Sumitra was wearing at the time of her going that side. This created a suspicion that she might have com.- milted suicide by jumping into the river.\n\nShe was searched at the river bank as also in the nearby villages ...... but her dead-body was not found, nor any clue of her going is available.\n\nSmt. Sumitra was married in a good famify and her character was also good, her relations with her husband were cordial. No quarrel on that day or prior to that, took place between her and my son, nor is there any reason for lier disappearance.\n\nI have come to report, which may be recorded.\n\nAfter locating her alive or dead, separate report will be lodged.\"\n\nDaulat Ram, Station Honse Offiror\n\n(P.W. 38) then visited the scene of occurrence on May 13, 1972. He was not s:itisfied about t!ic correctness of the information given by Shish Ram', accused. He, therefore, got a case under Section 364; Penal Code, registered.\n\nShislr Ram accused produced bzforc him the Sa/war (Ex. P'l4) and shoes (Ex. P-15/12) which, according to Shish Ram's report, belonged to Sumitra deceased and were found lying on the river bank.\n\nThe investigator also prepared a rough sketch of the. spot where these clothes and shoes were stated to have been found.\n\nl' Som Krishan upon receiving the information, suspected that her daughter had been murdered at the iustance of Rama Nand and others.\n\nSom Krishan reached the spot and made enquiries.\n\nRama Nand and Shish Ram accused were arrested by the Investigating Officer on June 5, 1972. The Investigating Officer took into possession the Locket-chain (Ex. P-1) and the watch (Ex. P-2) belonging G to the deceased from the room which was in the occupation of Rama Nand, in the presence of Kanshi Ram and Hira Mani and prepared the Memo (Ex. P-A) in this behalf.\n\nRama Nand accused, whilst in polic-.: custody, produced Sumitra's clothes (Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-10) which were taken into possession by the Investigator in the presence of Mastu and Hari Ram, witnesses (vide Ex. P-Y).\n\nThese clothes, 11 according to the prosecution, were the same which Sumitra was wearing when sl1e arrived at the house of Rama Nand accused on May 13, 1972.\n\nRA'l1A NAND v. H.P. (Sarkaria, J.) 449\n\nOn June 5, 1972, a legless and armless dead-body in a highly tkcomposed state was found at a distance of four kilometres downslrcam on the bank of the river Sutlej near village Randaul.\n\nKali Datt appellant was found near tlrat skeleton in the early hours or June S, 1972.\n\nHe dragged the skeleton from the river upto some distance.\n\nIt appeared that Jogs clc. had eaten away the flesh.\n\nA p.1rl of the skull was found in tact, while the remaining part of it was lying at some distance.\n\nOn receiving information, Som Krishan (P.W. 33) and bis brother's wife, Laxmi (P.W. 2), came and identified the skeleton to be' that of Sumitra. There was some flesh on the buttock portion and there was a mark on it.\n\nAccording to these -f identifying witnesses, this mark was that of a burn which Sumitra bad received during her infancy.\n\nOne of the teeth found in the mandible was carious, while another tooth was jutting out.\n\nDaulat Ram got the dead-body measured from shoulder to the cut portion of the thics by Mchar Chand.\n\nThe measurement came to 2'-4\".\n\nDaulat Ram prepared the inquest report (Ex. P /F) which was attested by Kundan wilncss.\n\nHe sent the dead-body a.long with the inquest report (Ex. PF) to Simla for post-mortem examination. The deadhody reached the Hospital at 1 p.m. on June 7, 1972. There, they directed the police to take the dead-body lo Ripon Hospital.\n\nConsequently, at 2 p.m., the dead-body was made over to the Duty Doctor at the Ripon Hospital.\n\nThe post-mortem examination was conduct.ed by Dr. J. R. Sharma (P.W. 14) on the following day.\n\nThe post mortem report was handed over to the police by the Doctor on June 21, 1972. A few components of the skeleton, including the mandible, were sent to the Dental Surgeon, Dr. R. S. Patbania (P.W. 15) and Radiologist, Dr. M. L. Ahuja (P.W. 16) for examination and opinion.\n\nThese Doctors, however, opined that the mandible belonged to a child of not more than 10 years of age.\n\nThe components of the _ skeleton were, also, sent to Dr. 0. P. Bhargava (P.W. 31), Professor J' of Anatomy in the Medical College of Simila. His opinion about the ' age of the deceased was also the same. The Doctors could not determine the sex of the skeleton.\n\nOn August 24, 1972, a Paranda (cotton headtail), alleged to be G\n\nof Sumitra deceased was recovered from the jungle of Ghangar.\n\nSome human hair were found entangled in the Paranda.\n\nThese hair were sent for comparison with the hair of the deceased found embedd•:d in her Dupal/a.\n\nThe forensic expert opined that the two sets of hair belonged to one and the same person.\n\nAfter investigation, the four accused, namely, Rama Nand, .his H father Shish Ram, his brother Kali Datt and Shish Ram's brother Kesar Chand, were sent up befor~ a Magistrate who committed them\n\n\nfor trial to the Court of Session.\n\nAt the trial, j)1 his examination under Section 342, Rama Nand admitted that after her marriage, Sumitra got employment as a teacher.\n\nHe, however, denied the prosecution allegation that he and his father were opposed to her employment as a teacher. He expressed ignorance as to whether there was any settlement between his father, Shish Ram, and Som Krishan Shastri, father of Sumitra that she would continue her studies even after the marriage and would be free to take up service as her career.\n\nHe added that his matrimonial alliance with Sumitra was not negotiated alld settled in his presence.\n\nHe admitted that the letters dated December 13, 1971, December 16, 1971 and May 9, 1972 (the English rendering of which is marked Ex. PAH, Ex. P AB, and Ex. PC, respectively) were written by him to Sumitra, and that the letter (Ex. PAJ) dated October 14, 1971, was written by him to his fatherin-law. Som Krishan Shastri (P.W. 33). He further admitted that on May 13, 1972, Sumitra came to his house In village Jherwin from her parents' place, and that she was then wearing the golden chain (Ex.\n\nP-1), wrist watch (Ex. P-2), Dupatta (Ex. P-5), suit (Ex. P-6 and Ex.\n\nP-7), socks (Ex.P-8 and 9), banian (Ex.P-10) and was carrying the basket (Ex. P-11) and umbrella (Ex. P-12).\n\nHe, however, added that when she (Sumitra) reached home on May 13, 1972 with the articles mentioned above, she was wearing pink ribbon on her head and not any threadbunch like Ex.P-4.\n\nQuestion No. 9 put to him was: \"It is in prosecution evidence that on May 14, 1972 Sumitra was not seen at your house or in the village at Jherwin at all or thereafter.\n\nWhat have you to say?\" He replied: \"On 14-5-72 morning at about, say upto 11 a.m., she was working in the field at Jherwin and thereafter she was not seen there and later on I was arrested and so I cannot say about her whereabouts.\" He admitted that his father Shish Ram had lodged the report (Ex. PAQ) in the Police Station, Karsog.\n\nWhen the circumstance appearing in the prosecution evidence, \"that after the occurrence on May 16, 1972, he (Rama Nand) went away to Simla from Jherwin and returned home three or four days thereafter\" was put to Ramanand, he replied: \"It is wrong. I went to Simla on 17-5-72 evening and returned on 19th morning\". He denied that he and his father implored Som Krishan Shastri that he should save them from the police at Jherwin.\n\nWhen .the negative circumstance appearing in evidence, to the effect that the Sa/war (Ex. P-14) was not of Sumitra, was put to him, he asserted that the Salwar (Ex. P-14) was that of Sumitra; and that bis father had shown the Salwar (Ex. P-14) indicating that bis daughter-in-Jaw, Sumitra had gone in the river when the (Rama'nand) was weeping. In reply to the last question, Rama N and narrated more or less the same story which was given by them (accused) to\n\n- \"\n\nRAMA NAND v. H.P. (Sarkaria, !.) 451\n\nthe police in the Report, PA Q.\n\nAmong other things, he stated : \"It A was found on the river side that her Salwar (Ex. P-14) and shoes (Ex. P-15) were lying by the river bank giving indication that she had jumped into the river. Then we were in mourning and the villagers also verified that Sumitra was seen going to the river\".\n\nShish Ram accused admitted that Sumitra had come to their house at Jherwin on May 13, 1972 and had disappeared on May 14, 1972.\n\nHe admitted having lodged the report (Ex. PAQ) in th\" Police Station, Karsog. He admitted that he had produced the Salwar (Ex.P-14) and shoes (Ex. P-15) before the police during investigation. He also maintained that the Salwar (Ex. P-14) belonged to Sumitra. He denied that he and his co-accused were threatening to teach Sumitra and her father the lesson of life for keeping Smnitra employed against their wishes at Chanayana.\n\nHe_ repeated the substance of the story which he had earlier stated in the report (Ex. PAQ), and reiterated that since Sumitra's Salwar and shoes were found on the river bank, she had either jumped into the river or run away somewhere.\n\nThe learned Additional Sessions Judge by his judgment, dated December 1, 1973, convicted Rama Nand under Section 302, Penal\n\nCode, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life. He further convicted Kali Datt and Shish Ram accused under Section 201,\n\nPenal Code, and sentenced each of them to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fiue of Rs, 500/-. Keshar Chand accused was given E the benefit of doubt and acquitted.\n\nThe appeal by the convicted persons was dismissed by the High Court as per its judgment, dated June 7, 1974. Hence this appeal by special leave. The conviction of the appellants is based entirely on circumstantial evidence.\n\nIn convicting Rama Nand, appellant under Section 302, Penal F :i\"' Code, for the murder of his wife, Sumitra, the courts below have con- , currently relied upon these circumstances which, according to them, had been established by the prosecution.\n\n(1) Rama Nand accused had a strong moth'l: to murder his wife, • Sumitra.\n\n(2) Sumitra was last seen alive with Rama Nand, appellant in the family house at Jherwin on the night between 13th and 14th May,\n\n1972. The other two co-accused were also present in the same house.\n\n(3) (a) Rama Nand .and the other co-accused falsely gave out that she bad committed suicide by jumping into the river.\n\nThey .H 'planted' a Salwar and a pair of shoes on the 'bank of the Sutlej and gave out that they belonged to the deceased, artd Shish Ram lodged\n\na false report with the police to the effect that she had committed suicide by jumping into the river. The Salwar and the shoes, which had been 'planted' there to manufacture false clues by the accused, did not belong to Sumitra, and the accused have falsely asserted that these articles belong to the deceased.\n\n( b) The story given out by the accused persons that upto 11 a.m. on May 14, 1972, Sumitra was planting chillies along with Sheela and other members of the family of the accused, was false.\n\n(4) The gold chain (Ex. P-1) and the watch (Ex. P-2) which Sumitra used to wear on her person all the 24 hours, and the clothes (Ex. P-5 to P-10) which she had on her person and the basket -~\"' (Ex. P-11) and umbrella (Ex. P-12) which she was carrying when on the evening of May 13, 1972 she came to the house of the accused at Jherwin,. were recovered from the house of the accused.\n\n(5) Some days after the occurrence, one Paranda was found from the jungle near this village. There was a bunch of hair in the plaited tail of this Paranda. The tail appeared to have been cut. These hair sticking in the Paranda and those found entangled in _the Dupatta of the dceascd were according to the Forensic Expert of one and the same person.\n\n( 6) A legless decomposed corpse . was recovered from the Sutlej E near village Randol in a mutilated condition. From a burnt mark on the flesh stickinf, l to the buttock of the corpse it was identified as that of Sumitra, deceased.\n\nTI1e High Oiurt further held that even if any doubt remained with regard to the identity or recovery of the corpus delicti, the telling F circumstances otherwise complete the chain of evidence to establish beyond doubt that Sumitra had been murdered and the charges had been established against the accused as held by the trial court. In the - result it dismissed the appeal of the accused respondents.\n\nShri Hardayal Hardy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contents that these circumstances have not been satisfactorily •\n\nG established. He has placed great emphasis on the evidence of the medical experts, according to which the mutilated corpse found at Randol was that of a child, aged about 8 or 9 years. It is submitted that the dead-body found was not that of Sumitra deceased. and as a result, the courts below were not justified in holding that the death of H Su.mitra had been established by the prosecution.\n\nOn the other band, the learned counsel for the State has argued in support of the judgment of the High Court.\n\n---~-~ ..\n\nRAMA NAND v. H.P. (Sarkaria, !.) 453\n\nIt ig well seUJed that where the inference of guilt of an accuse\" person is to be drawn from circumstantial evidence only, those circumtances must, in the first place, be cogently established. Further, those circumstances should be of a definite tendency pointing towards the guilt of the accused, and in their totality, must unerringly lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the offence was committed by the accused and none else.\n\nThe first circumstance which has been found to be established by the courts below against the appellant is that he had \"a very strong motive\" to commit the murder of Sumitra. To substantiate this fact,\n\n~--rhe prosecution produced four letters written by Rama Nand appellant.\n\nThere arc: Ex. PAJ, Ex. PAH. Ex. PAB/1 and Ex. PC.\n\nThe accused also tendered in evidence the letter (Ex. DA) dated November 14, 1971 written by Som Krishan to Sumitra.\n\nAs already mentioned, Rama Nand accused has admiltcd that the letters (Ex. PAJ, PAR, PAB/l and P.C.) were written by him. Ex.\n\nP AJ purports to have been written by him from village Jherwin on D October 14, 1971. In this Jetter, Rama Nand very clearly informed his father-in-law that his father Shish Ram was not in favour of Sumitra taldng up service and residing away from the accused's house at Jherwin. In this Jetter, Rama Nand urged his father-in-law that the latter should either come !o Jherwin along with Sumitra or send her\n\n:ilone. This letter also indicates that Sumitra was persisting in takbg E\n\nup &ervice elsewhere against the wishes of the accused persons.\n\nChronologically, the next letter is Ex. DA dated November 14,\n\n1971. It is addressed by Som Krishan to his daughter, Sumitra.\n\nTn this Jetter, the father informs the daughh:r that he had obtained her appointment Jctter and she would be required to join by the 17th to start the Nursing School at Balwari. He wanted her to come to his (house to take up the appointment. In this letter, he also wishes her daughter to convey to Rama Nand appellant and his brother, Kesar Chand (acquitted accused) that tl1ey should agree to Sumitra's taking up this employment and that they should further bring round Shish Ram by reminding him that they liad earlier consented to her taking\n\n11p Service. This letter further indicates that Sumitra was much distressed because of the hostile attitude adopted by her in-laws towards her. To console her, the father wrote : \"Don't worry. Whatever God does is good. Have self-confidence and do not repent on any failure\".\n\n8. The third Jetter, datoo December 13, 1971, (Ex. PAH), written .by Rama Naud to Sumitra, shows tl1at the opposition of the appellant,\n\n13-57 SCI/81\n\nhis father Shish Ram and brothers to Sumitra's taking up service away from the matrimonial home, had passed from the serious to the sardonic stage. It starts with the words : \"Wish you happy luxury!\" Read in accord with the tenor of the letter, it conveys a biting ironical taunt. These words were capable of being construed as conveying an innuendo that she was merry-making de-hors the matrimonial home in an extra-marital way. May be, the appellant was doubting her fidelity.\n\nHe informs her that he had visited Jherwin in the hope toot be would join her there, but this hope did not materialise. He complains against this attitude of neglect on the part of his wife when\n\nhe says : \"Today you have not seen to my condition, and have defamed me. To whom should I blame? It is the wind and to whicl!~ side it blows it must do something. I was thinking to save (you) from\n\nthis wind.\" He further reproaches a\\1d upbraids her : \"You did not think owr it seriously and you did not care for it nor others. You have taken it as a prestige issue. I cannot do anything so long I am not heartily happy and I weep to my fate.\" He then warns her in a contemptuous and peremptory tone : \"It would be better that you should resign your job now and come down here ... If you intend to reside with me, then you should agree to my words .... otherwise it will be a dog's life. You should either come to this place or to village Jherwin after resigning the job and from there you may come to Simla on any day. As you know, a friend in need is a friend in-deed.\n\nWhen this is lost, one cannot take the shelter of others.\" He reminds her that her marriage had been solemnised with him. \"To do serJice entirely depends upon you and me and not upon (your) father ...\n\nIt is tin1e to resign the Service ... \" He repeats : \"It is against the respect of my family, yourself and myself that I should allow you to serve at a monthly pay of Rs. 120/- and only for a tenure of six F months and myself to stay at Simla in the Hotel.\" He then in stronger language demanded her to resign her job within 24 hours and coine to his house direct wit?out waitig for her resiation to be ccepted.:\"\\ He closes the letter with an ommous threat veiled as a warmng : \"If ·\n\nyou do not resign the job, onr relations will become strained.\"\n\nIn the next letter (Ex. PC), dated December 16, 1971, Rama Nand wrote to Sumitra that he did not understand why she did not 'improve his (?) life' and why she was acting at the beck and call of others. He urged her that it would be better to 'live for a more'.\n\nHe added : \"You obey me or not, you yourself will understand the significance of this when you give place to it in your mind\". He sternly repeated the warning : \"I once again request you to keep in mind your as also my honour, what you have to do, as the time has come.\n\nThere is no example in the history of world that. a girl after marriage\n\nRAMA NANO v. H.P. (Sarkaria, J.) 455\n\nshould act on the advice of her father, which may be harmful.\" He again urged her : \"Do not think this letter as a, mere piece of paper, but each and every line in it will decide our future career ...... you should resign your post.\" He again administered a warning, coupled w.i!h a threat of resorting to violence in case she did not resign her job to live with the accused permanently : \"The present is the condition of China's wall as Lt. General Mr. Kaul was saying that on China Border there is no firing, no firing, no firing. But what was the\n\nresult in the end, you know betler . . . . . . . . . If you honour me, 'your husband, then you should tender your resignation from the job\n\nferthwith\". He further sternly warned her : \"If you still do not come round, what would happen in future, will entirely be your responsibility and I may not be blamed for that\". He ended the Jetter with a hostile note, repeating the threat : \"I may write, what will happen in future, Entire responsibility of future solely depends upon you. It is the question of life and not of service . . . . . . This is time of your test. Reply this letter.\" The sentence, 'It is the question of life and not of service' read in the context, clearly conveys to !he wife a threat that the choice open to her was between 'life' and 'service', that is to say, she would not be left alive if she did not give up the 'service'. This\n\nletter unmistakably reveals that Rama Nand had worked his feelings at his wife's persistent refusal to give up service and live with him, into\n\nsuch a frenzied resolve that if his wife did not, as he desired, 'mend' her ways, he would 'end' her life.\n\nEven after this Jetter, there appears to have been no alleviation or change in this revengeful attitude of the husband towards his wife.\n\nThis is discernible from Rama Nand's last letter dated May 9, 1972\n\n(Ex, PAB) addressed to Sumitra.\n\nIn this letter also, he cannot conceal his feeling of being \"sick of you\". He writes, \". . . . . . the difference in views can make life troubleful or as well can '1ead towards F downfall as I already told you'', that \"to deceive any true person can ;*- only be a sin and nothing else\". He appears to be giving her a last warning, a last chance to come round and come home when he\n\nwrites that \"time is short I will again request you that if you try to come home on Saturday, it will be good .... I do not feel good. . . . you definitely try to come, if you cannot come on Saturday then come on Sunday, otherwise .... \"\n\n, , ' These letters vividly reveal that despite the repeated persuasions, Warnings and threats proceeding from Rama Nand ccused, Sumitra intransigently and persistently refused to give up hi:r service , at G!anyana, and reside_nce with her parents, _and declined .to come and\n\nlive permanently iu .the matrimonial home at Jherwin:, and a& a result, how the husband's.feelings of tender11es.s towards his wife progressively\n\n.~· .\n\n456 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS\n\n[1981) 2 S.<.K.\n\nchanging into regret, persecution complex, resentment, exasperation and smouldering hostility, ultimately hardened into a revengeful resolve in the mind of Rama Nand lo end what Ire calls \"a dog's life\" by putting an end to the life of his spouse, We agree with tJae High O>urt that these letters reveal that Rama Nand appellant had a strong motive to murder the deceased.\n\nThe second circumstauce was also well established. lt had been admitted even by the appellant and his co-accused. The courts below have found, aud rightly so, that both the limbs of circumstance No. (3) had also been established by evidence produced by 1he prosecution. Som Krishan (P.W. 33), father of Surnitra, had testified that when he went to Jhcrwin on receiving a message from the accused about the disappearauce of his daughter, he was shown the Salwar (Ex. P-14) and shoes (Ex. P-15/1-2) and told that these clothes were left behind on the bank of lhe Sutlej river when she disappeared.\n\nP.W. 33 further stated that this shabby Salwar (Ex. P-14) which had patches on it, did not belong to Snmitra and she never wore such a Salwar; nor did the pair of shoes (Ex. P-15) belong to lrer. P.W. 33 further testified : \"Then Rama N and, Shish Ram and Kesar Chand accused implored me that they may be saved from police remand.\n\nTo this I said that I was not conversant with law but you may tell the truth\". This testimony of P.W. 33 has been accepted by lhc courts below. We have no reason to take a different view.\n\n. As rightly held by tire courts below Sumitra was a sophisticated and educated girl. It was difficult lo believe that she would do chi.Ry plantation and wear such a patched and dirty Salwar as Ex. P-14.\n\nThe very story given out by the accused persons and narrated ii:' Shish Ram in the report (Ex. PAQ) made by him to the Police, and repeated by him and Rama Nand in their examination under Section\n\n342, Cr. P.C., to effect-that Sumitra had after undressing aad ·· \"\"': leaving behind her shoes (Ex. P-15) and Salwar (Ex. P-14) on t&e bank of the Sutlej, committed suicide by jumping into the river-was improbable, incredible and false. Thus, circumstance 3(a) and (b) G had also been clearly aud cogently established. This piece of evidence was relevant under Section 8, Evidence Act and was a definite pointer towards the guilt of the accused. Circumstauce ( 4) appearing in the prosecution evidence, was admitted by the accused persons. Circnm- stauce (5) also stood established. Though a feeble pointer towards the guilt of the accused, by itself it was not of a conclusive character. n Circumstance ( 6) has been seriously controverted. The burden of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellauts is that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish that the legless decomposed\n\n:.. '\n\nRAMA NAND v. H.P. (Sarkaria, /.) 457\n\nbody found in the river was that of Smt. Sumitra, and in such a A situation, the possibility of her being alive cannot be reasonably ruled out.\n\nAlthough the High Court has held that the body recovered was that of Sumitra deceased and that the bones sent to the medicdl experts were not parts of the decomposed body found, but appeared to have been fraudulently replaced with the bones of a child during transmission to the medical experts, we would assume that the identity of the body found in the river was not established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, we would take it that the corpus delicti, i.e., the dead-body of the victim was not found in this case. But even on that assumption, the question remains whether the other circumstances established on record wer9 sufficient to lead to the conclusion that Within all human probability, she had been murdered by Rama Nand appellant? It is true that one of the essential ingredients of the offence\n\nof culpable homicide required to be proved by the prosecution is that the accused \"caused the death\" of the person alleged to have been killed.\n\nThis means that before seeking to prove that the accused is the perpetrator of the murder, it must be established that homicidal death has been caused. Ordinarily, the recovery of the dead-body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is sufficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. There was a time when under the old English Law,. the finding of the body of the deceased was held to be essential before a person was convicted of committing his culpable homicide. \"I would never convict\", said Sir Mathew Hale, \"a per.; on of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least th\" body was found dead\". This was merely a rule of\n\ncaution, and not of law. But in those times when execution was the only punishment for murder, !he need for adhering to this cautionary rule was greater, Discovery of the dead-body of the victim bearing\n\nysical evidence of violence, has neve~ been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder.\n\nIndeed. very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead-body is\n\nimpo5siblc. A blind adherence to this old \"body\" doctrine would open the door wide open for many a heinous murderer to escape with impunity simply becal!Se they w&e cunning and clever enough to destroy the body of their victim. In the context of our law, Hale's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of the victim must bo adduced by the prosecution.\n\nSuch proof may be by the direct ocular\n\nal:colint of an eye-witness, or by circumsl!Jntial evidence, or by bot.h.\n\nBut where the fact of corpus delicti, i.e. ·micidal death' is sought: to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to\n\nthe inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal . death.\n\nE; ye)i so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far s requiring absolute proof .. Perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world, and absolute certainty is a myth. That is why under Section\n\n:>, Evidence Act, l>fact is said to be \"proved\", if the Court considering the matters before it, considers its existence so probable that a -.4; prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular. case, to. act µpan the supposition that it exists. The corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the victim has been murdered by tJie\n\naccused concerned .. In the instant case, Circumstances (I) to . (5), in their cumulative effect, are not only inconsistent with the innocenc.e of Rama Nand appellant, but ineluctably and rationally compel th~ conclusion that Sumitra has died and it is Rama Nand appellant who has intentionally caused her death. Circumstance (3) involves an admission by Rama Nand and Shlsh Ram accused that Sumitra has inet an unnatural death. The only difference between the prosecution version and the defence version is as to whether Sumitra committed suicide or had been killed by Rania Nand appellant. It has been found that the story of the suicide set up by the accused is fal>c. The ar\\icl~~ Salwar (Ex. P.14) and the shoes (Ex. P-15) do not belong to he.,\n\nThey were planted by the accused to lay a false trail and to mis-direct the investigation. This circumstance taken in conjunction with the others, irresistibly and rationally leads to the conclusion that she liru; b, een murdered by Rama Nand appellant and her dead body has been - \"\"'\n\ndisposed of by the appellants Shish Ram and Kali Datt\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal and maintain ihe convictions and sentences of the appellants.\n\nSJl.\n\nAppeal d~<misseef.\n\n, '.;;\n\n'.--;", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "RAMA NAND AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH\n\nJanuary 6, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rama Naud", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1107, "end_char": 1116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case-, the following circumstances had been correctly found to have been established by the prosecution: (i) Rama Naud accused bad a stroiit motive to murder bis wife, Sumitra. (", "canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Sumitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case-, the following circumstances had been correctly found to have been established by the prosecution: (i) Rama Naud accused bad a stroiit motive to murder bis wife, Sumitra. (", "canonical_name": "Sumitra \\Vas"}}, {"text": "Sumitra \\Vas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1180, "end_char": 1192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ii) Sumitra \\Vas last seen alive \"ith Rama: Nand, appellant inthe family house at Jherwin on the night between 13th and 14th May, 1972.", "canonical_name": "Sumitra \\Vas"}}, {"text": "Rama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1214, "end_char": 1218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ii) Sumitra \\Vas last seen alive \"ith Rama: Nand, appellant inthe family house at Jherwin on the night between 13th and 14th May, 1972.", "canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Nand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1220, "end_char": 1224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ii) Sumitra \\Vas last seen alive \"ith Rama: Nand, appellant inthe family house at Jherwin on the night between 13th and 14th May, 1972.", "canonical_name": "Nand Lal"}}, {"text": "Jherwin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1258, "end_char": 1265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ii) Sumitra \\Vas last seen alive \"ith Rama: Nand, appellant inthe family house at Jherwin on the night between 13th and 14th May, 1972."}}, {"text": "13th and 14th May, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ii) Sumitra \\Vas last seen alive \"ith Rama: Nand, appellant inthe family house at Jherwin on the night between 13th and 14th May, 1972."}}, {"text": "Rama Nand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1323, "end_char": 1332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) (a) Rama Nand and the other co-accused falsely gave out that she had committed suicide by jumping into the river.", "canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Shish Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1556, "end_char": 1565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They 'planred' o Sa/war and a pair of shoes on the bank of the Sutlaj and gave out that they belcnged to the deceased, and Shish Ram lodged a folsc report with the police to the effect that she had committed suicide by jumping into the river.", "canonical_name": "Shish Ram\"s"}}, {"text": "May 14, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on May 14, 1972, Sumitra was planting chillies along with Sheela and other members of the family of the accused, was false. ("}}, {"text": "Sheela", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on May 14, 1972, Sumitra was planting chillies along with Sheela and other members of the family of the accused, was false. (", "canonical_name": "Sheela Devi"}}, {"text": "\\Vhich Sumitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2129, "end_char": 2143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-2) \\Vhich Sumitra ued to \\Vear on her person all the 24 hours, and the clothes (Ex, P-5 to P-10) which she had on her person and lhc basket (fu."}}, {"text": "May 13, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2348, "end_char": 2360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-12) which sho was carrying \\Vhcn on the evening of May 13, 1972 she came to the house of the accused at Jhen.vin, \\Vere recovered: from the house: of thoaccued. ("}}, {"text": "Jhen.vin,", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2401, "end_char": 2410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-12) which sho was carrying \\Vhcn on the evening of May 13, 1972 she came to the house of the accused at Jhen.vin, \\Vere recovered: from the house: of thoaccued. ("}}, {"text": "Paranda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2498, "end_char": 2505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v) Somo days after the occurrence, one Paranda was found from the jungle near this village."}}, {"text": "Randol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2889, "end_char": 2895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "recovered from the Sutlej near village Randol in a mutilated condition."}}, {"text": "Mathew Hale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3778, "end_char": 3789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A blind adherence to this old doctrine of Sir Mathew Hale that \"for a conviction of murder atlcast the bcxly was found dead\" would open the doer \\\\'idc open for many a henious."}}, {"text": "Haolc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the context of our law, Haolc's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a: murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory prOOf of hon1icidal dlath of the victim must be adduced by the prosecuti.on."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4905, "end_char": 4914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. P. Juneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5661, "end_char": 5673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "flardya/ Hardy and P. P. Juneja for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "Badri Das Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5696, "end_char": 5712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Das Sharma and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Das Sharma and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5801, "end_char": 5809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated June, 7, 1974, of the High Cour~ of Himaehal Pradesh, whereby it upheld the conviction of Rama Nand accused under Section 302, Penal Code."}}, {"text": "High Cour~ of Himaehal Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5904, "end_char": 5934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated June, 7, 1974, of the High Cour~ of Himaehal Pradesh, whereby it upheld the conviction of Rama Nand accused under Section 302, Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5996, "end_char": 6007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6019, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sbish Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that of the co-accused Sbish Ram and Kali Datt under Section 201, Penal Code, and also the sentences awarded to each of them by the learned Sessions Judge,\n\nA Mandi."}}, {"text": "Kali Datt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6062, "end_char": 6071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that of the co-accused Sbish Ram and Kali Datt under Section 201, Penal Code, and also the sentences awarded to each of them by the learned Sessions Judge,\n\nA Mandi.", "canonical_name": "Kali Datt"}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6078, "end_char": 6089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6091, "end_char": 6101, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sumitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6264, "end_char": 6271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution story, as it emerged from the record, was as follows:\n\nSumitra deceased, aged 19 yearn, was }he daughter of Som Krishan (P.W. 33).", "canonical_name": "Sumitra \\Vas"}}, {"text": "Som Krishan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution story, as it emerged from the record, was as follows:\n\nSumitra deceased, aged 19 yearn, was }he daughter of Som Krishan (P.W. 33)."}}, {"text": "Rama Nand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6340, "end_char": 6349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rama Nand, appellant is her husband and Shish Ram, appellant 2, is her father-in-law while Kali Datt appellant ii 3, is the younger brother of Rama Nand.", "canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Shish Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6380, "end_char": 6389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rama Nand, appellant is her husband and Shish Ram, appellant 2, is her father-in-law while Kali Datt appellant ii 3, is the younger brother of Rama Nand.", "canonical_name": "Shish Ram\"s"}}, {"text": "Kali Datt", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6431, "end_char": 6440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rama Nand, appellant is her husband and Shish Ram, appellant 2, is her father-in-law while Kali Datt appellant ii 3, is the younger brother of Rama Nand."}}, {"text": "Shish Rama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7012, "end_char": 7022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While negotiating this matrimonial alliance, Shish Rama told Som Krishan that his son was suitably employed on a Government job in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kasumpti.", "canonical_name": "Shish Ram\"s"}}, {"text": "Som Krishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While negotiating this matrimonial alliance, Shish Rama told Som Krishan that his son was suitably employed on a Government job in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kasumpti.", "canonical_name": "Som Krishan Shastri"}}, {"text": "Kasumpti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7137, "end_char": 7145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While negotiating this matrimonial alliance, Shish Rama told Som Krishan that his son was suitably employed on a Government job in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kasumpti."}}, {"text": "Snmitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7491, "end_char": 7498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before this marriage it was settled by Som Krishan with Shish Ram and Rama Nand accused that even after her marriage, Snmitra would continue to pursue further stu.dies and take up employment as a teacher.", "canonical_name": "Sumitra \\Vas"}}, {"text": "Chanyana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the marriage, her father got his daughter, Sumitra, employed as a teacher in Village Nursery School at Chanyana which was situated near her parents' village."}}, {"text": "Chnayana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7762, "end_char": 7770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While teaching at Chnayana, she continued to reside with her parents."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8442, "end_char": 8454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 12, 1972, he came to Jherwin from Kasumpti."}}, {"text": "Shish Ram\"s", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8838, "end_char": 8849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "447\n\nrooms of the house were in occupation of the other members of Shish Ram\"s family.", "canonical_name": "Shish Ram\"s"}}, {"text": "May 16, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9294, "end_char": 9306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After pretending to make a search for her body in the river and nearabout, Shish Ram on May 16, 1972, went to Police Station Karsog at 5.30 p.m. and lodged a report (Ex."}}, {"text": "Police Station Karsog", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9316, "end_char": 9337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After pretending to make a search for her body in the river and nearabout, Shish Ram on May 16, 1972, went to Police Station Karsog at 5.30 p.m. and lodged a report (Ex."}}, {"text": "Nand Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9416, "end_char": 9424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was recorded by Head Constable Nand Lal.", "canonical_name": "Nand Lal"}}, {"text": "Inder Pal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9515, "end_char": 9524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording it in the Roznamacha, the Head Constable read it in the presence of one Inder Pal to the informant, who, after hearing the same."}}, {"text": "lnder Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9624, "end_char": 9633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to be correct, signed it in Hindi and his companion lnder Lal signed it in English."}}, {"text": "Sumitra Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10006, "end_char": 10018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sumitra Devi aged about 18/19 years, was married about H years ago, to my son Rama Nand who is employed in the office of D.C.\n\nKasumpti as a clerk.", "canonical_name": "Sumitra \\Vas"}}, {"text": "12-5-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10418, "end_char": 10425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly my son Rama Nand had come on leave to his house on 12-5-72 and in the evening of 13-5-72, my daughter-in-law, Smt."}}, {"text": "13-5-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10448, "end_char": 10455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly my son Rama Nand had come on leave to his house on 12-5-72 and in the evening of 13-5-72, my daughter-in-law, Smt."}}, {"text": "14-5-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10578, "end_char": 10585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As usual, because of Sunday holiday, in the morning on 14-5-72, myself, my daughter-in-law and other members of the family\n\nwere planting chiliy seedlings in the fields near our house."}}, {"text": "Sheela Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10868, "end_char": 10879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sumitra Devi along with Sheela Devi aged about 7 years, who is daughter of my brother, had gone downward on the pretext of easing herself.", "canonical_name": "Sheela Devi"}}, {"text": "Suntitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suntitra were found which Smt."}}, {"text": "Daulat Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12232, "end_char": 12242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulat Ram, Station Honse Offiror\n\n(P.W. 38) then visited the scene of occurrence on May 13, 1972."}}, {"text": "Section 364", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12457, "end_char": 12468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12470, "end_char": 12480, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shislr Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12495, "end_char": 12505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shislr Ram accused produced bzforc him the Sa/war (Ex.", "canonical_name": "Shish Ram\"s"}}, {"text": "June 5, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13075, "end_char": 13087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rama Nand and Shish Ram accused were arrested by the Investigating Officer on June 5, 1972."}}, {"text": "Kanshi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13290, "end_char": 13300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-2) belonging G to the deceased from the room which was in the occupation of Rama Nand, in the presence of Kanshi Ram and Hira Mani and prepared the Memo (Ex."}}, {"text": "Hira Mani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13305, "end_char": 13314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-2) belonging G to the deceased from the room which was in the occupation of Rama Nand, in the presence of Kanshi Ram and Hira Mani and prepared the Memo (Ex."}}, {"text": "Mastu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13532, "end_char": 13537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-10) which were taken into possession by the Investigator in the presence of Mastu and Hari Ram, witnesses (vide Ex."}}, {"text": "Hari Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-10) which were taken into possession by the Investigator in the presence of Mastu and Hari Ram, witnesses (vide Ex."}}, {"text": "Randaul", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13954, "end_char": 13961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RA'l1A NAND v. H.P. (Sarkaria, J.) 449\n\nOn June 5, 1972, a legless and armless dead-body in a highly tkcomposed state was found at a distance of four kilometres downslrcam on the bank of the river Sutlej near village Randaul."}}, {"text": "Kali Datt appellant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13964, "end_char": 13983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kali Datt appellant was found near tlrat skeleton in the early hours or June S, 1972."}}, {"text": "Laxmi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14337, "end_char": 14342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receiving information, Som Krishan (P.W. 33) and bis brother's wife, Laxmi (P.W. 2), came and identified the skeleton to be' that of Sumitra."}}, {"text": "Daulat Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14695, "end_char": 14705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulat Ram got the dead-body measured from shoulder to the cut portion of the thics by Mchar Chand."}}, {"text": "Mchar Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14782, "end_char": 14793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulat Ram got the dead-body measured from shoulder to the cut portion of the thics by Mchar Chand."}}, {"text": "Kundan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14900, "end_char": 14906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P /F) which was attested by Kundan wilncss."}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14982, "end_char": 14987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PF) to Simla for post-mortem examination."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15064, "end_char": 15076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deadhody reached the Hospital at 1 p.m. on June 7, 1972."}}, {"text": "Ripon Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15135, "end_char": 15149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, they directed the police to take the dead-body lo Ripon Hospital."}}, {"text": "J. R. Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15298, "end_char": 15310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The post-mortem examination was conduct.ed by Dr. J. R. Sharma (P.W. 14) on the following day."}}, {"text": "June 21, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15414, "end_char": 15427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The post mortem report was handed over to the police by the Doctor on June 21, 1972."}}, {"text": "R. S. Patbania", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15524, "end_char": 15538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few components of the skeleton, including the mandible, were sent to the Dental Surgeon, Dr. R. S. Patbania (P.W. 15) and Radiologist, Dr. M. L. Ahuja (P.W. 16) for examination and opinion."}}, {"text": "M. L. Ahuja", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15570, "end_char": 15581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few components of the skeleton, including the mandible, were sent to the Dental Surgeon, Dr. R. S. Patbania (P.W. 15) and Radiologist, Dr. M. L. Ahuja (P.W. 16) for examination and opinion."}}, {"text": "P. Bhargava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15786, "end_char": 15797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Bhargava (P.W. 31), Professor J' of Anatomy in the Medical College of Simila."}}, {"text": "Medical College of Simila", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15840, "end_char": 15865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Bhargava (P.W. 31), Professor J' of Anatomy in the Medical College of Simila."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15991, "end_char": 16006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 24, 1972, a Paranda (cotton headtail), alleged to be G\n\nof Sumitra deceased was recovered from the jungle of Ghangar."}}, {"text": "Kesar Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16490, "end_char": 16501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After investigation, the four accused, namely, Rama Nand, .his H father Shish Ram, his brother Kali Datt and Shish Ram's brother Kesar Chand, were sent up befor~ a Magistrate who committed them\n\nfor trial to the Court of Session.", "canonical_name": "Keshar Chand"}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16633, "end_char": 16644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Som Krishan Shastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16940, "end_char": 16959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He expressed ignorance as to whether there was any settlement between his father, Shish Ram, and Som Krishan Shastri, father of Sumitra that she would continue her studies even after the marriage and would be free to take up service as her career.", "canonical_name": "Som Krishan Shastri"}}, {"text": "December 13, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17229, "end_char": 17246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admitted that the letters dated December 13, 1971, December 16, 1971 and May 9, 1972 (the English rendering of which is marked Ex."}}, {"text": "December 16, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17248, "end_char": 17265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admitted that the letters dated December 13, 1971, December 16, 1971 and May 9, 1972 (the English rendering of which is marked Ex."}}, {"text": "May 9, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17270, "end_char": 17281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admitted that the letters dated December 13, 1971, December 16, 1971 and May 9, 1972 (the English rendering of which is marked Ex."}}, {"text": "October 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17437, "end_char": 17453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PAJ) dated October 14, 1971, was written by him to his fatherin-law."}}, {"text": "Som Krishan Shastri", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17495, "end_char": 17514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Som Krishan Shastri (P.W. 33)."}}, {"text": "Police Station, Karsog", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18537, "end_char": 18559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PAQ) in the Police Station, Karsog."}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the circumstance appearing in the prosecution evidence, \"that after the occurrence on May 16, 1972, he (Rama Nand) went away to Simla from Jherwin and returned home three or four days thereafter\" was put to Ramanand, he replied: \"It is wrong."}}, {"text": "Ramanand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18774, "end_char": 18782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the circumstance appearing in the prosecution evidence, \"that after the occurrence on May 16, 1972, he (Rama Nand) went away to Simla from Jherwin and returned home three or four days thereafter\" was put to Ramanand, he replied: \"It is wrong.", "canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "17-5-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18829, "end_char": 18836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I went to Simla on 17-5-72 evening and returned on 19th morning\"."}}, {"text": "Rama'nand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19313, "end_char": 19322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-14) indicating that bis daughter-in-Jaw, Sumitra had gone in the river when the (Rama'nand) was weeping.", "canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Rama N", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19368, "end_char": 19374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to the last question, Rama N and narrated more or less the same story which was given by them (accused) to\n\"\n\nRAMA NAND v. H.P. (Sarkaria, !.)", "canonical_name": "RAMA NAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Smnitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20334, "end_char": 20341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He denied that he and his co-accused were threatening to teach Sumitra and her father the lesson of life for keeping Smnitra employed against their wishes at Chanayana.", "canonical_name": "Sumitra \\Vas"}}, {"text": "Chanayana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20375, "end_char": 20384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He denied that he and his co-accused were threatening to teach Sumitra and her father the lesson of life for keeping Smnitra employed against their wishes at Chanayana."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20685, "end_char": 20701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional Sessions Judge by his judgment, dated December 1, 1973, convicted Rama Nand under Section 302, Penal\n\nCode, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20729, "end_char": 20740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20867, "end_char": 20878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20881, "end_char": 20891, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Keshar Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20981, "end_char": 20993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keshar Chand accused was given E the benefit of doubt and acquitted.", "canonical_name": "Keshar Chand"}}, {"text": "June 7, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21146, "end_char": 21158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal by the convicted persons was dismissed by the High Court as per its judgment, dated June 7, 1974."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21317, "end_char": 21328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hardayal Hardy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23948, "end_char": 23962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardayal Hardy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contents that these circumstances have not been satisfactorily •\n\nG established."}}, {"text": "H Su.mitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24418, "end_char": 24428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and as a result, the courts below were not justified in holding that the death of H Su.mitra had been established by the prosecution.", "canonical_name": "Sumitra \\Vas"}}, {"text": "November 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25476, "end_char": 25493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DA) dated November 14, 1971 written by Som Krishan to Sumitra."}}, {"text": "November 14,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26254, "end_char": 26272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DA dated November 14,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "Balwari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26501, "end_char": 26508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn this Jetter, the father informs the daughh:r that he had obtained her appointment Jctter and she would be required to join by the 17th to start the Nursing School at Balwari."}}, {"text": "Rama Nand appellant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26631, "end_char": 26650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this letter, he also wishes her daughter to convey to Rama Nand appellant and his brother, Kesar Chand (acquitted accused) that tl1ey should agree to Sumitra's taking up this employment and that they should further bring round Shish Ram by reminding him that they liad earlier consented to her taking\n\n11p Service."}}, {"text": "Jherwin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27822, "end_char": 27829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He informs her that he had visited Jherwin in the hope toot be would join her there, but this hope did not materialise."}}, {"text": "Kaul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30706, "end_char": 30710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General Mr. Kaul was saying that on China Border there is no firing, no firing, no firing."}}, {"text": "China", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30730, "end_char": 30735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General Mr. Kaul was saying that on China Border there is no firing, no firing, no firing."}}, {"text": "Surnitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33924, "end_char": 33932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Som Krishan (P.W. 33), father of Surnitra, had testified that when he went to Jhcrwin on receiving a message from the accused about the disappearauce of his daughter, he was shown the Salwar (Ex."}}, {"text": "Jhcrwin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33969, "end_char": 33976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Som Krishan (P.W. 33), father of Surnitra, had testified that when he went to Jhcrwin on receiving a message from the accused about the disappearauce of his daughter, he was shown the Salwar (Ex."}}, {"text": "Section\n\n342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35132, "end_char": 35144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35503, "end_char": 35512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38537, "end_char": 38541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the context of our law, Hale's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of the victim must bo adduced by the prosecution."}}, {"text": "Shlsh Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40245, "end_char": 40254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Circumstance (3) involves an admission by Rama Nand and Shlsh Ram accused that Sumitra has inet an unnatural death.", "canonical_name": "Shish Ram\"s"}}, {"text": "Rania Nand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40446, "end_char": 40456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only difference between the prosecution version and the defence version is as to whether Sumitra committed suicide or had been killed by Rania Nand appellant."}}, {"text": "Shish Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40944, "end_char": 40953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This circumstance taken in conjunction with the others, irresistibly and rationally leads to the conclusion that she liru; b, een murdered by Rama Nand appellant and her dead body has been - \"\"'\n\ndisposed of by the appellants Shish Ram and Kali Datt\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal and maintain ihe convictions and sentences of the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Shish Ram\"s"}}, {"text": "Kali Datt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40958, "end_char": 40967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This circumstance taken in conjunction with the others, irresistibly and rationally leads to the conclusion that she liru; b, een murdered by Rama Nand appellant and her dead body has been - \"\"'\n\ndisposed of by the appellants Shish Ram and Kali Datt\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal and maintain ihe convictions and sentences of the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Kali Datt"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_459_465_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "KAMLA KANAHlYALAL KHUSHALANI\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.\n\nJanuary 6, 1981\n\n[S, MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of S1nuggling Activities Act, 1974-Scction 3(3)-Failure to 1upply docu11if!1t/s and rnatcrials to the d1.:ft'11u-Efiect of-\"cffective representation\"-Meani11g of.\n\nIn a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioner detenu com\n\n-plained that though the grounds of detention were served on the dctenu on the C date of arrest (October 20, 1980) the materials and documents on which the order of detention was based were not supplied to him till November 5, 1980 and that his representation dated November 18, 1980 was disposed of nearly a month later (December 15, 1980) and that the failure on the part of the detaining authority to supply the requisite documents and materials and the unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation constituted violation of the safeguards contained in Art, 22(5) of the Constitntion which vitiated the D .order of detention.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD': I~ is well settled that the law of preventive detention has to <atisfy a two-fold test : ( 1) that the protection and the guarantee afforded under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution are complied with, and (2) that the procedure ifl just and reasonable. (4630] E\n\nBefore an \"effective representation\" could be made by the detenu he must be supplied with the documents and materials which form the basis of the grounds of detention and unless this is done there could be no question of\n\nmaking any representation, much less an \"effective representation\" against the order of detention.\n\nThe documents and materials relied upon in the order ,,-- of detention form an integral part of the grounds and must besupplied to the .\"' detenu pari passu the grounds of detention. [461B]\n\nSmt. lcc/zu Devi Clzoraria v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors. (1980] 4 SCC 531 and Srnt. Slwlini Soni & Ors. v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors. [1980] 4 SCC 544 referred to.\n\nIf procedure under Art. 21 has to be reasonable, fair and just, then the\n\nwords 'effective representation' appearing in Art. 22(5) must be construed so G aa to provide a real and meaningful opportunity to the detenu to explain his case to the detaining authority in his representation. If the words 'effective representation' are interpreted in an artificial or fanciful manner, then it would defeat the very object not only of Art. 22(5) but also of Art. 21 of the Constitution. It is settled law that it is of the utmost importance that all the neceasary safeguards laid down by the Constitntion under Art. 21 or Art. 22(5) should be complied with fully and strictly and any departure from any of the H <afeguards would vitiate the order of detention. [463E-F]\n\nManeka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 referred to.\n\nIn tho intant caso not only were the documents and materials not supplied to the detenu alongwith the order of detention but there ha4 been an un, explain ed delay of about 25 days ill disposing of tho repre.entatlon of tho detenu.\n\n'[4658)\n\n[Despite repeated warnings by this Court the detaining authorities do not care to comply with tho spirit and tenor of the safeguards contained in Art, 22(5) of tho Constitution. There should be no difficulty in keeping copies of tho documents and materials referred to in tho order of detention and supplying them to tho detenu along with tho order of detention. This dereliction on the part of the detaining authorities results in the relea')e of persons indulgi11g in such antinational activities as smuggling though on merits the deto.tions in suitable cases may bo justified.]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 5873 of 19.80.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.) Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.\n\nO. P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This petition has been filed by the sister of the detcnu praying that the detenu be released because the safeguards pro vidcd by tl:!e constitution hav~ not been complied with.\n\nThe detcnuwas arrested on 20-10-1980 when only the grounds of detention were served on him.\n\nOn 5-11-1980 the documents and materials on the basis of which the order of detention was passed were supplied to the detenu. On the 18th November 1980, the detenu made a representation to the Government which was disposed of as late as the 15th December 19.80.\n\nIn support of the petition, Mr. Jethmalani has sub mitted two points on which alone, in our opinion, the petition must . succeed.\n\nIn the first place, it was pointed out that, as already held by this Court the grounds served on the petitioner \"'.ere not 11ccompanicd by the documents and materials which formed the basis of the order of detention, hencethe safeguards contained in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution not having been complied with, the continued detention of the detcnu became void. Secondly, it was argued that even though the detenu had m11de a represeptation on 18-11-1980, the same was disposed of a month thereafter and no explanation for this delay has been furnished by the respondents.\n\nThis Court has held in numerous cases that the representations of the detenu should b~ disposed of as soon as possible and even an unexplained del'ay of 12 to 14 days has been heW to be fatal to the order of detention.\n\nReliance has been placed\n\nby Mr. Jethmalani on two decisions of this Court in Smt. lcchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India & Ors.(I) which was later followed in Smt.\n\nShali11i Soni &. Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.('). As regards the tirst case, which is a decision of two Judges of this Court. it has clearly held that before an effective representation can be made by the detenu. he must be supplied with the documents and materials which formed the basis of the grounds of detention.\n\nUnless this is done, there could be no question of making any representation, much less an effective representation, against the order of detention.\n\nIn this connection, Bhagwati J., speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Now it is obvious that when clause (5) of Article 22 and sub-section (3) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are ny documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detcnu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds >and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot _be said to be coqiplete without them. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the groUJ)ds of detention must also be furnished to the dctenu within the prescribed time subject of course to clause (6) of Article 22 in order to constitute compliance with clause ( 5) of Article 22 and Section 3, sub-section\n\n(3) of the COFEPOSA Act.\n\nOne of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the dctenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representatioi:i unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other nraterials relied upon in the grounds of detention. There can t}Jereforc be no doubt that on a proper construction of clause ( 5) of Anick 22 read with Section 3, sub-section (3) _of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to clause (6) o[ Article 22 copies of the\n\n(I) [1980J 4 sec 531 [19s111 scR64o\n\n(2) [I 930J 4 sec 544\n\n_ __,_ \"~,,--.-~\n\n--·,,-~......, ,,... . ,,, -.--·-··\n\nA documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the\n\n grounds of detention shoul.d be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention or in any event not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorde<) in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of deteution. If this requirement of clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, sub-section (3) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void.\"\n\nMr. Rana for the St•ate has submitted that the observations extracted above do not form the ratio of the decision because in a subsqaent para of the decision, Bhagwati, J. had observed that at the most grounds could be given within a period of five to fifteen days of the order of detention.\n\nThese observations, no doubt, are conained in parngraph> 7 and 8 of the judgment but they do not, in our opiuion, form the ratio decidendi of this case but were made merely to rebut the extreme arguments that could be put forward.\n\nThis Court made it very clear that even apart from the interpretation placed by the Court on Art. 22(5) of the Constitution, the conclusion is inescavable that the documents and statements which formed the basis of the grounds of detention must be supplied to the detenu without least possible delay.\n\nIt is in this context that these observations were made in paragraphs 7 and 8.\n\nMoreover, this position has been made absolutely clear by a letcr dedsion of this Court in Smt. Shalini Soni's case (supra) where a Division Bench of this Court while endorsing Smt. Tcchu Devi's case observed as follows :-\n\n\"The matter may aJso be looked at from the point nf view of the second facet of Article 22(5).\n\nAn opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him.\n\nIt means that the detenu is to be informed not merely, as we said, of the inferences of fact but of all the factual material which have led to the inferences of fact.\n\nIf the detenn is not to be so informed the opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution becomes reduced to an exercise in futility.\n\nWhatever angle from which the question is looked at, it is clear that 'grounds' in Article 22(5) do not mean mere factual inferences but me-an factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences.\n\nThe grounds must be self -sufficient and selfcxplanatory.\n\nIn our view copies of documents to which\n\n. reference is made in the 'grounds' must be supplied to the A 'cletenu as part of the 'grounds'.\" . :·· .\n\nThe Court, therefore, clearly held that the documents and materials relied. ll'pOn in the order of detention formed an integral part of the grounds and nrnst be supplied to the detenu pari passu tbc grounds of defention. If the documents and materials are supplied later, then the detenu is deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. In this case, the court relied\n\nupon the ratio in _lcchu i/)evi Choraria's case (supra) extracted above.\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreement with the view expressed by the- 'two decisions of this Court and we are unable to accede to the prayer of Mr. Rana for sending !he case for reconsideration to a larger Bench.\n\nThis Court has invariably laid down that before an order of detention can be supported, the constitutional safeguards must be strictly observed. ·\n\nThis Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (') has widened the horizon of Art. 21 and added new dimensions to various features of Md. concept of liberty enshrined in Art. 21.\n\nIn view of the decision in the aforesaid case, Art. 22(5) of the Constituticn assumes a new complexion and has to be construed liberally and meaningfully so as to permit the legislature to impose the minimum possible curbs on the precious rights of a citizen, by virtue of preventive detention. If a procedure under Art. 21 has to be reasonable, fair and just, then the words 'effective representation' appearing in Art. 22(5) must be construed so as to provide a real and meaningful opportunity to detenu to explain his case to the detaining authority in his representation. If the words 'effective representation' are interpreted in an: artificial or fanciful r manner, then it would defeat the very object not only of Art. 22(5) but also of Art. 21 of the Constitution.\n\n'Ilrus, we are of the opinion that in view of \\\\hat has been laid down in Mankea Gandhi's case (supra) and in a number of other cases following the aforesaid decision, the law of preventive detention has now :to satisfy a twofold test : ( 1) that the protection and the guarantee afforded under Art. 22(5) is complied with, and (2) that the procedure is just:and reasonable.\n\nIn this view of the matter unless the materials and documents relied on in the order of detention are supplied to the detenu alongwith the grounds, the supply of grounds simpliciter would give him not a real but merely an illusory opportunity to make a reprcentation to the detaining authority.·\n\n(I) [1978] 2 SCR 621\n\nIt is well settled that the Court frowns on preventive detention without 'trial because the detenu is deprived of the right of proving his innocence in 'a trial by a court of law. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that all the necessary safeguards laid down by the Constitution under Art. 21 or Art. 22(5) should be complied with fully ruid strictly and any departure from any of !Jle safeguards would void the order of detention.\n\nThis is so be<:ausc in a civilised society, like ours, liberty of a citizen is 'a highly precious right and a prized possession and has to be protected unless it be<:omes absolutely essential to detain a person in order to prevent him from indulging in ar.ti-national activities like smuggling, etc. We are fortified in' our view b; r a de.:ision of this Court in SampaJ Prakash v. State of !ammu & Kashmir(') where the following observations were made :\n\n\"that the restrictions placed on a person preventively detained must, consistently with the effectivenese of <1etention, be minimal.\"\n\nIt is a matter of great concern and deep dismay that despite re-· peatcd warnings by this Court, the detaining authorities do no.t care to comply with the spirit and tenor of the constitutional safegir.irds contained in Art. 22 ( 5) of the Constitution. It is manifest that when the detaining authopty applies its mind to the documents and materials which form the basis of the detention, the same are indeed placed before it and there could be no difficulty in getting photostat copies of the documents and materials, referred to in the order of detention, prepared and attaching the same alongwith the grounds of detention, it the detaining authority is really serious in passing a valid order of detention.\n\nUnfortunately, the constitutional safeguards are nAlt com\" plied with, resulting in the orders of detention being set aside by the Court, even though on merits they might have been justified iri suitable cases. We feel that it is high time that the Government should impress on the detaining authority the desirability of complying with the constitutional safeguards as adumbrated by the principles laid down in\n\nthis regard.\n\nWe would like to suggest that whenever a detention is struck down by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the detainilig authority or the officers concerned who are associated with the prep:tration of the grounds of detention, must be held personally responsible and action should be taken against them for not complying with the constitutional requirements and safeguards (viz. delay in disposing of the representation, not supplying the documents and .materials relied upon in _the order of detention pari passu the order of detention, etc. etc.) or, at any rate, an explanation from the authorities concern-\n\n(!) [1969] 3 SCR 574\n\n~· ....\n\n\":d must be called for by the Central Government so that in future persons against whom serious acts of smuggling are alleged, do not\n\no scot free.\n\nIn the instant case, not only were the documents and materials not supplied along with the order of detention, but there has hccn a delay of about 25 days in disposing of the represenfation of the <l<'!cnu and no explanation for the same has been given. These lire\n\nmaucrs which must be closely examined by the Government.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we hold tliat the continued detention -<'f the detenu is void. We allow the petition and direct the detenu kl\n\n. be released forthwith.\n\nA copy of this judgment be sent to the Home Ministers of all the State Governments, Hon'ble the Home Minister of the Government of India and also the Hon'ble Finance Minister, Government of India for necessary action .\n\nIJ'.B.R.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "KAMLA KANAHlYALAL KHUSHALANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAMLA KANAHIYALAL KHUSHALANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 6, 1981\n\n[S, MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "November 18, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 679, "end_char": 696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution the petitioner detenu com\nplained that though the grounds of detention were served on the dctenu on the C date of arrest (October 20, 1980) the materials and documents on which the order of detention was based were not supplied to him till November 5, 1980 and that his representation dated November 18, 1980 was disposed of nearly a month later (December 15, 1980) and that the failure on the part of the detaining authority to supply the requisite documents and materials and the unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation constituted violation of the safeguards contained in Art, 22(5) of the Constitntion which vitiated the D .order of detention."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 735, "end_char": 752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution the petitioner detenu com\nplained that though the grounds of detention were served on the dctenu on the C date of arrest (October 20, 1980) the materials and documents on which the order of detention was based were not supplied to him till November 5, 1980 and that his representation dated November 18, 1980 was disposed of nearly a month later (December 15, 1980) and that the failure on the part of the detaining authority to supply the requisite documents and materials and the unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation constituted violation of the safeguards contained in Art, 22(5) of the Constitntion which vitiated the D .order of detention."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2133, "end_char": 2143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2441, "end_char": 2451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2464, "end_char": 2471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2617, "end_char": 2624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2628, "end_char": 2638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2809, "end_char": 2825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3729, "end_char": 3739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3762, "end_char": 3776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3786, "end_char": 3801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "O. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O. P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3838, "end_char": 3850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O. P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3917, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This petition has been filed by the sister of the detcnu praying that the detenu be released because the safeguards pro vidcd by tl:!e constitution hav~ not been complied with."}}, {"text": "20-10-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detcnuwas arrested on 20-10-1980 when only the grounds of detention were served on him."}}, {"text": "18th November 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th November 1980, the detenu made a representation to the Government which was disposed of as late as the 15th December 19.80."}}, {"text": "15th December 19.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th November 1980, the detenu made a representation to the Government which was disposed of as late as the 15th December 19.80."}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4497, "end_char": 4507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the petition, Mr. Jethmalani has sub mitted two points on which alone, in our opinion, the petition must ."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18-11-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5041, "end_char": 5051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, it was argued that even though the detenu had m11de a represeptation on 18-11-1980, the same was disposed of a month thereafter and no explanation for this delay has been furnished by the respondents."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6046, "end_char": 6054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Bhagwati J., speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Now it is obvious that when clause (5) of Article 22 and sub-section (3) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7062, "end_char": 7072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7142, "end_char": 7151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7692, "end_char": 7701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 531", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7865, "end_char": 7872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 544", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7903, "end_char": 7910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8335, "end_char": 8345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8356, "end_char": 8365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8472, "end_char": 8476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rana for the St•ate has submitted that the observations extracted above do not form the ratio of the decision because in a subsqaent para of the decision, Bhagwati, J. had observed that at the most grounds could be given within a period of five to fifteen days of the order of detention."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9086, "end_char": 9096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shalini Soni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9471, "end_char": 9483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shalini Soni's case (supra) where a Division Bench of this Court while endorsing Smt."}}, {"text": "Tcchu Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9557, "end_char": 9567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tcchu Devi's case observed as follows :-\n\n\"The matter may aJso be looked at from the point nf view of the second facet of Article 22(5)."}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9679, "end_char": 9692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10304, "end_char": 10317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11588, "end_char": 11595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11680, "end_char": 11687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11737, "end_char": 11747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12006, "end_char": 12013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12106, "end_char": 12116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12411, "end_char": 12421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12434, "end_char": 12441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mankea Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12538, "end_char": 12551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Ilrus, we are of the opinion that in view of \\\\hat has been laid down in Mankea Gandhi's case (supra) and in a number of other cases following the aforesaid decision, the law of preventive detention has now :to satisfy a twofold test : ( 1) that the protection and the guarantee afforded under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12759, "end_char": 12769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13141, "end_char": 13157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13452, "end_char": 13459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13463, "end_char": 13473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14411, "end_char": 14418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15420, "end_char": 15433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would like to suggest that whenever a detention is struck down by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the detainilig authority or the officers concerned who are associated with the prep:tration of the grounds of detention, must be held personally responsible and action should be taken against them for not complying with the constitutional requirements and safeguards (viz."}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 574", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15945, "end_char": 15961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16002, "end_char": 16020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1969] 3 SCR 574\n\n~· ....\n\n\":d must be called for by the Central Government so that in future persons against whom serious acts of smuggling are alleged, do not\n\no scot free."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16728, "end_char": 16747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of this judgment be sent to the Home Ministers of all the State Governments, Hon'ble the Home Minister of the Government of India and also the Hon'ble Finance Minister, Government of India for necessary action ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_466_484_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "NATRAJ STUDIOS (P) LTD.\n\nNAVRANG STUDIOS & ANR.\n\nJanuary 7, 1981\n\n(R. S. PATHAK, 0. CmNNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM;'JJ.]\n\nBonzbay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1941-Sectioua 5 and SA and 28-Scope of-Exclusive jurisdiction to try suits under the Act given to Court of S1nall Causes-Parties, if could confer jurisdiction on a arbit~\n\nr.ator by agreement.\n\n1hc respondent granted to the appellant \"leave and licence\" for the use of their two studios, machinery, equipment and certain other materials: With effect from February 1, 1973 section 15A was inserted in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 under which any person who was in occupation of any premises on February 1, 1973 as a licensee shall be deemed to have become on that date a tenant of the landlord in respect of the premises or part thereof in his occupation.\n\nThe 'leave and licence' agree ment was in force on that date.\n\nIn April, 1979 the respondent purporting to terminate the lave and licence' agreement called upon the appellant to hand over possession of the studio3 to the first respondent. Immediately thereafter the appellant filed a suit for a declaration that the appella.nt was a monthly tenant of the two studios and other structures covered by the agreement.\n\nIn August, 1979 the appellant filed an application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act for a declaration that the arbitration clause in the 'leave and licence' agreement was invalid and inoperative. The application was dismissed by a single Judge on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to determine the rights, if any, of the appellant as a tenant. A Division Bench of the liigh Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against the order of the single Judge en the ground that it was not maintainable under section 39 of the Arbitration Act.\n\nAllowing the first respondent's application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act the High Court appointed the second respondent as the sole arbitrator.\n\nJn appeal against the dismissal of his suit and against the judgment of the High Court appointing the second respondent as sole arbitrator it was contended on behalf of the appellant that under tne 1947 Act the dispute between the parties could only be resolved by the Court of Small Causes and that the juris djction of every other Court including that of an arbitrator was excluded.\n\nOn behalf of the first respondent it was contended that the subject matter of 'leave and licence' agreement was not 'premises' within the meaning of that expression as defined in the 1947 Act but the business as such and therefore the provisions of the Act were not attracted.\n\n... , ,,\n\nNATRAJ STUDIOS V. NAVRANG STUDIOS 467\n\nAllowing the appeai\n\nIIELD : A building in which a person is licensed te run a. business is \"premises\" within the meaning of sections 5(8) and 5(8A), to which part II of the Act is made applicable by section 6(1) notwithstanding the fact that the build ing is not let as such. [474D]\n\nIf the definitions of \"premises let or given on licence for business\", \"premises\" and \"licensee\" are read together it will be clear that even a building so conshucted or designed as to be capable of being used for running a tcrtain business Only is \"premises\" within the meaning of section 5(8) and section 5 (SA) and does not cease to be premises merely because the building is capable of being used for the particular business only or merely because machinery or equipment must necessarily go alongwith the building if it is to be used for the business. If \"premises\" did not, by definition, include a build ing given on licence but meant only a building which was let, it could perhaps be argued that the expression 'premises' would not take within its stride a business let as a business, but the situation is changed by the inclusion of any building given on licence in the definition of \"premises\" a-nd by the deeming of a licensee as a tenant under section 15A of the Act. A licensee is not really a tenant but is a person deemed to be a tenant because of section 15A of the Act. [474 A-BJ\n\nUttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani A.l.R. 1965 S.C. 716 and Dwarka Prasad\n\nv. Dwarka Das Saraf, [19761 I S.C.R. 277 held inapplicable.\n\nThe 1947 Act applies to a licence to use a building even if the building is to be used necessarily and simultaneously along with machinery and fixtures separately licensed to be used.\n\nIn such a situation there can be no question Eof the licence to use the machinery and the licence to use the building being dominant and subsidiary purposes of the agreement. [475 G]\n\nThe argument that the agreement was primarily a licence to t!_arry on the business of shooting films by using the machinery and equipments listed in the agreement and that the licence to use the building was only a subsidiary incident of the dominant purpose of the agreement is not valid. The two studios F given on licence would still be premises given on licence for business within the meaning of the Act so as to attract its protective provisions. [475 H]\n\nThe aggrement in the instant case is a composite agreement which gave \"leave and licence\" tc use tbc studios and other premises for producing films and to use the machinery and equipment for the same purpose. The liccnsors parted with possession of the studios and the machinery in favour of the licen sees.\n\nNotwithstanding the fact that the agreement was a composite one and the two licences were to operate \"simultaneously and together\" there could be no gainsaying the fact that the studios and other premises were certainly given on licence for the business of producing films.\n\nThe parties themselves were cons cious that the licence granted by the licensor in favour of the licensee was in respect of the studios &nd other premises and that there was even a risk of the lic:ence being construed as a lease. They were, therefore, anxious to emphasise that what was granted was a licence and not a, lease. Both by reason of section.\n\n28 of the 1947 Act and by reason of the broader consideration of public policy\n\nA the Court of Small Causes has and the arbitrator has not the jurisdiction to decide the question whether the rcspondent-1icensorlandlord is e-ntiiled to seek p05session of the two studios and other premises together with machinery and equipment from the appellant-licensee-tenant. [476 G-H]\n\nSection 28(1) of the 1947 Act po.ritively confc-f8 jurisdiction on the Collrt of Small Causes to entertain and try any suit between, among others, a liccttsor\n\n._II and a licensee relating to the recovery of licence fee and to decide any application made under the Act and negatively exclude8 the jurisdiction of ony other Court from entertaining any such suit, proceeding or application or dealing with such claim or question. [477 D-E]\n\nThe scheme of the 1947 Act shows that the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on certain C-Ourts is pursuant to the social objective at which the legElat1on aims. Public policy requires that contracts to the contrary cannot be permitted. Therefore, public policy requires that the parties cannot. be permitted to contract out of the legislative mandate which require~ certain kinds of d; sputes to be settled by special C-Ourts constituted by the Act. [477 G]\n\nExclusive jurisdiction to entertain arul try certain suits, to decide certain <1pplications or to deal with cert.'\"lin claims or questions given to the Court of Small Causes does not necessarily mean exclusive jurisdiction to decide jurlsdic~\n\ntional facts also. Juri.., dictional facts have necess:)fl1y to be decided by the Court where the jurisdictional question falls to be decided and the question n1ay fall for decision before tJ1e Court of exclusive jurisdiction or before the C.ourt of ordinary jurisdiction. A suit by the landlord against the tenant for recovery of possession of his premises on grounds specified in the Rent Act \\Vill have to be brought in the Court of Small Causes which has been n1ade the Court of exclusive jurisdiction. [478 A-CJ\n\nIn the instant case the relationship between the parties bcin~ that of licensor landlord and licenseetenant and the dispute bei\\Veen then1 relating to the possession of the licensed-demised premises the Court of Small Causes alone has the jurisdiction and the 1\\rhitrator has none to adjudicate upon the dispute bct\\veen the parties.\n\nHablffal Bhurarnal & Anr. v. 1\\rt111dra111 Sltivra111 & Ors. [19591 S.C.R. 367, Rniwda Topandm & Anr. '\" M/1 Gorakhrnm Gukalcha11d [1964] 3 S.C.R. 214,\n\nVas1ulev Gopalkri'shna Tarnwekar v. The Board of Liquidators, Ilappy Ilomc\n\nCoopraliic /lousing Socit'l)' [19641 3 S.C.R. 964 and Deccan Merchants Cooperatil•c Bank Ltd. v. Af js Dalichand Jugraj Jai11 & Ors. {19691 1 S.C.R. 887 referred to .\n\n. 1G l'lu1dha Motor Tran.\\porr Co. (P) Ltd., Deihl v. R. J\\1. Chopra A.l.R. 1968 l)clhi 75, and Basanti Cotton Mills v. Dliingra Brothers, A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 684 apprcved.\n\nThe Court of SrnalJ Causes jg 11ot exercising jurisdiction over any arbitration prc.x:·:edings merely because the agreement beh\\•een the parties contains &n arbitration clause and the Court is asked to stay a proceeding before itscl.f. The jurisdiction under section 34 of the Arbitration: Act may be exercised by the judicial authority before which tho procttdings are pending and not by the court\n\nwhich has jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings. This is clear from the\n\nl 1 '\n\nlanguage of section 34 of the Arbitration Act.\n\nAn application under section 34 A is not an arbitration proceeding; nor is it aa application arising thereout. The bar under section 40 does not come in the way of the Court of Small Causes exercising jurisdiction under section 34 of the Arbitration Act to sta-y proceeding pending before it. [483 F-0]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1906-1907 B Of 1980.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgments and Orders dated 12-11-1979 and 29-2-1980 of the Bombay High Court in Arbitration Petition Nos. 94/79 and 9/80,\n\nSoli J. Sorabji, Talat Ansari and A. N. Haksar for the Appellant.\n\nP. R. Mridul, P. H. Parekh, Jushubhai and R. N. Karanjawala for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellant Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd., and the first respondent Navrang Studios, a firm, entered into an agreement on March 28, 1970, by which the latter granted the former \"leave and licence\" for the use of their two studios and other premises described in list I annexed to the agreement and situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri Bombay, and the machineries, equipments, property. setting materials etc. mentioned in list No. 2 annexed to the agreement.\n\nThough the agreement was initially for a period of 11 months it was extended from time to time. By an agreement dated November 5, 1972, the original agreement was extended for a period of eleven months from Janpary 1, 1973. The 'leave and licence' agreement was thus in force on February 1, 1973, with effect from which date S. 15A was inserted in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Honse Rates Control Act, 1947, by an amendment (Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973). r-The effect of S. 15A was that any person who was in occupation of any premises o'n February 1, 1973 as a licencee was w...emed to have . become, on that date, for the purposes of the Act, a tenant of the landlord, in respect of the premises or part thereof in his occupation.\n\nOn April 28, 1979, the first respondent purported to terminate the 'leave and licence' agreement and called upon the appellrnt to hand over JXMISession of the Studios to the first respondent.\n\nImmediately, on May 8, 1979, the appellant filed Declaratory Suit Nd. 2326 of 1979 in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, praying for a declaration that the plaintiff-appellant was a monthly tenant of the two studios and all other structures and open land covered by the agreement and for fixation of standard rent and other reliefs.\n\nA. written statement was filed by the first respondent contesting the suit. Pending disposal of\n\n14-57 SCI/81 '\n\nthe suit an interim order was made provisionally fixing the rent as Rs. 11500 per month.\n\nOn August 4, 1979, the appellant filed 11n application under S. 33 of the Arbitration Act in the Bombay High Court for a declaration that the arbitration clause in the 'leave and licence' agreement was invalid, inoperative etc. The application was dismissed by the High Court on November 12, 1979, by a learned single Judge on the ground that, he had no jurisdiction to detennine the alleged rights if any of the appellant as a tenant. On January 21, 1980, the first respondent filed an application under s.8 of the Arbitration Act praying !hat the second respondent might be appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes and differences between the parties under the 'leave and licence' agreement dated March 28, 1970.\n\nOn February 29, 1980, the High Court allowed the application of the first respondent and appointed the second respondent as the sole arbitrator. A day earlier that is, on February 28, 1980, an appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and order daled Novem~ ber 12, 1979 of the learned single Judge was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that it was not maintainable under S.39 of the Arbitration Ac!.\n\nThe present two Civil Appeals have been filed by the appellant against the orders of the High Conrt dated November 12, 1979, and February 29, 1980.\n\nShri Soli Sorabji and Shri Talat Ansari learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the essence of the dispute between the parties was the right to the possession of the two Studios, that after the 1973 Amendment to the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the status of the appellant was at least that of a 'deemed tenant', that under !he scheme of the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging Honse Rates Control Act, 194 7, the dispute between the parties could only be resolved by the Court of Small Causes and\n\nthat every other Court's jurisdiction including that of an arbitrator was excluded. Shri Mridual, learned counsel for the first respondent, argued that the subject matter of the 'leave and licence' agreement was not 'premises' within the meaning of that expression as defined in the Bombay Act but the business as such and, therefore, the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act were not attracted at all.\n\nFor a clear appreciation of the rival submissions, the relevant provisions of the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, may first be set out.\n\nSection 5 ( 4A) defines a licensee as follows:\n\n\"(4A) 'licensee', in respect of any premises or any part thereof, means the person who is in occupation of the pre-\n\n~ , r\n\n.i:;,\n\n'\\I\n\nmises or such part, as the case may be, under a subsisting agreement for licence given for a licence fee or charge; and\n\nincludes any person in such occupation of any premises or part thereof in a building vesting in or leased to a cooperative housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960; but does not include a paying guest, a member of a family residing together, a person in the service er employment of the licensor, or a person conducting a running business belonging to the licensor, or a person having any aceo=odation in a hotel, lodging house, hostel, guest house, club, nursing home, hospital sanatorium, qharmashala, home for widows, orphans or like premises, marriage or public hall or like premises, or in a place of amusement or entertainment or like institution, or in any premise$ belonging to or held by any employee or his spouse who on account of the exigencies of service or provision of a residence attached to his or her post or office is temporarily not occupying the premises, provided that he or she charges licence fee or charge for such premises of the employee or spouse not exceeding the standard rent and permitted increases for such premises, and any additional sum for services supplied with such premises, or a person having accommodation in any premises or part thereof for conducting a canteen, creche, dispensary or other services as amenities by any undertaking or institution; and the expressions 'licence', 'licensor' and 'premises given on licence' shall be construed accordingly\";\n\n'Jl'\n\nSection 5(8) defines premises as follows:\n\n~\"-(8) 'premises' means-\n\n(a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes,\n\n(b) any building or part of a building let or given on licence separately (other than a farm building) including-\n\n(i) the garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, G appurtenant to such building or part of a building,\n\n(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building,\n\n(iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, H\n\nbut dees not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or lodging house.\"\n\nA Section 5 (SA) is as follows:\n\n\"(SA) 'premises Jet or given on licence for business' includes, and shall be deemed always to have included, premises Jet or given on licence for the purpose of practising any profession or carrying on any occupation therein\";\n\nSection 5 ( 11) defines tenant as follows:-\n\n\"tenant\" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes- (a) xxx xxx xxx _,\n\n(aa)· xxx\n\n(b) xxx\n\nxxx\n\nxxx\n\nxxx\n\nxxx\n\n(bb) such licensees as are deemed to be tenants for the purposes of this Act by Section 15A.\n\n( c) xxx xxx x:xx\n\n. We may add here that the definition of landlord in S.5(3) was suitably amended in 1973 so as to include 'in respect of a licensee deemed to be a tenant by S.15A' 'the licensor who has given such licence'.\n\nSec. 6(1) provides:\n\n\"(1) In areas specified in Schedule I, this part shall apply to premises let or given on licence for residence, education, business, trade or storage.\"\n\nSec. 15A which deems certain licensees in occupation of premises on 1.2.1973 as tenants says: ~\n\n\"15A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or anything contrary in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where any person is on the 1st day of February, 1973 in occupation of any premises, or aoy part thereof which is not less than a room, as a licensee he shall on that date be deemed to have become, for the purposes of this Act, the tenant of the landlord, in respect of the premises or part thereof, in his occupation.\n\n(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not affecf\n\n.. _,_,,.,,.~ ..• - __ ,___.\n\nin any manner the operation of sub-section ( 1) of cection\n\n15 after the date aforesaid.\"\n\nSec. 28 (1) which prescribes and prohibits the jurisdiction of certain Courts says;\n\n\"28(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction,\n\n(a) in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay,\n\n(aa) in any area for which, a Court of Small Causes is established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, such Court and\n\n(b) elsewhere, the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or, if there is no such Civil Judge, the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary\n\njurisdiction,\n\nshall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a land-lord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply or between a licensor\n\nand a licensee relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charge and to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question.\"\n\nSec. 6( 1) which occurs in Part II of the Act makes the provisions\n\n::f Part II applicable to \"premises let or given on licence for business\"\n\nalso. Sec. 5 (SA) expands the meaning of the expression \"premises\n\nlet or given on licence for business\" so as to include premises let or given on licence for the purpose of practising any profession or carrying on any occupation therein.\n\nSec. 5 ( 8) defines \"premises\" among other things, as any building or part of a building let or given on licence separately', including, among other things, 'any fitting/I affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. Sec. 5(4A), while defining licensee as the person who is in occupation of the premises or any part thereof under a subsisting agreement for a licence, excludes a person conducting a running business belonging to the licensor. If the definitions of \"premises let or given on licence for business\", \"premises\" and\n\n\"licensee\" are read together it will at once become clear that even a building so constructed or designed as to be capable of being used for running a certain business only is \"premises\" within the meaning of Sec. 5(8) and Sec. 5(8A) and does not cease to be premises merely because the building is capable of being used for the particular business only or merely because machinery or equipment must necessarily go alongwith the building if it is to be used for the business.\n\nH \"premises\" did not, by definition include a building given on licence but meant only a building which was let, it could perhaps be argued with great force that the expression premises would not take within its stride a business let as a business, but the situation is changeg;,- by the inclusion of auy building given ou licence in the definition of~\n\n\"premises\", and by the deeming of a licensee as a tenant up.der S. 15A of the Act. A licensee is not really a tenant but is a person deemed to be a tenant because of Sec. 15A of the Act. A building in which a person is licensed to run a business is \"premises\" within the meaning of S. 5 (8) and 5 (SA), to which Part II of the Act is made applicable by S. 6(1) notwithstanding the fact that the building is not let as such.\n\nShri Mridul relied upon Uttamchand v. S. M. Laiwani(I) and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf(') in support of his contention that having regard to the definition of \"premise!\" the licensee of a business or industry which is carried on in a building cannot be considered to be the licensee of the premises as such, independently of the business, so as to be deemed to be a tenant entitled to the protection of the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani (supra) the facts were that Dal Mill Building with fixed machinery and other accessories was the subject matter of a lease. The object was to use the building as a Dal Mill. The question arose whether the subject matter of the lease was 'accommodation' within the meaning of S. 3 (A) of t~ Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act which defined 'accom- , modation' as meaning, among other things, any building or part of a building and including any fittings affixed to uch building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof.\n\nThis Court held that in construing the lease it was necessary to determine the dominant intention of the parties. It was found that the dominant intention of the parties was that the building should be used as a Dal Mill It was not a case where the subject matter of the lease was the building and alongwith the leased building, incidentally, passed the fixtures of the machinery in regard to the mill. In truth the Mill was the subject matter of the lease and it was because the Mill was intended to be let\n\n(1) AIR 1965 SC 716.\n\n(2) [1976] 1 SCR 277.\n\n> No\\TRAJ STUDIOS v. NAVRANG STUDIOS (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 475\n\nout that the building had inevitably to be let out alongwith the mill.\n\nOn that finding it was held that the lease was of the mill and not of the building and therefore, there was no lease of any 'accommodation'.\n\nDwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (Supra) was a case of a composite lease of a Cinema theatre consisting of the building for which the rent was Rs. 400/- per month and the projector, fittings, fans and other fixtures for which the rent was Rs. 1000 per month. Tue question arose whether there was a lease of 'accommodation' as defined by Sec. 2(a) of the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of\n\nRent and Eviction Act, 1947. Accommodation was there defined as meaning residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a Building including any fi\\tings, affixed to such building or part of the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. This Court held that where the lease was composite and had a plurality of purposes, the decisive test was the dominant purpose of the demise.\n\nApplying the test it was found that the real ubject of the lease was the cinema apparatus and fittings including, 'subsidiarily and i11cidentally', the building. It will be seen that in both the eases there was no question of a licence, nor any question of a licensee being deemed to be a tenant. The question concerned a lease and the question was\n\nwhether what was demised was a business or a building as such.\n\nIf what was intended to be demised was a bmincss, the Act would not apply. If what was intended to be demised was a building the Act would apply.\n\nThe test of dominant intentiou was applied and it was found in each of the cases that the lease was of a business and not of 'accommodation'.\n\nThe question in the present case is entirely different and is one of construction of the provisions of the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging Honse Rates (Control) Act, 1947, which deem a licensee to be a __ tenant and, by definition, include a building or a part of a building given on licence within the meaning of the expression \"premises\",\n\nand, expressly make the Act applicable to \"premises\" given on licence for business.\n\nWe are of the view that the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, r.pplies to a licence to use a building even if the building is to be used necessarily and simul\n\ntaneously along with machinery and fixtures separately lieenced to be used.\n\nIn such a situation there can be no question of the licence to use the machinery etc. and the licence to use the building being dominant and subsidiary purposes of the agreement as suggested by Shri Mridul in his argument. The submission of Shri Mridul that the agreement was primarily a licence to carry on the business of shooting films by using the machinery and equipments listed in the agreement and that the licence to use the building was only subsidiary incident\n\nof the dominant purpose of the agreement does not appeal to us.\n\nOn the construction placed by us upon the provisions of the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, the two studios given on licence would still be premises given on licence for busi:J.ess within the meaning of the Act so as to attract its protective provisions.\n\nAt this juncture we may refer to the terms of the agreement. The agreement provided for ( 1) \"leave and licence in respect of studios Nos. 2 and 3 duly sound proofed and electrified and other premises more particularly described in list No. 1 hereto annexed situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri, Bombay, on a monthly compensation of Rs. 25Q including sound proofing and electrification\" and (2) \"leave and licence in respect of the machineries, lights, equipments, setting and property materials etc. mentioned in list No. 2 hereto annexed on a monthly compensation of Rs. 7500\". The two licences, it was stipulated, were to be \"in force and operation simultaneously and together\" and \"not subject to divisibility\". The licensees were entitled to carry on their work of producing motion picture films in the studios and the machineries and other equipments were to be used for that purpose only.\n\nThe licensees were also entitled to permit the use of the studios and other premises, machineries and other articles temporarily, by others, whomsoever they liked during the subsistence of the licences for the purpose of producing motion pictures only. Property tax and other taxes were to be borne and paid by the licensors while the licensees were required to pay for the consumption of electricity and water. During the subsistence of the licences the licensees were not to part with the possession of the studios and other premises, machineries and equipments.\n\nThe Studios and other premises, machineries and. equipments were to be used by the licensees in a prudent manner. The agreement further stipulated that no tenancy rights . were to be understood as having been created by the licensors in favour of the licensees. The interest created was that of lice11Bees only. The licensees were to carry on their business of motion picture films' production in the licensed premises under the name and style of Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. The agreement is thus seen to be a composite agreement which gave 'leave and licence' (1) to use the studios and other premises for producing films and (2) to use the machinery and equipment for the same purpose. The licensors parted with possession of the Studios and the machinery in favour of the licensees. Notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was a composite one and the two licences were to operate 'simultaneously and together', there could be no gainsaying the fact that the Studios and other premises were\n\ncertainly given on licence for the business of producing films.\n\nThe\n\n• ·-\n\nparties themselves were conscious that the licence granted by the licensor in favour of the licensee was in respect of the Studios and other premises and that there was even a risk thelicence being construed as a lease.\n\nSo they were anxious, at that stage. to emphasise that what was granted as a licence and not a lease. That was obviously to circumvent the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 194.7.\n\nIt was apparently thought that the sophisticated description of the transaction as a 'licence' instead of a lease would take it out of the clutches of the Bombay Rent, Hotel a'Ud Lodging ? House Rates Control Act. It was precisely the type of agreement that forced the hand of the legislature to intervene and amend the Act by introducing S. 15 A by which such licensees were deemed to be tenants of the landlord.\n\nWe may now proceed to consider the submission that the Court of Small Causes alone has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the dispute\n\nbetween the parties. S. 28 ( 1) of the Bombay Rent Act, positively confers jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises or between a licensor and a licerlsee relating to the recovery of licence fee or charge and to decide any application made under the Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions, and negatively it excludes the jurisdiction of any other Court from entertaining any such suit, proceeding or application or dealing with such claim or question.\n\nThe Bombay Rent Act is a welfare legislation aimed at the definite social objective of protection of tenants against harassment !ly landlords in various ways.\n\nIt is a matter of public policy.\n\nThe scheme of the Act shows that the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on certain Courts is pursuant to the social objective at which the legislation aims.\n\nPublic policy requires that contracts to the contrary which nullify the rights conferred on tenants by the Act cannot be permitted.\n\nTherefore, public policy requires that parties cannot also be permitted to contract out of the legislative mandate which requires certain kind of disputes to be settled by special courts constituted by the Act. It follows that arbitration agreements between parties whose rights are regulated by the Bombay Rent Act cannot be recognised by a Court of law .\n\nThus exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Court of Small Causes and jurisdiction is denied to other Courts (I) to entertain and try\n\nany suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to recovery of rent or possession of any premises, (2) to try any suit or proceeding between a licensor and a licensee relating to the recovery of licence fee or charge, ( 3) to decide any application made under the Act and, ( 4) to deal witb any claim .or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions.\n\nExclusive jurisdiction to entertain and try certain suits, to decide certain appliC'ations or to deal with certain claims or questions does not necessarily mean exclusive jurisdiction to decide jurisdictional facts also.\n\nJurisdictional facts have necessarily to be decided by the Court where the jurisdictional question falls to be decided, and the question may fall for decision before the Court of exclusive jurisdiction or before the Court or ordinary jurisdiction.\n\nA person claiming to be a landlord may sue his alleged tenant for possession of a building on grounds specified in the Rent Act. Such a suit will have to be brought in the Court of Small Causes, which has been made the Court of exclusive jurisdiction. In such a suit, the defendant may deny the tenancy but the denial by the defendant will not oust the jurisdiction of Court of Small Causes. If ultimately the Court finds that the defeudant is not a tenant the suit will fail for that reason. If the suit is instituted in the ordinary Civil Court instead of the Court of Small Causes the plaint will have to be returned irrespective of the plea of the defendant. Conversely a person claiming to be the owner of a building and alleging the defendant to be a trespasser will have to institute .the suit, on the plaint allegations, in the ordinary Civil Court only.\n\nIn such a suit the defendant may raise the plea that he is a tenant and not a trespasser.\n\nThe defendant's plea will not straightaway oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court but if ultimately the plea of the defendant is accepted the suit must fail on that ground. So the question whether there is relationship of landlord !!.Ild tenant between the parties or such other jurisdictional questions may- have to be determined by the Court where it falls for determinationbe it the Court of Small Causes or the ordinary Civil Court. If the jurisdictional question is decided in favour of the Court of exclusive jurisdiction the suit or proceeding before the ordinary Civil Court must cease to the extent its jurisdiction is ousted.\n\nIn Babula/ Bhaurama/ & Anr. v. Nandram Shivram & Ors.,(I) it was held that S.28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House\n\nRates Control Act, 1947, excluded the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court from entertaining a suit for a declaration that one of the plain- .\n\ntiffs was the tenant of the defendant-landlord and the other plaintiffs\n\n(I) [1959] SCR 367\n\n...\n\n....,, ,\n\nwere his sub-tenants and that they were entitled to be protected from eviction, under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The argument that S.28 applied only to suits where the relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted was repelled with the observation that the suit did not cease to be a suit between a landlord and a tenant merely because the defendants denied the claim of the plaintiffs. It was said:\n\n\"On a proper interpretation of the provisions of S.28 of the suit contemplated in that section is not only a suit between a landlord and a tenant in which that relationship is admitted but also a suit in which it is claimed that the relatioushJt> of a landlord and a tenant within the meaning of the Act subsists between the parties.\n\nThe Courts which have jurisdiction to entertain and try such a suit are the Courts specified in S.28 and no other\".\n\nIn Raizada Topandas & Anr. v. M/s. Gorakhram Gokalchand(') the plaintiff instituted a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay, against the defendant for a declaration that the plainiff was in lawful possession of a shop and for an injunction restraining the defendants from entering the shop. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vl'as licensee for a definite term of years and that the period of licence stipulated under the agreement had expired (The suit was instituted before S.15A was introduced into the Act by the 1973 amendment). The defendant's plea was that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the Court of Small Causes alone had jurisdiction to try the suit and not the City Civil Court. It was held by this Court that since the plaintiff did not admit the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the defendant, the defendant could not, by his plea force the plaintiff to go to a forum where, on his own averments, he could not go.\n\nThe Court, however, did not say that the defence could never be considered to decide the question of jurisdiction. It would be the duty of the Court to consider the defence at some stage, and come to a conclusion, if the facts warrant whether the plaintiff's denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant was a mere camouflage and whether on the facts there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties which precluded the Court from trying the suit any further.\n\nIn Vasudev Gopa/krishna Tamwekar v. The Board of Liquidators, Happy Home Cooperative Housing Society, (2) there was a dispute O\n\n(1) £1964]3 SCR 214.\n\n(2) [1964] 3 SCR 964 .\n\n~ -~1*~'~\"··------·--,,~.,, --\n\nA between a House Building Cooperative Society and one of its members. The question arose whether the relationship between the Society and the member was that of a landlord and a tenant. The dispute was referred to a Committee of Arbitrators under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act and an award was made. When the award was sought to be executed it was claimed that it was without jurisdio- B tion as the question whether the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant could only be determined by the Court of Small Causes under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and not by any other authority. The Court found that if the jurisdiction of the Arbitrators was to be excluded, c\n\nthe proceedings before the Arbitrators must be between landlord and tenant and must relate to the recovery of rent or possession of a premises. Where the person invoking the jurisdiction of the Court did not set up a claim that the opposite party was a tenant or a landlord, the defendant was not entitled to displace the jurisdiction of the ordinary Court by alleging the relationship of landlord and tenant between them. It was held that the jurisdiction was not ousted as soon as the contesting party raised a plea about the relationship of a landlord and a tenant.\n\nThe Court, however, did not go further and say that the ordinary Court's jurisdiction would not be ousted even if the Court came to the conclusion that the relationship between the parties was of a landlord and a tenant. The Court, however, found as a fact that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.\n\nIn Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Mls. Dalichand Jugraj Jain & Ors.(I), the conflict was between the jurisdiction of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act and the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The Court held that whether or not the Registrar of Cooperative Societies was a 'Court' whose jurisdiction was ousted under\n\nS.28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the jurisdiction of the Registrar was surely ousted on broader considerations of public policy.\n\nThe Court pointed out that the Rent Act had a specific social objective in view and for the achievement of that objective it was necessary that the Court set up under the Rent Act alone should deal with a dispute between a landlord and a tenant and that in accordance with the provision~ of the Rent Act. Necessarily, the jurisdiction of the Registrar was ousted.\n\nThe Court said (at pp. 901, 902);\n\nB \"The scheme of the various Rent Acts and the public policy underlying them are clear; the policy is to give pro-\n\n(!) [1969] 1 SCR 887\n\n\"\" - I\n\ntection to the tenants. Various powers have been conferred on the authorities under the Rent Acts to grant protection to the tenants against ejectment and other reliefs claimed by the landlords . . . . . . . . . . . . If the matter is heard by the Registrar, none of these provisions would apply. We can hardly imagine that it was the intention of the legislature to deprive tenants in buildings owned by cooperative societies of the benefits given by the Rent Act. It seems to us that the Act was passed, in the main, to shorten litigation, lessen its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal managemont of the societies. But under the Rent Act a different social objective is intended to be achieved and for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispu_te between the landlord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of the Rent Act. This social objective does not impinge on the objective underlying the Act. It seems to us that the two acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, should apply.\n\nIn Govindram Salamatrai Bachani v.\n\nDharampal Amarnath Puri,(') a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Choagla C.J. and Bhagwati J. considered whether the question as to whether the defendant was a tenant or a licensee was a question which arose out of the Act or any of its provisions (the case was decided lon6 before the 1973 amendment).\n\nChagla, C.J., observed that the question was a jurisdictional _ question and had nothing to do with the Act or any of its provisions.\n\nWhether a person was a tenant or a licensee or a trespasser was a question which was not let: to the exclusive determination of the Special Court set up under the Rent Control Act but the question whether a person was entitled to the benefits of any of the provisions of the Act was a question which could only be decided and determined by Special Court. It was observed by Bhagwati J. (at p. 391-392) :\n\n-'There was no bar to the High Court entertaining a suit for ejectment of a licensee as such or a trespasser as such. It would be_ determined by a perusal of the plaint which was filed in the High Court as to whether such a suit was capable of being entertained by the High Court.\n\nOnce it was a suit which could be entertained by the High --- (!) (Lil) 1951 Bomb1y Law Reporter p, 386 @391-392.\n\n. F\n\nCourt, there was no question of its not being entertained by it. It would only be when the defendant filed a written statement and claimed the protection of the Rent Act that the question would arise to be determined by the High Comt whether the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant in the particular case before it was that as between landlord and tenant. If it came to the conclusion that it was not so, it would continue to have the jurisdiction to try the suit and would be able to try the suit on the merits to jts logical conclusion.\n\nIf, on the other hand, the High Court came to the conclusion that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was as between landlord and tenant it would cease to have jurisdiction on that determination and the suit would be liable to be transferred to the Small Causes Court which, under s. 28 of Bombay Act LVII of 1947, would be the only Court to have jurisdiction to try the suits as between landlords and tenants falling within the purview of s. 28\".\n\nIn Sabavva Kam Hanmappa Simpiger v. Basappa Andaneppa Chiniwar, ( 1) the question directly arose, as in the present case, whether s. :\\8 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Cemtrol Act, 194 7, excluded reference to arbitration of a dispute relating to recovery of rent or possession of premises. It was held by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court that the expression Court occurring in • s.28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 included an arbitrator and therefore, the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to make an award in respect of any dispute of the nature mentioned in s. 28 was excluded .\n\nIn the light of the foregoing discussion and the authority of the precedents, we hold that both by reason of S.28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and by reason of the broader considerations of public policy mentioned by us earlier and also in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v.\n\nM/s. Dalichand Jugraf Jain & Ors. (supra), the Court of Small Causes has and the Arbitrator has not the jurisdiction to decide the question whether the respondent-licensor-landlord is entitled to seek possession of the two studios and other premises together with machinery and equipment from the appellant-licensee-tenant.\n\nThat this is the real dispute between the parties is abundantly clear from the petition filed by the respondents in the High Court of Bombay, under S. 8 of the Arbitration Act seeking a reference to Arbitration.\n\n(1) (1955) LVII Bombay Law Reporter P. 261\n\n.. ' -\n\nThe petition refers to the notices exchanged by the parties, the respondent calling upon the appellant to hand over possession of the studios to him and the appellant claiming to be a tenant or protected licensee in respect of the studios.\n\nThe relationship between the parties being that of licensor-landlord and licensee-tenant and the dispute between them relating to the possession of the licensed--demised premises, there is no help from the conclusion that the Court of Small Causes alone has the jurisdiction and the Arbitrator has none to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant further argued that the rest pondent had filed a written statement in the suit instituted by the\n\nappellant in the Court of Small Causes and was therefore, precluded from seeking a reference to Arbitration.\n\nOn the other hand it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondmt that S. 40 of the Arbitration Act prevented the Sma~ Cause Court from exercising any jurisdiction over arbitration proceedings. It wa~ also urged that the questions at issue in the Court of Small Giuses and before the arbitrator were not identical.\n\nThe suit was properly instituted in the Court of Small Causes and if the respondent wanted to rely upon the arbitration clause an application under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act should have been made to the Court of Small Causes before the written statement was filed.\n\nThat was not done. It was said' that the Court of Small Causes would have no jurisdiction to stay the proceedings under s. 34 of the Act as it was precluded from exercising any jurisdiction over arbitration proceedings under s.40.\n\nThere is no substance in this argu ment.\n\nS. 40 of the Arbitration Act declares that a Small Cause Court shall have no jurisdiction over any arbitration proceeding or ,,,,-UVer any application arising thereout.\n\nWe do not see how it can b(l ... said that the Court of Small Causes is exercising jurisdiction ove~\n\nany arbitration proceedings merely because the agreement between the parties contains an arbitration clause and the Court is asked to stay a proceeding before itself.\n\nThe jurisdiction under s. 34 may be exercised by the judicial authority before which the proceedings\n\nare pending and not by the Court which has jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings.\n\nThis is clear from the language of s. 34 of the Arbitration Act.\n\nAn application under s. 34 is not an arbitratian. proceeding; nor is it an application arising thereout. The bar under s. 40 does not come in the way of the Court of Small Causeil exercising jurisdiction under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act to stay a proceeding pending before it. If authority is necessary for this\n\nA proposition it may be found in Chadha Motor Transport Co. (P) Ltd. Delhi v. R. N. Chopra(I) and Basanti Cotton Mills v.\n\nDhingra Brothers.(') The submission that there is no identity of dispute is also without substance. As already pointed out by us the dispute is between the licensor-landlord and licensee-tenant about the right to possess two studios and other premises. The identity of the dispute is clear from a perusal of the pleadings in the suit in the Coil.rt of Small Causes and the petition for reference to Arbitration filed in the High Court.\n\nIn the result both the appeals are allowed with costs. The arbitration clM!se in the agreement dated March 28, 1970 is declared to ..\n\nC be inoperative. The application for reference to Arbitration is dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\n(I) AIR 1968 Delhi 75\n\n(2) AIR 1949 Cal. 684\n\nAppeals allowed. '\n\n... ....", "total_entities": 146, "entities": [{"text": "NATRAJ STUDIOS (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NAVRANG STUDIOS & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAVRANG STUDIOS & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 7, 1981\n\n(R. S. PATHAK, 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CmNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM;'JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288, "end_char": 290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1941", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1941"}}, {"text": "February 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1hc respondent granted to the appellant \"leave and licence\" for the use of their two studios, machinery, equipment and certain other materials: With effect from February 1, 1973 section 15A was inserted in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 under which any person who was in occupation of any premises on February 1, 1973 as a licensee shall be deemed to have become on that date a tenant of the landlord in respect of the premises or part thereof in his occupation."}}, {"text": "section 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1941", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1941"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 599, "end_char": 646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1346, "end_char": 1356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1801, "end_char": 1811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5(8) and 5(8A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2830, "end_char": 2853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2905, "end_char": 2917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3272, "end_char": 3284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4053, "end_char": 4064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6361, "end_char": 6374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 3 S.C.R. 214", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8490, "end_char": 8509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9484, "end_char": 9494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9588, "end_char": 9598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9683, "end_char": 9693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9767, "end_char": 9795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "483 F-0]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9994, "end_char": 10009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94/79 and 9/80,\n\nSoli J. Sorabji, Talat Ansari and A. N. Haksar for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "Soli J. Sorabji"}}, {"text": "Talat Ansari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10011, "end_char": 10023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94/79 and 9/80,\n\nSoli J. Sorabji, Talat Ansari and A. N. Haksar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Haksar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10028, "end_char": 10040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94/79 and 9/80,\n\nSoli J. Sorabji, Talat Ansari and A. N. Haksar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10061, "end_char": 10073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, P. H. Parekh, Jushubhai and R. N. Karanjawala for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10075, "end_char": 10087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, P. H. Parekh, Jushubhai and R. N. Karanjawala for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Jushubhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10089, "end_char": 10098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, P. H. Parekh, Jushubhai and R. N. Karanjawala for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "R. N. Karanjawala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10103, "end_char": 10120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, P. H. Parekh, Jushubhai and R. N. Karanjawala for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10187, "end_char": 10202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellant Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd., and the first respondent Navrang Studios, a firm, entered into an agreement on March 28, 1970, by which the latter granted the former \"leave and licence\" for the use of their two studios and other premises described in list I annexed to the agreement and situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri Bombay, and the machineries, equipments, property.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10222, "end_char": 10246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellant Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd., and the first respondent Navrang Studios, a firm, entered into an agreement on March 28, 1970, by which the latter granted the former \"leave and licence\" for the use of their two studios and other premises described in list I annexed to the agreement and situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri Bombay, and the machineries, equipments, property.", "canonical_name": "Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd."}}, {"text": "Navrang Studios", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10273, "end_char": 10288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellant Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd., and the first respondent Navrang Studios, a firm, entered into an agreement on March 28, 1970, by which the latter granted the former \"leave and licence\" for the use of their two studios and other premises described in list I annexed to the agreement and situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri Bombay, and the machineries, equipments, property.", "canonical_name": "NAVRANG STUDIOS & ANR"}}, {"text": "Andheri Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10531, "end_char": 10545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellant Natraj Studies (P.) Ltd., and the first respondent Navrang Studios, a firm, entered into an agreement on March 28, 1970, by which the latter granted the former \"leave and licence\" for the use of their two studios and other premises described in list I annexed to the agreement and situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri Bombay, and the machineries, equipments, property."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10782, "end_char": 10798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement dated November 5, 1972, the original agreement was extended for a period of eleven months from Janpary 1, 1973."}}, {"text": "Janpary 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10871, "end_char": 10886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement dated November 5, 1972, the original agreement was extended for a period of eleven months from Janpary 1, 1973."}}, {"text": "S. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10989, "end_char": 10995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging Honse Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11030, "end_char": 11077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11141, "end_char": 11147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging Honse Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging Honse Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "April 28, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11407, "end_char": 11421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 28, 1979, the first respondent purported to terminate the 'leave and licence' agreement and called upon the appellrnt to hand over JXMISession of the Studios to the first respondent."}}, {"text": "Court of Small Causes, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11687, "end_char": 11716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2326 of 1979 in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, praying for a declaration that the plaintiff-appellant was a monthly tenant of the two studios and all other structures and open land covered by the agreement and for fixation of standard rent and other reliefs."}}, {"text": "August 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12137, "end_char": 12151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 4, 1979, the appellant filed 11n application under S. 33 of the Arbitration Act in the Bombay High Court for a declaration that the arbitration clause in the 'leave and licence' agreement was invalid, inoperative etc."}}, {"text": "S. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12195, "end_char": 12200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12231, "end_char": 12248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 4, 1979, the appellant filed 11n application under S. 33 of the Arbitration Act in the Bombay High Court for a declaration that the arbitration clause in the 'leave and licence' agreement was invalid, inoperative etc."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12413, "end_char": 12430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was dismissed by the High Court on November 12, 1979, by a learned single Judge on the ground that, he had no jurisdiction to detennine the alleged rights if any of the appellant as a tenant."}}, {"text": "January 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12573, "end_char": 12589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 21, 1980, the first respondent filed an application under s.8 of the Arbitration Act praying !"}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12639, "end_char": 12642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12848, "end_char": 12862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hat the second respondent might be appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes and differences between the parties under the 'leave and licence' agreement dated March 28, 1970."}}, {"text": "February 29, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12868, "end_char": 12885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 29, 1980, the High Court allowed the application of the first respondent and appointed the second respondent as the sole arbitrator."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13036, "end_char": 13053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A day earlier that is, on February 28, 1980, an appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and order daled Novem~ ber 12, 1979 of the learned single Judge was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that it was not maintainable under S.39 of the Arbitration Ac!."}}, {"text": "Novem~ ber 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13125, "end_char": 13144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A day earlier that is, on February 28, 1980, an appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and order daled Novem~ ber 12, 1979 of the learned single Judge was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that it was not maintainable under S.39 of the Arbitration Ac!."}}, {"text": "S.39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13274, "end_char": 13278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Soli Sorabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13458, "end_char": 13470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Soli Sorabji and Shri Talat Ansari learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the essence of the dispute between the parties was the right to the possession of the two Studios, that after the 1973 Amendment to the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the status of the appellant was at least that of a 'deemed tenant', that under !", "canonical_name": "Soli J. Sorabji"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13692, "end_char": 13739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lodging Honse Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13859, "end_char": 13890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mridual", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14077, "end_char": 14084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mridual, learned counsel for the first respondent, argued that the subject matter of the 'leave and licence' agreement was not 'premises' within the meaning of that expression as defined in the Bombay Act but the business as such and, therefore, the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act were not attracted at all.", "canonical_name": "Mridual"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14359, "end_char": 14400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14532, "end_char": 14569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14594, "end_char": 14603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15086, "end_char": 15130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16372, "end_char": 16384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17013, "end_char": 17022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17272, "end_char": 17281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17558, "end_char": 17569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17644, "end_char": 17650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17748, "end_char": 17753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17799, "end_char": 17808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17847, "end_char": 17857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17973, "end_char": 17981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1.2.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18041, "end_char": 18049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15A which deems certain licensees in occupation of premises on 1.2.1973 as tenants says: ~\n\n\"15A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or anything contrary in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where any person is on the 1st day of February, 1973 in occupation of any premises, or aoy part thereof which is not less than a room, as a licensee he shall on that date be deemed to have become, for the purposes of this Act, the tenant of the landlord, in respect of the premises or part thereof, in his occupation."}}, {"text": "Sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18720, "end_char": 18727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of Small Causes is established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19121, "end_char": 19207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 6( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20098, "end_char": 20108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court of Small Causes is established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887", "statute": "Court of Small Causes is established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Part II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20125, "end_char": 20143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20247, "end_char": 20253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Act", "statute": "Part II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20481, "end_char": 20487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Act", "statute": "Part II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 5(4A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20743, "end_char": 20753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Act", "statute": "Part II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 5(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21265, "end_char": 21274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5(8A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21279, "end_char": 21289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21951, "end_char": 21957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22053, "end_char": 22061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22169, "end_char": 22173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22199, "end_char": 22217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22240, "end_char": 22247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Act", "statute": "Part II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22317, "end_char": 22323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mridul relied upon Uttamchand v. S. M. Laiwani(I) and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf(') in support of his contention that having regard to the definition of \"premise!\"", "canonical_name": "Mridual"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22757, "end_char": 22804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dal Mill Building", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22865, "end_char": 22882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani (supra) the facts were that Dal Mill Building with fixed machinery and other accessories was the subject matter of a lease."}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23112, "end_char": 23116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23127, "end_char": 23167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1965 SC 716", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23899, "end_char": 23914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 1 SCR 277", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23921, "end_char": 23937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24556, "end_char": 24565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24611, "end_char": 24638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Andheri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27528, "end_char": 27535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 hereto annexed situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri, Bombay, on a monthly compensation of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27537, "end_char": 27543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 hereto annexed situated at 194 Kurla Road, Andheri, Bombay, on a monthly compensation of Rs."}}, {"text": "Natraj Studios (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29151, "end_char": 29174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The licensees were to carry on their business of motion picture films' production in the licensed premises under the name and style of Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. The agreement is thus seen to be a composite agreement which gave 'leave and licence' (1) to use the studios and other premises for producing films and (2) to use the machinery and equipment for the same purpose."}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30166, "end_char": 30207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30406, "end_char": 30429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30556, "end_char": 30561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "House Rates Control Act", "statute": "House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30787, "end_char": 30792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "House Rates Control Act", "statute": "House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "S.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34917, "end_char": 34921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34968, "end_char": 34991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35342, "end_char": 35389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35409, "end_char": 35413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35731, "end_char": 35735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36113, "end_char": 36117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "City Civil Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36232, "end_char": 36256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. M/s. Gorakhram Gokalchand(') the plaintiff instituted a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay, against the defendant for a declaration that the plainiff was in lawful possession of a shop and for an injunction restraining the defendants from entering the shop."}}, {"text": "S.15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36615, "end_char": 36620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 3 SCR 964", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37772, "end_char": 37788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38396, "end_char": 38443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39751, "end_char": 39798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Registrar of Cooperative Societies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39839, "end_char": 39873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court held that whether or not the Registrar of Cooperative Societies was a 'Court' whose jurisdiction was ousted under\n\nS.28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the jurisdiction of the Registrar was surely ousted on broader considerations of public policy."}}, {"text": "S.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39925, "end_char": 39929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39951, "end_char": 39998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 1 SCR 887", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 40617, "end_char": 40633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Various powers have been conferred on the authorities under the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40667, "end_char": 40739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41343, "end_char": 41351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Choagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42014, "end_char": 42026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Govindram Salamatrai Bachani v.\n\nDharampal Amarnath Puri,(') a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Choagla C.J. and Bhagwati J. considered whether the question as to whether the defendant was a tenant or a licensee was a question which arose out of the Act or any of its provisions (the case was decided lon6 before the 1973 amendment)."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42031, "end_char": 42039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Govindram Salamatrai Bachani v.\n\nDharampal Amarnath Puri,(') a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Choagla C.J. and Bhagwati J. considered whether the question as to whether the defendant was a tenant or a licensee was a question which arose out of the Act or any of its provisions (the case was decided lon6 before the 1973 amendment)."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42253, "end_char": 42259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chagla, C.J., observed that the question was a jurisdictional _ question and had nothing to do with the Act or any of its provisions."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44054, "end_char": 44059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act LVII of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44063, "end_char": 44086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44213, "end_char": 44218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act LVII of 1947", "statute": "Bombay Act LVII of 1947"}}, {"text": "Lodging House Rates Cemtrol Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44388, "end_char": 44419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44629, "end_char": 44633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lodging House Rates Cemtrol Act", "statute": "Lodging House Rates Cemtrol Act"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44655, "end_char": 44701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44845, "end_char": 44850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947"}}, {"text": "S.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44976, "end_char": 44980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45002, "end_char": 45049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45635, "end_char": 45655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this is the real dispute between the parties is abundantly clear from the petition filed by the respondents in the High Court of Bombay, under S. 8 of the Arbitration Act seeking a reference to Arbitration."}}, {"text": "S. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45663, "end_char": 45667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46700, "end_char": 46705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47093, "end_char": 47098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47334, "end_char": 47339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47439, "end_char": 47443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47488, "end_char": 47493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47951, "end_char": 47956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48156, "end_char": 48161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48208, "end_char": 48213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48306, "end_char": 48311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48397, "end_char": 48402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_485_489_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "- '\n\nSMT. SOORAJ DEVI\n\nPYARE LAL AND M'R.\n\nJanuary 8, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S. 362-Scope of.\n\nWhet!Ier the High Court can alfe'J' or review its OlVll judgment in exercise of inherent powers under s. 482.\n\nWords and Phrases-'otherwise pl'ovided by thls Code or by any other lau.\" for the time being in force'-'Clerical or arithmetical error'-Meaning of.\n\nSection 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, mandates a court not to alter its judgment. It declares that: \"save as otherwise provided by this\n\nCode or by any other law for the tin1e being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same e.xcept to correct a clerical or arithnietical error.\"\n\nThe house property owned by the husband of the appellant was sold in a court auction sale and the first respondent purchased the property and obtained possession through the Civil Court Amin. In his absence, it was alleged, that the second respondent (son of the appellant) had removed tl1e lock and entered into possession. The first respondent, instituted a criminal proceeding against the second respondent, and he was ultimately convicted and sentenced by the High Court under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code, with the further direction that 'the house property be restored to the possession of the first respondent'. Pursuant to that order the first respondent applied for possession, but the appellant objected asserting her right to the property. The Magistrate overruled the objection and observed that it was open to the appe1lant to establish her right by way of a civil suit. This order was upheld by the High Court.\n\n~- -- The appellant thereafter filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Application before the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 alleging that she was not a party to the criminal proceedings against the first respondent and that she was in possession in her own right and that the earlier order of the High COurt in the criminal proceedings directing restoration of possession to the first respondent be clarified by a declaration that it was not binding on her and did not affect her possession. The High Court dismissed this application.\n\nDismissing the appellant's appeal\n\nHELD : 1. The High Court was right in declining to entertain the application. [489 CJ\n\n2. \"A clerical or arithmetical error\" is anl error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the Court.\n\nIt represents that which the court never r\n\n15-57 SC!/81\n\nA intended to say.\n\nIt is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a rristake in writing or typing. [488 G] ,\n\nMaster Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Another, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 99 referred to.\n\nIn the instant case \\Vhat the appellant sought by the applicatian, was not the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error, but a declaration that the High Court order in the criminal proceedings rtid not affect her right in the house property and that the direction to restore ession to• the first respon dent was confined to that portion only of the house property respecting which the offence of trespass was committed so that she was not evicted from the • portion in her possession. This controversy cannot be brought within the des~ ~\\ cription \"clerical or arithmetical error\". [488 DF]\n\n3. The inherent power of the Court under section 482 of the Code is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power by the appellant can be of no avail.\n\n[488H-489A]\n\n4. The inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. [489 BJ\n\nSa11katha Singh v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1962 SC 1208 referred to.\n\n5. The prohibition in section 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is \"otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.\". These words refer only to those provisions where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment.\n\n[489B]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 471 of 1979.\n\nF From the Judgment and Order dated 5-1-1979 of the Allahabad\n\nHigh Court in Criminal Case No. 5127 of 1978.\n\nKameshwar Prasad and Pramod Swarup for the Appellant.\n\nS. K. Jain for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J: This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing an application for \"clarification\" of an earlier order made by the court iJi a criminal proceeding.\n\nThe dispute in this appeal relates to a property described as house H No. 24/47, Birhana Road, Kanpur.\n\nA suit filed by the South India Trading Company against Jethmal Laxmichand was decreed and execution proceedings were taken for the attachment and sale of the\n\nf •\n\n' • -\n\naforesaid house property. The house was owned by one Khem Raj, who died leaving a widow, Smt. Sooraj Devi (the appellant) and a son, Kailash Chandra Jain (the second respondent). The property was purchased by Pyare Lal (the first respondent). Pyare Lal obtained possession through the Civil Court Amin on 8th October, 1965, but in his absence Kailash Chandra Jain is said to have removed the lock and entered into possession.\n\nIn a criminal proceeding against him on a complaint by Pyare Lal, he was ultimately convicted and sentenced by the High Court under s. 448, Indian Penal Code by an order dated 1st September 1970, under which the High Court ) also directed \"that house No. 24/47, Birhana Road, Kanpur be restored to the possession of the complainant\". Pursuant t() that order, Pyare Lal applied for possession. The appellant filed an objection, asserting a right to the property.\n\nThe Magistrate overruled her objection, observing that it was open to her to establish her right by way of suit.\n\nThe rejection of her objection was upheld by the High Court by its order dated 21st July, 1978. The appellant then filed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 5127 of 1978 before the Higla Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that she was not a party to the criminal proceeding against Kailasil Chandra Jain, that she was in possession in her own right, and that the earlier order of the High Court dated 1st September, 1970 directing restoration of possession to Pyare Lal be clarified by a declaration that it was not binding on her arid did not affect her possession.\n\nOn 5th January, 1979, th~ High Court dismissed the application in view of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala etc.(') The order has led to this appeal.\n\nBefore passing on the merits of this appeal, we may observe that\n\nthe house property has been, and still is, the subject of civil litigation.\n\nF Civil Suit No. 73 of 1963 was filed by Kailash Chandr.!_ Jain a'nd his ?*'rilfuor sons alleging that they were entitled to the house property and the decree obtained by the South India Trading Compa'ny was not binding on them and could not be executed against them.\n\nAs the property was meanwhile sold and the sale confirmed the suit was regarded as infructuous and the plaint was allowed to b~ rejected G for want of court fee.\n\nInstead, Civil Suit No. 53 of 1964 was filed by the minor sons of Kail ash Chandra Jain claiming that they were joint owners of the property, that the sale conferred no right, title or interest in Pyare Lal and that they were entitled to an injunction.\n\nThe appellant, who had originally been impleaded as a defendant in the suit, was t!ansposed to the array of plaintiffs. The suit was H dismissed in default, but subsequently restoration was allowed by the\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1979 SC 87.\n\nTrilil Court on payment of costs, and the time for payment of costs was extended by the High Court. A third suit, Civil Suit No. 18 of 1977, was filed by the appellant for partition. An application for interim injunction for preserving th~ appellant's possession in the house property has been dismissed by the trial court.\n\nThe sole question before us is whether the High Court was right in refusing to entertain Criminal Miscellaneous Appliction No. 5127 of 1978 on the ground that it had no power to review its order dated 1st September, 1970. Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure declares :\n\n\"Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in !om\" no Court, _when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error\".\n\nIt is apparent that what the appellant seeks by the application is not the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error.\n\nWhat she desires is a declaration that the High Court order dated 1st September, 1970 does not affect her rights in the house property and that the direction to restore possession to Pyare Lal is confined to that portion only of the house property respecting which the offence of trespass was committed so that she is not evicted from the portion in her possession.\n\nThe appellant, in fact, asks for ; n adjudication that the right to possession alleged by her remains unaffected by the order dated 1st September, 1970. Pyare Lal disputes that the order is not binding on her and tht she is entitled to the right in the property claimed by her. Having considered the matter, we are not satisfied that the controversy can be brought within the description \"clerical or arithmetical error\". A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an aecidental slip or omission of the court. \"\"<; It represents that which the court never intended to s_ay.\n\nIt is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing.\n\nMaster Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa and A not her.(')\n\nThe appellant points out that he invoked the inherent power of the High Court saved by s. 482 of the Code and that notwithstand- H ing the prohibition imposed by s. 362 the High Court had power to\n\ngriint relief. Now it is wen settled that the inherent power of the\n\n\ncourt cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code.\n\nSankatha Singh v. State of U.P.( 1) It is true that the prohibition in s. 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is \"otherwise provided by this Cod.; or by any other law for the time being in force\".\n\nThose words, however, refer to those provisions only .where the Court has be.en expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgl)lent.\n\nThe inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provi$.iQn contained in section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail. ,_\n\nThe High Court, in our opinion, is right in decliajng to entertain the application.\n\nThe appeal must be dismissed. But we may observe that anything said by the High Court in the criminal proceeding agai'nst Kailash Chandra Jain should not be allowed to influence the judgment of the court in the civil suits mentioned above or in any proceeding arising therefrom.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1962 SC 1208.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "SOORAJ DEVI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SOORAJ DEVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PYARE LAL AND M'R", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PYARE LAL AND M'R", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SOORAJ DEVI\n\nPYARE LAL AND M'R.\n\nJanuary 8, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 412, "end_char": 423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 448", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1265, "end_char": 1276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1284, "end_char": 1301, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1820, "end_char": 1831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1839, "end_char": 1871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 99", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2895, "end_char": 2913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3567, "end_char": 3578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3648, "end_char": 3659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3974, "end_char": 3985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "These words refer only to those provisions where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4145, "end_char": 4245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kameshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kameshwar Prasad and Pramod Swarup for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4500, "end_char": 4513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kameshwar Prasad and Pramod Swarup for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4534, "end_char": 4544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Jain for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J: This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing an application for \"clarification\" of an earlier order made by the court iJi a criminal proceeding."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J: This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing an application for \"clarification\" of an earlier order made by the court iJi a criminal proceeding."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4914, "end_char": 4920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24/47, Birhana Road, Kanpur."}}, {"text": "South India Trading Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A suit filed by the South India Trading Company against Jethmal Laxmichand was decreed and execution proceedings were taken for the attachment and sale of the\n\nf •\n\n' • -\n\naforesaid house property."}}, {"text": "Jethmal Laxmichand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A suit filed by the South India Trading Company against Jethmal Laxmichand was decreed and execution proceedings were taken for the attachment and sale of the\n\nf •\n\n' • -\n\naforesaid house property."}}, {"text": "Khem Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The house was owned by one Khem Raj, who died leaving a widow, Smt."}}, {"text": "Sooraj Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5189, "end_char": 5200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sooraj Devi (the appellant) and a son, Kailash Chandra Jain (the second respondent).", "canonical_name": "SOORAJ DEVI"}}, {"text": "Kailash Chandra Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5228, "end_char": 5248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sooraj Devi (the appellant) and a son, Kailash Chandra Jain (the second respondent).", "canonical_name": "Kailash Chandr.!_ Jain"}}, {"text": "Pyare Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The property was purchased by Pyare Lal (the first respondent).", "canonical_name": "PYARE LAL AND M'R"}}, {"text": "Pyare Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pyare Lal obtained possession through the Civil Court Amin on 8th October, 1965, but in his absence Kailash Chandra Jain is said to have removed the lock and entered into possession.", "canonical_name": "PYARE LAL AND M'R"}}, {"text": "8th October, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pyare Lal obtained possession through the Civil Court Amin on 8th October, 1965, but in his absence Kailash Chandra Jain is said to have removed the lock and entered into possession."}}, {"text": "Kailash Chandra Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5438, "end_char": 5458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pyare Lal obtained possession through the Civil Court Amin on 8th October, 1965, but in his absence Kailash Chandra Jain is said to have removed the lock and entered into possession.", "canonical_name": "Kailash Chandr.!_ Jain"}}, {"text": "s. 448", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5662, "end_char": 5679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1st September 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a criminal proceeding against him on a complaint by Pyare Lal, he was ultimately convicted and sentenced by the High Court under s. 448, Indian Penal Code by an order dated 1st September 1970, under which the High Court ) also directed \"that house No."}}, {"text": "21st July, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6178, "end_char": 6193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rejection of her objection was upheld by the High Court by its order dated 21st July, 1978."}}, {"text": "Higla Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5127 of 1978 before the Higla Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that she was not a party to the criminal proceeding against Kailasil Chandra Jain, that she was in possession in her own right, and that the earlier order of the High Court dated 1st September, 1970 directing restoration of possession to Pyare Lal be clarified by a declaration that it was not binding on her arid did not affect her possession."}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6301, "end_char": 6307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6315, "end_char": 6341, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kailasil Chandra Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5127 of 1978 before the Higla Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that she was not a party to the criminal proceeding against Kailasil Chandra Jain, that she was in possession in her own right, and that the earlier order of the High Court dated 1st September, 1970 directing restoration of possession to Pyare Lal be clarified by a declaration that it was not binding on her arid did not affect her possession.", "canonical_name": "Kailash Chandr.!_ Jain"}}, {"text": "1st September, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5127 of 1978 before the Higla Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that she was not a party to the criminal proceeding against Kailasil Chandra Jain, that she was in possession in her own right, and that the earlier order of the High Court dated 1st September, 1970 directing restoration of possession to Pyare Lal be clarified by a declaration that it was not binding on her arid did not affect her possession."}}, {"text": "5th January, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th January, 1979, th~ High Court dismissed the application in view of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala etc.(')"}}, {"text": "Kailash Chandr.!_ Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7068, "end_char": 7090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "73 of 1963 was filed by Kailash Chandr.!_", "canonical_name": "Kailash Chandr.!_ Jain"}}, {"text": "South India Trading Compa'ny", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7202, "end_char": 7230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rilfuor sons alleging that they were entitled to the house property and the decree obtained by the South India Trading Compa'ny was not binding on them and could not be executed against them."}}, {"text": "Kail ash Chandra Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7525, "end_char": 7546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "53 of 1964 was filed by the minor sons of Kail ash Chandra Jain claiming that they were joint owners of the property, that the sale conferred no right, title or interest in Pyare Lal and that they were entitled to an injunction.", "canonical_name": "Kailash Chandr.!_ Jain"}}, {"text": "Section 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8490, "end_char": 8501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8509, "end_char": 8535, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10264, "end_char": 10270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10339, "end_char": 10345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10604, "end_char": 10610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11023, "end_char": 11034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11499, "end_char": 11505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_490_499_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "P. KASILINGAM v.\n\nP.S.G. COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY\n\nJanuary S, 1981\n\n[Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, C.J., A. P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.J\n\nThe Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, sections 20, 22, 39 and 40, scope of-Competence of the Governrncnt in dealing with an appeal under section 20 of the Act to come to its own conclusoion and even -f contrary to tire findings of the enquiry officer-Rules of natural justice as enjoined by section 39 of the Act must be followed by the Government while disposing of an appeal in a disciplinary proceeding-While adjudicating upon the claim to payment of back wage.r the employer is entitled as a matter of law to adjustment of equities between the parties by an account being taken of the &alaT)' earned by the discharged employee elsewher, e-Constitution of India, Article 226, writ of certiorari, intention behind, issuance of.\n\nD Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to the Government for\n\nadjudication of the claim for back wages, the Court~\n\nHELD: {!). The manner in which the letter of resigr1ation was obtained from the appellant together with the letter of apology, just before the departmental enquiry was to commence suggests that they were integral parts of the same transaction. It was somewhat unusual for a delinquent officer to be called to the residence of the Correspondent of the College along with the Principal and to have the two documents signed by him, as a condition for dropping the enquiry. The submission of letter of apology, which amounted lo an admission of guilt, along with the uru:onditional letter of resignation, was\n\npart of a deal between the management and the appellant.\n\nIt was meant to act as an inducement for the enquiry not to be proceeded with. The management wanted to dispense with tho services of the appellant. The Government was, therefore, justified in holding that if the appellant placed in such circumstances submitted his resignation, it would not necessarily give rise to an.....,.._ inference that his act in doing so was voluntary. The Government in dealing - \\ with an apreal under section 20 of the Tamil Nadu Privat<l Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 was, at any .rate, entitled to come to that conclusion.\n\n[494C-F]\n\n(2) It is open to a Government servant to make his resignation operative from a future date and to withdraw such resignation. bef,>re its acceptance.\n\nThe services of a Government servant normally stand terminat:ed from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, unless there is any law or statutocy rule governing the conditions of service to tbe contrary. There is no reason why the same principle should not be applicable to the case of any other employee. (497 ErFJ H Rai Kumar v. Union of India, (1968] 3 SCR 857, followed.\n\nUnion of ndia v. Shri Gopal Chandra Misra & Anr., (1978] 3 SCR 12, distinguished.\n\n(3) Ordinarily the Government must, in all cases, before it comes to a contrary conclusion, as a matter of course, give the parties the opportunity of making their representations before taking a decision. In the instant case, the Government acted in breach of the rule of natural justice inasmuch as there was on its part non-compliance of the requirements of clause ( 1) of subsec. (2) of section 39 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act,\n\n1976. Ho\\vever, remitting the appeal in this particular case to the Government for a re-hearing would really serve no usual purpose inasmuch as\n\n(i) the charges levelled a-gainst the appellant were not of such a nature as would merit his dismissal from service,\n\n(ii) on the contrary, it could easily be visualised that even if the appeal were to be sent back to the Government, it would either exonerate the appellant or may let him off \\vith a minor penalty.\n\n[497 F-G, 498 B, C-D)\n\n(4) Sub-section (!) section 40 Of the Act makes deposit of arrears of salary and allowances upon reinstatement by the appellate authority referred to in section 20 of the Act a pre-condition to the preferment of an appeal by the management under section 22. Only when such an appeal is preferred by the management the Tribunal is invested with jurisdiction to make a direction under sub-section ( 1) of section 40 that the management shall deposit the arrears of pay and allowances within such time as it directs. In that event, it is of course, open to the management to raise a dispute according to subsection (3) Of section 40 of the Act as to the amount to be deposited under sub-section (1). In the instant case, however, since there is no appeal filed by the management under section 22 of the Act, the question of making a direction in terms of sub-section (1) of section 40 of the Act does not arise.\n\n[498 F-H]\n\n(5) It was, however, open to the Government whl1e allowing the appeal\n\npreferred by the appellant under section 20 of the Act to make a direction E not only for his reinstatement but also for payment of all his arrears of pay and a11owances. The words \"make such order as it deems just and equitable'~ read in the context of sub-clause (iii) thereof. \"considering all the circumstances of the case\", occurring in sub-section (2) of section 39 of the Act, are wide enough to include the power to make such a direction. Normally, the reinstatement of a person in service should carry a direction for payment of his bock wages.\n\nIn the instant case, the Government has made no direction F in that behalf. [498 H, 499 A]\n\n(6) The management was entitled, as a matter of 1aw, to adjustment of equities bet\\veen the parties by an account being taken of the salary earned by the appellant elsewhere or of a.ny income derived by him from any source whatsoever. [499C-D]\n\nCiVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 493 Of 1980.\n\n' Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 11-10-1979 of the Madms High Court in W.P. No. 16/79.\n\nR. K. Garg, Vimal Dave and R. C. Misra for the Appellant.\n\nT. S. T. Krishnamurthy Iyer, A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for respondent No. 1.\n\nA. V. Rangam for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Madras High Court dated October 11, 1979 quashing an order of the State Government of Tamil N adu dated December 20, 1978 passed in appeal preferred by the appellant under s. 20 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', by which the Government held that the resignation submitted by him on March 19, 1976 from his post as Lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P. S. G. College of Tech- -~\n\nnology, Coimbatore, was not voluntary and, therefore, directed his reinstatement with immediate effect.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal are these : On February 28, 1976, the appellant while he was on probation as a Lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P.S.G. College of Technology, Coimbatore, was subjected to a departmental enquiry for den!liction of duty and irresponsible conduct by the Principal and the two charges levelled against him were (I) on February 18, 1976 he did not allow one batch of students of III-B Techonology Class to complete their laboratory experiments in the test that was being held from 1.45 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. and further that he left the college before 4.30 p.m. without collecting the answer books of the students who had carried out their laboratory experiments in that test and without signing the attendance register, and (2) he failed to conduct the laboratory class for III-B Technology students which was to be held on February 25, 1976.\n\nOn March 3, 1976, the appellant submitted his explanation refuting the charges framed against him and prayed that an oral enquiry be held.\n\nThe Principal accordingly appointed an enquiry officer who was to commence the enquiry on March 13, 1976, but at his request it had to be adjourned to 9.0 a.m. on March 19, 1976. ~\\ On March 19, 1976 at 8.30 a.m., i.e., just as th! departmental enquiry was to commence, the appellant accompanied by the Principal of the College came to the Correspondent's residence and handed over two letters addressed to the Principal, first was a letter of apology and the other a letter of resignation. The letter of apology submitted by him was virtually an admission of guilt and contained a promise that he would reform in future and give no further cause for complaint. It reads :\n\n\"I apologize sincerely for thes~ lapses on my part. I assure you that hereafter I will conduct myself in conformity with the rules and the regulations of the institution and to the satisfaction of my superiors.\"\n\n. ,_\n\nThe letter of resigntion submitted along with the written apology signified his intention to leave the service of the respondent with a request that his services may be retained for six months. It was in these terms :\n\n\"I hereby tender my resignation as Lecturer. I request B that I may be relieved of my duties on 19th September, 76.\"\n\nThere is an endorsement of even date by the Principal at the foot of the letter of resignation by which he accepted the resignation but directed that the appellant as desired by him, be relieved from duties with effect from September 19, 1976. He further directed that the enquiry into the charges levelled against the appellant be dropped.\n\nOn April 5, 1976, the Principal, however, issued a relieving order dispensing his services forthwith on payment to him salary for a period of six months by a cheque for Rs. 5,165.53 i.e., upto the period ending on September 19, 1976 because the date September 19, 1976 fell in the midst of the academic session 1976-77 and would have disrupted the normal working of the College.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal under s. 20 of the Act tG the Government on September 27, 1976.\n\nThe Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 is E enacted, inter alia, for the regulation of the conditions of service of teachers employed in private colleges. The avowed purpose and object of the Act is to confer protection to the teachers of private educational institutions against arbitrary action of or victimisation by the management of such educational institutions, Section 20 of the Act, insofar as material, provides : F If' \"20. Any teacher or other person employed in any private college-\n\n(a) who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated,\n\n(b) by any order, may prefer an appeal against such order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed .... \".\n\nThe Government directed the Addi. Director of Technical Education to hold an enquiry into the allegations made by the appellant that\n\nhis letter of resignation was not voluntary but had been obtained by\n\n' B the respondent by coercion.\n\nIt appears that the Addi.\n\nDirector, Technical Edncation held an enquiry and afforded the parties an opportunity to lead their evidence and ultimately submitted a report holding that the allegations made by the appellant were baseless. The Government, however, by their order dated December 20, 1978 did no~ accept the report of the Addi. Director of Technical F..Pucation and\n\nheld that the letter of resignation submitted by the appellant was not voluntary.\n\nT, he Government, accordingly, allowed the appeal and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with immediate effect. The respondent challenged the impugned order of the Government by a writ petition. The High Court has by its judgment under appeal quashed the mder of the Government.\n\nThere is no manner of doubt that the circumstances attendant upon the submission of the letter of resignation and the letter of apology on March 19, 1976 are somewhat strange. The manner in which the\n\nletter of resignation was obtained from the appellant on that day at 8.30 A.M. together with his letter of apology, just before the departmental enquiry was to commence at 9.00 AM., clearly suggests that they were integral parts of the same transaction. It was somewhat unusual fm a delinquent officer to be called to the residence of the Correspondent of the College along with the Principal and to have the two documents signed by him, as a condition for dropping the enquiry.\n\nIt appears that the submission of letter of apology, which virtually amounted to an admission of guilt, along with the unconditional letter of resignation, was part of a deal between the management and the appellant. It was meant to act as an inducement for the enquiry not to be proceeded with. One is left with the unfortunate impression that the management wanted to dispense with the services of the appellant. The Government was, therefore, justified in holding that if the appellant placed in such circumstances submitted his resignation, it would not necessarily give rise to an inference that his act in doing so was voluntary. The Government in dealing with an appeal under s. 20 of the Act was, at any rate, entitled to come to that conclusion.\n\nThe stand of the Government before the High Court is reflected in para 8 of its return, which reads :\n\n\"8. As for averrnents contained in para 16 of the Affidavit it is submitted that a close examination and on comparison of the exhibits R9 and Rl 0 with exhibits R20 and R21, it is seen that both the apology and resignation letters seem to have been typed by the management themselves.\n\nIt is also clear that the correction in the apology letter was carried out in handwriting of the Advocate for the management.\n\nTherefore, these circnmstances were taken into\n\n-f •\n\naccount and in view of the position, the Government independently came to a conclusion on materials available that the resignation letter was obtained by force. Further, there will be no necessity to give resignation and apology letters simultaneously.\"\n\nRegrettably the High Court has in allowing the writ petition converted itself into a court of appeal and examined for itself the correctness of the conclusion reached by the Government and decided what was the proper view to be taken or the order to be made. It adverts to the three circumstances relied upon by the Government for reaching the conclusion that the letter of resignation was not voluntary and not accepting the report of the enquiry officer.\n\nIt observes that 'though Prof. Shamnughasundaram, Head of the DeJl'llrtment, had been examined dnring the enquiry, there was no specific question put to him during his cross-examination that the two letters had been typed by him.' It further observes that 'there was absolutely no evidence at all as to who typed the letters in question and on whose typewriter they were got typed'. It observes that 'the Govermncnt was also aware of the lack of evidence on this aspect of the case and it was for this reason they have not made any specific averment in the counter affidavit. They merely say the letters seem to have been typed by the management themselves.\n\nThis appears to be a mere conjecture and a finding based on such a conjecture cannot at all be supported as based on any acceptable evidence'. It then proceeds to refute the suggestion of the Government that the corrections made in the two letters were in the handwriting .of the Advocate appearing for the management, and goes on to say that 'the Government once again merely surmises that the letter contained corrections by the Advocate for the management'. It also rejects the suspicion attaching to the submission of the letters of resignation and apology simultaneously by expressing that 'we do not see how the Government can delve into the mind of the management and find out whether there was necessity to give the letter of resignation and apology simultaneously'.\n\nThe Government was competent to come to the conclusion that G it did upon the facts appearing on the record. The High Court could not speculate as to what were the 'circumstances' which outweighed the finding recorded by the Add!. Director of Technical Education holding that the appellant had voluntarily submitted his resignation.\n\nThe fact remains that the report submitted by him was not accepted by the Government and it came to the conclusion that the letter of H resignation could not be treated to be voluntary. The Govermnent was circumspect in viewing the circumstances surrounding the sub-\n\nmission of the letter of resignation with certain amount of suspicion.\n\nThe finding reached by the Government does not necessarily mean that the letter of resignation was obtained from the appellant under coercion. It may well be that the appellant was acting under an element of compulsion for he had become a victim of the situation brought about by the holding of a departmental enquiry and if the appellant placed in such circumstances submitted a letter of resignation it would not necessarily give rise to an inference that his act in doing so was voluntary.\n\nThe High Court has viewed the matter from a wrong perspective.\n\nIn quashing the order of the Government, the High Court observes that its finding is based on no evidence but proceeds on conjectures and surmises.\n\nIn doing so, it ignores lhe long line of decisions starting from T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa & Anr.(') laying down that the supervision of the High Court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points. One is the area of jurisdiction •and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise, the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise.\n\nSuch writs are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record •and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice.\n\nIt was rightly observed in Basappa's case that a writ of certiorari will not issµe as a cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie to bring up an order or decision for re-hearing. It exists to correct error of law when revealed on the face of an order or decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction when shown.\n\nIt is clear beyond doubt that the High Court had transgressed its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution by entering upon the merits of the controversy by embarking upon an quiry into the facts\n\nas to whether or not the letter of resignation submitted by the appel lant was voluntary.\n\nThe question at issue as to whether the resignation was voluntary was a matter of inference to be drawn from other facts.\n\nThe question involved was essentially one of fact. It cannot be questioned that the Government undoubtedly had the jurisdiction to draw its own conclusions upon the material before it.\n\nIn the view that we take of the case, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant based on the majority decision in Union of\n\n(I) [1955] 1 SCR 250.\n\n.\"\"' '\n\nIndia v. Shri Gopal Chandra Misra & Anr.(1) does not really arise. It is urged that it is open to a civil servant to tender his resignation on a prior date to take effect on a subsequent date specified and, therefore, it could always be withdrawn before the expiry of such date. There can be no dispute with the proposition, but the decision on which reliance is placed is cleady distinguishable on facts. The letter addressed by Satish Chandra J., as he then was, to the President signifying his intention to demit the office of a Judge was couched in entirely different language. It ran thus :\n\n\"I beg to resign my office as Judge High Court of Judi cature at Allahabad.\n\nI will be on leave till 31st of July, 1977. My resignation shall be effective on 1st of August, 1977.\"\n\nThe Court in construing the words 'resign his office' in proviso (a) to Art. 217(1) of the Constitution held that a High Court Judge's letter addressed to the President intimating or notifying his intention to resign his office of a Judge on a future date, does not and cannot sever him from the office of the Judge, or terminate his tenure. It may be conceded that it is open to a servant to make his resignation operative from a future date and to withdraw such resignation before its acceptance. The question as to when a Government servant's resignation becomes effective came up for consideration by this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India('). It was held that the services of a Government servant normally stand terminated from the date on which the Jetter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate anthority, unless there is any lw or statutory rule governing the conditions of service to the contrary. The.fe is no reason why the same principle should not :ipply to the case of any other employee.\n\n,..,-- - We are, however, constrained to observe that the Government acted in breach of the rules of natural justice inasmuch as there was on its part non-compliance of the requirements of cl. (1) of sub-s. (2) of s. 39 of the Act, which reads :\n\n\"39(2) On receipt of any such appeal, the appellate authority shall, after-\n\n(i) giving the parties an opportunity of making their representations,\n\n(ii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iii) ................. .\n\nmake such order as it deems just and eqnitable.\" H\n\n(I) [19781 3 SCR 12.\n\n(2) [1968] 3 SCR 857.\n\nA II is contended on behalf of the respondent that the High Court instead of resting its decision on merits, should have directed the Government to re-hear the appeal under s.20 of the Act. It is submitted that there was a duty cast on the Government to hear the respondent since the Addi. Director of Technical Education had on the basis of the evi- 8 dence adduced, come to a definitive finding that the letter of resignation submitted by the appellant was volunlary, before it came to a contrary conclusion.\n\nThe contention has considerable force. It is needless to stress that ordinarily the Government must, in all such cases, as a matter of course, give the parties the opportunity of making their representations before taking a decision. c In our judgment it would however, really serve no useful purpose in remitting the appeal in this particular case to the Government for a re-hearing. It is not seriously disputed before us that the charges levelled against the appellant were not of such a nature as would merit his dismissal from service.\n\nOn the contrary, it can easily be visuallsed that even if the appeal were sent back to the Government, it would either exonerate the appellant or may let him off with a minor penalty. The better course would be to restore the order of the Government for the reinstatement of the appellant in service, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.\n\nThere still remains the question of back-wages. It is sought to be urged on behalf of the appellant that upon such reinstatement he would be entitled under the terms of sub-s. (1) of s.40 of the Act to all his arrears of pay and allowances. We are afraid, we can make no such direction in this appeal. There is nothing on record to show that any such appeal has been filed by the respondent.\n\nSub-section\n\n(1) of s.40 makes deposit of arrears of salary and allowances upon reinstatement by the appellate authority referred to in s.20 of the Act, a pre-condition to the preferment of an appeal by the management under s.22. Only when such an appeal is preferred by the management the Tribunal is invested with jurisdiction to make a direction under sub-s.(1) of s.40 that the management shall deposit the arrears of pay and allowances due to the appellant within such time as it directs. In that event, it is of course, open to the management to raise a dispute according to sub-s.(3) of s.40 of the Act as to the amount to be deposited under sub-s. (1). In the instant case, however, since there is no appeal filed by the respondent under s.22 of the Act, the question of making a direction in terms of sub-s.(1) of s.40 of the Act does not arise.\n\nIt was, however, open to the Government while allowing the appeal preferred by the appellant under s. 20 of the Act to make a\n\n...\n\ndirection not only for his reinstatement but also for payment of all his arrears of pay and allowances.\n\nThe woJ:>Js 'make such order as it deems just and equitable' read in the context of cl. (iii) thereof:\n\n\"(iii) considering all lhe circumstances of the case\" occurring in sub-s. (2) of s.39 of the Act, are wide enough to include the power to make such a direction. Normally, the reinstatement of a person in service should carry a direction for payment of his back-wages.\n\nWe regret to find that the Governmenl has made no direction in that behalf.\n\nWe are, therefore, constrained to remit the matter to the Government. While adjudicating upon the claim of lhe appellant to t payment of all his arrears of pay and allowances, the Government shall give an opportunity to the respondent to have its say in the matter. The respondent is entitled, as a matter of law. it adjustment of equities between the parties by an account being taken of the salary earned by the appellant elsewhere or of any income derived by him from any source whatsover, between the period from September 19, 1976 till the date of reinstatement. The appellant had a duty to mitigate his loss and it cannot be that during the aforesaid period he remained idle throughout.\n\nIn the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the State Government\n\nfor reinstatement of the appellant in service is restored. We remit the appeal to the Government to decide as to whether the appellant is E entitled to all his arrears of pay and allowances upon his reinstatement in service, and direct that while dealing with the question, it shall afford the parties full opportunity to raise all such contentions as they may be advised and lead their evidence thereon, for determination of the amount payable. There shall be no order as to costs.\n\n, W S.R.\n\nAppeal allowed and matter remitted to Government.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "P. KASILINGAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. 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No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5889, "end_char": 5899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Vimal Dave and R. C. Misra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Vimal Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5901, "end_char": 5911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Vimal Dave and R. C. Misra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5916, "end_char": 5927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Vimal Dave and R. C. Misra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. T. Krishnamurthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5948, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. T. Krishnamurthy Iyer, A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5977, "end_char": 5993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. T. Krishnamurthy Iyer, A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. N. Ramalingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5998, "end_char": 6014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. T. Krishnamurthy Iyer, A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6041, "end_char": 6050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6118, "end_char": 6121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Madras High Court dated October 11, 1979 quashing an order of the State Government of Tamil N adu dated December 20, 1978 passed in appeal preferred by the appellant under s. 20 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', by which the Government held that the resignation submitted by him on March 19, 1976 from his post as Lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P. S. G. College of Tech- -~\n\nnology, Coimbatore, was not voluntary and, therefore, directed his reinstatement with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 18, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to the appeal are these : On February 28, 1976, the appellant while he was on probation as a Lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P.S.G. College of Technology, Coimbatore, was subjected to a departmental enquiry for den!liction of duty and irresponsible conduct by the Principal and the two charges levelled against him were (I) on February 18, 1976 he did not allow one batch of students of III-B Techonology Class to complete their laboratory experiments in the test that was being held from 1.45 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. and further that he left the college before 4.30 p.m. without collecting the answer books of the students who had carried out their laboratory experiments in that test and without signing the attendance register, and (2) he failed to conduct the laboratory class for III-B Technology students which was to be held on February 25, 1976."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7615, "end_char": 7632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to the appeal are these : On February 28, 1976, the appellant while he was on probation as a Lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P.S.G. College of Technology, Coimbatore, was subjected to a departmental enquiry for den!liction of duty and irresponsible conduct by the Principal and the two charges levelled against him were (I) on February 18, 1976 he did not allow one batch of students of III-B Techonology Class to complete their laboratory experiments in the test that was being held from 1.45 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. and further that he left the college before 4.30 p.m. without collecting the answer books of the students who had carried out their laboratory experiments in that test and without signing the attendance register, and (2) he failed to conduct the laboratory class for III-B Technology students which was to be held on February 25, 1976."}}, {"text": "March 3, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7638, "end_char": 7651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 3, 1976, the appellant submitted his explanation refuting the charges framed against him and prayed that an oral enquiry be held."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7865, "end_char": 7879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Principal accordingly appointed an enquiry officer who was to commence the enquiry on March 13, 1976, but at his request it had to be adjourned to 9.0 a.m. on March 19, 1976."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7938, "end_char": 7952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Principal accordingly appointed an enquiry officer who was to commence the enquiry on March 13, 1976, but at his request it had to be adjourned to 9.0 a.m. on March 19, 1976."}}, {"text": "19th September, 76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 9001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I request B that I may be relieved of my duties on 19th September, 76.\""}}, {"text": "September 19, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9229, "end_char": 9247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is an endorsement of even date by the Principal at the foot of the letter of resignation by which he accepted the resignation but directed that the appellant as desired by him, be relieved from duties with effect from September 19, 1976."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9350, "end_char": 9363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 5, 1976, the Principal, however, issued a relieving order dispensing his services forthwith on payment to him salary for a period of six months by a cheque for Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9767, "end_char": 9772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 27, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9805, "end_char": 9823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred an appeal under s. 20 of the Act tG the Government on September 27, 1976."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 20, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11071, "end_char": 11088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government, however, by their order dated December 20, 1978 did no~ accept the report of the Addi."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12903, "end_char": 12908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamnughasundaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14290, "end_char": 14307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It observes that 'though Prof. Shamnughasundaram, Head of the DeJl'llrtment, had been examined dnring the enquiry, there was no specific question put to him during his cross-examination that the two letters had been typed by him.'"}}, {"text": "Basappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17851, "end_char": 17858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was rightly observed in Basappa's case that a writ of certiorari will not issµe as a cloak of an appeal in disguise."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18247, "end_char": 18255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 SCR 250", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18908, "end_char": 18924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Satish Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19365, "end_char": 19379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter addressed by Satish Chandra J., as he then was, to the President signifying his intention to demit the office of a Judge was couched in entirely different language."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judi cature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19568, "end_char": 19606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It ran thus :\n\n\"I beg to resign my office as Judge High Court of Judi cature at Allahabad."}}, {"text": "31st of July, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19633, "end_char": 19651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will be on leave till 31st of July, 1977."}}, {"text": "1st of August, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19690, "end_char": 19709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My resignation shall be effective on 1st of August, 1977.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19785, "end_char": 19796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20940, "end_char": 20945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 SCR 857", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21270, "end_char": 21286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21462, "end_char": 21466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22886, "end_char": 22890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23116, "end_char": 23120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23232, "end_char": 23236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23320, "end_char": 23324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23464, "end_char": 23468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23690, "end_char": 23694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23842, "end_char": 23846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23919, "end_char": 23923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24051, "end_char": 24056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24374, "end_char": 24378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_500_503_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nCHAMANLAL MANJIBHAI SONI\n\nJanuary 8, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, .ection SA, interpretation of.\n\n}i{aintaining the order of the High Court quashing the detention, the Court\n\nHELD : (I) The detention under section 3 of the COFEPOSA is only for the purpose of preventing smuggling and all the grounds, \\\\'hether there are one or more, \\\\'Ould be relatable only to various activities of smuggling and no other sepa-rat'e ground which could deal with matters other than smuggling could be conceived of because the Act of smuggling covers several activities each forming a separate ground of detention and the Act deals with no other act except smuggling.\n\nIndeed, if the interpretation, namely, that Section 5A contemplates that there should be only one' ground which relates to the violation of section 3 of the Act and if that ground is irrelevant while the other grounds which relate to the same subject rnatter are clear and specific the detention order will not stand vitiated, is accepted, then section 5A will become otiose. [501 H, 502 A-q\n\n(2) Whenever allegations of smuggling are made against a person who is sought to be deta-ined for preventing further smuggling, there is bound to be one act or several acts with the con1mon object of smuggling gocxls wltlch is sought to be prevented by the Act.\n\nJt would, therefore, not be correct to My that the object of the Act constitutes the ground for deten tion. If this is so, in no case there could be any other ground for detention, except the one which relates to smuggling. This is neither the object of the Act nor ca!l such an object be spelt out from the language in which sec~ tion 5A is couched. What section 5 (A) of the Act provides is that where there are a number of grounds of detention covering various activities of the detenu spreading over a period or periods, ea-ch activity is a separate ground by itself and if one of the grounds is irrelevant, vague or unspecific, then that will not vitiate the ordep of detention on the other grounds.\n\n[502 H, 503 A)\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 91 of\n\n...\n\n19m ~\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-12-1978 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Application No. 245/78.\n\nM. N. Phadke and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.\n\nJ. G. Shah, Vineet Kumar and Ashok Kaul for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against . tbe judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated December 22, 1978 in a Criminal Habeas Corpug Writ for quashing the order of detention PMl!ed against the detenu. 'I1Je detenu was arrested on October 20, 1978 and grounds of detention were sefved on him that very day.\n\nThe High Court allowed the Writ Petition mainly on the ground that, as one of the grounds, namely, ground No. 7 was irrelevant, the entire order of detention is vitiated. In corning to this finding, the High Court, has put, in our opinion, a wrong interpretation on Sec. 5 (A) Of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling\n\nActivities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section SA reads thus:\n\n,,.: . . .\n\n\"SA. Ground9 of detention severable.-Where a person has been detained in pursuance ol' an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 which has been made o'n two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of snch grounds and accordingly-\n\n( a) such order shall no't be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are-\n\n(i) vague,\n\n(ii) non-existent,\n\n(iii) not relevant,\n\n(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with\n\nS'Uch person, or ·~\n\n(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to bold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section\n\n(1) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention,\n\n(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said snb-section ( 1) after being\n\nsatisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.\"\n\nThe High Court seems to think that Sec. 5 (A) contemplates that there should be only one ground which relates to the violation of\n\nl~-57 SCI/81\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[198]\\ 2 $.C..R.\n\nSec. 3 of the Act and if that gronnd is irrelevant and the other grounds which relate to some other subject matter are clear and specific, the detention will not stand vitiated. In our opinion, the argument of the High Court with due respect amounts to begging the question because the detention under Sec. 3 of the Act is only for the purpose of preventing smuggling and all the grounds whether there are one or more, would be relatable only to vrious activities of smuggling and we cannot conceive of any other separate ground which could deal with matters other than smuggling because the act of smuggling covers several activities each forming a separate ground of detention and the Act deals with no other act except smuggling. Indeed, if the interpretation of the High Court in respect of Sec. S(A) is accepted. then Sec. 5/\\. will become otioe. While construing section 5 (A) the High Court observed thus :-\n\n\"But in the present case the subjective satisfaction i; based on one ground, that is, for preventing the present petitioner from smuggling goods and in support of that ground various statements have been relied upon and the totality of consideration of all these statements has resulted in the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority when it passed the impugned order of detention. Now for these totality of circumstances considered by the detaining authority, if one irrelevant or unsustainable element has entered in the process of subjective satisfaction, the process of arriving at subjective satisfaction being comprehensive, the said element would disturb the entire process of subjective satisfaction and consequently, even if one statement which could not have been relied upon appeared before the mind's eye of the detaining authori!j, it could easily be seen that its subjective satisfaction would be vitiated and its final decison would rest upon a part of the material which is irrelevant.\"\n\nThe process of reasoning adopted by the High Court is absolutely unintelligible to us.\n\nIt is manifest that whenever the allegations of smuggling are made against a person who is sought to be detained by way of preventing further smuggling, there is bound to be one act or several acts witl1 the common object of smuggling goods which is sought to be prevented by the Act. It would, therefore, not be correct to say that the object of the Act constitutes the ground for detention. If this is so, in no case there could be any other ground for detention, except the one which relates to smuggling. In our opinion, this is neither the object of the Act nor can such an object be spelt ou! from the language in which Sec. SA is couched. What the Act provides is that where there are a number of grounds of detenfion covering various\n\nf i\n\nI I I l\n\nactivities of the detenu spreading over a period or periods, each activity is a separate ground by itself and if one of the grounds is irrelevant, vague or unspecific, then that will not vitiate the order of detention. The reason fo'r enacting Sec. 5 (A) was the fact that several High Courts took the view that where several grounds are mentioned in an order of detention and one of them is found to be either vague or irrelevant then the entire order is vitiated because it cannot be predicted to what extent the subjective satisfaction of the autho~ rity could have been influenced by the vague or irrelevant ground. It was to displace the basis of these decisions that the Parliament enacted Sec. 5 (A) in order to make it clear that even if one of the\n\ngrounds is irrelevan.t but the other grounds are clear and specific that by itself would not vitiate the order of detention. Mr. G. A. Shah\n\nappearing for the detenu frankly conceded that he is not in a position to support the view taken by the Gujarat High Court on the interpretation of Sec. 5 (A). He also stated that he does not want to challenge the vires of Sec. 5 (A) of the Act. Mr. Phadke has frankly slated that he only wants the law to be settled in the peculiar circumstnces of this case and the order of the High Court quashing the detention need not be disturbed. We, therefore, hold that t)le view taken by the High Court on interpretation of Sec. 5(A) is legally erroneous and is hereby overruled. With these observations the appeal is disposed of with-. out disturbing the order. of the High Court quashing the order of detention.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHAMANLAL MANJIBHAI SONI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHAMANLAL MANJIBHAI SONI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nCHAMANLAL MANJIBHAI SONI\n\nJanuary 8, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 820, "end_char": 830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 916, "end_char": 925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1121, "end_char": 1131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788, "end_char": 1797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2358, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J. G. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. G. Shah, Vineet Kumar and Ashok Kaul for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2420, "end_char": 2432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. G. Shah, Vineet Kumar and Ashok Kaul for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Ashok Kaul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2437, "end_char": 2447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. G. Shah, Vineet Kumar and Ashok Kaul for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against ."}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3109, "end_char": 3115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3418, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling\n\nActivities Act, 1974", "statute": "Of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling\n\nActivities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4028, "end_char": 4037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling\n\nActivities Act, 1974", "statute": "Of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling\n\nActivities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4862, "end_char": 4868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5383, "end_char": 5389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7580, "end_char": 7586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8013, "end_char": 8023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was to displace the basis of these decisions that the Parliament enacted Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8032, "end_char": 8038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. A. Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. A. Shah\n\nappearing for the detenu frankly conceded that he is not in a position to support the view taken by the Gujarat High Court on the interpretation of Sec."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8339, "end_char": 8357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. A. Shah\n\nappearing for the detenu frankly conceded that he is not in a position to support the view taken by the Gujarat High Court on the interpretation of Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8383, "end_char": 8389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8458, "end_char": 8464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phadke has frankly slated that he only wants the law to be settled in the peculiar circumstnces of this case and the order of the High Court quashing the detention need not be disturbed."}}, {"text": "Sec. 5(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8752, "end_char": 8761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_504_508_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "!'104\n\nASHOK KUMAR & ORS.\n\n\\'.\n\nI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, NAINITAL & ORS.\n\nJanuary 9, 1981\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]\n\nUttar Prade3h Urban Buildings (Regulation of Lttting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972-Sectlon 16(1)(a)-Scope of.\n\nThe appellant. were the landlords of a building in which the tenant was running a hotel. They filed a suit for the tenant's eviction on the ground that·~ he !lad defaulted in the payment of rent. The suit was decreed. The landlord, in anticipation of the premises falling vacant, filed an application before the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer under section 16 of the. U.P. Urban Buildinas\n\n(Regulation of Lelling, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for release of the building in question.\n\nIn the meantime respondent No. 3 filed a petition before the District Judge alleging that he was a partner in the hotel business with the consent and permbsion of the landlord and that the landlord be directed not to dispossess him.\n\nThis application was rejected on the ground that respondent No. 3 was neither a party to the ejectment suit nor was any objection filed by him during the pend ency of the suit alleging' that he bad a share in the business carried out by !he tenant.\n\nAfter physical JlO\"'e\"ion of the premises was delivered to the appellant decreeholder respondent No. 3 filed a suit against the appellant and the former tenant faii setting aside the ejectment decree. He claimed that it was he who was the sole tenant and, that for this reason the decree could not have been passed\n\nagainst the former tenant. The suit was dismi.!sed.\n\nThe appellant made an application before the Eviction Officer that the premises be allotted to him.\n\nThe Eviction Officer rejected the objection raised by respondent No. 3 and released the property in favour of the appellant. Th• Appellate Authority, however, allowed respondent No. 3 ·, appeal holding that\"\" the application filed by the landlord ,. .. not maintainable under section 16 of the Act as the tenant bad not been actually ejected when the application for notifying the vacancy was made.\n\nG The appellant'• writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground\n\nthat before notifying the vacancy tho Eviction Officer did not hear reipondent No. 3: .\n\nAllowing the appeal\n\nHEW : The High Court w.. in error in dismis.ling the appellant's writ petition.\n\nThe High Court doeo not appear to have con•idered the history Of the case and the various proceedings leading to the eviction of the tenant and to the fact that respondent No. 3 bad ao claim or right to the property.\n\nRe<1pondent No. 3 never came in po11C11ion of the premises but tried to defeat or\n\nj .\n\n....\n\nASHOK KUMAR v. I ADDL. DISTT. JUDGE (Fazal Ali, !.) 505\n\ndelay the decree by varioll8 subterfuges and pretexts.\n\nAt no stage could he A show that ho was either a sub-tenant or a partner of tho tenant. There wOi, therefore, no question of his being heard by the Eviction Officer after possession waa delivered to the landlord and the vacany notified. If at all, such a hearing would have been futile and would have ultimately led to the same reswt.\n\n[508E&DJ\n\nThe Appellate Authority took a wrong view of the law in allowing the res- B pondent's appeal. Under section 16(1) of the Act it was not necessary that tho application for notifying the vacancy should be made only after the premises have become actually vacant. Section 16(1)(a) so far as relevant, provides that tho District Magistrate may require a landlord to let any building which is about \"o fall vacaut to any person specified in the order. Manifestly it is not necessary that under section 16(l)(a) the premises must actually become vacant before an application under it could be filed before tho District Magistrate. In the C instant case as the decree for ejectment was under contemptation it 'vas open to the appellant to move the District Magistrate for notifying the vacancy under the section. [507 E-GJ\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1154 of 1974.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16-11-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 1086/76 .\n\nR. K. Garg, Vi; ay K. Jain and R. K. Gupta for the Appellants.\n\nBishamber Lal for Respondent No. 3.\n\n'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an Order dated November 16, 1978 of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants.\n\nThe facts of the case fall within a narrow compass and may be , J\"l=arised bus.\n\nThe premises in question which are situated in Nainita! were commonly known as 'Waverly Quarters' and properly called as 'Hotel Waldrof.\n\nAccording to the appellants the premises were rented out to one Keshar Singh on an annual rent of Rs. 14,000 on November 17, 1953 and the allotment of Hotel Waldrof to the tenant,\n\nKeslµr Singh, was confirmed by the Rent Controller sometime in the year 1954.\n\nThereafter, the tenant-Keshar Singh defaulted in the payment of rent resulting in a suit filed by the appellants for his eviction.\n\nThis suit was filed on 9-4-72 for ejectment and for recovery of arrears amounting to Rs. 26,743, due up to June 4, 1971.\n\nOn March 12, 1973 the tenant was asked to furufah . security for arrears which he failed to do and an application by the tenant for extension of time for furnishing security was also rejected by the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nDistrict Judge on 31st March, 1973.\n\nOn April 25, 1973, the landlord-appellant in anticipation of the premises falling vacant filed an application before !he Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Nainital (hereinafter referred to as the 'Eviction Officer') under s.16 of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for release of the building in question. On this application, the Eviction Officer directed the Inspector to submit a report on the question as to whether or not the premises had fallen vacant.\n\nMeanwhile as the tenant had not deposited the rent as. directed by the Court, nor furnished the security his defence was• struck off and the appellant's suit for eviction was decreed on 9-5-1973.\n\nAfter the decree for ejectment was passed against the tenant, Respondent No. 3, Harbans Singh, filed an application on 11-5-1973 in the court of District Judge, Kumaon, Nainital on the allegation that he was a partner of Keshar Singh in the business of Hotel Waldrof with the consent a.nd permission of the landlord and had purchased D the moveables of the aforesaid Hotel from Keshar Singh. He further prayed that the landlord-appellant be directed not to dispossess him (Harbans Singh).\n\nThis application was, howev•er, rejected by the District Judge on the ground that Harbans Singh was neither a party to the ejectment suit nor was any objection filed by him during the\n\npendency of the suit alleging that he had any share in the business.\n\nThe application of Harbans Singh was accordingly rejected by the District Judge on 12-5-73 .\n\nSubsequently on 21-5-1973, the Rent Control Inspector reported to the Eviction Officer that the building in suit which was allotted to Keshar Singh in 1954 had fallen vacant ih pursuance of the decree for ejectment obtained by the appellant. During the pendency of snit, the original tenant, Keshar Singh had been appointed a Receiver of Hotel Waldrof but after the decree was passed, he delivered physical possession of the Hotel to the appellant-decree holder in the presence of witnesses. It appears that Harbans Si'ngh tried to resist the delivery of possession and abused the Conunissioner but to no avail.\n\nThus, having failed in his attempts, to resist the delivery of possession to the appellant, Harbans Singh filed a suit (No. 47 of 1973) in the court of District Judge against the appellant and the former tenant, Keshar Singh for setting aside the ejectment decree passed in II suit No. 27 of 1972 alleging that as he had become the sole tenant, Keshar Singh ceased to be a tenant of the disputed properly and the decree was wrongly passed against Keshar Singh.\n\nHe also pleaded\n\n...\n\nASHOK KUMAR v. I ADDL. DISTT. JUDGE (Fazal Ali, J.) 507 , that the suit being a collusive one, the decree should be set aside.\n\nA The suit filed by respondent No. 3 does not appetr to have been pursued and ultimately it stood dismissed on 11-6-1975.\n\nSometime in July 1973 the appellant by means of an application informed the Eviction Officer that the landlord had been delivered possession of the Hotel and prayed that since the premises had fallen vacant, the same may be allotted to him. Respondent No. 3, however, on 8-11-1973 filed objectious to the application of the landlord for releasing the accommodation on the allegation that he had filed a suit for setting aside the decree.\n\nThe Rent Control Inspector on being asked to report the exact position submitted his report to the viction Officer who rejected the application filed \\Jy respondent No. 3 and by an order dated 18-11-1974 released the property in favour of the appellant with the exception of the outhouses which were in possession of different tenants. Harbans Singh then tiled an appeal on 11-4-1974 before the appellate authority challenging the order of the Eviction Officer.\n\nThis appeal was admittedly time-barred.\n\nThe appeal was, however, allowed by the appellate authority on the ground that the application filed by the landlord was not maintainable under s.16 of the Act as the tenant had not been actually ejected when the application for notifying the vacancy was made.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the appellate authority took a wrong\n\nview of law in allowing the appeal because under the provisions of E s.16 ( 1) of the Act it was not necessary that the application for notifying the vacancy should be made only after the premises have become actually vacant.\n\nSection 16(1)(a) runs thus:\n\n\"16(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the District Magistrate may by order-(a) require the landlord to Jet any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but not appurtenant land\n\n&lone, to any person specified in the order (to be called an allotment order),.\" (Emphasis supplied).\n\nIt is manifest that under s.16(1)(a), it is not necessary that the premises must actually become vacant before an application under s. 16 could be filed before the District Magistrate. In the instant case, as a decree for ejectment was under contemplation, it was open to the appellant to have moved the District Magistrate for notifying the vacancy under s.16(1)(a) of the Act.\n\nWe have already pointed out that the premises did fall vacant sub- H sequently and the delivery of possession was also given to the landlord in pursuance of the decree of ejectment passed by the civil court.\n\n---<--\n\ns o s\n\nSUPRE11E COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.6.11..\n\nA Respondent No. 3 appears to have made a futile attempt to make confusion worse confounded by representing that the premises were not vacant when he knew full well that the delivery of possession was given to the landlord in bis presence and he had later filed a suit for setting aside the decree which was dismissed.\n\nThus, it appears from the record that respondent No. 3, Harbans Singh, never came in B possession of the premises in question but tried to defeat or delay !be decree passed by the civil court in favonr of the appellant by various subterfuges and pretexts. However, as the appellate authority bad accepted the appeal filed by respondent No. 3, the appellants were compelled to take the matter to the High Court by way of a writ petition.\n\nThe High Court, however, dismissed the writ petition } mainly on the ground that before notifying the vacancy, the Eviction Officer did not bear respondent No. 3 . The High Court does\n\nnot appear to have considered the history of the case and the various proceedings leading to the eviction of Keshar Singh and to the fact that respondent No. 3 had absolutely no claim or right to the property.\n\nAt no stage could Harbans Singh prove that either be was a sub-tenant or a partner of Keshar Singh.\n\nHis attempt to get !he decree, passed in favour of the appellant, set aside failed.\n\nIn these circum.stances, therefore, there was no question of his beiug heard by the Eviction Officer after !he possession was delivered to the landlord and the vacancy was notified.\n\nIf at all, such a hearing would have been futile and would have ultimately led to the same result.\n\nIn these circumstances, we are clearly of the op; nion !hat the High Court erred in law in dismissing the writ petition and up holding the judgment of the District-Judge remanding the matter to the Eviction Officer.\n\nWe, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the\n\n];' judgment of the High Court as also that of the District Judge (the appellate authority) and restore the order of the Eviction Officer releasing the accommodation in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe appel land will be entitled to costs in this Court quantified at Rs. 2,000 1 (Rupees two thousand m:;Ӥ ) .\n\n11'.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 44, "entities": [{"text": "104\n\nASHOK KUMAR & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASHOK KUMAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, NAINITAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, NAINITAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 9, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 93, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 9, 1981\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 609, "end_char": 619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1975, "end_char": 1985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3240, "end_char": 3253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3401, "end_char": 3417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3629, "end_char": 3645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4147, "end_char": 4157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Vi; ay K. Jain and R. K. Gupta for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Gupta"}}, {"text": "K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4166, "end_char": 4173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Vi; ay K. Jain and R. K. Gupta for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4178, "end_char": 4189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Vi; ay K. Jain and R. K. Gupta for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishamber Lal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an Order dated November 16, 1978 of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4395, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an Order dated November 16, 1978 of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants."}}, {"text": "Keshar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4757, "end_char": 4769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the appellants the premises were rented out to one Keshar Singh on an annual rent of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Keshar Singh"}}, {"text": "November 17, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4805, "end_char": 4822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14,000 on November 17, 1953 and the allotment of Hotel Waldrof to the tenant,\n\nKeslµr Singh, was confirmed by the Rent Controller sometime in the year 1954."}}, {"text": "Keslµr Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4874, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14,000 on November 17, 1953 and the allotment of Hotel Waldrof to the tenant,\n\nKeslµr Singh, was confirmed by the Rent Controller sometime in the year 1954.", "canonical_name": "Keshar Singh"}}, {"text": "Keshar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the tenant-Keshar Singh defaulted in the payment of rent resulting in a suit filed by the appellants for his eviction.", "canonical_name": "Keshar Singh"}}, {"text": "9-4-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5108, "end_char": 5114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was filed on 9-4-72 for ejectment and for recovery of arrears amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "June 4, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,743, due up to June 4, 1971."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5210, "end_char": 5224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 12, 1973 the tenant was asked to furufah ."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5465, "end_char": 5481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "security for arrears which he failed to do and an application by the tenant for extension of time for furnishing security was also rejected by the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nDistrict Judge on 31st March, 1973."}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5707, "end_char": 5711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "-5-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6249, "end_char": 6256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "directed by the Court, nor furnished the security his defence was• struck off and the appellant's suit for eviction was decreed on 9-5-1973."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, Harbans Singh, filed an application on 11-5-1973 in the court of District Judge, Kumaon, Nainital on the allegation that he was a partner of Keshar Singh in the business of Hotel Waldrof with the consent a.nd permission of the landlord and had purchased D the moveables of the aforesaid Hotel from Keshar Singh.", "canonical_name": "Harbans Si'ngh"}}, {"text": "11-5-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6378, "end_char": 6387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, Harbans Singh, filed an application on 11-5-1973 in the court of District Judge, Kumaon, Nainital on the allegation that he was a partner of Keshar Singh in the business of Hotel Waldrof with the consent a.nd permission of the landlord and had purchased D the moveables of the aforesaid Hotel from Keshar Singh."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Kumaon, Nainital", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6404, "end_char": 6436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, Harbans Singh, filed an application on 11-5-1973 in the court of District Judge, Kumaon, Nainital on the allegation that he was a partner of Keshar Singh in the business of Hotel Waldrof with the consent a.nd permission of the landlord and had purchased D the moveables of the aforesaid Hotel from Keshar Singh."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6732, "end_char": 6745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further prayed that the landlord-appellant be directed not to dispossess him (Harbans Singh).", "canonical_name": "Harbans Si'ngh"}}, {"text": "12-5-73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7087, "end_char": 7094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application of Harbans Singh was accordingly rejected by the District Judge on 12-5-73 ."}}, {"text": "21-5-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7114, "end_char": 7123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently on 21-5-1973, the Rent Control Inspector reported to the Eviction Officer that the building in suit which was allotted to Keshar Singh in 1954 had fallen vacant ih pursuance of the decree for ejectment obtained by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Harbans Si'ngh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7606, "end_char": 7620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Harbans Si'ngh tried to resist the delivery of possession and abused the Conunissioner but to no avail.", "canonical_name": "Harbans Si'ngh"}}, {"text": "11-6-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8434, "end_char": 8443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 does not appetr to have been pursued and ultimately it stood dismissed on 11-6-1975."}}, {"text": "8-11-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8717, "end_char": 8726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, however, on 8-11-1973 filed objectious to the application of the landlord for releasing the accommodation on the allegation that he had filed a suit for setting aside the decree."}}, {"text": "18-11-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9078, "end_char": 9088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and by an order dated 18-11-1974 released the property in favour of the appellant with the exception of the outhouses which were in possession of different tenants."}}, {"text": "11-4-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9259, "end_char": 9268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Singh then tiled an appeal on 11-4-1974 before the appellate authority challenging the order of the Eviction Officer."}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9533, "end_char": 9537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9785, "end_char": 9789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9943, "end_char": 9959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10340, "end_char": 10350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10446, "end_char": 10451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10670, "end_char": 10680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10951, "end_char": 10954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_509_515_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "AJITSINGH THAKURS!NGH & ANR. v.\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nJanuary 9, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nSupreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 -S. 2 & Indian Penal Code, S. 302 High Court setting aside order of acquillal of SeS&'iona Cpurt - Approach to be adopted by High Court in exercising appellate powera - High Court to consider whether integrality of evidence alone can •- ensure that accused are guilty.\n\nlimitation Act 1963, Art, 114 & S. 5-De/ay in filing, appeal against order of acquittal-Condonation of-Any event or circu1nstance arising after expiry of li111itation-whether can constitute 'sufficient cause'.\n\nThe two appellants who were father 311.ld son alongwith another son, who was acquitted were charged with the offence of committing the murder of tho deceesed and of causing injuries to his two brothers all of whom were residing in a chaw! belonging to the first appellant.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that on the fateful day the appellants demanded payment of rent from the deceased and refuse! to make immediate payment infuriated the second appellant who\n\ninfilcted two kirpan blows on him.\n\nWhen the deceased started running to the room of W. brothers he wa• pursued and further kirpan blows were infiictecl on him.\n\nHis brothers were also atta.cked by the three accused.\n\nAfter the incident all the accused ran away from the place leaving their bicycles behind.\n\nThe decea&ed succumbed to his injuries in the hospital and one of his brothers was admitted. as an indoor patient.\n\nThe three a<:Cused were tried by the Addi. Sessions Judge.\n\nAs there were n1aterial contradiction& in the 'eye witnesses' account of the sequence of events, the exact places where tho blows were struck, and tho role played by each aC<:UICd and the seizure of four bicycleo by the police at the scene being inconsittent with the prosecution case that threo persons, the accused were involved rthe Seooions Judge held tho evidence to bo untrustworthy and being of opinion that it was unsafe and hazardous to convict the accused on such. testimony he gave them the benefit of doubt and acquitted them.\n\nNo appeal was filed at first becau'° the State Government saw no cMe on the merita for an appeal. However, in a revision petition filed by one of the brothers of the deceased the High Court declared that the case waa a fit case where the State Government should file an appeal. Thereafter, the State Government filed an appeal, in the High Court and prayed for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal.\n\nThe High Court condoned the delay considered the appeal on its merits, and allowed it against the two appellants. Tho appeal agiilnst the acquittal _of the third ru:cnsed wos dismissed.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court:\n\nHEID: l(i) There was no sufficient cause for the State not filing the H appeal within time, and tho High Court erre<l' in condoning the delay.\n\n[512 F-H]\n\n- ---; i:i:· ~- --\n\n(ii) A party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation fo\" filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.\n\nThere may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of Limitaticn which may B further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowe<l\n\nto expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arlsin!i within the period of limitation. [512 GJ\n\n2(i) The High Court erred in interfering with the judgment of the trial court. [515 DJ -t\n\n(ii) The approach to be adopted by the High Court v1hen exercising its appeUate powers in a case of appeal against an order of acquittal has been defined in a long line of cases.\n\nAs long o.go as 1934, the Privy Council declared that the High Court must give proper weight and com.ideration to \"such matters as (1) the view of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses;\n\n(2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presun1ption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and ( 4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses\".\n\nThe approach has been endorsed by this Court repeatedly and in a very recent decision it has been held that if the main grounds on which the Court below has based its order acquittin~ the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and cannot be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal.\n\n[514DF; HJ\n\nWarTc11 Ducane S1nith v. Tlie King A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 22:7 & Ganes!J 'Bhavan Patel & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [1979] 2 S.C.R. 94, referred to.\n\n(iii) The High Court after specifically referring to tl1e aforesaid legal position, overlooked the limitations imposed on it and em.barked oc. a course not warranted by law. It took into particular regard a, few considerations which seemed to it to assume importance and has concentrated on sonie of the material only. omitting to consider in the process that the integrality of the evidence alone can ensure whether the accused are guilty. [515 A, C]\n\nIn the instant case the High Court referred to the recovery of a blood stained slipper and a diary from the scene of the offence, and inferred that they belooged to the first appellant.\n\nThis connection hos not been properly established. The papers found in the diary do not necessarily show that that the diary belonged to him. Nor is there sufficient proof that tbe slipper i3 his.\n\n[515 BJ\n\n3 The trial court wrote a careful judgment, exhaustively considering all the evidence and on painstaking analysis reached conclusions which are preeminently. reasonable and support the order of acquittal. [513 BJ\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.\n\nH 329 of 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 9-4-1979 of the Gnjarat High\n\n·~\n\nCourt in Criminal Appeal No. 270/76. '1\n\n..... -\n\nRajandra Prasad Singh, M/s. K. G. Vakharia, P. H. Parekh and Raian Karanjawala for the Appellants.\n\nT. U. Mehta, M. N. Shroff and Himantika Wahi for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThis appeal, preferred under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat setting aside the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial C court and convicting and sentencing the appellants for offences under\n\n8. 302 read with s. 34, Indian Penal Code, and under s. 326 read with s. 34 of the Code.\n\nThe appellants, Ajit Singh and Balwant Singh, are father and son.\n\nD Another son is Mohan Singh.\n\nAll three were charged with the murder of Manilal and with causing injuries to Parmabhtl, Bhulabhai and Natwarlal. The prosecution case is that Manila!, Bhufabhai and Bhikabhai wcro three brothers residing in a chaw! belonging to the appellant Ajit Singh, that on 9th April, 1975 Manila!' drew his salary from the factory where he worked and at about 6.45 p.m. on returning to his room in the chaw! he was met by the appellants and Mohan Singh. They demanded payment of rent but Manila! said he would pay it only on the next day. His refusal to make immediate payment is alleged to have infuriated Balwant Singh who, it is said, inflicted two kirpan blows on him.\n\nUpon \\his Manila! started rnnning away, pursued by the three accused, and headed towards the room of Parmabhai. Further kirpan blows were inflicted on him there by the appellants.\n\nParrnabhai, who had emerged from !us room, was also attacked and given a kirpan blow.\n\nManila!, meanwhile, turned and entered the house of Shanabhai. Ajit Singh is alleged to have struck him further blows there in consequence of which he fell down.\n\nBhulabhai, who arrived on the scene, was also struck a kirpan blow.\n\nMohan Singh is alleged to have wielded a bamboo stick and hit Natwarlal on the head with it All three accused are said to have run away from the place then, leaving their bicycles behind. Manila! was removed to the hospital and declared dead.\n\nParmabhai was admitted as an indoor patient.\n\nShanabhai telephoned the police control room and informed them If of the incident, and he Gomtipur Police Station recorded a complaint made by Bhulabhai.\n\n-..---\n\nA The three accused were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), who after considering the evidence on tha record acquitted the accused by his judgment and order dated 15th October, 1975.\n\nOn 26th April, 1976 the State filed an appeal in the High Court B and prayed for condonation of the delay in filing it. 'Ih~ High Court condoned the delay, considered the appeal on its merits and allowed it against Ajit Singh and Balwant Singh.\n\nThey were convicted under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nThey were also convicted under s. 3 26 read with s. 34 of the Code but no separate sentence was passed thereunder.\n\nThe appeal C against the acquittal of Mohan Singh was dismissed.\n\nAt the outset, it is urged by learned counsel for \\ht appellants that the High Court erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal, and the appeal should have been dismissed as barred by limitation. We have examined the facts carefully. It appears that initially the State\n\nGovernment took a decision not to me an appeal and it allowed the D period of limitation to lapse.\n\nSubsequently, on certain observations made by the High Court while considering a revision petition by Bhulabhai that it was a fit case where the State Government should . file an appeal and on notice being issued by the High Court to the\n\nState Government in the matter, the appeal was filed. It was filed\n\nthree months after limitation had expired. A faint attempt was made to show that when the initial decision was taken not to file an appeal\n\nall the papers had not been considered by the department concerned, but we are not impressed by that allegation.\n\nThe truth appears to be that the appeal was not filed at first because the State Government saw no case on the merits for an appeal, and it was filed only because the High Court had observed - and that was long aEter limitation had expired - that the case was fit for appeal by the State Government. Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when 1t allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time.\n\nNo event or circumstance. arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.\n\nThere may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing. of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Comt erred in condoning the delay.\n\nAJJT SINGH v. GUJARAT (Pathak, J.) 5 1 3\n\nIt is pointed out that the High Court could have sent for the\n\nrecerd in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and examined the case.\n\nThat is quite another matter and -raises other questions.\n\nWe are concerned here with the question whether the delay in filing the\n\nappeal could have been condoned.\n\nBut quite besides this, there was also no merit in the appeal filed\n\nbefore the High Court.\n\nThe trial court wrote a careful judgment,\n\nexhaustively considering all the evidence and on painstaking analysis\n\n.reached conclusions which, in our opinion, are pre-eminently rea\n\nsonable and support the order of acquittal.\n\nIt found that the evidence ʧ did not establish that the injury suffered by Bhulabhai could have\n\n , resulted from a kirpan, that the panch witnesses to the recovery of the two kirpans did not support the prosecution, that of the six eye witnesses one of them, Ramiben, widow of Manila!, was not present on the scene at all, that all the eye witnesses had mdulged in palpable falsehood in attempting to implicate Mohan Singh when plainly he\n\nwas not there (the State appeal against his acquittal was dismissed\n\nby the High Court) , that there were material contradictions between\n\nthe different eye-witnesses concerning the sequence of events, the\n\nexact places where the blows were struck, and the role played by each\n\naccused, that the information given by one eye witness, Shanabhai, to the police control room mentioned merely !hat four or five \"sar\n\ndarjis\" had come to the chaw! and had injured two persons with a knife, and although admittedly Shanabhai had known the accused by\n\nname for the last four or five years he did not mention their names\n\nin that report.\n\nIt is also in evidence that it wa& already dark when\n\nthe incident took place and there were no municipal lights within the\n\n limits of the chaw!.\n\nThe trial court has further adverted to the cir\n\ncumstance that four bicycles were seized by the pnlice at the scene,\n\nwhich is inconsistent with the prosecution case that three persons, the accused, were involved.\n\nAs regards the complaint filed by Bhula\n\nbhai, the trial court has found that it could not be admitted in f evidence under s. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, and there was ample material to show that the eye-witnesses had plenty of time to\n\nconfer with one another before the complaint w11s drawn up.\n\nThe\n\ntrial court also adverted to the fact that the police did nc..t record the\n\nstatement of the remaining eye-witnesses that very night.\n\nThe Prose- . cuting Inspector also admitted in cross-examination that during the\n\ninvestigation all the eye-witnesses came forward with \"stereotype\"\n\nstatements.\n\nOne other significant fact remains.\n\nAccording to the\n\nevidence the incident was witnessed by several olher people, but not a single independent witness has come forward to support the prose\n\ncution.\n\nThe eye-witnesses produced are either related or members .\n\nof the same commuuity; members of other communities also lived in the chaw! and admittedly were on cordial terms with the complainant Bhulabhai and the other witnesses.\n\nThe trial court pointed out that the eye-witnesses were, already prior to the incident, extremely hostile to the accused. There was a running war between them in the matter of payment of rent, and disputes had arisen concerning ownership of the property and criminal proceedings had been taken. At this point, it is relevant to note that Ajit Singh used to employ one Shivram for collecting rents. In all the circumstances, the trial court observed that when the witnesses could not identify \\he four or five Sardarjis who had come to the chaw!, they put their heads together and decided to C involve Ajit Singh and his two sons.\n\nHolding that the <evidence was unlrustworthy and it would be highly unsafe and hazardous to convict the accused on such testimony the trial court gave them the\n\nbenefit of doubt and acquitted them. t<·\n\nWe may observe that the High Court had befme it an appeal against an order of acquittal.\n\nThe approach to be adopted by the High Court when exercising its appellate powers in such a case has been defined in a long line of cases.\n\nAs long ago as Warren Ducane Smith v. The King(I) the Privy Council declared that the High Court must give proper weight and consideration to \"such matters as ( 1) the view of the trial judfil' as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumptioh of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainlf not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of .any doubt; and ( 4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.\" The approach has been endorsed by this Court repeatc.Jly, and in a very recent decision, Ganesh Bhavan Patel & Anr. v. Statl of Maharashtra(') to which one of us (Sarkaria, J.) was party. it was also observed : --\"\"-,\n\n\"Where two reasonable conc_lusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court stou!d as a matter of judicial caution, refr:iin from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the Coun below.\n\nIn other words, if the main grounds on which !he Conrt be1ow has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and cannot be entirely and effectively dislouged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal.\"\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 227.\n\n(2) [1979] 2 SCR. 94.\n\n'fhe legal position is well settled and, indeed, has been adverted to by the High Court. But after specifically referring to it the High Court appears to have overlooked the limitations imposed on it and has embarked on a course not warranted by law. It has taken into particular regard a few considerations whi<; h seemed to it to assume importance. It has referred to the recovery of a bloodstained slipper and a diary from the scene of the offence, and has inferred that they belong to Ajit Singh.\n\nWe are not satisfied that the connection has been truly established. The papers found in the diary do not necessarily show that the diary belongs to him.\n\nNor is there sufficient proof that the slipper is his.\n\nThe High Court has concentrated on some of the material only, omitting to consider in the process that the integra!ity of the evidence alone can ensure whether the accused are guilty.\n\nWe are satisfied that the High Court erred in interfering with the judgment of the trial court. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court set aside and the judgment\n\nand order of the t_rial court restored.\n\nThese are the reasons which persuaded us to make the order disposing of the appeal.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n~.!'l=': ,., ~~-,>\n\ni~'\"", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "AJITSINGH THAKURS!NGH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AJITSINGH THAKURSINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 180, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 451, "end_char": 465, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 483, "end_char": 487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4895, "end_char": 4897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 S.C.R. 94", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4992, "end_char": 5010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajandra Prasad Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6277, "end_char": 6298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n..... -\n\nRajandra Prasad Singh, M/s. K. G. Vakharia, P. H. Parekh and Raian Karanjawala for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "K. G. Vakharia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6305, "end_char": 6319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n..... -\n\nRajandra Prasad Singh, M/s. K. G. Vakharia, P. H. Parekh and Raian Karanjawala for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6321, "end_char": 6333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n..... -\n\nRajandra Prasad Singh, M/s. K. G. Vakharia, P. H. Parekh and Raian Karanjawala for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Raian Karanjawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6338, "end_char": 6355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n..... -\n\nRajandra Prasad Singh, M/s. K. G. Vakharia, P. H. Parekh and Raian Karanjawala for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "T. U. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6377, "end_char": 6388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta, M. N. Shroff and Himantika Wahi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6390, "end_char": 6402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta, M. N. Shroff and Himantika Wahi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Himantika Wahi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6407, "end_char": 6421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta, M. N. Shroff and Himantika Wahi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6487, "end_char": 6493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThis appeal, preferred under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat setting aside the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial C court and convicting and sentencing the appellants for offences under\n\n8."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6532, "end_char": 6604, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6838, "end_char": 6843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6845, "end_char": 6862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6874, "end_char": 6880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6891, "end_char": 6896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ajit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6927, "end_char": 6937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, Ajit Singh and Balwant Singh, are father and son.", "canonical_name": "Ajit Singh"}}, {"text": "Balwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6942, "end_char": 6955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, Ajit Singh and Balwant Singh, are father and son.", "canonical_name": "Balwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Mohan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6995, "end_char": 7006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Another son is Mohan Singh."}}, {"text": "Manilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7051, "end_char": 7058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All three were charged with the murder of Manilal and with causing injuries to Parmabhtl, Bhulabhai and Natwarlal.", "canonical_name": "Manilal"}}, {"text": "Parmabhtl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All three were charged with the murder of Manilal and with causing injuries to Parmabhtl, Bhulabhai and Natwarlal.", "canonical_name": "Parrnabhai"}}, {"text": "Bhulabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7099, "end_char": 7108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All three were charged with the murder of Manilal and with causing injuries to Parmabhtl, Bhulabhai and Natwarlal.", "canonical_name": "Bhula\n\nbhai"}}, {"text": "Natwarlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All three were charged with the murder of Manilal and with causing injuries to Parmabhtl, Bhulabhai and Natwarlal."}}, {"text": "Bhufabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7162, "end_char": 7171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhufabhai and Bhikabhai wcro three brothers residing in a chaw!", "canonical_name": "Bhula\n\nbhai"}}, {"text": "Bhikabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhufabhai and Bhikabhai wcro three brothers residing in a chaw!"}}, {"text": "Manila", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7488, "end_char": 7494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They demanded payment of rent but Manila!"}}, {"text": "Balwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7607, "end_char": 7620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His refusal to make immediate payment is alleged to have infuriated Balwant Singh who, it is said, inflicted two kirpan blows on him.", "canonical_name": "Balwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Parmabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7775, "end_char": 7784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "started rnnning away, pursued by the three accused, and headed towards the room of Parmabhai.", "canonical_name": "Parrnabhai"}}, {"text": "Parrnabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7855, "end_char": 7865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parrnabhai, who had emerged from !", "canonical_name": "Parrnabhai"}}, {"text": "Manila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7942, "end_char": 7948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manila!,", "canonical_name": "Manilal"}}, {"text": "Shanabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7994, "end_char": 8003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "meanwhile, turned and entered the house of Shanabhai."}}, {"text": "Ajit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8005, "end_char": 8015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ajit Singh is alleged to have struck him further blows there in consequence of which he fell down.", "canonical_name": "Ajit Singh"}}, {"text": "Manila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8362, "end_char": 8368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manila!", "canonical_name": "Manilal"}}, {"text": "Gomtipur Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8554, "end_char": 8577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanabhai telephoned the police control room and informed them If of the incident, and he Gomtipur Police Station recorded a complaint made by Bhulabhai."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8673, "end_char": 8717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..---\n\nA The three accused were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), who after considering the evidence on tha record acquitted the accused by his judgment and order dated 15th October, 1975."}}, {"text": "15th October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8822, "end_char": 8840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..---\n\nA The three accused were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), who after considering the evidence on tha record acquitted the accused by his judgment and order dated 15th October, 1975."}}, {"text": "26th April, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8846, "end_char": 8862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th April, 1976 the State filed an appeal in the High Court B and prayed for condonation of the delay in filing it. '"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9115, "end_char": 9121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9132, "end_char": 9137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9222, "end_char": 9226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9240, "end_char": 9245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramiben", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12388, "end_char": 12395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It found that the evidence ʧ did not establish that the injury suffered by Bhulabhai could have\n\n , resulted from a kirpan, that the panch witnesses to the recovery of the two kirpans did not support the prosecution, that of the six eye witnesses one of them, Ramiben, widow of Manila!,"}}, {"text": "Shanabhai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12903, "end_char": 12912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was not present on the scene at all, that all the eye witnesses had mdulged in palpable falsehood in attempting to implicate Mohan Singh when plainly he\n\nwas not there (the State appeal against his acquittal was dismissed\n\nby the High Court) , that there were material contradictions between\n\nthe different eye-witnesses concerning the sequence of events, the\n\nexact places where the blows were struck, and the role played by each\n\naccused, that the information given by one eye witness, Shanabhai, to the police control room mentioned merely !"}}, {"text": "Bhula\n\nbhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13598, "end_char": 13609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the complaint filed by Bhula\n\nbhai, the trial court has found that it could not be admitted in f evidence under s. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, and there was ample material to show that the eye-witnesses had plenty of time to\n\nconfer with one another before the complaint w11s drawn up.", "canonical_name": "Bhula\n\nbhai"}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13687, "end_char": 13693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13695, "end_char": 13721, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhulabhai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14565, "end_char": 14574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and admittedly were on cordial terms with the complainant Bhulabhai and the other witnesses."}}, {"text": "Shivram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14969, "end_char": 14976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At this point, it is relevant to note that Ajit Singh used to employ one Shivram for collecting rents."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16416, "end_char": 16424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Statl of Maharashtra(') to which one of us (Sarkaria, J.) was party."}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 SCR. 94", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16966, "end_char": 16982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18214, "end_char": 18220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_516_532_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "FRANCIS CORALIE MULLIN\n\n' . ..\n\nTHE ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI\n\n& ORS.\n\nJanuary 13, 1981\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]\n\nRight of the detenu under Conservation of Foreig11 Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activitiea Act, to have interview wilh a lawyer and the mtm bm of hu family-Section 3(b)({) &: (ii) read with rule 559A and 550 of the Punjab Manual of the Superintendence and Management of lail.J-Whethtr\n\nvoilate3 Article.J 14 and 21 of the Constitution and hence invalid-Di3tirlctioll between premtive detention with punitive detention-Constitution , of Indf~ 1950 Article 21, scope of.\n\nAllowing the writ petition, the Court\n\nHEll> : ( 1) While considering the question of validity of conditiom of detention coum must necessarily bear in mind the vital distinction betm:en preventive detention and ptmitive detention.\n\nPunitive detention is intended to inflict punishment on a person, who is found by the judicial process to have committed an offence, while preventive detention is not by way of punishment\n\nat all, but it is intended to pre-empt a peon from indulging in conduct injurio\\18 to tho society. [523 AB]\n\n(2) Tho power of preventive detention has been recognised as a noceseary evil and is tolerated in a free society in the larger interest of security of th, e State and maintenance of public order. It is a drastic power to detain a person without trial and in many countries it is not allowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. The Indian Constitution does recognise the existence of this power, but it is hedged-in by various safeguards set out in Articles 21 and 22. Article 22 in clauses (4) to (7) d.t1lls specifically with F safeguards against preventive detention and enjoins that any law of preventive detention or action by way of preventive detention taken under such law m111t be in confonnity with the restrictions laid down by those clause! on pain of -.-.... invalidation, Article 21 also lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. [523 B-DJ\n\nArticle 21 as interpreted in Mantka Gandhi'3 callt requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procWure must be rea!lonablo, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its corutitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given ca.se is by procedure, which is reasonable, falr and just or it is otherwise. The law of preventive detention must, therefore, pass the test not only of Article 22 but also of Article 21. But, despite these safeguards laid down by the Constitution and creatively evolved by the Courts. the power of preventive detention is a frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences affectin~ personal liberty, which is the moet cheri8hed\n\n•••\n\nF. C. MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY 517\n\nand prized possession of man in a. civilised society. It i.~ a power to be exer~ A cised with the greatest care and caution and the courts have to be ever vigilant to see that this power is not abused or misused, inasmuch as the preventive detention is quilitatively different from punitive detention and their purposes are diiferent. In case of punitive detention, the person has fullt opportunity to defend himself, while in case of preventive detention, the opportunity that be has for contesting the action of the Executive is very limited. Therefore, the \"restrictions placed on a person preventively detained must, consis- B tently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal\".\n\n[524 A-G]\n\nManeka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1979] 1 SCC 248; M.O. Hoscot v.\n\nState of Maharashtra,\n\n[1979] 1 SCR 192; Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, [1980] 1 SCC 81; Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration, (1979] 1 SCR 392; Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration,\n\n[1980] 2 SCR 557, referred to.\n\nSampat Prakash v. Stflte of Jammu and Kashmir, [1969]\n\n3 SCR 574, follnwed.\n\n3. The prisoner or detenu has all the fundamental rights and other legal rights available to a free person, save those which are incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarcera.tion. A prisoner or detenu is not stripped\n\nof his fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are inconsistent D with his incarceration, and if any of these rights are violated, the Court will\n\nimmet!iately spring into action and run to his rescue.\n\n[525 B-C, 526 G-H, 521 A]\n\nSunil Batra (/) v. Delhi Administration, [19791 1 SCR 392~ Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, [1980l 2 SCR 551, State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri, [19661 1 SCR 702; D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh, .£ [19751 2 SCR 24. followed.\n\nEve Pall's Case, 417 US 817: 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 495; Charles Wolff's Case, 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 935, quoted with approval.\n\n(4) While arriving at the proper meaning and content of the right to life, the attempt of the court should always be to expand the reach and ambit of :, r- -the fundan1ental right rather than to a.ttenuate its meaning and content. A · constitutional provision must be construed, not in a narrow and constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of chllnging conditions and purposes so tha.t the constitutional provision does\n\nnot get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems ap.d challenges. This principle applies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by .the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms\n\nthe ark of all other rights must therefore be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. [527 C-D, 528 A-C]\n\nWeems v. U.S. 54 Lawyers Edition 801, quoted with approval.\n\n(5) The right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. 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\u0005İ\u0002\u0018\u0005ń\n\nÂ\u0001 \b\u0004\u0003Mń HĽ\u0012zQ\u0001®H u\u0002:\u0012I\u0018\u0001 \u000fń \u0010\u0014+ń y\u000eń\u000f Jńę\u0004\u0001\u0005\u0001 \u0012Jń\u0002\u000eńˆ\u0014\u0012 ń ›˶ʉӧɷȼ•ӧɛoӧɶ›+ҵp•̀ʲ+ѢӚ ΀ӏӧ йʴɸҨБ˖ӧ ťʠ˾ ѭ̕ʾӧ ҙΙtӧ Ϛˠӧ ±̎pӧ ̾+±oАҶ̿ʳҾӧ ҿ ѣ̏ϛҩѤӧ ,µϜ΁µ́,˿ӧ Ƚ,Ӑӧ ¥œкѥ¥œβqΗqγѦӧ\n\n\u0002\u000eń *K\u0001ń ĉı\u00010\u0011^\u0001\u0017,ń \u000fK@bń \u0005\u0014\u0012 ń \u0002ø\u0012I\u0004ń ܂\u0006ń ͡ӧ ~Ͳӧ ¦2\u0003¬\u0003-ɹ\u0003ӧ \u00128b \u0002\u000fń \u0010\u0001ń \u0005\u0002ń ʂnƧ2Ƴ\u0006iń\n\nSUPR.EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981} 2 S.C.R.\n\nthen any other Jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but in a month to a detenu.\n\nWhen an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility\n\n[532C-F]\n\n(10) The right of a detcnu to consult a legal adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in a criminal proceeding but also for\n\nsecuring release from preventive detention or filing a writ petition or prosecuting any claim or proceeding, civil or crimine.I is obviously included in the right to live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of the detenu be interfered with except in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by a valid law. [531 C-E]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 3042 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)\n\nN. M. Ghatate (Dr.) and S. V. Deshpande for the Petitioner.\n\nlfardayal Hardy and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents Nos. 1-2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBnAGWATI, J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution raises a question in regard of the right of a detenu under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as COFEPOSA Act) to have interview with a lawyer and the members of his family. The facts giving rise to the petition are few and undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows:\n\nThe petitioner, who is a British national, was arrested and detained in the Central Jail, Tihar under an Order dated 23rd November 1979 issued under section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. She preferred a petition ih this Court for a writ of habeas corpus challenging her detention, but by a judgment delivered by this Court on~ 2'1fh February 1980, her petition was rejected with the result that she continued to remain under detention in the Tihar Central Jail. Whilst under detention, the petitioner experienced considerable difficulty in t. having interview with her lawyer and the members of her family.\n\nHer daughter aged about five years and her sister, who was looking .~ after the daughter, were pemiitted to have interview with her only once in a month and she was not allowed to meet her daughter more often, though a child of very tender age. It seems that some criminal proceeding was pending against the petitioner for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country and for the purpoe of her defence in such criminal proceeding, it was necessary for her to consult her lawyer, but even her lawyer found it difficult to obtain an interview with her because in order to arrange an interview, h0 wa~\n\nF. C. MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwati, J.) 521\n\nrequired to obtain prior appointment from the District Magistrate,\n\nDelhi and the interview could take place only in the presence of a Customs Officer nominated by the Collector of Customs. This pro~ cedure for obtaining interview caused considerable hardship and inconvenience and there were occasions when, even after obtaining prior appointment from the District Magistrate, Delhi, her lawyer <:ould not have an interview with her since no, Customs Ofticer nomi~\n\nnated by the Collector of Customs remained present at the appointed time; The petitioner was thus effectively denied the facility of interview with her lawyer and even her young daughter 5 years old could not meet her except once in a month. This restriction on interviews was\n\n--posed by the Prison Authorities by virtue of clause 3 (b) sub-clauses .-\n\n(i) and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention laid down by the Delhi Administration under an Order dated 23rd August 1975 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under section 5 of the COFEPOSA\n\nAt- Act. These two sub-clauses of clause 3 (b) provided inkr alia as under:\n\n\\,-:\n\n- ---\n\n\"3, The conditions of detention in respect of classifica~ tion and interviews shall be as under :-\n\n(a)\n\n(b) Intenriews : Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time, permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate, Delhi as under :-\n\n(i) Interview with legal adver :\n\nInterview with legal adviser in connection with defence of a detenu in a criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like, may be allowed by prior appointment, in the presence of an officer of Customs/Central Excise/ Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector of Customs/Central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention.\n\n(ii) Interview with family members:\n\nA monthly interview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of wife, . children or parents of the detenu ......... \"\n\nThe 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V“’WV3 ü \u000fIü ? ü \b \u0001ü\u000f\u0006\u0013 \u0003\b\u0003\u0010\u0013\u0005ü \u0006\u0011ü\b \u0001\u0003fü \u0001\b\u0001\u0013\u0004 \u0006\u0013ü \u0013ü á\u0001¹\u0002\u0007 ü \beü ` \b\u0001g-\u0003\u0001\u000e\u0005ü \u0016 \u0005\bü \u0015\u0001ü ¸ \u0002Ì*\u0019ü \u0005\u0001I\b\u0012\u0001 ‚ü \u0015\u0019ü \b a\u0005ü \u0010J \u0004ƒü\n\nđʪƏ˦˾ Ǎɫʪ ǎɍʪȈʦɎɏȜʪ ɬȫʪʼnŹńʪ ǣʪǾǐSCʪ ɭƳźʪ CLƧɯLSżɰǑȬȉʪ ŊEɮʍŻEgʪ \u0005*Y ñ®×ð\u0017\u0001ü ¨\b\u0001, H\u001b\u0006 oü \u0002\u0013 ü \u0014J,\u001b\bAl\u0001ü ²\u0001,ë\u0003\u0006 p9ü \u000e \u0001\u0013ü \u000e\u0001ü \u0002g\u0001ü \u000fe,\u0005\u001b \u0001âÃÚºü\n\nF. C. MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY (Bhpgwati, J.) 523\n\nthe question of validity of contions of detentin. TJ; t.e~~ }~ . it~F A distinction between these two. kinds of detention.\n\n1p'unitive deten~19.!'.;~. is intended to inflict punishment on a person,' . who\\ is fuhd \"bi th't\n\n• ' '\n\n. . I judicial process to have committeCI an offence, while 'preventive\n\n<ktmi6n' is .riot by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to:\n\nJSte:mpt ~: rson from indulging in conduct njur.ious to the . society. . B The power of preventive detention has been recognised as a ncessary:. evil and is tolerated in a free society in the larger in, terest of1security .\n\nof the State and maintenance of public order. It is a drastic power to detain a person without trial and there are many countries where it is not aHowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. -~ ~j tnfitittion, do.es\n\n1ec.ise _the exitence. of is power, but it is heiigchl!ifl:>by vnous safeguards set out m Articles 21 and 22. Art. 22\n\n• \"\"' ' ' '- : ,_ < ' ' • • r •• ' :. \\o • •\n\n..J }. ' .. ...,., • < 0 '\n\nn:i clauses ( 4) to (7), . deals spe<; rfically w1th saf(.:g_urd~ ~~;:qn~~ pr!!- ventive detention and .ally law of preventive. d, etntjon-.Pt -c.mm by . way of preventive detention e~ 11fidr s, uch lw. ~st \"e :in . conformity with the restritions laid down by thoe ).Clauses\n\n3on p, ain of\n\niva!idation. But apart from Art. 22, there is also Ari. 21 whiCh lays D do\\%. resttictions on the power of preventive detention. Until the decisfon ·r tbts· Court in Maneka Gandh~ v. Union of lndia(l), a very narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in Art. 21 and that article was understood to embody only that aspect of the rule of law, which requires that no one shall be deprived of. his life or personal liberty without the authority of law.\n\nIt was construed only as a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law. So long as there was some law, which prescribed a proce:dre authorising deprivtion of life or personal berty, it _ was .\n\nsdpPO~d o tneet .the equlreent of Art. 21. But in Maneka, Gandhi's\n\ncae . {supra),. this .cou~ Jor t4e _first time opened-up a _ne~ gilpnsion\n\nof Art. 2l and laid down that Art. 21 is not. only a guarantee against\n\n-.ei.eqtive action unsupported by law, butfs also a re~riiio~ on .law ' ll:iaking .. It is not enough to secure compliance wit4 the . prescription .. of Adic; le -21 that thefe should be a law prescribing some semblanee of a 'proqedore fot' depriving a t>erson of his life or personal liberty, but ·\n\ntli'e pi-ocl:ue t>rescribed by the law must be reasonable, fair and just and if it is not so, the law would be void as violating the guarantee of Art. 21. This Court expanded the scope and ambit of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Art. 21 and sowed_ the seed for future development of the law enlarging this most funa\n\nmental of Fundamental Rights. This decision in Maneka Gandhi's case became the starting point-the-spri'ng-board-for a most spectacular evolution of the law culminating in the decisions in M. 0. Hoscot v.\n\n(l) [1979] 1 sec 248\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nState of ; u aharashtra, ( 1), H ussainara Khatoon' s case (2), the first Sunil Batra's case(') and the second Sunil Batra's case.(4-) The position now is that Art. 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi's case\n\n(supra) requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procedure must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or B fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise. The law of preventive detention has therefore now to pass the test not only of Art. 22, but also of Art. 21 c and if the constitutional validity of any such law is challenged, the 1- Court would have to decide whether the procedure laid down by such law for depriving a person of his personal liberty is reasonable, fair and just. But despite these safeguards laid down by the Constitution and creatively evolved by the Courts, the power of preventive detention is a frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences D affecting personal liberty, which is the most cherished and prized possession of man in a civilised society. It is a power to be exercised with the greatest care and caution and the courts have to be ever vigilant to see that this power is not abused or misused. It must always be remembered that preventive detention is qualitatively different from puuitive detention and their purposes are different. In case of E punitive detention, the person concerned is detained by way of punishment afl';;:r he is found guilty of wrong doing as a result of trial where he has the fullest opportunity to defend himself, while in case of preventive detention, he is detained merely on suspicion with a view to preventing him from doing harm in future and the opportunity that he has for contesting the action of the Executive is very limited.\n\nF Having regard to this distinctive character of preventive detention, which aims not at punishing an individual for a wrong done by him,\n\nbut at curtailing his liberty with a view to pre-empting his injurious--~ activities in future, it has been laid down by this Court in Sampat Prakash v.\n\nState of Jammu and Kashmir(\") \"that the restrictions placed on a person preventively detained must, consistently \\\\ith the effectiveness of detention, be minimal.\"\n\nThe question which then arises is whether a person preventively detained in a prison has any rights which he can enforce in a Court\n\n(1) [1979] 1 SCR 192\n\n(2) [1980] 1 sec 81\n\n(3) [1979]1 SCR 392\n\n(4) [1980] 2 SCR 557\n\n(5) [1969] 3 SCR 574.\n\nF. C. MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (BhagwaO, J.) 525\n\nof law. Once his freedom is curtailed by incarceration in a jail, does he have any fundamental rights at all or does he leave them behind, when he enters the prison gate? The answer to this question is no longer res integra. It has been held by this Court in the two Sunil Batra cases that \"fundamental rights do not flee the person as he enters the prison although they may suffer shrinkage necessitated by incarceration .. , The prisoner or detenu has all the fundamental rights and other legal rights available to a free person, save those which are incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. Even before the two Sunil Batra cases, this position was impliedly accepted in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri(l) and it was spelt-out clearly\n\n-~ and in no uncertain terms by Chandrachud, J. as he then was, in D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh( 2 ) :\n\n\"Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess. A compulsion under the authority of law, following upon a conviction. to live in a prison-house entails to by its own force the deprivation of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the territory of India or the right to ''practise\" a profession. A man of profession would thus stand stripped of his right to hold consultations while serving out his sentence. But the Constitution guarantees other freedoms like the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property for the exercise of which incarceration can be no impediment.\n\nLikew:se, even a convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution that he shall not be deprived of his life or peson~ liberty except according to procedure established by law.\"\n\nThis statement of the law was affirmed by a Bench of five Judges of X this Court in the first Sunil Batra case (supra) and by Krishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of the Court in the second Sunil Batra case (supra). Krishna Iyer, J. in the latter case pror.:leded to add in his characteristic style; \"The jurisdictional reach and range of this Court's writ to hold prison caprice and cruelty in constitutional leash is incontestable\" and concluded by observing; \"Thus it is now clear law that a prisoner wears the armour of basic freedom even behind bars a'nd that on breach thereof by lawless officials the law will respond to his distress signals through 'writ' aid. The Indian human has a constant companion-the Court armed with the Constitution.\"\n\n(1) [1966] 1 SCR 702\n\n(2) [1975] 2 SCR 24.\n\n526 .suPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n1 ..\n\n{1981] 2 S.C.R,\n\nA It is iriterestmg to note tltat tlie Supreme Colirt of th~ United States t .a.Iib . .taken the same view ill. regard to rights of pisoners: - Mr.\n\nre~Douglas struck a humanistic note when he said in Eve Pati>i grs'{l)-: . . .\n\n\"Prisoners are still persons entitled to all constitutional B rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all the requirements of due procss.''\n\nS~.lUs~.in Charles Wolff's case,(2) Mr. Justice White made the same\n\niU:tt: in1'n11; lhf!tic t~Ilis .·. _. 1 •\n\ni .. t;~ J~1iuf,.; thou~~ his rights may be dimiriished by environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped off constitutional protections, when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.u\n\n0 Mr. l.JJStice Douglas reiterated lils thesis when he asserted:\n\n~·.Eyry prisoner's. li., erty 'i.e. of courses, circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement, but his interest in the limited liberty left to him is then only the more substantial.\n\nConviction of a crime does not render one a non-person whose rights are subject to the whim of the prison adminis- E ttation, and tRerefore, the imposition of any serious punish\n\n~~r .. , within the system requires procedural safeguards.\"\n\nn:.\n\nMr. Justice Marshall also expressed himself clearly and explicitly in the same terms : . . ' . ''I have previously statfd my view that a prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights at the prison gate, and I fully support the court's holding that the . interest of inmates in freedom from imposition of serious . discipline is a 'liberty·, enlitled to due process proteetion.\"\n\nat; i~·.tted by these larned Judg~ i~ :rerd o the riih!~ 9(.~ pmoner under the Constitution of _the United States appes equy. in regard to the rights of a prisoner or detenu under our constitJ.-\n\ntionai system. It must, therefore, now be taken to be well-settled that a prisoner or detenu is not stripped of his fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are inconsistent with his incarceration, and if any of these rights are violated, the Court which is to use the words of Krishna Iyer, J., \"not a distant abstraction omnipotent in the\n\n(1) 417 U.S. 817 : 41 L. ed. 2d 495\n\n(2) 41 L. ed. 2d 935,\n\nF •. c.- MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwatj, J.) 52 7 1 ~\n\nbooks. but an activist institution which is the cynosure of public ho~; will immediately spring into action and run to his rescue.\n\nWe must therefore proceed to consider whether any of the Fundamental Rights of the detenu are violated by sub-climses -(i) and\n\n(ii) of clause 3(b) so as to result in their invalidation wh9Uy Qr i~ I>¥t : Yi.e will fut t!ife -~!? for consideratoll: the}un~~~_pt_al j:i~\n\nf :the <letenu under Article 21 because that is a Fundamnt~ R,!ght which has, after the decision in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra), a highly activist magnitude and it embodies a constitutional value of supreme importance in a democratic society. It provides that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to\n\noceure established by law and such procedure shall be reasonable fair, .and just.- Now what is the true scope and ambit of the right to\n\n~e , Jaanteed under -ti_s :~cle ? While arriiii~ at the pro.Per meaning and content of the right to life, we must .remember t!tat it is a constitutional provision which we are expounding and moreover it is a provision enacting a Fundamental right and the attempt of the court should always be t<> expand the reaeh and ambit of the fund~..: mental right xathet than to attenuate its: meaning and cnntent. The luminous guideline in the interpretation of a constitutional provision is::. provided. by the Supreme Court of United States in Weems v. il.s._ 54 -awyers Edition 801.\n\n\"Legislation, both statutory and constitutional'is enacted, it is true, fto:tn an experience of evils, but-its general language sliollld , not, therefore, be necessarily colllined to the form that evil had, therefore taken . .Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and : purwses. J:}!e(efore, a principle,· to~ be vital, mustbe capableof wider a}.1plieation tha:n m.isch_ief. which gave it -birth. This is peculiary true of Constitutions.\n\nThey are not ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions. TMy are, to use the word~ of Chief Justice Marshall, \"designed to approach immOrality as nearly as htima'n institutions cim apPrach1t~.\n\nThe \"future is their care, nd provisions for evenrs. bf'go6d arid bad tendencies a.f which no prophecy can t; e made. In the. application of a:. constitution, therefore: 6'\\ir . contemplation cimnO't' be only of what has been, 'buf Of wnat 'may' be.' Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power.\n\nIts general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into important and lifeless formulas.\n\nRights declared in the words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognised. The meaning and vitality of the\n\n' A\n\n\nConstitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.\"\n\nThis principle of interpretation which requires that a Constitutional provision must be construed, not in a narrow and constricted sense_,\n\nbut in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that the Constitutional provision does not get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challnges, app1ies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpretated in a broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person.\n\nNow obviously, the right to life enshrined in Article 21 can not be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival.\n\nIn Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar\n\nPrade.h(l) Subba Rao J. quoted with approval the fo11owing passage from the judgment of Field J. in Munn v. lllinois(2) to emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21 :\n\n*\"By the term \"life\" as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out, of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the. body through which the soul communicates with the outer world.\"\n\nand this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of thls Court in the first Sunil Batra case {supra). Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus G protected by Article 21 and a fortiorari. this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Artide 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore, depriva- H\n\n(1) [1964] l S.C.R. 232\n\n(2) [1877) 94 u.s. 113\n\n*Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. P. 503.\n\nF. C. MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwati, J.) 529\n\ntion is not an act which is complete once and for all : it is a contnuing act and so lClng as it lasts, it must be in accordance. with procedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21.\n\nBut the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to 1ive with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include tne right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends\n\nagainst or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights. Now obviously. any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, bu~ no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. n would thus be seen that there is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right to live which is comprehended within the broad connotation of the right to life can concededly be abridged according to procedure established by law and therefore when a person is lawfully imprisoned, this right to live is bound to suffer attenuation to the extent to which it is incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. The prisoner or detenu obviously cannot move about freely by going outside the prison walls nor can he socialise at his free will with persons outside the jail. But, as part of the\n\nII'\n\n\n~ . . . .\n\n\n.A right live with human dignity nd thefore . as. a neces?a_ry: c, qD!pO;\n\nnent of the right to life, , h_e wod l:!e entit_ledto have_ine.rvi~~w!~\n\nh~ .. IJ1Cmbrs :o~ his: faly and friends aQd no pri_s~:m regulflf!ew;~ pure l; eid : dewp.. by :Prison regulation regulating the right -m ve\n\nnterviews with the members of the family and friends can be upheld\n\nB as constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 21, unless it is reasonable, fai~ an~ jt.\n\nThe sanie consequence would follow even if this problem is considered from the point of view of the right to personal Uberty enshrined in Article 21, for the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is clearly part of personal liberty guaranteed under that Article.\n\nThe expression 'personal liberty' occurring in Article 21 has been given a broad and liberal interpretation in Maneka Gandhi's case\n\n(supra) and it has been held in that case that the expression 'personal liberty used in that' Artjcle is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of a man and it also iricludes rights which \"have ben raised to the:status of dis~ tinct 'F~.uitlamental ' igbtS' and given.~- aaditionai p; rotectien . 'uflder ArtiCte ·19\"'. - There 'can . therefore be-- n5: doub't -that 'persoriaf tiblriy' wourn-incliide •the. dgh:tto . sO<:iatise 'wifli members otth'e fatrrlly' ami ftlehels Si.ib]ect,· csf C'outse,· to any valid prison regulations aiid under Articles 14 and 21, such prison regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary. If any prison regulation or procedure laid down by it regulating the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is arbitrary or unreasonable, it would be liable to be struck dowri as invalid as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. . . -\n\nNow obviously \\fhen an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility of interviews , with relatives and friends twice in a week under Rule\n\n55~A. and . a oonviciect por is ~t~ - to have. intei~~ t)l his .. rlatives ami .friends onee irr a wee~· under .Rule 550, it. is :diffi.eult to Understand how 6Ub-clause (.ii) of-CJ.ause •3 (b) ofthe C~~.tion~ \" Of\n\nDetention Order, which restricts the interview oil.ly to one in .a .month in case of a detenu, can possibly be regarded as reasonable and nonarbitrary, particularly when a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an undertrial prisoner or a convict and, as held by this Court in Sampath Prakash's case (supra) restrictions placed on a detenu must. \"consistent\n\nt!J;:th~ etJ:ectivqess _of detention,· be minimal.\" We would . tq~~fr_c\n\n-u1tt!ittingly.:ho!d sub-clause (ii) of l~1:1se 3(b} to be viaffi'~#\n\n}\\JtiGl~: 14-nd 21 if!. so-far: as i~ permitr. only_ one inte:r~, r~~:--, ~~-to. a, detenu. -W~:; are-of the.view that a-detenU-J!l.US~ ~;'~t\n\nJe4-t~~ye-atleast two iews in a week with relatiyes ·~.Jtiends andit sbould be possible-_for a relative or friend to have inteniew with\n\n. .._\n\nMULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwa01 J.) p, c. 531\n\nat any reasonable hour on obtaining permission h dctcoil f h J .l d . h l t e S pcrintendent o t c a1 an 1t s ou d not be necessary to fr rn the 0 h D' t ·\n\n\"I ) ~. he rmission of t c 1s net 1v ag1strate, Delhi, as the latter\n\n• S<\"<k ·ureould be cumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view\n\n. 1 prOC 'ty and hence unreasonable. We would go so far as to say tha\\\n\nof secun I 550 d 559 A . \"'pendently of Ru es an ,.,., we would regard the pre een tn\"\" . • k f . scnt uorm of two interviews m_ a wee or pnsoners as furnishing a cri- . , f ... b, t we would consider reasonable and non-arbitrary tenon•nu •\n\nThe same reasoning must also result in invalidation of sub-clause\n\n(i) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Order which pres- , cnbes that a detenu can have interview with a legal adviser only after\n\nobtaining prior permission of the District Magistrate, Delhi and the c interview has to take place in the presence of an offtcer of Customs/\n\n 1 Central Excise/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector uf CustomsjCentral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who bas sponsored the case for detention. The right of a detenu to conmit 11 legal adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in a criminal proceeding but also for securing release fro?I preventive detention of filing a writ petition or prosecuting any\n\naun or proceeding, civil or criminal, is obviously included in the\n\nfight lo live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of\n\n~~ deteu be interfered with except in accrd'ance with reasonable,\n\n~~and Just procedure established by a valid Jaw. A prison regula-\n\nUnb may, therefore, regulate the right of a detcnu to have interview \"11 Blegalad' · d' bt it VtSer m a manner which is reasonable, fau an JUst u\n\n- latannot prescribe an arbitrary or unreasonable procedure for regu- A:gl &uch an interview and if it does 50 it would be violative of • 1c es 14 a d 21 ' d . \\1ve . 0 • Now in the present case the kg'Jl a viscr can F ' ' tntervicw h f b I\n\ning pe • • Wit n dctcnu only by prior appointment n ter o ttn-- tly ca:SSIOO or the District Magistrate, Delhi. This would obvi?U- .\\)U}d h &reat hardship and inconvenience because the legal adviser 'r.d lht:ve to apply to the District Mugistrate, Delhi well in avance be _also the time fixed by the District M:gistrate, Delhi may 1 ittitj~UJ!able to the legal adviser who would ordinarily be a busy G riV!t to :ns and, in that event, from a practicnl point of view the the lntervie ult 8 legal adviser would be rendered illusory. Moreover, a! l: V.: rnust take place in the presence of an officer of Customs/ Cq_torn:~~/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collectr\n\n'Ponso entral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement w o 11 ::able p/d the detention and this too would seem to be an uttrea•\n\n<~Ce ti{ :ural requirement because in order to secure the yJ; i\n\nc officer at the interview, the District Magistrate, e\n\n. - ... --\n\n- ~--\n\n- .. -~---- -..... - ·-·\n\n; '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c.a,\n\nwould have to fix the time for the interview in consultation wth\n\n\"E . . b D I Collector of Customs/Central elSe or t e epuy Director of Enforcement and it ay come dcult to sncbro'nise tbe time which suits the legal adviser With the. time convement to the concemed ofli. • cer and furthermore if the nommated officer does not, for any reaso attend at the appointed time, as seems to have happened on quite\n\n0 ' few occasions in. the case of the petitioner, the interview cannot held at all and the legal adviser would have to go back without mt- ing the detenu and the entire procedure for applying for an appointment to the District Magistrate, Delhi would have to be gone through once again. We may point out that no s-atisfactory explanation has been , given on behalf of the respondents disclosing the rationale of this re- '1 . ' qwrement. .., We are therefore of view that sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) regulating the right of a detenu to have interview with a legal adviser of his choice is violative of Arts. 14 and 21 and must be held to be unconstitutional and void. We think that it would be quite reasonable if a detenu were to be entitled to have interview with his kgal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail, which appointment should be given by th~ Superintendent without any avoidable delay. We may odd that ~~ intcrvie\\Y heed not necessarily take place in the presence of a notiU nated officer of CustomsjCentral Excise/Enforcement but if the presence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of th: interview without involving any postponement of the interview, then liuch officer and if his presence cannot be so secured, tbcn any other Jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but .not 50\n\nas to be within hearing distance of the detenu and the Jagal adVISe!• .\n\nWe accordingly allow the writ petition and grant relief to the e~~~:nt -1. indicated above. .\n\nv.o.K.\n\n11.-·(J.\n\nPetition II V\"\n\nMGIPP-$7SCJ/81-8-7-19Sl-2SOO", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "FRANCIS CORALIE MULLIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FRANCIS CORALIE MULLIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI\n\n& ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activitiea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(b)({)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313, "end_char": 328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activitiea Act", "statute": "Prevention of Smuggling Activitiea Act"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 604, "end_char": 614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activitiea Act", "statute": "Prevention of Smuggling Activitiea Act"}}, {"text": "Articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1623, "end_char": 1641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1643, "end_char": 1653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2048, "end_char": 2058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mantka Gandhi'3", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "523 B-DJ\n\nArticle 21 as interpreted in Mantka Gandhi'3 callt requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procWure must be rea!lonablo, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its corutitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given ca.se is by procedure, which is reasonable, falr and just or it is otherwise.", "canonical_name": "Mantka Gandhi'3"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2616, "end_char": 2626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2639, "end_char": 2649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1979] 1 SCR 192", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1979] 1 SCR 392", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3845, "end_char": 3861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SCR 557", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3906, "end_char": 3922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969]\n\n3 SCR 574", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3985, "end_char": 4002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Charles Wolff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4787, "end_char": 4800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eve Pall's Case, 417 US 817: 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 495; Charles Wolff's Case, 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 935, quoted with approval."}}, {"text": "S. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6003, "end_char": 6013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15263, "end_char": 15273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15499, "end_char": 15509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15628, "end_char": 15666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16021, "end_char": 16030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "statute": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17921, "end_char": 17929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18119, "end_char": 18128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18180, "end_char": 18188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19193, "end_char": 19203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23440, "end_char": 23458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23460, "end_char": 23467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23863, "end_char": 23870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24114, "end_char": 24121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24548, "end_char": 24555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maneka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24564, "end_char": 24570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in Maneka, Gandhi's\n\ncae . {"}}, {"text": "Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24572, "end_char": 24578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in Maneka, Gandhi's\n\ncae . {"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24660, "end_char": 24666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24687, "end_char": 24694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25176, "end_char": 25183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25280, "end_char": 25287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25415, "end_char": 25428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision in Maneka Gandhi's case became the starting point-the-spri'ng-board-for a most spectacular evolution of the law culminating in the decisions in M. 0.", "canonical_name": "Mantka Gandhi'3"}}, {"text": "sec 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25586, "end_char": 25593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H ussainara Khatoon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25666, "end_char": 25685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hoscot v.\n\n(l) [1979] 1 sec 248\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nState of ; u aharashtra, ( 1), H ussainara Khatoon' s case (2), the first Sunil Batra's case(') and the second Sunil Batra's case.(4-) The position now is that Art."}}, {"text": "Sunil Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25709, "end_char": 25720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hoscot v.\n\n(l) [1979] 1 sec 248\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nState of ; u aharashtra, ( 1), H ussainara Khatoon' s case (2), the first Sunil Batra's case(') and the second Sunil Batra's case.(4-) The position now is that Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25795, "end_char": 25802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26373, "end_char": 26380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26394, "end_char": 26401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1979] 1 SCR 192", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28245, "end_char": 28261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28276, "end_char": 28282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SCR 557", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28309, "end_char": 28325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 574", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28331, "end_char": 28347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29192, "end_char": 29203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even before the two Sunil Batra cases, this position was impliedly accepted in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri(l) and it was spelt-out clearly\n~ and in no uncertain terms by Chandrachud, J. as he then was, in D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh( 2 ) :\n\n\"Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29619, "end_char": 29624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to live in a prison-house entails to by its own force the deprivation of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the territory of India or the right to ''practise\" a profession."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30019, "end_char": 30026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30285, "end_char": 30297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This statement of the law was affirmed by a Bench of five Judges of X this Court in the first Sunil Batra case (supra) and by Krishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of the Court in the second Sunil Batra case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "[1966] 1 SCR 702", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30914, "end_char": 30930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 24", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30936, "end_char": 30951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Douglas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31157, "end_char": 31164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "regard to rights of pisoners: - Mr.\n\nre~Douglas struck a humanistic note when he said in Eve Pati>i grs'{l)-: . . ."}}, {"text": "White", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31474, "end_char": 31479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S~.lUs~.in Charles Wolff's case,(2) Mr. Justice White made the same\n\niU:tt: in1'n11; lhf!tic t~Ilis .·. _."}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32310, "end_char": 32318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Marshall also expressed himself clearly and explicitly in the same terms : . . ' . ''"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33171, "end_char": 33183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must, therefore, now be taken to be well-settled that a prisoner or detenu is not stripped of his fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are inconsistent with his incarceration, and if any of these rights are violated, the Court which is to use the words of Krishna Iyer, J., \"not a distant abstraction omnipotent in the\n\n(1) 417 U.S. 817 : 41 L. ed.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "S. 817", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33245, "end_char": 33251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwatj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33331, "end_char": 33339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2d 935,\n\nF •. c.- MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwatj, J.) 52 7 1 ~\n\nbooks.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwatj"}}, {"text": "clause 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33623, "end_char": 33634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33779, "end_char": 33789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34736, "end_char": 34766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Supreme Court of United States in Weems v. il.s."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37043, "end_char": 37053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Field", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37284, "end_char": 37289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar\n\nPrade.h(l) Subba Rao J. quoted with approval the fo11owing passage from the judgment of Field J. in Munn v. lllinois(2) to emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21 :\n\"By the term \"life\" as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37360, "end_char": 37370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37871, "end_char": 37889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of thls Court in the first Sunil Batra case {supra)."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38018, "end_char": 38028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38320, "end_char": 38330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38454, "end_char": 38460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38532, "end_char": 38540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. C. MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwati, J.) 529\n\ntion is not an act which is complete once and for all : it is a contnuing act and so lClng as it lasts, it must be in accordance.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwatj"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38914, "end_char": 38924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40261, "end_char": 40271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40580, "end_char": 40598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40647, "end_char": 40657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40762, "end_char": 40771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40835, "end_char": 40844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41840, "end_char": 41858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42037, "end_char": 42047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42236, "end_char": 42246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42928, "end_char": 42946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43244, "end_char": 43262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sampath Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43903, "end_char": 43918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is :diffi.eult to Understand how 6Ub-clause (.ii) of-CJ.ause •3 (b) ofthe C~~.tion~ \" Of\n\nDetention Order, which restricts the interview oil.ly to one in .a .month in case of a detenu, can possibly be regarded as reasonable and nonarbitrary, particularly when a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an undertrial prisoner or a convict and, as held by this Court in Sampath Prakash's case (supra) restrictions placed on a detenu must. \""}}, {"text": "MULLIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44415, "end_char": 44421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwa01 J.) p, c. 531\n\nat any reasonable hour on obtaining permission h dctcoil f h J .l d ."}}, {"text": "UNION TERRITORY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44425, "end_char": 44440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwa01 J.) p, c. 531\n\nat any reasonable hour on obtaining permission h dctcoil f h J .l d ."}}, {"text": "clause 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45150, "end_char": 45161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48208, "end_char": 48234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the case of the petitioner, the interview cannot held at all and the legal adviser would have to go back without mt- ing the detenu and the entire procedure for applying for an appointment to the District Magistrate, Delhi would have to be gone through once again."}}, {"text": "clause 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48480, "end_char": 48491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48594, "end_char": 48609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49569, "end_char": 49571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.\n\n11.-·(J.\n\nPetition II V\"\n\nMGIPP-$7SCJ/81-8-7-19Sl-2SOO"}}, {"text": "8-7-19Sl-2SOO", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49614, "end_char": 49627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.\n\n11.-·(J.\n\nPetition II V\"\n\nMGIPP-$7SCJ/81-8-7-19Sl-2SOO"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_533_599_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "• ·:I\n\n'T•J,~.\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nJanuary 13, 1981\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, D. A. DESAI AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nIndustries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, (65 of 1951) Ss.\n\nIBA (I)(b), IBAA(I)(a)-Taking over a/ an industrial undertaking-Opportunity of being heard-Whether and when to be given-Denial of opporttuzity-Whethcr vitiates order--Opinion of take-over by Government-Whether liable to judicial scrutiny.\n\nArl111inistrati\\'C Law-Do(trine of iYatural Justice-JVJ:at i~-Whe11 applicnble-PrP-decisional and post-d'ecistianal hearing-When 1uises.\n\nThe Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Unio!l of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act.\n\nItem 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories .\n\nSection 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a tull and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is. of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely\n\nto be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard E to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likeJy to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article ... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article ..... for which there is no justification; or\n\n(iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned F or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appro~ priate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15.\n\nChapter III-A consisting of Sections IBA, IB-AA, 18-B, IB-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18~F deal with \"direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases\".\n\nSec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that :\n\n(a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under\n\nsection 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest.\n\nSection 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial under· taking taken over under Section 18-A.\n\nSection 18-F empowers the Central B Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appear& that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the orde( should remain in force.\n\nThe appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken ove.r by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section !SAA of the C Indu; tries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial under .. takings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action i~ ne; sary to prevent such a situation,\n\nThe Government authorised the Natiollal Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shalt comply \\Vitb all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years.\n\nThe appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the 1-Iigh Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 1 SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section i~ vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured.\n\nIf' The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows :-\n\n(a) Section lSAA(l)(a) (b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the pa<ty who would be affected by order thereunder.\n\n(b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post-decisional hearing to lhe owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA. cancelled on any relevant ground.\n\n(c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any suCh vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise.\n\nThe minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, a prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the\n\n\\ -\n\nJ. I\n\n),~1-]il\"j\n\nt;.··.···\n\n~-,\n\nf'f' ll\n\n)t I\n\n-'ii'-\n\n' /\n\n-,,,\n\n\"· . '\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS V. UNION 535\n\ngrant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderat~ the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary U:Dtil the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropnate directions.\n\nAfter the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a\n\nFull Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The B challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seekin.l. to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of tbe subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allo\\Ved and the respon~\n\ndents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings.\n\nAppeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. ·\n\nTwo propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that : (a) \\Vhctber it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(l) (a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rtJles of natural justice relating to prior bearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi ulterarn purtern rule altogether.\n\n(2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a-) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15.: The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(l) (a) only dispenses with jnvestigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram pmte1n altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A _and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971.\n\n(3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(l). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub--section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing.\n\n(5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, cf section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing. of the order of take-over rind under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits tbe\n\norder v...as void ab initio. i_, (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be lailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimu1n so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action.\n\n(7) Where the civil ronsequenct'lll of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is uot a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the\n\nSUPJ!EME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\npre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency.\n\n(8) The Central Government aJppointed four Govemment Officials including one from the office of th~ Textile commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recon1mendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court.\n\nIf there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them.\n\nIf there was immediacy situational modifications could be n1ade to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their ex.planation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice.\n\nSuch an opportunity of hearing could ha-ve been given after the passing of a conditional\n\ntantativi.: order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could b~ taken under section 16.\n\nOn behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that ( 1) the presumption in favour of audi alterani partenz rule '>tands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and t_he purpose of the provision in section 18AA.\n\n(2) Section 18AA on its plain tenn.i;; deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problen1s which may be caused by fa1l in production.\n\nThe purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but te> potcct the scheduled industry.\n\nThe issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking.\n\nThe object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers.\n\n(3) The rule of natural justkc to give. a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded.\n\n(4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conforn1ance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required 0f it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage.\n\n(5) l.Jnder section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on theaggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition.\n\nAllo\\ving the appeal by the Company,\n\nHELD : (Sarkaria & Desai, JI. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.)\n\nIn the facts and compliance with the circumstances of the instant case, there has been a nonimplied requirement of the audi alteram parten1 rule of\n\n1' f,! (':\n\n!1¥!\n\n.. I\n\nI~-\n\n'\"\\\n\nlt ••\n\n....\n\n'j(\n\ni' H • •\n\ni ..\n\nf-,\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS V. UNION 537\n\nnatural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck A down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment/ concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing.\n\n[587GH, 588Cj\n\n1. 1he phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition.\n\nIt cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula.\n\nRules of natural justice are not embodied rules.\n\nHence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules.\n\nTwo fundamental maxims of natural justice have, now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the conlillon consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently nece:; sary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly.\n\nThese twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua.\n\nAudi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is i..:alcu!atcd to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach l'hould not be nanowc<l and its applicability circumscribed.\n\n[554C'-G}\n\n2. The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made.\n\nIf a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the manJ.ate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in D the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for \\\\hich it is conferred and the effect of that power.\n\n[556A-BJ\n\n3. The maxim audi alterani parte1n has many facets.\n\nTwo of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms.\n\nDifficulties, however, arise when lhe statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain facters such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would\n\nobtitruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi altcra111 parte1n rule may be disregarded in an emergent situatiOn where imn1ediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazarJ to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the' magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action undet section J 7 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance.\n\nSimilar!)' action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing.\n\n[556C-H]\n\n4. Cases where ov.-ing t'o the compulsion of the f11ct situation. or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre-decisional hearing is given but the action, is fo11owed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the a11di alteram parteni rule.\n\nTo call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the co111peting claims of hurry <lnd hearing:.\n\nI560H-561A l\n\n5. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform :1pplication seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude lhis rule\n\nf\\ of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional bearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [56!G]\n\n6. If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no B full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as eXcluding the duty Of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative pruces8 or fru8trate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H)\n\n7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(l)(b) and Section 18AA(l) (c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(l) (b) L<i.D be taken only after an investigation bad been made under Section 15; while under Section ! SAA (1 )(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA 1ead in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section\n\n18A ( 1 )(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence Of the objective fac~ namely : that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section !SA(!) (a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be !&ken under section lS(A)(lJ(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a &ine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(l). The phrase \"highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest\" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cc\\'er a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the m_a.nner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it,\n\naction under section 18AA(l)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the nvin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession.\n\n[5690-HJ\n\n7(ii). An analysis of section 18AA(l)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied \"from documentary or other evidence in its possession'\" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances : (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the indnstrial undertaking. and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.\n\n[570B-D]\n\n8. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administartive authority and makes the exercise of that ro\\ver conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard\n\n:I,\n\n, ...\n\n...\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS V. UNION 539\n\nto the existence of an immediacy. its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion. as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existerice of such \"circumstances\", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie.\n\n[571 £.G]\n\n9. From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage.\n\n[574B]\n\nIn the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There\n\nwas no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government C from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisiona-1 or pre-takeover stage. [583A]\n\nKeshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 11973]\n\n3 S.C.R. 22; Kam/a Prasad Khetan v. Unian of India, [1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union\n\nof India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] I S.C.R. 457; D Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Conzn1ission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pam Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapaor v. lagmohan & Ors., [19$1] I\n\nS.C.R. 746, referred to.\n\n(Per Cbinnappa Reddy, I. dissenting)\n\nThe principles of natural justice are not attra-cted to the situations contemplated by section !SAA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act.\n\nI. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public\n\nlaw and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the F citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-BJ '\n\n2. Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interei)t and respond to the demands of an evolving society.\n\n[590C]\n\n3(i). The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial H conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administra~\n\ntive.\n\nWhere authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily dis placed. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved arc mere property rights.\n\nIn cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest ii involved, pre-emptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of pre-emptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 59lF-G)\n\n3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation.\n\n[592B]\n\n4. The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1) (b) Joes not make any difference.\n\nSection 18AA(l) (a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section\n\n18AA contemplates a situation where the disastet has occurred and action is necessary\n\n10 restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopp:d in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected.\n\nJmrnediate action ts, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section J8AA(l)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section ISAA(l)(a).\n\n[596 F-G)\n\n5. The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra-distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 1 SAA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which con1e to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 n1ay fornt\n\nthe hasi~ of action under section 18AA( 1) (a). ~'here in the course of an invcs~ ligation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles 1nanufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate -action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government n1ay not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1) (a) without waiting for cornpletion of investigation under section 15.\n\n[597 A-B1\n\n6. Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insh.t upon a pre-decisional observance of natural justice.\n\n[598AJ\n\n7. The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Govemment to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action n1ay prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. 1\"he necessity for in1mediate\n\noWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 541\n\naction by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely A indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA .\n\n[598C-D]\n\n8. Neither section 18F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice.\n\nB The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied. by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express !tlovision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post-decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre-decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms C of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C]\n\nRidge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.Ed. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.Ed.\n\n2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co .. 40 L.Ed. 2d 406, referred t0.\n\nOVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1629, 1857\n\n.._ & 2087 of 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 1\"5-1979 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 408 of 1978.\n\nF. S. Nariman, S. D. Parekh, A. D. Mehta, Lalit Bhasin, Vinay Bhasin and Vineet Kumar for the Appellants in C.A. No. 1629 and for R. 1 in C.A. No. 2087 /79.\n\nV. N. Tarkunde, S. Ganesh, K. Vasdev and T.V.S.N. Chari for the Appellants in CA 1857 /79.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, Solicitor General and Girish Chandra for Appell( !ants in CA 2087 and for Respondent (UOI) in CA 1629 /79.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, Solicitor General, S. Ganesh Vasdev and T. V. S. N.\n\nChari for Respondent No. 2 in CA 1629.\n\nT. V. S. N. Chari for Respondent No. 4 in CA 2087 Suresh Parik G and S. Swarup for Respondent No. 3 in CA 2087.\n\nF. S. Nariman, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for Respondent-Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. in CA No. 1857 and 2087 /79.\n\nC. M. Chopra for Intervenor.\n\nThe Judgment of R. S. Sarkaria and D. A. Desai, JJ. was delivered H bySarkaria, J. 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. gave a dissenting Opinion. 2-152 SCl/81\n\nSARKARIA. J. These appeals arise out of a judgment, dated May 1,\n\n1979. of the High Court of Delhi, in the following circumstances :\n\nAppellant No. l in Civil Appeal 1629 of 1979 is Swadeshi Cotton Miib Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company). Jt was in- B corporated as a private company with an authorised capital of Rs. 30 1akl1> in 1921 by the Horseman family by converting their partnership\n\nbusiness into a Private Joint Stock Company. Its capital was raised in 1923 to Rs. 32 lakhs and thereafter in 1945 to Rs. 52.50 lakhs by issue of bonus shares. In 1946, the Jaipuria family acquired substantiol holding in the Company. Jaipuria family is the present manage- C mcnt. By issue of further bonus shares in 1946, the capital of the Company was increased to Rs. 122.50 lakhs. In 1948, the paid-up capital of the Company was raised to Rs. 210 lakhs by the issue of forther bonus shares.\n\nThe subscribed and issued capital consisting mainly of the bonus shares has since remained constant at Rs. 210 lakhs.\n\nD In the year 1946, the Company had only one undertaking, a Textile Unit at Kanpur, known as \"The Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur\".\n\nBetween 1956 and 1973, the Company set up and/or acquired five further Textile Units Jn Pondicherry, Naini, Udaipur, Maunath Bhanjan and Rae Bareilly. Each of these six Units or undertakings of the Company was separately registered in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the IDR Act).\n\nIn addition to these six industrial undertakings, the Company (it is claimed) had other distinct businesses and assets.\n\nIt holds inter alia 97 per cent shares in the subsidiary, Swadeshi Mining and Manu- F facturing Company Ltd., which owns two sugar Mills.\n\nThe Company claims, it has substantial income from other businesses and activities including investments in its subsidiary and in other shares and securities which include substantial holding of 10,00,000 Equity Shares of Rs. 10/\" each in Swadeshi Polytex Ltd., representing 30 per cent\n\nG of the total equity capital value of Swadeshi Polytex Ltd., the intrinsic va1ue whereof exceeds Rs. 5 crores.\n\nThe Company made considerable progress during the years 1957 to 1973.\n\nThe reserves and surplus of the Company increased from Rs. 2.3 crores in 1957 to Rs. 4.3 crores in 1973-74, but declined to Rs. 2.8 crores in 1976-77.\n\nThe fixed assets of the Company in- H creased from 5.8 crores in 1957 to 19 crores in 1973-74, but declined to Rs. 18 crores, registering a marginal decrease of Rs. 1 crore in 1976-77.\n\n'f'\n\nI ..\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, l.) 543\n\nThe Company maintained separate books of acconnts for each of its six industrial undertakings.\n\nFrom and after April 1973, the Compauy maintained separate sets of books of accounts of the businesses and assets other than of the said six industrial undertakings. Annual accounts of the six industrial undertakings were first prepared separately in seven sets which were separately audited.\n\nThe consolidated annual a_ccounts of the Company were then prepared from such aunual accounts at the registered office of the Company at Kanpur, and after audit, were placed before the shareholders of the Company.\n\nThe Company made over-all profits up to the year 19_69 and even thereafter up to 1975.\n\nThe Balance Sheet showed that the Company suffered a loss of Rs_ 86.23 lakhs after providing depreciation of Rs. 93.93 lakhs and gratuity of Rs. 48.79 lakhs, though the trading results showed a gross profit of Rs_ 56.49 lakhs.\n\nDuring the year ending March 31, 1976, the Company again suffered a loss of Rs. 294.82 lakhs after providing for depreciation.\n\nThe last Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account adopted by the shareholders and\n\npublished by the Company relates to the year ending March 31, 1977.\n\nIt shows that the Company suffered a loss of Rs. 200.34 Lakhs after taking into account depreciation of Rs. 73.27 lakhs which was not provided in accounts.\n\nBetween 1975 and 1978, the Company created the undernoted encumbrances on the fixed assets :\n\nUnit As on As on As on As on Remar:\"s 31-3-75 31-3-76 31-3-77 31-3-78 (in lakhs) (in lakhs)\n\nI 2 3 4 5 6\n\n(i) Pondicherry 2·40 Nil Nil Nil On fixed assets of Pondicherry Unit\n\n(ii) Maunath Bhanjan 11 40 5·71 Nil Nil On fixed assets of Maunath Bhan jan Unit.\n\n(Iii) Udaipur 2·76 Nil Nil Nil On fixed assets of Udaipur Unit.\n\n(iv) Kanpur (ICICI) 13·44 9·75 5·95 2·00 On fixed asset of Kanpur Unit\n\n(v) Kanpur Nil 150·00• 150·00 150 00 On fixed assets of Kanpur, Maunath Bhanjan & Pondicherry Units for wages and Bank dues *New encumbrance\n\n(vi) Company\n\n(vil) Udaipur\n\n(viii) Naini\n\n(ix) Kanpur, Rae Bareilly & Naini\n\n2 3 4 5 6\n\n67 53 68 45 59 44 59 44 On diesel generating sets of Kanpur, Naini, Pondicherry, Mannath Bhanjan and Rae- Bareilly Units.\n\nNil 25 00• 25 00 25 00 On fixed assets of Udaipur Unit for gratuity fund.\n\nNil Nil 70 oo•• 70 00 On fixed assets of Naini for gratuity.\n\n106 20 75 31 50 67 15 97 On new machinery of Kanpur, Rae Bareilly & Naini Units under-deferred payment credit.\n\n203·73 334·22 361 06 322·41\n\n'.I'he borrowings of the Kanpur, Pondicherry, Naini, Udaipur, Mannath Bhanjan and Rae Bareilly Units of the Company as Oil March 31, 1978 against current assets were Rs. 256.78, 183.92, 271.05, 70.72, 47.98 and 55.82 lakhs respectively.\n\nAll the encnmbrances on fixed assets (except the encumbrances of Rs. 70 lakhs on the fixed assets of Naini Unit for gratuity funding to get the benefit of Section 44A of the Income-tax Act) were created prior to March\n\n31. 1976.\n\nF In the accounting year 1976-77, only one new encumbrance was\n\ncreated by the Company on its fixed assets. The following are statistics of production in each of the six units of the Company during the years 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1977-78 : ':'\n\nName of the Unit\n\nNaini Udaipur Mannatb Bhanjan Rae Bareilly Pondicberry Kanpur\n\n•New encumbrance.\n\n1975-76 1976-77 (figures in lakhs) 1977-78\n\n66 13 kgs. 18 51 kg!,\n\n15 59 kg!. 12·09 kgs. 170 52 Mtrs. 318 75 Mtrs.\n\n65 76 kgs,\n\n18 50 kgs. 16 63 kgs. 13 58 kgs.\n\n72 35 kgs. 18 60 kgs. 18 49 kgs. 14 00 kgs. 178 77 Mtrs. 176 54 Mtrs. 472 12 Mtrs. 238 22 Mtrs.\n\n••No new encumbrance ..\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, 1.) 545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry,\n\n(iii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini, C\n\n(iv) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Maunath Bhanjan,\n\n(v) M/s. Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E . situation;\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of power conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section !SAA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 19 51 ( 65 of 1951), the Central Government hereby authorises the National Textile Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Authorised person) to take over the management of the whole of the said industrial undertakings, subject to the following terms and conditions, namely :-\n\n(i) The authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government;\n\n(ii) the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years from the date of publication of this order in the Official Gazette;\n\n(iii) the Central Government may terminate the appoint- H ment of the authorised person earlier if it CO!JSiders necessary to do so.\n\nThis order shall have effect for a period of five years commencing from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.\n\nSd/- R. Ramakrishna Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India\n\n(Seal).\"\n\n_ On April 19, 1978, three petitioners, namely, the Company through its Joint Secretary, Shri Bhim Singh Gupta, its Managing Director, Dr.\n\nRajaram Jaipuria, and its subsidiary company, named; Swadeshi Mining and Manufacturing Company, through its Directors and Shareholdern filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Delhi High Cami against the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation to challenge the validity of the aforesaid Government Order dated April 13, 1978.\n\nThe writ petitiO!l was .further supplemented by subsequent affidavits and rejoinders.\n\nThe Union of India and the National Textile Corporation Ltd., who has been authorised to assume management of the undertakings concerned were impleaded, as respondents.\n\nThe writ petition first came up for bearing before a Divison Bench who by its order dated August 11, 1978, requested the Chief Justice to refer it to a larger Bench. The case vras then heard by a three Judge Bench who by their order dated October 12, 1978, requested the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute a still larger Bench to consider the question whether a prior hearing is necessary to be' given to the persons affected before the order under Section 18AA is passed.\n\nUltimately, the reference came up for consideration before a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question, which was reframed by the Bench as under :\n\n\"Whether in construing Section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. 1951, as a pure question of law compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied. If so,\n\n(a) whether such hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed under the said Section prior to the passing of the order; or\n\n(b) whether such hearing is to be given after the passing of the order; and\n\n(c) if prior hearing is to be normally given and the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such '\n\n...\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 547\n\nhearing. whe:hcr such vice can be cured by the grant u: a subsequent hearing.\"\n\nThe Bench. by a majority (consisting or Deshpande, CJ., R. Sacher and M. L. Jain, JJ.) answered this three fold ques1io11 .,., follows ·\n\n\"(I) Section 18AA(J)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing Lo the party who would be aHectcd by order thereunder.\n\n(2) Section 18F expressly provides for a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under Section 1 SAA to have the order made under Section l 8AA cancelled on any relevant ground. ( 3) As the taking over of management under Scetton J 8AA is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing, the question of any such vice being: cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise.\"\n\nH. L. Anand and N. N. Goswamy, JJ, however dissented.\n\nIn the opinion of the minority, in compliance with the principles of natural justice, a prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before passing an order under Section\n\nI SAA. that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subscnc public interest, and to make appropriate directions to ensure that the subsequent hearing would be a full and complete review of the circumstances of the take-over and for the preservatLon &nd maintenance of the property during the interregnum.\n\nAfter the decision of the reference. the case was reheard on merits by a Bench of three learned Judges (consisting of Deshpande, C.J., Anand and M. L. Jain, JJ.) who by their judgment dated May l, 1979, disposed of the writ-petition.\n\nThe operative part of the judgment reads as under :\n\n\"In the result, the writ-petition succeeds in part, the G challenge to the validity of the impugned order fails and to that extent the petition is dismissed.\n\nThe petition succeeds in so far as it seeks to protect from the impugned order the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the holding of the company in Polytex and the assets and property of the company which arc not H referable to any of the industrial undertakings. The respondents are hereby restrained from in any manner interfering\n\nwith the corporate entity, the assets and property which are outside the impugned order. The respondents would release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company, which arc not refer able to the industrial undertakings in terms of the observations made in paras 46 and 4 7 of the judgment, within a period of three months from today (May 1, 19791.\n\nIn the peculiar circumstances the parties would bear their respective costs.\"\n\nOn the application of the Company, the Delhi High Court certified under Article l 33 of the Constitution that the case was lit for appeal to this Court.\n\nSubsequently, on July 12, 1979, a similar certificate was granted by the High Court to the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation Ltd.\n\nConsequently, the Company, the TJnion of India and the National Textile Corporation have filed Civil Appeals 1629, 2087 and 1857 of 1979, respectively, in this Court.\n\nAll the three appeals will be disposed of by this judgment.\n\nThe primary, two-fold proposition posed and propounded by Shri F. S. Nariman, learned coumel for the appellant-Company in Civil Appeal 1629 of 1979, is as follows :\n\n(a) \\Vhether it is necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before iS>uing a notified order under Section !SAA, or enforcing a decision ur:der Section 18AA, or\n\n(b) \\\\bother the provisions of Section 18AA and/or Section lSF impliedly exclude rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing.\n\nThere were other contentions also which were canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length.\n\nBut for reasons mentioned in the final part of this judgn1ent, we do not think it necessary, for the disposal of these appeals to deal with the same.\n\nThus. the first point for consideration is whether, as a matter of law, it is necessary, in accordance with the rules of natural justice, to give a hearing to the owner of an undertaking before issuing a notified order, or enforcing a decision of its take-over under Section 18AA.\n\nShri Nariman contends that there is nothing in the language, scheme or object of the provisions in Section 1 SAA and/or Section\n\n!SF which expressly or by inevitable implication, excludes the application of the principles of natural justice or the giving a pre-decisional hearing, adapted to the situation, to the owner of the undertaking. It is submitted that mere use of the word \"immediate\" in sub-clause (a) of Section J SAA ( 1 ) does not show a legislative intent to exclude the\n\nSWADESHI COTTON Mii.LS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 549\n\napplication of audi a/term partem rule, altogether.\n\nIt is maintained that according to the decision of this Court in Keshav Mills Company Ltd. v. Union of India('), even after a full investigation has been made under Section of the LD.R. Act, the Government has tc observe the rules of natural justice and fairplay, which in the facts of a particular case, may include the giving of an opportunity to the affected owner to explain the adverse findings against him in the investigation report In support of his contention, that the use of the word \"immediate\" in Section 18AA(l)(a) does not exclude natural justice, learned counsel has advanced these reasons :\n\n(i) The word \"immediate\" in clause (a) has been used in contradistinction to 'investigation'.\n\nIt rn1ly means that under Section I SAA action can be taken without prior investigation under Section 15, if there is evidence in the possession of the Government, that the assets of the Company owning the undertaking arc being frittered away by doing any of the three things mentioned in clause (al; or, the undertaking has remained closed for a period of not less than three months and the condition of plant and machinery is such that it is possible to restart the undertaking.\n\nThis construction. that the use of the word \"immediate\" in Section 18AA(1) (a) only dispenses with investigatio111 under Section 15 and not with the principle of audi alterm partem altogether, is indicated hy the marginal heading of Section: 18AA and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted Se<:tion 18AA, in 1 971.\n\n(ii) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of Section 18AA(l). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of\n\nthe sub-section, when its other clause does not exclude it.\n\n(iii) Section 18F does not exclude a predecisional hearing. This section was there, when in Keshav Mills' case, (ibid), it was held by this Court, that even at the post-investigation stage, before passing an order under Section 18A, the Government must proceed fairly in accordance with the rules of natural justice. The so-called postdecisional hearing contemplated by Section 18F cannot be-and is not intended to be-a s\\Jbstitute for a pre-decisional hearing.\n\nSection 18F, in tenns, deals with the power of Central Government to cancel an order of take-over under two conditions, namely : First when \"the pUijpose of an order under Section 18A has been fulfilled, or, second when \"for any other reason it is not necessary that the order should reinain in force\". \"Any other reason\" has reference to post-\"take-\n\n(!) [1973) 3 S.C.R. 22\n\nover\" circumstances only, and doos not cover a reason relatable to pre-takeover circumstances.\n\nAn order of cancellation under Section 18F is intended to be prospective. This is clear from the plain meaning of the expressions \"remain in force\", \"necessary\" etc. used in the Section.\n\nSection 18 incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, (Kam/a Prasad Kheta11 v. Union of India('), referred to.) Therefore, the illusory right given by Section 18F to the aggrieved owner of the undertaking, to make an application for cancellation of the order, is not a full right of appeal on merits.\n\nThe language of the Section impliedly prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of \"take-over\", and under it, the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits, the order was void ab initio.\n\nAs held by a Bench (consisting of Bhagwa.ti and Vakil JJ.) of the Gujarat High Court, in Dosabhai Ratans/wh Keravale v. State of Gujarat('), a power to rescind or cancel an order, analogous to that under Section 21, General Clauses Act, has to be construed as a power of prospective cancellation, and not of retroactive obliteration.\n\nIt is only the existence of a full right of appeal on the merits or the existence of a provision which unequivocally confers a power to reconsider, cancel and obliterate completely the original order, just as in appeal, which may be construed to exclude natural justice or a pre decisional hearing in an emergent situation. (Reference on this point has been made to Wade's Administrative Law, 4th Edition, pp. 464 to 468.)\n\n(iv) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly, because, even an emergent, situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair-hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the rca<onable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose ,, f the contemplated action.\n\n(v) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action-- as in the instant case-are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is noth; ng in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisioml hearing, and the post-decisional hearin~ provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full' ---- -·---- - - (ll [19571S.CR.1052 (2)\n\n(1970) IT Gujrat Law Reporter 361\n\nSWADESlll COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 551\n\nright of appeal, the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (Reference in this connection has been made to Wade's Administrative Law, ibid, page 468 bottom.)\n\nApplying the proposition propounded by him to the facts of the instant case, Shri Nariman submits that there was ample time at the dispos11l of the Government to give a, reasonably short ncticc to the Company to present its case.\n\nIn this connection, it is pointed out that according to pam 3 of the further affidavit filed by Shri Daulat Ram on behalf of the Union of India and other respondents. the Central Government had in its possession two documents, namely :\n\n(a) cpy of the Survey Report on M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., covering the period from May to September. 1977 prepared by the office of the Textile Commissioner, and (b) Annual Report (dated September 30, 1977) of the Company for the vear ending March 31, 1971. In addition, the third circumstance mentioned in the a.ffidavit of Shri Daulat Ram is, that by an order dated January 28, 1978, the Central Government appointed four Government Officials, including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner, to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation.\n\nThis Official Group submitted its rCiJlOrt on February 16, 1978. It is submitted that this evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed, was not disclosed to the appellant Company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court to challenge the impugned order. It is emphasised that if the Survey Report was assumed to contain something adverse to the appellants, there was time enough-about six weeks between the submission of the Survey RCiJlort and the oassing: of the impugned order for giving a short, re11sonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them.\n\nIt is urged that even if there was immediacy, situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice.\n\nSuch an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under Section 18AA. For\n\nthe interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of H the Company or restraining the Ccmpany from creating further encumbrances, etc. could be taken nnder Section 16.\n\nReference in this connection has been made to Keshav Mills case (ibid); Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner of India(1); Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(2 ) Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v.\n\nBhagatram Sardar Singh( 3); A. K. Kraipak v.\n\nUnion of India('); Ridge v. Baldwin('); Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission(•); Commissioner of Police v. Tanos( 7); Secretary of State\n\nfor Education & Science v. Metropolitan Borough of Tameside( 8 ); Wiseman v. Borneman(\"); Nawabkhan Abba.1klu111 v. State of Gujarat('\") and State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei(\").\n\nAs against this, Shri Soli Sorabji, learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of respondent 1, contends that the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced Ly the language, scheme, setting, and the purpose of the provision in Section 18AA.\n\nIt is maintained that Section 18AA, on its plain terms, deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under Section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry.\n\nThe issue under Section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of tllking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. On these premises, it is urged, the context, the subject-matter and the legislative history of Section 18AA negative the necessity of giving a prior hearing; that Section 1 SAA does not contemplate any interval between the making of an order thereunder and its enforcement, because it is designed to meet an emergent situation by immediate preventive action. Shri Sorabji submits that this rule of natural justice in a modified form has been incorporated in Section 18F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who, if he feels aggrieved, can, on his application, be heard to show that even the original order under Section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. Thns,\n\n(1)\n\n\n[1975]3 S.C.R. 619 (4)\n\n[1970] I S.C.R. 457 (5)\n\n[1964] A.C. 40; 196 (6) 14 Australian Law Reports 519 (7)\n\n[1958] 98 C.L.R. 383 (8) [1976] 3 All ER. 665. (9) [1971] A.C. 297; Wade's Administrative Law p. 465 (10)\n\n\nSWADESH! COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, !.) 553\n\nShri Sorabji does not go to the length of contending that the principles of natural justice have been fully displaced or completely excluded by Section 1 SAA. On the contrary, his stand is that on.. ii, true construction of Section 18AA read with Section 18F, the requirements of natural justice and fair-play can be read into the statute only \"in so far all conformaqce to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it\", by the provision for 11 remedial hearing <1t a subsequent stage.\n\nShri Sorabji further submits that since Section 18F does not specify any period of time within which the aggrieved party can seek the relief thereunder, the oppor.tunity of full, effective and post-decisional hearing has to be given within a reasonable time. It is stressed that under Section 18F, the Central Government exercises curial functions, and that Section confers on the 11ggrieved owner a right to apply to the Govermnent to cancel the order of take-over.\n\nOn a true construction, this Section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition.\n\nShri Sorabji further concedes that on the well-settled principle of implied and ancillary powers, the right of hearing afforded by Section 18F carries with it the right to have inspection and copies of all the relevant books, documents, papers etc. and the Section obligates the Central Govermnent to take all steps which are necessary for the effective hearing and disposal _of ar. application under Section 18F.\n\nShri Sorabji has in connection with his arguments cited thel!e authorities : Mohinder Singh Gill v.\n\nChief Election Comm/.ssioner (ibid); In re. K. (An Infant), Official Solicitor v. K. & Anr.('); Collymore v. Attorney General (2); Union of India v. Col. J. N. Sinha(•); Judicial Review, 3rd Edn. by De Smith('); Queen v.\n\nDavey(•); Gaiman v. National Association for Internal Revenue(•); John H.\n\nN. Fahey v. Paul Millionee('); Schwartz's Administrative Law'(8 ); Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. Maharashtra('); Vijay Kumar Mundhra v.\n\nUnion of India( 10); Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukumel v.\n\n(1)\n\n[19651 A.C. 201 (H.L.).\n\n(2) [1969] 2 All E.R. 1207.\n\n(3) A IR 1970 S.C. 40.\n\n(4) Pages 162, 167, 169 & 170.\n\n(5) [1899]2 QB. 301.\n\n(6) [1930] 283 U.S. 589.\n\n(7) 332 us. 248.\n\n(8) 1976 Ed. p. 210, para 74.\n\n(9) [1979] l S.C.R. 192.\n\n(10) I.L.R. [19~2] 2 Delhi 483 F.B.\n\nA Reserve Eank of India('); Corpomtion of Ca!cutia v, Ca/cul/a Tram- \" ways(') and Furne II v, Whapgarei High Schoo/CJ,\n\nBefore deal.ng with the contentions advanced on b:ith sides, it wili be useful to have a general idea of the concept of \"natural justice\" and the broad principles governing its application or exclusion in the B construction or administration of statutes and the exercise of judicial or administrative powers by an authority or tribunal constituted thereunder,\n\nWell then what is \"natural jusitce\"? The phrase is not capable of a static and precise definition, It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula, Historically, \"natural justice\" has been used in a way \"which implies the existence of moral principles of self-evident and unarguable truth,(') In course of time, judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to \"equity and good conscience\".\n\nLegal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between\n\n\"natural justice\" and \"natural law\", \"Natural justice\" was considered as \"that part of nntural law which relates to the administration of justice\".\n\nRules of natural justice are not embodied rules.\n\nBeing means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules,\n\nBut two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind, as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially, objectively and fairly. Described in the form of Latin tags these twin principles are : (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. For the purpose of the question posed above, we are primarily concerned with the first.\n\nThis principle was well-recognised even in the ancient world, Seneca, the philosopher, is said to have referred in Medea that it is unjust to reach a decision without a full hearing. In Maneka Gandhi's case, Bhagwati, J. emphasised that audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a jnst decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power.\n\nHence its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.\n\nDuring the last two decades, the concept of natural justice has made great strides in the realm of administrative law.\n\nBefore the epochmaking decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin, it was\n\n(1) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R, 632.\n\n(2) [196415 S, C, R, 25. (3) [197311 All E.R, 400.\n\n(4) \"Natural Justice\" by Paul Jackson, 2nd Edn. Page 1\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MllLS v. UNION (Earkaria, J.) 55:;\n\ngenerally thought that the rules of natural justice apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; and for that purpose, whenever a breach ·\n\nof the rule of natural justice was alleged, Courts in England used to ascertain whther the impugned action was taken by the statutory authority or tribunal in the excrci'e of its adminisrative or quasi-judicial power.\n\nIn India also, this was the position before the decision, dated February 7, 1967, of this Court in Dr. Bina Pani Dds case (ibid); wherein it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matter; involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice.\n\nThis supposed distinction between quasijudicial and administrative decisions, which was perceptibly mitigated in Bina Pani Dei's case, was further rubbed out to a vanishing point in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India (ibid), thus:\n\n\"Jf the purpose of these rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justcie one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.\n\nOften times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries ..... .\n\nArriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries.\n\nAn unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry.\"\n\nIn A. K. Kraipak's case, the Court also quoted with approval the observations of Lord Parker from the Queens Bench decision in In re\n\nH. K. (An Infant) (ibid), which were to the effect, that good administration and an honest or bona fide decision require not merely impartiality or merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly.\n\nThus irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory JI body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial, a duty to act fairly, that is, in consonance with the fundamental principles of substantive justice is generally implied, because the presumption is that in a democratic polity wedded to the rule of law, the state or the Legislature does not intend that in the exercise of their statutory powers its functionaries should act unfairly or unjustly.\n\n• In the language of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (vide Mohinder SilU!h Gill's case, ibid.) :\n\n\"Subject to certain necessary limitations natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although varying in its play.\n\nH Its essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more--but nothing less.\"\n\nA The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They can supplement the law but cannot supplant it (Per Hegde, J. in A. K. Kraipak, ibid).\n\nIf a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice, then the Court Cll!lllOt ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded, wholly or in part, in the exercise of statutory power, depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power. (See Union of India v. Col. l. N. Sinha, ibid.)\n\nC / The maxim audi a/teram partem has many facets.\n\nTwo of them\n\nare : (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain.\n\nThis rule is universally respected and duty to afford a fair hearing in Lord Loreburn's oft-quoted language, is \"a duty lying upon every one who decides something\", in the exercise of legal power.\n\nThe rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, \"convenience and justice\"-as Lord Atkin felicitously put it-\"are often not on speaking terms\"(').\n\nv The next general aspect to be considered is : Are there any exceptions to the application of the principles of natural justice, particularly the audi alteram partem rule? We have already noticed that the statute conferring the power, can by express language exclude its application. Such cases do not present any difficulty.\n\nHowever, difficulties arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors : such as, urgency, where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. It is proposed to dilate a little on this aspect, because in the instant case before us, exclusion of this rule of fair hearing is sought by implication from the use of the word 'immediate' in Section 1 SAA(l). Audi a!teram part em rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests.\n\nThus, Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases, for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under Section 17, Land Acquisition Act, furnishes another such instance.\n\nSimilarly, action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing.\n\n(I) General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] AC 627 at 638\n\n·~\n\nSWADESH[ COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, I.) 557\n\nBe that as it may, the fact remains that there is no consensus of judicial opinion on whether more urgency of a decision is a practical consideration which would uniformly justify non-observance of even an abridged form of this principle of natural justice. In Durayappah v.\n\nFemando('). Lord Upjohn observed that \"while urgency may rightly limit such opportnnity timeously perhaps severely, there can never be a denial of that opportunity if the principles of natural justice are applicable.\n\nThese observations of Lord Upjohn in Durayappah's case were quoted with approval by this Court ih Mohinder Singh Gill's case. It is therefore, proposed to notice the same here.\n\nIn Mohinder Singh Gill's case, the appellant and the third respondent were candidates for election in a Parliamentary Constituency.\n\nThe appellant alleged that when at the last hour of counting it appeared that he had all but won the election, at the instance of respondent, violence broke out and the Returning Officer was forced to postpone declaration of result. The Returning Officer reported the happening to the Chief Election Commissioner. An officer of the Election Commission who was an observer at the counting, reported about the incidents to the Commission. The appellant met the Chief Election Commissioner and requested him to declare the result.\n\nEventually, the Chief Blee• tion Commissioner iswod a notification which stated that taking all circumstances ihto consideration the Commission was satisfied that the poll had been vitiated, and therefore in exercise of the powers under Article 324 of the Constitution, the poll already hc'.d was cancdled and a repoll was being ordered in the constituency.\n\nThe appellant contended that before making the impugned order, the Election Commission had not given him a full and fair hearing and al: that he had was a vacuous meeting where nothing was disclosed.\n\nThe Election Commission contended that a prior hearing has, in fact, been given to the appellant. In addition, on the que5tion of application of the principles of natural justice, it was urged by the respondents that the tardy process of notice and hearing would thwart the conducting of elections with speed, that un:ess civil consequences ensucd, hearing was not necessary and that the right accrues to a candidate only when he is declared elected. This contention, which had found favour with the High Court, was negatived by this Court.\n\nDelivering the judgment of the Court, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J.. lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of natural justic•c and its role in a case where there is a competition between the necessity of taking speedy\n\n(1) [1967] 2 AC 137 3-152SCf/81\n\naction and the duty to act fairly. It will b.o useful to extract those illuminating observations, in extenso:\n\n\"Once we understand the son! of the rule as !airplay in action - and it is so - we must hold that it extends to both the fields.\n\nAfter aa, administrative power in democratic set-up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary, executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if 'natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a bee in one's bonnet.\n\nIts essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more - but nothing less. The 'exceptions' to the rules of 1>atural justice are a misnomer or rather are but a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in those exclllSionary cases nothing unfair can he inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case.\"\n\nAfter referring to several decisions, including the observations of Lord Upjohn in Durayappah v. Fernando, the COllrt explained that mere invocation or existence of urgency does not exclude the duty of giving a fair hearing to the pero; on affected :\n\n\"It is untenable heresy, in our view, to lock jaw the victim or act behind his back by tempting invocation of urgency, unless the clearest case of public injury flowing from the least delay is self-evident. Even in such cases a remedial hearing as soon as urgent action has been taken is the next best. Our objection is not to circumscription dictated by circumstances, but to annihilation as an easy escape from benignant, albeit inconvenient obligation.\n\nThe procedural pre-condition or fair hearing, however minimal, even postdecisio'nal, has rekvance to administrative and judicial gentlemanliness.\"\n\n\"We may not be taken to .... say that situational modifications to notice and hearing are altogether impermissible .\n\n. . . . . . . the glory of the law is not that sweeping rules are laid H down but that it tailors principles to practical needs, doctors remedies to suit the patient promotes not freezes Life's processes, if we may mix metaphors.'' ......... .\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 559\n\nThe Court further emphasised the necessity of striking pragmatic bala'nce between competing requirem2nts of acting urgently and fairly, thus:\n\n\"Should the cardinal principle of \"hearing' as condition for decision-making be martyred for the cause of administrative, immediacy? We think not.\n\nThe full panoply may not be there but a manageable minimum may make-do.\"\n\n\" In Wiseman v. Borneman there was a hint of the competitive c:aims of hurry ahd hearing. Lord Reid said: 'Ev•cn\n\nwhere the decision has to be reached by a body acting judicially, there must be a balance between the need for expedition and the need to give full opportunity to the defendant to see material against him (emphasis added). We agree that the elaborate and sophisticated methodology of a formalised hearing may be injurious to promptitude so essential in an election under way. Even so, natural justice is pragmatically flexible and is amenable to capsulation under the compulsive pressure of circumstances. To burke it altogether may not be a stroke of fairness except in very exceptional circumstances.\"\n\nThe Court further pointed out that the competing claims of hurry and heari'ng can be reconciled by making situationa; modifications in the audi alferam partem rule:\n\n\"Lord Denning M.R., in Manward v. Borneman, summarised the obsrvations of the Law Lords in this form. No doctrirwire approach is desirable but the Court must be anxious to salvage the cardinal rule to the extent permissible in a given case. After all, it is not obligatory that counsel should be allowed to appear hor is it compulsory that oral evidence should be adduced. Indeed, it is not even imperative that written statements should be called for disclosure of the prominent circumstances and asking for an immediate explanation orally or otherwise may, in many cases be suflicient compliance. It is eveu cohceivable that an urgent meeting\n\nwith the concerned parties summoned at an hour's notice, or _in a crisis, even a telephone call, may suffice. If all that is\n\nnot possible as in the case of a fleeing person whose pass- H port has to be impounded lest he should evade the course of justice or a dangerous nuisance needs immediate abatement, the action may be taken followed immediately by a hearing for the purpose of sustaining or setting aside the action to the extent feasib}e.\n\nIt is quite o'n the cards that the Election Commission, if pressed by circumstances may give a short hearing.\n\nIn any view, it is not easy to appreciate whether before further steps got under way he could have afiorded an opportunity of hearing the paiiies, and revoke the earlier directions ...... All that we need cmpha size is that the content of natural justice is a dependent variable, not an easy casualty.\"\n\n\"Civil consequence' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages.\n\nIn its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence.\" (emphasis added)\n\nIn 'Muneka Gandhi, it was laid down that where in an emergent situation, requiring immediate action, it is not practicabic to give prior notice or opp01iunity to be heard, the prelimi'nary action should be soon followed by a full remedial hearing.\n\nThe High Court of Australia in Commissioner of Polzce v. Twws, ibid, held that some urgency, or necessity of prompt action docs not necessarily exclude natural justice because a true emergency situation can be properly dealt with by short measures.\n\nIn Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, ibid, the same High Court held that without the use of unmistakable language in a statute. one would not attribute to Parliament an intention to authorise the Commission F to order a person not to deal in shares or attend a stock exchange without observing 'natural justice.\n\nIn circumstances o[ likely immediate detriment to the public, it may be appropriate for the Commission to issue a warning-off notice without notice or stated grounds but limited to' a particular meeting, coupled with a notice that the Commission proposed to make a long-term order on stated grounds G and to give an earliest practicable opportunity to the person affected to appear before the Commission and show why the proposed long term order be not made.\n\nAs pointed out in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Com missioner and in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, ibid, such cases B where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action, no pre-decisional hearing is given but the action is followed soon by a full post decisional hearing to the\n\n.;-··\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v, UNION (Sarkaria, !.) 561\n\nperson affected, do not, in reality, constitute a'n 'exception' to the audi alterani partem rule. To call such cases an 'exception' is a misnomer because they do not exclude 'fair-play in action', but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing.\n\n'\"The necessity for speed'', writes Paul Jackson, \"may justify immediate action, it will, however, normally allow for a hearing at a later stage.\n\nThe possibility of such a hearing-and the adequacy of any later remedy should the initial action prove to have been nnjnstified--are considerations to be borne in mind when deciding whether the need for urgent action excludes a right to rely on natural justice.\n\nMoreover, however the need to act swiftly may modify or limit what natural justice requires. it must not be thought 'that because rough, swift or imperfect justice only is available that there ought to be no justice' Prati v. Wanganui Education Board.(1)\"\n\nProf. <le Smith, the renowned author of 'Judicial Review' (3rtl Edn.) has at pae 170, expressed his views on this aspect of the subject. thus :\n\n\"Can the absence of a hearing before a decision is made be adequately compensated for by a hearing ex post facto?\n\nA prior hearing may be better than a subsequent hearing, but a subsequent hearing is better than no hearing at all: and in some cases the courts have held that statutory provision for an administrati vc appeal or even full judicial review on the merits are sufficient to negative the existence of any implied duty to hear before the original decision is made.\n\nThe approach may be acceptable where the original decision does not cause serious detriment to the person affected, or where there is also a paramount need for prompt action, or where it is impracticable to afford antecedent hearings.\"\n\nIn short, the general principle-as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application-seems to be that where a statute does not in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would he construed as excluding the lilldi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to con-\n\n(!) [1977) I N.Z.L.R. 476.\n\nstrue such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shown of all its fonnal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need or utmost promptitude.\n\nIn short, this rule of fairplay \"must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where ccmpulsive necessity so demands\". The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications.\n\nBut, to recall the words of Bhagwati, J., the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.\n\nKeeping the general principles stated above, let us now examine the scheme content, object and legislative history of the relevant provisions of the I.D.R. Act.\n\nThe I.D.R. Act (Act 65 of 1951) came into force on May 8,\n\n1952. The Statement of Objects and Reasons published in the Gazette of India, dated March 26, 1949, says that its object is to provide the Central Government with the means of implementing their industrial policy which was announced in their Resolution, dated April\n\n6, 1948, and approved by the Central Legislature.\n\nThe Act brings under Central Control the development and regulation of a number of important industries specified in its First Schedule, the activities of which affect the country as a whole and the development of which mnst be governed by economic factors of all-India import.\n\nThe requirement with regard to regsitration, issue or revocation of licences of these specific industrial undertakings has been provirled in Chapter II of the Act. Section 3 ( d) defines an 'industrial undertaking' to mean \"any undertaking pertaining to a scheduled industry carried on in one or more factories by any person or authority including Government\": Clause (f) of the same section defines \"owner\" in relation to an undertaking.\n\nSection 15 gives power to the Central Government to cause investigation to be made into a scheduled industry or industrial undertaking.\n\nThe Section reads as follows :\n\n\"where the Central Government is of the opinion that-\n\n(a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings-\n\n(i) there has been, or is likely to be a substantial fall in the volume of production in respect of any article or class\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 563\n\nof articles relatable to that industry or manufactured or produced in the industrial •ondertaking or undertakings, as the case may be; for which having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, then.': is no justification, or\n\n(ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article or class of articles rclatable to that industry or manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking or undertakings, as the case may be, which could have been or can be avoided; or\n\n(iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article or class of articles relatable to that industry or manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking or undertakings, as the case may be, for which there is no justification; or\n\n(iv) it is necessary to take any such action as is provided in this Chapter for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance which are utilised in the industry or the industrial undertaking or undertakings, as the case may be; or\n\n(b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest.\n\nthe Central Government may make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case by such person or body of persons as it may appoint for the purpose.\"\n\nSection 16 empowers the Central Government to issue appropriatit directions to the industrial undertaking concerned on completion of investigation under Section 15.\n\nSuch directions may be for all or any of the following purposes :\n\n\"(a) regulating the production of any article or class of articles by the industrial undertaking or undertakings and fixing too standards of production;\n\n(b) requiring the industrial undertaking or undertakings to take such steps as the Cutral Government may consider necessary, to stimulate the development of the industry to which the undertaking or und•crtakings relates or relate;\n\n(c) prohibiting the industrial undertaking or undertakings from resorting to any act or practice which might reduce its or their production, capacity or economic value;\n\n(d) controlling the prices, or regulating the distribution of any article or class of articles which have been the subjectmatter of investigation.\"\n\nSub-section (2) enables the Central Government to issue such direc tions to the industrial undertakings pending investigation.\n\nIn the course, of the working of !.D.R. Act, certain practical diffi. culties came to light. One of them was that \"Government cannot take over the management of any industrial undertaking, even in a situation ca11ing for emergent action without first issuing directions to it and waiting to see whether or not they are obeyed.\" In order to remove such difficulties, the Amending Act 26 of 1953 inserted Chapter IHA containing Sections 18A to l 8F in the I.D.R. Act.\n\nSection 18A confers power on the Central Government to assume management or control of an industrial undertaking in certain cases.\n\nThe material part of the Section reads as under :\n\n\"(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that\n\n(a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of Section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or\n\n(b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which ah investigation has been made under Section 15 (whether or not any directions have been issued to the undertaking in pursuance of Section 16), is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest:\n\nthe Central Government may, by notified order, authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of the undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order.\n\n(2) Any notified order issued under sub-section\n\n(I) shall have effect for such period not exceeding five years as mal'. be specified in the order.\"\n\nSection ! SB specifies the effect of notified order under Section t 8A, Sub-section (1) of the section reads thus :\n\n-\"\"-\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS r. U~ION (Sarkaria, J.) 565\n\n\"On the issue of a notified order under Section 18A authorising the taking over of the management of an industrial undertaking-\n\n( a) all persons in charge of the management including, persons holding office as managers or directors of the industrial undertaking immediately before the issue of the noti- B tied order, shall be deemed to have vacated their offices as such;\n\n(b) any contract of management between the industrial undertaking and any managing agent, or any director thereof holding office as such immediately before the issue of the notified order shall be deemed to have been terminated;\n\n(c) the managing agent, if any, appointed under Section 18A shall be deemed to have been dnly appointed as the managing agent in pursuance of the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913 (7 of 1913), and the memorandum and articles of D association of the industrial undertaking, and the provisions of the said Act and of the memorandum and articles shall, subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, apply accordingly, but no such managin1r agent shall be removed from office except with the previous consent of the Central Government; E\n\n( d) the person or body of persons authorised under Section I SA to take over the management shall take all such steps as may be necessary to take into his or their custody or control all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the industrial undertaking is or appears to be entitled, and all the property and effects of the industrial undertaking, shall be deemed to be in the custody of the person or, as the case may be, the body of persons as from the date of the notified order; and\n\n(e) the persons, if any, authorised under Section 18A G to take over the management of an industrial undertaking which is a company shall be for all purposes the directors of industrial undertaking duly constituted under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913). and shall alone be entitled to exercise all the powers of the directors of the industrial undertaking, whether such powers are derived from D the said Act or from the memorandum or articles of association of the industrial undertaking or from any other source.\"\n\nSection 18D provides that a person whose office is lost under clause\n\n(a) or whose contract of management is terminated under clause (b) of Section 18B shall have no right to compensation for such loss or termination.\n\nSection l 8F is material.\n\nIt reads thus :\n\n\"Jf at any time it appears to the Central Government on the application of the owner of the industrial undertaking or otherwise that the purpose of the order made under Section l 8A has been fulfilled or that for any other reason it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. the Central Government may. by notified order, cancel such order and on the cancellation of any such order the management or the control, as the case may be of the industrial undertaking shall vest in the owner of the undertaking.\"\n\nBy the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act 1955, Chapter IHA of the I.D.R. Act was included as Item 19 in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.\n\nBefore we may come lo Section ! SAA, we may notice here the legislative policy with regard to Cotton Textile Industry, as adumbrated in the Cotton Textile Companies Management of Undertakings and Liquidation or Reconstruction Act. 1967 (Act XXIX of 1967). The Statement of Objects and Reasons for enacting this statute, inter a/ia, says:\n\n\"The cotton textile industry provides one of the basic necessities of .[ife and affords gainful employment to millions of people.\n\nOver the last few years, this vital industry has been passing through difficult times.\n\nSome mills have already to dos\" down and the continuing economic operation of many others is beset with many difficulties.\n\nThese difficulties have been aggravated in many cases by the heavy burden of past debts.\n\nThe taking over the management of the mills for a limited time and then restoring tlrem to original owners has not remedied the situation. Steps are therefore, necessary to bring about a degree of rationalisation of the financial and managerial structure of such units with a view to their rehabilitation. so that production and employment may not suffer.\"\n\nTextile Industry is also among the industries, included m the First Schedu.Je to the I.D.R. Act.\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, !.) 567\n\nThe Amendment Act 72 of 1971 inserted Section I SAA in the original I.D.R. Act.\n\nThe material part of the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing this Bill of 1971 published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, is as follows :\n\n\"The industries included in the First Schedule . . . . not only substantially contribute to the Gross National produce of the country, but also afford gainful employment to millions of people. For diverse reasons a number of industrial undertakings engaged in these industries have had to close down and the continuing economic operation of many others is beset with serious difficulties affecting industrial production and employment ... During the period of take over Government has to invest public funds in such undertakings and it must be able to do so with a measure of confafonce about the continued efficient management of the undertaking at the end of the period of take over.\n\nIn cirder to ensure that at the end of the period of take over by Government, the industrial undertaking is not returned to the same hands which were responsible for its earlier misfortune, it has been provided in the Bill that in relation to an undertaking taken over by them, Government will have the power to move for\n\n(i) the sale of the undertaking at a reserve price or higher (Government purchasing it at the reserve price if no offer at or above the reserve price is received), action being taken simultaneously for the winding up of the company owning the industrial undertaking; or (ii) the reconstruction of the company owning the industrial undertaking with a view to giving the Government a controlling interest in it. . .. With a view to ensuring speedy action by Government, it has been provided in the Bill that if the Government has evidence to the effect that the assets of the company owning the industrial undertaking are being frittered away or the undertaking has been closed for a pe<icd not less than three months and such closure is prejudicial to the concerned scheduled industry and that the financial condition of the company owning the industrial undertaking and the condition of the plant and machinery installed in the undertaking is such that it is possible to restart the undertaking and such restarting-is in the public interest, Government may take over the management without an investigation.\"\n\n(emphasis added).\n\nWith the aforesaid Objects in view. Section 18AA was inserted by the Amendment Act No. 72 of 1971.\n\nThe marginal heading of the Section is to the effect : \"Power to take over industrial undertakings without investigation under certain circumstances\".\n\nThis marginal heading, it will be seen, accords with the Objects and Reasons extract- J ed above. Section 18AA runs as under :\n\n\"Without prejudice to any other provision of this Act. if, from the documentary or other evidence in its possession. the Central Government is satisfid, in relation to an industrial undertaking that-\n\n(a) the persons incharge of such industrial undertaking have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial unde; taking, or by diversion qf funds, brought about a situation which is likely tv affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and that immediate action i~ 11eccs~ sary to prevent such a situation; or\n\n(b) it has been closed for a period of not less than three months (whether by reason of the voluntary winding up of the company owning the industrial undertaking or for any other reason) and such closure is prejudicial to the concerned scheduled industry and that the financial con<litir-n of the company owning the industrial undertaking and the condition .of the plant and machinery of such undertaking are such that it is possible to re-start the undertaking an<l such re-starting is necessary in the interests of the general public, it may, by a notified order, authorise any person (hereinafter referred to as the 'authorised person') to take over the management of the whole or any part of the industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order.\n\n(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of SectiDn J 8A shall, as far as may be, apply to a notified order m2dc 1111, Icr sub-section (I) as they apply to a notified order made uicJcr sub-section (!) of Section l 8A.\n\n(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (I) anJ \"ub section (2) shall apply to an industrial undertaking owned by a company which is being wound up by c, r under the supervision of the Court.\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 569\n\n( 4) Where any notified order has been made under sub-section (1), the person or body of persons having, for the time being, charge of the management or control of the industrial undertaking, whether by or under the orders of any court or any contract, instrument or otherwise, shall notwithstanding anything contained in such order, contract, instrument or other arrangement, forthwith make over the charge of management or control, as the case may be, of the industrial undertaking to the authorised person.\n\n(5) The provisions of Section 18-B to 18-E (botn inclusive) shall, as far as may be, apply to, or in relation to, the industrial undertaking in respect of which a notified order has been made under sub-section (1), as they apply lo an industrial undertaking in relation to which \"' notdicd order has been issued under Section 18-A.\"\n\nA comparison of the provisions of Section J 8A(l )(bJ and Section 18AA(l) (a) would bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section l 8A ( 1 )(b) can be taken only after an\n\ninvestigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(l)(a) or (b) action can be taken witho:it sud1 investigation.\n\nThe language, scheme and setting of Section I 8AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provi; ion make this position clear beyond doubt.\n\nSecond, before taking action under Sectionl8A(l) (b), the Central Government h1;; to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under Section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, nameiy : that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner nighly detrimental to the Scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under Section 18AA(l) (a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any oi the three kinds of acts specified in that provision.\n\nThis shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the unrlertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under Section l 8A(l) (b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstances, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under Section l 8AA(l).\n\nThe phrase \"highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest\" in Section J 8A is capable of being construed to over a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management.\n\nIn contrast with it, action under Section 18AA(l) (a) can be taken only if the Central Gov-\n\nA ernment is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession.\n\nFrom an analysis of Section 18AA(l) (a), it will be clear that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, 8 the Central Government must be satisfied \"from documentary or other evidence in its possession\" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances :\n\n(i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation, which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and\n\n(ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.\n\nSpeaking for the High Court (majority), the learned Chief Justice (Deshpande, C.J.) has observed that only with regard to the fulfilment of condition (i) the satisfaction of the Government is required to be objectively reached on the basis of relevant evidence in its possession; while with regard to condition (ii), that is, the need foc immediate action, it is purely subjective, and therefore, the satisfaotion of the Government with regard to the immediacy of the situation is outside the scope of judicial review.\n\nShri Sorabji has in his arguments, forcefully supported this opinion of the High Court.\n\nHe maintains that the satisfaction of the F Government with regard to the existence of the immediacy is not justicable.\n\nRelianc(l has been placed on the following passage in the judgment of Channell, J. in Queen v. Davey & Ors.( 1) :\n\n\"The genernl principle of law is that an order affecting his liberty or property cannot be made against any one without giving him an opportunity of being heard; the result is that, if general words used in a statute empowering the making of such an order as this, it must be made on notice to the party affected.\n\nThere are, however, exceptions to this rule, which arise where it can be seen on the words of the statute that it was intended that the order should be made on an ex parte application, and the case in which it is easiest to see the propriety of the exception is where, looking\n\n(I) [1899] 2 Q.B. at pp. 305-306 •\n\nSIVADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 571\n\nat the scope and object of the legislation, it was clearly intended that the parties putting the law in force should act promptly.\n\nSuch a case is an order for the destruction of unsound mC'at, which clearly may be made ex parte, because it is desirable in the interest of the public health that it should be acted upon at once. The case of removing an infectious person, likely to spread abroad the infection, to an infectious hospital is obviously of the same character.\"\n\nAccording to the learned Solicitor-General, the power conferred 011 the Central Government is in the nature of an emergency power, that the necessity for taking immediate action is writ large in Section\n\n18AA(l) (a)-the provision being a legislative response to deal with an economically emergent situation fraught with national repercussions. The object of the exercise of this power is not to punish anyone but to take immediate preventive action in the public interest.\n\nOn the other hand, Shri Nariman submits that the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the satisfaction of the Central Govern- D ment with regard to the necessity of taking immediate action was not open to judicial review at all. It is enphasised that the very language of the provision shows that the necessity for taking immediate tiction is a question of fact, which should be apparent from the relevant evidence in the possession of the Government.\n\nWe find merit in this contention. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to jndicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an el.ement of subjectivity is always involved in the formatio:i of such an opinion, but as was pointed out by this Court in Bariam Chemicals (ibid), the existence of circumstances from which the inferences constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such \"drcums!ances\", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie.\n\nSection 18AA(l) (a), in terms, requires that the satisfaction of\n\nthe Government in regard to the existence of the circumstances or conditions precedent set out above, including the necessity of taking immediate action, mnst be based on evidence in the possession of the Government. If the satisfaction of the Government in regard to the TI existence of any of the conditions, (i) and (ii), is based on no evidence, or on irrelevant evidence or on an extraneous consideration,\n\nit will vitiate the order of 'take-over', and the Court will be justified in quashing such an illegal order on judicial review in appropriate proceedings.\n\nEven where the statute conferring the discretionary power does not, in terms, regulate or hedge around the formation of the opinion by the statutory authority in regard to the existence of preliminary jurisdictional facts with express checks, the authority has to form that opinion reasonably like a reasonable person.\n\nWhile spelling out by a construction of Section ! SAA (1) (a) the proposition that the opinion or satisfaction of the Government in regard to the necessity of taking immediate action could not be the subject of judicial review, the High Court (majority) relied on the analogy of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, under which, according to them, the Government's opinion in regard to the existence of the urgency is not justiciable.\n\nThis analogy holds good only upto a point. Just as under Section ! SAA of the !.D.R. Act, in c; ase of a genuine 'immediacy' or imperative necessity of taking immediate action to prevent fall in production and consequent risk of irn\"1'nent injury paramount public interest, an order of 'take-over' can be passed without prior, time-comuming investigation under Section 15 of the Act, under Section 17 ( 1) and ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act, also, the preliminary inquiry under Section SA can be dis1Pensed with in case of an urgency. lt is true that the grounds on which the Government's opinion as to the existence of the urgency can be cha!· lenged are not unlimited, and the power conferred on the Government under Section 17 ( 4) of that Act has been formulated in subjective term; nevertheless, in cases, where an issue is raised, that the Government's opinion as to urgency has been formed in a manifestly arbitrary or perverse fashion without regard to patent, actual and undeniable facts, or that such opinion has been arrived at o'n the basis of irrelevant consideratiom or no material at all, or on materials so tenuous, flimsy, slender or dubious that no reasonable man could reasonably reach that conclusion, the Court is entitled to examine the validity of the formation of that opinion by the Government in the context and to the extent of that issue.\n\nIn Narayan Govind Gavate v. St.ate of Maharashtra & Ors.(') this Court held that while exercising the power under Section 17 ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act, the mind of the officer or authority con cerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary !Proceedings under Section SA of the Act should be eliminated.\n\nIt is not just the existence of an\n\n(1) A.I.R.1977 SC 183\n\n., ,.\n\nl- -\n\nsWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, I.) 573\n\nurgency but the need to dispense with an inqmry under Section •5A\n\nof _the Act which has to be considered. If the circumstances on the\n\nbasis of which the Government formed its opinion with regard to the existence of the urgency and the other conditions precedent, recited in the notification, are deficient or defective, the Court may look beyond it. At that stage, Section 106, Evidence Act can be invoked by the party assailing the notification and if the Government or the authority concerned does not disclose such facts or circumstances especially within its knowledge, without even disclosing a sufficient reason for their abstention from disclosure, they have to take the consequences which flow from the non-production of the best evidence which could be produced on behalf of the State if its stand was correct.\n\nAgain, in Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab & Ors.('), this Court held that where the purported order does not recite the satisfaction of the Government with regard to the existence of urgency, nor the fact of the land being waste or arable land, the order was liable to be strnck down and the mere direction, therein, to the Collector to take action on ground of urgency was not a legal and complete fulfilment of the requirement of the law.\n\nRecently, in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh('), V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court, made these apposite observations :\n\n\" ... It is fundamental that c01n, pulsory taking of a man's E property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fuimess is constitutional anathema except for good reasons.\n\nSave in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum F time needed to give a hearing, land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act.\" /- From these decisions, it is abundantly clear that even under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, the satisfaction or opinion of G Government/authority in regard to the urgency of taking action thereunder, is not altogether immune from judicial scrutiny.\n\nFor the reasons already stated, it is not possible to subscribe to the proposition prqpounded by the High Court that the satisfaction of the _Central. Government in regard to condition (ii), i.e. the exis-\n\n(l) A.I.R. 1979 S.C.1594.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 319.\n\n4-152SCI/81\n\nA tence of 'immediacy', though subjective, is not open to judicial review at all.\n\nFrom a plain reading of Section 1 SAA, it is clear that it doe~ not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi a/teram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage.\n\nThe question, therefore, is narrowed down to the issue, whether the phrase \"tlrat immediate action is necessary\" excludes absolutely, by inevitable implication, the application of this cardinal canon of fairplay in all cases where Section 18AA(l)(a) may be invoked.\n\nIn our opinion, for reasons that follow, the answer to this question must bo in the negative.\n\nFirstly, as rightly pointed out by Shri N ariman, the expression \"immediate action\" iii the said phrase, is to be construed in the light of the marginal heading of the Section, its context and the Objects and Reason for enncting this provision. Thus construed, the expression only means \"without prior investigation\" under Section 15.\n\nDispensing with the requirement of such prior investigation does not necessarily indicate an intention to exclude the application of the fundamental fPrinciples of natural justice or the duty to act fairly by affording to the owner of the undertaking likely to be affected, at the pre-decisional stage, wherever practicable, a short-measure fair hearing adjusted, attuned and tailored to the exigency of the situation.\n\nAt this stage, it is necessary to examine two decisions of this Court, viz., Ambalal M. Shah v.\n\nHathi Singh Manufacturing Co.\n\nLtd.('); and Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (ibid), because according to the High Court (as per Deshpande, C.J., who wrote the leading opinion) these two decision&-which are binding on thr. High Court--eonclusively show that :-\n\n\"The only prior hearing consisted of the investigation under Section 15 read with Rule 5 before action under\n\nSection 1 SA is taken.\n\nThe very object of Section 18AA is to enable action to be taken thereunder without being preceded by the investigation under Section 15.\n\nOn the authority of the two Sµpreme Court decisions in Ambalal M. Shah and Keshav Mills tliat the only hearing prior to action under Section 18A was the investigation under Section 15, it would follow that action under Section 18AA is to be taken without the investigation under Section 15 and, therefore, without a prior hearing.\"\n\n(I) [1962] 3 S.C.R 171\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, /.) 5 7 5\n\nShri N ariman maintains that the High Court has not correctly construed these decisions.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, the corollary deduced by the High Court, viz., that exclusion of the investigation under Section 15 includes exclusion of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-takeover stage, is just the contrary of what was laid down by this Court in Keshav Mills in which Ambala/'3 case was also noticed.\n\nIndeed, Shri Nariman strongly relies on this decision in support of his a£gument that if the application of this rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage is not excluded even where a full investigation has been made, there is stronger reason to hold that it is to be observed in a case where there has been no investigation at all.\n\nWe will first notice the case of Kdhav Mills because that is a later decision in which Ambala('s case was referred to. In that case, the validity of an order passed by the Central Government under Section 18A was challenged. By that impugned order the Gujarat State Textile Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) was appointed as authorised controller of the Company for a period of five years. The Company was the owner of a cotton textile mill.\n\nTill 1965, the Company made flourishing business.\n\nAfter the year 1964-65, the Company fell on evil days and the textile mill of the Company was one of the 12 sick textile mills in Gujarat, which had to be closed down during 1966 and 1968.\n\nOn May 31, 1969, the Central Government passed an order appointing a Committee for investigation into the affairs of the Company under Section 15 of the l.D.R. Act- After completing the inquiry, the Investigating Committee submitted its report to the Goverrunent who thereafter on November 24, 1970, passed the impugned order under Section 18A authorising the Corporation to take over the management of the Company for a period of five years. The Company challenged the order of 'take-over' by a writ-petition in the High Court of Delhi.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the petit.i, oo.\n\nThe main contention of the rcompany before the High Court was that the Government was not competent to proceed under Section 18A against the Company without supplying before hand, a copy of the report of the Tuvestigating Committee to the Company. It was further contended that the Government should also have given a hearing to the Company before finally deciding UQOU take-over under Section 1 SA.\n\nThis contention was pres5ed oh behalf of the Company in spite of the fact that an opportunity had been given by the Investigating Committee to the management and the employees of the Company for adducing evidence and for making representation before the completion of the investigation. On the contentions raised by the Company and\n\nresisted by the respondent, in that case, the Court formulated the following questions :\n\n( 1) Is it necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before enforcing a decision under Section 18A of the Act?\n\n(2) What are the rules of natural justice in such a case?\n\n(3)(a) In the present case, have the rules to be observed once during the investigation under Section 15 and then again, after the investigation is completed and action m the report of the Investigating Committee taken under Section 18A ?\n\n(b) Was it necessary to furnish a copy of the Investigating Committee's Report before passing an order of take-over?\n\nMukherjea, J. speaking for the Court, answered these questions, thus:\n\n(1) \"The first of these questions does not present any D difficulty.\n\nIt is true that the order of the Government of India that has been challenged by the appellants was a purely executive order embodying on administration decision.\n\nEven so, the quei; tion of natural justice does arise in this case.\n\nIt is too late now to contend that the principles of natural justice need not apply to administrative E order or proceedings; i'n the language of Lord Denning M.R. in Regina v. Gaming Board, exparte Beniam(') \"that heresy was scotched in Ridge v. Baldwin\"\n\n(2) \"The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer.\n\nWe do not think it either feasible or even d•csirable to lay down a'ny fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner.\n\nTh~ concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight. jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably.\n\nWhere administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly.\n\nSee, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in In re\n\n(!) [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1009.\n\n- A-\n\n~ ..\n\n~WADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNIQN .(Sarkaria, J.) 577\n\nH.K. (an infa11J). It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin as insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances.\n\nHowever, even the application of the concept of fairplay requires real flexibility.\n\nEverything will depend on the actual facts and .circumstances of a case.\"\n\n(3) (a) \"For answering that question we shall keep in mind . . . . . . and examine the nature and scope of the inquiry that had been carried out by the Investigating Committee set up by the Government, the scope and purpose of the Act and rules under which the Investigating Committee was supposed to act, the matter that was being investigated by the Committee and finally the opportunity that was afforded to the appellants for presenting their case before the Investigating Committee.\"\n\n(After noticing the object, purpose and content oi the relevant provisions, the judgment proceeded) : ~\n\n\"In fact, it appears from n ietter addressed by appellant No. 2 Navinchandra Chandulal Parikh on behalf of the Company to Shri H. K Bansal, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Supply on 12th September, 1970 that the appellants had come to know that the Government of India was in fact considering ti>' question of appointing an authorised controller under Section 18A of the Act in respect of the appellants undertaking.\n\nIn that letter a detailed account of the facts and circllimstances under which the mill had to be closed down was given.\n\nThere is also an account of the efforts made by the Company's Directors to restore the mill.\n\nThere is no ; tttempt to minimise the finanial difficulties of the Company in that letter .... The letter specifically mentions the company's application to the Gujarat State Textile Corporation Ltd., for financial help . . . the Corporation ultimately failed to come to the succour of the Company.\n\nParikh requested Government not to appoint an authorised controller and further prayed that the Government of India should ask the State Government and the Gujarat Sta~ Textile pijrporation Ltd., . to give a financiaf guarantee to the Company ... \"\n\n\"Only a few day6 before this letter had been addressed, Parikh, it appears, had an interview with the Minister of ·\n\nForeign Trade on 26th August, 1970, when the Minister gave him, as a special case, four weeks' time with effect from 26th August, 1970 to obtain the necessary financial guarantee from the State or the Gujarat State Textile Corporation without which the Company had expressed its inability to reopen and run the mill.\n\nIn a letter of 22 September, 1970, Bansal informed Parikh in clear language that if the Company failed to obtain the necessary guarantee by 26 September 1970, Government was pro ceeding to take action under the Act.\n\nIt is obrious, therefore, that the appellants were .aware all long that as a result of the report of the Investigating Committee the Company's undertaking was going to be taken up by Government, Parikh had not only made writte11 representations but had also seen the Minister of Foreign Trade and Supply.\n\nHe had requested the Minister not to take over the undertaking and, on the contrary, to knd his good offices so that the Company could get financial support from the Gujarat State Textile Corporation or from the Gujarat State Government.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\n\"All these circumstano;!s leave in no manner of doubt that the Company had full opportunities to make all possible representations before the Government against the proposed take-over of its mill under Section 18A. In this connection, it is significant that even after the writ petition had been filed before the Delhi High Court the Government of India had given the appellants at their own request one month's time to obtain the necessary funds to commence the working of the mill.\n\nEven then, they failed to do so .... \"\n\n\"There are at least five features of the case which make it impossible for us to give any weight to the appellants complaint that the rules of natural justice have not been observed.\n\nFirst on their own showing they were perfectly aware of the grounds on which Government had passed the order under Section 18A of the Act.\n\nSecondly, they are llot in a position to deny (a) that the Company has sustained such heavy losses that its mill had to be closed down indefinitely, and (b) that there was not only loss of production of textiles but at least 1200 persons had been thrown out of employment. Thirdly, it is trallsparently clear from the affidavits that the Company was not in a position\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, /.) 579\n\nto raise the resources to recommence the working of the mill. Fourthly, the appellants were given a full hearing at the time of the investigation held by the Investigating Committe and were also given opportunities to adduce evidence.\n\nFihally. even after the Investigating Committee had submit led its report, the appellants were in constant communion with the Government and were in fact negotiating with Government for such help as might enable them to reopen the mill and to avoid a take-over of their undertaking by the Government.\n\nHaving regard to these features it is impossible for us to accept the contention that the appellants did not get\n\nany reasonable opportunity to make out a case against the take-over of their undertaking or that the Government ha~ not treated the appellants fairly.\n\nThere is not the slightest jruitification in this case for the complaint that there has been any denial of natural justice.\"\n\n\"In onr opinion, since the appellants have received a fair treatment and also all reasonable opportunities to make out their own case before Government they ca1uwt be allowed to make any grievance of the fact that they were not given a formal notice calling upon them to show cause why their undertaking should not be taken over or that they had not been furnished with a copy of the report.\n\nThey had made all the representations that they could possibly have made against the proposed take-over.\n\nBy ho stretch of imagination, can it be said that the order for take-over took them by surprise.\n\nIn fact, Government gave them ample opportunity to reopen and run the mill on their own if they wanted to avoid the take-over.\n\nThe blunt fact is that the a!'Jiellants just did not have the irecessary resources to do so.\n\nInsi.<!ence on formal hearin11 in such circumstances is nothing but insistence on empty formality.''\n\n(emphasis added)\n\n(3) (b) \"In our opinion it is not possible to lay down any general principle on the question as to whether the report of an investigating body or ah inspector appointed by an administrative authority should be made available to the persons concerned in any given case before the authority takes a decision upon that report.\n\nThe answer to this question also must always depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not at all unlikely that there may be artain cases where unless the repon i5\n\nl[)\n\nl!I\n\nSUPREME COURJ; REPORTS\n\n[!981] 2 S.C.R.\n\ngiven the party concerned cannot make any effective representatfon about the action that Government takes or proposes to ta.ke on the basis of that report.\n\nWhether the report should be furnished or not must therefore, depend in every individual case on the merits of that case.\n\nWe have no doubt that in the instant case, non-disclosure of the repon of the Investigating Committee has not caused any prejudice whatsoever to the appellants.\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nIt will be seen from what has been extracted above that in Keshav Mills case, this Court did not lay it down as an invariable rnle .that where a full investigation after 'notice to the owner of the industrial undertaking has been held under Section 15, the owner is never entitled on grounds of natural justioc, to a copy of the investigation report and to an opportunity of making a representation about the action that the Government proposes to take on the basis of that repon. On the contrary, it was clearly said that this rule of nalural justice will apply at that stage in cases \"where unless the repon is given the party concerned cannot make any effe.ctive representation about the action that Government takes or proposes to take on the basis of that report.\" It was held that the application E or non-applicatio'n of this rnle depends on the facts and citc; umstances of tlie particiilar case.\n\nIn the facts of that case, it was found that the non-disclosure of the investigatfon report had not caused any prejudice whatever because the Company were \"aware all along that as a result of the report of the Investigating Committee the Company's undertaking was going to be taken (over) by Government\", and had full oppor-\n\nF tunities; to make all possible representations before the Goverµment against the proposed tak; over of the MµJ.\n\nShri Sorabji submitted that the observations made by this Court in Keshav Mills case, to the effect, that in certain cases even at the postinvestigation stage. before making an order of take-over under Section G 18A, it may be necessary to give another opport, unity to the affected 'owner of the undertaking to make a representation, appear to be erroneous.\n\nThe argument is that the Legislature has provided in Sections 15 and 18A of the Act and Rule 5 framed thereunder, its measure of this principle of natural justice and the sta!j~ at which it has to be observed, 'The High Court, therefore, was not rig\\lt in H engraftir\\g any further application of the rnle of natural justice at the\n\nf ' post infostigation s1nge.\n\nAccording to the learned Solicitor-Gneral for the Meisicm of '\\he case, it was not heoessary to go beyon4 the\n\n.sWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION. (Sarkaria, !.) 581\n\nratio of Shri Ambalal, M, Shah & Anr. v . .Hathi Si11gh Manufacturing :. A Co. Ltd.(') which was followed in Keshav Mills case.\n\nIn onr opinion, the observations of this Court in Keshav Mills in regard to the application of this rule of natural justice at the post-investigation stage cannot b~ called obiter dicta.\n\nThere is \\1othing in those observations, which can be said to be inconsistent with the ratio decidendi of Ambalal's case.\n\nThe main ground on which the order of take-over under Section 18A was challenged in Ambalal's case was that on a proper construction of Section 18A, the Central Government had the right to make the order under that Section on the ground that the Company was being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest, only wher•c the investigatio'ri made under Section 15 was initiated on the basis of the opinion as mentioned in Section 15(b), whereas in the present case (i.e. Ambalal's case), the investigation ordered by the Central Government was initiated on the formation of an opinion as mentioned in clause (a) (i) of Section\n\n15. It was urged that, in fact, the Committee appointed to investigate had not directed its investigation into the question whether the industrial undertaking was being managed in the manner mentioned abcve.\n\nThe High Court came to the conclusion that on a correct construction of Section 18 A(l) (b) it was necessary before any order could be made thereunder that th~ inves, tigation should have been initiated on the basis of the opinion mentioned in Section 15(b) of the Act.\n\nIt also accepted the petitioner's contention that no inwstigation had, in fact, been held info\n\nthe question whether the undertaking was being managed in a manner hlghly detrimental to public interest,\n\nOn. appeal .by spial leave, . this Court reversed the decision of t)ly IJ:igh Court, and held that the words nsed by the Legislatnre in\n\n~- Section J 8A ( 1) (b) \"in respect of which an investigation has been\n\n; ma<le uµder Section 15\" cpuld not be cut down by the restricting\n\nphfase \"based on an opinion that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest\"; that Section ISA (1) (b) empowers the Central Government to authorise a persop to take .ovr the management of 'an industrial undertaking if. the one condition of an in- VeStigation made under Section 15 had been folfilled irre, spective of on what opinion that investigation was initiated and the further condition is fulfilled that the Central Government was of. opinion that such\n\nn'ertaking was being rilana~d in .~ manner highly dtrilllental ·.to the sclieduled industry concerned or to' public interest. In this Court it _ _:_j_ ' ' ·-- ,_~ .. ~' ' ' '\n\n\nwas urged on behalf of the Company that absurd results would follow if the words \"investigation has been made under Section 15\" are held to include investigation based on any of the opinions mentioned in Section 15(a). Asked to mention what the absurd results would be, the counsel could only say that an order under Section 18A (I)\n\n(b) would be unfair and contrary to natural justice in such cases, as the owner of an industrial undertaking would have no notice that the quality of management was being investigated.\n\nThe Court found no basis for this assumption because in its opinion, the management cou:d not but be aware that investigation would be directed in regard to the quality of management, also.\n\nIt is to be noted that the question of natural justice was casually and half heartedly raised in a different context as a last resort.\n\nIt was negatived because in the facts and circumstances of that case, the Company was fully aware that the quality of the management was also being inquired into and it had full opportunity to meet the allegations against it during investigation.\n\nThe second reason-which is more or less a facet of the firstfor holdin2 that the mere use of the word \"immediate\" in the phrase \"immediate actioh is necessary'', does not necessarily and absolutely exclude the prior application of the audi alteram partem rule, is that immediacy or urgency requiring swift action is a situational fact having a direct nexus with the likelihcql of adverse effect on fall in production.\n\nAnd, such likelihood and the urgency of action to prevent it, may vary greatly in degree.\n\nThe words \"likely to affect production\" used in Section !SAA (1) (a) are flexible enough to comprehehd a wide spectrum of situations ranging from the one where the likelihood of the happning of the apprehended event is imminent to that where it may be reasonably anticipated to happen sometime in the near future.\n\nCases of extreme urgency where action under Section 18AA(l) (a) to prevent fall in production and consequent injury to public interest, brooks absolutely no de:ay, would be rare. - In most cases, where the urgency is not so extreme, it is practicable to adjust and strike a balance between the competing claims of hurry and hearing.\n\nThe audi alteram partem rule, as already pointed out, is a very flexible, malleable and adaptable concept of natural justice. To adjust and harmonise the need for speed and obligation to act fairly, it can be modified and the measure of its application cut short in reasonable proportion to the exigencies of the situation.\n\nThus, in the ultimate analysis, the question, (as to what extent and in what measure) this rule of fair hearing will apply at the pre-decisional stage will depend upon the degree of urgency, if any, evident from the facts and circumstances of the particular case.\n\n~··\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, !.) 583\n\nIn the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order.\n\nThere was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre-takeover stage.\n\nAs regards the other five units of the Company, the question whether on the basis of the evidential matter before the Government at the time of making the impugned order, any reasonable person could reasonably form an opinion about a likelihood of fall in production and the urgency of taking immediate action, will be discussed later. For the purpose of the question under consideration\n\nwe shall assume that there was a likelihood of fall in production. Even c so, the undisputed facts and figures of production of 2 or 3 years preceding the take-over, relating to these units, show that on the average, production in these units has remained fairly constant.\n\nRather, in some of these units, an upward trend in production was discernible.\n\nBe that as it may, the likelihood of fall in production or adverse effect on production in tbse five units, could not, by any stretch of prognos- D trcal!on or feat of imagination, be said to be imminent, or sq urgent that it could not permit the giving of even a minimal but real hearing to the Company before taking-over these units.\n\nThere was an interval of about si~ weeks between the Official Group's Report, dated February 16, 1978 and the passing of the impugned order dated April 13, 1978.\n\nThere was thus sufficient time available to the Government to serve a E copy of that report on the appellant Company and to give them a short-measure opportunity to submit their reply and representation regarding the findings and recommendations of the Group Officers and the proposed action under Section 18AA ( 1).\n\nThe third reason for our forbearance to imply the exclusion of the audi a/teram partem rule from the language of Section 18AA(l) (a) is, that although the power thereunder is of a drastic nature and the consequences of a take-over are far-reaching and its effect on the rights and interests of the owner of the undertaking is grave and deprivatory, yet the Act does not make any provision giving a full right of a remedial bearing equitable to a full right of appeal, at the post-decisional stage .\n\nThe High Court seems to be of the view that Section J 8F gives a nght of full post-decisional remedial hearing to the aggrieved party.\n\nShri Soli Sorabji also elaborately supported that view of the High Court. In the alternative, the learned counsel has committed himself H on behalf of bis client, to the position, that the Central Government will if required, give the Company a full and fair hearing on merits,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO)!.TS\n\n{1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nincluding an opportunity to show that the impugned order was not made on adequate or valid grounds.\n\nShri Nariman on the other hand contends-and we think rightlythat the so-called right of a post-decisional hearing available to the aggrieved owner of the undertaking under Section 18F is illusory as in B its operation and effect the power of review, if any, conferred thereunder, is prospective, and not retroactive, being strictly restricted to and liependent upon the post-takeover circumstances.\n\nBy virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 18AA, the reference to Section 18A in Section 18F will be construed as a reference to Section 18AA, also.\n\nThe power of cancellation under Section l SF can he exercised only an any of these grounds : (i) \"that the purpose of the order made under Section 18A has been fulfilled\", or (il) \"that for any other reason it is not necessary that the order should remain in force\". 'These 'grounds' and the language in which they are couched is clear enough to show that the cancellation contemplated thereunder cannot have the e!Iect of annulling, rescinding or obliterating the order of take-over with retro-active force; it can have only a prospective effeet. Section l 8F embodies a principle analogous to that in Sectioll\n\n21 of the General Clauses Act.\n\nThe first 'ground' in Section 18F for the exercis_e oif the power, obvioµly doe~ not cover a review ol the merits or circumstances preceding and existing at the date of passing the order of 'take-over' under Section 18AA(l). The words \"for any other reason\" if read in isolation, no doubt, appear to be of wide amplitude.\n\nBut their ambit has been greatly cut down and\n\nircumscribed by the contextua, J phrase \"no longer necessary that it should remain in force\".\n\nConstrued in this context, the expressioni \"for any other reason\" cannot include a ground that the very order of take-over was invalid or void ab initio.\n\nThus, the post-decision~ hearing. available to the aggrieved otwner ot the undertaldng is not an! appropriate substitute for a fair-hearing, at the pre-decisional stage.\n\nThe Act does not provide any adequate remedial hearing or right of\n\nredres~Jo the aggrieved party even where his under-taking has been arbitrarily taken-over on insufficient grounds.\n\nRather, the plight'' of the aggrieved owner is accentuated by the provision in 18D which disentitles him and other persons whose officers are Jost or whose conttact of management is terminated as a result of the 'take-over', from claiming any cmpensation whatever for such loss or termination.\n\nBefore we conclude the discussion on this point, we may notice one If more argument that has been advanced on behalf of the respondents.\n\nIt is argued that this was a case where a prior hearing to the Company could .o.nly be a useless formality because the impugned action has been\n\nSWADESHI coiioN 'MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, /.) 58 s\n\ntaken on the basis of evidence, consisting of the Balance-sheet, account- A books and other records of the Company itself, the correctness af which could not have been disputed by the Company.\n\nOn these premises, it is submitted that non-observance of the rule of audi a/trem partem would not prejudice the Company, and thus make no difference.\n\nThe contention does not appear to be well-founded.\n\nFirstly, this B documentary evidence, at best, shows that the Company was in debt and the assets of some of its 'units' had been hypothecated or mortgaged as security for those debts.\n\nGiven an opportunity the Company might have explained that as a result of this indebtedness there was no likelihood of fall in production, which is one of the essential conditions m regard to which the Government must be satisfied before taking c action under Section 18 ( 1) (a).\n\nSecondly, what the rule of natural Justice requirr.d in the c!Icumstances of this case, was not only that the\n\nCompany should have been given an opportunity to explain the evidence against it, but also an opportunity to be informed of the proposed achon ot take-over and to represent why it be not taken.\n\nIn the renowned case, Ridge v. Baldwin & Ors. (ibid), it was contended before the House of Lords that since the appellant police officer had convicted himself out of his own mourh, a prior hearing to him by lhe Watch Committee could not have made any difference; that on the undeniable facts of that case, no reasonable body of men could have reinstated the appellant.\n\nThis contention was rejected by the House E of Lords for the reason that if the Watch Committee had given the police officer a prior hearing they would not have acted wrongly or\n\nunrearnnably if they had in the exercise of their discretion decided to take a more lenient course than the one they had adopted.\n\nA similar argument was advanced in S. L. Kapoor v. lagmohan & p Ors(') tu which decision two of us (Sarkaria and Chinuappa Reddy, JJ.) were parties.\n\nIn negativing this argument, this Court, inter a/ia, quoted with approval the classic passage, reproduced below, from the judgment of Megarry, J. in John v. Rees & Ors(2)\n\n\"l\\s everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn 'with examples of\n\nopeu and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change.\n\nNor are those with any knowledge of human\n\n(I) [t981] 1 S.C.R. 746.\n\n(2) (1970) I Chancery p. 345 •t).!402\n\nnature who pause to think for a moment likely to underestimat~ the feelings of resentment of those who find that a decision against them has been made without their being a:torded any opponunity to mfluence the course of events.\"\n\nIn General Medical Council v. Spackman('), Lord Wright condemned the oft-adopted attitude by tribunals to refuse relief on the ground that a fair hearing could have made no difference to the result.\n\nWade in his Administrative Law, 4th Edn., page 454, has pointed out that \"in principle it is vital that the procedure and the merits should be kept strictly apart, since otherwise the merits may be prejudged unfairly\",\n\nIn Maxwell v. Department of Trade & Industry(2 ), Lawton L.J. expressed in the same strain that \"doing what is right may still result in unfairness if it is done in the wrong way.\" This view is founded on the cordinal canon that justice mus.t not only be done but also manifestly be seen to be done.\n\nObservance of this fundamental principle is necessary if the courts and the tribunals and the administrative bodies are to command public confidence in the settlement of disputes or in taldng quasi-judicial or administrative decisions affecting civil rights or legitiinate interests of the citizens.\n\nThe same proposition was propounded in R. v. Thames Magistrates' Court ex p. Polemis(8), by Lord Widgery C.J. at page 1375; :ind by the American Supreme Court in Margarita Fuentes et al., v. Tobert L. Shevin(4).\n\nIn concluding the discussion in regard to this aspect of the matter, we can do no' better than reiterate what was said by one of us (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) in S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (ibid) :\n\n\"In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed.\n\nThe non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.\"\n\n(I) [1955] 1 K.B. 24.\n\n(2) [1974] QB 523 at p. 540.\n\n(3) [1974] I W.L.R. 1371.\n\n(4) 32 L.Ed. 2d 556 at p. 574.\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Sarkaria, I.) 587\n\nWe, therefore, over-rule this last contention .\n\nIn sum, for all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that it is not reasonably possible to construe Section I SAA( 1) as universally excluding, either expressly or by inevitable intendment, the application of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-takeover stage, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.\n\nIn the circumstances of the insta'nt case, in order to ensure fairplay in action it was imperative for the Government to comply substantially\n\nwith this fundamental rule of prior hearing before passing the impugned order.\n\nWe. therefore, accept the two-fold proposition posed and propounded by Shri Nariman. .. The further question to be considered is : What is the effect of the noh-observance ot this fundamental principle of £airplay ? Does the non-observance of the audi alteram partem rule, which in the quest of justice under the rule of law, has been considered universally and most spontaneously acceptable principle, render an administrative decision having civil consequehces, void or voidable? In England, the outfall from the watershed decision, Ridge v. Baldwin brought with it a rash of conflicting opinion oh this point.\n\nThe majority of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin held that the non-observance of this principle, had rendered the dismissal of the Chief Constable void.\n\nTlle rationale of the majority view is that where there is a duty to act fairly, just like the duty to act reasonably, it has to be enforce4 as an implied statutory requiiement, so that failure to observe it means that th\" administrative act or decision was outside the statutory power, unjustified by law, and therefore ultra vires and void. (See Wade's Administrative Law, ibid, page 448). In India, this Court has consistently taken the view that a: quasi-judicial or administrative decision rendered ih violation of the audi alteram partem rule, wherever it can be read as an implied requirement of the law, is null and void. (e.g. Maneka Gandhi's case, ibid, and S. L. Kapoor v. -''Pgmohan, ibid). In the facts and circumstances of the instant case,\n\n'there has tr.en a non-compliahce with such implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage.\n\nThe impugned order therefore, could be struck down as invalid on that score alone.\n\nBut we refrain from doing so, because the learned Solicitor-General in all fairness, has both orally and in his written ., submissiohs dated August 28, 1979, committed himself to the position that under Section ! 8F, the Central Govermnent in exercise of its curial functions, is bound to give the affected owner of the under- • taking taken-over, a \"full and effective hearing on all aspects touching the validity and/ or correctness of the order and/or action of take-\n\nF /\n\nover\", within a reasonable time after the take-over.\n\nThe learned Solicitor has assured the Court that such a hearing will be afforded to the appellant Company if it approaches the Q:mtral Government for cancellation of the impugned order.\n\nIt is pointed out that •his was the conceded position in the High Court that the aggrieved owner of the u'ndertaking had a right to such a hearing.\n\nIn view of this commitment! or concession fairly made by the learned Solicitor-General, we refrain from quashing the impugned order, and allowing Civil Appeal 1629 of 1979 send the case back to the Central Government with the direction that it shall, within a reasonable time, preferably within three months from today, give a full, fair and effective hearing to the aggrieved owner of the undertaking, r~ . i.e., the Company, on all aspects of the matter, including those touching the validity and/or correctness of the impugned order and/or action of take-over and then after a review of all the relevant materials and circumstances including those obtaining on the date of the impugned order, shall take such fresh decision, andior such remedial action as may be necessary, just, proper and in accordance with law.\n\nIn view of the above decision, no separate order is necessary in Civil Appeals 1857 and 2087 of 1979.\n\nAll the three appeals arc disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.\n\nSince the appeals h\\!ve been disposed of on the first i.nd foremost point canvassed before us, in the manner indicated above, it is not necessary to burden this judgment with a discussion of the other poi'nts argued by the counsel for the parties.\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. l have the misfortune to be unable to agree with the erudite opinion of my learned brother Sarkaria on the question of the applicability of the principles of natural justice.\n\nI do so with diffidence and regret.\n\nThe first of the submissions of Shri F. S. Nariman, learned counsel for the appellant company was that there was . a violation of the principles of natural justice.\n\nHe submitted that the provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act did not rule out natural justice and that !here were several occasions in the march of events that led to the passing of the order under Sec. l 8AA • when an opportunity could have been given to the Company and the principles of natnral justice observed but the Government of India refrained from doing so.\n\nHe urged that the immediate action • contemplated by Sec. 18AA(l) (a) was not to be construed as negat-\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 589\n\ning natural justice but as intended merely to distinguish it from action under Sec. 18A which was to be taken only after investigation under Sec. 15. He drew inspiration for this argument from the marginal note to Section 18AA which is \"power to take over industrial undertakings without investigation under certain circumstances\".\n\nHe also urged that Sec. 18F contemplated a post-decisional situation necessitating cancellation of the order of take-over but did not contemplate cancellation of the order of take-over on the ground that such order ought never to have been made. He urged that the scope of Sec. 18F was very narrow and did not entitle the party affected to a fair hearing.\n\nIn any case he argued that the remedy such as it was povided by Sec. 18F was not an answer to the claim to predecisional natural justice.\n\nHis submission was that natural justice was not to be excluded except by the clear and unmistakable language of the statute, though the \"quantum'' of natural justice to be afforded in an individual case might vary from case to case.\n\nShr> Soli Sorabji, learned Solicitor General, while conceding that statutory silence on the question of natural justice should ordinarily lead to an implication by presumption that natural justice was to be observed, urged that the presumption might be displaced by necessary implication, as for instance where compliance with natural justice might be inconsistent with the demands of promptitude, and delayed action might lead to disaster.\n\nThe presumption of implication of natural justice was very weak where action was of a remedial or preventive nature or where such action concerned property rights only. In appropriate situations post-decisional hearing might displace pre-decisional natural justice.\n\nThe statute itself might well P, rovide for a post-decisional hearing as a substitute for pre-decisional natural justice in situations requiring immediate action.\n\nSec. 18-F of the Industries Development and Regulation Act expressly provided for such a postdecisional hearing and the urgency of the situation contemplated by Sec. 18AA necessarily excluded pre-decisional natural justice.\n\nThere was no reason to belittle the scope of Sec. 18F, so, to exclude a fair post-decisional hearing at the instance of the party affected and consequently, to imply pre-decisional natural justice.\n\nBoth the learned counsel invited our attention to considerable case-law. I do not propose to discuss the case law as my brother Sakraria has referred to all the cases in great detail.\n\nBefore I consider the submissions of the learned counsel as to the applicability of the principles of natural justice, a few prefatory remarks, however, require to be made.\n\n5-152SCI/81\n\nNatural justice, like Ultra Vires and Public Policy, is a branch of the Public Law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizeu. It is productive of great good as well as much mischief.\n\nWhile it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used, as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. In the context of modern welfare legislation, the time has perhaps come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests.\n\nOur Constitution, as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest.\n\nNatural justice, Ultra Vires, Public Policy, or any other rule of interpretation must therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society.\n\nIn Ridge v. Baldwin('), it was thought by Lord Reid that natural D justice had no easy application where questions of public interest and policy were more important than the rights of individual citizens. He observed :\n\n\"If a Minister is considering whether to make a scheme for, say, an important new road, his primary concern will E not be with the damage which its construction will do to the rights of individual owners of land. He will have to consider all manner of questions of public interest and, it may be, a number of alternate schemes. He cannot be prevented from attaching more importance to the fulfilment of his policy than to the fate of individual objectors, and it would be F quite wrong for the Courts to say that the Minister should or could act in the same kind of way as a board of works deciding whether a house should be pulled down.\"\n\nAnd, as pointed out by a contributor in 1972 Cambridge Law Journal at page 14 :\n\n\". . . . . . the safeguarding of existing rights can after all in some circumstances amount to little more than the fij!hting of a rear-guard action by the reactionary element in society seeking only to preserve its own vested position.\"\n\nThe United States Supreme Court has recognised the distinction H between cases where only property rights are involved and cases where\n\nother civil and political rights are involved.\n\nIn cases where only\n\n(I) [1964) AC 40,\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 591\n\n' property rights are involved postponement of enquiry has been held A not to be a denial of due process, vide : Annie G. Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue('), John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee(2), • Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida('), and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. F. Grant Co.(<).\n\nIn the first case (75 L.Ed. 1289), Brandeis J. observed :\n\n\"Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate.\n\nDelay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that Governmental needs be immediately satisfied. For the protection of public health, a state may order the summary destruction of property by administrative authorities without antecedent notice or hearing. Because of the public necessity the property of citizens may be summarily seized in war time. And at any time, the United States may acquire property by eminent domain, withol!t paying, or determining the amount of the compensation before the taking.\"\n\n[ The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the juditf' cial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani, Kraipak, Mohinder\n\nSingh Gill, Maneka Gandhi etc. etc. They are now considered so fundameutal as to be \"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty\" and, therefore, implicit in every decision making function, call it judicial, quasi judicial or administrative. Where authority funcons under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other.\n\nNo wider right than that provided by statute can be claimed nor can the right be narrowed.\n\nWhere the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. The implication of natural justice being !Presumptive it may be excluded by express words of statute or by necessary intendment.\n\nWhere the conflict is between the public intere3t and the private interest, the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displacedJThe presumption is also weak where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, pre-emptive\n\n(I) 75 L Ed 1289\n\n(2) 91 L Ed 2030\n\n(3) 32 L Ed 2d 556\n\n(4) 40 L Ed 2d 406\n\nSIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\naction may be a strategic necessity.\n\nThere may then be no question of observing natural justice. Even in cases of pre-emptive action. if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice.\n\nWhere natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation.\n\nSeeming judicial ambivalence on the question of the applicability of the principles of natural justice is generally traceable to the readiness of judges to apply the principles of natural justice where no question of the public interest is involved, particularly where rights and interests other than property rights and vested interests are involved and the\n\nreluctance of judges to apply the principles of natural justice, where there is suspicion of public mischief nd only property rights and vested interests are involved.\n\nIn the light of these prefatory remarks, I will proceed to consider the relevant statntory provisions.\n\nThe Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, was enacted pursuant to the pOIWer given to Parliament by Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nAs required by that Entry Section 2 of the Act declares that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take' under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act.\n\nItem 23 of the First Schedule to the Act relates to Textiles of various categories, Sec. 3(d) defines \"Industrial undertaking\" to mean \"any undertaking pertaining to a scheduled industry carried on in one or more factories by any person or authority including Government''.\n\nThe expression undertaking is not, however, defined Sec. 3 (f) defines \"Owner\", \"in relation to an industrial undertaking\" as \"the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of the undertaking, and, where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agents, such manager, managing director or managing agent shall be deemed to be the owner of the undertaking\".\n\nSec. 3 (j) provides that words and expressions not defined in the Act but defined in the Companies Act shall have the meaning assigned to them .in that Act. Sec. 10 obliges the owner of an industrial undertaking to register the undertaking in the prescribed manner.\n\nSec. lOA authorises the revocation of registration after giving an opportunity to the owner of the undertaking in certain circumstances.\n\nSec. 11 provides for the licensing of the new industrial undertaking and Sec. 1 lA provides for the licensing of thri production and manufacture of the new articles.\n\nSec. 13 provides, among other things, that, except under, and in accordance with. a licence issued in that behalf by the Central Government, no owner of an industrial undertaking shall effect any snbstantial expansion or\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 593\n\nchange the location of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking.\n\nSt; c. 14 provides for a full and complete investigation in respect of applications for the grant of licence or permission under Sections 11, 11 A, 13 or 29B.\n\nSec. 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation _into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that :\n\n(a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production ..... for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevail ing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality Qf any article ...... which could have been or can be avoided; or\n\n(iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any arti, cle ...... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or\n\n( b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under Sec. 15, Sec. 16(1) provides, if the Central Government is satisfied that such action is desirable, it may issue appropriate directions for\n\n(a) regulating the production of any article ...... and fixing the standards of production;\n\n(b) requiring the industrial undertaking to take such F steps as the Central Government may consider necessary, to stimulate the development of the industry;\n\n( c) prohibiting resort to any act or practice which might reduce the undertaking's production, capacity or eco..\n\nG nomic value;\n\n( d) controlli11g the prices, or regulating the distribution of any article.\n\nSec. 16(2) also provides for the issue of interim directions by the\n\nCentrl Government pending investigation under Sec. 15. Such direc- H tions are to have effect until validly revoked by the Central Government\n\nChapter III-A consisting o1' Sections !SA, 18-AA-\n\n18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deals with \"direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases\".\n\nSec. 18-A which is entitled \"Power of Central Government to assume management or control of an industrial undertaking in certain cases\" provides that tj1e Central Government may, by notified order, authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order. if the Central Gcwernment is of opinion that :\n\n(a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have\n\nbeen issued in pursuance of Sec. 16 has failed to mmply with such directions, or\n\n(b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to publio interest.\n\nSec. 18-AA refers to \"Power to take over industrial undertakings without investigation under certain circumstances\". It enables the Central Government by a notified order to authorise any person or E body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if, without prejudice to any other provisions of the Act, from the documentary or other evidence in its possession, the Central Government is satisfied in relation to the industrial under- F taking, that\n\n''la) the persons incharge of such industrial undertakings\n\nhave, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation; or •\n\n(b) it has been closed for a period of not less than three months (whether by reason of the voluntary winding up o1' the company owning the industrial undertaking or for any other reason) and such closure is prejudicial to the concerned scheduled industry and\n\n. ./\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 595\n\nthat the financial condition of the company owning the industrial undertaking and the condition of the plant and machinery of such undertaking are such that it is possible to re-start the undertaking and such re-starting is necessary in the interests of the general public\".\n\nSec. J 8-AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18-E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under s. 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Sec. 18-A.\n\nSec. 18-B specifies the eftect of a notified order under Sec. 18-A.\n\nSec.\n\n!SC empowers the Court to cancel or vary contracts made in bad faith etc. by the management of an undertaking before such management was taken by the Central Government.\n\nSec. 18-D provides that there shall be no right to compensation for termination of office or contract as a result of the 'take over'.\n\nSec. 18-E deprives the shareholders and the Company of certain rights under the Indian Companies Act. if the industrial undertaking whose management is taken over is a Company.\n\nSec. 18-F empowers the Central Govern• ment on the application of the owner of the industrial undertakingi or otherwise to cancel the order made under Sec. 18-A if it appears to the Central Government that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or that for •my other reason it is not necessary that the order should remain in force.\n\nSec. 18FD(3) enables the Central Government to exercise the powers under Sec. 18-F in relation to an undertaking taken over under Sec. 18-AA.\n\nThe question for consideration is whether Sec. 18-AA excludes natural justice by necessary implication. The development and regu- F lation of certain key industries was apparently considered so basic and vital to the economy of our country that Parliament, in its wisdom, thought fit to enact the Industries Development & Regulation,\n\nAct, after making the declaration required by Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution that it was expedient, in the public interest, that the Union should take under its control the G industries specified in the schedule to the Act, as earlier mentioned by us.\n\nApart from making provision for the establishment of a Central Advisory Council and other Development Councils, and the licensing of scheduled industries, the Act empowers the Central Government to cause a full and complete investigation to be made where there is a substantial fall in the volume of production for H which there is no justification having regard to the prevailing economic conditions or there is marked deterioration in the quality of the\n\ngoods produced or the price of the goods produced is rising unjustifiably or where conservation of resources of national importance is necessary or the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or to public interest (Sec. 15) and thereafter to issue necessary and appropriate directions to the industrial undertaking to mend matters suimbly (Sec. 16).\n\nWhere the instructions issued under Sec. 16 are not complied with or\n\nwher~ the investigation reveals that the industrial undertaking i& being managed in a manner highly detrimenml to the scheduled industry or to the public interest the Central Government may take over the industry under Sec. 18-A. Whether there is an investigation or not, the Central Government may also 'take over' the management of the industry under Sec. 18-AA, if consequent on certain wilfull acts of commission on the part of the management the production is likely to be effected but immediate action may prevent suclt a situation, or the industrial undertaking has been closed for a period of not less than three months and the closure is prejudicial to the scheduled industry. Action under Sec. 18-AA is thus preventive and remedial.\n\nWhere there is an apprehension that production is likely to be affected as a result of the wilful! acts of the management or where the production has already come to a stand-still because of the closure of the undertaking for a period of not less than three months the Central Government is authorised to intervene to restore production.\n\nThe object clearly is to take immediate action to preven~ a situation likely to affect production or to restore production. There was some argument at the Bar that the expression 'immediate action' was not to be found in Sec. 18-AA(l)(b). I do not think that the absence of the expression \"immediate action in Sec. 18-AA(l) (b) makes any difference.\n\nSec. 18-AA(l) (a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas Sec. 18-AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore no.rmalcy.\n\nRestoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent, in the public interest, as preven\\iQl1 of a situation where production may be affected.\n\nImmediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by Sec. 18-AA(l){b) as in the situation contemplated by Sec. 18-AA-\n\n(1) (a).\n\nIt is true that the marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word 'immediate' is used only to contra-distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by Sec. 15 of the Act, though, of course a consequence of immediate action under Sec. 18-AA may be to dis-\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,/.) 597\n\npense with the enquiry under Sec. 15.\n\nIn fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under Sec. 15 may form the basis of action under Sec. 18-AA(l) (a).\n\nWhere in the course of an investigation under Sec. 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not\n\nstraight away take action under Sec. 18-AA(l) (a) without waiting for completion of investigation under Sec. 15. Parliament apparently contemplated a situation where immediate action was necessary, and having contemplated such a situation, there is no reason to assume that Parliament did not contemplate situations which brooked not a moments delay. If Parliament also contemplated situations which did not brook a moment's delay, it would be difficult to read natural justice into Sec. 18-AA.\n\nThe submission of Shri Nariman was that the immediacy of the situation would be relevant and relateable to the quantum of natural justice nd not to a total denial of natural justice. According to him the scope and extent of the opportunity to be given to the party against whom action is taken may depend upon the situation but nothing would justify a negation of a natural justice. He pointed out that in a situation of great urgency which brooked no delay, an order under Sec. 18-AA might be made, the situation could be so frozen that the persons incharge of the industrial undertaking might do no more mischief and the GC>Vermnent could then, without giving further effect to the order under Sec. 18-AA, give a notice to the person incharge to show caue why the order under Sec. 18-AA should not be given effect.\n\nIn another given case, according to Shri Nariman, notice of, say two. weeks, might be given before making\n\nan order, if the making of an order was not so very urgent.\n\nHe suggested that the opportunity to be given might vary from situation to situation but opportunity there must be, either before the decision was arrived at or so shortly after the decision was arrived at and before any great mischief might result from the order.\n\nThe argument of Shri N ariman would vest in the Government a power to decide from case to case the extent of opportunity to be given in each individual case and, as a corollary, a corresponding right in the aggrieved party to claim that the opportunity provided was not enough.\n\nSuch a procedure may be possible, practicable and desirable in situations\n\nwhere there is no statutory provision enabling the decision making authority to review, or reconsider its decision.\n\nWhere there is a\n\nprovision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it 31Ppears to us to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre-decisional observance of natural justice. The question must be considered by regard to the terms of the statute and by an examination, on the terms of the statute, whether it is possible, practicable and desirable to observe pre-decisional natural justice and whether a post decisional review or reconsideration provided by the statute itself is not a sufficient substitute.\n\nThe likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest.\n\nParliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the mana_gement of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it\n\nhas already stopped.\n\nThe necessity for immediate action by the Central Government, contemplated by Parliament, is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice.\n\nIt is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy.\n\nHe may move the Central Government under Sec. 18-F to C'ancel the order made under Sec. 18-AA.\n\nTrue some mischief affecting the management and top executives may have already been done.\n\nOn the other hand, greater mischief affecting the public economy and the lives of many a thousand worker may have been averted.\n\nWhile on the one hand mere property rights are involved, on the other vital public interest is affected.\n\nThis ...... again, in the ligjit of the need for immediate action contemplated by Parliament, is a clear pointer to the exclusion of natural justice .. lLwas submitted by the learned counsel that Sec. 18-F did not provide any remedy but merely prnvided for cancellation of an order of take over on the fulfilment of the purpose of the order of take over or\n\nfor any other reason which rendered further continuance in force of the order unnecessary because of the happening of subsequent events.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel the basic assumption of Sec. 18-F was the validity of the order nnder Sec. 18-A or Sec. 18-AA. All that Sec. 18-F did was to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the general power which every authority had under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act to cancel its own earlier order.\n\nIt was said that if Sec. 18-F could be said to impliedly exclude natural justice there is then no reason not to hold that Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act similarly excluded natural justice in every case.\n\nI am unable to agree with these submissions of the learned counsel.\n\nNeither Sec. 18-F of the Industries H (Development and Regulation) Act nor Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act, by itself, excludes natural justice.\n\nThe exclusion of natural justice, where such exclusion is not express, has to be implied by reference\n\n\\ ,>'.\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 599\n\nto the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre-decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute.\n\nThat a post-decisional. hearing may also be had by the terms of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned.\n\nOn the other hand even the general provision contained in Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act may be sufficient to so interpret the terms of a given statute as to exclude natural justice.\n\nAs I said it depends on the subject, statute and the statutory situation.\n\nI am, therefore, satisfied that the principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by Sec. 18-AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act.\n\nIn view of the orde~ proposed by my learned brothers Sarkaria and Desai JJ. I do not propose to consider the other questions.\n\nORDER\n\nAs per majority decision, the appeals are allowed.\n\nN. K. A.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 516, "entities": [{"text": "SWADESHI COTTON MILLS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SWADESHI COTTON MILLS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 13, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ·:I\n\n'T•J,~.\n\nSWADESHI COTTON MILLS\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nJanuary 13, 1981\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, D. A. DESAI AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 181, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 583, "end_char": 632, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 786, "end_char": 800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act", "statute": "India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 846, "end_char": 856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act", "statute": "India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 872, "end_char": 890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a tull and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1863, "end_char": 1873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1875, "end_char": 1888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1984, "end_char": 1997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2300, "end_char": 2307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2748, "end_char": 2758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3012, "end_char": 3023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3182, "end_char": 3192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3263, "end_char": 3273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central B Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3304, "end_char": 3324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial under· taking taken over under Section 18-A.\n\nSection 18-F empowers the Central B Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appear& that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the orde( should remain in force."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3356, "end_char": 3366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Cotton Mills", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3514, "end_char": 3535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken ove.r by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section !", "canonical_name": "SWADESHI COTTON MILLS"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3559, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken ove.r by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section !"}}, {"text": "April 13, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3603, "end_char": 3617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken ove.r by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section !"}}, {"text": "Natiollal Textile Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4118, "end_char": 4155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAA of the C Indu; tries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial under .. takings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action i~ ne; sary to prevent such a situation,\n\nThe Government authorised the Natiollal Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shalt comply \\Vitb all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4603, "end_char": 4663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5253, "end_char": 5263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951", "statute": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5403, "end_char": 5414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951", "statute": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951", "statute": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5537, "end_char": 5548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951", "statute": "SAA of the Industries Development and E Regulation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5894, "end_char": 5905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6789, "end_char": 6803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of tbe subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allo\\Ved and the respon~\n\ndents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings."}}, {"text": "National Textile Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7108, "end_char": 7136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. ·"}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7314, "end_char": 7325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7759, "end_char": 7770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7874, "end_char": 7885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7934, "end_char": 7944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8052, "end_char": 8063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8153, "end_char": 8164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8252, "end_char": 8263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8437, "end_char": 8447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8547, "end_char": 8557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8644, "end_char": 8655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8704, "end_char": 8714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8722, "end_char": 8741, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 16, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10237, "end_char": 10254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978."}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11251, "end_char": 11262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11436, "end_char": 11446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", 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Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30324, "end_char": 30333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 in CA 2087 Suresh Parik G and S. Swarup for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30383, "end_char": 30399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for Respondent-Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. in CA No."}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30404, "end_char": 30416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for Respondent-Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. in CA No."}}, {"text": "C. M. Chopra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30493, "end_char": 30505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. M. Chopra for Intervenor."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30539, "end_char": 30553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of R. S. Sarkaria and D. A. 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Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30852, "end_char": 30881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l in Civil Appeal 1629 of 1979 is Swadeshi Cotton Miib Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company)."}}, {"text": "Jaipuria family", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31250, "end_char": 31265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946, the Jaipuria family acquired substantiol holding in the Company."}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31790, "end_char": 31819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D In the year 1946, the Company had only one undertaking, a Textile Unit at Kanpur, known as \"The Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur\"."}}, {"text": "Naini", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31924, "end_char": 31929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1956 and 1973, the Company set up and/or acquired five further Textile Units Jn Pondicherry, Naini, Udaipur, Maunath Bhanjan and Rae Bareilly."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31931, "end_char": 31938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1956 and 1973, the Company set up and/or acquired five further Textile Units Jn Pondicherry, Naini, Udaipur, Maunath Bhanjan and Rae Bareilly."}}, {"text": "Maunath Bhanjan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31940, "end_char": 31955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1956 and 1973, the Company set up and/or acquired five further Textile Units Jn Pondicherry, Naini, Udaipur, Maunath Bhanjan and Rae Bareilly."}}, {"text": "Rae Bareilly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31960, "end_char": 31972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1956 and 1973, the Company set up and/or acquired five further Textile Units Jn Pondicherry, Naini, Udaipur, Maunath Bhanjan and Rae Bareilly."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32092, "end_char": 32102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32110, "end_char": 32159, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Mining and Manu- F facturing Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32374, "end_char": 32424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It holds inter alia 97 per cent shares in the subsidiary, Swadeshi Mining and Manu- F facturing Company Ltd., which owns two sugar Mills."}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Polytex Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32694, "end_char": 32715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10/\" each in Swadeshi Polytex Ltd., representing 30 per cent\n\nG of the total equity capital value of Swadeshi Polytex Ltd., the intrinsic va1ue whereof exceeds Rs."}}, {"text": "s 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34814, "end_char": 34818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36199, "end_char": 36210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36218, "end_char": 36232, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March\n\n31. 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36256, "end_char": 36271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "70 lakhs on the fixed assets of Naini Unit for gratuity funding to get the benefit of Section 44A of the Income-tax Act) were created prior to March\n\n31."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37062, "end_char": 37073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "£wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37385, "end_char": 37414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. 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Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E ."}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37427, "end_char": 37461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. 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Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E ."}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37475, "end_char": 37503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry,\n\n(iii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini, C\n\n(iv) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Maunath Bhanjan,\n\n(v) M/s. Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E ."}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Maunath Bhanjan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37518, "end_char": 37556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry,\n\n(iii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini, C\n\n(iv) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Maunath Bhanjan,\n\n(v) M/s. Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E ."}}, {"text": "Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37568, "end_char": 37597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry,\n\n(iii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini, C\n\n(iv) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Maunath Bhanjan,\n\n(v) M/s. Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E ."}}, {"text": "Rae Bareilly Textile Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37609, "end_char": 37635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry,\n\n(iii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini, C\n\n(iv) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Maunath Bhanjan,\n\n(v) M/s. Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E ."}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37659, "end_char": 37693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545\n\nOn April 13, 1978, the Government of India in exerCise of its A power under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18AA of the IDR Act, passed an order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) which reads as follows :\n\n\"SO 265(E)/l 8AA/IDRA/78-Whereas the Central Government is satisfied from the documentary and other evidence in its possession, that the persons in charge of the industrial undertakings namely,\n\n(i) M/s. £wadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur,\n\n(ii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Pondicherry,\n\n(iii) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini, C\n\n(iv) M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Maunath Bhanjan,\n\n(v) M/s. Udaipur Cotton Mills, Udaipur, and\n\n(vi) Rae Bareilly Textile Mills, Rae Bareilly of M/s.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the said industrial under- D takings), have, by creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said industrial undertakings, brougbt about a situation which has affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the said industrial undertakings and that immediate action is necessary to prevent §uch a E ."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38195, "end_char": 38238, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "National Textile Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38306, "end_char": 38342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 19 51 ( 65 of 1951), the Central Government hereby authorises the National Textile Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Authorised person) to take over the management of the whole of the said industrial undertakings, subject to the following terms and conditions, namely :-\n\n(i) The authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government;\n\n(ii) the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years from the date of publication of this order in the Official Gazette;\n\n(iii) the Central Government may terminate the appoint- H ment of the authorised person earlier if it CO!JSiders necessary to do so."}}, {"text": "R. Ramakrishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39052, "end_char": 39066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- R. Ramakrishna Joint Secretary to the Govt."}}, {"text": "Bhim Singh Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39210, "end_char": 39226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_ On April 19, 1978, three petitioners, namely, the Company through its Joint Secretary, Shri Bhim Singh Gupta, its Managing Director, Dr.\n\nRajaram Jaipuria, and its subsidiary company, named; Swadeshi Mining and Manufacturing Company, through its Directors and Shareholdern filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Delhi High Cami against the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation to challenge the validity of the aforesaid Government Order dated April 13, 1978."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39419, "end_char": 39430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39486, "end_char": 39500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_ On April 19, 1978, three petitioners, namely, the Company through its Joint Secretary, Shri Bhim Singh Gupta, its Managing Director, Dr.\n\nRajaram Jaipuria, and its subsidiary company, named; Swadeshi Mining and Manufacturing Company, through its Directors and Shareholdern filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Delhi High Cami against the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation to challenge the validity of the aforesaid Government Order dated April 13, 1978.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA"}}, {"text": "National Textile Corporation Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39735, "end_char": 39768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India and the National Textile Corporation Ltd., who has been authorised to assume management of the undertakings concerned were impleaded, as respondents."}}, {"text": "October 12, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40117, "end_char": 40133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case vras then heard by a three Judge Bench who by their order dated October 12, 1978, requested the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute a still larger Bench to consider the question whether a prior hearing is necessary to be' given to the persons affected before the order under Section 18AA is passed."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40332, "end_char": 40343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40537, "end_char": 40548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40557, "end_char": 40600, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Deshpande", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41257, "end_char": 41266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by a majority (consisting or Deshpande, CJ.,"}}, {"text": "R. Sacher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41273, "end_char": 41282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Sacher and M. L. Jain, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. L. Jain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41287, "end_char": 41297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Sacher and M. L. Jain, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41360, "end_char": 41371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41479, "end_char": 41490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41628, "end_char": 41637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. L. Anand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41928, "end_char": 41939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Anand and N. N. Goswamy, JJ, however dissented."}}, {"text": "N. N. Goswamy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41944, "end_char": 41957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Anand and N. N. Goswamy, JJ, however dissented."}}, {"text": "Anand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42872, "end_char": 42877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the case was reheard on merits by a Bench of three learned Judges (consisting of Deshpande, C.J., Anand and M. L. Jain, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "May l, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42927, "end_char": 42938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who by their judgment dated May l, 1979, disposed of the writ-petition."}}, {"text": "Polytex", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43385, "end_char": 43392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition succeeds in so far as it seeks to protect from the impugned order the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the holding of the company in Polytex and the assets and property of the company which arc not H referable to any of the industrial undertakings."}}, {"text": "May 1, 19791", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43958, "end_char": 43970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents would release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company, which arc not refer able to the industrial undertakings in terms of the observations made in paras 46 and 4 7 of the judgment, within a period of three months from today (May 1, 19791."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44091, "end_char": 44107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the Company, the Delhi High Court certified under Article l 33 of the Constitution that the case was lit for appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44223, "end_char": 44236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on July 12, 1979, a similar certificate was granted by the High Court to the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation Ltd.\n\nConsequently, the Company, the TJnion of India and the National Textile Corporation have filed Civil Appeals 1629, 2087 and 1857 of 1979, respectively, in this Court."}}, {"text": "National Textile Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44320, "end_char": 44353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on July 12, 1979, a similar certificate was granted by the High Court to the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation Ltd.\n\nConsequently, the Company, the TJnion of India and the National Textile Corporation have filed Civil Appeals 1629, 2087 and 1857 of 1979, respectively, in this Court."}}, {"text": "TJnion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44386, "end_char": 44401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on July 12, 1979, a similar certificate was granted by the High Court to the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation Ltd.\n\nConsequently, the Company, the TJnion of India and the National Textile Corporation have filed Civil Appeals 1629, 2087 and 1857 of 1979, respectively, in this Court."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44647, "end_char": 44660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The primary, two-fold proposition posed and propounded by Shri F. S. Nariman, learned coumel for the appellant-Company in Civil Appeal 1629 of 1979, is as follows :\n\n(a) \\Vhether it is necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before iS>uing a notified order under Section !", "canonical_name": "F. S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44902, "end_char": 44913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44951, "end_char": 44962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45591, "end_char": 45602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45611, "end_char": 45618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nariman contends that there is nothing in the language, scheme or object of the provisions in Section 1 SAA and/or Section\n\n!", "canonical_name": "N ariman"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45705, "end_char": 45714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46707, "end_char": 46718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46995, "end_char": 47005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47442, "end_char": 47453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47504, "end_char": 47514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47821, "end_char": 47832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48010, "end_char": 48021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keshav Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48096, "end_char": 48108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section was there, when in Keshav Mills' case, (ibid), it was held by this Court, that even at the post-investigation stage, before passing an order under Section 18A, the Government must proceed fairly in accordance with the rules of natural justice."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48224, "end_char": 48235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48374, "end_char": 48385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48467, "end_char": 48478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48639, "end_char": 48650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1973) 3 S.C.R. 22", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 48823, "end_char": 48841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48970, "end_char": 48981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49127, "end_char": 49137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49186, "end_char": 49196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49204, "end_char": 49223, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49322, "end_char": 49333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwa.ti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49744, "end_char": 49753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As held by a Bench (consisting of Bhagwa.ti and Vakil JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Bhagwa.ti"}}, {"text": "Vakil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49758, "end_char": 49763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As held by a Bench (consisting of Bhagwa.ti and Vakil JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49776, "end_char": 49794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Gujarat High Court, in Dosabhai Ratans/wh Keravale v. State of Gujarat('), a power to rescind or cancel an order, analogous to that under Section 21, General Clauses Act, has to be construed as a power of prospective cancellation, and not of retroactive obliteration."}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49914, "end_char": 49924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49926, "end_char": 49945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50411, "end_char": 50415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference on this point has been made to Wade's Administrative Law, 4th Edition, pp."}}, {"text": "Daulat Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52038, "end_char": 52048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, it is pointed out that according to pam 3 of the further affidavit filed by Shri Daulat Ram on behalf of the Union of India and other respondents."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52376, "end_char": 52394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1977 prepared by the office of the Textile Commissioner, and (b) Annual Report (dated September 30, 1977) of the Company for the vear ending March 31, 1971."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52431, "end_char": 52445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1977 prepared by the office of the Textile Commissioner, and (b) Annual Report (dated September 30, 1977) of the Company for the vear ending March 31, 1971."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52557, "end_char": 52573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In addition, the third circumstance mentioned in the a.ffidavit of Shri Daulat Ram is, that by an order dated January 28, 1978, the Central Government appointed four Government Officials, including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner, to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53928, "end_char": 53939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54121, "end_char": 54131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Soli Sorabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54725, "end_char": 54737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against this, Shri Soli Sorabji, learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of respondent 1, contends that the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced Ly the language, scheme, setting, and the purpose of the provision in Section 18AA."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54967, "end_char": 54978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55004, "end_char": 55015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55231, "end_char": 55242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55328, "end_char": 55339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55652, "end_char": 55663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55720, "end_char": 55729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sorabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55921, "end_char": 55928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sorabji submits that this rule of natural justice in a modified form has been incorporated in Section 18F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who, if he feels aggrieved, can, on his application, be heard to show that even the original order under Section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded."}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56015, "end_char": 56026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56220, "end_char": 56231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56725, "end_char": 56734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56805, "end_char": 56816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56828, "end_char": 56839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57126, "end_char": 57137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57371, "end_char": 57382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57857, "end_char": 57868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govermnent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58005, "end_char": 58023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Section obligates the Central Govermnent to take all steps which are necessary for the effective hearing and disposal _of ar."}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58127, "end_char": 58138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schwartz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58570, "end_char": 58578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by De Smith('); Queen v.\n\nDavey(•); Gaiman v. National Association for Internal Revenue(•); John H.\n\nN. Fahey v. Paul Millionee('); Schwartz's Administrative Law'(8 ); Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. 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UNION (Earkaria, J.) 55:;\n\ngenerally thought that the rules of natural justice apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; and for that purpose, whenever a breach ·\n\nof the rule of natural justice was alleged, Courts in England used to ascertain whther the impugned action was taken by the statutory authority or tribunal in the excrci'e of its adminisrative or quasi-judicial power."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62089, "end_char": 62094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India also, this was the position before the decision, dated February 7, 1967, of this Court in Dr. Bina Pani Dds case (ibid); wherein it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matter; involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice."}}, {"text": "February 7, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62150, "end_char": 62166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India also, this was the position before the decision, dated February 7, 1967, of this Court in Dr. Bina Pani Dds case (ibid); wherein it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matter; involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice."}}, {"text": "Bina Pani Dds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62189, "end_char": 62202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India also, this was the position before the decision, dated February 7, 1967, of this Court in Dr. Bina Pani Dds case (ibid); wherein it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matter; involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice.", "canonical_name": "Bina Pani Dds"}}, {"text": "Bina Pani Dei", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62500, "end_char": 62513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This supposed distinction between quasijudicial and administrative decisions, which was perceptibly mitigated in Bina Pani Dei's case, was further rubbed out to a vanishing point in A. 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Kraipak's case, the Court also quoted with approval the observations of Lord Parker from the Queens Bench decision in In re\n\nH. K. (An Infant) (ibid), which were to the effect, that good administration and an honest or bona fide decision require not merely impartiality or merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly."}}, {"text": "H. K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63291, "end_char": 63296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A. K. Kraipak's case, the Court also quoted with approval the observations of Lord Parker from the Queens Bench decision in In re\n\nH. K. (An Infant) (ibid), which were to the effect, that good administration and an honest or bona fide decision require not merely impartiality or merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly."}}, {"text": "V.R. Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64000, "end_char": 64017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• In the language of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (vide Mohinder SilU!h Gill's case, ibid.) :"}}, {"text": "Mohinder SilU!h Gill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64028, "end_char": 64048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• In the language of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (vide Mohinder SilU!h Gill's case, ibid.) :", "canonical_name": "Mohinder SilU!h Gill"}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64426, "end_char": 64431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They can supplement the law but cannot supplant it (Per Hegde, J. in A. K. Kraipak, ibid)."}}, {"text": "A. K. Kraipak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64439, "end_char": 64452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They can supplement the law but cannot supplant it (Per Hegde, J. in A. K. Kraipak, ibid).", "canonical_name": "A. K. Kraipak"}}, {"text": "Loreburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65271, "end_char": 65279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule is universally respected and duty to afford a fair hearing in Lord Loreburn's oft-quoted language, is \"a duty lying upon every one who decides something\", in the exercise of legal power."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65517, "end_char": 65522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, \"convenience and justice\"-as Lord Atkin felicitously put it-\"are often not on speaking terms\"(')."}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66451, "end_char": 66460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66668, "end_char": 66679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66687, "end_char": 66713, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66870, "end_char": 66880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66882, "end_char": 66902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Upjohn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67461, "end_char": 67467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Upjohn observed that \"while urgency may rightly limit such opportnnity timeously perhaps severely, there can never be a denial of that opportunity if the principles of natural justice are applicable."}}, {"text": "Durayappah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67699, "end_char": 67709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations of Lord Upjohn in Durayappah's case were quoted with approval by this Court ih Mohinder Singh Gill's case."}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh Gill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67760, "end_char": 67779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations of Lord Upjohn in Durayappah's case were quoted with approval by this Court ih Mohinder Singh Gill's case.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder SilU!h Gill"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 68305, "end_char": 68324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An officer of the Election Commission who was an observer at the counting, reported about the incidents to the Commission."}}, {"text": "Article 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68739, "end_char": 68750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. 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Krishna Iyer, J.. lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of natural justic•c and its role in a case where there is a competition between the necessity of taking speedy\n\n(1) [1967] 2 AC 137 3-152SCf/81\n\naction and the duty to act fairly."}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72637, "end_char": 72641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Reid said: 'Ev•cn\n\nwhere the decision has to be reached by a body acting judicially, there must be a balance between the need for expedition and the need to give full opportunity to the defendant to see material against him (emphasis added)."}}, {"text": "Denning M.R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73433, "end_char": 73445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court further pointed out that the competing claims of hurry and heari'ng can be reconciled by making situationa; modifications in the audi alferam partem rule:\n\n\"Lord Denning M.R., in Manward v. Borneman, summarised the obsrvations of the Law Lords in this form."}}, {"text": "Muneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75240, "end_char": 75253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "emphasis added)\n\nIn 'Muneka Gandhi, it was laid down that where in an emergent situation, requiring immediate action, it is not practicabic to give prior notice or opp01iunity to be heard, the prelimi'nary action should be soon followed by a full remedial hearing."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 75489, "end_char": 75512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Australia in Commissioner of Polzce v. Twws, ibid, held that some urgency, or necessity of prompt action docs not necessarily exclude natural justice because a true emergency situation can be properly dealt with by short measures."}}, {"text": "le Smith", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 77886, "end_char": 77894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it must not be thought 'that because rough, swift or imperfect justice only is available that there ought to be no justice' Prati v. Wanganui Education Board.(1)\"\n\nProf. <le Smith, the renowned author of 'Judicial Review' (3rtl Edn.)"}}, {"text": "May 8,\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80526, "end_char": 80538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The I.D.R. 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Davey & Ors.("}}, {"text": "Section\n\n18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100987, "end_char": 100999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bariam Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 102268, "end_char": 102284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While it may be conceded that an el.ement of subjectivity is always involved in the formatio:i of such an opinion, but as was pointed out by this Court in Bariam Chemicals (ibid), the existence of circumstances from which the inferences constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such \"drcums!ances\", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102541, "end_char": 102552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103774, "end_char": 103784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104295, "end_char": 104305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104324, "end_char": 104334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104655, "end_char": 104665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105418, "end_char": 105428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Proceedings under Section SA of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105613, "end_char": 105652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106166, "end_char": 106177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Proceedings under Section SA of the Act", "statute": "Proceedings under Section SA of the Act"}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107691, "end_char": 107702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107736, "end_char": 107746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107824, "end_char": 107834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108403, "end_char": 108412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108812, "end_char": 108823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N ariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 108983, "end_char": 108991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Firstly, as rightly pointed out by Shri N ariman, the expression \"immediate action\" iii the said phrase, is to be construed in the light of the marginal heading of the Section, its context and the Objects and Reason for enncting this provision.", "canonical_name": "N ariman"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109266, "end_char": 109276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110126, "end_char": 110136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110175, "end_char": 110184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110218, "end_char": 110229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110324, "end_char": 110334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ambalal M. 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Shah and Keshav Mills tliat the only hearing prior to action under Section 18A was the investigation under Section 15, it would follow that action under Section 18AA is to be taken without the investigation under Section 15 and, therefore, without a prior hearing.\""}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110470, "end_char": 110481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110510, "end_char": 110520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110556, "end_char": 110567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110616, "end_char": 110626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R 171", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 110674, "end_char": 110692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110960, "end_char": 110970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kdhav Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 111542, "end_char": 111553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We will first notice the case of Kdhav Mills because that is a later decision in which Ambala('s case was referred to."}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111596, "end_char": 111602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We will first notice the case of Kdhav Mills because that is a later decision in which Ambala('s case was referred to.", "canonical_name": "Ambalal"}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111706, "end_char": 111717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat State Textile Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 111761, "end_char": 111799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that impugned order the Gujarat State Textile Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) was appointed as authorised controller of the Company for a period of five years."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 112161, "end_char": 112168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the year 1964-65, the Company fell on evil days and the textile mill of the Company was one of the 12 sick textile mills in Gujarat, which had to be closed down during 1966 and 1968."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 112224, "end_char": 112236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 31, 1969, the Central Government passed an order appointing a Committee for investigation into the affairs of the Company under Section 15 of the l.D.R. Act- After completing the inquiry, the Investigating Committee submitted its report to the Goverrunent who thereafter on November 24, 1970, passed the impugned order under Section 18A authorising the Corporation to take over the management of the Company for a period of five years."}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112356, "end_char": 112366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 24, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 112502, "end_char": 112519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 31, 1969, the Central Government passed an order appointing a Committee for investigation into the affairs of the Company under Section 15 of the l.D.R. Act- After completing the inquiry, the Investigating Committee submitted its report to the Goverrunent who thereafter on November 24, 1970, passed the impugned order under Section 18A authorising the Corporation to take over the management of the Company for a period of five years."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112553, "end_char": 112564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 112738, "end_char": 112757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company challenged the order of 'take-over' by a writ-petition in the High Court of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112920, "end_char": 112931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113189, "end_char": 113198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113722, "end_char": 113733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113900, "end_char": 113910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114031, "end_char": 114042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114164, "end_char": 114173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea, J. speaking for the Court, answered these questions, thus:\n\n(1) \"The first of these questions does not present any D difficulty."}}, {"text": "Navinchandra Chandulal Parikh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 116914, "end_char": 116943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Navinchandra Chandulal Parikh on behalf of the Company to Shri H. K Bansal, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Supply on 12th September, 1970 that the appellants had come to know that the Government of India was in fact considering ti>' question of appointing an authorised controller under Section 18A of the Act in respect of the appellants undertaking."}}, {"text": "H. K Bansal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 116977, "end_char": 116988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Navinchandra Chandulal Parikh on behalf of the Company to Shri H. K Bansal, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Supply on 12th September, 1970 that the appellants had come to know that the Government of India was in fact considering ti>' question of appointing an authorised controller under Section 18A of the Act in respect of the appellants undertaking."}}, {"text": "12th September, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 117048, "end_char": 117068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Navinchandra Chandulal Parikh on behalf of the Company to Shri H. K Bansal, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Supply on 12th September, 1970 that the appellants had come to know that the Government of India was in fact considering ti>' question of appointing an authorised controller under Section 18A of the Act in respect of the appellants undertaking."}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117218, "end_char": 117229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117800, "end_char": 117806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parikh requested Government not to appoint an authorised controller and further prayed that the Government of India should ask the State Government and the Gujarat Sta~ Textile pijrporation Ltd., ."}}, {"text": "Gujarat Sta~ Textile pijrporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 117956, "end_char": 117994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parikh requested Government not to appoint an authorised controller and further prayed that the Government of India should ask the State Government and the Gujarat Sta~ Textile pijrporation Ltd., ."}}, {"text": "26th August, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 118184, "end_char": 118201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to give a financiaf guarantee to the Company ... \"\n\n\"Only a few day6 before this letter had been addressed, Parikh, it appears, had an interview with the Minister of ·\n\nForeign Trade on 26th August, 1970, when the Minister gave him, as a special case, four weeks' time with effect from 26th August, 1970 to obtain the necessary financial guarantee from the State or the Gujarat State Textile Corporation without which the Company had expressed its inability to reopen and run the mill."}}, {"text": "Gujarat State Textile Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118368, "end_char": 118401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to give a financiaf guarantee to the Company ... \"\n\n\"Only a few day6 before this letter had been addressed, Parikh, it appears, had an interview with the Minister of ·\n\nForeign Trade on 26th August, 1970, when the Minister gave him, as a special case, four weeks' time with effect from 26th August, 1970 to obtain the necessary financial guarantee from the State or the Gujarat State Textile Corporation without which the Company had expressed its inability to reopen and run the mill."}}, {"text": "22 September, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 118500, "end_char": 118518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a letter of 22 September, 1970, Bansal informed Parikh in clear language that if the Company failed to obtain the necessary guarantee by 26 September 1970, Government was pro ceeding to take action under the Act."}}, {"text": "Bansal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118520, "end_char": 118526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a letter of 22 September, 1970, Bansal informed Parikh in clear language that if the Company failed to obtain the necessary guarantee by 26 September 1970, Government was pro ceeding to take action under the Act."}}, {"text": "Parikh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 118897, "end_char": 118903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is obrious, therefore, that the appellants were .aware all long that as a result of the report of the Investigating Committee the Company's undertaking was going to be taken up by Government, Parikh had not only made writte11 representations but had also seen the Minister of Foreign Trade and Supply."}}, {"text": "Gujarat State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 119220, "end_char": 119244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had requested the Minister not to take over the undertaking and, on the contrary, to knd his good offices so that the Company could get financial support from the Gujarat State Textile Corporation or from the Gujarat State Government.\""}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119468, "end_char": 119479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120090, "end_char": 120101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123661, "end_char": 123671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 15 and 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125180, "end_char": 125199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125483, "end_char": 125485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gneral", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125526, "end_char": 125532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the learned Solicitor-Gneral for the Meisicm of '\\he case, it was not heoessary to go beyon4 the\n\n.sWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION. ("}}, {"text": "Ambalal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125669, "end_char": 125676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "581\n\nratio of Shri Ambalal, M, Shah & Anr.", "canonical_name": "Ambalal"}}, {"text": "Ambalal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126078, "end_char": 126085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is \\1othing in those observations, which can be said to be inconsistent with the ratio decidendi of Ambalal's case.", "canonical_name": "Ambalal"}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126149, "end_char": 126160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126231, "end_char": 126242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126461, "end_char": 126471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126530, "end_char": 126543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126727, "end_char": 126738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127017, "end_char": 127027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127189, "end_char": 127202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127643, "end_char": 127653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128057, "end_char": 128067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128541, "end_char": 128551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128629, "end_char": 128642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128742, "end_char": 128753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130389, "end_char": 130400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133218, "end_char": 133229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133351, "end_char": 133362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPO)!.TS\n\n{1981] 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 134153, "end_char": 134193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the alternative, the learned counsel has committed himself H on behalf of bis client, to the position, that the Central Government will if required, give the Company a full and fair hearing on merits,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO)!.TS\n\n{1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nincluding an opportunity to show that the impugned order was not made on adequate or valid grounds."}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134468, "end_char": 134479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134728, "end_char": 134739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134759, "end_char": 134770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134774, "end_char": 134785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134822, "end_char": 134833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134982, "end_char": 134993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135466, "end_char": 135485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135510, "end_char": 135521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135696, "end_char": 135707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137937, "end_char": 137947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinuappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139058, "end_char": 139073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar argument was advanced in S. L. Kapoor v. lagmohan & p Ors(') tu which decision two of us (Sarkaria and Chinuappa Reddy, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ."}}, {"text": "Megarry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139229, "end_char": 139236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In negativing this argument, this Court, inter a/ia, quoted with approval the classic passage, reproduced below, from the judgment of Megarry, J. in John v. Rees & Ors(2)\n\n\"l\\s everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn 'with examples of\n\nopeu and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 140015, "end_char": 140021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In General Medical Council v. Spackman('), Lord Wright condemned the oft-adopted attitude by tribunals to refuse relief on the ground that a fair hearing could have made no difference to the result."}}, {"text": "Lawton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140437, "end_char": 140443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "page 454, has pointed out that \"in principle it is vital that the procedure and the merits should be kept strictly apart, since otherwise the merits may be prejudged unfairly\",\n\nIn Maxwell v. Department of Trade & Industry(2 ), Lawton L.J. expressed in the same strain that \"doing what is right may still result in unfairness if it is done in the wrong way.\""}}, {"text": "Widgery", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141086, "end_char": 141093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same proposition was propounded in R. v. Thames Magistrates' Court ex p. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147537, "end_char": 147545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147599, "end_char": 147606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147672, "end_char": 147683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147810, "end_char": 147818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148064, "end_char": 148072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148212, "end_char": 148220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149394, "end_char": 149401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149555, "end_char": 149563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149664, "end_char": 149672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sakraria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149946, "end_char": 149954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not propose to discuss the case law as my brother Sakraria has referred to all the cases in great detail.", "canonical_name": "bySarkaria"}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 152457, "end_char": 152484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The United States Supreme Court has recognised the distinction H between cases where only property rights are involved and cases where\n\nother civil and political rights are involved."}}, {"text": "Brandeis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153095, "end_char": 153103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1289), Brandeis J. observed :\n\n\"Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 153748, "end_char": 153761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And at any time, the United States may acquire property by eminent domain, withol!t paying, or determining the amount of the compensation before the taking.\""}}, {"text": "Binapani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154001, "end_char": 154009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the juditf' cial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani, Kraipak, Mohinder\n\nSingh Gill, Maneka Gandhi etc.", "canonical_name": "Bina Pani Dds"}}, {"text": "Kraipak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154011, "end_char": 154018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the juditf' cial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani, Kraipak, Mohinder\n\nSingh Gill, Maneka Gandhi etc."}}, {"text": "Mohinder", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154020, "end_char": 154028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the juditf' cial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani, Kraipak, Mohinder\n\nSingh Gill, Maneka Gandhi etc."}}, {"text": "Singh Gill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154030, "end_char": 154040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the juditf' cial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani, Kraipak, Mohinder\n\nSingh Gill, Maneka Gandhi etc."}}, {"text": "SIJPREME COURT REPORTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 155290, "end_char": 155312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": 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{"document_id": "1981_2_600_603_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "Goo\n\nS. A. SUNDARARAJAN\n\nA. P. V. RAJENDRAN\n\nJanuary 13, 1981 B\n\n[R. $. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nCode of Civil Procedure-Order XX!, rule 90-And section 41-Irr£gularities in settling sale proclamation--Section 41, if attracted.\n\nIn his petition under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellant alleged that the sale of one. of the lots of his property which was attached persuant to a decree of a court was vitiated in that there were several irregularities and omissions in the proclamation of sale and the conduct of the sale. Accepting his contention that the material irregularities in the sale proclamation vitiated the sale, the executing court set aside the sale.\n\nAllowing the respondent's appeal, the High Court held that the application for setting aside the sale lay under rule 90 of Order XXl and not under section 47 of the Code.\n\nDismissing the appeal\n\nHELD : The application for setting aside the sale on tho grounds taken by the appellant is referable to rule 90 of Order XX! and, therefore, not to section 47.\n\n[603F]\n\nThe settling of the sale proclamation is part of the integral process of publishing the sale and irregularities committed in the process of settling the sale proclamation are irregularities which fall within the amplitude of rule 90 of Order XXL\n\n£603BJ\n\nThe errors complained of by the appellant amounted to mere irregularities comn1itted in settling the sale proclamation: and could not be described as e11rors which render the sale void.\n\n[602D]\n\nThe requirements which were not complied with when settling the sale pro-- clamation were intended for the benefit of the appellant who could waive them. 1\"hey were not matters which went to the root of the court's jurisdiction and constituted the foundation or authority for the proceeding or where public interest y,.as involved. They were mere irregularities which fell within the scope of rule 90 of Order XX! C.P.C.\n\n[602E-F]\n\nDhirendra Nath Gorai and Subal Chandra Shaw and Others v.\n\nSudhir Chandra Ghosh and Others [1964] 6 S.C.R. 1001 applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 124 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by StPecial Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-6-1979 of th~ Madras High Court in AAO No. 386/75.\n\n' M. Natesan, K. Ramkumar and Mrs. J. Ramachandran for the A Appellant.\n\nT. S. Krishnamoorthy and K. R. Choudhary for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court maintaining that objections in regard to a sale proclamation in proceedings for execution of a civil decree can be raised under rule 90 of Order XXI, Code of Civil\n\ni Procedure.\n\n~ A civil suit by the respondent against the appellant was decreed in 1971. The attachment of the appellant's property before judgment was made absolute on the date of the decree. To execute the decree the respondent filed execution Petition No. 222 of 1972 and prayed for sale of the attached property. It was decided to put up the attached !Property in two lots for sale.\n\nLot No. 1 was sold on 28th January, 1974 for Rs. 40,0001to the respondent.\n\nLot No. 2 was not sold for want of bidders.\n\nThe sale of Lot No. 1 was confirmed by the court on 2nd March, 1974 and full satisfaction of the decree was recorded.\n\nSubsequently, the appellant filed Execution Application\n\nr No. 600 of 1974, purporting to be under s. 47 of the Code, for setting aside the sale of Lot No. 1. He claimed that the proclamation of sale and the conduct of the sale was vitiated by several irregularities.\n\nIt was alleged that the proclamation was not drawn up in accordance with law, that credit had not been given for a payment of Rs. 6,000/- made by the apjpellant and that there were other omissions in the sale proclamation inasmuch as it did not mention the date of auction, the tax payable in respect of Lot No. 1 and the revenue assessment in respect of Lot No. 2. It was also alleged that the reduction of the upset price from Rs. 80,000/- to Rs. 40,0001for Lot No. 1 was improper and that as the appellant was an agriculturist entitled to the benefit of\n\n,>-\" Act No. IV of 1938 he was not liable to pay interest prior to 1st February, 1972 and consequently the amount mentioned in the sale proclamation as due from him was incorrect.\n\nThe application was resisted by the respondent, principally on the ground that it was not maintainable under s. 47.\n\nThe executing Court found substance in the complaint of the appellant and holding that the sale proclamation was vitiated by material irregularities it set aside the sale. The respondent filed an appeal, C.M.A. No. 386 of 1975, in the High Court against that H order.\n\nTwo other appeals were also filed in the High Court, C.M.A.\n\nNos, 2 and 3 of 1976.\n\nThey arose out of the dismissal of two\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\napplications, one for restoration of an application for possession and the other for removal of obstruction.\n\nThe two applications have been dismissed as infructuous consequentially to the setting aside of the sale.\n\nAll the three appeals by the appellant were considered together by the High Court and, in the circumstances, the appeal against the order setting aside the sale was taken as the main aruieal. The principal qnestion determined by the High Court was whether the objection to the sale could properly form the subject of a proceeding under s. 47 or under rule 90 of Order XXI. After examining a large number of cases on the point, the High Court held that the application for setting aside the sale lay under rule 90 of Order XXI and not under s. 4 7, and therefore remitted the appeals to the executing CQurt for fresh consideration.\n\nIt seems to us that the High Court is right. It is plain that the errors complained of by the appellant amount to mere irregularities committed in settling the sale proclamation.\n\nThey cannot be described as errors which render the sale void. The difference between an error which makes the proceeding void and one which makes it merely irregnlar has been pointed out by this Court in Dhirendra Nath Gorai and Subal Chandra Shaw and Others v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Others.(') The requirements which were not complied with in this case when settling the sale proclamatio'n were intended for the benefit of the appellant and could be waived by him.\n\nThey were not matters which went to the root of the court's jurisdiction and constituted the foundation or authority for the proceeding or where public interest was involved. Clearly, they were mere irregnlarities.\n\nConsequently, they fall within the scope of rule 90 of Order XXI.\n\nIt may be pointed ont that when rnle 90 of Order XXI employs the expression \"in publishing or conducting the sale\", it envisa~ the proceeding commencing after the order for sale made under rule 64 of Order XXL The provisions after rule 64 are provisions relating to publishing and conducting the sale.\n\nSettling the proc' amation of sale is part of the proceedings for publishing the sale.\n\nRole 65 of Order XXI declares that e¥ery sale in execution of a decree shall be conducted by an officer of the court or a person nominated by the court, and shall be made by public auction in the manner prescribed.\n\nHow the sale will be published relates to the H manner in which the sale is made.\n\nRule 66 of Order XXI is the first step in tht behalf. It provides for a proclamation of sale.\n\nWhen\n\n(l) [1964) 6 S.C.R. 1001.\n\nI . ,., -\n\ndrawing up a sale proclamation, sub-rule (2) of rule 66 requires that the several matters specified therein be taken into account.\n\nOther particulars relating to the sale are prescribed in the succeeding rules of Order XXL In our view, the settling of the sale proclamation is\n\npart of the integral process of publishing the sale, and irregularities committed in the process of settling the sale proclamation are irregularities which fa]] within the amplitude of rule 90 of Order XXL It may be observed that in Dhirendra Nath Gurai's case (supra) the question which this Court was called upon to consider was whether non-compliance with s. 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 when drawing up the sale proclamation was a mere irregularity.\n\nHaving held that it was, the Court then considered it in the light of rule 90 of Order XXL\n\nOur attention has been invited by the appellant to the Madras amendment made in 1952 in rule 66 of Order XXI whereby a new sub-rule (2) has been substituted for the original provision. It has not been shown to us, however, that the substituted provision makes any material difference so far as the point under consideration is concerned.\n\nIt is urged that an opportunity has been provided under the substituted provision to a judgment-debtor to participate in the drawing up of the sale proclamation, and therefore there is no further right to complain against the sale proclamation under rule 90 of Order\n\nXXI.\n\nBut that right was also available i'n somewhat similar terms under the original provision.\n\nWhether or not a judgment-debtor, to whom notice has been issued under rule 66 of Order XXI to participate in the proceeding and who does not do so, should be permitted thereafter to challenge the sale under rule 90 of Order XXI, is a matter to be determined by other considerations.\n\nIt is sufficient to point out that the applicatio'n for setting aside the sab on the grounds taken by the appellant is referable to rule 90 of Order XXI, and, therefore, not to s. 47.\n\nSome argument has been addressed before us in regard to the period of limitation but that, in our opinion, has been properly left by the High Court to the executing Court for determination.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed, but there is no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "Goo\n\nS. 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Natesan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2238, "end_char": 2248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' M. Natesan, K. Ramkumar and Mrs. J. Ramachandran for the A Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Ramkumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2250, "end_char": 2261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' M. Natesan, K. Ramkumar and Mrs. J. Ramachandran for the A Appellant."}}, {"text": "J. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2271, "end_char": 2286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' M. Natesan, K. Ramkumar and Mrs. J. Ramachandran for the A Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2309, "end_char": 2329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy and K. R. Choudhary for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. R. Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy and K. R. Choudhary for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2415, "end_char": 2421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court maintaining that objections in regard to a sale proclamation in proceedings for execution of a civil decree can be raised under rule 90 of Order XXI, Code of Civil\n\ni Procedure."}}, {"text": "28th January, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3089, "end_char": 3107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was sold on 28th January, 1974 for Rs."}}, {"text": "2nd March, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3240, "end_char": 3255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was confirmed by the court on 2nd March, 1974 and full satisfaction of the decree was recorded."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3406, "end_char": 3411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st February, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4201, "end_char": 4219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IV of 1938 he was not liable to pay interest prior to 1st February, 1972 and consequently the amount mentioned in the sale proclamation as due from him was incorrect."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4424, "end_char": 4429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964) 6 S.C.R. 1001", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dhirendra Nath Gurai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7972, "end_char": 7992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Other particulars relating to the sale are prescribed in the succeeding rules of Order XXL In our view, the settling of the sale proclamation is\n\npart of the integral process of publishing the sale, and irregularities committed in the process of settling the sale proclamation are irregularities which fa]] within the amplitude of rule 90 of Order XXL It may be observed that in Dhirendra Nath Gurai's case (supra) the question which this Court was called upon to consider was whether non-compliance with s. 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 when drawing up the sale proclamation was a mere irregularity."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8098, "end_char": 8103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8111, "end_char": 8141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8353, "end_char": 8359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having held that it was, the Court then considered it in the light of rule 90 of Order XXL\n\nOur attention has been invited by the appellant to the Madras amendment made in 1952 in rule 66 of Order XXI whereby a new sub-rule (2) has been substituted for the original provision."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9465, "end_char": 9470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_604_614_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RAJASTHAN PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORY,\n\nBANGALORE AND TWO OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nJanuary 14, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND A. C. GUPTA, JJJ\n\nDrugs and Cosn1etics Act, 1940-0.ffe; nce.s under sec. 18 (c), (Sale without lice1ice); under sec. 18(a)(i), (Selling substandard quality drugs); under sec. 28 (nondi.sclosure of source of purchase of drugs exhibited for sale); and under sec. 18(a)(vi), (disposing of drugs against prohibitory orders) under sec. 22(1)(c) of tile Act and Rule 54A of the rules framed thereunder-Sentences validity of-Vicarious liability of partners under sec. 34 of the Act-Fine ordered in excess of the statutory nzaximum under sec. 1SA is not in order- Whcther the additional sentence of imprisonment on one of the accused for the satne offence lras illegal-Plea of ignorance about the sub-standard quality woilld be a valid defence only as provided by sub-sec. (2) and (3) of sec. 19 of the Act--Sec. 22(1)(c) of the Act does not provide for a separate punishment ill c1ddition to sec. 27(b) of the Act.\n\nM/s. Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory, first appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 1975 is a firm of which the second appellant is a. partner and the third appellant is a manager.\n\nThe first appellant holds a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 for re-packing of drugs mentioned in the E list \\V'hich forms part of the licence and, therefore, is a manufa.cturer of the said drugs for the purposes of the Act in vie\\V of the definition of the term \"manufacture\" occurring in sec. 3 (f) of the Act. The second and the third appellant are also a partner and a manager respectively of the first appellant, M/s. Manoi Drug House & others, in Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 1975.\n\nA search of the business premises in Criminal Appeal 120 of 1975 resulted F in seizure of sub-standard drug, \"Sodium Bromide J.P.\" Batch No. 1 and in Criminal Appeal 96 of 1975 of a sub-standard drug \"Liquid Paraffin I.P. 450 ml. Batch No. 1'.\n\nBe&ides the three appellants in these two appeals, another partner of these two firms figured as an accused in the compla-int but as be was absconding the trial could not proceed against him. In Criminal Appeal 120 of 1975 tho appellants were charged under sections 18(c), 18(a)(1) and 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and in Criminal Appeal 96 of 1975 they were charged under sections 18(a)(i) a-nd 18(a)(ii).\n\nThe appellants in both the appeals were acquitted by the trial court.\n\nBut in appeals preferred by the State, the High Court in Criminal Appeal 120 of 1975, sentenced each of the three appellants to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 on each of the counts in defa-ult appellants Nos. 2 and 3 were to undergo simple imprisonment for three months \"for each non-payment of line\".\n\nFor the sa1ne offences the High Court further sentenced the third appellant \"by virtue of sec. 34(2) of the Act to undergo simple imprisonment for three months on each\n\nRAJASTHAN PHARMACEUTICAL V. KARNATAKA 605\n\ncount and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 on each count and in default of payment to A simple imprisonment for one month for \"each nonpayment of fine\". The substantive sentences passed on the third appellant were directed to run con .. currently. In Crimin•! Appeal 96 of 1975 the High Court convicted thel accused under sec. 18(a)(i) and sec. 18(a)(vi) and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 on each count, the second and the third appellants were to undergo simple imprisopment for one month in default of payment.\n\nThe I-Iigh Court further convicted them \"for having committed the offence B punishable unde: sec. 22 (I)( c)\" and sentenced \"each one of the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 for the ol!ence under sec. 22(1)(c)\".\n\nAllowing both the appeals in part and remanding Criminal Appeal 120 of 1975 to the High Court for proper sentences, the Court\n\nHELD: (I) The additional sentence of imprisonment on the third appel- C lant for the same offence is illegal.\n\nBut in sentencing the second and the third appellants to pay a fine only for the oficnce under sec. 18(c); the provisions of sec. 27 (a) (ii) which make a sentence of imprisonment compulsory has been overlooked. [612B]\n\n(2) Sec. 27(a) (ii) of the Act makes a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year compulsory for an offence under s. lS(c) in addition to D fine unless for special reasons a sentence of imprisonment for a lesser period was warranted. Of course, in the nature of things a company or a firm could not be sent to jail but that docs not apply to the other two appellants in the instant case. [611E-F]\n\n(3) By virtue of sec. 34(1r of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the appellants 2 and 3 are accused to be guilty of the offences committed by the first appellant, as the explanation appended to sec. 34 makes its provisions apply to a E firm and its partners. [61 lA-B]\n\n(4) The non-obstante clause with which sub-sec. (2) of sec. 34 begins does not permit the court to punish the offender twice for the same offence.\n\nIt is plain that sec. 34(2) imposes a liability on those directors or officers of the company 'vho are not directly in charge of the management of the company and as such could not be held guilty with the help of sub-section (I) of sec. F 34, if they were responsible for the commission of the offences by consent, connivance or neglect.\n\nIt would be incongruous if a man found to be directly responsible for the commission of the offence could at the same time be held guilty cf contributing to the commission of the offence. by his consent, connivance or neglect.\n\n[611 B-C]\n\nThere is nothing in the language of sec. 34 to warrant a construction, that G tlte words \"punished accordingly\" in clause (2) of sec. 34 of the Act mean that the persons 1nentioned therein can be punished only in the same way as a company would be punisha-ble, that is, only with a fine and not with a.ii imprisonment. The words \"punished accordingly\" in the context mean that a person deemed to be guilty of an offence committed by a company shall receive the punishment that is prescribed by the Act for that offence. [6110]\n\nH The Stall of Maharashtra v. Joseph Anthony Pereira, (1971) 73 B.L.R. 613, overruled.\n\n6-152SCI/81\n\n(6) For lhc contravention of provisions of sec. ! 8,.\\, cc. 28 prescribed imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or \\vith fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both. Clearly therefore no fine in excess of five hundred rupees ould be imposed for an offence under sec. 18A.\n\nThe in1position of a fine of Rs. 2,000 for the offence unde1 -; cc. 18A which i\"I punishable undeT sec. 28, in the instant case, is not in order.\n\n[61 JH]\n\n(7} 1he plea Of ignorance of the nature, substance or quality of the drug in view of the fact that accuscJ got the supplies of these drugs from the firm Rajasthan Pha-ra1naceutical l.aboratory~ who are the packers. is not only not cove.red by sub-sec. (2) and (3) of sec. 19 which enumerate the cases in which the general rule contained in sub-sec. (1) would not app1y, but also factually incorrect because appellants 2 and 3 in Criminal Appeal 96 of 197 5, are 1 respectively & partner and the manager of both the firm<;, Rajnsthau Pharmaceu .. tical Laboratory and Manoj Drug House. [613 F-H)\n\n(S) Sec. 22(l)(c) does not provide for a sepa1atc punishment.\n\nRule 54A of the rules framed under the Drugs and Cosnh:tic-; A-:t prohibits con .. travention of the prohibitory order made under sec. 22(1) (c) and sec. 27(b) itself 1nakes such contravention punishable with imprisonn1ent or with fine or with both.\n\n[614 G-HJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 29-1-1975 of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 274/74.\n\nAND\n\nWrit Petition No. 2929 of 1980.\n\nF (Under Article 32 of the Constitution).\n\nAND\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 96 of 1975.\n\nG Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n13-9-1974 of the Ka.rnataka High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 168/74.\n\nS. K. Bisaria for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 96/75.\n\nA. K. Sen and S. K. Bistiria for the appellant in Cr. A. 120/75 and for the Petitioner in W.P. 2929/80.\n\nN. Nettar for the respondent in 8ll. the maftei'S.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 120 of 1975 • GUPTA, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of\n\nthe Karnataka High Court by which the High Court set aside the acquittal of the three appellants before us ordered by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, (4th Court), Bangalore and convicted them of B various offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The first appellant M/s. Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory is a firm of which the second appellant is a partner and the third appellant is the Manager.\n\nThe first appellant holds a ., lirence under the Act for repacking of drugs mentioned in the list which forms pa.rt of the licence.\n\nFor purposes of the Act the first C appellant is a manufacturer of the said drugs in view of the definition of the term 'manufacture' occurring in section 3 (f) of the Act which is as follows :-\n\n\"manufacture in relation to any drug or cosmetic includes any process or part of a process for making, altering, orna- D menting, finishing, packing, labelling, breaking up or otherwise treating or adopting any drug or cosmetic with a view to its sale and distribution but does not include the compounding or dispensing of any drug, or the packing of any drug or cosmetic in the ordinary course of retail business; and 'to manufacture' shall be construed accordingly;\" E\n\nOn February 27, I 970 on a search of the business premises of the first appellant, a Drug' Inspector seized 42 items of drugs from a room, 33 of which were net in the approved list of drugs appended to the licence issued to the first appellant. The third appellant who is the Manager of the firm and was present during the search failed to disclose the source from which these drugs had been acquired. To a notice issued ' under section 18A of the Act calling upon the first appellant to disclose .f-' the source of acquisition of the drugs seized, the reply, signed by the third appellant on behalf of the firm, was a denial of the fact that the drugs were found iu their possession and that they were seized. Samples were taken from the seized drugs which were sent to the Government Analyst and from his report it was found that one of the drugs, Sodium Bromide I.P. Batch No. 1 was sub-standard. On th\\' aforesaid facts the Drugs Inspector filed a complaint iu the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class (4th Court), Bangalore allegiHg that the appellants before us were guilty of having comruitted offences under sections f8{c), 18(a)(i) and 18A punishable respectively under 8ections 27(a}(ii), 27 (b) and 28 of the Act. Another partner of the firm also figured as an accused in the complaint but as he was absconding the trial could\n\nA not proceed against him.\n\nAs already stated the magistrate acquitted !he appellants.\n\nOn the facts on record the High Court found :\n\n(a) 33 out of the 42 items of drugs seized from the business premises of the first appellant do not figure in the approved list of drugs which forms part of the licence issued to the. first appellant. These 33 items had been kept in the premises for sale without tbe requisite licence.\n\nThis constitute~ an offence tinder section 18 ( c) of tbe Act for which all the appellants are punishable under section 27 (a) (ii).\n\n(b) Of the samples of the drugs seized and sent to the Government Analyst, one sample of Sodium Bromide I. P. Batch No. 1 was found to be sub-standard.\n\nAn offence under section 18 (a) (i) has therefore been committed for which the appellants are punishable under section 27(b).\n\n(c) The appellants failed to disclose the source of acquisiti<ln D of the aforesaid 3 3 items of drugs which were not in the approved list.\n\nThis constitutes an offence under section 18A which makes the appellan'h punishable under section 28 of the Act.\n\nFor these offences the High Court sentenced each of the three appellants to pay a fine of Rs. 2000 on each of the counts, in default appellants nos. 2 and 3 were to undergo simple imprisonment for three months 'for each non-payment of fine'.\n\nFor the same offences the High Court further sen!enced the third appellant \"by virtue of section 34 (2)\" of the ct to undergo simple imprisonment for three months on each count and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 on each count, in default of payment to simple imprisonment for one month for 'each non-payment of fine'.\n\nThe substantive sentences passed on the third appellant were directed to run concurrently.\n\nThe only contentiog raised before us by Mr. A. K. Se, n for the' appellants was that the additional sentence of imprisonment on the, thirq appellant for the same offences was illegal.\n\nMr. Sen's contention is right.\n\nBut in sentencing the second and the third appellants to pay a fine only for the offence under section 18(c), the High Court appears to have overlooked the provisions of section 27 (a) (ii) which makes a sentence of imprisonment compulsory.\n\nChapter IV of the Act, hded \"Manufacture, Sale and Distribu- H tion of Drugs and Cosmetics\" includes section 16 of section\n\n33A.\n\nSection 18 provides inter alia : \"no person shall himself or by any other person on his behalf :\n\n(a) Manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute-\n\n(b)\n\n(i) any drug or cosmetic which is not of standard qnality:\n\nx x x\n\n( c) manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for sale. or distribute any drug or cosmetic, except under, and in accord11nce with the conditions of, a licence issued .. , ...\n\nx x x\n\nSection 18A in these terms :\n\n\"Disclosure of the name of manufacture:-\n\nEvery person not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall, if so required, disclose to the Inspector the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom he acquired the drug or cosmetic.\"\n\nSection 27 which enumerates the penalties for illegal manufacture, sale, etc. of drugs reads-\n\n\"Whoever himself or by any other person on his behalf manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes-\n\n(a) any drug-\n\n(i) x x x\n\n(ii) without a valid licence as required under clause\n\n(c) of section 18.\n\nshall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine :\n\nProvid\\)d that the Court may, for any special reasons to be recorded in writing, inipose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year;\n\n(b) any drug other than a drug referred to in clause\n\n(a) in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years', or with fine or with both.\"\n\nA Section 28 provides for \"penalty for non-disclosure of the name of the manufacturer etc.\" and states\n\n\"Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 18A shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term wliich may extend to one year, or with fi.ne which may extend to five B hundred rupees, or with both.\"\n\nIn this case the offences mentioned above haJ been committed by the appellant firm which was engaged in the business of repacking of drugs. In view of the definition of the term 'manufacture' in section 3(f), packing amounted to manufacture in relation to the said drugs for the purposes of the Act. It is necessary to refer . to the provisions of section 34 of the Act which creates vicarious liability for an offence under the Act committed by a body corporate including a firm:\n\n\"34. (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for tl:!e conduct of the business of the company, as well as the comp@y shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :\n\nProvided that nothing contained in this sub section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised an due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (l), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director. manager. secretary or other officer of the company, such director. manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall he liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.\n\nExplanation.-For the purpose of this scetion-\n\n(a) 'company' means a body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals: and\n\n(b) 'director' in relation to a firm means a partner in the\n\nfirm.\"\n\nThe High Court held and rightly that \"by virtue of section 34(1) of the Act, it will have to be held that both respondents 2 and 3 [present appellants 2 and 3] are deemed to be guilty of these offences committed by respondent No. 1 [the first appellant in this Court]\".\n\nIn view of the explanation appended to section 34 its provisions will apply to a firm and its partners. But having found the third appellant guilty with the aid of sub-section (1) of section 34, the High Court appears to have misdirected itself in thinking that the non-obstante clause with which sub-section (2) of the section begins permitted the court to punish the appellant twice for the same offence. It is plain that section 34(2) imposes a liability on those directors or officers nf the company who were not directly in charge of the management\n\no{ the company and as such could not be held guilty with the help nf sub-section ( 1) of section 34, ii they were responsible for the commission of the offence by consent, connivance or neglect. It would also be a little incongruous if a man found to be directly responsible for the commission of the offence could at the same time be held guilty of contributing to the commission of the offence by his consent, connivunce or neglect, The further punishment awarded to the third appellant with the aid of section 34(2) is therefore set aside.\n\nBut this does not conclude the matter. The High Court imposed a fine of two thousand rupees on each of the three appellants for the offence under section 18(c). Section 27(a)(ii) makes a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year compulsory for such offence in addition to fine unless for special reasons a sentence of imprisonment for a lesser period was warranted.\n\nOf course in the nature of thing' a company or a firm , oald not be sent to jail but that does not apply to the other two appellants. Mr. Sen referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in ( 1971) 73 B.L.R. 613(') which holds that the words \"punished accordingly\" in clause (2) of section 34 of the Act mean that the persons mentioned therein can be punished only in the same way as a company would be punishable, that is, only with a fine and not with irnJ)risonment. We are unable to agree. There is nothing in the language of section 34 to warrant such a construction.\n\nIt seems clear to us that the words \"punished accordingly\"' in the context mean that a person deemed to be guilty of an offence committed by a company shall receive the punishment that is prescribed by the Act for that offence. It appears that the High Court was also in error in imposing a fine of two thousand rupees for the offence under section 18A which is punishable under section 28.\n\nFor the contravention of provisions of section 18A, section 28 prescribes imprisonment for a term which\n\n(1) State ofMal:arashtra v. Joseph Anthony Pereira\n\nA may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both. Clearly therefore no fine in excess of five hundred rupees could be imposed for an offence under section 18A.\n\n' In the result, while maintaining the conviction of the appellants, we remit the case to the High Court; the High Court will consider B again on the findings already recorded the question of sentence--(a) for the offence under section 18(c) punishable under section 27(a) (ii) so far as appellants 2 and 3 are concerned, and (b) for the offence punishable under section 28 of which all the three appellants have been fonnd guilty,-and pass appropriate sentences.\n\nThe appeal is allowed to the extent and in the manner indicated above. c\n\nWrit Petition No. 2929 of 1980\n\nThe writ petition questions the validity of the order of the High Court punishing the third appellant in the above appeal (Criminal appeal No. 120 of 1975) twice for the same offences with the aid of section 34(2) of the Act. In view of our decision in the appeal no order is necessary on the writ petition.\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 96 of 1975\n\nBy the judgment impugned in this appeal which is also by special leave, the Kamataka High Court set aside an order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Isl Class (1st Court), Bangalore City and convicted the appellants before us for having committed offences under section 18(a)(i) and 18(a)(vi) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Of the three appellants in this appeal the second and the third amiellants are the same persons as in the other appeal.\n\nThe second appellant is a partner and the third is the manager of the first appellant, a firm called M/s.\n\nManoj Drug House.\n\nThe absconding partner of the other firm is also a iParlner of the first appellant here.\n\nThe firm possessed valid licence to sell, stock and exhibit for sale drugs. The magistrate before whom the appellants were tried for the aforesaid offences acquitted them; the High Conrt on appeal set aside the order of acquittal as already stated.\n\nThe facts found by the High Court in this case are as follows.\n\nOn July 17, 1970 the Assistant Drug Controller for the State of Mysore who had been appointed as Inspector under section 21 of the Act took samples of \"Liquid Paraffin J.P.\" Batch I, and \"Formaline I.P.\" Batch 1 which, as the labels on these drugs showed, had been repacked by M/s. Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory, the first appellant in the other case.\n\nThe Inspector sent the samples to the\n\nGovernment Analyst and the report received from him showed that the products were not of standard quality.\n\nOn September 9, 1970 the Drugs Inspector, Bangalore Division, found that the firm M/s .\n\nManoj Drug House was exhibiting for sale stocks of the drugs which the Governm.ent Analyst had declared as not of standard quality. He therefore issued an order under section 22(1) (c) of the Act prohibiting the sale of the said drugs for a certain period which was extended from time to time.\n\nOn October 28, 1970 the Inspector asked the third appellant who was the Manager of the firm to produce the stock of the prohibited drugs.\n\nThe Insipector seized the stock produced before him but this was found to be short by 57 bottles of Liquid Paraffin I.P. 450 ml. Batch No. 1. On these facts a complaint was filed in the court of the City Magistrate, Bangalore alleging that the appellants were guilty of an offence under section 18(a) (i) of the Act for having in their stock and exhibiting for sale drugs not of standard quality and further that they were guilty of an offence under section 18 ( 11) (vi) for dispos; ing of the aforesaid 'Ruantities of Liquid Paraffin I.P. Batch No. 1 in spite of the prohibitory order under section 22(1) (c) thus contravening rule 54A of the Rules framed under the Act.\n\nBoth these offences are punishable under section 27 (b) of the Act. The trial court acquitted the accused but on appeal preferred by the State of Kamataka the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the accused under section 18 (a)( i) and section 18 (a)( vi) , and sentenced each of the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- on each count : the second and the third appellants were to undergo simple imprisonment for one month in default of payment. We see no reason to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the High Court. The only point argued before us on behalf of the appellants which was also urged in the High Court was that they got the supplies of these drugs from the firm Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory who were the packers and the appellants did not know that the drugs were sub-standard.\n\nThe High Court rightly pointed out that this did not constitute a valid defence in view of section 19(1) of the Act which is as follows.\n\n\"19. Pleas.-(!) Save as hereinafter provided in this Section, it shall be no defence in a prosecution under this Chapter to prove merely that the accused was ignorant of the nature, substance or quality of the drug or cosmetic in respect of which the offence has been committed or of the circumstances\n\nof its manufacture or import, or that a purchaser, having B bought only for the purpose of test or analysis, has not been prejudiced by the sale.\"\n\nThe High Court fouud that the case of the accused was not covered by su.b-sections (2) and (3) of section 19 which enumerate the cases in which the general rule contained in sub-section (1) would not apply. In this connection it is to be noted that appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are respectively a partner and the manager of both the firms, Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Lahoratory, and Manoj Drug House.\n\nThis appeal therefore must fail.\n\nTt appears however that the High Court having convicted the appellants as aforesaid and sentenced them under section 27 (b) of the Act further convicted them \"for having committed the offence punishable under sec. 22 ( l) ( c)\" and sentenced \"each one of the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One thousand) for the offence under Sec. 22(1) (c)\".\n\nSection 22(1) deals with the powers of Inspectors, clause (c) of which states that an Inspector mcl\\ within the local limits of the area for which he is appointed.\n\n\"enter and search at all reasonable times, with such assistants. if any, as he considers necessary, any place in which he has reason to believe that an offence under this Chapter has hecn or is being committed and order in writing the person in possession of any drug or cosmetic in respect of which the offence has been or is being committed, not to dispose of any stock of such drug or cosmetic for a specified period not exceeding twenty days, or unless the alleged offence is such that the defect may be removed by the possessor of the drug or cosmetic seize the stock of such drug or cosmetic.\"\n\nRule 54A of the Rules framed under the Act pro, ides:\n\n\"54A. Prohibition of sale.-No person in poscssion of a drug in respect of which an Inspector has made an order under clause ( c) of sub-section (I) of Section 22 of the Act shall in contravention of that order sell or otherwise dispose of\n\n._,/·\n\nany stock of such drug.\" , -...(_ ·\n\nRule 54A prohibits contravention of a prohibitory order made under section 22(1) (c) and section 27(b) itself makes such con- G travention punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with both.\n\nSection 22 ( 1) ( c) does not provide for a separate punishment.\n\nAccordingly; we set aside the conviction of the appellants purported to be under section 22(1) (c) of the Act and the sentences passed in respect of the said 'offence'.\n\nH Subject to the modification indicated above the appeal is dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals partly allowed.", "total_entities": 127, "entities": [{"text": "RAJASTHAN PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORY,\n\nBANGALORE AND TWO OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJASTHAN PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORY, BANGALORE AND TWO OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 14, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJASTHAN PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORY,\n\nBANGALORE AND TWO OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nJanuary 14, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND A. C. GUPTA, JJJ\n\nDrugs and Cosn1etics Act, 1940-0.ffe; nce.s under sec."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 18(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 292, "end_char": 299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 18(a)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 378, "end_char": 392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 22(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 578, "end_char": 585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 1S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 22(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 922, "end_char": 935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1007, "end_char": 1017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "first appellant holds a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1221, "end_char": 1292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1522, "end_char": 1528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first appellant holds a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "The first appellant holds a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Manoi Drug House", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1655, "end_char": 1671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second and the third appellant are also a partner and a manager respectively of the first appellant, M/s. Manoi Drug House & others, in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "sections 18(c), 18(a)(1) and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2220, "end_char": 2251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first appellant holds a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "The first appellant holds a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2259, "end_char": 2288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 18(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "sec. 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2839, "end_char": 2849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "sec. 18(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3275, "end_char": 3288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "sec. 18(a)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3293, "end_char": 3307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3580, "end_char": 3587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 22(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4064, "end_char": 4071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 27(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4163, "end_char": 4173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4623, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4885, "end_char": 4892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4995, "end_char": 5005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5592, "end_char": 5599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6586, "end_char": 6593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Pha-ra1naceutical l.aboratory~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6796, "end_char": 6836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[61 JH]\n\n(7} 1he plea Of ignorance of the nature, substance or quality of the drug in view of the fact that accuscJ got the supplies of these drugs from the firm Rajasthan Pha-ra1naceutical l.aboratory~ who are the packers."}}, {"text": "sec. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6910, "end_char": 6917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajnsthau Pharmaceu .. tical Laboratory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) would not app1y, but also factually incorrect because appellants 2 and 3 in Criminal Appeal 96 of 197 5, are 1 respectively & partner and the manager of both the firm<;, Rajnsthau Pharmaceu .. tical Laboratory and Manoj Drug House. ["}}, {"text": "Sec. 22(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7243, "end_char": 7256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7432, "end_char": 7442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7807, "end_char": 7817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Bisaria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8011, "end_char": 8024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Bisaria for the appellant in Cr.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bistiria"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8065, "end_char": 8074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and S. K. Bistiria for the appellant in Cr.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "S. K. Bistiria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8079, "end_char": 8093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and S. K. Bistiria for the appellant in Cr.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bistiria"}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8170, "end_char": 8179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Nettar for the respondent in 8ll."}}, {"text": "GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8300, "end_char": 8305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "120 of 1975 • GUPTA, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of\n\nthe Karnataka High Court by which the High Court set aside the acquittal of the three appellants before us ordered by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, (4th Court), Bangalore and convicted them of B various offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "Bangalore and convicted them of B various offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8532, "end_char": 8622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9096, "end_char": 9105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bangalore and convicted them of B various offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "Bangalore and convicted them of B various offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "February 27, I 970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9620, "end_char": 9638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For purposes of the Act the first C appellant is a manufacturer of the said drugs in view of the definition of the term 'manufacture' occurring in section 3 (f) of the Act which is as follows :-\n\n\"manufacture in relation to any drug or cosmetic includes any process or part of a process for making, altering, orna- D menting, finishing, packing, labelling, breaking up or otherwise treating or adopting any drug or cosmetic with a view to its sale and distribution but does not include the compounding or dispensing of any drug, or the packing of any drug or cosmetic in the ordinary course of retail business; and 'to manufacture' shall be construed accordingly;\" E\n\nOn February 27, I 970 on a search of the business premises of the first appellant, a Drug' Inspector seized 42 items of drugs from a room, 33 of which were net in the approved list of drugs appended to the licence issued to the first appellant."}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10046, "end_char": 10057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Judicial Magistrate, First Class (4th Court), Bangalore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10599, "end_char": 10654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On th\\' aforesaid facts the Drugs Inspector filed a complaint iu the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class (4th Court), Bangalore allegiHg that the appellants before us were guilty of having comruitted offences under sections f8{c), 18(a)(i) and 18A punishable respectively under 8ections 27(a}(ii), 27 (b) and 28 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11422, "end_char": 11432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11499, "end_char": 11509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11691, "end_char": 11701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11785, "end_char": 11798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11976, "end_char": 11987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12032, "end_char": 12042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12388, "end_char": 12398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Se", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12748, "end_char": 12756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only contentiog raised before us by Mr. A. K. Se, n for the' appellants was that the additional sentence of imprisonment on the, thirq appellant for the same offences was illegal.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12893, "end_char": 12896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen's contention is right."}}, {"text": "section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13016, "end_char": 13029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13091, "end_char": 13101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13163, "end_char": 13184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13264, "end_char": 13274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "section\n\n33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13278, "end_char": 13290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13293, "end_char": 13303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13737, "end_char": 13748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14375, "end_char": 14385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14943, "end_char": 14953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15084, "end_char": 15095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15444, "end_char": 15456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15597, "end_char": 15607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17142, "end_char": 17155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17401, "end_char": 17411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17545, "end_char": 17555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17786, "end_char": 17799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18006, "end_char": 18016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18422, "end_char": 18435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18607, "end_char": 18620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18622, "end_char": 18639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19009, "end_char": 19026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in ( 1971) 73 B.L.R. 613(') which holds that the words \"punished accordingly\" in clause (2) of section 34 of the Act mean that the persons mentioned therein can be punished only in the same way as a company would be punishable, that is, only with a fine and not with irnJ)risonment."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19131, "end_char": 19141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19379, "end_char": 19389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19764, "end_char": 19775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19802, "end_char": 19812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19854, "end_char": 19865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19867, "end_char": 19877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20161, "end_char": 20172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20403, "end_char": 20416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20434, "end_char": 20447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20538, "end_char": 20548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20946, "end_char": 20959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kamataka High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21163, "end_char": 21182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1975\n\nBy the judgment impugned in this appeal which is also by special leave, the Kamataka High Court set aside an order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Isl Class (1st Court), Bangalore City and convicted the appellants before us for having committed offences under section 18(a)(i) and 18(a)(vi) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "Judicial Magistrate, Isl Class (1st Court), Bangalore City", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21229, "end_char": 21287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1975\n\nBy the judgment impugned in this appeal which is also by special leave, the Kamataka High Court set aside an order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Isl Class (1st Court), Bangalore City and convicted the appellants before us for having committed offences under section 18(a)(i) and 18(a)(vi) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "section 18(a)(i) and 18(a)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21363, "end_char": 21393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21401, "end_char": 21430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "July 17, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22123, "end_char": 22136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 17, 1970 the Assistant Drug Controller for the State of Mysore who had been appointed as Inspector under section 21 of the Act took samples of \"Liquid Paraffin J.P.\" Batch I, and \"Formaline I.P.\" Batch 1 which, as the labels on these drugs showed, had been repacked by M/s. Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory, the first appellant in the other case."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22175, "end_char": 22190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 17, 1970 the Assistant Drug Controller for the State of Mysore who had been appointed as Inspector under section 21 of the Act took samples of \"Liquid Paraffin J.P.\" Batch I, and \"Formaline I.P.\" Batch 1 which, as the labels on these drugs showed, had been repacked by M/s. Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory, the first appellant in the other case."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22233, "end_char": 22243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22402, "end_char": 22437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 17, 1970 the Assistant Drug Controller for the State of Mysore who had been appointed as Inspector under section 21 of the Act took samples of \"Liquid Paraffin J.P.\" Batch I, and \"Formaline I.P.\" Batch 1 which, as the labels on these drugs showed, had been repacked by M/s. Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory, the first appellant in the other case."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22629, "end_char": 22646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 9, 1970 the Drugs Inspector, Bangalore Division, found that the firm M/s ."}}, {"text": "Manoj Drug House", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22715, "end_char": 22731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manoj Drug House was exhibiting for sale stocks of the drugs which the Governm.ent Analyst had declared as not of standard quality."}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22882, "end_char": 22895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23013, "end_char": 23029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 28, 1970 the Inspector asked the third appellant who was the Manager of the firm to produce the stock of the prohibited drugs."}}, {"text": "City Magistrate, Bangalore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23348, "end_char": 23374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts a complaint was filed in the court of the City Magistrate, Bangalore alleging that the appellants were guilty of an offence under section 18(a) (i) of the Act for having in their stock and exhibiting for sale drugs not of standard quality and further that they were guilty of an offence under section 18 ( 11) (vi) for dispos; ing of the aforesaid 'Ruantities of Liquid Paraffin I.P. Batch No."}}, {"text": "section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23436, "end_char": 23449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23599, "end_char": 23609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23742, "end_char": 23755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23864, "end_char": 23874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Kamataka", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23960, "end_char": 23977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court acquitted the accused but on appeal preferred by the State of Kamataka the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the accused under section 18 (a)( i) and section 18 (a)( vi) , and sentenced each of the accused to pay a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24058, "end_char": 24068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24081, "end_char": 24091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24748, "end_char": 24761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25344, "end_char": 25354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Lahoratory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25581, "end_char": 25616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3 are respectively a partner and the manager of both the firms, Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Lahoratory, and Manoj Drug House."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25784, "end_char": 25794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25884, "end_char": 25891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26015, "end_char": 26025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26033, "end_char": 26046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27005, "end_char": 27015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27205, "end_char": 27218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27227, "end_char": 27240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27334, "end_char": 27344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27481, "end_char": 27494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_615_636_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "6 1 &\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nv .\n\nWASSON SINGH AND FIVE OTHERS\n\nJanuary 1 5, 1981\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\n' .\n\nCtinti11al Procedure Code 1973. S. 154 & Indian Penal Code, S. 302-\n\nTrial fot n1urdrr-Ar.:cused convic:ted by Sessions Court-Acquitted by High\n\nl'ourt-lnterfercnce by Supreme Court.\n\nF.I.R.-Pro111ptness i11 lodging-Evidentiary value of,\n\nEye-wit11eJ.H'.\\-Uelated to d:eceascd-Antecedents of questionable nature ʤʥiu1i11y of: ӣvi; hnc\"e by Court-A1ethodology to be adopted.\n\nlnvestjgatio11 O.fljcer--Faflure to join respectable persons of locality to\n\nwitr;:c.\\'S recovery of i\"W.0.-Value of such evidence.\n\nThe prosecution case 'against the six Uccused (Respondents) was that prior\n\nto the incident in question, there was Ml altercation between the tWo deceased\n\non one side and the six accused on the other ovei tTespasS of cattle of the\n\naccused personsom the land of the deceased, whith dairuiged his cotton crop.\n\nOn the day of the incident when P.¥.'. 2, P.W. 3 and the two deceased were\n\ngoing by a foot path, the six accused suddenly emerged out of a field and\n\nfired.\n\nThe two deceased fell dead, while P.W. 2 and 3 ran and escaped unhurt.\n\nP.W. 2 reached the bus stand, picked up his motor cycle parked at a shop and\n\ndrove to the ne<irest police station to lodge the F.I.R.\n\nThe Additional Sessidns Judge found that one of the accused. had a strong motiye to inutdcr on . e oi _the deceased because of. an. oki_ fued a_nd that on ;Ӣccount of this ill v.ri1J, Some of the accused had ' a strong motive in joining\n\nh<'lnds with thi.:: .others to, murder .the deceased, but that ..no motive could be\n\nestablished. for murdering the second deceased.\n\nHe also found that the fact\n\nthat the F.I.R. was lodged by P.W. 2 with the utmost promptitude furnished\n\nvaluable conoboration of his evidence and also disbelieved the evideace of the police Sub-Inspector (P.VV. 13); fn the result he convicted all the six\n\naccused under section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. for murder of one of\n\nthe deceased „ nd sentenced them to in1prisonment.\n\nJn the case of first accused however. he. was pentenced to death' for the murder of one of the deceased.\n\nAll the necu.;; cd appealed against their conviction alld sentence to the High Court \\(hich aliowea ihe appeal and rejected the relference.\n\nIt rejected the\n\nevidence of the eye-witnesses, P.\\V. 2 and P.\\V. 3 on the ground that these \\Vitnesses were closely related to the. first deceased who was the principal target\n\nof the accuc; ed and that it had not been satisfactorily established by the prose¿\n\ncution that the other five accused had any motive to commit the 111urders in question .\n\nIt found that the prosecution story was highly unnatural and that \\he presence of \\he two eye witnesses alongwith the deceased persong was unlikely.\n\nIt further held there was material inconsistency in their testimony, as to when the first deceased and P.\\V. 2 had left the hamlet, and that the inves tig.ition of the Ca\"e conducted by the Sub-Inspector (P.W. 13) did not inspire confidence.\n\nIn the appeal by the State to this Court it was contended on behalf of the State that the reasoning of the High Court was manifestly unsound, if not wholly perverse. The fact that the F.I.R, was lodged by P.W. 2 with utmost promptitude and aJI the material facts including the. names of the accused and of the witnesses having been mentioned therein, indicated that there was no time to concoct a false story.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents it was submitted that the acquittal could not be disturbed, as the reasons given by the High Court could not be called perverse.\n\nHELD : l(i) The acquittal of respondent Nos. I and 2 are set aside and they are convicted under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code for the murder of the first deceased and sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe bcnelit of doubt to the rest of the accused (responctents) and their acquittal on all the counts maintained. [636 C-D]\n\nD (iiJ Sufficient assurance of the testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 was availahie from the circumstantial evidence regarding the participation of respondents Wasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh in the murder of deceased Hazara Singh.\n\nThe evidence of the eye witnesses therefore, could safely be acted upon for convicting these respondents for the said murder. [635 C-D]\n\n2. The reasons given by the High Court for holding that P.W. 2 was not 'E <'Ill eye witness of these two murders are utterly unsustainable.\n\nThe reason that P.W. 2 had succeeded in escaping unhurt, or that there are discrepancies in the statcmeuts of P.\\V. 2 and P.W. 3 as to whether they had gone with the deceased on tbe very day of occurrence or a day earlier was no ground for the conclusion that P.W. 2 was not in the company of the decesed or near aloout the scene of occurrence when the two deceased were shot dead. [626 F-GJ\n\n3. Discrepancies in rega.rd to collateral or subsidiary facts or matters of detail occur even in the statements of truthful witn.sses, particularly when they are examined to depose to events which happened long before thefr exami .. nation. Such discrepancies are hardly a ground to reject the evidence of the witnesses when there is general agreement and consistency in regard to the substratum of the prosecution case. [626H-627 A]\n\nIn the instant case the occurrence took place on August 4, 1973, while P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 were examined at the trial oni December 27, 1974 i.e. seventeen months after the incident. The trial court has rightly observed that P.\\V. 2 wa~ nf'Vl\"r crossexamined by the defence regarding his whereabouts and those of the deceased on the previous night. The mere fact that P.W. 2 did not IP..ake any purchase at Amarkot could hardly be a reason to hold that his heini;: in the company of the deceased at the material time was improbable.\n\n[626G. 627B]\n\n4. P.W. 3 is the brother a.nd P.W. 2 relation of the deceased. All three 1, vere livin!! together in the same hamlet in the fields.\n\nIt is in the evidence of\n\nPUNJAB V. WASSON SINGH 617\n\nthese witnesses that the other accused are partymen of respondent No. 1. It is A further in evidence that sometime before the occurrence both the deceased and P.W. 2 were arrested and handcuffed by a police Sub-Inspector on the a!legatio1\\ that they were indulging in smuggling and \\\\'ould be liquidated. lti was, there-_\n\nfore, not improbable that this trio consisting of first deceased, P.\\V. Z :ind P.W. 3 'vere as usual moving about or carrying on their activities together.\n\nMoreover the deceased must have known that Respondent No. 1 who was inin1ically disposed to\\vards him was at large on bail. This was an added\n\nB.. reason for this troika to move about for their security, if not for anything else, in the company of each other. [627C-F]\n\n5. (i) The .High Court has not all dealt with the First Information lleport or the promptitude with which it was made.\n\n[628D]\n\n(ii) The towering circumstance which lends assurance to the claim of P.W.\n\nC- 2 that he was an eye-\\vitncss of the occurrence is that the First Infonnation Report was lcxiged by him at the Police Station so promptly that he had practi .. cally no time to spin out a false story. The reason employed by the High Court for disbelieving the version of P.W. 2 regarding his owning and going on a motor cycle to the Police Station was manifestly unsound. The Sub-Inspector P.\\V. 13 \\Vas not questioned in cross examination as to whether or not P.W. 2 had come to the Police Station on a motor cycle. He was, however, questioned\n\nD .... as to \\vha-t transport he had used for going from the Police Station to the scene of murders. The witness replied that he went on a motor cycle upto Amarkot and fro1n there \\vent on foot to the scene of occurrence. This explanation of P.\\V. 2 regarding the kacha path from Amarkot to the scene of occurrence, being non-motorable on the day of occurrence, receives inferential support from the fact appearing in the evidence of P.W. 13 that he had to cover the distance trotn Adda Amarkot to the place of occurrence, on foot.\n\nE l627H, 629E, 628G-629AJ\n\n6. The conduct of the Investigation Officer (P.W. 13) indicates that he was not favourably disposed to the deceased and P.W. 2.\n\nA suggestion was also put to P.W. 13 by the Public Prosecutor that he had been, unf<l'ir in the investigation of the case and tried to favour the 3rd and 4th responde111.t.\n\nThe High Court found that the note iti the zimini was a fraudulent insertion. This being the case, Sub-Inspector (P.W. 13) would be least disposed to join hands with\n\nP.W. 2 informant in preparing the First Information Report, after deliberation with P.W. 2 at the spot.\n\n[629F-HJ\n\n7. The opinion of the medical witness P.W. 1 corroborates the version of P.\\V. 2 in as much as the latter has testified that the murders took place at about 3.30 p.m. This means that the statement of P.W. 2 in the F.I.R.\n\nWll6 made \\vithout undue delay, and, as such, furnished very valuable corroboration of his testimony at the trial in all material particulars. [630B-C]\n\n8. (i) Both P.W. 2 aad P.W. 3 are related to the deceased, and as such are interested witnesses. Their antecedents, also, are of a questionable nature, But their antecedents or mere interestedness was not a valid ground to reject their evidence. All that was necessary for the Court was to scrutinise their evidence\n\nwith more than ordinary care and circumspection with reference to the pat -'lr I\\ role assigned to each of the accused. An effort should have been made to sift the grain from the chaff; to accept what appeared to be true and to reject the\n\nrest. The ligh Court did not udopt this methodology in appreciating their evidence.\n\nTnstead, it took a shortcut to disposal and rejccled their evidence whole-sale against a!J the accused for reasons which arc maJ:1ifestly untenable.\n\n[630E-G]\n\n(ii) Excepting for immaterial. discrepancies the evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. J was consistent and their presence aot the time and place of murders was probable. Even so, as a matter of abundant caution it will be safe to act on their interested evidence 10 the extent to Which son1e assurance is coming forth from surrounding cirCumstances or other evidence.\n\n[630H-631A]\n\n9. The prosecution has proved that the respondent No. 2 had also a motive to p<llrticipatc in the murder of the socond deceased.\n\nThis lends assurance to the testimony of P.\\V. 2 and P.\\V. 3 and strengthens the inference of guilt against the said accused also.\n\nP.W. 2's con'li'ltent testimony corroborated by the F.I.R. was sufficient to establish this fact beyond doubt. [63JH-632A]\n\nJO. It had been clearly proved that two fired cartridges were picked up from the scene of crime and sealed into parcels \\vhich were later deposited with sea16 intact in the Police Station.\n\nOn the memo it is mentioned th.it these fired cartridges were of 303 bore rifle.\n\n[632H]\n\n11. There was substance in the observation of the trial Judge that the investigation \\VilS biased in favour of the accused.\n\nIf that was so, the failure of P.W. 13 to join \\\\'Ith hiln respectables of the locality was by itself no ground for ruling out the evidence of the discovery of the rifle, altogether. The partiality of P.W. 13 towards the defence, rather assures the genuineness of the discovery.\n\nHe was least disposed to 'coJlaborate' or cooperate with the rela- E tions of the deceased to procure this rifle from some other source and then foist it on respondent Mukhtar Singh.\n\nThe omission on the part of this Investigating Officer to join \\vith him some independent persons or respectables of the locality to witness the recovery devalues that e\\'idence but does not render it inadn1issible.\n\n[6340-F, HJ\n\n12. The circun1stance of the recovery of the rifle (Ex. P. 7) and the opinion of the Ballistic Expert that the empty cartiridge (CI) had been fired through the rifle though feeble it might be-was relevant and furnished a further pointer to the participation of Mukhtar Singh in the commission of Hazara Singh's murder by rifle-fire.\n\n[635BJ\n\n13. Although the investigation betrays a tilt in favour of the accused, and P.W. 13 made a fradulent insertion in the zamini to help Joginder Singh accused, it cannot be said that the version of P.W. 13, that when he went to the scene of murders at 5.30 p.m. he found Joginder Singh irrigating Ws nearby fields at a distance of about 100 yards therefrom and he interrogated him there and then but did not think it necessary to arrest him-is necessarily false. The absence of motive and the presence of Joginder Singh near the scene of crime shortly after the 1nurders, engaged in normal agricultural acti.vities does cast a doubt about his participation in the commission of these murders.\n\n[635 FGJ\n\n14. P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 have stated that they started running away from the spot, immediately after deceased Hazara Singh was shot dead. The surround ing circumstances, natural probabilities and the nonnal course of human conduct\n\n> •\n\n')..\n\nPUNJAB v. WASSON Sll'GH (Sarkaria, J.) 619\n\nalso sugge:st the :s; u11e inference, that in1mediately on seeing Hazara Singh beina A !Shot down, these \\\\fitnesses who were follov.-ing him ran fast for their lives. llaU they tarried for a while at the scene of the murder, it ¥.roul<l have been too late for then1 to escape unhurt.\n\nIn such ;1 situation, when they were being pursued by person.-.. nrmed with fire-arms, they \\.'.ould if at alJ they turned and looked behind have only a fleeting glimp .... e in the distance of the a6sailants of Resha1n Singh deceased.\n\nThat is why P.\\\\'. 2 is not consistent 1n his statements as to \\l.hich of lhc accused had fired at him when he was running away for his B life.\n\nMoreover it has not been establishe<l that any of the :six accused had any motive, whatever to murder Reshan1 Singh deceased.\n\n[635H--636C] ·\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTJON : Criminal Appeal No. 499 ef 1976.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated C 22-7-1975 of the Punjab & Haryamt High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 166175 and Murder Reference No. 10175.\n\n0. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant.\n\nR. K . .loin for Respondents Nos. I and 3 to 6.\n\nR. K. Kohlt and R. C. Kohli for the complainant.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab is directed against a judgment, dated July 22, 1975, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, whereby the appeal Of the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was accepted and they were acquitted of the double-murder charge against them.\n\nThe prosecution story narrated by Resham Singh (P.W. 2), who claims to be an eyewitness of the occurrence, runs as follows.\n\nF Resham Singh (P.W.2) used to live with his brother-in-law, Hazara Singh deceased, in a hamlet in the fields outside the habitation of village Cheema.\n\nOne Ajit Singh of village Dhual was murdered, ~~ and Wassan Singh accused and his party-men were tried therefor. At\n\nthe trial, Hazara Singh deceased appeared as an eyewitness of that murder.\n\nThe trial court convicted Wasson Singh and his companions in that case. They went in appeal to the High Court.\n\nPending the appeal the High Court enlarged Wasson Singh accusetl on bail.\n\nThe occurrence now in question in the instant case took place when Wasson Singh was on bail.\n\nThe lands of Avtar Singh, Mukhtar Siugh and Hnrbhajan Singh accused (respondents) adjoin the lands of Hazara Singh deceased.\n\nThree or four days prior to the incident in question, the cattle of II these accused persons trespassed on the land of Hazara Singh and damaged his cotton crop.\n\nThereupon, a sharp altercation took place\n\nbetween Hazara Singh and Resham Singh on one side and Harbhajan Singh and Mukhthar Singh on the other.\n\nGajjan Singh son of Gopal Singh resident of the village interceded and pacified the parties. Joginder Singh accused respondent is the brother of Mukhtar Singh accused respondent while Harbhajan Singh Respondent is their first cousion. Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh accused are alleged to be partyman of Wasson Singh.\n\nOn August 4, 1973 at about 3.30 p.m., Resham Singh (P.W.2) ..\n\nResham Singh (deceased) son of another Hazara Singh and Hazara Singh deceased were proceeding by the foot-path from the Bus Stand Amarkot to their hamlet. On the way Bachan Singh, brother of Hazara Singh, met them and proceeded along with them. When they reached near the fields of Jarmaj Singh Sarpanch of Mahmoodpura, all the six accused, namely, Wasson Singh, Baj Singh, Meja Singh, Joginder Singh, Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh emerged from the sann crop and came to the bank of the watercourse.\n\nBaj Singh was armed with a pistol and the other five accused were armed with rifles. Wasson Singh, Joginder Singh and Mukhtar Singh fired their rifles at Hazara Singh. The rifle shots hit Hazara Singh on the left side of his head, and he dropped dead.\n\nResham Singh (P.W.2), Bachan Singh and Resham Singh deceased started running towards the ploughed fields.\n\nMeja Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Baj Singh chased them.\n\nMeja Singh and Harbhajan Singh encircled Resham Singh deceased and shot him dead with rifle-shots.\n\nBaj Singh chased Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Singh (P.W. 3) and fired at them with bis pistol.\n\nWhen these two were running away, the other two accused also fired at them.\n\nResham Singh and Bachan Singh, however, succeeded m escaping unhurt. Resbam Singh (P.W. 2) immediately reached the Bus Stand Amarkot, picked up his motor-cycle which was lying there at a shop and drove fast to Police Station Valtoha, where he lodged the First Information Report (Ex. PE) at 4.30 p.m. Police Sub-Inspector Bishambar Lal recorded the report of Resham Singh and sent a copy of the same as a special report to the superior officers, including the Judicial Magistrate, Frrst Class at Patti, who received the copy of the F.I.R. at 6.30 p.m., on the same day.\n\nWhile running away from the spot Resham Singh (P.W. 2) had left behind his shoe (Ex. P\"l) near the scene of murders.\n\nSub-Inspector Bashambar Lal reached the scene of occurrence at ,.\n\nH 5.30 p.m. and started investigation.\n\nHe prepared the inquest reports regarding the deaths of Hazara Singh and Resham Singh dece:ased persons. He also took into possession blood-stained earth\n\n• and other relevant articles lying near the two dead-bodies. He found A two empty cartridge cases at the scene of Hazara Singh's murder.\n\nHe took them into possession and sealed them into a parcel. He also seized two pairs of shoes lying at the spot.\n\nAfter his arrest, Mukhtar Singh accused was interrogated by the Investigating Officer on August 31, 1973.\n\nAfter making a statement, B Mukhtar Singh accused, in the presence of witnesses, fed the police to the discovery of the riJ!e (Ex. P-7) and some live cartridges.\n\nThe riJ!e and the empty cartridges earlier found at the scene of crime were sent to the ballistic expert for examination and opinion. After examination, the ballistic expert of the Forensic Science Laboratory,\n\n')>...\n\nChandigarh, reported (vide Ex. P. 9) that the 303 fired cartridge, C marked 0, had been fired through the 303 rifle marked 'A' by him.\n\nBut no definite opinion could be given regarding the linkage of the fired cartridge marked C2 with the 303 rifle marked 'A' due to lack of sufficient individual characteristic marks on C2•\n\nJoginder Singh accused was arrested on August 24, 1973 and D Baj Singh accused on Decembr 18, 1973.\n\nThe post mortem examination of the dead-body of Resham Singh was perfonned by Dr.\n\nGursharan Kaur on August 5, 1973 at 8 a.m.\n\nThe Doctor found five gun-shot injuries on his body. Two of these were wounds of entry, with everted margins on the back of the left chest. No charring was present on any of these gun-shot wounds.\n\nThe death in E the opinion of the Doctor was due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from gun-shot injuries on the chest which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.\n\nOn the same day, Dr. Gursharan Kaur conducted the autopsy on the dead-body of Hazara Singh and found fonr fire-arm injuries, two of F which were wounds of entry and two were wounds of exit.\n\nAl! these injuries were on the skull.\n\nThey involved fracture of the skull and j.,4amage to the brain. These injuries had been caused with fire- - arm and were sufficient to cause death instantaneously, in the ordinary -'\" course of nature.\n\nAt the. trial, the main-stay of the prosecution was the testimony of the two eye-witnesses, Resham Singh (P.W.2) and Bachan Singh\n\n(P.W.3).\n\nExamined under Section 342, Cr.P.C., Wasson Singh accused admitted that he along with others was tried for the murder of Ajit Singh\n\n, of village Dhual and Hazara Singh dec&ased had appeared against him H as eye-witness of that murder; and that he (Wasson Singh) was convicted by the Court of Sessi_on, but had been released on bail\n\n7-152 SCI/81\n\npending his appeal in the High Court.\n\nHe denied the rest of the prosecution case and stated that he had been falsely implicated by the relation! of Aj; t Singh deceased on suspicion; and that on the day of occurence, 1'e was working as a Conductor on a truck at Muzaffarnagar.\n\nThe plea of Baj Singh wa! one of plain denial of the prooecution case.\n\nHe stated that his brothers Punjab Singh, Narinder Singh and Bagicha Singh had been prosecuted for the murder of one Puran Singh who was a relation of Bachan Singh (P.W.3); that Punjab Singh and his companions were acquitted in that case.\n\nBaj Singh added that he used to look after the defence of the accused in Puran Singh's murder case; and that on account of this, he had been falsely impli- /....._ cated. He further stated that at the time of occurrence, he was resi- .- ding in U. P.\n\nMeja Singh accused, also, denied the prosecution case.\n\nHe stated that one Balkar Singh of Village Wan had been murdered. He (Meja Singh) used to look after the defence of Jarnail Singh (his wife's brother, who was being tried for the murder of Balkar Singh; that on account of this, the relation of the said Balkar Singh had, in connivance with the complainant party, falsely implicated him in the instant case.\n\nThe remaining accused, also, denied the circumstances appearing in evidence against them.\n\nThe learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, who tried the case against these six accused persons, found that Wasson Singh had a strong motive to murder Hazara Singh decea&'...d, because the latter had appeared as an eye-witness against Wasson Singh in Ajit Singh's murder case.\n\nThe trial Judge further accepted the prosecution evidence in regard to the fact that a few days before this occurrence in question, there was a : quarrel between Hazara Singh deceased and Resham Singh (P.W. 2) on one side and Mukhtar Singh, and Harbhajan Singh accused on the other, when the cattle of the accused~ .. had trespassed on the land of the deceased and damaged his cotton -- crop; and that on account of this ill-will, Joginder Singh, Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh accused had a sufficient motive to join hands with Wasson Singh accused to murder Hazara Singh deceased.\n\nThe trial Judge further found that the prosecution had failed to establish the exact nature of the motive which might have actuated Meja Singh and Baj Singh to murder Resham Singh deceased.\n\nThe trial Judg; o further held that the F.I.R. which had been lodged by Resham Singh with great promptitude at Police Statio'n Valtoha, which was about three miles from the place of occnrrence, furnished valuable corroboration of the evidence of Resham Singh (P .W. 2). '\n\n• He accepted the evidence of Resham Singh and Bachan Singh.\n\nHe further found that Snb-Inspector Bishambar Lal had tried to favour J oginder Singh accused by fabricating a note in his zimini at some subsequent stage.\n\nThis note is to the effect, that Joginder Sinch was, in fact, present irri!ating his nearby fields and he joined the police investigation on the very day of occurrence and had remained with the police till the investit; ation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The trial Judge disbelieved the plea of alibi set up by Meja Singh accused. In the absence of independent evidence, the trial Judge was unable to hold from the bare testimony of Bishamber Lal, Sub-Inspector, that the rifle (Ex. P-7) had been recovered from Mukhtar Singh accused.\n\nHe, however, criticised th~ conduct or Sub- Inspector Bishamber Lal in not s.ending the empty cartridges found at the spot to the ballistic expert of th~ Forensic Laboratory, Chandi1arh,\n\nwith due promptitude.\n\nIn the result, the trial Judge held that Wasson Singh, Joginder Singh and Mukhtar Singh accused had fired their rifles at Hazara Singh deceased, and had caused his death.\n\nHe therefore, convicted these three accused for the substantive cffence under Section 302, Penal Code.\n\nHe further held that the common object of the unlawful assembly constituted by the six accused was to murder Hazara Singh deceased. He therefore, further convicted all • the six accused under Section 302 read with Section 149, Penal Code, for the murder of Hazara Singh.\n\nThe trial Judge found that the murder of Resham Singh did not appear to have been caused in prosecution of the common object of the said unlawful assembly.\n\nHe therefore, convicted Baj Singh, Meja Singh and Harbhajan Singh accused only under Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code, for the mnrder of Reshilm Singh deceased and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 200/-. In respect of the murder of Hazara Singh, Wasson Singh was sentenced to death, while each of the other five accusd were sentenced to imprisonment for life . and a fine . .. i.~\n\nThe trial Judge referred the case to the High Court for confir mation of the death sentence of Wasson Singh. All the accused, also\n\nappealed against their conviction and sentences.\n\nThe Hi&h Court G\n\nallowed the appeal, declined the roference and rejected the evidence of the eye-witnesses, Rcsham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Sinjh (P.W.\n\n3) , for these reasons :\n\n(i) Both these witnesses are closely related to the deceased Hazara Singh, who was the prfncipal target of the accused.\n\n(ii) (a) Excepting in the case of Wasson Singh who had undoubtedly a grudge against Hazara Sinh deceased, it has not been\n\nsatisfactory established by the prosecution that the other five accused had any motive to commit the murders in question.\n\n(b) Gajjan Singh, who is said to have interceded and pacified both the parties at the time of the alleged quarrel over cattle trespass, three or four days prior to the occurrence, between Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh on one hand and Hazara Singh deceased and Resham Singh (P-W. 2) on the other, has not been examined by the prosecution.\n\n(c) There was no mention about this earlier incident in the statement of Bachan Singh (P.W. 3) before the police during investigation.\n\n(iii) Both Resham Singh and Bachan Singh, P.Ws. had earlier been invol'.\"cd in cases of serious crime, and Bachan Singh was admittedly registered as a bad character with the Police.\n\nO'n account of their antecedents, Resham Singh and Bachan Singh do not appear to be reliable people.\n\n(iv) The prose9ution story is highly unnatural.\n\nThe presence of these two eye-witnesses along with the deceased persons was unlikely.\n\nHad these witnesses been with Hazara Singh deceased, they would have been the target of attack after Hazara Si\"ngh was killed and r, ot Resham Singh deocased against whom the accused had no grudge.\n\n( v) Hazara Singh deceased, Bachan Singh and Resham Singh, E P.Ws., all admittedly reside in the hamlet of Hazara Singh deceased, and if they had to go to Amarkot for making purchases, they would have in all probability gone together. Bachan Singh's version, that he had gone to Amarkot to make e'nquiries regarding the availability of diesel and on his return journey in the way, met and joined the\n\nF company of his brother Hazara Singh deceased, and his companions, was not believable, becanse there was no need for Bachan Singh to have gone to Amarkot for the purchase of diesel as he could have asked Hazara Si'ngh to make the necessary enquiries.\n\n(vi) There is a material inconsistency in the testimony of the two eye-witnesses as to when Hazara Singh deceased and Resham Singh G (P.W. 2) had left their beliak (hamlet).\n\nFrom the statement of Resham Singh (P.W. 2), it appears that from their behck they had gone to Amarkot that very day for purchasing cloth and on the return journey they met Bachan Singh.\n\nAs against this, the story told by Bachan Singh is that a day earlier Hazara Singh deceased and Resham Singh, P.W. had left their beliak for some unknown destination and 0 that a day later they had met him at the adda, after !heir departure from the behak the previous day.\n\nThis V'crsion completely belies the version of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) that they had left their behak\n\nm order to make purchases of c:oth and other articles,\n\n(vii) Another odd feature brought out from the evidence of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) is the presence of motor-cycle at Amarkot o'n that day, It is surprising that he could afford to maintain a motorcycle from the meagre income that he wonld have got from his 5 or 6 acres of land. His explanation as to why he left the motor-cycle at Amarkot, is also not convincing.\n\n(viii) The investigation of the case conducted by the Sub-Inspector Bish amber Lal (P.W. 13) does not inspire confidence.\n\n(a) The evidence relating to the recovery of empty cartridges (vide Ex. P.G.) and pair of shoes from the spot near the dead-body of Hazara Singh, was not reliab'.e, because P.W. 13 did not mention about the pre&e11cc of tbese articles in the inquest report (Ex. PDZ),\n\n(b) Though the empty (crime) cartridges recovered from the spot were sent to the ballistic expert earJi.er, they were returned to the Police Station on the plea that the test cartridges had not been sent along with those empties, \"Even if it was so, there was no need of sending the crime cartridgecs to the Police Station, as the test cartridges could be sent for through a separate letter.\n\nJn htis situation, the suggestion that the crime cartridge had been later on fired through rifle (Ex. P7) when it was recovered cannot be considered improbable\",\n\n(ix) \"On arrival at !hoe scene of the incident,\n\nP.W. 13 fonnd Joginder Singh accused at a distance of abont 100 yards irrigating his field.\n\nAccording to Bishamber Lal, he interrogated Joginder Singh there and then, bnt did not arrest him. If Joginder Singh accused had been found near the scene of the crime within a short time, engaged\n\nin his normal activities, his participation in the crime would be highly F improbable\".\n\nJ - Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the r'Oasoning of the High Court is manifestly unsound, if not wholly perverse.\n\nGreat emphasis has bee'n laid on the fact that the First Information Report, in this case was lodged by Rcsham Singh (PW 2) G with utmost promptitude, and .even its copy had reacho\"d the Magistrate at about 6 or 6-30 p.m. at Patti, on the same day.\n\nIn the First Information Report, proceeds the argument, all the material facts including the names of th•\" accused and of the witnesses have been mentioned. It is submitted that si'nce this FJ.R. was made without delay in circumstances in which the informant had no time to concoct H a false story, it furnished valuable corroboration of the evidence of Rcsham Singh (P.W. 2), and made his evidence safe enough to be\n\n626 SUPJU!ME COUl!.T REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c.R.\n\naccepted.\n\nIt is further maintained that in the first place, the prrn; ecutio'n had established that Mukhtar Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Joiinder Singh had also a motive to join hands with Wasson Singh to murder Hzara Singh deceased, and that even if it was held that such motive on the part of the companions of Wasson Singh accused had not been substantiated-as the High Court has held-then P.Ws. 2 and 3 had also 'no motive or animus to falsely implicate them.\n\nCounsel have criticised the failure of the High Court to discuss the value and effect of the F.I.R. lodged by P.W. 2.\n\nIt is emphasis•od that the circumstance that the FI.R. was made without delay was a circumstance of paramount importance in evaluating Resham Singh's evidence in particular and the prosecution evidence in general.\n\nIt is argued that the omission on the part of the High Court to deal with and discuss the F.I.R. has caused •erious aberration in its approach and viti•, ted its apprec]!; tion of the evidence of the eyo-witnesses.\n\nOn the other hand, Shri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted that since the reasons given by the High Court in •upport of the acquittal of the accused cannot be called perverse, this Court should not, in keeping with its practice, disturb the acquittal even if it fuels inclined to hold that the view of the evidence taken by the trial court is also reasonable. Shri Jain has further\n\ntriecl to oupport the reasonini;: of the High Court.\n\nWe have carefully considered the contentions canvassed on both siues.\n\nWe are also not unmindful of the fact that we are dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal i'n a double-murder case.\n\nEven so, we find that tho reasons given by the High Court for bo:ding that Resham Singh (P.W. 2) was not an eye-witness of these murders, are utterly unsustainable. The mere fact that Resham Singh (P.W. 2) had succeeded in escaping unhurt, or that there arc discrepancies i'n the statements of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Singh (P.W. 3), as to whether they had gone to Amarkot with Hazara Singh' deceased on the very day of occurrence or a day earlier, was no ground for jumping to the conclusion that P.W. 2 was not in the company of the deceased or nearabout the scene of occurrence when Hazara Singh and Resham Singh were shot dead.\n\nThe occurrence took place on August 4, 1973, while Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Singh (P.W. 3) were examined at the trial on December 27, 1974, that is to say, 17 months after the incident.\n\nSuch discrepancies in regard to collateral or •ubsidiary facts or H matters of detail occur even in the statements of truthful witnesses, particularly when they are examined to depose to events which happened long before their examination.\n\nSuch discrepancies are\n\nhardly a ground to reject the evidence of the witnesses when there is general agreement and consistency in regard to the rnbstratum of the prosecutirn1 case.\n\nAs rightly observed by the trial court, Resham Singh (P.W.2) was never cross-examined by the defence regarding his whereabouts and that of Hazara Singh deceased on the previous night.\n\nThe mere fact that P.W. 2 did not make any purchases at Amarkot could hardly be a reason to hold that his being in the company of Hazara Singh deceased at the material time, was improbable.\n\nIt is common ground that there was no love-lost between Wassan Singh appellant and Hazara Singh deceased. Wassan Singh, though convicted by the trial court for the murder of Ajit Singh, was released on bail by the High Court pending his appeal.\n\nP.W. 3 is the brother and P.W. 2 a relation of the deceased.\n\nAll these three were living together in the same hamlet in the fields.\n\nIt is in the evidence of these witnesses that the other accused are partymen of Wasson Singh. It is further in evidence that sometime before the occurrence both Hazara Singh and Resham Singh (P.W. 2) were arrested and handcuffed by Darshan Singh, Police Sub-Inspector on the allegation that they were indulging in smuggling and would be liquidated.\n\nBoth of them however, escaped and appeared with handcuffs on before the Deputy Home Minister and complained against the Police Sub-Inspector. Both were prosecuted for smuggling betel leaves across the border. It was therefore, not improbable that this trio consisting of Hazara Singh deceased, P.W. 2 and P .W. 3 was, as usual, moving about or carrying on their activities together.\n\nMoreover, the deceased Hazara Singh must have known that Wasson Singh accused who was inimically disposed towards him, was at large on bail.\n\nThis was an added reason for this troika _.1' -to move about for their security, if not for anything else, in the company of each other.\n\nNor could P.W. Bachan Singh's presence at the scene of crime\n\nbe discounted and his evidence discarded merely on the score that G there was no necessity for him to go to Amarkot for enquiring about the availability of diesel.\n\nThere is one towering circumstance which goes a long way to lend assurance to the claim of P.W. 2 that he was an eye-witness of the occurrence.\n\nIt is that the F.I.R. (Ex. P.E.) was lodged by him B a! Police Station Valtoha, so promptly that he had practically no time to spin out a false story.\n\nThe learned trial Judge has accepted, and rightly so, the sworn testimony of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal (P.W. 13), who was then Station House Officer, Valtoha, to the effect, that the F.I.R. (Ex. P.E.), was recorded in the Police\n\nStation at 4.30 p.m. Police Station Valtoha is three miles from Bus Stand Amarkot.\n\nAccording to Resham Singh, the occurrence took place at about 3.30 p.m.\n\nOn seeing the occurrence and after eluding the pursuit, Resh am Singh, as he says, ran to Adda Amarkot through the fields covering a distance of about one kilometre.\n\nAccording to P.W. 2, his motor-cycle was lying at a shop in Amarkot.\n\nHe picked up his motor-cycle from there and drove to the Police Station, Valtoha and without loss of time lodged the first information, there.\n\nThe endorsement on Ex. PE, bears out that the copy of the First Information was in the hands of Shri K. K. Garg, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patti, at 6.30 p.m.\n\nThis circumstance assures the truth of the prosecution evidence on the point that the First Information Report was made by Resham Singh (P.W.\n\n2) at the Police Station at 4.30 p.m., that is within two hours of the occurrence, without undue delay.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have not at all dealt with the F.I.R. or the promptitude with which it was made.\n\nThey doubted Resham Singh's version that from Amarkot he went on bis own motor-cycle to Valtoha Police\n\nStation.\n\nThe argument employed by the High Court is that Resham Singh owned only four or five killas of land, and could not acquire and maintain a motor-cycle from the income of his petty holding.\n\nHowever, this was not the defence case. In cross-examination, the defence themselves, brought out and tried to establish that he was earning by smuggling betel or other things to Pakistan. Thus, according to the own showing of the defence, P.W. 2 had a source of income other than his agricultural income. It was, therefore, nothing improbable if Resham Singh owned a motor-cycle.\n\nSub-Inspector Bishamber I.al (P.W. 13) was not questioned in cross-examination as to whether or not Resham Singh bad come to the Police Station on a motor-cycle.\n\nHe (P.W. 13) was however, questioned as to what transport he had used for going from the Police Station to the scene of murders.\n\nThe witness replied that he went on a motor-cycle upto Amarkot and from there went on foot to the scene of occurrence. Resham Singh stated that since it had recently rained, the kacha path from Amarkot to their hamlet in village Ban, had become muddy and unsafe for riding a motorcycle because of the high risk of skidding. That was why, the witness had left the motor-cycle at Adda Amarkot with a shopkeeper.\n\n-~ -\n\nIt may be noted that the occurrence took place on August 4, 1973 when the rainy season would be in full swing. This explanation of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) regarding the kacha path from Amarkot to the scene of occurrence, being non-motorable on the day of occurrence, receives inferential support from the fact appearing in the evi- -Oence of Bishamber Lal (P.W. 13), that he had to cover the distance from Adda Amarkot to the place of occurrence, on foot. Thus, the reason employed by the High Court for disbelieving the version of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) regarding his owning and going on a motor-cycle from Amarkot to Police Station Valtoha was manifestly unsound.\n\nIt was argued before the trial court on behalf of the accused that the occurrence might have taken place at about 2 p.m. when Resham Singh (P.W. 2) was about 400 or 500 yards away in his hamlet, and that on hearing the report of gun-fire he was attracted to the scene of crime, and he having seen the dead-bodies lying there, went home, took his motor-cycle and. then drove to the Police Station Valtoha and brought Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal to the scene of occurrence and the Sub-Inspector prepared the F.I.R. at the spot after deliberation with Resham Singh and others.\n\nThis c_onte_ntion was rightly rejected by the trial court. As observed earlier, since it had rained a day prior to the occurrence, the kacha path from Amarkot to the scene of occurrence and to the hamlet of the deceased must have been muddy and slippery. Therefore, the very suggestion that from village Ban to markot and thereafter to Valtoha, Resham Singh went on his motor-cycle, was improbable. -\n\nMoreover, from the conduct of the Investigating Officer, Bisham- F ber Lal, it appears that he was not favourably disposed towards the deceased and the informant.\n\nIndeed, a suggestion was put to Bishamber Lal (P.W. 13) by the Public Prosecutor, that he has been unfair in the investigation of the case a!ld tried to favour Joginder Singh and Meja Singh accused.\n\nThe learned trial Judge found that the investigation conducted by Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal was G biased in favour of Joginder Singh and Meja Singh accused persons, and that the Sub-fnpector fraudently interpolated a note in his zimini to help Joginder Singh accused.\n\nThe High Court has, also, found that this note in the zimini was a fraudulent insertion.\n\nThis being the case. Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal would be least disposed to join hands with Resham Singh informant in preparing the First H Information Report, after deliberation with him (P.W.2) at the '.Spot.\n\n630 SUPREME COURT llEPO!lTS\n\n[198!) 2 S.C.R.\n\nDr. Gursharan Kaur (P.W. 1) who performed the post-mOf\"tem examination of the dead-bodies of Resham Singh and Hazara Singh on August 4, 1973 between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. respectively, opined that the time which elapsed between these deaths and their post-mortem examination was about 18 hours.\n\nThus, according to the Doctor'• opinion, also, the deaths took place at about 2 or 3 p.111. on August 4, 1973.\n\nThe opinion of the medical witness thus corroborated tbe version of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) in as much as the latter has testified that tbe murders took place at about 3.30 p.m.\n\nThis means, that the statement of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) in the First Information Report was made without undue delay, and, as such, furnished very valuable corroboration of his testimony at the trial, in all material particular.\n\nIf the presence of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Dalip Bachan Singh (P.W. 3) at the time and place of murders was probable the further question would be, how far their evidence could be safely accepted D against each of the accused persons ?\n\nIt is true that both these witnesse• are relavd to the deceased, and, as such, are interested witnesses.\n\nTheir antecedents, also, are of a questionable nature. But their antecedents or mere interestedness was not a valid ground to reject their evidence.\n\nPersons with such antecedents are not necessarily untruthful witness.\n\nNor mere relationship with the deceased was a good ground for discarding their testimony, when, as we have already held, their presence at the scene of occurrence was probable.\n\nAll that was necessary was to scrutinise their evidence with more than ordinary care and circumspection with reference to the part or role assigned to each of the accused.\n\nAn effort should have been made to sift the grain from the chaff; to accept what appeared to be true and to reject the rest.\n\nThe High Court did not adopt this methodology in appreciating their evidence. Instead, it took a short-cut to disposal, and rejected their evidence whole-sale against all the accused, [or reasons wl1icl1, as already discussed, are manifestly untenable.\n\nKeeping the principle enunciated above, we have scrutinised the entire material on record with particular focus on the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3, against each of the accused. Excepting the inunaterial di•crepancies considered earlier, the evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 wai; consistent, and their presence as already mentioned, at the time and place of murders was probable.\n\nEven so, as a matter of abundant caution, it will be safe to act on their interested evidence\n\n............\n\nto the extent to which some assurance is coming forth from surrounding circumstunces or other ev; dence .\n\nThe story narrated by the eye-witnesses, Resham Singh and Bachan Singh is that Wasson Singh, Mukhtar Singh and Joginder Singh first fired a volley of ritleshots at Hazara Singh deceased as a result of which he dropped dead at the spot.\n\nThe evidence of the Doctor who performed the autopsy on the dead-body of Hazara Singh is to the effect that there were two bullet wounds of entry on the left side of the head.\n\nThese wounds were located at a distance of 2t ems. from each other.\n\nThere were two corresponding wounds of exit.\n\nThere was no blackening or charring around these wounds of entry.\n\nThis indicates that these injuries were caused by bullets fired almost simultaneously from two separate rifles from a distance beyond 6 feet.\n\nThis means at least the rifles fired by two of the three aforesaid accused did find their mark, causing instantaneous death of the decea>ed. Now, both the courts below have concurrently found that Was•on Singh had a strong motive to murder Hazara Singh deceased. This circumstance, by itself, is sufficient to lend the necessary assurance to the evidence of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Sinah (P.W. 3) and make it a safe basis for convicting Was•on Singh accused for the murder of Hazara Singh.\n\nThe trial court had accepted the evidence of Resham Singh IP.W.2) in regard to the quarrel over cattk trespass that took place 3 or 4 days prior to these murders between Mukhtar Singh a'nd Harbhajan Singh accused on one side, and Hazara Singh deceased and P.W. 2 on the other.\n\nThis story finds particular mention in the F.1.R. (Ex. PE) which was lodged by P.W. 2 without undue delay.\n\nThe High Court has rejected this story about this previous quarrel on the three-fold ground, namely: (a) Gajjan Singh who interceded and pacified the parties has not been examined, (b) No evidence of the extent of damage done to the crop or of any complaint made to village Panchayat has been produced, (c) Bachan Singh (P.W.3), did not mention about this earlier incident in his police statement. ln our opinion, none of these was a valid ground for re, iecting the evidence of Resham Singh (P.W.2) in regard to this incident. Resham Singh's consistent testimony on this point corroborated by the F.I.R. (Ex. PE) was sufficient to establish this fact beyond doubt. Thus, it was proved by the prosecution that Mukhtar Singh accused had also a motive to join Wasson Singh accused in ki!ling Hazara Singh.\n\nThe circumstance that Mukhtar Singh had also a motive to participate in the murder of Hazara Singh deceased lends assurance to the\n\ntestimony of Resham Singh (P.W.2) and Bachan Singh (P.W.3), and strengthens the inference of guilt against the said accused, also.\n\nIt is in the evidence of Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal (P.W.13) that Mukhtar Singh was arrested on August 18, 1973 and on August 31, 1973 Mukhtar Singh accused, whilst under Police custody, made a disclosure statement in the presence of Ajit Singh and Sardul !:iingh Co'nstables. that he had kept concealed a 303 rifle with 5 cartridges wrapped in a piece on cloth in a bundle of reeds lying inside the courtyard of his house at village Thathiwala and he could get the same discovered. P. W. 13 recorded that statement (Ex. P 1). Thereafter, the accused was taken to village Thathiwala where he led the Sub-Inspector in the presence of Sardul Singh and Ajit Singh Constables, to that bundle and got discovered the rifle (Ex. P7) and the\n\ncartridges (Ex. PS to 12) there!rom.\n\nThe Sub-Inspector prepared the sketch of the rifle and the memo (Ex. PM) which was attested by the aforesaid Constables. The rifle and the cartridges were sealed into parcels and were thereafter sent through Constable Ajit Si'ngh, with seals intact, to the Police Station where they were received by the Moharrir Head Constable Natha Singh (P.W. 10).\n\nP, W. 13 has also, stated that he had on August 4, 1973 on inspecting the scene of murders, found two empty cartridges (Ex. P3 and Ex. P4) from near the dead-body of Hazara Singh.\n\nThe witness took them into possession and sealed them into a parcel in the presence of Anokh Singh and Gajjan Singh witnesses. and prepared the memo (Ex. PG). The parcel containing the empties was later deposited by the Snb-Inspector, with seals in tact, in the Malkhana of the Police Sta.lion.\n\nThe evidence of Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal, with regard to the seizure of the empty (crime) cartridges from the scene of occurrence on August 4, was supported by Anokh Singh (P.W.4) who is an \"\"\"\"\"\"\" attesting witness of the memo, Ex.PG. The witness is a resident of village Cheema.\n\nIn cross-examination, he revealed that these two fired cartridg:es were lying at a distance of H karams (8 or 9 feet) from the dead-body of Hazara Singh.\n\nNothing was brought out in cross-exan1ination to show that the witness was in any way interested in the prosecution or was related to the deceased or had any animus against the accused.\n\nThus, it has been clearly proved that two fired cartridges were picked up from the scene of crime and ,,, aled into parcels which were later deposited with seals intact in the Police Sta· lion.\n\nTn the memo (Ex. PG), il is mentioned that these fired cartridges were of 3G3 bore rifle.\n\nAjit Singh M:oharrir Head Constable (P.W.11) swore in his affi- /If. davit that on August 4, 1973, he received the sealed parcel of 2 empty cartridges from Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal.\n\nThe seals on the parcel remained intact so long as the parcel remained in his custody.\n\nThen, there are the affidavits of Avtar Singh Constable \\P.W. 9) B and Natha Singh Moharir Head Constable showing that on September 24, 1973, the sealed parcels containing the rifle (Ex. P7) and the five live cartridges were sent through P.W. 9 to the Forensic Science\n\nLaboratory Chandigarh, who delivered the same in the said Laboratory with seals intact.\n\nThe evidence of P.W. 13 regarding the discovery of the rifle (Ex.\n\nP7) from Mukhtar Singh accused was fully corroborated by Constable Sardul Singh (P.W. 12). His cross-examination reveals that Mukhtar Singh was interrogated in the Police Station at 4-5 A.M. when he made the statement (Ex. PL), leading to the discovery of the rifle (Ex. P7).\n\nSub-Inspector Bishamber Lal (P .W. 13) has slated that the sealed parcel containing the empty cartridges, that had been found at the scene of crime, was sent to the Fo\"ensic Science Laboratory Chandigarh at a dale earlier than the one on which the parcel containing the rifle (Ex. P7) and the five live cartridges was sent to the said Laboratory, but it was returned with the objection that it should have been\n\nsent along with the test cartridges. Consequently, this parcel containing the empties was again sent to the Forensic Laboratory along with the sealed parcel containing the rifle (Ex. P7) and the live cartridges recovered from Mukhtar Singh accused.\n\nIn the Report (Ex. PQ) of the Ballistic Expert (L. A. Kumar) which was tendered in evidence and admitted without objection, it is opined that the empty (crime) cartridge, marked C,, had been fired through the rifle (Ex. P7) . .. - In cross-examination, the defence suggested to P.W. 13, that he had purposely recalled the parcel containing the empty cartridges from\n\nthe Forensic Science Laboratory for creating evidence against the accused and he did so by firing one cartridge through the rifte (Ex.\n\nG P7). The oblique suggestion was that the cartridge, marked C1 which in the opinion of the Ballistic Expert had been fired through the rifle (Ex. P7) was substituted for the original empty cartridge that l1ad been found at the scene of murder.\n\nThe Sub-Inspctor emphatically denied the suggestion. It was further suggested to PW. 13 that the rifle (Ex. P7) had, in fact, been handed over to the Police by the IJ relations of the deceased after procuring it from some source.\n\nThis was also stoutly denied by P.W. 13.\n\nThe learned trial J u.dge discarded this evidence relating to the discovery of the rifle (Ex. P7) at the instance of the accused, Mukhtar Singh, for the reason that Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal, for no good reason, had failed lo join respectables of the locality to witness the discovery of the rifle, and that he (P.W. 13) \"has tried to be a defence witness rather than the investigating officer\". The trial Judge accepted Anokh Singh's statement regarding the rewvery of the two fired cartridges from the scene of Hazara Singh's murder on August 4, but he adversely commented on the conduct of Bishamber Lal in delaying the despatch of those crime cartridges to the Forensic Science Laboratory Chandigarh till after the recovery of the rifle. He observed : \"In all probability, Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal wanted to help the accused by creating suspicion with respect to the identity of the firing impressions\" (on the empties). For this reason, according to the trial Judge, the ballistic evidence \"will not be corroborative evidence for the prosecution.\"\n\nWe agree wilh the trial Court that the investigating officer did not deliberately join with him respectables of the locality to attest the statements (Ex. PL) made by Mukhtar Singh, and to witness the subsequent discovery of the rifle (Ex. P7) at the instance of Mukhtar Singh. There was substance in the observation of the trial Judge that the investigation was biased in favour of the accused.\n\nIf that was E so, the failure of Bishamber Lal (P.W. 13) to join with him respectables of !he locality was, by itself, no ground for ruling out the evidence of the discovery of the rifle, altogether. The partiality of Bishamber Lal towards the defence, rather assures the genuineness of the discovery He was least disposed to 'collaborate' or 'cooperate' with the relations of the deceased to procure this rifle (Ex. P7) from ome other source and then foist it on Mukhtar Singh. For the same reason, it is not possible to hold that he recalled the sealed parcel containing the fired\n\n(crime) cartridges from the Laboratory at Chandigarh, for substituting a cartridge fired through the rifle (Ex. P7) or for fabricating evidence in support of the prosecution.\n\nMoreover, the parcel containing the\n\nG two empties must have been returned by the Director of the Forensic Laboratory on his own initiative and not at the instanco of the Sub- Inc.pector (P.W. 13).\n\nThe omission on the part of this investigating officer to join with him some independent persons or respectables of the locality to witness the recovery devalues that evidence but does not render it inad- H missible.\n\nAlthough a suggestion of \"planting\" the rifle, and fabricating the evidence of the empty cartridge (Ci) was put to Sub- Inspector Bishamber Lal in cross-examination, no such allegation was\n\nmade, nor any such plea was set up by Mukhtar Singh accused when the evidence relating to the recovery of the two empties from the spot, the discovery of the rifle (Ex. P7) at his instance and the opinion (Ex. PQ) of the Ballistic Expert was put to this accused in his examination under Section 342, Cr. P.C. The circumstance of the recovery of the rifle (Ex. P7) and the opinion of the Ballistic Expert that the empty cartridge (marked 0) (found on August 4, at the scene of murder) had been fired through the rifle (Ex. P7),-though feeble it might was relevant and furnished a further pointer to the participation of Mukhtar Singh in the commission of Hazarn Singh's murder by rifle-fire.\n\nIn sum, sufficient assurance of the testimony of P .W. 2 and P.W. 3, was available from the circumstantial evidence discussed above, regarding the participation of Wasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh accused in the murder of Hazara Singh. The evidence 0£\n\nthe eyewitnesses therefore, could safely be acted upon for convicting Wasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh accused-resporclents for the murder of Hazara Singh.\n\nBut such assurance of the evidence of these eyewitnesses waQ not available against the remaining accused regarding either of the murders in question.\n\nJoginder Singh accused admittedly was not present when the quarrel over cattle trespass took place between Hazara Singh deceased and P.W. 2 on one side, and Mukhtar Singh\n\nand Harbhajan Singh accused on the other.\n\nIt has neither been alleged nor proved that Joginder Singh had any motive of his own to murder Hazara Singh deceased.\n\nAlthough, the investigation l:etrays a tilt in favour of the accused, and P.W. 13 made a fraudulent \"¥isertion in the zimini to help Joginder Singh accused, it cannot be said that the version of P.W. 13 to the effect-that when, he went to the scene of murders at 5.30 P.M., he found Joginder Singh irrigating his nearby fields at a distance of about 100 yards therefrom and he (P.W. 13) interrogated him there and theu, but did not think it necessary to arrest him,-is necessarily false.\n\nThe absence of motive, and the presence of Joginder Singh near the scene of crime shortly after the murders, enaged in normal agricultural activities does cast a doubt about his participation in the commission of these murders.\n\nP.W. 2 and P.W. 3 have stated that they started running away from the spot, immediately after Hazara Singh was shot dead. The surrounding circumstances, natural probabilities and the normal course of human conduct also sugget the same inference, that\n\nimmediately on seeing Hazara Singh being shot down, these witnesses who were following Hazara Singh, ran fast for their lives.\n\nHad they tarried for a while at the scene of Hazara Singh's murder, it would have been too late for them to escape unhurt.\n\nIn such a. situation, when they were being pursued by persons armed with fire-arms, they could, if at all they turned and looked behind have only a fleeting glimpse in the distance of the assailants of Resham Singh deceased.\n\nThat is why, Resham (P.W. 2) is not consistent in his statements as to which of the accused had fired at him when he was running away for his life.\n\nMoreover, it has not been established that any of the six accused had any motive, whatever, to murder Resham Singh deceased.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we partly allow this appeal by the State, set aside the acquittal of Wassan Singh and Mukhtar Singh accused (respondents) and comic! them under Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code for the murder of Hazara Singh dl7ceased and sentence each of them to imprisonment for life.\n\nWe would, however, accord the benefit of doubt to the rest of the accused (respondents) and maintain their acquittal on all the counts.\n\nWasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh shall surrender to their bail-bonds to serve out the sentences inflicted on them.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.\n\n. ~-", "total_entities": 153, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WASSON SINGH AND FIVE OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WASSON SINGH AND FIVE OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Procedure Code 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Procedure Code 1973", "statute": "Procedure Code 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1959, "end_char": 1970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1981, "end_char": 1992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1993, "end_char": 1998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3753, "end_char": 3763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3764, "end_char": 3781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Wasson Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4140, "end_char": 4152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "636 C-D]\n\nD (iiJ Sufficient assurance of the testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 was availahie from the circumstantial evidence regarding the participation of respondents Wasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh in the murder of deceased Hazara Singh.", "canonical_name": "Wasson Singh"}}, {"text": "Mukhtar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "636 C-D]\n\nD (iiJ Sufficient assurance of the testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 was availahie from the circumstantial evidence regarding the participation of respondents Wasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh in the murder of deceased Hazara Singh.", "canonical_name": "B Mukhtar Singh"}}, {"text": "Hazara Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4197, "end_char": 4209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "636 C-D]\n\nD (iiJ Sufficient assurance of the testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 was availahie from the circumstantial evidence regarding the participation of respondents Wasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh in the murder of deceased Hazara Singh.", "canonical_name": "Hazara Si\"ngh"}}, {"text": "August 4, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "626H-627 A]\n\nIn the instant case the occurrence took place on August 4, 1973, while P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 were examined at the trial oni December 27, 1974 i.e. seventeen months after the incident."}}, {"text": "December 27, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5438, "end_char": 5455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "626H-627 A]\n\nIn the instant case the occurrence took place on August 4, 1973, while P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 were examined at the trial oni December 27, 1974 i.e. seventeen months after the incident."}}, {"text": "Amarkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mere fact that P.W. 2 did not IP..ake any purchase at Amarkot could hardly be a reason to hold that his heini;: in the company of the deceased at the material time was improbable."}}, {"text": "PUNJAB V. WASSON SINGH 617", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6022, "end_char": 6048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the evidence of\n\nPUNJAB V. WASSON SINGH 617\n\nthese witnesses that the other accused are partymen of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mukhtar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11993, "end_char": 12006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 7) and the opinion of the Ballistic Expert that the empty cartiridge (CI) had been fired through the rifle though feeble it might be-was relevant and furnished a further pointer to the participation of Mukhtar Singh in the commission of Hazara Singh's murder by rifle-fire.", "canonical_name": "B Mukhtar Singh"}}, {"text": "Joginder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12207, "end_char": 12221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the investigation betrays a tilt in favour of the accused, and P.W. 13 made a fradulent insertion in the zamini to help Joginder Singh accused, it cannot be said that the version of P.W. 13, that when he went to the scene of murders at 5.30 p.m. he found Joginder Singh irrigating Ws nearby fields at a distance of about 100 yards therefrom and he interrogated him there and then but did not think it necessary to arrest him-is necessarily false.", "canonical_name": "J oginder Singh"}}, {"text": "Resha1n Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13557, "end_char": 13570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In such ;1 situation, when they were being pursued by person.-.. nrmed with fire-arms, they \\.'.ould if at alJ they turned and looked behind have only a fleeting glimp .... e in the distance of the a6sailants of Resha1n Singh deceased.", "canonical_name": "Resha1n Singh"}}, {"text": "Reshan1 Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13829, "end_char": 13842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover it has not been establishe<l that any of the :six accused had any motive, whatever to murder Reshan1 Singh deceased.", "canonical_name": "Resha1n Singh"}}, {"text": "P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14109, "end_char": 14118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. S. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14123, "end_char": 14136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K . .loin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14157, "end_char": 14169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K ."}}, {"text": "R. K. Kohlt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14206, "end_char": 14217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Kohlt and R. C. Kohli for the complainant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14222, "end_char": 14233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Kohlt and R. C. Kohli for the complainant."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14300, "end_char": 14308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab is directed against a judgment, dated July 22, 1975, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, whereby the appeal Of the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was accepted and they were acquitted of the double-murder charge against them."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab is directed against a judgment, dated July 22, 1975, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, whereby the appeal Of the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was accepted and they were acquitted of the double-murder charge against them."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14408, "end_char": 14440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab is directed against a judgment, dated July 22, 1975, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, whereby the appeal Of the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was accepted and they were acquitted of the double-murder charge against them."}}, {"text": "Resham Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14635, "end_char": 14647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution story narrated by Resham Singh (P.W. 2), who claims to be an eyewitness of the occurrence, runs as follows."}}, {"text": "Cheema", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14870, "end_char": 14876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F Resham Singh (P.W.2) used to live with his brother-in-law, Hazara Singh deceased, in a hamlet in the fields outside the habitation of village Cheema."}}, {"text": "Ajit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14883, "end_char": 14893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Ajit Singh of village Dhual was murdered, ~~ and Wassan Singh accused and his party-men were tried therefor.", "canonical_name": "Ajit Si'ngh"}}, {"text": "Dhual", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14905, "end_char": 14910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Ajit Singh of village Dhual was murdered, ~~ and Wassan Singh accused and his party-men were tried therefor."}}, {"text": "Wassan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14932, "end_char": 14944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Ajit Singh of village Dhual was murdered, ~~ and Wassan Singh accused and his party-men were tried therefor.", "canonical_name": "Wasson Singh"}}, {"text": "Wasson Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15098, "end_char": 15110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court convicted Wasson Singh and his companions in that case.", "canonical_name": "Wasson Singh"}}, {"text": "Avtar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15366, "end_char": 15377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands of Avtar Singh, Mukhtar Siugh and Hnrbhajan Singh accused (respondents) adjoin the lands of Hazara Singh deceased."}}, {"text": "Mukhtar Siugh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15379, "end_char": 15392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands of Avtar Singh, Mukhtar Siugh and Hnrbhajan Singh accused (respondents) adjoin the lands of Hazara Singh deceased.", "canonical_name": "B Mukhtar Singh"}}, {"text": "Hnrbhajan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15397, "end_char": 15412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands of Avtar Singh, Mukhtar Siugh and Hnrbhajan Singh accused (respondents) adjoin the lands of Hazara Singh deceased."}}, {"text": "Resham Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15709, "end_char": 15721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, a sharp altercation took place\n\nbetween Hazara Singh and Resham Singh on one side and Harbhajan Singh and Mukhthar Singh on the other.", "canonical_name": "Resha1n Singh"}}, {"text": "Harbhajan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15738, "end_char": 15753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, a sharp altercation took place\n\nbetween Hazara Singh and Resham Singh on one side and Harbhajan Singh and Mukhthar Singh on the other.", "canonical_name": "Harbhajan Singh"}}, {"text": "Mukhthar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15758, "end_char": 15772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, a sharp altercation took place\n\nbetween Hazara Singh and Resham Singh on one side and Harbhajan Singh and Mukhthar Singh on the other.", "canonical_name": "B Mukhtar Singh"}}, {"text": "Gajjan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15788, "end_char": 15800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajjan Singh son of Gopal Singh resident of the village interceded and pacified the parties."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15808, "end_char": 15819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajjan Singh son of Gopal Singh resident of the village interceded and pacified the parties."}}, {"text": "Harbhajan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15972, "end_char": 15987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Joginder Singh accused respondent is the brother of Mukhtar Singh accused respondent while Harbhajan Singh Respondent is their first cousion.", "canonical_name": "Harbhajan Singh"}}, {"text": "Resham Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16148, "end_char": 16160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 4, 1973 at about 3.30 p.m., Resham Singh (P.W.2) ..\n\nResham Singh (deceased) son of another Hazara Singh and Hazara Singh deceased were proceeding by the foot-path from the Bus Stand Amarkot to their hamlet.", "canonical_name": "Resha1n Singh"}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16339, "end_char": 16351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the way Bachan Singh, brother of Hazara Singh, met them and proceeded along with them."}}, {"text": "Jarmaj Singh Sarpanch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16455, "end_char": 16476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When they reached near the fields of Jarmaj Singh Sarpanch of Mahmoodpura, all the six accused, namely, Wasson Singh, Baj Singh, Meja Singh, Joginder Singh, Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh emerged from the sann crop and came to the bank of the watercourse."}}, {"text": "Mahmoodpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16480, "end_char": 16491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When they reached near the fields of Jarmaj Singh Sarpanch of Mahmoodpura, all the six accused, namely, Wasson Singh, Baj Singh, Meja Singh, Joginder Singh, Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh emerged from the sann crop and came to the bank of the watercourse."}}, {"text": "Baj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16536, "end_char": 16545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When they reached near the fields of Jarmaj Singh Sarpanch of Mahmoodpura, all the six accused, namely, Wasson Singh, Baj Singh, Meja Singh, Joginder Singh, Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh emerged from the sann crop and came to the bank of the watercourse."}}, {"text": "Meja Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16547, "end_char": 16557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When they reached near the fields of Jarmaj Singh Sarpanch of Mahmoodpura, all the six accused, namely, Wasson Singh, Baj Singh, Meja Singh, Joginder Singh, Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh emerged from the sann crop and came to the bank of the watercourse."}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17237, "end_char": 17249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baj Singh chased Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Singh (P.W. 3) and fired at them with bis pistol."}}, {"text": "Resbam Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17441, "end_char": 17453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Resbam Singh (P.W. 2) immediately reached the Bus Stand Amarkot, picked up his motor-cycle which was lying there at a shop and drove fast to Police Station Valtoha, where he lodged the First Information Report (Ex."}}, {"text": "Police Station Valtoha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17582, "end_char": 17604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Resbam Singh (P.W. 2) immediately reached the Bus Stand Amarkot, picked up his motor-cycle which was lying there at a shop and drove fast to Police Station Valtoha, where he lodged the First Information Report (Ex."}}, {"text": "Bishambar Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17694, "end_char": 17707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PE) at 4.30 p.m. Police Sub-Inspector Bishambar Lal recorded the report of Resham Singh and sent a copy of the same as a special report to the superior officers, including the Judicial Magistrate, Frrst Class at Patti, who received the copy of the F.I.R. at 6.30 p.m., on the same day."}}, {"text": "Judicial Magistrate, Frrst Class at Patti", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17832, "end_char": 17873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PE) at 4.30 p.m. Police Sub-Inspector Bishambar Lal recorded the report of Resham Singh and sent a copy of the same as a special report to the superior officers, including the Judicial Magistrate, Frrst Class at Patti, who received the copy of the F.I.R. at 6.30 p.m., on the same day."}}, {"text": "Bashambar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18075, "end_char": 18088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-Inspector Bashambar Lal reached the scene of occurrence at ,."}}, {"text": "August 31, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18665, "end_char": 18680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his arrest, Mukhtar Singh accused was interrogated by the Investigating Officer on August 31, 1973."}}, {"text": "B Mukhtar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18709, "end_char": 18724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After making a statement, B Mukhtar Singh accused, in the presence of witnesses, fed the police to the discovery of the riJ!e (Ex.", "canonical_name": "B Mukhtar Singh"}}, {"text": "Forensic Science Laboratory,\n\n')>...\n\nChandigarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19027, "end_char": 19075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After examination, the ballistic expert of the Forensic Science Laboratory,\n\n')>...\n\nChandigarh, reported (vide Ex."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19430, "end_char": 19445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But no definite opinion could be given regarding the linkage of the fired cartridge marked C2 with the 303 rifle marked 'A' due to lack of sufficient individual characteristic marks on C2•\n\nJoginder Singh accused was arrested on August 24, 1973 and D Baj Singh accused on Decembr 18, 1973."}}, {"text": "D Baj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19450, "end_char": 19461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But no definite opinion could be given regarding the linkage of the fired cartridge marked C2 with the 303 rifle marked 'A' due to lack of sufficient individual characteristic marks on C2•\n\nJoginder Singh accused was arrested on August 24, 1973 and D Baj Singh accused on Decembr 18, 1973."}}, {"text": "Decembr 18, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But no definite opinion could be given regarding the linkage of the fired cartridge marked C2 with the 303 rifle marked 'A' due to lack of sufficient individual characteristic marks on C2•\n\nJoginder Singh accused was arrested on August 24, 1973 and D Baj Singh accused on Decembr 18, 1973."}}, {"text": "Gursharan Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19575, "end_char": 19589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The post mortem examination of the dead-body of Resham Singh was perfonned by Dr.\n\nGursharan Kaur on August 5, 1973 at 8 a.m.\n\nThe Doctor found five gun-shot injuries on his body."}}, {"text": "August 5, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19593, "end_char": 19607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The post mortem examination of the dead-body of Resham Singh was perfonned by Dr.\n\nGursharan Kaur on August 5, 1973 at 8 a.m.\n\nThe Doctor found five gun-shot injuries on his body."}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20598, "end_char": 20609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20611, "end_char": 20617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Aj; t Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21080, "end_char": 21091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Aj; t Singh deceased on suspicion; and that on the day of occurence, 1'e was working as a Conductor on a truck at Muzaffarnagar."}}, {"text": "Muzaffarnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21194, "end_char": 21207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Aj; t Singh deceased on suspicion; and that on the day of occurence, 1'e was working as a Conductor on a truck at Muzaffarnagar."}}, {"text": "Punjab Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21310, "end_char": 21322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that his brothers Punjab Singh, Narinder Singh and Bagicha Singh had been prosecuted for the murder of one Puran Singh who was a relation of Bachan Singh (P.W.3); that Punjab Singh and his companions were acquitted in that case.", "canonical_name": "Punjab Singh"}}, {"text": "Narinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21324, "end_char": 21338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that his brothers Punjab Singh, Narinder Singh and Bagicha Singh had been prosecuted for the murder of one Puran Singh who was a relation of Bachan Singh (P.W.3); that Punjab Singh and his companions were acquitted in that case."}}, {"text": "Bagicha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21343, "end_char": 21356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that his brothers Punjab Singh, Narinder Singh and Bagicha Singh had been prosecuted for the murder of one Puran Singh who was a relation of Bachan Singh (P.W.3); that Punjab Singh and his companions were acquitted in that case."}}, {"text": "Puran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21399, "end_char": 21410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that his brothers Punjab Singh, Narinder Singh and Bagicha Singh had been prosecuted for the murder of one Puran Singh who was a relation of Bachan Singh (P.W.3); that Punjab Singh and his companions were acquitted in that case.", "canonical_name": "Punjab Singh"}}, {"text": "Balkar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21849, "end_char": 21861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that one Balkar Singh of Village Wan had been murdered."}}, {"text": "Wan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21873, "end_char": 21876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that one Balkar Singh of Village Wan had been murdered."}}, {"text": "Jarnail Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21946, "end_char": 21959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He (Meja Singh) used to look after the defence of Jarnail Singh (his wife's brother, who was being tried for the murder of Balkar Singh; that on account of this, the relation of the said Balkar Singh had, in connivance with the complainant party, falsely implicated him in the instant case."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22291, "end_char": 22326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, who tried the case against these six accused persons, found that Wasson Singh had a strong motive to murder Hazara Singh decea&'...d, because the latter had appeared as an eye-witness against Wasson Singh in Ajit Singh's murder case."}}, {"text": "Bishambar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23712, "end_char": 23725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further found that Snb-Inspector Bishambar Lal had tried to favour J oginder Singh accused by fabricating a note in his zimini at some subsequent stage.", "canonical_name": "Bisham- F ber Lal"}}, {"text": "J oginder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23746, "end_char": 23761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further found that Snb-Inspector Bishambar Lal had tried to favour J oginder Singh accused by fabricating a note in his zimini at some subsequent stage.", "canonical_name": "J oginder Singh"}}, {"text": "Joginder Sinch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23866, "end_char": 23880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This note is to the effect, that Joginder Sinch was, in fact, present irri!ating his nearby fields and he joined the police investigation on the very day of occurrence and had remained with the police till the investit; ation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police.", "canonical_name": "J oginder Singh"}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24277, "end_char": 24290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of independent evidence, the trial Judge was unable to hold from the bare testimony of Bishamber Lal, Sub-Inspector, that the rifle (Ex."}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24434, "end_char": 24447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, criticised th~ conduct or Sub- Inspector Bishamber Lal in not s.ending the empty cartridges found at the spot to the ballistic expert of th~ Forensic Laboratory, Chandi1arh,\n\nwith due promptitude.", "canonical_name": "Bisham- F ber Lal"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24841, "end_char": 24852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24854, "end_char": 24864, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25059, "end_char": 25070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25081, "end_char": 25092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25094, "end_char": 25104, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25381, "end_char": 25392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25403, "end_char": 25413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25415, "end_char": 25425, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Reshilm Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25445, "end_char": 25458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He therefore, convicted Baj Singh, Meja Singh and Harbhajan Singh accused only under Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code, for the mnrder of Reshilm Singh deceased and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Resha1n Singh"}}, {"text": "Rcsham Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26014, "end_char": 26026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Hi&h Court G\n\nallowed the appeal, declined the roference and rejected the evidence of the eye-witnesses, Rcsham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Sinjh (P.W.\n\n3) , for these reasons :\n\n(i) Both these witnesses are closely related to the deceased Hazara Singh, who was the prfncipal target of the accused."}}, {"text": "Bachan Sinjh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26040, "end_char": 26052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Hi&h Court G\n\nallowed the appeal, declined the roference and rejected the evidence of the eye-witnesses, Rcsham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Sinjh (P.W.\n\n3) , for these reasons :\n\n(i) Both these witnesses are closely related to the deceased Hazara Singh, who was the prfncipal target of the accused."}}, {"text": "Hazara Sinh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26291, "end_char": 26302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) (a) Excepting in the case of Wasson Singh who had undoubtedly a grudge against Hazara Sinh deceased, it has not been\n\nsatisfactory established by the prosecution that the other five accused had any motive to commit the murders in question.", "canonical_name": "Hazara Si\"ngh"}}, {"text": "Gajjan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26457, "end_char": 26469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) Gajjan Singh, who is said to have interceded and pacified both the parties at the time of the alleged quarrel over cattle trespass, three or four days prior to the occurrence, between Mukhtar Singh and Harbhajan Singh on one hand and Hazara Singh deceased and Resham Singh (P-W. 2) on the other, has not been examined by the prosecution."}}, {"text": "Hazara Si\"ngh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27454, "end_char": 27467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Had these witnesses been with Hazara Singh deceased, they would have been the target of attack after Hazara Si\"ngh was killed and r, ot Resham Singh deocased against whom the accused had no grudge.", "canonical_name": "Hazara Si\"ngh"}}, {"text": "Hazara Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27557, "end_char": 27569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( v) Hazara Singh deceased, Bachan Singh and Resham Singh, E P.Ws.,", "canonical_name": "Hazara Si\"ngh"}}, {"text": "Hazara Si'ngh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28158, "end_char": 28171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachan Singh's version, that he had gone to Amarkot to make e'nquiries regarding the availability of diesel and on his return journey in the way, met and joined the\n\nF company of his brother Hazara Singh deceased, and his companions, was not believable, becanse there was no need for Bachan Singh to have gone to Amarkot for the purchase of diesel as he could have asked Hazara Si'ngh to make the necessary enquiries.", "canonical_name": "Hazara Si\"ngh"}}, {"text": "Bish amber Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29433, "end_char": 29447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(viii) The investigation of the case conducted by the Sub-Inspector Bish amber Lal (P.W. 13) does not inspire confidence."}}, {"text": "Joginder Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30376, "end_char": 30390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hoe scene of the incident,\n\nP.W. 13 fonnd Joginder Singh accused at a distance of abont 100 yards irrigating his field."}}, {"text": "Patti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31111, "end_char": 31116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Great emphasis has bee'n laid on the fact that the First Information Report, in this case was lodged by Rcsham Singh (PW 2) G with utmost promptitude, and .even its copy had reacho\"d the Magistrate at about 6 or 6-30 p.m. at Patti, on the same day."}}, {"text": "Joiinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31736, "end_char": 31750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further maintained that in the first place, the prrn; ecutio'n had established that Mukhtar Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Joiinder Singh had also a motive to join hands with Wasson Singh to murder Hzara Singh deceased, and that even if it was held that such motive on the part of the companions of Wasson Singh accused had not been substantiated-as the High Court has held-then P.Ws.", "canonical_name": "J oginder Singh"}}, {"text": "Hzara Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31811, "end_char": 31822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further maintained that in the first place, the prrn; ecutio'n had established that Mukhtar Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Joiinder Singh had also a motive to join hands with Wasson Singh to murder Hzara Singh deceased, and that even if it was held that such motive on the part of the companions of Wasson Singh accused had not been substantiated-as the High Court has held-then P.Ws.", "canonical_name": "Hazara Si\"ngh"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32638, "end_char": 32648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Shri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted that since the reasons given by the High Court in •upport of the acquittal of the accused cannot be called perverse, this Court should not, in keeping with its practice, disturb the acquittal even if it fuels inclined to hold that the view of the evidence taken by the trial court is also reasonable."}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33007, "end_char": 33011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Jain has further\n\ntriecl to oupport the reasonini;: of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Hazara Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35458, "end_char": 35470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further in evidence that sometime before the occurrence both Hazara Singh and Resham Singh (P.W. 2) were arrested and handcuffed by Darshan Singh, Police Sub-Inspector on the allegation that they were indulging in smuggling and would be liquidated."}}, {"text": "Darshan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35529, "end_char": 35542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further in evidence that sometime before the occurrence both Hazara Singh and Resham Singh (P.W. 2) were arrested and handcuffed by Darshan Singh, Police Sub-Inspector on the allegation that they were indulging in smuggling and would be liquidated."}}, {"text": "P.W. Bachan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36321, "end_char": 36338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor could P.W. Bachan Singh's presence at the scene of crime\n\nbe discounted and his evidence discarded merely on the score that G there was no necessity for him to go to Amarkot for enquiring about the availability of diesel."}}, {"text": "Valtoha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37013, "end_char": 37020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned trial Judge has accepted, and rightly so, the sworn testimony of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal (P.W. 13), who was then Station House Officer, Valtoha, to the effect, that the F.I.R. (Ex."}}, {"text": "Resh am Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37306, "end_char": 37319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Resham Singh, the occurrence took place at about 3.30 p.m.\n\nOn seeing the occurrence and after eluding the pursuit, Resh am Singh, as he says, ran to Adda Amarkot through the fields covering a distance of about one kilometre.", "canonical_name": "Resha1n Singh"}}, {"text": "Police Station, Valtoha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37544, "end_char": 37567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He picked up his motor-cycle from there and drove to the Police Station, Valtoha and without loss of time lodged the first information, there."}}, {"text": "K. K. Garg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37732, "end_char": 37742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PE, bears out that the copy of the First Information was in the hands of Shri K. K. Garg, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patti, at 6.30 p.m.\n\nThis circumstance assures the truth of the prosecution evidence on the point that the First Information Report was made by Resham Singh (P.W.\n\n2) at the Police Station at 4.30 p.m., that is within two hours of the occurrence, without undue delay."}}, {"text": "Valtoha Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38254, "end_char": 38268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They doubted Resham Singh's version that from Amarkot he went on bis own motor-cycle to Valtoha Police\n\nStation."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38648, "end_char": 38656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cross-examination, the defence themselves, brought out and tried to establish that he was earning by smuggling betel or other things to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Bishamber I.al", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 38865, "end_char": 38879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-Inspector Bishamber I.al (P.W. 13) was not questioned in cross-examination as to whether or not Resham Singh bad come to the Police Station on a motor-cycle."}}, {"text": "Ban", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39373, "end_char": 39376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Resham Singh stated that since it had recently rained, the kacha path from Amarkot to their hamlet in village Ban, had become muddy and unsafe for riding a motorcycle because of the high risk of skidding."}}, {"text": "Adda Amarkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39522, "end_char": 39534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was why, the witness had left the motor-cycle at Adda Amarkot with a shopkeeper."}}, {"text": "Bisham- F ber Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41259, "end_char": 41276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, from the conduct of the Investigating Officer, Bisham- F ber Lal, it appears that he was not favourably disposed towards the deceased and the informant.", "canonical_name": "Bisham- F ber Lal"}}, {"text": "Gursharan Kaur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42189, "end_char": 42203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S.C.R.\n\nDr. Gursharan Kaur (P.W. 1) who performed the post-mOf\"tem examination of the dead-bodies of Resham Singh and Hazara Singh on August 4, 1973 between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. respectively, opined that the time which elapsed between these deaths and their post-mortem examination was about 18 hours."}}, {"text": "Dalip Bachan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43041, "end_char": 43059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the presence of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Dalip Bachan Singh (P.W. 3) at the time and place of murders was probable the further question would be, how far their evidence could be safely accepted D against each of the accused persons ?"}}, {"text": "Was•on Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45822, "end_char": 45834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, both the courts below have concurrently found that Was•on Singh had a strong motive to murder Hazara Singh deceased.", "canonical_name": "Wasson Singh"}}, {"text": "Bachan Sinah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46009, "end_char": 46021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This circumstance, by itself, is sufficient to lend the necessary assurance to the evidence of Resham Singh (P.W. 2) and Bachan Sinah (P.W. 3) and make it a safe basis for convicting Was•on Singh accused for the murder of Hazara Singh."}}, {"text": "August 18, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47677, "end_char": 47692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the evidence of Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal (P.W.13) that Mukhtar Singh was arrested on August 18, 1973 and on August 31, 1973 Mukhtar Singh accused, whilst under Police custody, made a disclosure statement in the presence of Ajit Singh and Sardul !:"}}, {"text": "Sardul !:iingh Co'nstables", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47830, "end_char": 47856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the evidence of Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal (P.W.13) that Mukhtar Singh was arrested on August 18, 1973 and on August 31, 1973 Mukhtar Singh accused, whilst under Police custody, made a disclosure statement in the presence of Ajit Singh and Sardul !:"}}, {"text": "Thathiwala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48015, "end_char": 48025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that he had kept concealed a 303 rifle with 5 cartridges wrapped in a piece on cloth in a bundle of reeds lying inside the courtyard of his house at village Thathiwala and he could get the same discovered."}}, {"text": "Sardul Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48214, "end_char": 48226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the accused was taken to village Thathiwala where he led the Sub-Inspector in the presence of Sardul Singh and Ajit Singh Constables, to that bundle and got discovered the rifle (Ex."}}, {"text": "Ajit Si'ngh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48572, "end_char": 48583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rifle and the cartridges were sealed into parcels and were thereafter sent through Constable Ajit Si'ngh, with seals intact, to the Police Station where they were received by the Moharrir Head Constable Natha Singh (P.W. 10).", "canonical_name": "Ajit Si'ngh"}}, {"text": "Moharrir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48658, "end_char": 48666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rifle and the cartridges were sealed into parcels and were thereafter sent through Constable Ajit Si'ngh, with seals intact, to the Police Station where they were received by the Moharrir Head Constable Natha Singh (P.W. 10)."}}, {"text": "Natha Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 48682, "end_char": 48693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rifle and the cartridges were sealed into parcels and were thereafter sent through Constable Ajit Si'ngh, with seals intact, to the Police Station where they were received by the Moharrir Head Constable Natha Singh (P.W. 10)."}}, {"text": "Anokh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48974, "end_char": 48985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness took them into possession and sealed them into a parcel in the presence of Anokh Singh and Gajjan Singh witnesses."}}, {"text": "Anokh Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 49346, "end_char": 49357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal, with regard to the seizure of the empty (crime) cartridges from the scene of occurrence on August 4, was supported by Anokh Singh (P.W.4) who is an \"\"\"\"\"\"\" attesting witness of the memo, Ex."}}, {"text": "Ajit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 50096, "end_char": 50106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ajit Singh M:oharrir Head Constable (P.W.11) swore in his affi- /If."}}, {"text": "Avtar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 50404, "end_char": 50415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, there are the affidavits of Avtar Singh Constable \\P.W. 9) B and Natha Singh Moharir Head Constable showing that on September 24, 1973, the sealed parcels containing the rifle (Ex."}}, {"text": "Natha Singh Moharir", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 50441, "end_char": 50460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, there are the affidavits of Avtar Singh Constable \\P.W. 9) B and Natha Singh Moharir Head Constable showing that on September 24, 1973, the sealed parcels containing the rifle (Ex."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50492, "end_char": 50510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, there are the affidavits of Avtar Singh Constable \\P.W. 9) B and Natha Singh Moharir Head Constable showing that on September 24, 1973, the sealed parcels containing the rifle (Ex."}}, {"text": "Forensic Science\n\nLaboratory Chandigarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50622, "end_char": 50661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P7) and the five live cartridges were sent through P.W. 9 to the Forensic Science\n\nLaboratory Chandigarh, who delivered the same in the said Laboratory with seals intact."}}, {"text": "Sardul Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 50863, "end_char": 50875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P7) from Mukhtar Singh accused was fully corroborated by Constable Sardul Singh (P.W. 12)."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51266, "end_char": 51276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-Inspector Bishamber Lal (P .W. 13) has slated that the sealed parcel containing the empty cartridges, that had been found at the scene of crime, was sent to the Fo\"ensic Science Laboratory Chandigarh at a dale earlier than the one on which the parcel containing the rifle (Ex."}}, {"text": "L. A. Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51783, "end_char": 51794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PQ) of the Ballistic Expert (L. A. Kumar) which was tendered in evidence and admitted without objection, it is opined that the empty (crime) cartridge, marked C,, had been fired through the rifle (Ex."}}, {"text": "Forensic Science Laboratory Chandigarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53424, "end_char": 53462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Judge accepted Anokh Singh's statement regarding the rewvery of the two fired cartridges from the scene of Hazara Singh's murder on August 4, but he adversely commented on the conduct of Bishamber Lal in delaying the despatch of those crime cartridges to the Forensic Science Laboratory Chandigarh till after the recovery of the rifle."}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55867, "end_char": 55878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hazarn Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56234, "end_char": 56246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P7),-though feeble it might was relevant and furnished a further pointer to the participation of Mukhtar Singh in the commission of Hazarn Singh's murder by rifle-fire.", "canonical_name": "Hazara Si\"ngh"}}, {"text": "Mukhtar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 56986, "end_char": 56999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Joginder Singh accused admittedly was not present when the quarrel over cattle trespass took place between Hazara Singh deceased and P.W. 2 on one side, and Mukhtar Singh\n\nand Harbhajan Singh accused on the other."}}, {"text": "Harbhajan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 57005, "end_char": 57020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Joginder Singh accused admittedly was not present when the quarrel over cattle trespass took place between Hazara Singh deceased and P.W. 2 on one side, and Mukhtar Singh\n\nand Harbhajan Singh accused on the other."}}, {"text": "Resham", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 58624, "end_char": 58630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why, Resham (P.W. 2) is not consistent in his statements as to which of the accused had fired at him when he was running away for his life."}}, {"text": "Wassan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58982, "end_char": 58994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the foregoing reasons, we partly allow this appeal by the State, set aside the acquittal of Wassan Singh and Mukhtar Singh accused (respondents) and comic!", "canonical_name": "Wasson Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59057, "end_char": 59068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59079, "end_char": 59089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59091, "end_char": 59101, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 59447, "end_char": 59453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal partly allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_637_660_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "- ;., -\n\nVIDYA CHARAN SHUKLA\n\nPURSHOITAM LAL KAUSHIK\n\nJanuary 15, 1981\n\n{P. N. BHAGWATI, R. S. SARKARIA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J 8\n\nDfaqualificution fron1 being chosen as a candidate for election-Whether the electio11 of a returned candidate whose appeal against the orders of his convic tion and sentence exceeding two years' imprisonment, pending at the date of scrufi,'iy of noniination papers is accepted by the appellate. court, resulting in the acquittal, before the election petition against hitn becomes void under section C lOO(l)(a) of the Representation of People .Act, 1951 on the ground that he wa.s disqualified from being chosen aS a candidate within the meaning of section 8(2) uf the Act-Representation of the People Act, section 1(b), 8(2), (I). 32,\n\n36(2) (a), 53, 66, 67A. IOO ( l ) (a); Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 84, 102,\n\n173 and 191.\n\nThe appellant had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment exceeding tvvo years by the Sessions Judge, Delhi, on February 26/27, 1979.\n\nBy his Order\n\ndated February 27, 1979, passed under section 389(3) of the Code of Criminal\n\nProcedure, the Sessions Judge who had convicted the appellant suspended the\n\nexecution of the sentence to afford the appellant time to file an appeal.\n\nMorch 21. 1 979 the High Court of Delhi admitted his appeal and by an order of the same date directed that his sentence shall remain suspended provided the\n\nappellant furnished a personal bond and surety in the amount of Rs. 5,000/- to\n\nthe satisfaction of the Sessions Judge, which was complied with.\n\nThe respondent and the, appellant contested the election as rival candidates\n\nto the Lok Sabha from No. 18 Mahasamund Parliamentary Constituency in\n\nĦfadhya Pradesh.\n\nThe last date for filing nominations wa.s Decembe:ri. 7, 1979.\n\nThe scrutiny of the nomination papers took place on December 11, 1979.\n\nThe\n\nReturning Officer by his Order dated December 11, 1979 rejected tbe objection of the respondent that the appellant was disqil'alified from being chosen as a\n\ncandidate in view of subsection (2) of section 8 of the .Representaotion of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951 and accepted the appeUant's nomination as valid.\n\nThe result\n\nof the election was declared on January 7, 1980.\n\nThe election result was noti\n\nfied on January 10, 1980.\n\nThe &ppellant was declared elected and the\n\nrespondent was defeated.\n\nThereafter, on February 18, 1980 the respondent\n\nfiled au election petition I of 1980 in the High court of Madhya Pradesh to get\n\nthe election of the appellant declared void under section IOO(l) (a) and IOO(l)(b;(i) of the Act challenging that at the date of the election including the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers the appellant was disqualified\n\nby virtue of section 8(2) of the Act from being chosen as candidate on account\n\nof his aforesaid conviction and sentence.\n\nThe appellant's appeal pending in the High Court was transferred to the\n\nSupreme Court under the Special Courts Act, 1979.\n\nThe Supreme Court by its\n\njudgment dated April 11, 1980 allowed the appeal set aside the conviction and\n\nsentence of the appellant and acquitted him Qf charges against him. Sub'sequent\n\n8-1 52SCl/81\n\nA to this decision of the Supreme Court, by its judgment dated September S, 1980,\n\nthe High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the election petition with costs and declared the appellant's election to be void on the ground contamed in section\n\nlOO(l)(d)(i) of the Act, hence the appeal.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nB HELD : ( 1). Abiding by the principle of stare decisis and following the\n\nratio decidcndi of Manni Lal's case, [197.1] 1 SCR 798, the acquittal of th~ appellant in appeal prior to the pronouncement of the judgment of the High Court in the eJection petition had the result of wiping out his disqualification as comr)letely and effectively as if it did not exist at &ny time including the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers and that his nomination paper was properly accepted by the Returning Officer. [660B..C]\n\nManni Lal v. Slzri Parmai Lal & Ors. [1971] I SCR 798, a.pplied\n\n(2) An order of acquittal particularly one passed on merits wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes, and as effectively as if it had never been passed. An order of acquittal annulling or voiding a conviction operates. from nativity. [6S4BJ\n\nMallni Lal v. Shri Parmai Lal & Ors., [1971] I SCR 798; Dilip Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 289, followed.\n\n(3) The ratio decidendi logically deducible from Manni Lal's case is that if the successful candidate is disqualified for being chosen, at the date of his election or at any earlier stage of any step in the election process on account of his conviction and sentence exceeding two years' imprisonment, but his conviction and sentence are set aside and he is acquitted on appeal before the pronouncement of judgment in the election-petition pending against him, his disqualification is annulled rendered non est with retroactive force from its very inception, snd\n\nthe challenge to his election on the ground that he was so disqualified is no longer sustainable. [656D-E]\n\n(4) A plain reading of section 100(1) of the Act shows that it can be conveniently divided into two parts. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the sub-section fall in the first part and clause ( d) along with its sub-clauses falls in the second part. The distinction between clauses (a), (b) and (c) in the first part and clause (d) in the second part lies in the fact that whereas on proof of any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c), the election has to be declared void without any further requirement, in a case falling under clause (d) the election cannot be declared void merely on proof of any of the grounds mentioned in its sub-clauses, unless it is further proved \"that the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected\". The expression \"any nomination\" occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) in the second part may include nomination of a returned candidate as well; but in the case of a returned candidate whose nomination has been improperly accepted, the effect on the result of the election so far as it concerns him, is obvious. However, if the election is challenged on the ground that the nomination of a candidate, other than the returned candidate, has been improperly accepted, the petitioner in order to succeed will be required to prove under clause (d)(i) in addition to improper acceptance the further fact that thereby\n\n-~ ..\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. P. L. KAUSHIK 639\n\nthe result of the election so far as it concerns the returned cdidate has been materilllly affected. [651H-652D]\n\nClause (a) of sub-section (1) requires that the disqualification or lack of qualification of the returned candidate is to be judged with reference to \"the date of his election\", which date, according to section 67A is \"the date on which a candidate is declared by the returning officer under the provisions of section 53 or section 66, to be elected to a House of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State\". But, the word \"disqualified\" used in clause (a) is capable of an expensive construction also, which may extend the scope of the inquiry under this clause to all the earlier steps in the election process.\n\nSection 7 (b) defines \"disqualified\" to mean \"disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament etc.\" The words ;'for being chosen\" in that definition have been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chatturbhuj's case, [1954] SCR 817, to include the whole \"series of steps starting with the nomination and ending with the announcement of the election.\n\nIt follows that if a disqualification attaches to a candidate at any one of these stages he cannot be chosen.\" But this definition of \"disqualified\" is in terms of section 7(b) meant for Chapter III, in Part II of the Act; while section lf)O\n\nfalls in Chapter III of Part VI. If the expression \"for being chosen\" \\vhich is a central limb of the definition of \"disqualified\", is given such an extensive interpretation V.'hich will bring in its train the whole series of steps an_d earlie1 stages in the election process commencing with the filing of the nominations. it will be repugnant to the context and inconsistlent with \"the date of his election\".\n\nSuch a ronstruction which will introduce disharmony and inconsistency between\n\nthe various limbs of clause (a) has to be eschewed. In the context of clause (a), therefore, the ambit of the words \"for being chosen\" in the de:finiti0n of \"disqualified\" bas to be restricted to \"the date of his election\" i.e. declaration of the result of the election under section 53 or section 66, and such date is to be the focal point of tin1e in an inquiry under this clause.\n\n[652H-653D]\n\nIn contrast with .; lause (a), in a case falling under clause (d)(i) of section 100, if an objection is taken before the Returning Officer against the nomination\n\nof any candidate on the ground of his being not qualified, or being disqualified F for being chosen the crucial date as per section 36(2) (a) with reference to which the existence or non-existence of such disqualification is to be enquired ,, J to is the date of scrutiny of the nomination of the candidate.\n\n[653CJ\n\nAssuming that technically, the election-petitioner's case that survives is one under clause (d)(i), and not under clause (a) of section 100(1). Even so, the fact remains that, in substance, the election of the appellant is being challenged G on the ground that on account of his conviction and sentence exceeding two years, the appellant was under Article 102(1)(e) of the Constitution read with section 8(2) and 36(2)(a) of the Act, disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat concerned.\n\nSuch being the real ground of challenge, apart from sub-clause (i), sub-clause (iv) of clause (d) of section 100(1) will also be attracted, because the phrase \"non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act etc.\" according to the decision of this Court in Durga Shankar H Mehta's case is wide enough to cover a case where the improper acceptance or rejection of the nomination is challenged on the ground of the candidate being disqualified for being chosen. [653E-G]\n\nDln}.; a Sl; a11/, cr illclua v. Ihakul' Raghuraj Singh & Ors. [1955] 1 SCR 267\n\nand Chatturbhu.j Vithaldas Jasani v. Nareshwar Parashram & Ors., [1978] 2 SCR\n\n272, followed.\n\n(a) It is true that in order to adjudicate upon the validity of the challenge\n\nin the appellant's election under clause (d) (i) of section 100(1), what was\n\nrequired to be determined by the High Court was whether the nomination of\n\nthe appellant ¥.'as properly or improperly accepted by tile Returning Officer.\n\nBut; in order to determine this question, it was necessary for the High Court\n\nto decid::, as a preliminary step, whether the appellant was di$qualified at the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers, for if he was disqualified, his\n\nnon1ination could not be said to have been properly accepted by the Returning\n\nOfficer and if, on the other hand, he was not disqualified, his nomiilation would\n\nhave to be regarded as properly accepted by the Returning Officer.\n\nThe primary\n\nquestion before the High Court therefore, was whether or not the appellant was\n\ndisqualified at the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers and it is difficult\n\nto see how the determination of this question could be made on any principle other than that governing the determination of a similar question under clause\n\n(a) of section 100(1).\n\nIf, as laid down in Manni Lal's case, the returned\n\ncandidate cannot be said to be disqualified at the date of the election, if before\n\nor during the pendency of the election petition in the High Court his conviction\n\nis set aside and he is acquitted by the appellate court, on the application of the\n\nsame prillciple, that, in like circumstances, the returned candidate cannot be\n\nsaid to be disqualified at the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers.\n\nthis view, the appellant could not be said to be disqualified on the date of\n\nscrutiny of the nomination paper since his conviction was set aside in appeal by this Court and if that be so, the conclusion must inevitably follow that the\n\nnomination of the appellant was properly accepted by the Returning Officer.\n\nThe position is analogous to that arising where a case is decided by a Tribunal\n\non the basis of the law then prevailing and subsequently the law is amended\n\nwith retrospective effect and it is then held by the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction that the order of the Tribunal discloses. an error of law\n\napparent on the face of the record, even though having regard to the law as it\n\nthen existed, the Tribunal w.is quite correct in deciding the case in the manner\n\nit did.\n\n[656C-H]\n\nVenkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Company Lin1ited, 34\n\n!TR 143, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2020 of 1980.\n\nG From the Judgment and Order dated 5-9-1980 of the Madhya\n\nPradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 1 of 1980.\n\nA. K. Sen, 0. P. Sharma, Rajinder Singh,\n\nP. L.\n\nDubey and P. N. Tewari for the appellant.\n\nS. N. Kacker, Swaraj and Mrs. Sushma Swaraj for Respondent H No. 1 .\n\nY. S. Chitale (Dr.) and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Iqtervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. This is an appeal under Sections HG(A) and l16(B) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against a judgment dated September 5, 1980, of a learned Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, whereby the Election Petition 1 of 1980 filed by the respondent was acccpteu and the appellant's election to Lok Sabha was declared to be void.\n\nTho princip\"I question that falls to be dctcnnincd in this appeal is, whether the election of a returned candidate whose appeal ogainst the orders of his conviction and sentence exceeding two years i1nprisonment, pending at the date of the scrutiny of nomination papers, is accepted by the appellate court, resulting in his acquittal, before the decision of Lhe l:lection-petition against him, can be declared to be\" vmd under Section 100(1) of lhe Act, on the ground that he was disqualified from being chosen as a candidate within the meaning or Section 8(2) of the Act.\n\nThe material facts arc as follows :\n\nThe respondent and the appellant contested the election as rival candidates, to the Lok Sabha from No. 18, Mahasamund Parliamentary Constituency in Madhya Pradesh. The last date for filing nominations was December 7, 1979. The scrutiny of the nomination papers\n\ntook place on December 11, 1979.\n\nThe respondent raised an objection to the validity of the appellant's nomination before the Returning OffLcer at the tiine of the scrutiny.\n\nThe objection was that t)le appellant had been convicted and sentenced to in1prisonment exceeding t\\VO years by the Sessions Judge, Delhi on February 22/27, I 979, and, as such, the appellant was dis '.._,.aualificd from being chosen as a candidale in view or sub-section (2) rof Section 8 of the Act.\n\nThe Returning Officer, by his order dated December I I, 1979, rejected the objection and accepted the appellanl's nomination as valid.\n\nThe result l\\f the election was declared on January 7, 1980.\n\nThe election result was notified on January 10, 1980.\n\nTh<0 appellant was declared elected, and the respondent was • defeated.\n\nThereafter on February 18, 1980, the respondent filed an Election Petition in the High Courf to get the election of the appellant herein, declared void under Section 100(1) (a) and I 00(1) ( d) (i) ' of the Act. alleging that at the date of the election, including the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers, the appellant was disqualified by vi1tue of Section 8(2) of the Act from being chosen as a candidate on account of his aforesaid conviction and sentence.\n\nThe Sessions Judge who had convicted the appellant, had, by his order dated February 27, 1979, passed under Section 389 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, suspended the execution of the sentence to afford the appellant time to file an appeal.\n\nOn March 21, 1979, the High Court of Delhi admitted his appeal and by an order of the same date directed that his sentence shall remain suspended provided the appellant furnished a personal bond and surety in the amount of Rs. 5000/- to the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge.\n\nThe appellant's appeal pending in the High Court W'ds transferred to the Supreme Court under the Special Courts Act, 1979.\n\nThis Court by its judgment dated April 11, 1980, allowed the appeal, set _ ~. aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant and acquitted '.him of the chargs against him.\n\nSubsequently, by its impugned judgment, dated September 5, 1980, the High Court of Madya Pradesh, allowed with costs, the election petition filed by the respondent, and declared the appellant's election to D be void on the ground contained in Section 100(1) (d) (i) of the Act.\n\nHence this appeal.\n\nThe contentions canvassed by Shri Asoke Sen, learned counsel for the appellant may be summarised as follows :\n\n( 1) The conviction and sentence of the appellant had been quas E hed by the Supreme Court in appeal.\n\nThe acquittal of the appellant had the effect of wiping out the conviction with retrospective effect as if he had never been convicted and sentenced.\n\nIn support of this proposition, reliance has been placed on Manni Lal v. Shri Parmai Lal & Ors.(').\n\nReference has also been made to Dilip Kumar\n\nSharma & Ors. v.' State of Madhya Pradesh(2 ).\n\n(2) Conviction and sentence in Section 8(2) must mean t)ie final and ultimate conviction and sentence.\n\nReference has been made to ; Union of India v. R. Akbar-Sheriff(•); and Di/bag Rai Jarry Divisional Superintendent(•).\n\n( 3) Invalidity of the appellant's election, in the instant case, was to be tested under clause (a) and not under clause (d) (i) of Section 100 (!) of the Act, because-\n\n( a) (i) \"Election\" within the meaning of Section 100 (1) (a) connotes the entire process of election commencing with the filing of\n\n(I) r1971] t S.C.R. 798 at pp 800.801.\n\n(2) [l976j 2 S.C.R. 289 = A.LR. 1976 S.C. 133.\n\n(3) A.1.R. 1961 Mad. 486\n\n(4) A.LR. 1959 Pb. 401.\n\nnominations and ending with the declaration of the result of the poll.\n\nA 111e stage of the scrutiny of the nominations and their acceptance or rejection was an important step of the election process and, as such, was an integral part of the 'election'.\n\nReliance on this point has been placed on the decisions of this Court in N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namaklal Constituency(,!); and M. S. Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner(').\n\n(ii) The tenn \"disqualified\" iu clause (a) of Section 100 (1), as. defmed in Section 7 (b) means \"disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament, etc.\", and the expression \"being chosen\". (which is the language of Article 102 of the Constitution also) has been interpreted by this Court in Chatturbhuj C Vithaldas .Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram & Ors.( 3), as embracing \"a series of steps starting with the nomination and ending with the announcement of the election''.\n\n(b) In substance and reality, the election of the appellant has been challenged on the ground that both at the date of the scrutiny and acceptance of his nomination and at the subsequent stages of the election including the dates of poll and declaration of the election result, the appellant was disqualified for being chosen on account of his having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment exceeding two years.\n\nThis ground finds specific mention in clause (a) and not ini clause (d) (i) which is a general and residuary clause and its application to the instant case will be excluded on the principle that the special excludes the general.\n\n(c) The phrase \"any candidate\" in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of Section 100 (1) does not include the returned candidate. (This point was not seriously pressed).\n\n(4) (a) Even if it is assumed that clause (d) (i) or (d) (iv) is applicable, then also, the instant case cannot be taken out of the, ratio of Manni Lal's case (ibid), because the effect of the quashing of the appellant's conviction and sentence by the appellate court, during the pendency of the Election Petition before the High Court was, that the convictioh and sentence were retrospectively wiped out, and th~ High Court could not at the date of deciding the Election Petition hold that in spite of the acquittal by the Appellate Court, the disqualification of the appellant \"for being chosen\" ever existed-even at the date of the acceptance of his nomination paper by the Returning Officer.\n\nThe proposition enunciated by this Court in Manni Lal's case must be taken\n\n(!) [1952] S, C.R. 218.\n\n(2) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 272.\n\n(3) [1954] S.C.R. 817.\n\nSUPREMI: COORT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA to its logical \"nd and the imagination must not be allowed to bogg1\" .,\n\ndown.\n\n(b) Clause (a) and clause (d) (i) of Section 100 (l) of the Act should be construed harmoniously. If these clauses are const111ed differently, there will be serious contradiction, and inconsistencies.\n\nUnder Section 100 (1) (a), the candidaic \\\\hose conviction and sentence are quashed, is qualified to be chesen and elected on the principle of retrospective wiping out of conviction and sentence. and yet he remains disqualifid for his nomination.\n\nSuch an anomalou' result should he avoided.\n\n( 5) The effect of wspcnsiotl of the sentrncc made by the trial court and thereafter by tho High Court pending the appeal. would be that the disqualification automatically stcicJ eclipsed. (This point was also not pressed).\n\nOn the other hand Shri S. N. Kacker, kcmicd counsel for the n; spondent, made these submissions:\n\n(I) Article 102 ( l ) ( e) of the Constitution provides that \"a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament --- \" \"if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliamenl.\" Under Section 8 (2) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.-whieh is a law made by Parliament the appellant on account of his conviction and sentence exceeding two years. was disqualified at th'c date of scrutiny of nominations and the Returning Officer was bom1d in view of Section 36(2) (a). of the Act. to take into account only such facts a> they stood on the date of the scrutiny, which is an integral step in the process of election i.e._. process of '\"being chosen\". (Reference has been made in this connection to Chaturblwj's case (ibid) and C/w111l!ln Lal v. Ram Dass and Another(').\n\n(2) The phrase \"dah: of such conviction\" occurring in sub-section\n\n(2) of Section 8 of the Act means the date of the initial conviction and not the date of the final conviction. If this phrase was constm:d to nican the date of the final and ultimate cc;1viction on termination of the entire judicial precess in the hierarchy c, r courto, sub-section(3l wonlcl k rcdnndant.\n\nSub-section (3) applies to a special category of persons n1entioncd therein, and its language n1akL:-1 it clear that in their case, conviction will not operate as disqualifice1tion unless it becomes final in the course of judicial process.\n\n(3) The present case is governed by clause (d) (i) and not by clause (a) of Section 100(1). Jn the election-petition, both the ----- ------\n\n(!) 41 E.L.R. 214 (SC).\n\n• grounds u\"ndcr Section JOO(!) (d) (i) and und•cr Section 100(1) A\n\n(a) were taken, because -\n\n(i) the appellant was disqualified on the date of scrutiny-a ground under Section 100(1) (d) (i); and\n\n(ii) the disqualification also existed on the dauc of declaration of election rc,•.11t.-c:Jfordin!'. ground under Section 100(1) (a).\n\nSince the aµpellant was subsequently acquitted during the pcndcncy of ckct'on-pctition, the ground under Section I 00( I) (a) become noncxist. nt in view of the princip:c laid down by this Court in Manni Lal's case rihid). but the Ground under Section 100(1) (d) (i) still subsisted.\n\nCo11seq11c11tly, at the stage of argument.< before the High C Court. the ground under Section I 00 ( I ) (a) was given up and the petition was pressed only on the ground undtr Section 100( 1)\n\n(d) (i).\n\nI+) Section I (10( I) ( d ! (i) \" applicahlc tp a returned candidate as we]].\n\n(SJ The basic distinction between clauses (a) and (d) (i) of Section 100 (I ) is that under the former clause the existence or non-existence of disqualification of the returned candidate is to be determined as \"on the date of his election\", which date in view of Section 67A, mecn' the dnte on which he was declared elected under Section 53 or Section 66 o[ the Act; whereas under clause ( d) (i), the enquiry is restricted ic judgin~ the propriety or otherwise of the actic, n of the Returning Officer in accepting his nomination on the date of scrufrny; that is to say, for purposes of the latter c:ausoo all 'hat has to be enquired into is whether the disqualification cxis t•.:d :._111 the date of scrutiny.\n\n(6) Th-.: pro~1usition laid down in A1ru1ni Lal's case (ibid) to the efTect that subsequent acquittal hy the appellate court in a criminal ,,-1-..,, natter has the effect of wiping out the conviction from the date of its\n\nvery inception is not applicable to the case in hand because :-\n\n(a) Manni Lars case was one under Section 100(1) (a): while the p:cscnt case is under Section 100(1) (d) (i);\n\n(b) in Mn1111i l.11l\"s case the returned candidate was not disqualified dn the date of the scrutiny; whereas in the instant case the clisqualification of the appellant did. in fact exist on the date of the scrutin:y, althouh th~ Saine may have ceased to exist in point of law\n\n' due to his subsequent acquittal; and R\n\nle) Section 36(2) (a) fixes a date for judging the qualification of a candidate, and if the legal fiction of retrospective repeal is applied\n\nA to the case of subsequent acquittal wiping out the disqualification • which ill fact existed on the date of scrutiny, Section 36(2) (a) could be rendered nugatory and several inconsistent situations could arise.\n\n(7) In sum, the instant case being one under Section 100(1) (d)\n\n(i) falls within the ratio of this Court's decision in Amritlal Ambalal , B Patel v. Himatbhai Gumanbhai Patel & Anr. (') and Manni Lafs case is not in point.\n\nShri Chitale, appearing for the intervener, has elaborated contentions ( 5) and 6 ( c) of Slui Kacker and stressed !hat the facts constituting the disqualification, as obtaining on the date of scrutiny, are under Section 36 the decisive factor.\n\nBefore dealing with the contentions canvassed on both sides, it will be necessary to have a look at the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions.\n\nArticle 102 of the Constitution, so far as material, reads thus : n \" ( 1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament-\n\n( a) to (d) ..... .\n\n( e) if he is so disqualified by or under any Jaw made by Parliament.\"\n\nThe words \"for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament\" have been lifted from Article I 02 and incorporated in the definition of \"disqualified\" given in Section 7 (b) of the Act. According to this definition, \"disqualified\" means \"disqualified for bing chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State.'.'\n\nSection 8 of the Act provides for disqualification on conviction > for certain offences.\n\nUnder sub-section (1), a person convicted or---l....._ ally of the offences specified in that sub-section shall be disqualified for a period of six years from the date of such conviction. The material G part of sub-sections (2) and (3) reads as under:\n\n\"(2) A person convicted by a court in India for any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction\n\nanct shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of five years since his release\n\nProvided ..... .\n\n(I) (1969] I S.C.R. 277.\n\n(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1) and subsection (2), a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought i'n respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is dispooed of by the court.\"\n\nThen there is an Explanation appended to this Section, which is nut material for our purpose.\n\nChapter I of Part V includes Sections 30 to 39 under the main beading \"Nomination of Candidates\".\n\nSection 30 requires the Election Commission to appoint dates for making nominations, scrutiny of nominations, withdrawal by candidates, for poll and also to specify the date before which the election shall be completed.\n\nThe provision in clause (b) requires that the date for the scrutiny of nomination~ shall be the date immediately following the last date for making nominations or, if that day is a public holiday, the next succeeding day which is not a public holiday.\n\nSection 32 lays down that any person may be nominated as a candidate for election to fill a seat if he is qualified to be chosen to fill that seat under the provisions of the Constitution and this Act, or under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963), as the case may be.\n\nSection 36 deals with scrutiny of nominations.\n\nSub-section (2) (a) .of the Section is material.\n\nIt reads thus :\n\n\"(2) The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any 'nomination on any of the following grounds :-\n\n(a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of noru.inations the candidate either is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the following prov1s10ns that may be applicable, namely:-\n\nArticles 84, 102, 173 a'nd 191,\n\nPart II of this Act and ...... \"\n\nUnder sub-section (7), for the purposes of this Section, a certified copy of an entry in the electoral roll for the time being in force of a constituency shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that the person referred to in that entry is an elector for that constituency, unless it is proved that lie is subject to a disqualification mentioned in Section 16 of the Representation of the. People Act, 1950.\n\nBefore the amendment of 1956, clauses (a) and (b) of sub-sec tion (2) of Section 36 read as under :\n\n\"The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and . . . . . . refuse any nomination on any of the following grounds :\n\n(a) that the candidate is not qualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Ccmstitution or this Act; or\n\n(b) that the candidate is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act . \"\n\nD The Amendment Act 27 of 1956 recast clauses (a) to (e) of ihe old Section.\n\nIt also combined clauses (al and (b) and the recast clause read as follows :\n\n\" (a) that the candidate is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the following\n\nE provisions that may be applicable, '.namely: . . . . . . \"\n\nThe Amendment Act 40 of 1961 substituted in Sub-section (2) (a), +\n\nfor the words \"that the candidate\" the words \"that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the candidate\".\n\nThe same Amendment Act snbstituted in sub-section (5) the proviso for the words \"an objection is made\" the words \"an objection is raised by thċ returning officer or is made by any other person''.\n\nThus, the amendmeRt in sub-section 2(a) was only of a clarificatory character.\n\nIt made it clear that the date of Bcrutiny of the nominations is a crucial date.\n\nNext, we come to Section\n\nI 00.\n\nThe Section enumerates the grounds oh which an election ca_n be declared to be void.\n\nBefore the Amendment of 1956, Section 100, so far as material, was as follows :\n\n\" ( 1) If the Tribunal is of opinion - (a)\n\n(b) ( c) that the result of the election has been materially affocted by the improper acceptance or rejection of\n\n.• -l\n\n;. .\n\nany nomination, the Tribunal shall declare the elec- A lion to be wholly void.\n\nExplanation . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n\n( 2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section ( 1 ) if the Tribunal is of opinion -\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\n( c) that the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper receptio'n or refusal of a vote. or by the reception of any vote which is void or by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Consti tution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act or of any other Act or rul.,.; relating to the electio'n, or by any mistake in the use of any prescribed form,\n\nthe Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candi date to be void\".\n\nIn Durga Shanker Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj . Singh & Ors.(•') nominations were filed for a double member Legislative Assembly <:onstituency in Madhya Pradesh.\n\nNo objection was taken before the returning officer, that one of the candidates, Vasa'nt Rao, was less than 25 years of age at the date of the nomination and, as such, was not qualified under Article 173 to be chosen to fill the seat.\n\nThe Returning Officer accepted his nomination.\n\nTn the Election Petitio'n, the election of the returned candidate, V asant Rao, was challenged on the ground that his nomination had been improperly accepted by the Returning Officer within the contem plation of Section 100 ( 1 ) ( c) of the Act, as then in force, because he was llot qualified to be chosen in view of Section 173 of the Consti tution.\n\nThe Tribunal held that the act of the Returning Officer in accepting the nomination of Vasant Rao, who was disqualified to be elected a member of the State Legislature under the Constitution, .amounted to an improper acceptance of nomination withi'n the meaning of Section JOO ( 1) ( c) of the Act, and as the result of the election was materially affected thereby, the whole election must be pro nounced to be void.\n\nThe controversy centered round the question, whether on the facts proved and admitted the caÝ was one u'nder sub-section (I ) ( c) or Section 2(c) of the then extant Section 100.\n\nThis Court held that\n\n(1)\n\n[1955J I S.C.R. 267\n\nthe acceptance of the nomination paper of Vasant Rao by the Returning Officer could not be said to be improper acceptance \"within the contemplation of Section 100 ( 1) ( c) of the Act, and that the case was of a description which came under sub-section (2) (c) of Section\n\n100 and not under sub-section (1) ( c) of the Section, as it really amounted to holding an election without complying with the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nThe expression \"non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution\" in clause (c) of sub-section (2) was held to be sufficiently wide to cover such cases where the question was not one of improper acceptance or rejection of the nomination by the Returning Officer, but there was a fundamental disability in the candidate to stand for election at all.\n\nThere was no material difference between \"non-compliance\" and \"non-observanre\" or ''breach\" and this item in clause ( c) of sub-section (2) might be taken as a residuary provision contemplating cases where there had ken infraction of the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act but which had not been specifically enumerated in the other portions of th•c clause.\n\nAfter the decision in Durga Shanker Mehta's case (ibid), Parliament in 1956 amended Soction 100 along with Sections 36, 123, 124 and 125 of the Act.\n\nBy this Amendment, the various c:auses of subsections ( 1) and (2) were rearranged and recast and simplified in accordance with the recommendations of the Select Co; nmittee of Parliament, \"that sub-sections (1) and (2) of existing Section 100 should be suitably combined retaining the substance of the existing Jaw and at the same time making the Jaw simple and easily intelligible\". \"'l\n\nNow, Section 100, as amended, by the Amending Act of 1956 and subsequent Amendment Acts, .reads as under :\n\n\"100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion-\n\n(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualifud, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963); or\n\n(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or\n\n(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or\n\n( d) )hat the resnlt of the election, ih so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected-\n\n(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, B or\n\n(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the\n\ninterests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent, or\n\n(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or c\n\n(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act, D the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.\n\n(2) If in the opinion of the High Court, a returi>'d candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the High Court is satis- E fied-\n\n( a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders, and without the consent, of the candidate or his election agent; F\n\n(b)\n\n(c)\n\n(d)\n\nthat the candidate and his election agent took all reasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practices at the election; and\n\nthat in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agents,\n\nthen the High Court may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void\".\n\nA plain reading of Section 100 (1) of the Act shows that it can be conveniently divided into two parts.\n\nClauses (a), (b) and (c)\n\nof the sub-section fall in the first part and clause ( d) along with its\n\nsub-clauses falls in the second part.\n\nThe disti'nction bdween clauses\n\n(a), (b) and (c) in the first part and clause (d) in the second part\n\nlies in the fact that whereas on proof of any of the groqnds mentioned\n\nin clauses (a) , (b) and (c), the election has to be declared voia\n\nwithout any further requirement, in a case falling under clause (d)\n\nthe eiection cannot be declared void merely on proof of any of the\n\ngrounds me'ntioned in its sub-clauses, unless it is further proved \"that\n\nthe result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate\n\nhas bee'n materially affected\".\n\nThe expression \"any nomination\"\n\noccurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) in the second part may\n\ninclude nomination of a returned candidate as well, but in the case of a\n\nreturned candidate whose nomination has been improperly accepted,\n\nthe effect on the result of the election so far as it concerns him, is\n\nobvious.\n\nHowever, if the election is challenged on the ground that\n\nthe nomination of a candidate, other than the returned candidate has\n\nbeen improperly accepted, the petitioner in order to succeed will be\n\nrequired to prove under clause (d) (i), iu addition to improper accep\n\ntance the further fact that thereby the result of the election so far as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected.\n\nClause (a) of sub-section (1) appears to require that the dis\n\nqualification or lack of qualification of the returned candidate is to he\n\njudged with peference to \"the date of his election\", which date, accord\n\ning to Section 67 A, is \"the date on which a candidate is declared\n\nby the returning officer under the provisions of Section 53 or Section 66, to be elected to a House of Parliament or of the Legislature of a\n\nState\".\n\nBut, the word \"disqualified\" used in clause (a) is cfipable\n\nof an expansive construction also, which may extend the scope of the\n\ninquiry under this clauøe to all the earlier steps in the election pro cess.\n\nAs already noticed, Section 7 (b) defines \"disqualified\" to\n\nmean \"disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of\n\neither Houre of Parliament etc.\" The words \"for being chosen\" in\n\nthat definition have been interpreted by this Court in Chatturbhui's\n\ncaù (ibid) to include the whole \"series of steps starting with the\n\nnomination and ending with the announcement of the election.\n\nfollows that if a disqualification attaches to a candidate at any one of\n\nthese stages he cannot be chosen\".\n\nBut this definition of \"disquali\n\nfied\" is in terms of Section 7 (b) meant for Chapter III, in Part II of\n\nthe Act; while Súction 100 falls in Chapter III of Part\n\nVI.\n\nIf the\n\nexpression \"for being chosen\" which is a central limb of the definition\n\nof \"disqualified\", is give'n such an extensive interpretation which wi!l\n\nbring in its train the whole ûries of steps and earlier stages in the 1\\\\1\\etilln ])I\\\\ee'( commencing with the filing of the nominations. it will\n\ni .\n\nbe repugnant to the context and inconsistent with \"the date of his election\". Such a construction which will introduce disharmony and inconsistency between the various limbs of clause\n\n(a) has to be eschewed. In the context of clanse (a), therefore, the ambit of the words \"for being chosen\" in the definition of \"disqualified\" has to be restricted to \"the date of his election\" i.e. declaration of the result of the election under Section 53 or Section 66, and such date is to be the focal point of time in an inquiry under this clause.\n\nIn contrast with clause (a), in a case falling under clause (d) (i) of Section I 00, if an objection is taken before the Returning Officer against the nomination of any candidate on the ground of his being not qualified, or being disqualified for being chosen the crucial date as per Section 36 (2) {a) with reference to which the existence. or nonexistence of such disqualification is to be enquired into is the date of scrutiny of the nomination of the candidate.\n\nThe first question is whether on facts admitted or proved on record, thecasefallsunderSection 100(1) (a) or Section 100(1) (d), orboth?\n\nThe burden of Shri Kacker's arguments is that the case falls under clause (d) (i) and not under clause (a) of Section 100(1). Learned oounsel has conceded that if clause (a) were applicable, the case would have been within the ratio of Ma1mi Lal's case and that was why at the stage of arguments before the High Court, the challenge under clause (a) of the sub-Section was given up.\n\nWe will therefore, assume that technically, the election-petitioner's case !hat survives is one nuder clause (d) (i), and not under caluse\n\n(a) of Section 100(1).\n\nEven so, the fact remains that, in substance, the election of the appellant is being challenged on the ground that on account of his conviction and sentence exceeding two years, the appellant was under Article 102 (I) ( e) of the Constitution read with Sections 8 ( 2) and 36 (2) (a) of the Act, disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat , concerned.\n\nSuch being the real ground of challenge, apart from sub-\n\n- • clause (i) sub-clause (iv) of clause (d) of Section 100 (1) will also be attracted. This is so, because the phrase, non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act etc.\", according to the decision of this Court in Durga Shanker Mehta's case (ibid), is wide enough to cover a case where the improper acceptance of rejection of the nomination is challenged on the ground of the candidate being disqualified for being chosen.\n\nThe controversy thus narrows down into the issue: Whether on facts undisputed or proved on record, the present case falls within the ratio\n\nof Manni Lal v. Shri Parmai Lal & Ors., even if the challenge is con- R sidered to be one under clause (d) (i) and (iv) of Section 100(1).\n\n9-152 SCI/81\n\nBefore examining the facts and ratio of Manni Lat's case, it will be worthwhile to notice here a general principle of criminal law bearing on this issne. This principle as reiterated by this Court in Di/ip Kumar S/zarma's case, ibid, (at page 289), is as follows :\n\nAn order of acquittal particularly one passed on merits wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes, and as effectively as if it had never been passed. An order of acquittal an nu Iii ng or voiding a conviction operates from nativity. As Kelson puts it, '\"it is a true annulment an annulment with retroactive force\". So when the conviction (for the offence) was quashed by the High Court (in appeal) .. .'it killed the conviction not then, but performed the formal obsequies of the order which had died at birth.'\n\nIn Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal (ibid), this Court applied this principle to the question of the disqualificaton iof a candidate for being chosen to fill a seat in State Legislative Assembly.\n\nIn that case, the last date for filing nominations from the U.P. Legislative Assembly Constituency, Hardoi was January 9, 1969. The returned candidate was convicted two days later on January 11, 1969 and sentenced. inter alia, to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 304, Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn January 16, 1969, he filed an appeal against l1is conviction in the High Court. Polling took place on February 9, 1969 and the result of the election was declared on February 11, 1969, and he was successful in the election.\n\nHis election was challenged by an election-petition primarily on the ground that he was disqualified under Section 8 (2) of the Represer 'on of the People Act, because on the date of his election he stood convicted for an offence of imprisonment exceeding two years.\n\nBefore the election-petition was decided, the returned candidate's appeal was allowed on September 30, 1969 by the High Court and his conviction and sentence were set aside.\n\nThe question for decision before the Court was : What was the effect of the acquittal in appeal of the returned candidate before the decision of the election-petition, on his conviction and sentence, which was the main ground on which he was alleged to be disqualified for being chosen? The bench presided over by J.C. Shah, J. (as he then was) answered this question thus :\n\n\" ... it is clear that, though the conviction of respondent No. 1 was recorded by the trial court on 1 lth January, 1969, he was acquitted o'n 30th September, 1969 in appeal which acquittal had the effect of completely wiping out the conviction. The appeal having once been allowed, it has to be held that the conviction and sentence were vacated with effect\n\n• ,\n\nfrom the date on which the conviction was recorded and the A. sentence awarJod.\n\nJn a criminal case, acquittal in appeal does not toke effect merely from the date of the appellate\n\norder setting aside the conviction; it has the effect of retrospectively wiping out the conviction and the sentence awarded by the lower court.\n\nThe disqualification relied upon by the appellant was laid under s. 8(2) of the Act read with Article 102 ( l) ( e) of the Constitution.\n\nThe provision is that a person convicted by a court in India for any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years shall be disqualified for a further period of five years since his release.\n\nThe argument on behalf of the appellant was that, though respondent No. 1 was not disqualified at the time of filing of nomination, he was, in fact, disqualified on 9th February, 1969, the date of polling, as well as on 11th February, 1969, when the result was declared ..... .\n\nTI1e argument overlooks the fact that an appellate order of acquittal takes effect retrospectively and the conviction and sentence are deemed to be set aside with effect from the date they were recorded. Once an order of acquittal has been made, it has to be held that the conviction has been wiped out and did not exist at all. The disqualification, which existed nn the 9th or 1 lth February, 1969 as a fact, was wiped out when the conviction recorded on 11th January, 1969 was set aside and that acquittal took effect from that very date. ft is significant that the High Court, under Section 100(1) (a) of the Act, is to declare the election of a returned candidate to be void if the High Court is of opinion that, on the date of his election, a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or the Act. It is true that the opinion has to be formed as to whether the successful candidate was disqualified on the date of his election; but this opinion is to be formed by the High Court at the time of pronouncing the judgment in the election petition. ln this case, the High Court proceeded to pronounce the judgment on 27th October, 1969. The High Court had before it the order of acquittal which had taken effect retrospectively from 1 lth January, 1969. It was therefore, impossible for the High Court to arrive at the opinion that on 19th or 11th February 1969, respondent No. 1 was disqualified.\n\nThe conviction and sentence had been restrospectively wiped out, so that the opinion required to be formed by the High Court to\n\ndeclare the election void could not be formed. The situation is similar to the one that could have come into existence if Parliament itself had chosen to repeal s.8(2) of the Act retrospectively with effect from 11th January, 1979.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nThe essence of the decision is in !he sentences which have been underlined by us in the above extract.\n\nIn sum, what was laid down in Manni Lal's case was that if the disqualification of the returned canclidate, viz., his conviction and sootence exceeding two year's imprisonment which existed as a fact at the date of the election, is subsequently set aside by the Appellate Court, then a challenge to his election on the ground under Section 100(1) (a) of the Act, in an election-petition pending in the High Court at the date of such acquittal, must fail because the acquittal has the effect of retrospectively wiping out the disqualification as completely and effectively as if it never had existed.\n\nIn other words, the ratio decidendi logically deducible from the above esxtract, is that if the successful candidate is <lisqualified for being chosen, at the date of his election or at any earlier stage of any step in the election process on account of his conviction and sentence ex- .:eeding two years' imprisonment, but his conviction and sentence are set aside and he is acquitted on appeal before the pronouncement of judgment in the election-petition pending against him, his disqualification is annulled and rendered non est with retroac.tive force from its very inception, and the challenge to his election on the ground that he was so disqualified is no longer sustainable.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent has tried to distinguish Manni F Lal's case from the one before us on three grounds.\n\nFirst, that in Manni Lal's case, the election was challenged under clause (a) of Section 100 (1); whereas in the instant case, the challenge is only on the ground under clause (d) (i) of the Section, since the plea in the election-petition on the ground under said clause (a) of Section 100(1) was given at the time of arguments in the High Court. Second, in G Manni Lal's case, the disqualification on account of conviction and sentence of the candidate concerned did not exist on the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers, but was incurred subsequently to the acceptance of his nomination, whereas in the present case, such disqualification existed as a fact even at the date of the scrntiny of the nomination papers.\n\nThlrd, in vi.ew of the mandte in Section 36(2) (a), II for the purpose of an enquiry under Section 100(1) (d) (i), the existence or nonexistence of the clisqualification is to be judged as on the date of the scrutiny of the nominations, whereas in Manni Lal,\n\n'the legislative mandate of Section 36(2) (a) was inapplicable, the A challenge to the election being one under Section 100(1) (a) only.\n\n1t appears to us that this three-fold feature pointed out by th<l learned counsel amounts no more than to a distinction without a difference.\n\nThe basic ground of challenge and material factual constituents thereof are common in both these cases. In both these case~ what has been challenged is the election of the successful candidate. Although at the time of arguments in the High Court the ground under clause\n\n(a) of Section 100(1) was not pressed and no arguments were addressed with reference to that caluse, it had been pleaded and proved by the election-pct1tioner that both at the date of the scrutiny of nominations and at the date of the election, the appellant's disqualificatio11 existed as a facl.\n\nAnother undisputed fuct apparent on the record is that the appellant was acquitted by the appellate court before the decision of election-petition in the High Court. As here, in Manni Lal also, such disqualification of the successful candidate exist-- ed not only at the date of his 'election' as defined in Section 67A, but also at the date of the poll, which was an earlier step in the process of \"being chosen\".\n\nAs here, there also, such disqualificati011 had been wiped out with retroactive force on account of his acquittal after the elections but before the decision of the election petition by the High Court. Similar to the third point raised here, in Manni Lill also, it was contended that under section 100(1) (a), the question whether the successful candidate was disqualified o.~ the date of his election was to be determined with reference to the situation obtaining on that date only. This contention was repelled with the observation that such opinion had to be formed by the High Court at the time it proceeds to pronounce the judgment in the election-petition and High Court had at that time before it the order of acquittal which had taken effect retrospectively from the date on which the conviction had been recorded by the trial court. Although the Court did not specifi •-- cally say so, this reasoning employed by the Court in negative the e-0ntention of the election-petitioner in that case, appears to hve been spelled out from a construction of the phrase \"if the High Court is of opinion\" used hy the Legislature in the opening part of Section 100(1 ).\n\nThis phrase, be it noted, qualifies not only clause (a), but also clause ( d) of the sub-section. Thus, the ratio of Manni Lal squarely and fully applies to the present case.\n\nOn the application of that rule, the acquittal of the appellant herein by the appellate court, during the pendency of the election-petition must be held to have completely and effectively wiped out the disqualification of the appellant with retrospective effect from the date of the conviction, so that in the eye of law it existed neither at the date of scrutiny of nominations, nor at the date of the 'election' or at any other stage of the process of \"being chosen\".\n\nIn short, the acquittal of the appellant before the decision of the election-petition pending in the High Court, had with retrospective effect, made his disqualification non-existent, even at the date of the scrutiny of nominations. This being the position, the High Court could not at the time of deciding the election-petition form an opinion as to the 'existence' of a non-existent ground and sustain the challenge to the appellant's election under Section 100(1) (d) (i).\n\nIt is true that in order to adjudicate upon the validity of the challenge to the appellant's election under clause ( d) (i) of Section 100(1), what was required to be detertnined by the High Court was whether the nomination of the appellant was properly or improperly accepted by the Returning Officer.\n\nBut, in order to determine this question, it was necessary for the High Court to decide, as a preliminary step, whether the appellant was disqualified at the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers, for if he was disqualified, his nomination could not be said to have been properly accepted by the Returning Officer and if, on the other hand, he was not disqualified, his nomination would have to be regarded as properly accepted by the Returning Officer.\n\nThe primary question before the High Court, therefore, was whether or not the appellant was disqualified at the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers and it is difficult to see how the determination of this question could be made on any principle other than that governing the determination of a similar question under clause (a) of Section 100(1).\n\nIf, as laid down in Manni Lal's case, the returned candidate cannot be said to be di>- qualified at the date of the election, if before or during the pendency of the election petition in the High Court his conviction is set aside and he is acquitted by the appellate court, it must be held. on the application of the same principle, that, in like circumstances, the returned candidate cannot be said to be disqualified at the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers.\n\nOn this view, the appellant _ .( could not be said to be disqualified at the dale of scrutiny of the nomination paper since his conviction was set aside in appeal by this Court and if that be so, the conclusion must inevitably follow that the nomination of the appellant was properly accepted by the Returning Officer.\n\nThe position is analogous to that arising where a case is decided by a Tribunal on the basi~ of the law then prevailing and subsequently the Jaw is amended with retrospective effect and it is then held by the High Court in. the exercise of its writ jurisdiction that the order of the Tribunal discloses an error of law apparent on the face of the record, even though having regard to the Jaw as it then existed, the Tribunal was quite corre<:t in deciding\n\nthe case in the manner it did, vide V mlwtachalam v. Bombay Dye- A ing & Ma1111/act11ring Company Limited(').\n\nAmritlal Ambalal Patel (ibid) cited by Shri Kacker is not a parallel case.\n\nIt is clearly distinguishable.\n\nThe facts therein were materially different from Manni Lal' s case or the one before us. In that case, the election of Amritlal Ambalal Patel to Gujarat Legislative Assembly was challenged ou the ground that he was on the date of scrutiny of nominations less than 25 years of age-which was the minimum age prescribed under Article 173 (b) of the Constitution and, as such, not being qualified for being chosen, his nomination was wrongly accepted.\n\nThe candidate attained the age of 25 years on the date of election.\n\nNotwithstanding this subsequent fact, it was held by the Court that the nomination of the candidate had been \"improperly accepted\" within the meaning of Section 100\n\n(1 )(d). The rationale of the decision was that the attairunent of the prescribed age by the candidate after the date of scrutiny of nominations did not operate retrospectively to remove his disqualification for being chosen, with effect from the date of the scrutiny of the nominations. The disqualification on the date of the scrutiny remained unaffected.\n\nThat was not a case like the present one where the disqualification of the candidate existing as a fact at the date of the nominations, due to his conviction and sentence exceeding two years, was retrospectively wiped out owing to his subsequent acquittal by the appelJate court, during the pendency of the elections petition in the High Court.\n\nIt is possible that, difficult and anomalous situations may arise if\n\nthe rule in Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal is applied to a converse hypothetical case wherein the candidate whose nomination is rejected on F account of his disqualification, viz., conviction and. sentence exceeding two years' imprisonment existing as a fact on the date of scrutiny ...i-. of nominations, brings an election-peti1ion to challenge the election of the returned candidate on the ground that his nomination was improperly rejected. as his disqualification had been, as a result of his subsequent acquittal by an appellate court, annulled and ob!ite- G rated with retroactive force.\n\nBut we do not think it necessary to indulge in this hypothetical and academic exercise.\n\nFirstly, the instant case is not one where the election is being challenged under Section lOO(l)(c) on the ground that the election-petitioner's nomination was improperly re- Bl jected. Secondly, it has not been urged before us by the learned\n\n(1) 34ITR 143.\n\ncounsel for the respondent, that Manni Lal's case was wrongly decided and that its ratio needs reconsideration by a l[trger Bench.\n\nAll efforts of the learned counsel have been directed to show that the principle enunciated in Manni Lal's case is ; napplicable to the present case because on facts, between these two cases, there is a difference and a distinction, where, in reality, none that matters, really exists.\n\nIn this situation therefore, we would abide by the principle of stare decisis and follow the ratio of Manni Lal' s case, and m the result, hold that the acqnittal of the appellant in appeal prior to the pronouncement of the judgment by the High Court in the electionpetition had the resnlt of wiping out his disqualification as completely and effectively as if it did not exist at any time including the date of th•c scrutiny of the nomination papers and that his nomination paper was properly accepted by the Returning Officer.\n\nThe challenge to. the election of the appellant on the ground under clause 100(1) (d) (i) rirnst, therefore, fail.\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the election-petition of the respondent.\n\nIn view of the Jaw point involved, we will leave the parties to pay and bear their own coiils throughout.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 216, "entities": [{"text": "VIDYA CHARAN SHUKLA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIDYA CHARAN SHUKLA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PURSHOITAM LAL KAUSHIK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PURSHOTTAM LAL KAUSHIK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VIDYA CHARAN SHUKLA\n\nPURSHOITAM LAL KAUSHIK\n\nJanuary 15, 1981\n\n{P. N. BHAGWATI, R. S. SARKARIA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J 8\n\nDfaqualificution fron1 being chosen as a candidate for election-Whether the electio11 of a returned candidate whose appeal against the orders of his convic tion and sentence exceeding two years' imprisonment, pending at the date of scrufi,'iy of noniination papers is accepted by the appellate."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 686, "end_char": 698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 710, "end_char": 742, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 1(b), 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 84, 102,\n\n173 and 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 389(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1278, "end_char": 1297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 979 the High Court of Delhi admitted his appeal and by an order of the same date directed that his sentence shall remain suspended provided the\n\nappellant furnished a personal bond and surety in the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2066, "end_char": 2075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2108, "end_char": 2124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on February 18, 1980 the respondent\n\nfiled au election petition I of 1980 in the High court of Madhya Pradesh to get\n\nthe election of the appellant declared void under section IOO(l) (a) and IOO(l)(b;(i) of the Act challenging that at the date of the election including the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers the appellant was disqualified\n\nby virtue of section 8(2) of the Act from being chosen as candidate on account\n\nof his aforesaid conviction and sentence."}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representaotion of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951", "statute": "Representaotion of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court under the Special Courts Act, 1979", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2979, "end_char": 2992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court by its\n\njudgment dated April 11, 1980 allowed the appeal set aside the conviction and\n\nsentence of the appellant and acquitted him Qf charges against him."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3262, "end_char": 3290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub'sequent\n\n8-1 52SCl/81\n\nA to this decision of the Supreme Court, by its judgment dated September S, 1980,\n\nthe High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the election petition with costs and declared the appellant's election to be void on the ground contamed in section\n\nlOO(l)(d)(i) of the Act, hence the appeal."}}, {"text": "Manni Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abiding by the principle of stare decisis and following the\n\nratio decidcndi of Manni Lal's case, [197.1] 1 SCR 798, the acquittal of th~ appellant in appeal prior to the pronouncement of the judgment of the High Court in the eJection petition had the result of wiping out his disqualification as comr)letely and effectively as if it did not exist at &ny time including the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers and that his nomination paper was properly accepted by the Returning Officer. [", "canonical_name": "Manni F Lal"}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 SCR 289", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4447, "end_char": 4463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5170, "end_char": 5184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 67A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7024, "end_char": 7034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7038, "end_char": 7048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7078, "end_char": 7088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "651H-652D]\n\nClause (a) of sub-section (1) requires that the disqualification or lack of qualification of the returned candidate is to be judged with reference to \"the date of his election\", which date, according to section 67A is \"the date on which a candidate is declared by the returning officer under the provisions of section 53 or section 66, to be elected to a House of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State\"."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7329, "end_char": 7338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatturbhuj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7564, "end_char": 7575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words ;'for being chosen\" in that definition have been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chatturbhuj's case, [1954] SCR 817, to include the whole \"series of steps starting with the nomination and ending with the announcement of the election.", "canonical_name": "Chatturbhuj"}}, {"text": "section 7(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7882, "end_char": 7894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7921, "end_char": 7939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8727, "end_char": 8737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Act", "statute": "Part II of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8741, "end_char": 8751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Act", "statute": "Part II of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8920, "end_char": 8931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Act", "statute": "Part II of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9135, "end_char": 9148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9456, "end_char": 9470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9676, "end_char": 9693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8(2) and 36(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9724, "end_char": 9749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9922, "end_char": 9936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Durga Shankar H Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10100, "end_char": 10121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "according to the decision of this Court in Durga Shankar H Mehta's case is wide enough to cover a case where the improper acceptance or rejection of the nomination is challenged on the ground of the candidate being disqualified for being chosen. [", "canonical_name": "Durga Shankar H Mehta"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 SCR 267", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10376, "end_char": 10392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR\n\n272", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10459, "end_char": 10476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10620, "end_char": 10634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11607, "end_char": 11621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13169, "end_char": 13178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13181, "end_char": 13192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, 0."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13194, "end_char": 13208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma, Rajinder Singh,\n\nP. L.\n\nDubey and P. N. Tewari for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. L.\n\nDubey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13211, "end_char": 13223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma, Rajinder Singh,\n\nP. L.\n\nDubey and P. N. Tewari for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. N. Tewari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13228, "end_char": 13240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma, Rajinder Singh,\n\nP. L.\n\nDubey and P. N. Tewari for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker, Swaraj and Mrs. Sushma Swaraj for Respondent H No.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Kacker"}}, {"text": "Swaraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13275, "end_char": 13281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker, Swaraj and Mrs. Sushma Swaraj for Respondent H No."}}, {"text": "Sushma Swaraj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13291, "end_char": 13304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker, Swaraj and Mrs. Sushma Swaraj for Respondent H No."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13331, "end_char": 13344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale (Dr.) and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Iqtervener."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13360, "end_char": 13375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale (Dr.) and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Iqtervener."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13441, "end_char": 13449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. This is an appeal under Sections HG(A) and l16(B) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against a judgment dated September 5, 1980, of a learned Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, whereby the Election Petition 1 of 1980 filed by the respondent was acccpteu and the appellant's election to Lok Sabha was declared to be void."}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13511, "end_char": 13545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14255, "end_char": 14269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14376, "end_char": 14388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "February 22/27, I 979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15017, "end_char": 15038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objection was that t)le appellant had been convicted and sentenced to in1prisonment exceeding t\\VO years by the Sessions Judge, Delhi on February 22/27, I 979, and, as such, the appellant was dis '.._,.aualificd from being chosen as a candidale in view or sub-section (2) rof Section 8 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15156, "end_char": 15165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15359, "end_char": 15374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result l\\f the election was declared on January 7, 1980."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15413, "end_char": 15429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election result was notified on January 10, 1980."}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15663, "end_char": 15677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15865, "end_char": 15877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 27, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16052, "end_char": 16069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge who had convicted the appellant, had, by his order dated February 27, 1979, passed under Section 389 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, suspended the execution of the sentence to afford the appellant time to file an appeal."}}, {"text": "Section 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16084, "end_char": 16095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16107, "end_char": 16133, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16227, "end_char": 16241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 21, 1979, the High Court of Delhi admitted his appeal and by an order of the same date directed that his sentence shall remain suspended provided the appellant furnished a personal bond and surety in the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court under the Special Courts Act, 1979", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16575, "end_char": 16623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16659, "end_char": 16673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court by its judgment dated April 11, 1980, allowed the appeal, set _ ~. aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant and acquitted '.him of the chargs against him."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16849, "end_char": 16866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, by its impugned judgment, dated September 5, 1980, the High Court of Madya Pradesh, allowed with costs, the election petition filed by the respondent, and declared the appellant's election to D be void on the ground contained in Section 100(1) (d) (i) of the Act."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16872, "end_char": 16899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, by its impugned judgment, dated September 5, 1980, the High Court of Madya Pradesh, allowed with costs, the election petition filed by the respondent, and declared the appellant's election to D be void on the ground contained in Section 100(1) (d) (i) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17046, "end_char": 17060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supreme Court under the Special Courts Act, 1979", "statute": "the Supreme Court under the Special Courts Act, 1979"}}, {"text": "Asoke Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contentions canvassed by Shri Asoke Sen, learned counsel for the appellant may be summarised as follows :\n\n( 1) The conviction and sentence of the appellant had been quas E hed by the Supreme Court in appeal."}}, {"text": "Section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17692, "end_char": 17704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18017, "end_char": 18028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18097, "end_char": 18108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18818, "end_char": 18829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18849, "end_char": 18858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19027, "end_char": 19038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19998, "end_char": 20009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 S.C.R. 272", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20898, "end_char": 20917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21104, "end_char": 21115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21275, "end_char": 21286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21810, "end_char": 21822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand Shri S. N. Kacker, kcmicd counsel for the n; spondent, made these submissions:\n\n(I) Article 102 ( l ) ( e) of the Constitution provides that \"a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament --- \" \"if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliamenl.\"", "canonical_name": "S. N. Kacker"}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21889, "end_char": 21900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22132, "end_char": 22141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22153, "end_char": 22187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22404, "end_char": 22417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Chaturblwj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22650, "end_char": 22660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference has been made in this connection to Chaturblwj's case (ibid) and C/w111l!ln Lal v. Ram Dass and Another(').", "canonical_name": "Chatturbhuj"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22797, "end_char": 22806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23414, "end_char": 23428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23555, "end_char": 23569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23674, "end_char": 23688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23817, "end_char": 23831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24082, "end_char": 24096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24299, "end_char": 24314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24466, "end_char": 24477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 67A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24668, "end_char": 24679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24735, "end_char": 24745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24749, "end_char": 24759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A1ru1ni Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25154, "end_char": 25165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pro~1usition laid down in A1ru1ni Lal's case (ibid) to the efTect that subsequent acquittal hy the appellate court in a criminal ,,-1-..,, natter has the effect of wiping out the conviction from the date of its\n\nvery inception is not applicable to the case in hand because :-\n\n(a) Manni Lars case was one under Section 100(1) (a): while the p:cscnt case is under Section 100(1) (d) (i);\n\n(b) in Mn1111i l.11l\"s case the returned candidate was not disqualified dn the date of the scrutiny; whereas in the instant case the clisqualification of the appellant did."}}, {"text": "Manni Lars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25409, "end_char": 25419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pro~1usition laid down in A1ru1ni Lal's case (ibid) to the efTect that subsequent acquittal hy the appellate court in a criminal ,,-1-..,, natter has the effect of wiping out the conviction from the date of its\n\nvery inception is not applicable to the case in hand because :-\n\n(a) Manni Lars case was one under Section 100(1) (a): while the p:cscnt case is under Section 100(1) (d) (i);\n\n(b) in Mn1111i l.11l\"s case the returned candidate was not disqualified dn the date of the scrutiny; whereas in the instant case the clisqualification of the appellant did.", "canonical_name": "Manni F Lal"}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25439, "end_char": 25453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25491, "end_char": 25505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25839, "end_char": 25852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26097, "end_char": 26110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26237, "end_char": 26251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manni Lafs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26383, "end_char": 26393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Manni Lafs case is not in point.", "canonical_name": "Manni F Lal"}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26422, "end_char": 26429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Chitale, appearing for the intervener, has elaborated contentions ( 5) and 6 ( c) of Slui Kacker and stressed !"}}, {"text": "Slui Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26507, "end_char": 26518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Chitale, appearing for the intervener, has elaborated contentions ( 5) and 6 ( c) of Slui Kacker and stressed !"}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26630, "end_char": 26640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26818, "end_char": 26829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27278, "end_char": 27287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27513, "end_char": 27522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27894, "end_char": 27899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material G part of sub-sections (2) and (3) reads as under:\n\n\"(2) A person convicted by a court in India for any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction\n\nanct shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of five years since his release\n\nProvided ..... ."}}, {"text": "Sections 30 to 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28774, "end_char": 28791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28844, "end_char": 28854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29318, "end_char": 29328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29551, "end_char": 29592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29628, "end_char": 29638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Articles 84, 102, 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30278, "end_char": 30299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Part II of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30311, "end_char": 30330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30694, "end_char": 30704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of this Act", "statute": "Part II of this Act"}}, {"text": "People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30735, "end_char": 30751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30827, "end_char": 30837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "People Act, 1950", "statute": "People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31966, "end_char": 31978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32250, "end_char": 32261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33211, "end_char": 33216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh & Ors.(•') nominations were filed for a double member Legislative Assembly <:onstituency in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33309, "end_char": 33323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh & Ors.(•') nominations were filed for a double member Legislative Assembly <:onstituency in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Vasa'nt Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33407, "end_char": 33418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No objection was taken before the returning officer, that one of the candidates, Vasa'nt Rao, was less than 25 years of age at the date of the nomination and, as such, was not qualified under Article 173 to be chosen to fill the seat.", "canonical_name": "Vasa'nt Rao"}}, {"text": "Article 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33518, "end_char": 33529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V asant Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33677, "end_char": 33688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn the Election Petitio'n, the election of the returned candidate, V asant Rao, was challenged on the ground that his nomination had been improperly accepted by the Returning Officer within the contem plation of Section 100 ( 1 ) ( c) of the Act, as then in force, because he was llot qualified to be chosen in view of Section 173 of the Consti tution.", "canonical_name": "Vasa'nt Rao"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33822, "end_char": 33833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33929, "end_char": 33940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vasant Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34051, "end_char": 34061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held that the act of the Returning Officer in accepting the nomination of Vasant Rao, who was disqualified to be elected a member of the State Legislature under the Constitution, .amounted to an improper acceptance of nomination withi'n the meaning of Section JOO ( 1) ( c) of the Act, and as the result of the election was materially affected thereby, the whole election must be pro nounced to be void.", "canonical_name": "Vasa'nt Rao"}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34516, "end_char": 34528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34548, "end_char": 34559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34761, "end_char": 34772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34874, "end_char": 34886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Durga Shanker Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35790, "end_char": 35809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the decision in Durga Shanker Mehta's case (ibid), Parliament in 1956 amended Soction 100 along with Sections 36, 123, 124 and 125 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Durga Shankar H Mehta"}}, {"text": "Sections 36, 123, 124 and 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35875, "end_char": 35904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36150, "end_char": 36161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36313, "end_char": 36324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36685, "end_char": 36758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38471, "end_char": 38482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40208, "end_char": 40218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40318, "end_char": 40328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40332, "end_char": 40342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40649, "end_char": 40658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatturbhui", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40879, "end_char": 40890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words \"for being chosen\" in\n\nthat definition have been interpreted by this Court in Chatturbhui's\n\ncaù (ibid) to include the whole \"series of steps starting with the\n\nnomination and ending with the announcement of the election.", "canonical_name": "Chatturbhuj"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41189, "end_char": 41198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41245, "end_char": 41248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42043, "end_char": 42053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of\n\nthe Act", "statute": "Part II of\n\nthe Act"}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42057, "end_char": 42067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of\n\nthe Act", "statute": "Part II of\n\nthe Act"}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42434, "end_char": 42444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42703, "end_char": 42717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42725, "end_char": 42739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42773, "end_char": 42779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The burden of Shri Kacker's arguments is that the case falls under clause (d) (i) and not under clause (a) of Section 100(1)."}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42864, "end_char": 42878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ma1mi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42990, "end_char": 42999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned oounsel has conceded that if clause (a) were applicable, the case would have been within the ratio of Ma1mi Lal's case and that was why at the stage of arguments before the High Court, the challenge under clause (a) of the sub-Section was given up."}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43285, "end_char": 43299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43504, "end_char": 43515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sections 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43555, "end_char": 43565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43765, "end_char": 43776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44430, "end_char": 44444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manni Lat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44501, "end_char": 44510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9-152 SCI/81\n\nBefore examining the facts and ratio of Manni Lat's case, it will be worthwhile to notice here a general principle of criminal law bearing on this issne.", "canonical_name": "Manni F Lal"}}, {"text": "Di/ip Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44661, "end_char": 44672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle as reiterated by this Court in Di/ip Kumar S/zarma's case, ibid, (at page 289), is as follows :\n\nAn order of acquittal particularly one passed on merits wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes, and as effectively as if it had never been passed."}}, {"text": "zarma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44675, "end_char": 44680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle as reiterated by this Court in Di/ip Kumar S/zarma's case, ibid, (at page 289), is as follows :\n\nAn order of acquittal particularly one passed on merits wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes, and as effectively as if it had never been passed."}}, {"text": "Kelson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44976, "end_char": 44982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Kelson puts it, '\"it is a true annulment an annulment with retroactive force\"."}}, {"text": "U.P. Legislative Assembly Constituency, Hardoi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45501, "end_char": 45547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the last date for filing nominations from the U.P. Legislative Assembly Constituency, Hardoi was January 9, 1969."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45552, "end_char": 45567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the last date for filing nominations from the U.P. Legislative Assembly Constituency, Hardoi was January 9, 1969."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45624, "end_char": 45640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The returned candidate was convicted two days later on January 11, 1969 and sentenced."}}, {"text": "Section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45709, "end_char": 45720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45722, "end_char": 45739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "January 16, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45745, "end_char": 45761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 16, 1969, he filed an appeal against l1is conviction in the High Court."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45847, "end_char": 45863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Polling took place on February 9, 1969 and the result of the election was declared on February 11, 1969, and he was successful in the election."}}, {"text": "February 11, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45911, "end_char": 45928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Polling took place on February 9, 1969 and the result of the election was declared on February 11, 1969, and he was successful in the election."}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46077, "end_char": 46086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46327, "end_char": 46345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the election-petition was decided, the returned candidate's appeal was allowed on September 30, 1969 by the High Court and his conviction and sentence were set aside."}}, {"text": "J.C. Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46727, "end_char": 46736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bench presided over by J.C. Shah, J. (as he then was) answered this question thus :\n\n\" ... it is clear that, though the conviction of respondent No."}}, {"text": "1 lth January, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46890, "end_char": 46909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was recorded by the trial court on 1 lth January, 1969, he was acquitted o'n 30th September, 1969 in appeal which acquittal had the effect of completely wiping out the conviction."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46932, "end_char": 46952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was recorded by the trial court on 1 lth January, 1969, he was acquitted o'n 30th September, 1969 in appeal which acquittal had the effect of completely wiping out the conviction."}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47545, "end_char": 47552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47574, "end_char": 47585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "9th February, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47995, "end_char": 48013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was not disqualified at the time of filing of nomination, he was, in fact, disqualified on 9th February, 1969, the date of polling, as well as on 11th February, 1969, when the result was declared ..... ."}}, {"text": "11th February, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48050, "end_char": 48069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was not disqualified at the time of filing of nomination, he was, in fact, disqualified on 9th February, 1969, the date of polling, as well as on 11th February, 1969, when the result was declared ..... ."}}, {"text": "9th or 1 lth February, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48481, "end_char": 48508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disqualification, which existed nn the 9th or 1 lth February, 1969 as a fact, was wiped out when the conviction recorded on 11th January, 1969 was set aside and that acquittal took effect from that very date."}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48696, "end_char": 48710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th October, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49297, "end_char": 49315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln this case, the High Court proceeded to pronounce the judgment on 27th October, 1969."}}, {"text": "19th or 11th February 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49515, "end_char": 49541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was therefore, impossible for the High Court to arrive at the opinion that on 19th or 11th February 1969, respondent No."}}, {"text": "s.8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49869, "end_char": 49875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11th January, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49920, "end_char": 49938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The situation is similar to the one that could have come into existence if Parliament itself had chosen to repeal s.8(2) of the Act retrospectively with effect from 11th January, 1979.\""}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50396, "end_char": 50410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manni F Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51410, "end_char": 51421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the respondent has tried to distinguish Manni F Lal's case from the one before us on three grounds.", "canonical_name": "Manni F Lal"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51552, "end_char": 51563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51750, "end_char": 51764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G Manni Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51830, "end_char": 51841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Second, in G Manni Lal's case, the disqualification on account of conviction and sentence of the candidate concerned did not exist on the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers, but was incurred subsequently to the acceptance of his nomination, whereas in the present case, such disqualification existed as a fact even at the date of the scrntiny of the nomination papers."}}, {"text": "Section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52233, "end_char": 52246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52291, "end_char": 52305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52488, "end_char": 52501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52572, "end_char": 52586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53019, "end_char": 53033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 67A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53619, "end_char": 53630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manni Lill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53972, "end_char": 53982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar to the third point raised here, in Manni Lill also, it was contended that under section 100(1) (a), the question whether the successful candidate was disqualified o.~ the date of his election was to be determined with reference to the situation obtaining on that date only.", "canonical_name": "Manni F Lal"}}, {"text": "section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54017, "end_char": 54031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54875, "end_char": 54890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55992, "end_char": 56006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56144, "end_char": 56158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57117, "end_char": 57131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amritlal Ambalal Patel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58496, "end_char": 58518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amritlal Ambalal Patel (ibid) cited by Shri Kacker is not a parallel case.", "canonical_name": "Amritlal Ambalal Patel"}}, {"text": "Amritlal Ambalal Patel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58723, "end_char": 58745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the election of Amritlal Ambalal Patel to Gujarat Legislative Assembly was challenged ou the ground that he was on the date of scrutiny of nominations less than 25 years of age-which was the minimum age prescribed under Article 173 (b) of the Constitution and, as such, not being qualified for being chosen, his nomination was wrongly accepted.", "canonical_name": "Amritlal Ambalal Patel"}}, {"text": "Gujarat Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58749, "end_char": 58777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the election of Amritlal Ambalal Patel to Gujarat Legislative Assembly was challenged ou the ground that he was on the date of scrutiny of nominations less than 25 years of age-which was the minimum age prescribed under Article 173 (b) of the Constitution and, as such, not being qualified for being chosen, his nomination was wrongly accepted."}}, {"text": "Article 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58927, "end_char": 58938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59275, "end_char": 59286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62018, "end_char": 62031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_661_675_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "• •\n\nSUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,\n\nWEST BENGAL\n\nSATYEN BHOWMICK AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 15, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nOfficial Secrets Act-Section 14-Scope of-Advocate taking, notes on evidence of witnesses in respect of proceedings held in camera-Court, if could . prohibit taking notes-Court 'if could compel the advocate to produce his notes for inspection-Advocate if could claim privilege under section 126 of Evidence C Act.\n\nSection 14 of the Official Secrets Act provides that in addition to and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings if, in the course of proceedings before a Court against any person for an offenc.e under this Act, the prosecution makes an application that publication of any evidence to be given would be prejudicial D to the safety of the State. The Court may make an order prohibiting the publication of evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of proceedings if it is of opinion that the proceedings 'vould be prejudicial to the safety of the State.\n\nOn the allegation that the accused had passed on some military secrets to the enemy resulting in serious detriment to the safety and security of the country E the accused were charge-sheeted under sections 3, 9 and ,10 of the Act.\n\nDuring the commitment inquiry the prosecution prayed that the accused should not be allowed to have access to or be given copies of statements of witnesses recorded by the Magistrate. The defence lawyers were allowed to take notes of the statements of witnesses. When the Magistrate asked the defence Ja, vyers to produce their note-books for perusal, they claJmed privilege F under section 126 of the Evidence Act on the ground that they contained certain instructions given to them by the accused which amounted to privileged communication and that for this reason they could not be looked into by the Court.\n\nThe Magistrate upheld the objection .\n\nPurporting to folloW one of its earlier decisions the High Court in a revision filed by the State held that the Magistrate should have taken legal action against G the lawyer for flouting its order by not producing the note-books on the ground of privilege. It also held that in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Act not only could the public be excluded from the hearing but evP:n the statements of witnesses recorded by the C.ourt could not be made available to the accused or his counsel.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that the opening words of section 14 H really amounted to a non-obstante clause overriding the provisions of all Acts including the Code of Criminal Procedure and the mode of trial contemplated 'hy section 14 would take precedence over the mode of trial provided bys. 251-A\n\nors. 252 of the Code and (2) the l\\, Iagirr:-:tc could not only hold the proceedings in camera but could exclude publication of any evidence, including the right of accused to get notes of the statements recorded during the police investigation or during inquiry or trial.\n\nHELD : The opening words of section 14 'in addition and without prejudice to any powers \\Vhich a Court may possess\" clearly reval that the intention B of the legislature was to give only an enabling additional power to the Court regarding holding of the proceedings in camera. The legislature never intended that the inherent powers possessed by the Court to hold the proceedings in camera in suitable cases should in any way be affected by section 14.\n\nThe intention was merely to give an addition<il power to strengthen the hands of the Court for holding the proceedings in camera where tbe necessities of the situation demanded. [669F-H] c\n\nIt is we11 settkd that a non-obstante clause has the efft:l\"t of overriding the provisions of a law or of the law in which the said clause is inserted.\n\nThe non-obstante clause cannot reasonably be read as overriding anythil)g contained in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment.\n\nNormally a non-obstante clause is always expressed in a negative form i.e. by using the words \"notwithstanding anything contained\" or \"an:Ything contained in previous law shall not affect the provisions of a particular Act\" and so on.\n\n[670B-EJ\n\nIn the instant case the words \"in addition and without prejudice to any powers\" cannot be construed to be a non-obstante clause at all so as to override other provisions of the Act or those of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n[670EJ\n\nE Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. [1953] S.C.R.\n\nreferred to.\n\nInterpretation of Statutes, Vepa P. Sarathi, 2nd Edn. referred to.\n\nSection 14 not only confers powers on a Court for holding the proceedings. in camera but also to exclude publication of any evidence \\Vhich includes theright of the accused to get copies of the statements recorded during police investigation or during the inquiry or during tria-1.\n\n[670G]\n\nThe right to obtain copies of statements of witnesses recorded by the police is a very valuable right because without having those statements in his possession, it would be difficult for the accused to defend himself effectively. If an accused is not supplied either the statements recorded by the police or the statements of witnesses recorded at the inquiry or the trial he cannot defend himself and instruct his lawyer to cross-examine the witnesses successfully and eITectively so as to disprove the prosecution cnse.\n\n[671D~E]\n\nSection 14, therefore, could never have intended to take away or deprive an accused of this valuable right which has been conferred on him by the Criminal law of the land. The first part of the section does not prohibit or exclude giving to 3n accused person copies of the statements of witnesse\"i either during police investigation or in court but is mentioned merely as a motive or reason for holding proceedings in camera.\n\nThe entire sentence starting from \"application is m<tde by the prosecution on the ground that the publication of any evidence to he given or of any statement to be made in the course of the\n\nSUPDT. & REMEMBRANCER v. s. BHOWMICK (Faza/ Ali, J.) 663\n\nproceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State\" that all or any A portion of the public should be excluded during any part of the bearing has to be read conjunctively as one composite sentence and there is no wan-ant for truncating it into two separate parts dealing with diiierent subject matters. The words 'publication of any evidence' do not indicate that the accused should not be allowed access to the evidence recorded by the Court : they are merely made to highlight the ground for holding the proceedings in camera because if public are allowed to be present during the hearing the evidence which is B recorded in their presence will amount to publication and it is in that sense <done that the word publication -has been used in section 14.\n\n[671F-HJ\n\nIf it is held tbat section 14, by using the word 'publication' deprives an accused of getting any copies of the statement of witnesses or of the judgment under section 548 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Criminal Rules of Practice framed by the High Court then it would be difficult to uphold the C constitutional validity of section 14 because in that event the procedure would become extremely unreasonable, harsh and prejudicial to the accused as a result of which the case would have been tried according to a procedure which was not in consonance with the provisions of article 21 of the Constitution. [6720-H]\n\nThe apprehension that if the accused was allowed access to copies of statements recorded by the police or the Magistrate it would amount to publication, is not well founded.\n\nUnder the provisions of section 5 of the Act, any person who is found in possession or control of any document or information and niak.es it public would also be deemed to have committed an offence under that section and would be prosecuted and liable to a heavy penalty. This prohibits even the lawyers from disclosing the evidence outside the Court.\n\n[673B-C]\n\nIn the instant case the Magistrate \\Vas fully justified in not compelling the lawyer to surrender his register which contained a part of the privileged com- 1nunication and even if the lawyer had taken down the evidence in extcn<; o for the Jimited purpose of using it to defend the accused or cros5-examine the \\vitnesses, he could not be prevented from doing so, nor does section 14 contemplate or envisage such a course of action. [673E-FJ\n\nThe Superintendent and Reme1nbrancer of Legal Affairs, Wt>st Bengal v.\n\nF Satyen Bhawrnik & Ors., A.I.R. 1970 C<llcutta 535, overruled.\n\nAnthony A!lc11 Fletcher v. Starl' 78 Calcutta Weekly Notes 313 approved.\n\nNarcsh Shridhar Mirajkar & On-. \\'. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [1966} 3 S.C.R. 744 relied on.\n\nCRIMINAi APPELLATE JL'RISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 368 ol 1975\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 5-4-1974 of the Calcutta High Court in Cr!. Revn. No. 193 of 1971.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, M. M. Kshtriy11. A. K.\n\nGanguli and G.\n\nChatterjee fo1 the appellant.\n\nT. S. Arora for RR 1, 3 to 17.\n\nA Uma Dutta for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated April 5, 1974 of the Calcutta High Court by which the order of the trial court was set aside and the case was remitted for fresh hearing in the light of the directions given by the High Court.\n\nThe High Court further directed that the Commitment Inquiry held by Mr. R. P. Roy Chowdhury who was the Trial Magistrate, should be held by some other Magistrate.\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and the central controversy turns upon the interpretation of s. 14 of the Official\n\nSecrets Act., 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It appears that a complaint was filed on the 20th March 1969 against 38 accused persons under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with sections 3 9, and l 0 of the Act.\n\nThe charges against the accused were no doubt very serious and concerned the security of the State, as the 2ccused persons are alleged to have passed 011 some military secrets to the enemy resulting in serious detriment to the safety and security of our cormtry. _ Of the 38 accused persons named in the chargesheet, only 17 were in custody and a commitment inquiry into the charges was held against them by the trial Magistrate.\n\nDuring the commitment inquiry the State filed an application under s. 14 of the Act praying that the proceedings be held in camera and public should be excluded from attending the hearings of the case because the statements made in the course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State.\n\nIt was also prayed that apart F from excluding the public from the hearings of the proceeding, the accused should not be allowed to have access to, or be given copies of, the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Magistrate or those recorded earlier during police investigation.\n\nThe Magistrate partly allowed the application but permitted the defence lawyer to take copious notes of the statements of witnesss in order to be in a position G to cross-examine the witnesses.\n\nSubsequently, the Magistrate directed the lawyer to produce his notebook so that the Magistrate may examine if only a summary of the evidence had been taken by the lawyer or the statements had been taken in extenso in which case it would amount to publication and, therefore, would be barred by s. 14 of the Act.\n\nThe lawyer of the defence appearing before the Magistrate first agreed to show his note-book but later claimed privilege under s. 126 of the\n\n~· Evidence Act on the ground that the register in which he had takeri down the notes of the evidence also contained certain instructions given\n\nto him which amounted to a privileged communication and could not be looked into by the Court.\n\nIn this view of the matter the Magistrat~ found himself helpless and proceeded with the inquiry. As the prosecution was nor satisfied with the procedure adopted by the Magistrate, the State filed a revision before the High Court for quashing of the order of the Magistrate in allowing the lawyer to cross-examine the witnesses without impounding the notes comprising the statements of the witnesses taken down in extenso by the lawyer.\n\nThe High Court after hearing the counsel for the parties thoroughly examined the entire position and ultimately came to a finding that the Magistrate should have taken legal action against the lawyer for flouting the orders of the Court by not producing the notebook on the plea C of privilege which did not hold any water.\n\nThe High Court was further of the opinion that in view of the provisions of s. 14 of the Act not: only could the public be excluded from taking part at the hearing but even the statements of witnesses recorded by the court or other documents could not be made available to the accused or his counsel nor could copies of the said documents be given to the accused. In this view of the matter the High Court quashed the order of the Magistrate and remitted the case to the trial court to be heard by some other Magistrate in view of the directions given by it.\n\nHence, this appeal to this Court.\n\nWe have been taken through the entire judgment of the High Court by the learned counsel for the parties.\n\nThe two Judges who decided the case agreed in the conclusion but have given separate reasons for coming to the conclusion arrived at by them.\n\nThe only question that is to be determined in the present appeal is as to the scope and ambit of s. 14 of the Act.\n\nMr. Mukherjee, appearing for the State, however, submitted that on a close scrutiny of the language employed in s. 14, it wonld appear that the statute contains •a two-fold bar-0) that publication of any evidence cannot be given, and (2) that public should be excluded from attending the hearing of the proceedings.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that s. 14 does not in any way deprive the valuable right of the accused to get copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the commitment inquiry or the documents or statements recorded by the police which is a statutory right conferred on the accused under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Criminal rules framed thereunder by various High Courts. All that s. 14 prohibits is that the public be excluded from attending the hearings of the inquiry.\n\nSince the Magistrate had already acceded to this prayer of the accused, there was nothing more that could be done by him.\n\nD ..\n\nIt appears that the Calcutta High Court has been consistently taking the view as adumbrated by the learned counsel for the appellant, viz., that the court has a discretion under s. 14 of the Act not only to hold the proceedings in camera by excluding the public but also has the discretion to prohibit publication of any evidence given in the course of the proceedings.\n\nIn Rame11dra Singh v. Mohit Choudhary & Ors.(') a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court went to the extent of holding that the Act prescribes a special procedure and, therefore, overrides the procedure for trial under s. 251 A or 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955. In this connection, the High Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"The prosecution is under the Official Secrets Act and, it is unlikely that the Legislature would provide for a camera trial and at the same time provide for giving copies of all documents under section 173 to the accused.\n\nThis strikes at the root of secrecy and goes counter to the provisions of trial in camera and this is why the Legislature purposely used the word 'complaint' and provided for a special procedure regarding cognisance.\n\nThis view finds support from the provisions of Section 14 of the Act providing for camera trial.\n\nThe Official Secrets Act provides for a special procedure of com plaint and if it was upon a complaint by a person authorised under the Act, cognisance was taken under Section 190(1)(a)and not under Section 190(1)(b).\n\nThe procedure for trial would therefore, be under Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under Section 251A. In respect of prosecution under Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no compulsory provision for giving copies of documents referred to under Section 173 and the opposite parties are not, therefore, entitled to copies as of right.\"\n\nThe decision under appeal follows the aforesaid decision and has taken the same 'ew. In a later decision in In Re Anthony Allen Fletcher v. State('), the Calcutta High Court seems to have struck a slightly different note.\n\nIn that case, the court was considering the question of bail and the exclusion of the public from attending the H bearing of the case, where the following observations were made :\n\n(!) AIR 1969 Calcutta 535.\n\n(2) 78 Calcutta Weekly Notes 313.\n\n'On a consideration of the provisions of the Statute as also the imprimatur of the judicial decisions, we ultimately hold that in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 14 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 when it reasonably appears to the Court that a trial eatiis apertfa would have the risk of any publication of any evidence to be given or any statements to be made in course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State, the Court in exercise of its discretion can exclude the public from such proceedings\n\nand that this power is in addition to the inherent power exercised by the Court to do justice.\"\n\nIt may be noticed that the High Court did not go to the extremr~ of holding that even the statements or evidence recorded by the Magistrate in the course of th~ proceedings would have to be excluded under s. 14.\n\nAll that was held by the High Court was that the Court has a discretion to exclude the public from the proceedings and that this power of exclusion was available to the court apart from the inherent power which ewry Court possessed in this matter.\n\nWith dur' respect we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by th'\n\nCalcutta High Court in Fletcher's case (supra) as mentioned above.\n\nHowever, we find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken b; r the High Court in the judgment under appeal for the reasons that wt: shall give hereafter.\n\nWe might also mention that s. 14 was interpreted by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State af Maharashtra & Anr. ( '), where this Court while dealing with the question of holding proceedings in camera observed as follows :-\n\n\"Having thus ehnnciated the universally accepted proposition in favour of open trials, it is necessary to consider whether this rule admits of any exceptions or not.\n\nCases may occur where the requiremnt of the administration of justice itself may make it necessary for the court to hold a trial in camera.\n\nWhile emphasising the importance of public trial, we cannot overlook the fact that the primary function of the Judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a case is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? .......... That is why we\n\n(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744\n\n668 SUPREME tOURT REPORTS (1981] 2 s.c.R.\n\nfeel no hesitation in holding that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if th~ ends of justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption of such a course. . . . . . . . . It is the fair administration of justice which is the end of judicial process, and so, if ever a real conflict arises between fair administration of justice itself on the one hand, and public trial on the other, inevitably, public trial may have to be regulated or controlled in the interest of administration of justice.\"\n\nWhile interpreting the scope and ambit of s. 14 this Court inc Naresh Shridhar Mirajkars case (supra) observed as follows :-\n\n\"It would be noticed that while making a specific provision authorising the court to exclude all or any portion of the public from a trial, s. 14 in terms recognises the existence of such inherent powers by its opening clause.\"\n\nIt may be pertinent to note that while this Court was fully alive to the contents of s. 14, it neither held that the opening part of the section amounted to a non obstante clause nor that the section in any way deprived the accused of the right of getting copies of the statements. of witnesses recorded by the court or before the police. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court was concerned with a defamation case but the obs.ervations made by this Court fully apply to the_ facts of the present case also on the view that we take: on. the scope and ambit of s. 14 of the Act.\n\nThere can be no doubt that an open trial held in public is the general rule and seems to be the very concomitant of a fair and reasonable trial, yet the public can be excluded from the hearings of the trial and the proceedings can be held in camera only under very exceptional circumstances as pointed out by this Court in the aforesaid rose. This being the position, section 14 must be interpreted so as to fall in line with the observations made and the test laid down by this Court regarding the doctrine of holding proceedings in camera.\n\nA close and careful scrutiny of s. 14 would itself clearly show that the section does hot contemplate the type of exclusion that the High Court seems to think.\n\nIt is true that offences under the Act are very serious offences and maintenance of secrecy is of the very essence of the matter but that by itself will not justify the legislature to pass an Act so as to deprive H an accused of the valuable right to defend or for that matter to stifle the defence itself.\n\nThe importance of holding trial in camera in cases under the Official Secrets Act has been emphasised iin R. v. Socialist -\n\n~-\".\n\n~UPDT. & REMEMBRANCER v. s. BHOWMICK (Fazal Ali,!.) 6 69\n\nWorker Printers and Publishers Ltd. & Anr.(1), where Lord Widgery, A C. J., observed as follows :-\n\n\"When one has an order for trial in camera, all the public and all the press are evicted at one fell swoop and the entire supervision by the public is gone ..... The actual conduct of the trial, the success or otherwise of the defendant, does B not turn on this kind of thing, and very often the only value of the witness's name being given as opposed to it being withheld is that if it is published up and down the country other witnesses may discover that they can help in regard to the case and come forward.\"\n\nWith this background we shall now proceed to examine the language of section 14 of the Act itself which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"14. Exclusion of public from proceedings.\n\nIn addition and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings if, in the course of proceedings before a Court against any person for an offence under this Act or the proceedings on appeal, or in the course of the trial of a person under this Act, application is made by the prosecution, on the ground that the publication of any evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State, that all or any portion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing, the Court may make an order to that effect, but the passing of sentence shall in any case take place in public.\"\n\nTo begin with, the opening words of the section, namely, 'In addition and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may • possess' clearly reveal that the intention of the legislature was to give\n\n- , Oll!y an enabling additional power to the court regarding holding the proceedings in camera.\n\nIn other words, the legislature never intended that the inherent powers possessed by the court to hold the proceeding in camera in suitable cases would be in any way affected by section 14 but the intention was merely to give an additional power to strengthen the hands of the court for holding the proceedings in camera where the necessities of the situation demanded.\n\nThus, to begin with, section 14 is merely an enabling and not a barring provision. Mr.\n\nMukherjee argued that the opening woros of section 14, referred to above, really amount to a non-obstante clause overriding the provisiOllll\n\n(l) [1975] l All ER 142.\n\n!0-152SCI/81\n\nof all Acts including the Code of Criminal Procedure and the mode of trial contemplated by s. 14 would take precedence over the mode of trial provided by s. 251 A or 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this extreme argument wliich in fact overstates the law. It is well settled that a non-obstante clause has doubtless the effect Olf overriding the provisions of a law or of the law in which the said clause is inserted. Sarathi in 'Interpretation of Statutes'''' defines a non-obstante clause thus :-\n\n\"A section sometimes begins with the phrase 'notwithstanding anything contained etc.'.\n\nSuch a clause is called a non-obstante clause and its general purpose is to give the provision contained in the non-obstante clause an overriding effect in the event of a conflict between it and the rest of the Secti-On.\"\n\nIn Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v.\n\nArabinda Bose & Anr.(').\n\nSastri, C.J., held that the non-obstante clause cannot reasonably be read as overriding anything contained in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment.\n\nThese are the well settled rules of interpretation of a non-obstante clause.\n\nNormally, a non-obstante clause is always expressed in a negative form, that is to say, by using the words 'notwithstanding anything contained' or 'anything contained in a previous law shall not affect the provisions of a particular Act' and so on. In the instant case, the words 'in addition and without prejudice to any powers cannot be construed to be a nonohstante clause at all so as to override other provisions of the Act or those of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, the argument of Mr. Mukherjee that the opening words of s. 14 amount to a non-obstante clause cannot be accepted on a simple and plain interpretation of the opening part of section 14.\n\nThis takes us to the substantive portion of the Act on which reliance was placed both by Mr. Mukherjee and by the High Court so ) as to hold that the section not only conferred powers on a court foi:- .. t . . holding the proceedings in camera but !llso to exclude publication of\n\niny evidence which includes the right of the accused to get copies of the statements recorded during police investigation or during the inquiry or during trial. With great respect to the learned Jndges of the Calcutta High Court, we feel that the main part of the section has not been correctly inrerpreted by them.\n\nThe High Court seems to have taken for granted that section 14 consists of two separate parts, one, providing for a trial in camera, and the other prohibiting publication of\n\n•S:cond Bdn, P. 422.\n\n: (I) [19531 SCR I,\n\nevidence.\n\nBy the expression 'publication of evidence' is meant, according to the High Court, the power to deprive an accused of the\n\nright to get copies of the evidence recorded by the court or the statO.:' ments recorded during the police investigation.\n\nWe might mention: here that as s. 13(3) of the Act clearly provides that no court shall\n\ntake cognizance of any offence under the Act except upon a complaint made by or under the authority of the Government or any person em,\n\npowered by it, it is manifest that s. 251 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by the Act of 1955, will not apply because the present case was not inslituted on a police report but on the basis of a complaint. As the occurrence had taken place before the Code of 1973, therefore, the provisions of s. 207 of the Code of 1973 would\n\nnot apply to the present case.\n\nThe question, however, is: does the first part of s. 14 empower the court to take away the valuable right of an accused of getting copies of the statements recorded by the Magistrate before the Court ? Even before the amending Act of 1955, under the criminal rules framed by various High Courts, an accused was undoubtedly entitled to have copies of the statements of witnesses recorded by the police.\n\nThis is a very valuable right because without having the statements recorded by the police in his possession, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an accused to defend himself effectively.\n\nIt is well settled that fouler the crime the higher should be the proof. If an accused is not supplied either the statements recorded by the police or the statement of witnesses recorded at the inquiry or the trial, how can be possibly defend himself and instruct his lawyer to cross-examine the witnesses successfully and effectively so as to disprove the prosecution case. We, therefore, think that s. 14 could never have intended to take away or deprive an accused of this valuable right which has been conferred on him by the criminal law of the land. The legislature when it passed the Act in 1923 was aware of the provisions of the Code of Criminal ,!Procedure which had conferred the valuable right on an accused in order to defend himself.\n\nIndeed, if any of these rights were to be taken away, we should have expected a clearer and more specific language used in section 14 to connote such an intention. Our reading of s. 14 is merely this : that the first part of the section does not prohibit or exclude giving to an accused copies of the statements of witnesses either during police investigation or in court but is mentioned merely as a motive or reason for holding the proceedings in camera.\n\nThe entire sentence starting from 'application is made by the prosecution. on the ground that the publication of any evidence to he given or of any statement to be made in the course of tbe proceedings would be prejudicial to tbe safety of the State, that all or any portion of the\n\npublic shall be excluded during any part of the hearing' has to be read conjunctively as one composite sentence and there is no warrant for truncating it into two separate parts dealing with different subject matters.\n\nThe words 'publication of any evidence' on which great stress has been laid by Mr. Mukherjee and the High Court do not indicate that the accused should not be allowed access to the evidence recorded by the court, are merely made to highlight the ground for holding the proceedings in camera because if public are allowed to be present during the hearing the evidence which is recorded in their presence it will amount to publication and it is in that sense alone that the word 'publication' has been used in section 14.\n\nIndeed, if the interpretation put by the High Court or by Mr. - Mukherjee is accepted then the provisions of section 14 will have to be struck down as being violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.\n\nThis. Court has now widened the horizon of the concept of liberty, as contained in Art. 21 so as to give the word 'procedure' a very wide counotation. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (') while detailing the attributes of a fair trial as contemplated in Art. 21 this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or nonarbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 mnst answer the best of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be \"right and just and fair\" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.\"\n\nThus, if we hold that s. 14 by usin~ the word 'publication' deprives i_ an accused of getting any copies of the statement of witnesses or 'Of\n\nthe judgment under s. 548 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Criminal Rules 308 and 3 IO framed by the Calcutta High Court, then it would be difficult to uphold the constitutional validity of s. 14 because then the procedure would become extremely unreasonable harsh and prejudicial to the accused as a result of which the case would have been tried according to a procedure which was not in consonance with the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution.\n\nThis aspect of the matter does not appear to have been considered by the High Court perhaps because Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) came much later.\n\n\nMr. Mukherjee submitted that if the accused is allowed to have access to the statements recorded by the police or is given a copy of the statement recorded by the Magislrate, then it will amount to publication and will en4anger the safety and security of the country becaus0\n\nthe accused or the lawyer who is defending the accused may publish the statements or disclose the same to other persons. This apprehension, in our opinion, is not well founded.\n\nThe Act itself takes particular \"care of such a situation because under the provisions of s. 5 of the Act any person who is found in possession or control of any document or information and makes it public would also be deemed to have committed an offence under that section and would be prosecuted and , entitled to a heavy penalty.\n\nThis, therefore, prohibits even the lawyers from disclosing the evidence outside the court. So far as the arguments and the discussion of the evidence inside the court is concerned, so long as the proceedings are in camera the danger of publication is completely excluded.\n\nThe High Court had been rather bitter on the trial Magistrate when it observed that he could compel the lawyer to submit his register. Tho observations made by the High Court on the conduct of the Magistrate or on the lawyer were not at all called for because both of them were doing their duties according to law. On the view that we have taken, the Magistrate was fully justified in not compelling the lawyer to surrender his register which undoubtedly contained a part of the privileged communication and even if the lawyer had taken down the evidence in exlenso for the limited purpose of using it to defend the\n\naccused or cross-examine the witnesses, he could not be prevented from doing so, nor does s. 14 contemplate or envisage such a course of action. The Magistrate also in declining to give copies of the statements concerned to the accused, took an erroneous view of s. 14 of the Act which, as we have already held, did not debar the Magistrate from giving copies to the accused for the purpose of his defence. Thus, are satisfied that the judgment of the High Court under appeal is vitiated by an error of law and it has not correctly interpreted s. 14 of the Act. Similarly the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v.\n\nSatyen Ehowmik & Ors. (') cannot be held to be good law and must be overruled.\n\nThus on an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and a true interpretation of the language employed in s. 14 -0f the Act, we reach the following conclusions :- ·\n\nl. That s. 14 apart from providing that the proceedings of the H Court may be held in camera under the circumstances men•\n\n(I) AIR 1970 Calcutta 535.\n\ntioned in the Section, does not in any way affect or override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to enquiries or trials held thereunder. •\n\n2. That s. 14 does not in any way deprive the valuable rights of the accused to get copies of the statement recorded by the Magistrate or statements of witnesses recorded by the police the documents obtained by the Police during the in vestigation as envisaged by criminal Rules 308 and 310 framed under the Code of Criminal Procedure hy various . High Courts nor does s. 14 in any way affect the right of . __, the accused to get copies under s. 548 of the Code of Cri- J~ minal Procedure.\n\n3. That the opening words of s. 14 do not amount to a nonobstante clause but are merely in the nature of an enabling provmon reserving the inherent powers of the Court to exclude the public from the proceedings if the Court is of the opinion that it is just and expedient to do so.\n\n4. That there was absolutely no impropriety on the power of the Magistrate in not taking action against the defence lawyer for his refusal to show his register because the lawyer had rightly claimed privilege under s. 126 af the Evideuce Act as the register contained instructions given by the client which being privileged could not be disclosed to the Court.\n\nOn a parity of reasoning we find no impropriety on the conduct of the lawyer in refusing to show the statement of witnesses recorded by the Court in extenso in order to prepare himself for an effective cross-examination of the witnesses.\n\nHence the strictures passed by the High Conrtl on the Magistrate as also on the lawyer of the defence were, in our opinion, totally unwarranted.\n\n,,-J,\n\n5. That if. the lawyer of the defence or staff of the Conrt or any one who was not excluded from the hearing of the case made any attempt to disclose the contents of the documents or the statements of the witnesses, exposed himself to a prosecution on a charge under s. 5 of the Act.\n\n' For the reasons given above, we overrule the view of the High Court and the reasons given therefor that s. 14 af the Act prohibits the giving of copies of the statement concerned to the accused or that H (he lawyer is prohibited from taking the statements in extenso and had a duty to show the same to the court. We also overrule the view taken by the High Court regarding the interpretation of s. 14 of the Act.\n\nSUPDT. & REMEMBRANCER v. s. BHOWM!CK (Fazal Ali, J.) 675\n\nWe do not agree with the lligh Court that the case should be tried by some other Magistrate but as lot of time has elapsed, surely the Magistrate against whose orders revision was taken to the High Court must have been transferred by this time. Therefore, the case will now be inquired into by a Magistrate who is available in the light of the observations made by us. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.\n\nN.K.A .", "total_entities": 143, "entities": [{"text": "SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SATYEN BHOWMICK AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SATYEN BHOWMICK AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 15, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. 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"section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15615, "end_char": 15626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15909, "end_char": 15919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955"}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15964, "end_char": 15984, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 190(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16128, "end_char": 16145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955"}}, {"text": "Section 190(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16159, "end_char": 16176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955"}}, {"text": "Section 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16229, "end_char": 16240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16248, "end_char": 16274, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 251A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16289, "end_char": 16301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955"}}, {"text": "Section 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16335, "end_char": 16346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16354, "end_char": 16380, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16463, "end_char": 16474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17196, "end_char": 17206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17214, "end_char": 17240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17871, "end_char": 17876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923", "statute": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Fletcher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18228, "end_char": 18236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With dur' respect we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by th'\n\nCalcutta High Court in Fletcher's case (supra) as mentioned above."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18460, "end_char": 18465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 744", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19513, "end_char": 19532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20147, "end_char": 20152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naresh Shridhar Mirajkars", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20168, "end_char": 20193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While interpreting the scope and ambit of s. 14 this Court inc Naresh Shridhar Mirajkars case (supra) observed as follows :-\n\n\"It would be noticed that while making a specific provision authorising the court to exclude all or any portion of the public from a trial, s. 14 in terms recognises the existence of such inherent powers by its opening clause.\"", "canonical_name": "Naresh Shridhar Mirajkars"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20371, "end_char": 20376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20545, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20826, "end_char": 20839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court was concerned with a defamation case but the obs.ervations made by this Court fully apply to the_ facts of the present case also on the view that we take: on."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21022, "end_char": 21027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21409, "end_char": 21419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21616, "end_char": 21621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22114, "end_char": 22134, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22242, "end_char": 22277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 69\n\nWorker Printers and Publishers Ltd. & Anr.(1), where Lord Widgery, A C. J., observed as follows :-\n\n\"When one has an order for trial in camera, all the public and all the press are evicted at one fell swoop and the entire supervision by the public is gone ..... The actual conduct of the trial, the success or otherwise of the defendant, does B not turn on this kind of thing, and very often the only value of the witness's name being given as opposed to it being withheld is that if it is published up and down the country other witnesses may discover that they can help in regard to the case and come forward.\""}}, {"text": "Widgery", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22300, "end_char": 22307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 69\n\nWorker Printers and Publishers Ltd. & Anr.(1), where Lord Widgery, A C. J., observed as follows :-\n\n\"When one has an order for trial in camera, all the public and all the press are evicted at one fell swoop and the entire supervision by the public is gone ..... The actual conduct of the trial, the success or otherwise of the defendant, does B not turn on this kind of thing, and very often the only value of the witness's name being given as opposed to it being withheld is that if it is published up and down the country other witnesses may discover that they can help in regard to the case and come forward.\""}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22925, "end_char": 22935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24242, "end_char": 24252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24456, "end_char": 24466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24566, "end_char": 24576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24731, "end_char": 24757, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24796, "end_char": 24801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24859, "end_char": 24865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24882, "end_char": 24908, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sarathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25168, "end_char": 25175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarathi in 'Interpretation of Statutes'''' defines a non-obstante clause thus :-\n\n\"A section sometimes begins with the phrase 'notwithstanding anything contained etc.'."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25620, "end_char": 25626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sastri, C.J., held that the non-obstante clause cannot reasonably be read as overriding anything contained in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26326, "end_char": 26352, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26446, "end_char": 26451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26563, "end_char": 26573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27226, "end_char": 27236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27680, "end_char": 27688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27910, "end_char": 27916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27926, "end_char": 27952, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 207", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28184, "end_char": 28190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28300, "end_char": 28305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29253, "end_char": 29258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29724, "end_char": 29734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29780, "end_char": 29785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31069, "end_char": 31079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31191, "end_char": 31201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31252, "end_char": 31267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31275, "end_char": 31296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31382, "end_char": 31389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31555, "end_char": 31562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31739, "end_char": 31749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31813, "end_char": 31823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31897, "end_char": 31907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32055, "end_char": 32065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32114, "end_char": 32119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 548", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32254, "end_char": 32260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32268, "end_char": 32294, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32429, "end_char": 32434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32663, "end_char": 32670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32793, "end_char": 32806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been considered by the High Court perhaps because Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) came much later."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33385, "end_char": 33389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34611, "end_char": 34616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34784, "end_char": 34789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35065, "end_char": 35070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35420, "end_char": 35425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35488, "end_char": 35493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35799, "end_char": 35804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36099, "end_char": 36125, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36160, "end_char": 36165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 548", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36235, "end_char": 36241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36312, "end_char": 36317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36781, "end_char": 36787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37587, "end_char": 37591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37711, "end_char": 37716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38002, "end_char": 38007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_676_694_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "K. JANARDHAN PILLAI & ANR. ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nJanuary 23, 1981\n\n[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VBNKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nKerala Essential Articles Control (Ten1porary Powers) Act, 1961-Section 2(a) and Section 3-Raw cashewnuts-Whether \"foodstuff\" within the meaning of section 2(a) (v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955-State Government, if co1npetent to declare raw cashewnuts as essential article-Declaratio1t, whether / contravenes section 2(a) of the Kera/a Act. ,_.,,-.\n\nBy an order made on March 20, 1976 the Kerala State Government declared that raw cashewnut was an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kersla Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 and thereofter pro.qiulgated the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order\n\n1977 under section 3 thereof, regulating the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnuts in the State of Kerala. The expression \"essential article\" ii defined D in section 2(a) of the Kerala Act as \"an article (not being an essential con1- 111odity a.~ defined in the Essential Co1nmoditie~ Act, 1955) which may be declared by the Government by a notified order to be an essential article\". Under Section 2(a) (v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 essential commodity means \"foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils.\"\n\nIn their petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioners who were E engaged in the processing of raw cashewnuts urged that raw cashewnut being a foodstuff, which was an essential commodity under the Central Act, the State Government could not make a declaration that it was an essential article under sectiein 2(a) of the State Act and that for this reason the declaration and the impugned order were ultra vires the State Act.\n\nOn behalf of the State Government it was contended that the expression \"foodstuffs\" meant only those articles which could be directly consumed \\Vithout any kind of processing since the order regulated only the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnut5 which were used as industrial raw material, they could not be called foodstuffs in the strict sense and were not an \"essential .! ,_ commodity\" within the meaning of that term under the Central Act.\n\n1~11owing the petitions,\n\nHELD: Raw cashewnut is a foodstuff under section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act and hence cannot be declared as an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kerala Act. No order could therefore be made by the State Government under section 3 thereof in respect of raw cashewnuts. Therefore the declaration\n\nmade by the State Government to the effect that raw cashewnut is an essential article under the Kerala Act and the impugned order made thereunder are liable tc be quashed.\n\n[694 B-C]\n\nThe words in parenthesis in section 2(a) of the State Act makt; it clear that the State Government can declare as an essential article under the State Act\n\nK. J. PILLAI v. UNION 677\n\nonly .., article which is not an essential commodity under the C,, ntra! Act. It\n\nis a well known rule of interpretation th.at associated words take their meaning from one another and that is the meaning of the rule of statutory construction noocltur a .sociis.\n\nWhen the term 'foodstuffs' is associated with edible oilseeds which have to be processed before the oil in them can be consumed, it is .appropriate to interpret 'foodstuffs' in the wider sense as including nil articles of food which may be consumed by human beings after processing. [687 C]\n\nHaving regard to the fact that the object of the Central Act is to regulate production, supply and distribution of essential commodities amongst the people, the expression 'foodstuffs' should be given a wider meaning as including even raw materials which ultimately result in edible articles.\n\n[687 D-E]\n\nThe dictionary meaning of 'foodstuff' is 'a substance with food value' and\n\nthe raw material of food before or after processing'. Therefore 'foodstuff' C need not necessarily mean only the final food product which is consumed. It , also includes raw food articles which may, after processing, be used as food by human beings.\n\n[688 F]\n\nSrate of Bombay v. Virkun1ar Gulabchand Shuh !1952] S.C.R. 877 and Tiktl Ram; i & Ors. etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradc.1h S: Ors. fl956] S.C.R. 393 at 418 referred to.\n\nAlthough as a result of large exports of cashewnut it is now in short supply and its price is beyond the reach of the common man, it is an article of food eaten in raw form and is used in various preparations.\n\nIt is eaten in all parts , of the country though it is grown in a few States. It i_s exported as foodstuff.\n\nIt is, therefore, a foodstuff and must be classified as an es.scntial commodity.\n\n[692 M-G]\n\nThere is no substance in the argument that cashewnuts can be treated a<; an essential article only for the purposes of export and not an essential commodity under the Central Act.\n\nThe Central Government can make an Order w1der the Central Act even when an essential commodity is used for industrial purposes or for purposes of export. Essential commodities do not cease to be essential commodities under the Central Act merely because they are exported after they are processed in India. [693 Bl\n\nThe argument that so long as the Central Government had not 1nade an order in respect of raw cashewnuts the State Government can pass an order is not available in the circumstances by reason of the definition of essential article in the Kerala Act. [693 El\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 116, 186-189/77, G . 3935-63/78 3922-24/78, 1221/77, 3821-27 /78, 3828-31 /78, 44-50/ 77, 4237;'78, 4400/78, 92-97 /;77.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 116/77.\n\nR. M. Poddar for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. No. 116/77.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Attorney Genl., P. K. Pillai and T. P. Soundara Rajan, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P. No. 116/77.\n\nN. M. Abdul Khader,, M. A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for the Respondent.\n\nR. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 186-189/77.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att-Genl. and R. M. Poddar, for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 186-189/77.\n\nP, K. Pillai and T. P. Saundra Rajan, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.\n\nC Nos. 186-189/77.\n\nN. M. Abdul Khader, M.A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for the State.\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J, John, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 3935-63/78.\n\nN. M. Abdul Khader, M. A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 3935-63/78.\n\nA. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswaran, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.\n\nNos. 3935-63 /78.\n\nE P. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran, for the Petitioners in W.P.\n\nNos. 3922-24/78.\n\nK. M. K. Nair, for the Respondent in W.P. Nos. 3922-24/78.\n\nR. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 1221/77.\n\nF K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. I.\n\nA. S. Nambiyar for Respondent No. 2.\n\nMiss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 5.\n\nP. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran for the Petitioners in W.P.\n\nG Nos. 3821-27 /78.\n\nK. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 3821-27 /78.\n\nA. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswarmz for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.\n\nNos. 3821-27 /78.\n\nP. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran for the Petitioner in W.P. Nos. 3828-31/78.\n\nK. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. I in W.P. Nos. 3828-31/7.8.\n\n.. - ..\n\nA. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswaran for Respondent No. 2 in W.P.\n\nNos. 3828-31/78.\n\nR. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John for the Pet.itioners in W.P. Nos. 44-50/77.\n\nMiss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 44-50;77.\n\n. K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in W.P. Nos. 44-50/77.\n\nP. Gcvindan Nair, Mrs. Baby Krishnan and Mrs. V. ID. Khanna, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 4237 /78 .\n\nK. M. K. Nair for the Respondent in W.P. No. 4237 /78.\n\nD. Govindan Nair and Mrs. Baby Krishnan for the Petitioners in e W.P. No. 4400/78.\n\nK. M. K. Nair for the Resipondent in W.P. No. 4400/78.\n\nR. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 92-97/77.\n\nfl:!iss A. Sub.hashini for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 92-97,'77.\n\nK. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in W.P. Nos. 92-97 /77.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVF.NKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nThe common question which arise for coosideration in the above writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India relates to the validity of the declaration made by the State Government of orala on March 20, 1976 dec:aring that raw cashewnut was an essential article, in exercise of the\n\npower under clause (a) of section 2 of ti>~ Kerala Essential Articles F.\n\nControl (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Act 3 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Kerala Act') and the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') made by the State Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Kerala Act regulating the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnnts grown in the State of G KeraJa.\n\nThe petitioners are persons engaged in the cashewnut processing industry in the State of Kerala.\n\nSince the impugned declaration and the Order seriously interfered with the right of the petitio'ners to purchase sufficient quantities of raw ca, hewnuts for processing in their factories and imposed several other restrictions on them, they have filed the above petitions.\n\nAlthough the validity of several other It Orders was also questioned in the present petitions, the petitioners . confine-0 their chal:e'nge only to the impugned declaration and the\n\nOrder in the course of the arguments since according to them it was not necessary to urge thl\"ir contentions as against those orders.\n\nThe recital in the preamble to the Order stales that it was being made in order to ensure the maintrnance of supplies of raw casbewnuts which was considered to be essential for the continued employment of a large number of workmen in the State of Kerala and for their equitable distribution and availabi; ity at fair prices. It ill further recited that the Order was being made as the State Government felt a doubt about the question whether the Kcrala Raw Cashewnuts (Marketing and Distribution) Onler, 1976 issud under the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, i 971, for the very same purpose would continue to remain in force.\n\nThe main provisions of the Order broadly related to the prohibition of sale of raw cashewnuts to any person other than an agent authorised to purchase by c:ause 3 thereof, appointment of Co-operative Societies as subagents, imposition of rcstrictio'ns on processing or conversion of raw cashewnuts and their distribution amongst the occupiers of cashewnut processing factories, appointment and powers of Cashew Special Officer and other incidental and ancillary matters.\n\nThe explanatory 'note attached to the Order stated that it was intended to regulate the procurement and distribution of raw cashcwnuh by the\n\nState Government.\n\nThe Order is issued by the State Government of Kerala umler section 3 of the Kerala Act, the object of which is to provide, in the intepost of the general public, for the control of the production, supply F and distribution of, a'nd trade and commerce in certain articles which, as the title of the Act indicates, are considered to be essential for the community.\n\nTh•o Kerala Act as originally enacted was intended to be in force for a period of five years from the date of its commencement.\n\nBy successive amendments, its life is extendc<l to twenty years from the commencement of the Act.\n\nAlthough it makes provision for -G conferring power on the State Government to make appropriate <>rders regarding regulation of production, supply and distribution of essential articles substantially on the lines on which the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) (hereinafter derrcd to as 'the Central Act') passed by the Parliament provides for the regulation of production, supp:y and distribution of essential commodities as defined Jf in the Oontral Act, the Kerala Act does not itself specify any article as an essential article.\n\nBut the expression 'essential article' is defined by section 2 (a) of the Kerala Act thus :\n\n.... -\n\n.. 2. Definition.-In this Act, unless lhe context otherwise requires, Al\n\n(a) \"essential article\" means any article (not being an essential commodity as defined in lhe Essential Commodities Act, 1955) which may be declared by lhe Government by notified order to be an essential article.\"\n\nFrom the above defihition it is clear lhat the State Government can declare as an essential article under the Kerala Act only an article which i• not an essential commodity as defined in the Central Act.\n\nWhen such a declaration is made in respect of any article, lhe State Government acquires the .power to make an order u'nder section 3 thereof in respect of such artiele.\n\nThe State Government is, however, precluded from deelaring any article which is an essential commodity under the Central Act as an essential article and from making\n\nan order for the purpose of controlling its production, supply and distribution.\n\nThis is obvious from the words in the parenthesis in section 2 (a) of the Kerala Act defining the word 'essential article'.\n\nThat the object of the Kerala Act is only to provide for regulation of production, supp:y and distribution of a'n article which is not an essential commodity as defined under the Central Act is also clear from what is stated by the Kerala Government in lhe letter dated December 5, 1961 addressed by the Law Secretary, Government of Kerala to the Oentral Government seeking the assent of lhe President to the Bill passed by the Kerala Legislature.\n\nThe relevant part of the letter reads :\n\n\" •••••••••••••••••• ! •••••••\n\nSub : The Kera/a Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Bill 1960.\n\nI am to forward herewith two copies--of the Kerala Essen- • tial Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Bill, 1960, as passed by the Legislative Assembly and reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President.\n\n2. The Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949, as amended by the Kerala Acts 24 of 1958 and 3 of 1959, was in force in the Kerala State till 25-1-1960 when it expired by efflux of time.\n\nThe Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Central Act 10 of\n\n1955) applies only in the case of essential commodities specified in lhat Act. At present there is no law in the State to control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and co=erce in, essential articles required for industrial\n\nand other purposes, which do not fall within the ambit of the Central Act.\n\nFor the implementation of the scheme under the programme of industrialisation during the Third Five Year Plan it may become necessary to control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, articles which are not essential commodities and unless the Govt. have such powers, difficulties arc likely to arise.\n\n3. The object of the present legislation is to take power for the control of essential articles which are not essential commodities within the meaning of the Central Act.\n\nIt empowers Govt. to declare any article, not being an essential commodity within the meaning of Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to be an \"essential article\" and to control, by notified order, the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any such article.\n\nThis is an enabling measure and is modelled on the Central Essential Commodities Act. It is intended to be in force only for a period of five years.\n\n4. The subject-matter of the legislation falls within the scope of entries 26 and 27 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, namely :-\n\n26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III.\n\n27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisiQns of entry 33 of List III.\n\nHence the State Legislature is competent to enact the measure.\n\n5. The provisions of the Bill may attract Articles 301 and 304(b) of the Constitution as imposing a reasonable restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce. Accordingly the previous sanction of the President for the introduction of the Bill in the State Legislature has been obtained as required by the proviso to article 304 (b) in the letter of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry referred to as third paper above\".\n\nOne of the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners in support of these petitions is that raw cashewnut being a foodstuff (which is an essential commodity under the Central Act), the State Gt>vernment 'li of Kerala could not make a declaration to the effect that it was an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kerala Act and consequently the impugned Order was outside the scope of the Kerala Act.\n\n' •\n\nbehalf of the State Government, it is contended that raw cashewnut is not a foodstuff and even if it is held to re a foodstuff having regard to the nature and object of the Order, it should be treated as being within the competence of the State Gowrnment.\n\nThe relevant part of section 2(a) of the Central Act containing the definition of the expression 'essential commodity' reads thus :\n\n\"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-\n\n(a) \"essential commodity\" means any of the following classes of commodities :-\n\n(i) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;\n\n(v) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; ,,\n\nSince it is argued on behalf of the State Government that 'foodstuffs' o only mean those articles which can be directly consumed without any kind of processing and that raw cashewnuts which are intended to be used as industrial raw material cannot, therefore, be called as 'foodstuffs' in the strict sense, it is necessary to examine the history of legislation relating to the trade and commerce within a State and production, supply and distribution of goods in India.\n\nUnder the Government of India Act, 1935, entries 27 and 29 of List II in the Seventh Schedule read as follows :\n\n\"27. Trade and commerce within the Province; markets and fairs; money lending and money lenders.\n\n29. Production, supply and distribution of goods; development of industries, subject to the provisions of List I with respect to the development of certain industries under Federal control.\"\n\nEntry 34 of List I read as :\n\n\"34. Development of industries where development, under a Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest.\"\n\nFrom the above entries it is clear that the subject of trade and commerce within the Province and subject to entry 34 of List I, the subject of production, supply and distribution of goods were with; n B the competence of the Provincial Government.\n\nAs a result of the emergency proclaimed by the Governor-General under section 102 of\n\nthe Government of India Act, 1935 on the outbreak of the Second World War the Federal Legislature acquired the power to make laws on all the subjects in the Provincial List.\n\nThe laws made by the Federal Legislature on the provincial subjects after the Prochrnation of Fmergency were to cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the Proclamation of Emergency had ceased to operate except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period.\n\nThe Proclamation of Emergency was revoked on April 1, 1946. Consequently all laws made by the Federal Legislature on the subjects in the Provincial List were to cease to have effect after the expiry of September 30, 1946. During the period of emergency the Federal Legislature bad passed a Jaw enabling the F<:<leral Government to issue Orders with respect to trade and commerce within the Provinces and the production, supply and distribution of several commodities which were considered to be essential and those Orders were also to cease to have effect on the expiry of September 30, 1946. Since it was felt that the Federal Legislature should continue to have power to make Jaws on the subject of production, supply and distribution of certain essential commodities, on March 26, 1946 the British Parliament passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Chapter 39) amending, among others, sub-section (4) of section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as to the effect of Jaws passed by virtue of the Proclamation of Emergency. The relevant part of that Ar.t read :\n\n\"2. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature shall during the period mentioned in section four of this Act have power to make Jaws with respect to the following matters-\n\n(a) trade and commerce (whether or not within a Pre>- vince) in, and the production, supply and distribution of cotton and woollen textiles, papers (including newsprint). foodstuffs (including edible oil se'ds and oils) petroleum and petroleum products, spare parts of mechanically propelled vehicles,. coal, iron, steel and mica; and\n\n(b) ............... ._ .................. .\n\n(c) .................................. . but any law made by the Indian Legislature which that Legislature would not but for the provisions of this section, have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of the\n\nK. J. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkalaramiah, !.) 685\n\nsaid period except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof.\"\n\nSection• 4 of that Act specified the duration of the legislative power conferred on the Federal Legislature by sect10n 2 and section 5 prescribed the duration of laws passed by virtue of a Proclmnation of Emergency.\n\nIt is seen from section 2(1) (a) of the above British Act that for the first time, the subject of foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oils) was dealt with separately in a constitutional document. The Governor-General in exercise of the extended legislative power granted by the British Act promptly issued within the specicd period the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance\n\n1946 (XVIII of 1946) extending the controls in respect ol' certain essential commodities including foodstuffs beyond the fits! day of October, 1946 and the said Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act No. XXIV of 1946) enacted by the Federal Legislature in November, 1946. Section 2(a) of that Act defined the expression 'essential commodity' as meaning 'foodS'iuffs' and certain other articles mentioned therein.\n\nSection 2(e) defined 'foodstuffs' as 111c1uding edible oil seeds and oils.\n\nThe operation of the said Act was extended by competent legislative acts upto March 31, 1950.\n\nSince by Entries 26 and 27 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the subject of trade and commerce within he State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 ef List III and the subject to production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List JTJ had been assigned to the Svcs :nd Entry 33 of List III only dealt \\\\oth trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of the products of industries where the control of such industries hy the Union was declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, having regard to the then existing conditions, Article 369 was l enacted as a temporary and transitional measure conferring legislative ' power on the Parliament during a; period of five years from the commencement of the Constitution to make 1'aws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List, namely:\n\n(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of, cotton and woollen textiles, raw cotton (including ginned cotton and unginncd cotton or kapoas), cotton seed. paper (including newsprint), foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oil), cattle fodder (including oil-cakes and other concentrates). coal (including coke and derivatives of coal), iron, steel and mica;\n\n11 -l52SCT/81\n\n(b) offonces against Jaws with respect to any of the matters mentioned in clause (a), jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of those matters, and fees in respect of any of those matters but not including fees taken in any court.\n\nIt was provided that any law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the provisions of Article 369 of the Constitution have bee'n competent to make would, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of the period of five years from the co=encement of the Constitution except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof.\n\nIt may be noticed that clause (a) of Article 369 of the Constitution specifically referred to foodstuffs (including oilseeds and oil) and cattle fodder (including oil-cakes and other concentrates).\n\nIly virtue of the power under Article 369, the Parliament extended the life of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 till January 26, 1955. As the subjects referred to in Article 369 of the Constitntion were of national importance and it was thought that it was clesirable that the Parliament should also have concurrent power to make Jaws with respect to them, the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1954 was enacted on February 22, 1955 substituting Entry 33 of List Ill by the following new Entry :\n\n\"33. Trade and co=erce in, and the production, supply and distribution of,-\n\n( a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products;\n\n(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;\n\n(c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;\n\n(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; and\n\n(e) raw jute.\"\n\nIt was pursuant to the new Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution that Parliament enacted the Central Act (i.e. the Essential Commodities Act, 1955).\n\nH It is not disputed by the State Government that if raw cashewnut is foodstuff within the meaning of the Central Act, it cannot be declared as an essential article under the Krala Act.\n\nWhat is, however,\n\n-11 j\n\nK. L. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkataramaiah, /.) 687\n\nurged is that since the Order regulates only procurement and distribution of raw cashewnut as industrial raw material for processing in the factories it is not being dealt with as foodstuff.\n\nHence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act. There are at least two good reasons to reject this contention advanced on behalf of the State Government-first, the language used in section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act and secondly the purpose of the Ce'ntral Act.\n\nSection 2(a) (v) of the Central Act reads : 'foodstuffs. including edible oilseeds and oils'.\n\nIt is a well known rule of interpretation that associated words take their meaning from one another and that is the meaning of the rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis.\n\nWhen 'foodstuffs' are associated with edible oilseeds which have to be processed before the oil in them can be consumed, it is appropriate to interpret 'foodstuffs' in the wider sense as including all articles of food which may be consumed by human beings after processing. It is in this wider sense that the said term has been understood by Indian courts as can be seen from some of the decisions to which we shall presently refer. Secondly, having regard to the history of legislation relating to foodstuffs dealt with above and the object of the Central Act which regulates the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities amongst the poverty stricken Indian people, the expression 'foodstuffs' should be given a wider meaning as including even raw materials which ultimately result in edible articles.\n\nAny interpretation that may be given in this case should not be governed by its consequence on the impugned Order but in the light of the importance of the Central Act in the context of the national economy.\n\nA narrow interpretation may result in the exclusion of several articles from the purview of the Central Act although nobody bas entertained any doubt so far about their being essential commodities.\n\nWe shall now see what cashewnut means.\n\nCasbewnut is an edible t -- seed or nut belonging to the family of anacardiaceae and grows mostly in tropical and sub-tropical regions where humidity is great. It is generally grow'n in the States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in India, in East Africa and in the tropics of Central and South America.\n\nCashewnut is shaped like a kidney or large thick bean. 'It appears as though one of its ends had been forcibly sunk into the calyx end of a fleshy pear-shaped fruit, called the cashew apple which is about three times as large as the nut and of reddish or yellow colour.\n\nThe cashew apple is much used where the tree grows, in beverages, jams and jellies but is unimportant commercially.\n\nThe nut has two walls or shells, the outer of which is smooth and glass-like over the surface thin and somewhat elastic but stout and of olive green\n\ncolour until mature wheb it becomes strawberry roan.\n\nThe inner shell is considerably harder and must be cracked like the shells of other nuts ...... The fruits are picked by hand and the nuts arc first detached. then thorouglLy dried in the sun ...... 13y improved\n\nmthods of roasting, the nuts pass through large n:volving cylinders of sheet iron with perforated sid\". which are made to revolve above well-controlled flames.\n\nThe oil drains into containers below and is salvaged ...... Later, the inner she:ls are broken open by hand Jabour and the kernels given further beating treatment hy which the skins are removed and the kernels made ready for consumption'. (Vide Encyclopaedia Britannica 1962 Edn. Vol. 4, pp. 958-959). It is not disputed that the raw cashewnut with which we arc now con- - cerncd is used by the petitioners for processing in their factories in order to make it fit for human consumption. It is also stated that even the raw cashewnut kernel is eaten by human beings.\n\nIt is well known that the food eaten by human beings consists of cereals like wheat, rice or other coarse grains, pulses, oilseeds, vegetables, sugar, fruits and nuts, animal foodstuffs and sea food like meat. beaf, mutton and fish and dairy products like milk, butter, eggs etc.\n\nAccording to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the word 'food' means 'fodder' also.\n\nOne of the meanings of the word 'food' given in that Dictionary is 'material consisting of carbohydrates, fats, protdns and supplementary substances (as minerals. vitamins) that is taken or absorbed into the body of an organism in order to sustain growth, repair, and all vital processes and to furnish energy for all activity of the orgabism'. In the same Dictionary 'foodstuff' is defined as 'a substance with food valll'~' and 'the raw material of food before or after processing'.\n\nOne of the usages of the said word is given as 'a bountiful crop of cereal foodstuffs'.\n\nTherefore, 'foodstufl' noed not necessarily mean only the final food product which is consumed. It also includes raw food articles which may after processing be us•od as food by huma'n beings.\n\nThe earliest of the Indian cases cited before us on the interpretation of the expression 'foodstuffs' is Shriniwas Panrw/a/ Cliocklwni & Ors. v. The Crawn ( 1). In that case the conviction of the appellant of an offence punishable under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Tem- -porary Powers) Act. 1946 had been challenged.\n\nThe chargo of which the appellant had been found guilty by the judgment under appeal was that he had transported 'bharda' or 'chuni bharda' which was a foodstuff without the required permit.\n\nThe contention of the appellant was that it was just cattle feed which was not fit for human consump-\n\n-~ - ----~-- -- (!) A.T.R. 1951 Nag. 226.\n\ntion and therefore it could not he said that he had violated the !aw on the footing that the material transported was 'tur dal' a foodstuff th~ transport of which alone without a permit was an offence. The said argument was rejected by the Nagpur High Court with the following observations :\n\n\"The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that as the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordimnce, 1946 [XVIII (18 of 1946)] and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 [XXIV ( 24) of 1946], dealt with \"foodstuffs\" and not \"cattle feed\" export c; if chuni, a cattle feed was not prohibited under the Foodgrains Export Restrictions Order, 1943.\n\nThe term \"foodstuff\" has not been defined either in the Ordinance or in the Act. In common parlance, foodstuffs mean \"materials used as food\".\n\nThe term is not used only for material which is immediately fit for human consumption but it also applies to material which can be used as food after subjecti'ng it to processes like grinding, cleaning etc. For instance, paddy as such is not fit for human consumption but rice in it is, and yet paddy is called foodstuff.\n\nSo also tur.\n\nThere is no reason to suppose that the word \"food stuffs\" is not used, in these Jaws, in this usual sense but is used in the restricted sense of material which is fit for human consumption immediately without subjecting it to a'ny process.\n\nIf such a restricted meaning is aco<pted, it would lead to evasion of the law in question by mixing some foreign matter with the stnff that is immediately fit for human consumption.\n\nThe test is not whether it can be immediately used for human consumption but whether it can be so used after subjecting it to the usual processes.\n\nThe uncleand tnr dal (ie. tur dal without separating from it wastage and foreign matter) which was being exported on 26-12-1946 in this case was such a foodstuff and comes within the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance 1946, and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946\". . .\n\nIn the State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah(') this Court was called upon to decide whether 'turmeric' was 'foodstuff' in a rase arising under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powm) Act, 1946.\n\nVi:vian Bose, J. who delivered the judgment after observing :\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R 877.\n\n\"So far as \"food\" is concerned it can be used in a wide as well as a narrow sense and, in my opinion, much must depend upon the context and background. Even in a popular sense, when one asks another, \"Have you had your food\", one means the composite preparations which normally go to constitute meal---curry and rice, sweetmeats, pudding, cooked vegetables and so forth.\n\nOne does not usually think separately of the different preparations which enter into their making of the various condiments and spices and vitamins, any more than one would think of separating in his mind the purely nutritive elements of what is eaten from their nonnutritive adjuncts.\n\nSo also, looked at from another point of view, the various adjuncts of what I may term food proper which enter into its preparation for human consumption in order to make it palatable and nutritive, can hardly be separated from the purely nutritive elements if the effect of their absence would be to render the particular commodity in its finished state unsavoury and indigestible to a whole class of persons whose stomachs are accustomed to a more spicely prepared product\".\n\nheld:\n\n€ \"As we have seen, turmeric falls within the wider definition of 'food' and 'foodstuffs' given in a dictionary of international standing as well as in several English decisions. It is, I think, as much a Hfoodstuff\", in its wider meaning, as sausage skins and baking powder and tea.\n\nIn the face of all that I would find it difficult to hold that an article like F turmeric cannot fall within the wider meaning of the term\n\n\"foodstuffs\".\n\nFollowing the above decision of this Court, the High Court of Calcutt! held in Atulya Kumar De & Ors. v. The Director of Procurement and Supply & Ors.(') that paddy was foodstuff within the meaning of that expression used in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 even though paddy could not be consumed without further processing. The relevant part of the decision runs thus :\n\n\"The first point taken is that the power conferred by the Act (read with the notification) upon the State of West Bengal is only in relation to foodstuffs and that paddy is not foodstuff. It is stated that the description of paddy at \"Rice in\n\n(1) A.LR. 1953 Cal. 548.\n\nthe \"husk\" is a colourable attempt to avoid this difficulty. In-\n\n'The State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah' (AIR 1952 S.C. 335), it was held that turmeric is \"foodstuff\" within the meaning of the Spices (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order 1944\" read with S. 2(a) of the Act. It was held that the term \"foodstuff\" is ambiguous and may have a vide meaning or a narrow one. Whether the term is nsed in a particular Statute in its wider or narrower sense cannot b: answered in the abstract but must be answered with due regard to the background and context. Thus in -'James v.\n\nJones' [ ( 1894) 1 Q.B. 304], baking powder was held to be an article of food while in-'Hinde v. Allmond' (1918) 81 L.J.K.B. 893, it was held that tea was not. Now the act has been passed to control the production and distribution of essential commodities.\n\nWhat can be looked upon more of an essential commodity than both rice and paddy? In West Bengal, the two things most essential for the sustenance of human life are rice and paddy. Mr. Mukherjee admits that rice is an essential commodity & a foodstuff, but he says that paddy is not because nobody can eat paddy. But that is a very narrow view tu take. Paddy is only a stage in the production of rice and the one cannot be food without the other being food as well.\n\nNobody eats the busk in paddy; but nobody eats the skin of mango or the shell of a egg and yet they are unquestionably articles of food.\n\nIn my opinion paddy is 'foodstuff' within the meaning of that expression as used in the Act and the notification.\"\n\nTo the same effect is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nathuni Lal Gupta & Ors. v. The State & Ors.(') in which wheat and\n\nwheat products were held to be foodstuffs. The High Court of Punjab\n\n4. and Haryana in Sujan Singh Matu Ram v. The State of Haryana(2 ) and the High Court of Orissa in Bijoy Kumar Routrai & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors. (8) also lay down the same principle.\n\nIn Tika Ramji & Ors. etc v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(') G this Court observed :\n\n\"The essential commodities therein comprised inter alia food>tuffs which would include sugar as well as sugarcane ----- (!) A.LR. 1964 Cal. 279.\n\n(2) A.IR. 1968 Punjab & Haryana 363.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1976 Orissa 138.\n\n(4) [1956] S.C.R. 393 at 418.\n\nand both sugar and sugarcane therefore came within the jurisdiction of the Centre.\"\n\nThe above observation makes it manifest that even a raw rr.atcria) like sugarcane used in the manufacture of sugar is a 'foodstuff'.\n\nYounus v. Sub-Inspector of Police(') is a case in which the question whether raw cashewnut was foodstuff or not directly arose for\n\nCOl!iideration. The learned Judge who decided the case held :\n\n\"The reasoning adopted for holding that wheat and paddy are foodstuffs applies with equal force in the case of cashewnuts.\n\nThere is no scope for doubt that cashew kernel is an eatable commodity both in its raw form and also when fried.\n\nIt is taken in as part of the food and is also used in the preparation of food. That its kernel should be separated from the shell or outer covering or that it should be processed before use does not make raw cashewnuts any-the-less \"foodstuff.\"\n\n' It is also significant that 'raw cashewnut' is included in the group of edible fruits in Chapter 8 of section II dealing with vegetable products of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.\n\nIt was, however, urged that even though cashewnut was an article which could be eaten, it was an article which was eaten by very few persons on rare occasions and hence it is difficult to conceive cashewnut as an essential co=odity. It is no doubt true that cashewnu1 having become expensive, it is now more of a luxury. Due to export of cashewnut on a large scale, it is a commodity which is in short supply in the country and therefore the price at which it sells is beyond the reach of the common man.\n\nBut nevertheless it is an article of food. It is eaten in raw form and after it is fried. It is also commonly used in various perparations of food like pulav. sweets etc.\n\nThere is no basis for the assertion that it is a rnrc commodity outside the State where it is grown. It is eaten not only in Kera!a but also in other parts of the country. When cashewuut is exported. it is exported as a foodstuff.\n\nNow it cannot be that cashewnut eaten abroad is a foodstuff, and whatever is consumed within the country is not a foodstuff.\n\nIt is therefore, a foodstuff and must be classified as an essential commodity.\n\nIts importance as a foodstuff can also be seen from the statemoots filed in these cases in which it is stated that in the H State of Kerala in the year 1976-77 the total quantity of raw cashewnut procured was in the order of 60,000 tonnes, the number of workers\n\n(t) 1978 K.L.T. 427.\n\n-11\n\nengaged in the cashewnut processing industry was about 1,20,000 and that thrc were 269 cashew factories.\n\nIt was next urged that cashewnut could be treated as an essential article only for the purpose of export and not an essential commodity under the Central Act. This again is not correct. The Central Government can make an Order under the Central Act even when an essential conmmdi.ty is used for industrial purpose or for purposes of export.\n\nEssential commodities do not cease to be essential commodities under the Central Act merely because they are exported after they are processed in India. Foodgrains (Prohibition of Use in Manufacture of Starch) Order, 1971, The Fruit Products Order, 1955, The Gur (Regulation of Use) Order, 1968, Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977, Rice (Prohibition of Use in Wheat Products) Order, 1971. Vegetable Oil (Standards of Quality) Order, 1972, Vegetable Oil Product Producers (Regularion of Refined Oil Manufacture) Order, 1973 and the Essential Commodities (Regulation of Production and Distribution for puriposes\n\nof Export) Order, 1966 demonstrate the diverse purposes for which an Order can be made under the Central Act.\n\nIt was next urged that as long as the Central Government had not passed an order in respect of the same matter, it was open to the Government of Kerala to pass the impugned Order.\n\nReliance was E also placed on the decision of this Court in Tika Ramji's case (supra), in which U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,\n\n1954 was upheld even though sugarcane was an essential commodity under the Central Act.\n\nIn that case this Court was concerned with the question whether there was any repugnancy between a Central Jaw and a State law.\n\nWe are not concerned here with such a question.\n\nF If a question of application of Article 254 of the Constitution had arisen, it would have been open to consider whether there was any. repugnancy at all between the two laws having regard to the scopo and exrent of the field occupied by the Central law and the State Jaw.\n\nBut the real question which now arises for decision in these petitions is whether the Kerala Legislature ever intended to treat any article G which comes within the scope of the Central Act as an essential article. The language of section 2(a) of the Kcrala Act steers clear of all essential commodities under the Ce'ntral Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act.\n\nThe power of the Central Gowrnmcnt to make an order under the Central Act in respect of raw cashewnut which is a foodstuff cannot be doubted. If that is so H the Kerala Act cannot apply to it. The argument that as long as the Central Government had not made an Order in respect of raw cashewnut, the Kerala Government can pass an Order is not available in the , circumstances by reason of the definition of the 'essential article' in the Kerala Act. It might have been open to consideration if the said definition had not contained the words in the parenthesis.\n\nOn a careful consideration of the matter, we are satisfied that raw casheWnut is a foodstuff failing under section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act and hence cannot be declared as an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kerala Act. It follows that no Order can be made by the Government of Kerala under section 3 thereof in respect of raw cashewnut.\n\nThe action of the Kerala Government is beyond the power conferred on it hy the Kerala Legislature.\n\nIn the result, we hold that the declaration made by the Govern- 1ncnt or J(c-raJa to the effect that raw cashcwnut is an essential article under the Kerala Act and the impugned Order made thereunder are liable to be uashcd and they are accordingly quashed.\n\nAll the other contentions including those relating to the alleged infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners raised m these petitions are left open.\n\nBefore concluding, we propose to advert to the last submi'8ion made before us on behalf of the State Government. It was submitted that the rashcwnut industry in Kcrala was _a labour-oriented industry and if the declaration and the Order were struck down, a number of workmen would be adversely affected.\n\nIt was also snbmitted that the entire economy of the State of Kerala which largely depended on the export trndc in cashcwnuts would be d'srurted. If any such serious problem arises, it can always be set right by the competent Legislature or the appropriate Government taking needful remedial action in the light of Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nThe petitions are accord; ngly allowed.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, there shall he no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetitions allowed.", "total_entities": 145, "entities": [{"text": "K. JANARDHAN PILLAI & ANR. ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. JANARDHAN PILLAI & ANR. ETC. 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cashewnut was an essential article, in exercise of the\n\npower under clause (a) of section 2 of ti>~ Kerala Essential Articles F.\n\nControl (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Act 3 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Kerala Act') and the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') made by the State Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Kerala Act regulating the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnnts grown in the State of G KeraJa."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8874, "end_char": 8880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVF.NKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nThe common question which arise for coosideration in the above writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India relates to the validity of the declaration made by the State Government of orala on March 20, 1976 dec:aring that raw cashewnut was an essential article, in exercise of the\n\npower under clause (a) of section 2 of ti>~ Kerala Essential Articles F.\n\nControl (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Act 3 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Kerala Act') and the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') made by the State Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Kerala Act regulating the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnnts grown in the State of G KeraJa."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8920, "end_char": 8929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "G KeraJa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9032, "end_char": 9040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVF.NKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nThe common question which arise for coosideration in the above writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India relates to the validity of the declaration made by the State Government of orala on March 20, 1976 dec:aring that raw cashewnut was an essential article, in exercise of the\n\npower under clause (a) of section 2 of ti>~ Kerala Essential Articles F.\n\nControl (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Act 3 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Kerala Act') and the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') made by the State Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Kerala Act regulating the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnnts grown in the State of G KeraJa."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11065, "end_char": 11074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11824, "end_char": 11855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11932, "end_char": 11942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although it makes provision for -G conferring power on the State Government to make appropriate <>rders regarding regulation of production, supply and distribution of essential articles substantially on the lines on which the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) (hereinafter derrcd to as 'the Central Act') passed by the Parliament provides for the regulation of production, supp:y and distribution of essential commodities as defined Jf in the Oontral Act, the Kerala Act does not itself specify any article as an essential article."}}, {"text": "Jf in the Oontral Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12046, "end_char": 12067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12199, "end_char": 12208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jf in the Oontral Act", "statute": "Jf in the Oontral Act"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12415, "end_char": 12446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12865, "end_char": 12874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above defihition it is clear lhat the State Government can declare as an essential article under the Kerala Act", "statute": "From the above defihition it is clear lhat the State Government can declare as an essential article under the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13213, "end_char": 13222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above defihition it is clear lhat the State Government can declare as an essential article under the Kerala Act", "statute": "From the above defihition it is clear lhat the State Government can declare as an essential article under the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "Kerala Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the object of the Kerala Act is only to provide for regulation of production, supp:y and distribution of a'n article which is not an essential commodity as defined under the Central Act is also clear from what is stated by the Kerala Government in lhe letter dated December 5, 1961 addressed by the Law Secretary, Government of Kerala to the Oentral Government seeking the assent of lhe President to the Bill passed by the Kerala Legislature."}}, {"text": "Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14110, "end_char": 14191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949, as amended by the Kerala Acts 24 of 1958 and 3 of 1959, was in force in the Kerala State till 25-1-1960 when it expired by efflux of time."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14337, "end_char": 14368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15313, "end_char": 15344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15559, "end_char": 15584, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Articles 301 and 304(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16108, "end_char": 16131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16384, "end_char": 16395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Commerce and Industry", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16421, "end_char": 16454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the previous sanction of the President for the introduction of the Bill in the State Legislature has been obtained as required by the proviso to article 304 (b) in the letter of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry referred to as third paper above\"."}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16790, "end_char": 16802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17182, "end_char": 17194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18032, "end_char": 18061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18099, "end_char": 18115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18918, "end_char": 18929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18938, "end_char": 18967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19485, "end_char": 19498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Proclamation of Emergency was revoked on April 1, 1946."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19642, "end_char": 19660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently all laws made by the Federal Legislature on the subjects in the Provincial List were to cease to have effect after the expiry of September 30, 1946."}}, {"text": "March 26, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20214, "end_char": 20228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since it was felt that the Federal Legislature should continue to have power to make Jaws on the subject of production, supply and distribution of certain essential commodities, on March 26, 1946 the British Parliament passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo."}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20233, "end_char": 20251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since it was felt that the Federal Legislature should continue to have power to make Jaws on the subject of production, supply and distribution of certain essential commodities, on March 26, 1946 the British Parliament passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo."}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20387, "end_char": 20398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20406, "end_char": 20435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20559, "end_char": 20620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21696, "end_char": 21705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21804, "end_char": 21816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22509, "end_char": 22521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22651, "end_char": 22663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22805, "end_char": 22819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The operation of the said Act was extended by competent legislative acts upto March 31, 1950."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22867, "end_char": 22883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23459, "end_char": 23470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24316, "end_char": 24329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "coal (including coke and derivatives of coal), iron, steel and mica;\n\n11 -l52SCT/81\n\n(b) offonces against Jaws with respect to any of the matters mentioned in clause (a), jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of those matters, and fees in respect of any of those matters but not including fees taken in any court."}}, {"text": "Article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24557, "end_char": 24568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24890, "end_char": 24901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25082, "end_char": 25093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 26, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25188, "end_char": 25204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ily virtue of the power under Article 369, the Parliament extended the life of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 till January 26, 1955."}}, {"text": "Article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25237, "end_char": 25248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 22, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25488, "end_char": 25505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the subjects referred to in Article 369 of the Constitntion were of national importance and it was thought that it was clesirable that the Parliament should also have concurrent power to make Jaws with respect to them, the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1954 was enacted on February 22, 1955 substituting Entry 33 of List Ill by the following new Entry :\n\n\"33."}}, {"text": "List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution that Parliament enacted the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26094, "end_char": 26186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26197, "end_char": 26228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26685, "end_char": 26763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26898, "end_char": 26910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act", "statute": "Hence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26981, "end_char": 26993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act", "statute": "Hence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28738, "end_char": 28747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is generally grow'n in the States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in India, in East Africa and in the tropics of Central and South America."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28752, "end_char": 28762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is generally grow'n in the States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in India, in East Africa and in the tropics of Central and South America."}}, {"text": "East Africa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28777, "end_char": 28788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is generally grow'n in the States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in India, in East Africa and in the tropics of Central and South America."}}, {"text": "Central and South America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28811, "end_char": 28836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is generally grow'n in the States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in India, in East Africa and in the tropics of Central and South America."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31757, "end_char": 31766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32425, "end_char": 32442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said argument was rejected by the Nagpur High Court with the following observations :\n\n\"The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that as the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordimnce, 1946 [XVIII (18 of 1946)] and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 [XXIV ( 24) of 1946], dealt with \"foodstuffs\" and not \"cattle feed\" export c; if chuni, a cattle feed was not prohibited under the Foodgrains Export Restrictions Order, 1943."}}, {"text": "26-12-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34024, "end_char": 34034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tur dal without separating from it wastage and foreign matter) which was being exported on 26-12-1946 in this case was such a foodstuff and comes within the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance 1946, and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946\". . ."}}, {"text": "vian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34430, "end_char": 34439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vi:vian Bose, J. who delivered the judgment after observing :\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R 877."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36145, "end_char": 36166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the above decision of this Court, the High Court of Calcutt!"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36589, "end_char": 36609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant part of the decision runs thus :\n\n\"The first point taken is that the power conferred by the Act (read with the notification) upon the State of West Bengal is only in relation to foodstuffs and that paddy is not foodstuff."}}, {"text": "S. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37023, "end_char": 37030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37684, "end_char": 37695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In West Bengal, the two things most essential for the sustenance of human life are rice and paddy."}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37784, "end_char": 37793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mukherjee admits that rice is an essential commodity & a foodstuff, but he says that paddy is not because nobody can eat paddy."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38362, "end_char": 38381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nathuni Lal Gupta & Ors."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38500, "end_char": 38520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Punjab\n\n4."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38597, "end_char": 38617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Haryana in Sujan Singh Matu Ram v. The State of Haryana(2 ) and the High Court of Orissa in Bijoy Kumar Routrai & Ors."}}, {"text": "II dealing with vegetable products of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40057, "end_char": 40145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Essential commodities do not cease to be essential commodities under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42002, "end_char": 42086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order can be made under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42717, "end_char": 42756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42890, "end_char": 42910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next urged that as long as the Central Government had not passed an order in respect of the same matter, it was open to the Government of Kerala to pass the impugned Order."}}, {"text": "Tika Ramji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43000, "end_char": 43010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was E also placed on the decision of this Court in Tika Ramji's case (supra), in which U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,\n\n1954 was upheld even though sugarcane was an essential commodity under the Central Act."}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43051, "end_char": 43090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43394, "end_char": 43405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,\n\n1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,\n\n1954"}}, {"text": "Kerala Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43721, "end_char": 43739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the real question which now arises for decision in these petitions is whether the Kerala Legislature ever intended to treat any article G which comes within the scope of the Central Act as an essential article."}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43866, "end_char": 43878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,\n\n1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,\n\n1954"}}, {"text": "Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43958, "end_char": 44016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Gowrnmcnt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44036, "end_char": 44053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The power of the Central Gowrnmcnt to make an order under the Central Act in respect of raw cashewnut which is a foodstuff cannot be doubted."}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44689, "end_char": 44701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act", "statute": "Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44784, "end_char": 44796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act", "statute": "Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44887, "end_char": 44896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act", "statute": "Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act"}}, {"text": "Ja to the effect that raw cashcwnut is an essential article under the Kerala Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45114, "end_char": 45194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kcrala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45619, "end_char": 45625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was submitted that the rashcwnut industry in Kcrala was _a labour-oriented industry and if the declaration and the Order were struck down, a number of workmen would be adversely affected."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46106, "end_char": 46122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ja to the effect that raw cashcwnut is an essential article under the Kerala Act", "statute": "Ja to the effect that raw cashcwnut is an essential article under the Kerala Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_695_711_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA v.\n\nHEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR.\n\nJanuary 27, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nCode of Crimina: Procedure 1973, S. 195(1)(b)(i) & Indian Penal Code 1860, S.1. 467, 193 and 114-Suit for reden1p1io11 of 1nortgage-Conspiracy by accused to deprive con1plai11ant of land-Safe deed forged-Prosecution without lvrittcn con1plaint of Court-Maintainability.\n\nSection 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 provides that no court sha.11 take cognizance of any offence punishable under any of the sections enumerated therein (one of v ... hich is S. 193 J.P.C.) when such offence is allL'ged to haie been conunifled i11, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, except upon a written co1nplaint from a Court.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that both the respondents conspired to cheat the complainant and to deprive him fabricating a sale deed.\n\nalong\\\\'ith of certain two others lands by\n\nThe complainants' paternal grand-uncle mortgaged certain lands with possession to the father of respondent No. 1 for a period of 20 years with the condition that possession would be surrendered. to the owner after the expiry of\n\nth~ period. The father of the complainant executed a will bequeathing the\n\naforesaid lands to hinl. The period of 20 years having expired the complainant E requested respondent No. 1 to surrender possession. Respondent No. 1 having failed to deliver possession, the compla.inant filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage.\n\nSubsequent to the institution of the suit the complainant came to know that respondent No. 1 had purchased the lands in question from respondent No. 2 who had impersonated the real ov..ner, i.e. wife of the complainJnt's paternal grand-uncle.\n\nOn inquiries made in the office of the Sub-Registrar, the complainant learnt that the sale deed had been registered on 10-11-1970. After F obtaining a registration copy of the sale deed and ascertaining that respondent No. 2 had no property of her own, the complainant filed a criminal complaint in the Court.\n\nAfter investigation, the Sub-Inspector of police filed a chargesbeet against both the respondents a.nd two others for having commiUed offences under sections 120B, 193, 465. 468 and 420 read with section 114 I.P.C. The Sessions Court to which only the respondents were committed, convicted respondent No. l under section 467 read with section 114 and section G 193 I.P.C. and respondent No. 2 under section 467 I.P.C. and sentenced them to imprisonment and fine.\n\nIn the appeals. against their conviction and sentence. the High Court found that respondent No. 1 was guilty nnder section 467 read with section 114 and section 193 J.P.C., but acquitted him on the ground that the complaint in the crjminal case which ended in the conviction of both the respondents Vi'aS filed by a private individual i.e. the complainant and not by a Civil Court. As regards respondent ~Na. 2 it found her to be guilty under section 467 l.P.C. but finding that she forged the document independently of respondent No. 1 and\n\nA being an illiterate \\\\'Oman who haJ n1ercly put her thumb impression on the docun1ent to admit its execution hct'ore the Subi-Registrar modified the ,_entcncc awarded to her,\n\nIn the appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD:\n\n1 (i) The High Court was not right in law in holding that the complaint was totally not maintainable against respondent No. l in view of the provisions of S. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and in not only acquit ting him of the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. but also in finding that he has comn1itted an offence punisbabJe under section J 93 l.P.C. [7.lOH]\n\n1 (ii) The High Court was justified in coming to rhe conclusion on the evi dence that respondent No. 1 was guilty under section 467 read with section 114 I.P.C. and that respondent No. was guilty under section 467 l.P.C. [711AJ\n\nl(iii) 'fhe conviction of respondent No. l under section 467 read with section 114 I.P.C. and of respondent No. 2 of 467 I.P.C. are confirmed.\n\n[711B]\n\n2. S. 195 ( 1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the offence under s. 193 LP .C. should be alleged to have been committed in or in relation to, any proceeding in any court.\n\nSince the forged sate deed was not produced in evidence in any stage of the redemption suit, s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted.\n\nTherefore, the Magistrate who committed the accused to the Se'. sions. ccukl not n1ve taken cognizance of any\n\noffence under s. 193 I.P, C. so far as respondent No. 1 is concerned. The complaint could have been taken on file only for an offence punishable under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. so far as that accused is concer, ned. No complaint by the court for prosecuting respondent No. 1 for offence under s. 467 read with s. 114 l.P.C. is therefore required and he could be validly convicted for that offence on the complaint given by the private individual.\n\n[701E-GJ\n\n3. The Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition cont.'lined ins. 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when committed by a party .to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party.\n\n[708HJ\n\n4. In cases, v;'here in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a Court is necessary under section 195(1)(b) of the- Code of Criminal Procedure, and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not rossible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in\n\ns. 195 ( 1) (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.\n\n[702G]\n\nJn the instant case the document forged by Respondent No. 2 was the sale deed d<lted 10-11-70. The suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the complainant P.W. 3 on 24-11-70.\n\nHe filed the complaint before the police on 24-11-70 and before the court subsequently on 15-12-70. The forged sale deed dated 10-11~70 was not produced in the suit filed by the complainant for redemption of the rnortgage. r703A]\n\nKARNATAKA v. JJEMAREDD\\ ( Varadarajan, J.) 697\n\n:S. The offence of abietn1ent of forgery \\\\as complete when the forged sale . .\\ deed dated 10-11-70 was registered. But no offence under s. 195( I )(b) of Cr.\n\nP.C. \\Vas committed as the forged sale deed was not at aH put in evidence at any stage in the redemption suit filed by the complainant. [7108]\n\nlr1 Re. V V, L. l\\,, arasi111/u1111urthy, [1955] A.J.R. Madras 21 approved.\n\nVasudeo Ra111clu111dra Joshi [1923] A.l.R. Bombay 105 disapproved.\n\nIn re. J:lian.l:'ruo Yc1hwa11t (1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 362 & Mahadev Yadne.shwar Joshi (1912) 14 Bombay Law 'Report 715 distinguished.\n\n(Jirija IVandini Devi v. Bigendra l\\'andini Choudry [1967j I\n\nS.C.R. 93 & Patel Laljib/iai Son:abhai v. Thi' State of Gujarat (1971] Supr.\n\nS.C.R. 834\n\n1 eferred to.\n\nCRl~!INAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n(f 1975.\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 341\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-4-1974 of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 324 and 335 of 1973.\n\nN. Ncttar, and R. C. Kaushik for the Appellant.\n\nP. R\"m Reddy and A. V. V. Nair for Respondent No. I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deli<ered by\n\nV AR'.IJ.\\1:1..IAN, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave has been filed by\n\nthe State of Karnataka against the judgment of a Division Bencl1 of the E Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 324 and 335 of 1973 against the acquittal of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy (A-l) in Cr!. A. No. 324 of 1973 and against the order in Cr!. A. No. 335 of 1973 modifying the sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge, Raichur to Pyatal Bhimakka ( A-2) in Sessions Case No. 25/72. The learned Sessions Judge convicted Hemareddy alias Vernareddy under F s. 467 read with s. 114 and s. 193 Indian Penal Colic and sentenced him to undergo R.l. for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, and in default to undergo R. I. for three months under s. 467 read with s. 114 and to undergo R.I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.\n\n200/- and in default to undergo R.l. for one month for the offence under s. 193 1.P.C. He convicted Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2), the appel !ant in Cr!. A No. 335 of 1973 before the High Court, under s. 467\n\nI.P.C. and sentenced her to undergo R. I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default to undergo R.I. fur one month. Both\n\nthe accused filed appeals before the High Court against their convictions and sentences awarded to them by the learned Sessions Judge.\n\nIn Cr!. A. No. 324 of 1973 filed bv Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, the learned Judges held that on the facts there could be no doubt\n\nA that he is guilty under s. 467 read withs. 114 ands. 193 1.P.C. In the appeal filed by Pyatal Bhimakka, Crl. A. No. 335173, also the learned Judges found that there could be no doubt that she is guilty under s.\n\n467 I.P.C.\n\nThey confirmed the conviction of Pyatal Bhimakka, observing that she forged the document independently of Hemareddy alias Vemaredd y but taking into consideration the fact that Pyatal Bhimakka is an illiterate women who had been taken to the Office of the Sub- Registrar by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy and asked to put her thumb impression to the document and to admit execution of the document, which she did, for which Hemareddy alias Vemareddy paid her a sum of Rs. 1001-, the learned Judges felt that the sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka by the learned Sessions Judge was harsh and that the ends of justice would be met by sentencing her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one day, which she had already undergone before she was probably released on bail, and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 /- and in default to suffer RI. for a perrod of one week and thus modified the sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka accordingly. The State has filed the appeal by special leave also against this order modifying the sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court, however, acquitted Hemareddy alias Vemarcddy, the appellant in Crl. A. No. 324 of 1973 and set aside the .sentence awarded to him by the learned Sessions E Judge on the ground that the complaint in the criminal case which ended in the conviction of both accused in the Sessions Court, was fll\"d by the private individual Narsappa Eliger, P.W. 3 and not by the Civil Court. As stated earlier the Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State against the acquittal of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy by the F High Court.\n\nIt is 'necessary to set out briefly the facts of the case. One Narsappa is the son of one Thimmaiah who had an elder brother Nagappa Thimmaiah and Nagappa were the sons of one Thayappa. Nagappa's wife was one Bhimakka alias Bhieamma.\n\nThimaiah and Nagappa G lived for sometime in Underaldoddi. Nagappa purchased lands bearing Survey Nos. 93, 94 and 96 in Underaldoddi.\n\nThose lands were in the possession and enjoyment of Narsappa's father Thimmaiah.\n\nSubsequently, Nagappa and his wife left Underaldoddi and settled down in Alkur village.\n\nWhile Nagappa was living in Alkur village, he mortgag~ the aforesaid lands with possession to one Kurbar H Bhimayya, the father of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, A-1. According to the terms of the mortgage, Kurbar Bhimayya was to be in possession of the lands for twenty years and surrender possession thereof to the\n\nowner after the expiry of the period. Subsequently, Nagappa and his A wife as well as Nagappa's brother Thimmaiah came and settled down at Raichur. Bhimakka alias Bhisamma, the wife of Nagappa, died in •. or about 1953 and Nagappa died two or three years later. Nagappa's brother also died leaving behind him his son Narsappa as the only heir in the family, Meanwhile Kurbar Bhimayya, the mortgagee and father of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy (A-1) died.\n\nHemareddy alias B Vemareddy continued in possession of the lands.\n\nNarsappa, son ol Nagappa's brother Thimmaiah executed a will in favour of the complainant Narsappa Eliger, bequeathing the aforc,1id lands to him.\n\nNarsappa Eliger, the legatee under the will of Thimmaiah's son Narsappa, approached Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, the son of the mortgagee Kurbar Bhimayya, who was in possession of the lands and requested him to surrender possession of the lands on the ground that c\n\nthe period of twenty years had expired. Then Hemareddy alias Vemareddy informed the complainant Narsappa Eliger that he would consider his request a few days later as it was harvesting time.\n\nFinding that there was no response from Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, Narsappa Eliger wrote a letter, for which, according to the prosecution, Hemareddy alias Vemareddy sent the reply, Ex.\n\nP-3.\n\nSubsequently, Narsappa Eliger filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage. Subsequent tu the institution of the suit, Narsappa Eliger came to know from Shivareddy (P.W. 12) that Hemareddy alias Vemareddy has purchased the lands in quest; on from Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2) ana another and that A-2 had impersonated the real owner Bhimakka, wife of Nagappa,\n\nwho, as stated earlier, had died in or about 1953.\n\nThereupon, Narsappa Eliger made inquiries in the Office of the concerne<l Sub-- Registrar and learned that the sale deed had been registered on 10-11-\n\n1970. After obtaining a registration copy of the sale deed and after making inqmries at Alkur Narsappa Eliger learnt that Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2) had no properties of her own, Narsappa Eliger thereafter filed a criminal complaint in the Court, which was referred to the Police.\n\nAfter investigation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 21 filed a charge-sheet against both the accused and two others alleging that they had conspired to cheat N arsappa Eliger and to deprive him of the lands and that in pursuance of that conspiracy they put forward Pyatal Bhimakka as Nagappa's wife Bhimakka and got the sale deed executed by her and they thereby committe<l offences under ss. 120B,\n\n193, 465, 467, 468 and 420 read with s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOnly Hemareddy alias Vemareddy and Pyatal Bhimakka, A-1 and A-2 were ccmmittcd to the Court of Sessions at Raichur, and they were found guilty and convicted and sentenced as mentioned above.\n\nWe were taken through the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court.\n\nWe are satisfied that the learned Judges were justified\n\nA in coming to the conclusion on the evidence that Hemarcddy alias Yemareddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 144 J.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka i• guilty under s. 467 J.P.C.\n\nSince we agree with the learned Judges of the High Court on the question of fact in so far as it relates to A-2 in full and as regards Hcmareddy alias Vcmaredd) (A-2) in respect of his co'nviction under s. 467 read with s. 114, it is unnecessary for us to refer to the evidence relied upon by the learned Judges for coming to the conclusion that Hemareddy alias Vcmarcddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 1.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka is guilty under s. 467 l.P.C. This Court has obserwd in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bige1uira Nandini Choudry(') that it is not the duty ot the appellate court when it ngrees with the view of the trial court 011 the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.\n\nWe shall deal with the case of the prosecutiop against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy under s. 193 J.P.C. separately.\n\nWe, therefore, confirm the conviction of Hemareddy alias Yemareddy under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. and of Pyatal Bhimakka u'ndcr s. 467 I.P.C.\n\nWe are of the opinion that no interference with the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court in regard to the sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka is called for having rcg:Jrd to the fact that the learned Judges have given sufficient reasons for taking a lenient view in regard to that accused on the question of sentence.\n\nWe, therefore, dismiss the Criminal Appeal in so far as it relates to the question of .sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhim\"kka.\n\nIt is seen from the judgment under appeal that the learned Public Prosecutor of Karnataka had contended before the learned Judges of the High Court that the rose against Hemarcddy alias Vemareddy for fabricating false evidence may not be maintainable in view of the provisions of s. 195 (l )(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that be may be prosecuted for abetting the offence of forgery and that the conviction of that accused under s. 467 read with s. I J 4 I.P.C. is justified o•n the facts of this case for while s. 193 I.P.C. is one of the sections mentioned in s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 467 J.P.C. is not mentioned in that <ub-clause of s. 195(1).\n\nThe learned Judges rejected that submission, relying upon three decisions of the Madras High Court in Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Ayyar('), Ramnappa Reddy v. Emperor(') and in re. V.V.l,, Narasimhamurthy(').\n\nIn the first of those ca>es the complainant stated\n\n(1) lt967] I SC R 93.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1929 Madras 21.\n\n(3) A.LR. 19J2 Madras 253.\n\n(4) A.LR. 1955 Madras 217\n\n- J\n\nthat certain persons conspiTed with others and forged a document with the object of using it in evidence in certain proceedings pending in a court and other proceedings which might follow. That document was actually used in the proceedings pending before a court, and it has been held that the offence complained of fell under s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the complaint cannot be taken cognizance of unless it was in writing and by the court in which the offence was alleged to have been committed. It has\n\nbeen observed in that decision that to hold in such a case that although a private person was barred from prosecuting the accused for fabricating false evidence, he would still be at liberty to prosecute him for fraud would result in the provisions of s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure being evaded and that it is not open to the court to try the accused either for fabricating evidence or for fraud because\n\nthe specific offence of fabricating false evidence should be given preference over the more general offence of forgery. In the second case the complaint was filed by a private person alleging that the accused had fabricated a promissory note and induced a third party to file a suit against the complainant so as to obtain a fraudulent decree, and it has been held that the allegation made in the complaint attracted the provisions of s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procednre and the Conrt must refuse to take cognizance.\n\nIn the third case, Som&<lundaram, J. has observed : ·\n\n\"The main point on which Mr. Jayarama Aiyar appear- E ing for the petitioner seeks to quash this commital is that on the facts an offence under s. 193 I.P.C. ls disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under s. 195(1) (b) Criminal P.C. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under s. 193 F I.P.C. is revealed- Section 193 reads as follows : \"Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine.\"\n\n\"Fabrication of false evidence\" is defined in s. 192. The relevant part of it is :\n\n\"Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that such circumstance may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the\n\n12-152SCI/81\n\nevidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said \"to\n\nfabricate false evidence.\"\n\nThe effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into existence intending that such will my cause the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, therefore, ill the complaint will undoubtedly fall under s. 192, l.P.C. It will, therefore, amount to an offonce under s. 193, l.P.C., i.e. fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed wiill also amount to an offence under ss. 467 and 4 71 l.P.C. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence under ss. 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not be necessary as under s. 195(1)(c), Criminal P.C. a complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any proceeding in any court.\n\nMr. Jayarama Aiyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the minor gir~ is still a party to the proceeding.\n\nBut it is unnecessary to go into the question at the present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be disposed of on the other point, viz., that when the allegations amount to an offence under s. 193, I.P.C., a complaint of court is necessary under s. 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C. and this cannot be evaded by prosecuting the accused for an offence for which a complaint of court is not necessary.\n\nWe agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence -~ for which no complaint by a court is necessary under s. 195 (1 )(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in s. 195(J)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.\n\nHowever, it is not possible to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the complaint in this case given by the private individual Narsappa Eliger, P.W. 3 against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy for the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. is not cognizable and\n\nthat s. 195 ( 1 )(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code is attracted so far as Hemareddy alias Vemareddy is concerned. The document forged by Pyatal Bhimakka, A-2 is a sale deed dated 10-11-70. The suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the complainant Narsappa Eliger, P.W. 3 on 17-11-70. He filed the complaint before the Police on 24-11-70 and before the court subsequently on 15-12-70. It is not disputed that the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was not produced in the suit filed by the complainant for redemption of the mortgage.\n\nMr. P. Ram Reddy, learned counsel appearing for A-1, who assisted the court as Amicus Curiae for Pyatal Bhimakka , A-2, invited our attention to the decision in re. Vasudeo Ramchandra Joshi(') and submitted that the complaint should have been filed by the court in which the suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the complainant Narsappa Eliger in view of the provisions of s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that as the complaint was filed directly by the private individual, the prosecution of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy for offences under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. and s. 193 I.P.C. is bad. In that decision reference has been made to the decisions of the Bombay High Court in (1912) 14 Bombay Law Reporter 362 and 715. In that case there was a proceeding before the Magistrate at Bhusaval against one Vana Khusal in respect of the charge under s. 401 I.P.C. An application was made for bail on behalf of that person by Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, the petitioner before the High Court, but that application was refused on April 1, 1922.\n\nThe statements of three witnes§.es were recorded under s. 164, Criminal Procedure Code on April 18, 1922 from which it appeared that on April 10, 1922 those three witnesses had an interview with the Pleader Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi and he had instigated them to give false evidence.\n\nOn April 15, 1922 another case against Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi in respect of a dacoity was sent up to the Magistrate.\n\nThe case of the prosecution was that in connection with that case of\n\n~ . . dacoity the alleged instigation by the Pleader to give false evidence was\n\nmade. Those witnesses were examined before the Magistrate on June 2, 1922 in the dacoity case, and on June 7, 1922 a complaint was filed by the Police against Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, charging him with having abetted the giving of false evidence. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court who heard the Civil Revision Case have observed:\n\n\"On behalf of the Crown it is urged that no sanction is necessary because at the date of alleged abetment no proceeding in relation to which the offence is said to have been committed, was pending.\n\nIt is contended that the offence\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1923 Bombay 105.\n\nhad no relation to the proceedings pending on April 10 and that the proceedings to which it related, were sent up to the Magistrate on April 19 and were not pending at the time.\n\nIt is quite clear, however, from the very nature of the offence alleged against the present petitioner that if the offence. was committed, it was committed in relation to the proceeding in which those three persons were to be examined as witnesses, and it is difficult to understand how it could be said that the present proceedings against the petitioner could go on without the sanction of the Court before which these proceedings are pending at present, and in relation to \\Vhich the offence is said to have been committed. I assume, without deciding that the offence alleged against the petitioner related to the Budhgaon dacoity case and not to the case under s. 401, Indian Penal Code, then actually pending even then the offence related to proceedings which were clearly under contemplation then and which were sent up to the Magistrate on April\n\n15. The expression used in s. 195 ( 1) (b) is wide enough to cover such a proceeding and the decisions of this Court in re Khanderao (1912) 14 Bombay L.R. 362 and in re Mahadev Yadneshwar (1912) 14 Bombay L.W. 715, support that conclusion.\n\nI am unable to follow the reasoning adopted by the learned Magistrate in holding that no sanction is necessary. We, therefore, quash the present proceedings, without prejudice to any proceeding that may be taken after obtaining the necessary sanction.\n\nI may also point out that the prosecution of a pleader defending an accused person while that proceeding is pending, and before the evidence of the witnesses who are said to have been instigated to give false evidence has been appreciated by the Court, is inadvisable. If such a prosecution is to be started it ought to be started after the principal proceeding, in relation to which the offence is said to have ben committed, has terminated.\"\n\nWe are of the opinion that it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judges expressed in that case that even when the offence of instigating the witnesses to give false evidence was committed in relation to a proceeding which was not actually pending in the court but was only under contemplation the provisions of s. 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted.\n\n~· ...\n\nThe decisions in 1912 (14) Bombay Law Report 362 and 715 would not apply to the facts of the present case for whereas in those cases the false evidence hap been actually put in evidence in the present case, as already stated, the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was not at all tendered by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in the redemption suit filed by the complainant NarsapP'a Eliger on 17-11-70 at any stage of the proceedings in that suit. In the first of these two decisions-re.\n\nKhanderao Yeshwant(') the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, a Policeman, was present in a village Dhanchi on 20-2-1911 in relation to work about census and on that day a panchnama was filed in that village in regard to an offence alleged to have been committed by a certain Talukdar under the Arms Act.\n\nThe investigation into the alleged offence was not made by the petitioner Police constable but by the village constable Shamserkhan who sent up the case to the Sub-\n\nInspector by whom in turn it was committed to a Magistrate. In the course of trying the alleged offence the Magistrate found that certain rccitah in the panchnama were false.\n\nThe Talukdar was discharged as the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the charge imputed to him was false. In that view he issued a notice to the village constable Shamserkhan as to why sanction for prosecution should not be granted under s. 195 Cr!. P.C.\n\nAfter hearing Shamserkhari the Magistrate issued notice against the Police Constable and on 8-9-1911 directed the prosecution of the Police Constable under s. 211 I.P.C. Thus it is seen that the panchnama containing false recitals prepared by the Police Constable was actually used in a criminal proceeding against the Talukdar who had been implicated as a culprit in the panchnama.\n\nIn the second case re Mahadev Yadneshwar Joshi('), Mahadev and five others were being prosecuted for offences under s. 193 read with s. 109 I.P.C.-in that they were alleged to have abetted the making of a false statement during the police investigation in a theft case. The theft case was subsequently tried by a Magistrate who convicted the accused. The appeal filed against the conviction by the Magistrate was unsuccessful. During the trial the accused raised an objection that before they could be prosecuted, sanction of the competent Court should have been obtained.\n\nTh~ Magistrate over-ruled the objection.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that sanction was necessary and that the offences cannot be tried in the absence of a complaint by a. court before which the evidence, which is now said to be fabricated. was adduced. In that case also the fabricated evidence had been actualh used in a criminal proceeding and s. 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Cri,;, inal Procedure was therefore attracted. But in the present case. as lated ear; ier, the fabricated sale deed dated I 0-11-70 had not\n\n(I) (1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 362\n\n(2)\n\n(1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 715\n\nA been put in evidence at any stage of the suit for redemption filed by the complainant Narsappa Eliger in the Civil Court on 17-11-1970.\n\nMr. N. Nettar, appearing for the State, invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat.(') In that case the appellant before this Court had filed a suit for recovery of a certain amount on the basi's of a forged cheque. A private complaint was filed in the Court of a Judicial Magistrate against the appellant and another person under ss. 467 and 471 I.P.C. The Magistrate prima facie found on the evidence that the appellant had fraudulently used in the Civil Court a forged document and he committed the appellant to Sessions for trial.\n\nThe appellant raised an objection that under s. 195 (l)'(c) of the Code of Criminal Procednre no cognizance of the offence could be taken on a private complaint.\n\nThe High Court upheld the committal order. But this Court held ou the scope and effect of s. 195 (1) (c) and its applicability to cases where a forged document had been produced as evidence in a judicial proceedings by a party thereto and the prosecution of that party sought for offences under ss. 467 and 471 I.P.C. that the words \"to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court\" according to s. 195 (!) (c) mean that the offence should be alleged to have been committed by the party to' the proceeding in his character as such party, that is, after having become a party to the proceeding. This Court has observed:\n\n\"We are directly concerned only with cl. (c) of s. 195(1).\n\nWhat is particularly worth noting in this clause is (i) the allegation of commission of an offence in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a court; and (ii) the commission of such offence by a party to such proceeding. The use of the words \"in respect of\" in the first ingredient would seem to some extent to enlarge the scope of this clause. Judicial opinion, however, differs on the effect and meaning of the words \"to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court\". As cl. (b) of s. 195(1) does not speak of offence, committed by a party to the proceeding, while considering decisions on that clause this distinction deserves to be borne i'n mind.\n\nBroadly speaking two divergent views have been expressed in deciaed cases in this connection.\n\nAccording to one view, to attract the prohibition contained in cl. ( c) the offence should be alleged to have been committed by the party to the proceeding in his character as such party, which means after having\n\n(I) [1971J Suppl. S.C.R. 834\n\nI •\n\nbecome a party to the proceeding, whereas according to the other view the alleged offence may have been committed by / the accused even prior to his becoming a party to the proceeding provided that the document in question is produced or given in evidence in such proceeding.\n\nThe language used seems to us to be capable of either meaning without straining it.\n\nWe have therefore, to see which of the two alternative constructions is to be preferred as being more in accord with the legislative intent, keeping in view the statutory scheme and the purpose and object of enacting the prohibition contained ins. 195(1)(c).\n\nThe underlying purpose of enacting s. 195 (1 )(b) and ( c) and s. 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part\n\nof the private parties considering themselves aggrieved by the offences mentioned in those sections to start criminal prosecutions on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents.\n\nThese offences h_ave been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It. is the judicial process, in other words the administration of public justio~, which is the direct and immediate object or victim of these offences and it is only by misleading the courts and thereby preverting the due course of law and justice that the ultimate object of harming the private party is designed to be realised.\n\nAs the !Purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime the Court is considered to be the Qnly party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party.\n\nThe private party designed ultimately to be injured through the offence against the administration of public justice is undoubtedly entitled to move the court for persuading it to file the complaint.\n\nBut such party is deprived of the general right recognized by s. 190 Cr. P.C. of the aggrieved parties directly initiating the criminal proceedings.\n\nThe offences about which the court alone, to the exdusion of the aggrieved private pai:ties, is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that cour(, the commission of which has a reasqnably close nexus with\n\nthe proceedings in that court so that it can, without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference princ\\pally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appears to us to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confining the prohibition contained in s. 195 (1) ( c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceeding in the character as such party.\n\nIt may be recalled that the superior court is equally competent under s. 476A Cr. P.C. to consider the question of expediency of prosecution and to complain and there is also a right of appeal conferred by s. 476B on a person on whose application the Court has refused to make a complaint under s. 476 ors. 476A or against whom such a complaint has been made. The appellate court is empowered after hearing the parties to direct the withdrawal of the complaint or as the case may be, itself to make the complaint.\n\nAll these sections read together indicate that the legislature could no_t have intended to extend the prohibition contained in s. 195(1) (c) Cr\\. P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when committed by a party to a proceeding iri that court prior to his becoming such party. It is no doubt true that quite often-if not almost invariably-the documents are forged for being used or produced in evidence in court before the proceedings are started. But that in our opinion cannot be the controlling fader, because to adopt that construction, documents forged long before the commencement of a proceeding in which they may happen to be actually used or produced in evidence, years later by some other party wonld also be subject toss. 195 and 476 Cr!. P.C. This in our opinion would unreasonably restrict the right possessed by a person and recognized by s. 190 Cr. P.C. without promoting the real purpose and object underlying these two sections. The Court in such a case may not be in a position to satisfactorily determine the question of expediency or making a complaint.\"\n\nWe are bound by the view expressed in this decision that the Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained ins. 195(1) (c) Cr. P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party.\n\nIn the decision in Raghunath and Others v. State of U.P. and Others(') it is observed :\n\n(1) [1973] 1 S .C.C. 564 at 568\n\n-111 I\n\nI ..\n\nKARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadaraja11, J.) 709\n\n\"In this Court the main contention raised on behalf of the appellants by their learned counsel was that even prosecution for an offence under Section 465 I.P.C. requires complaint by th() revenue court concerned as such an offence is covered by Section J 95 (I) (c), Cr.P.C. This contention is diilkJlt to accept. This Court has recently in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai\n\nv. The State of Gujarat [1971] 2 SCC 376 after considering the conflict of judicial opinion on this point, approved the view taken in Kushal Pal Singh case (supra). According to that decision the words \"to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court\" in Section 195(1)(c) mean that the offence should be alleged to have been committed by tbc party to the proceeding in his character as such party, that is, after having become a party to the proceeding. The appellants learned counsel tried to distinguish the decision of the Allahab>ad High Court in Kushal Pal Singh case (supra) by pointing out that in that case lhe offence 4:lf forgery was alleged to have been committed in 1898, more than 25 years before it was produced or given in evidence in court and it was for this reason that Section 195(1) (c), Cr.P.C. was held to be inapplicahk. In our view, the duration of time between the date of forgery and the production or giving in evidence of the forged document in court is not a governing factor. The principle laid down in Sombabhai's case (supra) was not founded on any such consideration. Reference to such delay was made in that decision in another context. After taking notice of the fact that Section 195(1) (c), Cr. P.C. deprives a private aggrieved party of the general right recognized by Section 190 Cr.P.C. of directly initiating criminal [proceedings this Court observed in the case:\n\n\"The offences about which the Court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties, is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that comt, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can, without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appe'arS to be more appropriate to adopt in strict construction of confining the prohibition contained in Section 195 (1) (c) only to those cases in which the\n\noffences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceeding in the character as such party\".\n\nIn the present case, the offence of abetmcnt of forgery was complete when the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was fabricated and registered. But no offence under s. 193 I.P.C. falling within the scope of s. 195(1) (b) of Cr.P.C. could be stated to have been committed by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy as the forged sale deed was not at all put in evidence at any stage in the redemption suit filed by the complainant on 17-11-70. Section 195 (l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads :\n\n\"(195) (1) No Court shall take cognizance\n\n(a) ........................... .\n\n(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, sections l 93 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or\n\nIt could be seen that the section requires that the offence under s. 193 I.P.C. should be alleged to have been committed in or in relation to, any proceeding in any court. Since the forged sale deed was not produced jn evidence in any stage of the redemption suit, s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted. Therefore, the Magistrate who committed the accused to the Sessions, could not have taken cognizance of any offence under s. 193 I.P.C. so far as Hemareddy alias Vemareddy (A-1) is concerned. The complaint could have been taken on file only for an offence punishable under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. so far as that accused is concerned. It would follow that no complaint by the court for prosecuting Hemareddy alias Vemareddy for the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. is required, and he could be validly convicted for that offence on the complaint given by the private individual. We are,.therefore, of the opinion that learned Judges of the. High Court were not right in law in holding that the complaint in this case was totally not maintainable against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in view of the provisions of s. 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, und in not only acquitting Hemareddy alias Vemareddy of the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114\n\nI.P.C. but alw in finding that he has committed an olfence punishable under s. 193 I.P.C. We accordingly confirm the judgment of the\n\n' I t\n\nHigh Coutt as regards modification of the sentence awarded to Pyatal Dhimakka (A-2) and the acquittal of Hemaredd; alias Vemareddy under s 11)3 l.P .C. and dismiss the appeal to that extent but allow the appeal in part so far as Hemareddy alias Vcmareddy is concerned and find him guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 l.P.C. and convict him and sentence him to undergo RI. for one year and also pay a fine of Rs. 500/. and in default to undergo R.I. for thice months.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 288, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 27, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 27, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. 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"regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "10-11-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1856, "end_char": 1866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On inquiries made in the office of the Sub-Registrar, the complainant learnt that the sale deed had been registered on 10-11-1970."}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 193, 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2197, "end_char": 2220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2244, "end_char": 2255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2256, "end_char": 2261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2361, "end_char": 2372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, 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195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "10-11-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 was the sale deed d<lted 10-11-70."}}, {"text": "24-11-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the complainant P.W. 3 on 24-11-70."}}, {"text": "15-12-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed the complaint before the police on 24-11-70 and before the court subsequently on 15-12-70."}}, {"text": "10-11~70 was", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5983, "end_char": 5995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The forged sale deed dated 10-11~70 was not produced in the suit filed by the complainant for redemption of the rnortgage."}}, {"text": "s. 195( I )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vasudeo Ra111clu111dra Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6517, "end_char": 6545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vasudeo Ra111clu111dra Joshi [1923] A.l."}}, {"text": "N. Ncttar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7103, "end_char": 7112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Ncttar, and R. C. Kaushik for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "N. Ncttar"}}, {"text": "R. C. Kaushik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7118, "end_char": 7131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Ncttar, and R. C. Kaushik for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. R\"m Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7152, "end_char": 7164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R\"m Reddy and A. V. V. Nair for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "P. R\"m Reddy"}}, {"text": "A. V. V. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R\"m Reddy and A. V. V. Nair for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "V AR'", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7250, "end_char": 7255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deli<ered by\n\nV AR'."}}, {"text": "State of Karnataka", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7326, "end_char": 7344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJ.\\1:1..IAN, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave has been filed by\n\nthe State of Karnataka against the judgment of a Division Bencl1 of the E Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Vemareddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7487, "end_char": 7512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "324 and 335 of 1973 against the acquittal of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy (A-l) in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Pyatal Bhimakka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "335 of 1973 modifying the sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge, Raichur to Pyatal Bhimakka ( A-2) in Sessions Case No.", "canonical_name": "Pyatal Bhimakka"}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Vernareddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7756, "end_char": 7782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge convicted Hemareddy alias Vernareddy under F s. 467 read with s. 114 and s. 193 Indian Penal Colic and sentenced him to undergo R.l.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7791, "end_char": 7797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7808, "end_char": 7814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7819, "end_char": 7825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7980, "end_char": 7986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7997, "end_char": 8003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8138, "end_char": 8144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pyatal Bhimakka", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8165, "end_char": 8180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for one month for the offence under s. 193 1.P.C. He convicted Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2), the appel !", "canonical_name": "Pyatal Bhimakka"}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8258, "end_char": 8264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8698, "end_char": 8704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Pyatal Bhimakka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "193 1.P.C. In the appeal filed by Pyatal Bhimakka, Crl.", "canonical_name": "Pyatal Bhimakka"}}, {"text": "s.\n\n467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8882, "end_char": 8889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8890, "end_char": 8895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Vemaredd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9004, "end_char": 9028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "335173, also the learned Judges found that there could be no doubt that she is guilty under s.\n\n467 I.P.C.\n\nThey confirmed the conviction of Pyatal Bhimakka, observing that she forged the document independently of Hemareddy alias Vemaredd y but taking into consideration the fact that Pyatal Bhimakka is an illiterate women who had been taken to the Office of the Sub- Registrar by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy and asked to put her thumb impression to the document and to admit execution of the document, which she did, for which Hemareddy alias Vemareddy paid her a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Vemareddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9172, "end_char": 9197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "335173, also the learned Judges found that there could be no doubt that she is guilty under s.\n\n467 I.P.C.\n\nThey confirmed the conviction of Pyatal Bhimakka, observing that she forged the document independently of Hemareddy alias Vemaredd y but taking into consideration the fact that Pyatal Bhimakka is an illiterate women who had been taken to the Office of the Sub- Registrar by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy and asked to put her thumb impression to the document and to admit execution of the document, which she did, for which Hemareddy alias Vemareddy paid her a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Vemarcddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9999, "end_char": 10024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court, however, acquitted Hemareddy alias Vemarcddy, the appellant in Crl.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Narsappa Eliger", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10301, "end_char": 10316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "324 of 1973 and set aside the .sentence awarded to him by the learned Sessions E Judge on the ground that the complaint in the criminal case which ended in the conviction of both accused in the Sessions Court, was fll\"d by the private individual Narsappa Eliger, P.W. 3 and not by the Civil Court."}}, {"text": "Narsappa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10555, "end_char": 10563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Narsappa is the son of one Thimmaiah who had an elder brother Nagappa Thimmaiah and Nagappa were the sons of one Thayappa.", "canonical_name": "N arsappa Eliger"}}, {"text": "Thimmaiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10582, "end_char": 10591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Narsappa is the son of one Thimmaiah who had an elder brother Nagappa Thimmaiah and Nagappa were the sons of one Thayappa.", "canonical_name": "Thimmaiah"}}, {"text": "Nagappa Thimmaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10617, "end_char": 10634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Narsappa is the son of one Thimmaiah who had an elder brother Nagappa Thimmaiah and Nagappa were the sons of one Thayappa."}}, {"text": "Nagappa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10639, "end_char": 10646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Narsappa is the son of one Thimmaiah who had an elder brother Nagappa Thimmaiah and Nagappa were the sons of one Thayappa.", "canonical_name": "Nagappa G"}}, {"text": "Thayappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10668, "end_char": 10676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Narsappa is the son of one Thimmaiah who had an elder brother Nagappa Thimmaiah and Nagappa were the sons of one Thayappa."}}, {"text": "Bhimakka alias Bhieamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10701, "end_char": 10724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagappa's wife was one Bhimakka alias Bhieamma.", "canonical_name": "Bhimakka alias Bhieamma"}}, {"text": "Thimaiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10727, "end_char": 10735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thimaiah and Nagappa G lived for sometime in Underaldoddi.", "canonical_name": "Thimmaiah"}}, {"text": "Nagappa G", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10740, "end_char": 10749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thimaiah and Nagappa G lived for sometime in Underaldoddi.", "canonical_name": "Nagappa G"}}, {"text": "Underaldoddi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10772, "end_char": 10784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thimaiah and Nagappa G lived for sometime in Underaldoddi."}}, {"text": "Nagappa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10786, "end_char": 10793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagappa purchased lands bearing Survey Nos.", "canonical_name": "Nagappa G"}}, {"text": "Alkur village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11017, "end_char": 11030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, Nagappa and his wife left Underaldoddi and settled down in Alkur village."}}, {"text": "Kurbar H Bhimayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11131, "end_char": 11148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While Nagappa was living in Alkur village, he mortgag~ the aforesaid lands with possession to one Kurbar H Bhimayya, the father of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, A-1.", "canonical_name": "Kurbar H Bhimayya"}}, {"text": "Kurbar Bhimayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11236, "end_char": 11251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the terms of the mortgage, Kurbar Bhimayya was to be in possession of the lands for twenty years and surrender possession thereof to the\n\nowner after the expiry of the period.", "canonical_name": "Kurbar H Bhimayya"}}, {"text": "Raichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11486, "end_char": 11493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, Nagappa and his A wife as well as Nagappa's brother Thimmaiah came and settled down at Raichur."}}, {"text": "Bhimakka alias Bhisamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11495, "end_char": 11518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhimakka alias Bhisamma, the wife of Nagappa, died in •. or about 1953 and Nagappa died two or three years later.", "canonical_name": "Bhimakka alias Bhieamma"}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias B Vemareddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11799, "end_char": 11826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hemareddy alias B Vemareddy continued in possession of the lands.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Narsappa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11866, "end_char": 11874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narsappa, son ol Nagappa's brother Thimmaiah executed a will in favour of the complainant Narsappa Eliger, bequeathing the aforc,1id lands to him.", "canonical_name": "N arsappa Eliger"}}, {"text": "Narsappa Eliger", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11956, "end_char": 11971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narsappa, son ol Nagappa's brother Thimmaiah executed a will in favour of the complainant Narsappa Eliger, bequeathing the aforc,1id lands to him.", "canonical_name": "N arsappa Eliger"}}, {"text": "Shivareddy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12816, "end_char": 12826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent tu the institution of the suit, Narsappa Eliger came to know from Shivareddy (P.W. 12) that Hemareddy alias Vemareddy has purchased the lands in quest; on from Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2) ana another and that A-2 had impersonated the real owner Bhimakka, wife of Nagappa,\n\nwho, as stated earlier, had died in or about 1953."}}, {"text": "Bhimakka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12989, "end_char": 12997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent tu the institution of the suit, Narsappa Eliger came to know from Shivareddy (P.W. 12) that Hemareddy alias Vemareddy has purchased the lands in quest; on from Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2) ana another and that A-2 had impersonated the real owner Bhimakka, wife of Nagappa,\n\nwho, as stated earlier, had died in or about 1953."}}, {"text": "10-11-\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13213, "end_char": 13225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, Narsappa Eliger made inquiries in the Office of the concerne<l Sub-- Registrar and learned that the sale deed had been registered on 10-11-\n\n1970."}}, {"text": "Alkur Narsappa Eliger", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13309, "end_char": 13330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After obtaining a registration copy of the sale deed and after making inqmries at Alkur Narsappa Eliger learnt that Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2) had no properties of her own, Narsappa Eliger thereafter filed a criminal complaint in the Court, which was referred to the Police."}}, {"text": "N arsappa Eliger", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13659, "end_char": 13675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After investigation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 21 filed a charge-sheet against both the accused and two others alleging that they had conspired to cheat N arsappa Eliger and to deprive him of the lands and that in pursuance of that conspiracy they put forward Pyatal Bhimakka as Nagappa's wife Bhimakka and got the sale deed executed by her and they thereby committe<l offences under ss.", "canonical_name": "N arsappa Eliger"}}, {"text": "ss. 120B,\n\n193, 465, 467, 468 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13890, "end_char": 13927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13938, "end_char": 13944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13952, "end_char": 13969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court of Sessions at Raichur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14058, "end_char": 14086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only Hemareddy alias Vemareddy and Pyatal Bhimakka, A-1 and A-2 were ccmmittcd to the Court of Sessions at Raichur, and they were found guilty and convicted and sentenced as mentioned above."}}, {"text": "Hemarcddy alias Yemareddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14349, "end_char": 14374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are satisfied that the learned Judges were justified\n\nA in coming to the conclusion on the evidence that Hemarcddy alias Yemareddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 144 J.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka i• guilty under s. 467 J.P.C.\n\nSince we agree with the learned Judges of the High Court on the question of fact in so far as it relates to A-2 in full and as regards Hcmareddy alias Vcmaredd) (A-2) in respect of his co'nviction under s. 467 read with s. 114, it is unnecessary for us to refer to the evidence relied upon by the learned Judges for coming to the conclusion that Hemareddy alias Vcmarcddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 1.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka is guilty under s. 467 l.P.C. This Court has obserwd in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bige1uira Nandini Choudry(') that it is not the duty ot the appellate court when it ngrees with the view of the trial court 011 the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14391, "end_char": 14397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14408, "end_char": 14414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14463, "end_char": 14469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hcmareddy alias Vcmaredd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14613, "end_char": 14637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are satisfied that the learned Judges were justified\n\nA in coming to the conclusion on the evidence that Hemarcddy alias Yemareddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 144 J.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka i• guilty under s. 467 J.P.C.\n\nSince we agree with the learned Judges of the High Court on the question of fact in so far as it relates to A-2 in full and as regards Hcmareddy alias Vcmaredd) (A-2) in respect of his co'nviction under s. 467 read with s. 114, it is unnecessary for us to refer to the evidence relied upon by the learned Judges for coming to the conclusion that Hemareddy alias Vcmarcddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 1.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka is guilty under s. 467 l.P.C. This Court has obserwd in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bige1uira Nandini Choudry(') that it is not the duty ot the appellate court when it ngrees with the view of the trial court 011 the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14681, "end_char": 14687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14698, "end_char": 14704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Vcmarcddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14824, "end_char": 14849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are satisfied that the learned Judges were justified\n\nA in coming to the conclusion on the evidence that Hemarcddy alias Yemareddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 144 J.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka i• guilty under s. 467 J.P.C.\n\nSince we agree with the learned Judges of the High Court on the question of fact in so far as it relates to A-2 in full and as regards Hcmareddy alias Vcmaredd) (A-2) in respect of his co'nviction under s. 467 read with s. 114, it is unnecessary for us to refer to the evidence relied upon by the learned Judges for coming to the conclusion that Hemareddy alias Vcmarcddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 1.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka is guilty under s. 467 l.P.C. This Court has obserwd in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bige1uira Nandini Choudry(') that it is not the duty ot the appellate court when it ngrees with the view of the trial court 011 the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14866, "end_char": 14872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14883, "end_char": 14889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14938, "end_char": 14944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15451, "end_char": 15457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Yemareddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15519, "end_char": 15544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, confirm the conviction of Hemareddy alias Yemareddy under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. and of Pyatal Bhimakka u'ndcr s. 467 I.P.C.\n\nWe are of the opinion that no interference with the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court in regard to the sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka is called for having rcg:Jrd to the fact that the learned Judges have given sufficient reasons for taking a lenient view in regard to that accused on the question of sentence.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15551, "end_char": 15557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15568, "end_char": 15574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15575, "end_char": 15580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15612, "end_char": 15618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15619, "end_char": 15624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pyatal Bhim\"kka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16065, "end_char": 16080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, dismiss the Criminal Appeal in so far as it relates to the question of .sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhim\"kka.", "canonical_name": "Pyatal Bhimakka"}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16163, "end_char": 16172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is seen from the judgment under appeal that the learned Public Prosecutor of Karnataka had contended before the learned Judges of the High Court that the rose against Hemarcddy alias Vemareddy for fabricating false evidence may not be maintainable in view of the provisions of s. 195 (l )(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that be may be prosecuted for abetting the offence of forgery and that the conviction of that accused under s. 467 read with s. I J 4 I.P.C. is justified o•n the facts of this case for while s. 193 I.P.C. is one of the sections mentioned in s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 467 J.P.C. is not mentioned in that <ub-clause of s. 195(1)."}}, {"text": "Hemarcddy alias Vemareddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16253, "end_char": 16278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is seen from the judgment under appeal that the learned Public Prosecutor of Karnataka had contended before the learned Judges of the High Court that the rose against Hemarcddy alias Vemareddy for fabricating false evidence may not be maintainable in view of the provisions of s. 195 (l )(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that be may be prosecuted for abetting the offence of forgery and that the conviction of that accused under s. 467 read with s. I J 4 I.P.C. is justified o•n the facts of this case for while s. 193 I.P.C. is one of the sections mentioned in s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 467 J.P.C. is not mentioned in that <ub-clause of s. 195(1).", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16363, "end_char": 16369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16385, "end_char": 16411, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16521, "end_char": 16527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16547, "end_char": 16552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16604, "end_char": 16610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16611, "end_char": 16616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16654, "end_char": 16666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16674, "end_char": 16700, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16702, "end_char": 16708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16755, "end_char": 16764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16848, "end_char": 16865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges rejected that submission, relying upon three decisions of the Madras High Court in Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Ayyar('), Ramnappa Reddy v. Emperor(') and in re."}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17466, "end_char": 17475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17487, "end_char": 17513, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17933, "end_char": 17942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17954, "end_char": 17980, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18539, "end_char": 18548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Som&<lundaram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18653, "end_char": 18666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the third case, Som&<lundaram, J. has observed : ·\n\n\"The main point on which Mr. Jayarama Aiyar appear- E ing for the petitioner seeks to quash this commital is that on the facts an offence under s. 193 I.P.C. ls disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under s. 195(1) (b) Criminal P.C. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under s. 193 F I.P.C. is revealed- Section 193 reads as follows : \"Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine.\""}}, {"text": "Jayarama Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18718, "end_char": 18732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the third case, Som&<lundaram, J. has observed : ·\n\n\"The main point on which Mr. Jayarama Aiyar appear- E ing for the petitioner seeks to quash this commital is that on the facts an offence under s. 193 I.P.C. ls disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under s. 195(1) (b) Criminal P.C. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under s. 193 F I.P.C. is revealed- Section 193 reads as follows : \"Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine.\""}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18833, "end_char": 18839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18840, "end_char": 18845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18954, "end_char": 18963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19101, "end_char": 19107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19110, "end_char": 19115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19130, "end_char": 19141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19522, "end_char": 19528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20349, "end_char": 20355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20411, "end_char": 20417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 467 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20598, "end_char": 20611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 467 and 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20675, "end_char": 20690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20747, "end_char": 20759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21310, "end_char": 21316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21318, "end_char": 21323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21366, "end_char": 21378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21700, "end_char": 21706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21722, "end_char": 21748, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 195(J)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21959, "end_char": 21971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21979, "end_char": 22005, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22248, "end_char": 22254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22265, "end_char": 22271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22272, "end_char": 22277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22307, "end_char": 22313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "17-11-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22588, "end_char": 22596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the complainant Narsappa Eliger, P.W. 3 on 17-11-70."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22849, "end_char": 22861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. Ram Reddy, learned counsel appearing for A-1, who assisted the court as Amicus Curiae for Pyatal Bhimakka , A-2, invited our attention to the decision in re.", "canonical_name": "P. R\"m Reddy"}}, {"text": "Vasudeo Ramchandra Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23010, "end_char": 23034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vasudeo Ramchandra Joshi(') and submitted that the complaint should have been filed by the court in which the suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the complainant Narsappa Eliger in view of the provisions of s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that as the complaint was filed directly by the private individual, the prosecution of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy for offences under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. and s. 193 I.P.C. is bad.", "canonical_name": "Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi"}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23230, "end_char": 23239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23251, "end_char": 23277, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23414, "end_char": 23420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23431, "end_char": 23437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23438, "end_char": 23443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23449, "end_char": 23455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23456, "end_char": 23461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23536, "end_char": 23553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that decision reference has been made to the decisions of the Bombay High Court in (1912) 14 Bombay Law Reporter 362 and 715."}}, {"text": "Bhusaval", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23661, "end_char": 23669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case there was a proceeding before the Magistrate at Bhusaval against one Vana Khusal in respect of the charge under s. 401 I.P.C. An application was made for bail on behalf of that person by Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, the petitioner before the High Court, but that application was refused on April 1, 1922."}}, {"text": "Vana Khusal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23682, "end_char": 23693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case there was a proceeding before the Magistrate at Bhusaval against one Vana Khusal in respect of the charge under s. 401 I.P.C. An application was made for bail on behalf of that person by Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, the petitioner before the High Court, but that application was refused on April 1, 1922."}}, {"text": "s. 401", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23725, "end_char": 23731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23732, "end_char": 23737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23800, "end_char": 23825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case there was a proceeding before the Magistrate at Bhusaval against one Vana Khusal in respect of the charge under s. 401 I.P.C. An application was made for bail on behalf of that person by Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, the petitioner before the High Court, but that application was refused on April 1, 1922.", "canonical_name": "Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23901, "end_char": 23914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case there was a proceeding before the Magistrate at Bhusaval against one Vana Khusal in respect of the charge under s. 401 I.P.C. An application was made for bail on behalf of that person by Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, the petitioner before the High Court, but that application was refused on April 1, 1922."}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23972, "end_char": 23978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23980, "end_char": 24003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 18, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24007, "end_char": 24021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statements of three witnes§.es were recorded under s. 164, Criminal Procedure Code on April 18, 1922 from which it appeared that on April 10, 1922 those three witnesses had an interview with the Pleader Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi and he had instigated them to give false evidence."}}, {"text": "April 10, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24053, "end_char": 24067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statements of three witnes§.es were recorded under s. 164, Criminal Procedure Code on April 18, 1922 from which it appeared that on April 10, 1922 those three witnesses had an interview with the Pleader Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi and he had instigated them to give false evidence."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24205, "end_char": 24219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 15, 1922 another case against Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi in respect of a dacoity was sent up to the Magistrate."}}, {"text": "June 2, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24535, "end_char": 24547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those witnesses were examined before the Magistrate on June 2, 1922 in the dacoity case, and on June 7, 1922 a complaint was filed by the Police against Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, charging him with having abetted the giving of false evidence."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24576, "end_char": 24588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those witnesses were examined before the Magistrate on June 2, 1922 in the dacoity case, and on June 7, 1922 a complaint was filed by the Police against Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, charging him with having abetted the giving of false evidence."}}, {"text": "s. 401", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25923, "end_char": 25929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25931, "end_char": 25948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26139, "end_char": 26145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Mahadev Yadneshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26281, "end_char": 26299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression used in s. 195 ( 1) (b) is wide enough to cover such a proceeding and the decisions of this Court in re Khanderao (1912) 14 Bombay L.R. 362 and in re Mahadev Yadneshwar (1912) 14 Bombay L.W. 715, support that conclusion.", "canonical_name": "Mahadev Yadneshwar Joshi"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27381, "end_char": 27387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27403, "end_char": 27429, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hemareddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27748, "end_char": 27757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~· ...\n\nThe decisions in 1912 (14) Bombay Law Report 362 and 715 would not apply to the facts of the present case for whereas in those cases the false evidence hap been actually put in evidence in the present case, as already stated, the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was not at all tendered by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in the redemption suit filed by the complainant NarsapP'a Eliger on 17-11-70 at any stage of the proceedings in that suit."}}, {"text": "alias Vemareddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27758, "end_char": 27773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~· ...\n\nThe decisions in 1912 (14) Bombay Law Report 362 and 715 would not apply to the facts of the present case for whereas in those cases the false evidence hap been actually put in evidence in the present case, as already stated, the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was not at all tendered by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in the redemption suit filed by the complainant NarsapP'a Eliger on 17-11-70 at any stage of the proceedings in that suit."}}, {"text": "NarsapP'a Eliger", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27822, "end_char": 27838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~· ...\n\nThe decisions in 1912 (14) Bombay Law Report 362 and 715 would not apply to the facts of the present case for whereas in those cases the false evidence hap been actually put in evidence in the present case, as already stated, the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was not at all tendered by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in the redemption suit filed by the complainant NarsapP'a Eliger on 17-11-70 at any stage of the proceedings in that suit.", "canonical_name": "N arsappa Eliger"}}, {"text": "Khanderao Yeshwant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27938, "end_char": 27956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khanderao Yeshwant(') the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, a Policeman, was present in a village Dhanchi on 20-2-1911 in relation to work about census and on that day a panchnama was filed in that village in regard to an offence alleged to have been committed by a certain Talukdar under the Arms Act."}}, {"text": "Dhanchi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28043, "end_char": 28050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khanderao Yeshwant(') the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, a Policeman, was present in a village Dhanchi on 20-2-1911 in relation to work about census and on that day a panchnama was filed in that village in regard to an offence alleged to have been committed by a certain Talukdar under the Arms Act."}}, {"text": "20-2-1911", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28054, "end_char": 28063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khanderao Yeshwant(') the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, a Policeman, was present in a village Dhanchi on 20-2-1911 in relation to work about census and on that day a panchnama was filed in that village in regard to an offence alleged to have been committed by a certain Talukdar under the Arms Act."}}, {"text": "Talukdar under the Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28219, "end_char": 28246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shamserkhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28369, "end_char": 28380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The investigation into the alleged offence was not made by the petitioner Police constable but by the village constable Shamserkhan who sent up the case to the Sub-\n\nInspector by whom in turn it was committed to a Magistrate.", "canonical_name": "Shamserkhari"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28834, "end_char": 28840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Talukdar under the Arms Act", "statute": "Talukdar under the Arms Act"}}, {"text": "Shamserkhari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28866, "end_char": 28878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.\n\nAfter hearing Shamserkhari the Magistrate issued notice against the Police Constable and on 8-9-1911 directed the prosecution of the Police Constable under s. 211 I.P.C. Thus it is seen that the panchnama containing false recitals prepared by the Police Constable was actually used in a criminal proceeding against the Talukdar who had been implicated as a culprit in the panchnama.", "canonical_name": "Shamserkhari"}}, {"text": "8-9-1911", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28944, "end_char": 28952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.\n\nAfter hearing Shamserkhari the Magistrate issued notice against the Police Constable and on 8-9-1911 directed the prosecution of the Police Constable under s. 211 I.P.C. Thus it is seen that the panchnama containing false recitals prepared by the Police Constable was actually used in a criminal proceeding against the Talukdar who had been implicated as a culprit in the panchnama."}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29008, "end_char": 29014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Talukdar under the Arms Act", "statute": "Talukdar under the Arms Act"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29015, "end_char": 29020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Talukdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29171, "end_char": 29179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.\n\nAfter hearing Shamserkhari the Magistrate issued notice against the Police Constable and on 8-9-1911 directed the prosecution of the Police Constable under s. 211 I.P.C. Thus it is seen that the panchnama containing false recitals prepared by the Police Constable was actually used in a criminal proceeding against the Talukdar who had been implicated as a culprit in the panchnama."}}, {"text": "Mahadev Yadneshwar Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29258, "end_char": 29282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second case re Mahadev Yadneshwar Joshi('), Mahadev and five others were being prosecuted for offences under s. 193 read with s. 109 I.P.C.-in that they were alleged to have abetted the making of a false statement during the police investigation in a theft case.", "canonical_name": "Mahadev Yadneshwar Joshi"}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29352, "end_char": 29358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29369, "end_char": 29375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29376, "end_char": 29381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30178, "end_char": 30184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Narsappa Eliger", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30512, "end_char": 30527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as lated ear; ier, the fabricated sale deed dated I 0-11-70 had not\n\n(I) (1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 362\n\n(2)\n\n(1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 715\n\nA been put in evidence at any stage of the suit for redemption filed by the complainant Narsappa Eliger in the Civil Court on 17-11-1970.", "canonical_name": "N arsappa Eliger"}}, {"text": "17-11-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30550, "end_char": 30560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as lated ear; ier, the fabricated sale deed dated I 0-11-70 had not\n\n(I) (1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 362\n\n(2)\n\n(1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 715\n\nA been put in evidence at any stage of the suit for redemption filed by the complainant Narsappa Eliger in the Civil Court on 17-11-1970."}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30567, "end_char": 30576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N. Nettar, appearing for the State, invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat.(')", "canonical_name": "N. Ncttar"}}, {"text": "ss. 467 and 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30955, "end_char": 30970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30971, "end_char": 30976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31205, "end_char": 31211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31413, "end_char": 31419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 467 and 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31618, "end_char": 31633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31634, "end_char": 31639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31736, "end_char": 31742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32008, "end_char": 32017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32553, "end_char": 32562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33723, "end_char": 33729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33751, "end_char": 33757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34971, "end_char": 34977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35727, "end_char": 35733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 476A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35950, "end_char": 35957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 476B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36086, "end_char": 36093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36175, "end_char": 36181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36522, "end_char": 36531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37247, "end_char": 37253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38078, "end_char": 38089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38090, "end_char": 38095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38203, "end_char": 38209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kushal Pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38437, "end_char": 38453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court has recently in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai\n\nv. The State of Gujarat [1971] 2 SCC 376 after considering the conflict of judicial opinion on this point, approved the view taken in Kushal Pal Singh case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Section 195(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38575, "end_char": 38592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Allahab>ad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38847, "end_char": 38868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants learned counsel tried to distinguish the decision of the Allahab>ad High Court in Kushal Pal Singh case (supra) by pointing out that in that case lhe offence 4:lf forgery was alleged to have been committed in 1898, more than 25 years before it was produced or given in evidence in court and it was for this reason that Section 195(1) (c), Cr."}}, {"text": "Section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39109, "end_char": 39123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39129, "end_char": 39135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sombabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39354, "end_char": 39363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle laid down in Sombabhai's case (supra) was not founded on any such consideration."}}, {"text": "Section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39529, "end_char": 39543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39628, "end_char": 39639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39640, "end_char": 39646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40388, "end_char": 40399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40709, "end_char": 40715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40716, "end_char": 40721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40751, "end_char": 40760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40768, "end_char": 40774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40973, "end_char": 40984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40999, "end_char": 41025, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41190, "end_char": 41207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41477, "end_char": 41483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41484, "end_char": 41489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41676, "end_char": 41685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41697, "end_char": 41723, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41864, "end_char": 41870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41871, "end_char": 41876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42015, "end_char": 42021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42032, "end_char": 42038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42039, "end_char": 42044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42194, "end_char": 42200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42211, "end_char": 42217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42218, "end_char": 42223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42569, "end_char": 42575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42591, "end_char": 42617, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42693, "end_char": 42699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42710, "end_char": 42716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42718, "end_char": 42723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42794, "end_char": 42800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42801, "end_char": 42806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pyatal Dhimakka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42921, "end_char": 42936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court were not right in law in holding that the complaint in this case was totally not maintainable against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in view of the provisions of s. 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, und in not only acquitting Hemareddy alias Vemareddy of the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114\n\nI.P.C. but alw in finding that he has committed an olfence punishable under s. 193 I.P.C. We accordingly confirm the judgment of the\n\n' I t\n\nHigh Coutt as regards modification of the sentence awarded to Pyatal Dhimakka (A-2) and the acquittal of Hemaredd; alias Vemareddy under s 11)3 l.P .C. and dismiss the appeal to that extent but allow the appeal in part so far as Hemareddy alias Vcmareddy is concerned and find him guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 l.P.C. and convict him and sentence him to undergo RI.", "canonical_name": "Pyatal Bhimakka"}}, {"text": "Hemaredd; alias Vemareddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42964, "end_char": 42989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court were not right in law in holding that the complaint in this case was totally not maintainable against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in view of the provisions of s. 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, und in not only acquitting Hemareddy alias Vemareddy of the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114\n\nI.P.C. but alw in finding that he has committed an olfence punishable under s. 193 I.P.C. We accordingly confirm the judgment of the\n\n' I t\n\nHigh Coutt as regards modification of the sentence awarded to Pyatal Dhimakka (A-2) and the acquittal of Hemaredd; alias Vemareddy under s 11)3 l.P .C. and dismiss the appeal to that extent but allow the appeal in part so far as Hemareddy alias Vcmareddy is concerned and find him guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 l.P.C. and convict him and sentence him to undergo RI.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42996, "end_char": 43000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Hemareddy alias Vcmareddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43088, "end_char": 43113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court were not right in law in holding that the complaint in this case was totally not maintainable against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in view of the provisions of s. 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, und in not only acquitting Hemareddy alias Vemareddy of the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114\n\nI.P.C. but alw in finding that he has committed an olfence punishable under s. 193 I.P.C. We accordingly confirm the judgment of the\n\n' I t\n\nHigh Coutt as regards modification of the sentence awarded to Pyatal Dhimakka (A-2) and the acquittal of Hemaredd; alias Vemareddy under s 11)3 l.P .C. and dismiss the appeal to that extent but allow the appeal in part so far as Hemareddy alias Vcmareddy is concerned and find him guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 l.P.C. and convict him and sentence him to undergo RI.", "canonical_name": "HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43153, "end_char": 43159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43170, "end_char": 43176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_712_717_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.\n\nRAJA RAM & ORS.\n\nJanuary 29, 1981\n\n[A. D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]\n\nLand Acqui.sition Act, 1894, .51ectio11 3(e) read with section 4-U'hether the Food lorporarion, creaf(d by section 3 of the Food Corporation At!, 1964, is a co111pa11y within the 111eaning of section 3(e) of the Land A('qtd1ition Act.\n\nl)isn1issing the State appeal on certificate, the Court\n\nI~ELD : ( 1) The acquisition of land for the Food Corporation of India is not in nccordance \\Vith law for the reason that compliance with the pro-- visions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act had not heen made.\n\n[717A-B]\n\n(2) The Food Corporation of lndia is a Compa11y within the meaning of the term appearing in clause ( e) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.\n\nSection 3 (e) mentions in unrnistakable terms that a company incorporated by an Indian law would be a \"Company\" for the purposes of lhe Land Acquisition Act.\n\nThe Corporation wias adn1ittedly creat'ed by\n\nscction 3 of the Food Corporation Act. 1964. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Food Corporation Act, 1964 is an Indian Law and clothes the Corporation with the attribute~ of a<- compan)'. [7l 5A-E.]\n\n(3) A Government department has to be an. organisation which is not only completely controlled and financed by the Government but has also no identity of its own. The money earned by such a department goes to the exchequer of the Government and losses incurred by the department are losses of the Government. The Corporation, on the other hand, is an autonomous body capable of ocquiring, holding and disposing of properly and having tho power to contract. It n1ay also sue or be sued by its own nan1e and tho Government does not figure in any litigation to which it is a party. It is true that its original share capital is provided by the Central Government and thati 11 out of the 12 members of its Board of Directors are appointed by the Central Government but then these factors may at the most lead to the conclu~ sion that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government. [715E-H]\n\nEven the conclusion, ho\\\\1ever, that the Corporation is an agency or instru mentality of the Central Government does not lead to the further inference that rhe Corporation is a Government department. The reason is that the Food O:Jrporation Act has given the Corporation an individuality apart from that of the Government. In any case the Corpor::ition cannot be divested Qlf its character as a ''Company\" within the meaning of the definition in clause, (e) of section 3 of the La-nd Acquisition Act, for it completely fulfils the require~ ments of that clause.\n\n[716G-H, 717A-B]\n\nRaniana Daynrani Shetty v. The International Authority of India and Ors .. [1969] 3 SCR 1014, applied.\n\n) )\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2063 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 26-2-1970 of Punjab and Haryana l'Iigh Court in L.P.A. No. 283/69.\n\n0. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant.\n\nS. K. Mehra, P. N. Puri, E. \"M'. S. Anam and M. K. Dua for Res- B pondents Nos. 1-3.\n\nK. J. John for Respondent No. 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab and two others, namely, the Collector, Rupar District and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Rupar, is on a certificate granted by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in respect of its judgment in a Letters Patent Appeal holding the acquisition of the land in question to be bad in law on the grounds that the Food Corporation of India for which the Land in question was sought to be acquired was not a \"Company\" within the meaning of section 3 ( e) of the Land Acquisition Act that the land had also not been acquiTed for a public purpose and that the State could acquire the land under that Act only for a public purpose or for the purpose of a Company.\n\n2. The material facts of the case may be stated thus : Nine biswas of the disputed land situated within the municipal area of Morinda in the District of Rupar was owned by respondent No. 1, Raja Ram, Respondents No. 2 and 3. are Raja Ram's sons. The State of Punjab issued a notification dated December 17, 1968 under section 4 read with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter called \"the L.A. Act\"). The notification related to 15 different plots of land including the land of the present acquisition proceedings. The material portion of the notification is as follows :\n\n\"Whereas it appears to the President of India that the\n\nland is likely to be needed by Government, at public expense, G for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of godowns for storage of food-grains at Morinda, it is hereby notified that the land in the locality described below is likely to be required for the above purpose ........ \"\n\n\"Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act, the President of India is pleased to direct that the action under Section 1 7 shall be taken in this case on the\n\nA grounds of urgency and provisions of Section 5 (A) shall not apply in regard to this acquisition.\"\n\nOn the same day another notification under Sections 6 and 7 read with Section 17(2)(c) of the L.A. Act was issued. The material portion of this notification runs thus :\n\n\"Whereas the President of India is satisfied th-at the land specified below is needed by Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of godowns for storage of food grains at Marinda, it is hereby declared that the hmd described in the specification below is required for the aforesaid purpose. This declaration is made under the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 .......• \"\n\n3. Against the aforesaid notification a writ petition was filed by respondents No. 1 to 3.\n\nThe writ petition was heard by a single Judge of the High Court and was dismissed.\n\nThe learned Single Judge, inter alia, found that t_he provisions of Part VII of the L.A. Act relating to the acquisition of land for Companies were not applicable to the present case as the Food Corporation of India (hereinafter called the Corporation) was a department of Government and not a Company within the meaning of Section 3 ( e) of the L.A Act although, undoubtedly, accordi!llg to the learned Judge, there was no manner of doubt about the fact that the land in dispute was in fact being acquired for the Corporation and that the purpose for which the land had been acquired was a public purpose.\n\nAgainst the aforesaid Order of the learned Single Judge a Letters Patent Appeal, being L.P.A. No. 1283 of 1969, was filed by respondents No. 1 to 3 before the Division Bench, that allowed the appeal and quashed the land acquisition proceedings as stated earlier.\n\n4. With respect we find it difficult to agree with the learned division bench when it held that the Corporation was not a \"Company\" G within the meaning of section 3 ( e) of the L.A. Act which runs thus:\n\n\"3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context- '1\n\n( e) the expression \"Company\" means a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882 or under the II (English) Companies Act, 1862 to 1890 or incorporated by an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by an Indian law or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent and includes a\n\n~· ..\n\nsociety registered under the societies Registration Act, 1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the. Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 or any other law relatmg to cooperative societies for the time being in force in any State.\"\n\nThe section mentions in unmistakable terms that ll company incorporated by an Indian law would be ll 'Company' for the purposes of the L.A. Act. Now the corporation was admittedly created by section 3 of the Food Corporation Act, 1964 (hereinafter called the F.C. Act).\n\nThat section states :\n\n\"3. ( 1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, the Central Government shall establish for the purposes of this Act a Corporation kµown as the Food Corporation of India.\n\n(2) The Corporation shall be a body corporate with the name, aforesaid, having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract, and may, by that name, sue and be sued.\"\n\nSub-section (2) which we need hardly say, is an Indian law, clothe~ the Corporation with the attributes of a company. It cannot, therefore,\n\nbe contended with any plansibility that the Corporation is not a 'Com- E pany' within the meaning of the definition of that term appearing in clause (e) of section 3 of the L.A. Act.\n\n5. Learned counsel for the appellant then urged that 111e Corporation is a Government department. W~. are unable to accept this submission also.\n\nA Government department has to be an organisation which is not only completely controlled and financed by the Government but has also no identity of its own. The money earned by such a department goes to the exchequer of the Government and losses incurred by the dpartment are losses of the Government. The Corporation, on the other hand, is an autonomous body capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of property and having the power to contract. It may also sue or be sued by its own name and the Government does not figure in any litigation to which it is a party. It is true that its original share capital is provided by the Central Government (section 5 of the F.C.\n\nAct) and that 11 out of the 12 members of its Board of Directors are appointed by that Government (section 7 of the F.C. Act) but then these factors may at the most lead to the conclusion (about which we express no final opinion) that the COip9ration is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government. In this connection we may cite\n\nwith advantage the following obsenations of this Court in Rama11J1 Dayaram Shetty v. The Inter11J1tional Authority of India and Ors.(1)\n\n\"A Corporation may be created in one of two ways. It may be either established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act, 1956 or the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Where a corporation is wholly controlled by government not only in its policy making but also in carrying out the functions entrusted to it by the law establishing it or by the Charter of its incorporation, there can be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of Government.\n\nBut ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute. it is autonomous in its working subject only to a provision, often times made, that it shall be bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matters. So also a Corporation incorporated under law is managed by a Board of Directors or committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the statute under which it is incorporated. When does such a corporation become an instrumentality or agency of Government ?\n\nIs the holding of the entire share capital of the Corporation by Government enough or is it necessary that in addition, there should be a certain amount of direct control exercised by Government and, if so what should be the nature of such control? Should ihe functions which the Corporation is charged to carry out possess any particular characteristic or feature, or is the nature of the functions immaterial? Now, one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by Government it would be a long way towards in, Iicating that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, as is quite often the case the Corporation established by statute may have no share or shareholders in which case it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a Board of Directors appointed by Government though this consideration also may not be determinative, because even where the directors are appointed by Government, they may be completely free from governmental control in the discharge of their functions.\"\n\nEven the conolusion, however, that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government does not lead to the further inference that the Corportion is a Government department. The reason is that the F.C. Act has given the Corporation an individuality apart\n\n(I) (1%9] 3 S.C.R. 1014.\n\nIr-···\n\nfrom that of the Government. In any case the Corporation cannot be A divested of its character as a 'Company' within the meaning of the definition in clause ( e) of section 3 of the L.A. Act, for it completely fulfils the requirements of that clause, as held by us above ..\n\n6. The Corporation being a 'Company', compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the L.A. Act had to be made in order to lawfully acquire any land for its purpose. It is not denied that such compliance is completely lacking in the present case.\n\n7. As a result of the foregoing disc11ssion it must be held that the land in dispute has not been acquired in accordance with law, although\n\nour reasons in that behalf are different from those forming the basis of impugned judgment. This appeal is thus found to be without merit and C is dismissed but with no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n13-152 SCI/81", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJA RAM & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA RAM & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 29, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 29, 1981\n\n[A. D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL !"}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290, "end_char": 302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 727, "end_char": 736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vith law for the reason that compliance with the pro-- visions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Vith law for the reason that compliance with the pro-- visions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 773, "end_char": 782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 909, "end_char": 929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Food Corporation Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1059, "end_char": 1085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1821, "end_char": 1839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that its original share capital is provided by the Central Government and thati 11 out of the 12 members of its Board of Directors are appointed by the Central Government but then these factors may at the most lead to the conclu~ sion that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government. ["}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2556, "end_char": 2565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 1014", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2751, "end_char": 2768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. S. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2967, "end_char": 2980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehra, P. N. Puri, E. \"M'."}}, {"text": "P. N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehra, P. N. Puri, E. \"M'."}}, {"text": "E. \"M'. S. Anam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3026, "end_char": 3041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehra, P. N. Puri, E. \"M'."}}, {"text": "M. K. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Anam and M. K. Dua for Res- B pondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3087, "end_char": 3097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. J. John for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3165, "end_char": 3178, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab and two others, namely, the Collector, Rupar District and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Rupar, is on a certificate granted by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in respect of its judgment in a Letters Patent Appeal holding the acquisition of the land in question to be bad in law on the grounds that the Food Corporation of India for which the Land in question was sought to be acquired was not a \"Company\" within the meaning of section 3 ( e) of the Land Acquisition Act that the land had also not been acquiTed for a public purpose and that the State could acquire the land under that Act only for a public purpose or for the purpose of a Company."}}, {"text": "Rupar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3257, "end_char": 3271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab and two others, namely, the Collector, Rupar District and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Rupar, is on a certificate granted by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in respect of its judgment in a Letters Patent Appeal holding the acquisition of the land in question to be bad in law on the grounds that the Food Corporation of India for which the Land in question was sought to be acquired was not a \"Company\" within the meaning of section 3 ( e) of the Land Acquisition Act that the land had also not been acquiTed for a public purpose and that the State could acquire the land under that Act only for a public purpose or for the purpose of a Company."}}, {"text": "Food Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3580, "end_char": 3605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J.-This appeal by the State of Punjab and two others, namely, the Collector, Rupar District and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Rupar, is on a certificate granted by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in respect of its judgment in a Letters Patent Appeal holding the acquisition of the land in question to be bad in law on the grounds that the Food Corporation of India for which the Land in question was sought to be acquired was not a \"Company\" within the meaning of section 3 ( e) of the Land Acquisition Act that the land had also not been acquiTed for a public purpose and that the State could acquire the land under that Act only for a public purpose or for the purpose of a Company."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Morinda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4053, "end_char": 4060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts of the case may be stated thus : Nine biswas of the disputed land situated within the municipal area of Morinda in the District of Rupar was owned by respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rupar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4080, "end_char": 4085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts of the case may be stated thus : Nine biswas of the disputed land situated within the municipal area of Morinda in the District of Rupar was owned by respondent No."}}, {"text": "Raja Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Raja Ram, Respondents No.", "canonical_name": "RAJA RAM & ORS"}}, {"text": "December 17, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4221, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Punjab issued a notification dated December 17, 1968 under section 4 read with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter called \"the L.A. Act\")."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4245, "end_char": 4254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4265, "end_char": 4275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material portion of the notification is as follows :\n\n\"Whereas it appears to the President of India that the\n\nland is likely to be needed by Government, at public expense, G for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of godowns for storage of food-grains at Morinda, it is hereby notified that the land in the locality described below is likely to be required for the above purpose ........ \"\n\n\"Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act, the President of India is pleased to direct that the action under Section 1 7 shall be taken in this case on the\n\nA grounds of urgency and provisions of Section 5 (A) shall not apply in regard to this acquisition.\""}}, {"text": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4870, "end_char": 4931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4999, "end_char": 5008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act", "statute": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5086, "end_char": 5095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act", "statute": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act", "statute": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act"}}, {"text": "Section 17(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5219, "end_char": 5235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act", "statute": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act"}}, {"text": "Marinda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5533, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material portion of this notification runs thus :\n\n\"Whereas the President of India is satisfied th-at the land specified below is needed by Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of godowns for storage of food grains at Marinda, it is hereby declared that the hmd described in the specification below is required for the aforesaid purpose."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5702, "end_char": 5711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act", "statute": "Further in exercise of the powers conferred by the said H Act"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5719, "end_char": 5745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6258, "end_char": 6267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6962, "end_char": 6971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7133, "end_char": 7188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1862", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7215, "end_char": 7234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7501, "end_char": 7533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7819, "end_char": 7828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1912", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Food Corporation Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7836, "end_char": 7862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Food Corporation Act, 1964", "statute": "the Food Corporation Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9570, "end_char": 9579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9692, "end_char": 9701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "COip9ration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9832, "end_char": 9843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that its original share capital is provided by the Central Government (section 5 of the F.C.\n\nAct) and that 11 out of the 12 members of its Board of Directors are appointed by that Government (section 7 of the F.C. Act) but then these factors may at the most lead to the conclusion (about which we express no final opinion) that the COip9ration is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "may be either established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10125, "end_char": 10221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12650, "end_char": 12659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_718_726_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "KIRIT KUMAR CHAMAN LAL KUNDALIYA\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.\n\nJanuary 30, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.l\n\nConstitution of India-Art. 32-Habeas Corpus petition-Urging additional grounds in different petitions-If barred by constructive res judicata.\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Preve11tion of Smuggling Activities Act--Section 3-Petitioner's representation rejected by Secretary to the Depart- 1nent but not by the detaining authority-Validity of.\n\nWords and Phrases : \"relied on\", \"referred to\", \"based on'~ meaning! df.\n\nThe petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition impugning the order of the Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act impugned tho order of his detention on the grounds that the materials relied upon in the order of detention were not supplied to him and that two of the documents referred to in the order of detention were not supplied to him because the Secretary of the Department thought that they were not relevant.\n\nAfter exaomining the file and relevant documents the High Court held that failure to supply them did not vitiate the order of detention.\n\nThe petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition impugning the order of the High Court and also a petition under article 32 urging certain additiona~ grounds that the endorsement by the Secretary showed that it was he who decided the relevancy of the documents to be supplied and not the Minister Who was the detaining authority and (2) his representation was rejected by the Secretary acting on behalf of the Minister instead of the Minister himself.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised on behalf of tho State that the points not raised in the Hi,2h Court by the detenu could not be: agitated in a writ petition under Article 32 because that is barred by the principle of constructive\n\nre~ judicata.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : The well established position in law is that so far as petitions for. habeas corpus are concerned the doctrine of constructive res judicata could not apply. Secondly even successive petitions for habeas corpus under article 32 would be maintainable in this Court provided the points raised in the subsequent petitions are additional points not covered or agitated in the previous petitions. Thus if the principles of res judicata could not apply to successive writ petitions in this Court, much less could they be attracted to cases where points were not agitated before the High C'ourt but were raised for the first\n\ntime in this Court in a writ petition under Article 32.\n\n[723B&E]\n\nShri Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 352, B followed.\n\n\nThe doctrine of finality of judgment or principles of res judlcata are found A ed on the basic principle that where a Court of competent jurisdiction h~ decided an issue, the same ought not to be allowed to be agitated a-gain and again.\n\nSuch a doctrine would be wholly inapplicable to cases where the two forums have separate and independent jurisdictions. [723F]\n\nThe jurisdiction under Article 226 is a discretionary jurisdiction where8$ the jurisdiction to grant relief in & petition under Article 32 is guaranteed by the Constitution. Once the Court finds that there has beetn a violation o~ Article 22(5) of the Constitution it has no discretion in the matter but is , bound to grant the relief to the detenu. The doctrine of res judicata or th<i\n\n, _principles of finality of judgment cannot be allowed to whittle down or over- ._....- ride the express constitutional mandate to the Supreme Court enshrined in C Article 32 of the Constitution. [723G-H]\n\nThe concept of liberty has now been widened by Maneka Gandhi's case [1978] 2 S, CR- 621 wher\"' Article 21 as construed by this Court has added new dimensions to the various features and concepts of liberty as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, [724B] D\n\nSmt, Santosh Anand v, Union of India & Ors,, W, P. No, 1097/79 (decided on 31-I 0 1979) referred to,\n\n11 was not open to the High Court to have waded through the confidential file of the Government in order to fish out a point against the detenu. Secondly. the question of relevance was not to be decided by the Court but by the detain\"'\n\ning authority which alone had to consider the representation of the detenu on merits and then come to the conclusion whether it should be accepted or rejected. As the reasoning of the High Court was legally erroneous the order of the High Court cannot be allowed to stand, [724D-E]\n\nBefore the grounds were served on the petitioner, the documents , were placed before the detaining authority and were, therefore, referred to in the grounds of detention. Manifestly the subjective satisfaction could only be ascertained from or reflected in the grounds of the order of detention passed against the detetnu; otherwise without giving the grounds the mere subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority would make the order of detention G incomplete and ineffective.\n\nOnce the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention it becon1es the bounden duty of the detaining authority to supply the same to the detenu as part of the grounds or pari passu the grounds of detention. There is no particular charm in the expressions 'relied on', 'referred to' or 'based on' because ultin1ately all these expressions signify one thing, namely, that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority bas been arrived at on the documents mentioned in the grounds of detention, The ques- H tion whether the grounds have been \"referred to\", \"relied on\" or \"baBed on'' is merely a matter of describing the nature of the grounds,\n\n[725A-CJ\n\nRam Chandra A. Kamat v. Union of India & Ors. [1980] 2 S.C.C. 271 applied.\n\n\nWhether the docu1nents concerned are \"referred to\", \"relied upon\" or \"taken into consideration\", by the detaining authority they ha.Ye to be supplied to the detenu to make an effective representation immediatley on receiving the grounds of detention.\n\n[725GH]\n\nIn the present case this not having been done the continued detention of the petitioner must be held to be void.\n\nThere \\Vas no decision by the detaining authority that the documents were, 1 irrele\\'ant. The documents concerned were examined not by the detaining-......._ authority but by the Secretary. There is nothing to show that the opinion or endorsement of the Secretary was placed and approved by the detnining authority. [7240]\n\nThe petitioner's representation had been rejected by an authority which had no jurisdiction at all to consider or pass any orders on the representation of the detenu.\n\nThis renders the continued detention of the petitioner void. [7260]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 6354 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nAND Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 25-11-1980 of the Gujarat High Court in Cr!. Application No. 218 of 1980.\n\nAnil Divan, Harjinder Singh and M. M. Lodha for the Petitioner in Writ Petition and in the Criminal Appeal.\n\nM. N. Plwdke and M. N. S!JJ\"off for Respondents 1-3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-By our Order dated 21-1-1981 we had already allowed the petition and directed the detenu to be released forthwith. } We now proceed to set out the reasons for the Order which we passed on 21·1-1981.\n\nThe writ petition and the criminal special leave arise out of the same subject matter, namely, that the !Petitioner (Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya) was detained by an order passed by the Home Minister of the State of Gujarat on 9-9-1980 under s. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act.\n\nThe Petitioner/detenu in the first instance filed a petition for habeas corpus in the High Court of Gujarat which was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 25-11-1980.\n\nThe detenu thereafter filed a petition for special leave against the order of the High Court\n\nand also a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India in this Court. Both the petition for special leave and the writ petition hav•e been heard together.\n\nBefore the High Court, the detenu assailed the order of detention mainly on the ground that certain materials relied UIJOn or referred to in the order of detention wre not supplied to the detenu and hence he was not in a position to make an effective representation to the Government. It was also pleaded by the detenu before the High Court that two of the documents which were referred to in the order of detention were not supplied to him because the Secretary thought that they were not relevant.\n\nThoe High Court while examining the contention of the detenu sent for the entire file from the Government and after examining the documents itself found that .as the documents concerned were not relevant and consisted of statements of some other persons, the failure to supply the documents to the detenu did not vitiate the order of dete'ntion.\n\nHence the petition in thls Court for grant of special leave against the order of the High Court.\n\nA separate writ petition has also been filed by the detenu in this Court in which apart from the point canvassed before the High Court certain additional grounds have been taken.\n\nIn the view that we take in the present case. it is sufficient to refer only to two important grounds that have been taken in the writ petition. In (he first place, it was suggested that the endorsement by the Secretary shows that the question as to whether or not the documents demanded by the detenu were relevant was decided not by the Minister who was the detaining authority but by the Secretary. Secondly, it was urged that although the the case relied upon by the respondents also does not decide that the detenu made a representation to the State Government on 3-10-1980\n\n~ the same was rejected on 14-10-1980 not by the detaining authority, namely, the Hon.\n\nHome Minister acting on behalf of the Government but by the Secretary, and this infirmity was sufficient to render the.order of detention void.\n\nMr. Phadke appearing for the Smte took a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition filed by the detenu in this Court. The sheet-anchor of the argument of Mr. Phadke for the State was that as the dctenu had not raised the additional points taken in the High Court he could not be permitted to agitate those very points in the writ petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution as the same were barred by the principles of constructive res ; udicata. In sup-\n\nA port of his argument he relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of bidia & Ors.(1).\n\nThe learned counsel for the petitioner,- however, countered the submission of the respondents on the ground that a writ under Art. 32 being guaranteed by the Constitution the doctrine of res judicata mn have no application to a writ petition filed in this Court under Art. 32.\n\nMr. Dewan, learned counsel for the detenu further submitted that the case relied upon by the respondents also does nqt decide that the writ petition was not maintaining as being barred by principles of\n\nres judicata.\n\nIn our opinion, the contention raised by the larned counsel for the detenu is well founded and must prevail.- Ghu/am , .\n\nSarwar's case (supra.) which was heavily relied on by the respondents does not at all support the contention raised before us by them.\n\nIn that case this Court traced the history of habei\\S corpus writs and ultimately held that atleast so far as [petitions for habeas corpus are concerned, the doctrine of constructive res judicata could not apply.\n\nIn this connection Subba Rao, C. J. observed as follows :--\n\n\"If the doctrine of res judicata is attracted to an application for a writ of habeas corpus. there is no reason why the principles of constructive res judicata cannot also govern the said application, for the rule of constructivi: res judicata is only a part of the general principles of the law of res judicata and if that be applied, the scope of the liberty of an individual will be considerably narrowed ...... If the doctrine of constructive res judicata be applied, this Court, though it is enjoined by the Constitution to protect the right of a person illegally detained, will become powerless to do so. That would be whittling down the wide sweep of the constitutional protection.\"\n\nBachawat, J., in his concurring judgment also endorsed the view of Subba Rao, C. J., and observed as follows :\n\n\"The order of Khanna, J. dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner in the Punjab High Court challenging the legality of the detention order passed by the Ce!}tral Government under s. 3(2) (g) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and asking for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus is not a judgment, and does not operate as tes judicata. That order does not operate as a bar to the aPplication under Art. 32 of the Constitution asking for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus on the same facts. The\n\n(!) [1967! 2 S.C.R. 271.\n\npetitioner has fundamental right to move this Court under A Art. 3 2 for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for the protection of his right of liberty.\n\nThe present petition must, therefore, be entertained and examined on the merits.\"\n\nApart from the aforesaid case, there is a recent decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shri Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors.(') where this Court has held that even successive petotions for habeas corpus under Art. 32 would be maintainable in this Court provided the points raised in the subsequent petitions are additional points not covered or agitated jn the previous petitions. In this connection, Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"The position that emerges from a survey of the above decisions is that the application of the doctrine of constructive res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings.\n\nThis principle of public policy is entirely inapplicable to illegal detention and does not bar a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Art. 32 of the Constitution on fresh grounds, which were not taken in the earlier petition for the same relief\"\n\nThus, if the principles of res judicata could not apply to successive writ petitions in this Court much less could they be attracted in cases where points were not agitated before the High Court but were raised for the first time in this Court in a writ petition under Art. 32.\n\nApart from the cases discussed above there is another ground on which the argument of Mr. Phadke for respondents must be rejected.\n\nThe doctrine of finality of judgment or the principles of res judicata are founded on the basic principle that where a Court of competent jurisdiction has decided an issue, the same ought not to be allowed to be agitated again and again. Such a doctrine would be wholly inapplicable to cases where the two forums have separate and independent jurisdictions.\n\nIn the instant case, the High Court decided the petition of the detenn under Art. 226 which was a discretionary jurisdiction whereas the jnrisdiction to grant relief in a petition under Art. 32 filed in the Supreme Court is guaranteed by the Constitution and once the Court finds that there has been a violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution, then it has no discretion in the matter but is bound to' grant the relief to the detenu by setting aside the order of detention.\n\nThe doctrine of res iudicata or the principles of finality of judgment cannot be allowed to whittle down or override the express constitu-\n\n(1)\n\n\ntional mandate to the Supreme Court enshrined in Art. 32 of the Constitution. In a recent decision in the case of Smt. Santosh Anand\n\nv. Union of India & Ors.(') this Court has pointed out that the concept of liberty has now been widened by M aneka Gandhi's(') case where Art. 21 as construed by this Court has added new dimensions to the varions features and concepts of. liberty as enshrined in Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution. For these reasons, therefore, we overrule the preliminary objection taken by the respondents.\n\nWe now come to the merits of the cases.\n\nSo far as the writ petition filed in the High Court is concerned the only point taken . , ,,,,.. was that two documents referred to in the order of detention were -'---.. not supplied to the detenu.\n\nThe High Court rejected this contention on the ground that the documents were merely referred to and not relied on by the detaining authority and after having examined the documents it found that the same were not relevant. With due respect to the Judges we are unable to agree with the view taken by them. In the first place, it was not open to the Court to have waded through the confidential file of the Government in order to fish out a point against the detenu.\n\nSecondly, the question of relevnncc was not to be decided by the Court but by the detaining authority which alone had to consider the representation of the detenu on merits and then come to the conclusion whether it should be accepted or rejected.\n\nAs the reasoning of the High Court, was legally erroneous the order of the High Court cannot be allowed to stand and is hereby quashed.\n\nThe matter does not rest here but two additional points which have been taken in the writ petition before us are sufficient to void the order of detention [passed against the detenu.\n\nIn the first place, it was submitted that the endorsement on the file produced before us by the Gove=ent shows that the documents concerned were examined not by the detaining authority but by the Secretary and there is nothing to show that the note or endorsement of the Secretary\n\nwas placed and approved by the demining authority.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, it must be held that there was no decision by the detaining authority that the documents were irrelevant. It was, however, submitted by Mr. Phadke that the documents concerned were merely referred to in the grounds of detention but did not form the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority at the time when it passed the order of detention. It was, however, conceded by Mr. Phadke that before the grounds were served on the petitioner, the documents were placed before the detain-\n\n(!) W.P. No. 1097/79 (decided on 31-10-1979). (2)\n\n\nmg authority and were, therefore, referred to in the grounds of detention.\n\nIt is manifest, therefore, that the subjective satisfaction could only be asc<; rtained from or reflected in the grounds of the order of detention passed against the detenu otherwise without giving the grounds the mere subjective satisfaction of detaining authority would make the order of detention incompiete and ineffective.\n\nOnce the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention it becomes the bounden duty of the detaining authority to suwly the same to the detenu as part of the grounds or pari passu the grounds of detention.\n\nThere is no particular charm in the expressions 'relied on', 'referred to' or 'based on' because ultimately all these expressions signify one thing, namely, that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining autho-- rity has been arrived at on the documents mentioned in the grounds of detention.\n\nThe question whether the grounds have been referred to, relied on or based on is merely a matter of describing the nature of the grounds. Even so in the case of Ram Chandra A. Kamat v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors.(') a three Judge bench decision of this Court to which one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party, clearly held that even the documents referred to in the grounds of detention have to be furnished to the detenu.\n\nIn this connection the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"If there is undue delay in furnishing the statements and documents referred lo in the grounds of detention the right\n\nto make effective representation is denied.\n\nThe detention E cannot be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law.\"\n\nThe same view was taken in a later decision of this Court in Shri Tushar Thakker v. Union of India & Ors.(') where thls Court observed as follows :- F\n\n\"This Conrt has repeatedly held that the detenu has a constitutional right under Article 22 ( 5) to be furnished with copies of all the materials relied upon or referred to in the grounds of detention, with reasonable expedition.\"\n\nThus, it is absolutely clear to us that whether the documents con- G cerned are referred to, relied upon or taken into consideration by the detaining authority they have to be supplied to the detenu as Part of the grounds so as to enable the detenu to make an effective representation immediately on receiving the grounds of detention.\n\nThis not having been done in the present case the continued detention of the petitioner must be held to be void.\n\n(1) [1980] 2 sec 211.\n\n(2) [J9SOJ 4 sec 499.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP()RTS\n\n\nLastly, the order of detention suffers from yet another serious infirmity which makes the order of detention absolutely non est. The respondents, in their counter-affidavit have categorically averred that the order of detention was passed by the Home Minister, vide the counter affidavit of P.M. Shah at page 86 of the writ petition, where the following averments have been made by Mr. Shah, Deputy Secretary to the Govermnen.t of Gujarat :-\n\n\"Referring to ground No. XXII paragraph 7 of the petition, I say that the file relating to the detention of \\he petitioner was placed before the Home Minister of the State of Gujarat and the Home Minister on careful consideration of the same passed the impugned order of detention.\"\n\nThe representation made by the detenu on 3-10-1980 has been rejected on 14-10-1980 not by the Home Minister but by the Secretary, thus, the representation has been rejected by an authority which had no jurisdiction at all to consider or pass any orders on the representation of the detenu. This, therefore, renders the continued detention of the petitioner void. In an identical case this Court in Smt.\n\nSantosh Anand's case (supra.) observed as follows :-\n\n\"The representation was, therefore, not rejected by the detaining authority and as such the constitutional safeguard under Art. 22(5) as interpreted by this Court, cannot be said to have been strictly observed or complied with.\"\n\nFor the reasons given above, therefore, we allow this petition and direct the detenu to be released forthwith.\n\nThe special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetitwn allowed.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "KIRIT KUMAR CHAMAN LAL KUNDALIYA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KIRIT KUMAR CHAMAN LAL KUNDALIYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 30, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.l\n\nConstitution of India-Art."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 320, "end_char": 344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 346, "end_char": 355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Smuggling Activities Act", "statute": "Smuggling Activities Act"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1235, "end_char": 1245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Smuggling Activities Act", "statute": "Smuggling Activities Act"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1741, "end_char": 1751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2071, "end_char": 2081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2517, "end_char": 2527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 S.C.R. 352", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2595, "end_char": 2614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3019, "end_char": 3030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3124, "end_char": 3134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3520, "end_char": 3533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The doctrine of res judicata or th<i\n\n, principles of finality of judgment cannot be allowed to whittle down or over- .....- ride the express constitutional mandate to the Supreme Court enshrined in C Article 32 of the Constitution. ["}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3549, "end_char": 3559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "723G-H]\n\nThe concept of liberty has now been widened by Maneka Gandhi's case [1978] 2 S, CR- 621 wher\"' Article 21 as construed by this Court has added new dimensions to the various features and concepts of liberty as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, [724B] D\n\nSmt, Santosh Anand v, Union of India & Ors,, W, P. No, 1097/79 (decided on 31-I 0 1979) referred to,\n\n11 was not open to the High Court to have waded through the confidential file of the Government in order to fish out a point against the detenu.", "canonical_name": "M aneka Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3813, "end_char": 3831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "31-I 0 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3938, "end_char": 3949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "723G-H]\n\nThe concept of liberty has now been widened by Maneka Gandhi's case [1978] 2 S, CR- 621 wher\"' Article 21 as construed by this Court has added new dimensions to the various features and concepts of liberty as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, [724B] D\n\nSmt, Santosh Anand v, Union of India & Ors,, W, P. No, 1097/79 (decided on 31-I 0 1979) referred to,\n\n11 was not open to the High Court to have waded through the confidential file of the Government in order to fish out a point against the detenu."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6862, "end_char": 6880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 25-11-1980 of the Gujarat High Court in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6931, "end_char": 6946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Divan, Harjinder Singh and M. M. Lodha for the Petitioner in Writ Petition and in the Criminal Appeal."}}, {"text": "M. M. Lodha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6951, "end_char": 6962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Divan, Harjinder Singh and M. M. Lodha for the Petitioner in Writ Petition and in the Criminal Appeal."}}, {"text": "M. N. Plwdke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Plwdke and M. N. S!JJ\"off for Respondents 1-3."}}, {"text": "M. N. S!JJ\"off", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7045, "end_char": 7059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Plwdke and M. N. S!JJ\"off for Respondents 1-3."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7126, "end_char": 7135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-By our Order dated 21-1-1981 we had already allowed the petition and directed the detenu to be released forthwith. }", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7457, "end_char": 7489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioner (Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya) was detained by an order passed by the Home Minister of the State of Gujarat on 9-9-1980 under s. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act.", "canonical_name": "KIRIT KUMAR CHAMAN LAL KUNDALIYA"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7586, "end_char": 7590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7673, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7762, "end_char": 7783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Petitioner/detenu in the first instance filed a petition for habeas corpus in the High Court of Gujarat which was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 25-11-1980."}}, {"text": "25-11-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7841, "end_char": 7851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Petitioner/detenu in the first instance filed a petition for habeas corpus in the High Court of Gujarat which was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 25-11-1980."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7979, "end_char": 7986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7994, "end_char": 8015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3-10-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9812, "end_char": 9821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, it was urged that although the the case relied upon by the respondents also does not decide that the detenu made a representation to the State Government on 3-10-1980\n\n~ the same was rejected on 14-10-1980 not by the detaining authority, namely, the Hon."}}, {"text": "14-10-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, it was urged that although the the case relied upon by the respondents also does not decide that the detenu made a representation to the State Government on 3-10-1980\n\n~ the same was rejected on 14-10-1980 not by the detaining authority, namely, the Hon."}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10060, "end_char": 10066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phadke appearing for the Smte took a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition filed by the detenu in this Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10438, "end_char": 10445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10794, "end_char": 10801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10936, "end_char": 10943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dewan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10950, "end_char": 10955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dewan, learned counsel for the detenu further submitted that the case relied upon by the respondents also does nqt decide that the writ petition was not maintaining as being barred by principles of\n\nres judicata."}}, {"text": "Sarwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11286, "end_char": 11292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarwar's case (supra.)"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11655, "end_char": 11664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection Subba Rao, C. J. observed as follows :--\n\n\"If the doctrine of res judicata is attracted to an application for a writ of habeas corpus."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12388, "end_char": 12396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachawat, J., in his concurring judgment also endorsed the view of Subba Rao, C. J., and observed as follows :\n\n\"The order of Khanna, J. dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner in the Punjab High Court challenging the legality of the detention order passed by the Ce!}tral Government under s. 3(2) (g) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and asking for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus is not a judgment, and does not operate as tes judicata."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12514, "end_char": 12520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachawat, J., in his concurring judgment also endorsed the view of Subba Rao, C. J., and observed as follows :\n\n\"The order of Khanna, J. dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner in the Punjab High Court challenging the legality of the detention order passed by the Ce!}tral Government under s. 3(2) (g) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and asking for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus is not a judgment, and does not operate as tes judicata."}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12691, "end_char": 12698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12710, "end_char": 12730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12902, "end_char": 12909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13088, "end_char": 13094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13329, "end_char": 13347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the aforesaid case, there is a recent decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shri Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13504, "end_char": 13511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13696, "end_char": 13704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"The position that emerges from a survey of the above decisions is that the application of the doctrine of constructive res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14093, "end_char": 14100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14475, "end_char": 14482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15053, "end_char": 15061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15162, "end_char": 15169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15291, "end_char": 15301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15648, "end_char": 15655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M aneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15840, "end_char": 15854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court has pointed out that the concept of liberty has now been widened by M aneka Gandhi's(') case where Art.", "canonical_name": "M aneka Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15871, "end_char": 15878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15996, "end_char": 16011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "31-10-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18314, "end_char": 18324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1097/79 (decided on 31-10-1979). ("}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19523, "end_char": 19532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a three Judge bench decision of this Court to which one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party, clearly held that even the documents referred to in the grounds of detention have to be furnished to the detenu.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20200, "end_char": 20210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sec 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20815, "end_char": 20822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20838, "end_char": 20845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.M. Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21164, "end_char": 21173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents, in their counter-affidavit have categorically averred that the order of detention was passed by the Home Minister, vide the counter affidavit of P.M. Shah at page 86 of the writ petition, where the following averments have been made by Mr. Shah, Deputy Secretary to the Govermnen.t of Gujarat :-\n\n\"Referring to ground No."}}, {"text": "Santosh Anand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22004, "end_char": 22017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Santosh Anand's case (supra.)"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22181, "end_char": 22191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_727_734_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RAINBOW STEELS LTD. AND ANR.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.\n\nJanuary 30, 1981\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ]\n\nUttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948 S. 3A-State Government nptifying \"Sale of old discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery\" as liable to tax--Sale vf ti/Ci 111al power plant in running condition-Whether exigible to .tax.\n\nInterpretatiOI/ of Statutc:c.-Principle of noscitur a sociis-When can be invoked.\n\nJn exercise of the power under section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 the State Government, issued a notification datd May 30, 1975 which provided that the tu1nover in respect of \"old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery, stores or vehicles etc.\" shall be liable to tax at the point of sale at the rate of five per cent.\n\nA Thermal Power Plant together with its associate auxiliaries, components and accessories belonging to the State Electricity Board was sold in a working condition to the Appellant No. 1, who paid sales tax on the sale under protest The power plant was used by Appellant No. l and as the power position in the State improved, Appellant No. 1 discontinued the generation of electricity through this power plant and negotiated its sale to Appellant No. 2.\n\nSince there was dilTerence of opinion between the parties as to the pa•yment of sales tax on the machinery the question was referred for clarification to the Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 35 of the Act. The Commissioner was of the view that the four words, \"old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\" had been used disjunctively and each adjective had its own meanin& and seme and that since the power plant had been used before its sale it was \"old\" machinery and the sale was liable to tax under the said Entry.\n\nThe order of thP. Comn1issioner was confirmed by the High Court.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court, on behalf of the Appe1lants it was submitted invoking the principle of no\"Seitur a sociis that th~ expression 'old' which is G more general should be restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general expressions. namely \"discardedi unserviceable or obsolete,, and read in this manner the sale of the power plant could not be re.i.; arded as sale of \"old\" m:ichinerv falling within the Entry.\n\nOn behalf of the Respondents it was contended that the four adjectives occurring in the Entry have been used disjunctively and each must be given H its own separate meaning, 3nd 'that the principle of noscitur a sociis would nm: apply to the construction of the expression\n\n1old'.\n\nA Allowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. The thermal power plant was in perlect running condition and was 1:iold as such.\n\nJt would not faII within Entry No. 15 of the Notification.\n\n[733D]\n\n2. The four adjectives \"old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\" which are susceptible to analogous meaning are clubbed together while qualifying machinery in the Entry. The first adjectiv~ 'old' is clearly more. general than the other three and as such all the four would take their colour from each othc.:r. the meaning of the more general adjective 'old' being restriicted to a sense analogous to that of the less general namely \"disca•rded, unserviceable or obsolete\".\n\nAll the four adjectives which qualify the word \"machinery\" have been used disjunctively. The adjective 'old' by itself is vague, imprecise and ambiguous for there is no indication as to how n1uch old the machinery should be before it could be described as 'old machinery'--one day old, one month old, one yea.r old, five years old or even ten years old (the degree of oldness being a relative concept). l732F-733A]\n\n3. In the absence of any indication that the adjective 'old' has been deliberately used in a wider sense ¥.1hcn the expression 'old' is by itself vague, imp1ecise and ambiguous, being too general, the principle of noscitur a sociia will have to be applied i.e. all the associated words will take colour from each other. [733Bj\n\n4. (i) The principle of noscitur a sociis is clearly applicable to the cons~ truction of the expression old' occurring in Entry No. 15, and that expression will have to be given a restricted 1neaning-a sense analogous to that of the less gene!al \\.Vottls clubbed \\.Vith it.\n\n[732A]\n\n(ii) ]f the \\:vider words used are in themselves va.gue imprecise or ambiguou~ and there is no indication that thesei have been deliberately used to\n\ninfue \\vider n1eaning then the rule of noscitur a sociis can be invoked.\n\n[732E]\n\nState of Bombay & Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. [1960] 2 S.C.ll. 866 and l'he Corporation of the City of Nagpur v.\n\nIts En1ployee3 [1960] 2 S.C.R. 942 referred to.\n\nLetang v. Cooper [1965] I Q.B. 232 distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 337 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from 18-4-1979 of the Allahabad High F.A.F.O. No. 39/77.\n\nthe Judgment and Court (Lucknow\n\nOrder dated Bench) in\n\nV. M. Tarkunde and B. R. Sabharwal for the Appellant.\n\nS. Markandey for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. This appeal by special leave raises the question whether on true construction of Entry No. 15 of the Notification No.\n\nST-II-4949/X-10(2)-74 dated May 30, 1975 issued under S.3A of A U.P. Sales Tax Act 1948, the negotiated sale of a Thermal Power\n\nPlant by appellant No. 1 to aiwellant No. 2 is exigible to sales tax thereunder?\n\nThe short facts giving rise to the question may be stated : A Thermal Power Plant at Rampur comprising seven boilers, five tur- 8 bines together with its associate auxiliaries components and accessories originally belonged to the U.P. State Electricity Board. The Board, after selling it in working condition to appellant No. 1 on May 29, 1974 for Rs. 41.31 lakhs called upon the fatter to pay sales tax thereon which was paid under protest.\n\nAppellant No. 1 used it for generating electricity from May 29, 1974 to September 30, 1975.\n\nC As the power position improved in the State of U.P. appellant No. 1 discontinued the generation of electricity through this power plant and finding it expedient to realise its investment negotiated a sale thereof in perfect working condition to appellant No. 2.\n\nAppellant No. 1 desired to charge sales tax on the said negotiated sale but appellant Ne. 2 informed appellant No. 1 that it had obtained considered D opinion that no sales tax on such a transaction was leviable inasmuch as the sale was not of \"old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery,\" falling within Entry No. 15 of the concerned Notification dated May 30, 1975.\n\nBoth the appellants thereupon referred the question for clarification to the Commissioner of Sales Tax\n\nU.P., Lucknow under Section 35 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act 1948. It was E contended on their behalf that the word (adjective) \"old\" occurring in the Entry would take colour from the other words (adjectives) that follow it and the cumulative effect of all the words taken together showed that those words were either synonymous or near synonymous suggesting that the machinery in order to fall within the Entry should become non functional or non usable and that since the power plant in question had not become \"old\" in that sense and was in perfect working condition it would not fall within the Entry and the sale thereof by ajppellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2 was not exigible to tax.\n\nThe Commissioner by his order dated February 19, 1977 negatived the contention holding that the four words \"old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\" had been used disjunctively and each adjective had its own meaning and sense and that since the power plant had been used before its sale by appellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2 it was cild machlnery and the sale thereof was liable to tax under the said Entry.\n\nFeeling aggrieved by that order the aP1Pellants preferred an appeal H to the Allahabad High Court being F.A.F.O. No. 39 of 1977 and a learned single judge of the Lucknow Bench on April 18, 1979 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the Commissioner's view that since the concerned power plant had been purchased by appellant No. 1 long ago and had been put to use it was \"old machinery\" within the meaning of the Entry, observing that \"the degree of oldness has to be greater than recently manufactured machinery used only for the some time\".\n\nThe Commissioner's view as confirmed by the High Court is challenged by the appellants before us in this appeal.\n\nSection 3A of tbe U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 empowers the State Government to specify the rates of taxes and the point at which the tax can be imposed, subject to a maximum of 12 per cent, on the turn over in respect of the goods specified in the First Schedule to the Act and clause (b) empowers the State Government to amend the entries in the Schedule. In exercise of the aforesaid power the State Government issued tbe Notification No.\n\nST-II-4949/X-10(2)-74 dated May 30, 1975 which provided that witb effect from June 1, 1975 the turn over in respect of the goods specified in column II of the Schedule to this Notification shall be liable to tax at the point of sale and at the rate specified respectively in columns III and IV thereof :\n\nSI.\n\nNo.\n\nSchedule\n\n'M' Stands for sale by manufacturer in Uttar Pradesh. 'I' stands for sale by the importer in Uttar Pradesh.\n\nDescription of goods Point at which Rate of tax tax shall be levied.\n\nIII IV\n\n15.\n\nOld, discarded, unserviceable or obso- Sale to consu- 5 per cent Iete machinery, stores or vehicles inmer eluding waste products except cinder, coal ash and such items as are included in any other notification issued under the Act.\n\nThe question is whether the negotiated sale of tbe Thermal Power -O Plant at Rampur by appellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2 falls within tbe aforesaid Entry so as to attract sales tax at 5 per cent on the sale price charged by appellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2? In other words the qnestion is whether it is a sale of \"old machinery\" within the meaning of the Entry and what is the true meaning of the expression \"old machinery\". It is undisputed that the Thermal Power Plant 11 in question when it was sold by U.P.\n\nState Electricity Board to appellant No. 1 on May 29, 1974 was in perfect running condition and tbe Sales tax on that transaction was paid under protest. It is\n\n.... (\n\nfurther undisputed tlmt awellaut No. 1 used that power plant for generating electricity for about a year and four months and because the power position improved in the State of U.P. the appellant No. 1 negotiated the sale thereof to appellant No. 2 with the view to realise back its investment and the power plant had been kept in !Perfect running condition with periodical checks by the Inspector of Factories as also by the Inspector of Boilers and when sold it was in perfect working and running condition.\n\nQuestion is whether such power plant could be regarded as \"old machinery\" within the meaning of Entry 15.\n\nCounsel for the appellants contended that it could not be regarded as old machinery in the sense that it had become non-functional or non-usable whic)l meaning should be given to the expression 'old' occurring in the Entry.\n\nIn other words, he sought to invoke the principle of noscitur a sociis for constrning expression 'old' because of its association with the other expressions like \"discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\" occurring in the Entry.\n\nAccording to the counsel the expression 'old' which is more general should be restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general expressions, namely,\n\n\"discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\" and read in this manner the sale of the power plant in question could not be regarded as sale of old machinery falling within the Entry.\n\nOn the other hand counsel for the respondents supported the view taken by the Commissioner of Sales Tax as well as by the High Court, for, according to him the principle of noscitur a sociis would not apply to the construction of the eXjpression 'old' occurring in the Entry. He urged that the four adjectives have been used disjunctively and each must be given its own separate meaning and pointed out that in two decisions, namely, State of Bomhy & Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors.(')\n\nand The Corporation of the City of Nagpur v.\n\nIts Employees(') this Court refused to apply the said principle while construing the definition of 'industry' given in s.2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in s.2(14) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 respectively, and that in Letang v. Cooper(')\n\nDiplock, L. J., has observed thus : \"The maxim noscitur a sociis is always a treacherous one unless you know the societas to which the socii belong.\" According to 1rim further the ejusdem generis principle would be clearly inapplicable inasmuch as it was not a case where some general words follow any particular, generic or specific words.\n\n(1) [1960] 2 SCR 866.\n\n(2) [1960] 2 SCR 942.\n\n(3) [l 965] l Q.B. 232.\n\nHaving given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions urged before us, we are clearly of the view that the principle of noscitur a sociis is clearly applicable to the construction of the expression 'old' occurring in Entry No. 15, and that eXJPression will have to be give a restricted meaning-a sense analogous to that of the less general words clubbed with it. The principle is explained in MaxweN on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 289 thus :\n\n\"Where (Wo or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, noscitur a socfis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense.\n\nThey take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general.\"\n\nMoreover, even in the two decisions relied upon by counsel for the respondents where this Court refused to apply the principle of noscitur a sociis while construing the definition of 'industry' in the two concerned enactments because the Legislature bad deliberately used wider words in order to make the scope of defined word correspondingly wider, the Court has observed that \"it is only when the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful or is otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied.\" In other words, if the wider words used are in themselves vague, imprecise or ambiguous and there is no indication that these have been deliberately used to infuse wider meaning then this rule of construction can be invoked.\n\nDealing with the Entry in question, in the first place it cannot be disputed that the four adjectives which are susceptible to analogous\n\nmeaning are clubbed together while qualifying 'machinery' in the Entry. Secondly, it cannot be disputed that the first adjective 'old' is clearly more general than the other three and as such all the four G would take their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general adjective 'old' being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general, namely, \"discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\".\n\nThirdly, it is true that all the four adjectives which qualify the word 'machinery' have been used disjunctively but it is precisely for that reason that the adjective 'old' becomes vague, imprecise and ambig- B nous, being too general.\n\nThe adjective 'old' by itself i~ certainly vague, imprecise and ambiguous, for there is no indication as to how much old the maahinery should be before it could be described as\n\n• •\n\nold machinery. A machinery could be one day old, one month old,\n\non~ year old, five years old or even ten years old, (the degree of oldness being a relative concept) and which one is intended to be ill.eluded in the Entry has not been made clear at all. And, lastly, there is nothing in the Entry to indicate that the adjective 'old' has been deliberately used in a wider sense. In the absence of any indication to that effect and when the expression 'old' is by itself vague, impse, and ambiguous, being too general, the principle of noscitur a sociis will have to be applied i.e. all the associated words will take colour from each other, the meaning of the more general, adjective viz. 'old' being restricted to a sense analogous to the less general adjectives \"discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\". In other words in order to fall within th~ expression 'old machinery' occurring in the Entry, the machinery mnst be old machinery in the sense that it has become non•\n\nfunctional or non-usable. In our view, therefore, on true construction the sale of the Thermal Power Plant which at the time of sale by appellant No. l to appellant No. 2 was in perfect running condition and which was sold as such would not fall within the aforesaid Entry No. 15 of the concerned Notification dated May 30, 1975.\n\nThe English decision of the Court of Appeal in Letang v. Cooper\n\n(supra) relied upon by counsel for the respondents is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as it dealt with a statute which referred to \"negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue E of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision),\" and when it was argued that because the cause of action in both nuisance and negligence included the infliction of actual damage as an essential element, \"breach of duty\" should also be understood as confined to causes of\n\nation in which actual damage was likewise essential the said conten- F tion was rejected by Diplock, L.J., by observing thus :\n\n\"It is clear, however, that 'breach of duty' cannot be restricted to those giving rise to causes of action in which the infliction of actual damage is an essential element, for the words in parentheses expressly extend to a duty which exists by virtue of a contract and the infliction of actu_al damage is not an essential element in an actfon for breach of contractual duty.\"\n\nIn other words, it was a case of a statute where the parentheticel portion occurring therein expressly indicated the contrary intention-con- H trary to the contention urged and, therefore, the principle of noscitur a sociis was not applied.\n\n14-152SCl/81\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed and the view of the lower anthorities is set aside and the sale in question is declared to be not exigible to tax under Entry No. 15 of the concerned Notification dated May\n\n30, 1975 .. In the circumstance, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "RAINBOW STEELS LTD. AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAINBOW STEELS LTD. AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 97, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 30, 1981\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ]\n\nUttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948 S. 3A-State Government nptifying \"Sale of old discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery\" as liable to tax--Sale vf ti/Ci 111al power plant in running condition-Whether exigible to .tax."}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Uttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948", "statute": "Uttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948"}}, {"text": "section 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 481, "end_char": 491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948", "statute": "Uttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 504, "end_char": 523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 30, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 573, "end_char": 585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn exercise of the power under section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 the State Government, issued a notification datd May 30, 1975 which provided that the tu1nover in respect of \"old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery, stores or vehicles etc.\""}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1431, "end_char": 1441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 942", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4893, "end_char": 4907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Judgment and Court (Lucknow\n\nOrder dated Bench) in\n\nV. M. Tarkunde and B. R. Sabharwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. Sabharwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Judgment and Court (Lucknow\n\nOrder dated Bench) in\n\nV. M. Tarkunde and B. R. Sabharwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Markandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markandey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5026, "end_char": 5037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. This appeal by special leave raises the question whether on true construction of Entry No."}}, {"text": "S.3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5230, "end_char": 5248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5457, "end_char": 5463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short facts giving rise to the question may be stated : A Thermal Power Plant at Rampur comprising seven boilers, five tur- 8 bines together with its associate auxiliaries components and accessories originally belonged to the U.P. State Electricity Board."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5602, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short facts giving rise to the question may be stated : A Thermal Power Plant at Rampur comprising seven boilers, five tur- 8 bines together with its associate auxiliaries components and accessories originally belonged to the U.P. State Electricity Board."}}, {"text": "May 29, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 on May 29, 1974 for Rs."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 used it for generating electricity from May 29, 1974 to September 30, 1975."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5957, "end_char": 5961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C As the power position improved in the State of U.P. appellant No."}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6661, "end_char": 6668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the appellants thereupon referred the question for clarification to the Commissioner of Sales Tax\n\nU.P., Lucknow under Section 35 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act 1948."}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6698, "end_char": 6716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 19, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7378, "end_char": 7395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner by his order dated February 19, 1977 negatived the contention holding that the four words \"old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete\" had been used disjunctively and each adjective had its own meaning and sense and that since the power plant had been used before its sale by appellant No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7830, "end_char": 7850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Feeling aggrieved by that order the aP1Pellants preferred an appeal H to the Allahabad High Court being F.A.F.O. No."}}, {"text": "Lucknow Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7915, "end_char": 7928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "39 of 1977 and a learned single judge of the Lucknow Bench on April 18, 1979 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the Commissioner's view that since the concerned power plant had been purchased by appellant No."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7932, "end_char": 7946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "39 of 1977 and a learned single judge of the Lucknow Bench on April 18, 1979 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the Commissioner's view that since the concerned power plant had been purchased by appellant No."}}, {"text": "Section 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8408, "end_char": 8418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8431, "end_char": 8450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8653, "end_char": 8667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9211, "end_char": 9224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schedule\n\n'M' Stands for sale by manufacturer in Uttar Pradesh. '"}}, {"text": "U.P.\n\nState Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10106, "end_char": 10135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undisputed that the Thermal Power Plant 11 in question when it was sold by U.P.\n\nState Electricity Board to appellant No."}}, {"text": "s.2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12349, "end_char": 12355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12359, "end_char": 12388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.2(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12396, "end_char": 12403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12420, "end_char": 12466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Diplock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12514, "end_char": 12521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and The Corporation of the City of Nagpur v.\n\nIts Employees(') this Court refused to apply the said principle while construing the definition of 'industry' given in s.2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in s.2(14) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 respectively, and that in Letang v. Cooper(')\n\nDiplock, L. J., has observed thus : \"The maxim noscitur a sociis is always a treacherous one unless you know the societas to which the socii belong.\""}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 SCR 866", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12860, "end_char": 12876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 SCR 942", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12883, "end_char": 12899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May\n\n30, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18394, "end_char": 18407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 of the concerned Notification dated May\n\n30, 1975 .. In the circumstance, there will be no order as to costs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_735_737_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA A v.\n\nKAPUR CHAND KESARIMAL JAIN\n\nJanuary 30, 1981\n\n[A. D. KosHAL, v. BALAKRISHNA BRAD! AND R. B. MISRA, JJ.] B\n\nProbation of Offenders Act-Section 4--Criteria for application of section.\n\nThe respondent was convicted for offences under section 135 of the Customs Act and the Defence of India Rules for smuggling contraband gold into the country and was variously sentenced. When his appeal came to this Court, the C case was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision.\n\nOn remand the High Court accepted the prayer of the respondent that he be given the benefit of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act on the grounds that the contraband golCI recovered from him had been confiscated; that he had been facing criminal litigation for a period of sen years which resulted in a lot of monetary expense and mental agony on his part; that he ¥/as behind the bars for a period of five months, that no other case D on the criminal side was pending against him and that he was not in a position to pay any fine.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of' the State that in giving the benefit of section 4 of the Act, the High Court did not exercise its discretion properly.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : Recourse to section 4 was not at all called for, the time Jag between the commencement of the trial and the pronouncement of the impugned judgn1ent notwithstanding.\n\n[737F-G]\n\nOne of the major criteria in determining whether the benefit of the provisions of section 4 of the Act should be given to the offender or not is the nature of the offence.\n\nThe other relevant factors are the age of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. [737B-C]\n\nIn the instant case none of these factors goes to help the respondent because he was not a immature youth at the time of the commission of the offences; he was not less than 24 years of age then. The offences involved possession of a large quantity of contraband gold.\n\nThat he was apparently a regular smuggler is evident from the fact that a large quantity of gold with foreign marking and a number of empty jackets meant for storage of the gold were found in his possession. The fact that such offence had become rampant and had already endangered the economy of the nation is part of current history and a Court cannot look upon the present state of affairs with equanimity and deal with such offences leniently. [7370.E]\n\nThere is nothing on the record to show that the respondent was_ not in a H position to pay any fine.\n\n[737F]\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION' : Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated • 26-6-1973 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 504/72.\n\nB V. S. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.\n\nAnil Kumar Gupta for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J .-The respondent in this case was convicted by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay for an offem:e under clause (a) read with clause (i) of section 135 of the Customs Act, another under clause (b) read with clause (i) of that section and still another under Rule 126(H) (IA) read with Rule 126-P(ii) & (iv) of the Defence of India Rules.\n\nHe was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to rigorous imprisonment for 4-1 /2 months on each of the first two counts, and to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 10,000 /- on the third count, the sentence in default of payment of fine being rigorous imprisonment for 3 months.\n\nThe conviction recorded against and the sentence imposed upon the respondent were challenged by him right upto this Ccrurt which remanded the case to the Bombay High Court for a fresh decision. Before the High Court, no challenge was made after remand to the conviction and the only prayer made was that the respondent be given the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of , Offenders Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). That prayer was accepted by the High Court on the following five grounds :-\n\n(a) The contraband gold recovered from the respondent (which amounted to 2015 tolas) bas been confiscated by the Customs autho-- ties.\n\n(b) By the time the High Court pronounced its judgment after remand, the respondent had been facing criminal litigation for a period of 7 years which resulted in a lot of monetary expense and mental agony on his part. ( c) The respondent had already been behind the bars for a period of 5 months.\n\nH ( d) No other case on the criminal side was pending against the respondent. ( e) The respondent was not in a position to pay any fine.\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. KAPUR CHAND (Koshal, I.) 737\n\nIt has been vehemently argued on behalf of the State by Mr. Desai that in giving the benefit of Section 4 of the Act to the respondent, the High Court did not exercise its discretion properly and we find ourselves in agreeqient with him in spite of the learned arguments advanced by Mr. Gupta appearing as amicus curiae in support of the impugned judgment.\n\nWe may mention at the very outset that under Section 4 of the Act, the nature of the offence is one of the major ctifilria for determining whether benefit of its provion§ is to be given to the concerned offender or not.\n\nHis age would be another relevant factor.\n\nThe circumstances in which the offence was co=itted may be a third important consideration. None of these factors, as appearing in the present case, goes (o help !lie respondent.\n\nThe respondent was not an innnature youth at the time of the commission of !he 3 offences brought home to him, being no Jess than 24 years of age.\n\nThe offence committed by him, as already pointed out, in'.\"olved possession of no !es~ than 2015 tola.s of contraband gold and it may w_ell be that the respondent was a regular smuggler, for had that not been the case, there is no reason why he should have been found in possession of such a huge quantity of gold with foreign markings and a number of empty jackets meant for storage of the precious metal. From one point of view the offence may not be considered heinous as it merely contravenes a Jaw prohibiting illegal gain simpliciter, there being no clement of detriment to the life and liberty of others, but then the fact that such offences have become rampant and have already endangered the economy of the nation is part of current history and this Court cannot look upon the present state of affairs with equanimity and deal with the commission of such offences leniently. Nor do we find that there was any material whatsoever on the record to justify the observation by the High Court that the respondent was not in a position to pay any fine.\n\nIn this view of the matter, we think that recourse to section 4 of the Act was not at all called, for the time-lag between the commencement of the trial and the pronouncement of the impugned judgment notwithstanding. Consequently, we set aside that judgment in so far as it concerns the use of that section and restore instead the conviction recorded against and the sentence imposed upon the respondent by the trial Court on each of the three counts. He shall be taken into custody forthwith.\n\nThe appeal is disposed of accordingly.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n15-152 SCI/81", "total_entities": 28, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KAPUR CHAND KESARIMAL JAIN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAPUR CHAND KESARIMAL JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA A v.\n\nKAPUR CHAND KESARIMAL JAIN\n\nJanuary 30, 1981\n\n[A. D. KosHAL, v. BALAKRISHNA BRAD!"}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258, "end_char": 269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 277, "end_char": 288, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 592, "end_char": 601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 609, "end_char": 635, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1133, "end_char": 1142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1500, "end_char": 1509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B V. S. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2805, "end_char": 2817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B V. S. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Kumar Gupta for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2920, "end_char": 2926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J .-The respondent in this case was convicted by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay for an offem:e under clause (a) read with clause (i) of section 135 of the Customs Act, another under clause (b) read with clause (i) of that section and still another under Rule 126(H) (IA) read with Rule 126-P(ii) & (iv) of the Defence of India Rules."}}, {"text": "Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 3050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J .-The respondent in this case was convicted by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay for an offem:e under clause (a) read with clause (i) of section 135 of the Customs Act, another under clause (b) read with clause (i) of that section and still another under Rule 126(H) (IA) read with Rule 126-P(ii) & (iv) of the Defence of India Rules."}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3126, "end_char": 3137, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conviction recorded against and the sentence imposed upon the respondent were challenged by him right upto this Ccrurt which remanded the case to the Bombay High Court for a fresh decision."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4020, "end_char": 4029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4858, "end_char": 4863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA v. KAPUR CHAND (Koshal, I.) 737\n\nIt has been vehemently argued on behalf of the State by Mr. Desai that in giving the benefit of Section 4 of the Act to the respondent, the High Court did not exercise its discretion properly and we find ourselves in agreeqient with him in spite of the learned arguments advanced by Mr. Gupta appearing as amicus curiae in support of the impugned judgment."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4894, "end_char": 4903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5085, "end_char": 5090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA v. KAPUR CHAND (Koshal, I.) 737\n\nIt has been vehemently argued on behalf of the State by Mr. Desai that in giving the benefit of Section 4 of the Act to the respondent, the High Court did not exercise its discretion properly and we find ourselves in agreeqient with him in spite of the learned arguments advanced by Mr. Gupta appearing as amicus curiae in support of the impugned judgment."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5201, "end_char": 5210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6859, "end_char": 6868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_738_741_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "A MANAGING DIRECTOR, CHALTHAN VIBHAG SAHAKARl\n\nKHAND UDYOG, CHALTHAN, DIST. SURAT\n\nGOVERNMENT LABOUR OFFICER & ORS.\n\nB February 4, 1981\n\n[A P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nPaynient of Bonus Act, 1965-Section 2(21)-}Vhether the exprcsion 'salary or wage• in s.2(21) of the Act covers retaining allowance during tfte off season granted to the 1vorkn1en in the seasonal estahlislunent of the sugar C factory of the Udyog.\n\nThe appellant whkh runs a sugar factory, treated the retaining allowance paid to the workmen during the off-season as part of their wages for the purpose of the Employe_es' Provident Fund Act, 1972, but not for the purpose of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.\n\nOn a reference of an industrial dispute, the Industrial Court, Gujarat made an award holding that the allowance cannot D be included in wages or remuneration for the purpose of calculation of bonu\">.\n\n]<'\n\nThe Gujarat High Court set aside the a\\vard in writ petition and held that the allo\\vance fell within the definition of the expression 'salary or wage' in s. 2(21) of the Act. The appellant sought special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nDis1nissing the special leave petition, the Court.\n\nlJELD : The retaining allowance paid to the employees during the off-season 1n the sugar industry partakes the nature of deferred wages on a lo\\Yer scale and falls within the definition of the expression 'salary or wage' within the meaning of s.2(21) of the Payn1ent of Bonus Act, 1965 and, therefore, must be taken into account for the purpose of calculation of bonus payable under s.-10 of the Act.\n\nThe definition of the expression 'salary or wage' as given in s.2(21) of the Act is wide enough to cover the retaining allowance granted to the workmen during the off-season.\n\nThe retaining allowance is nothing l:a.lt remuneration correlated to service and it would be a misnomer to call it an allowance. It does not fall within the purview of clause (i) of the exclt¥ionary clause of s.2(21) but comes within the substantive part of the definlion uE 'salary or wage' ins. 2(21) of the Act.\n\n[741A-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1122 of 1981.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 28-11-1980 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Application No. 2003 /80.\n\nF. S. Nariman, TI. K. Puri and Arnn B. Desai for the Petitioner.\n\nCharan/al Salm for Respondent No. 3.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controversy in this case is whether for the purpose of bonus to the workmen employed in the Chalthan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog, Chalthan, which is a seasonal establishment, retaining allowance paid to such workmen should be regarded as remuneration or wages under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. The question arises under the following circumstances :\n\nThe Industrial Court, Gujarat, by its Award dated July 11, 1980 held that the retaining allowance pairt to the. workmen could not be included for the purpose of calculation of bonus and, therefore. the demand of the workmen was not justified. Thereupon, the workmen challenged the Award by a Writ Petition in the Gujarat High Court.\n\nThe High Court by its judgment dated December 15, 1980 set aside the Award of the Industrial Court and held that the. retaining allowance falls within the definition of the expression 'salary or wage' given in s. 2(21) of the Payment of Barrus Act, 1965 so as to attract the payment of bonus in the context thereof under s. 10 of the Act.\n\nFor a proper understanding of the question involved, it is necessary •to state a few facts. Chalthan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog runs a seasonal factory which crushes sugarcane and produces sugar.\n\nIt does not work for all the 12 months in year.\n\nThere is an offseason during the year during which the factory remains closed. Fnr this off-season during which the workmen suffer forced idleness, full wages are not paid. There are several categories of workmen employed by the management. There are unskilled workmn who are paid 10% of the basic wages and dearness allowance as retaining allowance during the off-season. There are also semi-skilled workmen who get 25 % of the basic wages and dearness allowance as retaining allowance. The rest, i.e., skilled 'C' to supervisory class of workmen, are paid at the rate of 50% of basic wages and dearness allowance as retaining aUowance during the off-season. The retaining allowance is paid to these workmen after 40 days of work in the next crushing season. Workmen in sngar factories in the State of Gujarat usually come from the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nDuring the off-season, they engage themselves in different occupation. Retaining allowance is a sort of incentive which is offered to the workmen to attract them to return to the factory after the expiry of the off-season.\n\nThe retaining allowance is paid in pursuance of the Report of thel Second Central Industrial Wage Board on the Sugar Industry and\n\nsubsequently in implementation of the Award of the Tndustrial ronrt.\n\nH Gujarat, based on the adoption of the U.P. Pattern Scales of Wages :md Dearness Allowance for workmen employed in all sugar factories\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nworking by vacuum Pan Manufacturing Process. Jn the Management of Shri Cha/than Vighab Khand Udyog Sahakari Mandali Ltd. etc. v. B. S. Barot and Anr. etc.(•) the Management challenged the Award on other grounds but did not question its liability to pay retaining allowance to the seasonal workmen. The payment of the retaining allowance by the Management to the workmen during the off-season is obligatory.\n\nThe Management treated the retaining allowanc to be part of wages for purposes of the Employees' Provident Funds Ae, t, l 952 but not for purposes of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.\n\nThe obligation to pay bonus to the workmen is creted by ' 10 of the Act.\n\nUnder s. 8 thereof, every employee is eligible for payment of bonus.\n\nThe question is whether retaining allowance should be regarded as remuneration or wages for purposes of computation of bonus.\n\nThe decision whether the retaining allowance forms '\"\"t of 'salary or wage' must tum on the construction of the definition of that expression contained in s. 2(2.ll of the Act which. in so far as it is relevant. reads :\n\n2(1). \"salary or wage\" means all remuneration (other than remuneration in respect of overtime work) capable of . being expressed in terms of money which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to any employee in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and includes dearness allowance (that is to say, aII cash payments, by whatever name called, paid to an employeR on account of a rise in the cost of livin.11). but does not include-\n\n(i) any other allowance which the employee is for the time being entitled to;\n\nxx xx xx\n\nThere can be no donbt that the retaining allowance paid to thP- ~- workmen dnring the off-season falls within the substantive part of the ifeflnition of the expression 'salary or wage'.\n\nIt nndoubtedlv is remuneration which would, if the terms of employment, express or G imolied, were fulfilfod, be payable to any employee in respect of his employment.\n\nThe retaining allowance is a remuneration on a lower scale which is paid to the workmen by the management during tl1e off-season for their forced idleness.\n\nThe pavment of such allowance b; v the management to its workmen during the off-season when there is no work and when the factory is not working, is indicative of t]1e ( H fact that it wants to retain their services for thPnext crushing season.\n\nThe very fact that retaining allowance is paid to the workmen dearlv\n\n(!) [1980] I SCR 509,\n\nshows that their services are retained and, therefore, the jural relationship of employer and the employee continues.\n\nIt is true that a workman may \"not return to work and may take up some other job or employment. In that event, be forfeits the right of payme\"nt of the retaining allowance.\n\nBut when the workmeh returns to work when !he next crushing s•oason starts, the payment of retaini11g allowa11ce during the off-season, partakes the nature of basic wag•2 on a diminished scale.\n\nThe definition of the expression 'salary or wage' given in s. 2 (21) of the Act is wide enough to cover the payment of retaining allowance to the workmen.\n\nIt is nothing but remuneration correlated to service and it would be a misnomer to call it an allowance.\n\nThe retaining allowance does not fall witjl.in the purview of clause\n\n(i) of the exclusionary clause of s. 2(21), but comes within the substantive part of the definition of 'salary or wage' in s. 2(21) of the Act.\n\nTue retaining allowance cannot be construed to be any O\\her allowance which the employee is, for the time being, entitled.\n\nThe High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that the retaining allowance paid to the seasonal employees was a part of iheir 'salary or wage' within the meaning of s. 2(21) of the Act and, therefore, must be taken into account for the purpose of calculation of bonus payable under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.\n\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the High Court is upheld.\n\ns. R.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "A MANAGING DIRECTOR, CHALTHAN VIBHAG SAHAKARl\n\nKHAND UDYOG, CHALTHAN, DIST. SURAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGING DIRECTOR, CHALTHAN VIBHAG SAHAKAR KHAND UDYOG, CHALTHAN, DIST. SURAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENT LABOUR OFFICER & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOVERNMENT LABOUR OFFICER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Paynient of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 206, "end_char": 219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Paynient of Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "Paynient of Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "s.2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 263, "end_char": 270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Paynient of Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "Paynient of Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Provident Fund Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 599, "end_char": 623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 656, "end_char": 682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Court, Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 730, "end_char": 755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a reference of an industrial dispute, the Industrial Court, Gujarat made an award holding that the allowance cannot D be included in wages or remuneration for the purpose of calculation of bonu\">."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 895, "end_char": 913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "]<'\n\nThe Gujarat High Court set aside the a\\vard in writ petition and held that the allo\\vance fell within the definition of the expression 'salary or wage' in s. 2(21) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "s.2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1444, "end_char": 1451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1471, "end_char": 1486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1665, "end_char": 1672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "s.2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1988, "end_char": 1995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[741A-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) No."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2295, "end_char": 2308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, TI."}}, {"text": "K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2314, "end_char": 2321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Puri and Arnn B. Desai for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Arnn B. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2326, "end_char": 2339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Puri and Arnn B. Desai for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2440, "end_char": 2443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controversy in this case is whether for the purpose of bonus to the workmen employed in the Chalthan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog, Chalthan, which is a seasonal establishment, retaining allowance paid to such workmen should be regarded as remuneration or wages under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965."}}, {"text": "Chalthan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog, Chalthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controversy in this case is whether for the purpose of bonus to the workmen employed in the Chalthan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog, Chalthan, which is a seasonal establishment, retaining allowance paid to such workmen should be regarded as remuneration or wages under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965."}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2722, "end_char": 2748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "July 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2857, "end_char": 2870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question arises under the following circumstances :\n\nThe Industrial Court, Gujarat, by its Award dated July 11, 1980 held that the retaining allowance pairt to the."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court by its judgment dated December 15, 1980 set aside the Award of the Industrial Court and held that the."}}, {"text": "s. 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3351, "end_char": 3359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Payment of Barrus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Barrus Act, 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Barrus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Chalthan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3573, "end_char": 3609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chalthan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog runs a seasonal factory which crushes sugarcane and produces sugar."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4531, "end_char": 4538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Workmen in sngar factories in the State of Gujarat usually come from the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4570, "end_char": 4583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Workmen in sngar factories in the State of Gujarat usually come from the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5750, "end_char": 5776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5859, "end_char": 5863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8256, "end_char": 8260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8563, "end_char": 8571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8652, "end_char": 8660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8969, "end_char": 8977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9090, "end_char": 9116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_742_760_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU\n\n11.\n\nHIND STONE ETC.\n\nFebruary 5, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nMines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1951-Section 15-Rule 8-C of Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959-Scope of-Rule, if ultra vires the rule making power of the State Government- Whether l'iolative of Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution.\n\nC lnJerpretation-\"Regulation\" whether includes ''prohibition\".\n\nThe Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 (Central Act) 'vas enacted in the public interest to enable the Union to take under its contro1 the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. Exercising its power u'.lder this Act, the Central Government declared by a notification that b?ack granite was a minor mineral.\n\nExercising power vested in it by section 15 of the Act, the State Government made the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. Rule 8 of the Rules pre.scribes the procedure for lease of quarries to private persons.\n\nBv rule 8C, introduced in 1977. leases for quarrying black granite in favour of private persons were banned.\n\nSubrule (2) of this rule enacts that the Statt\" Government themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation v,, holly O\"Wned by the State Government.\n\nSeveral applications for the grant of fresh leases as well as for the rene\\Val of leases for quarrying black granite belonging to the State Government were submitted to the State Government. sOme prior to the introduction of rule 8C and some after the rule came into force. The State Government considered all the applications and rejected all of them in view of nlle SC.\n\nThe respondents filed writ petition questioning the vircs of Rule SC on various grounds.\n\nThe High Court stn1ck do\\vn Rule 8C on the ground fhat it exceeded the rule making power given to the State Government and held that it was not open to the appellant Government to keep the applic~1tions pending for a long time and then to dispose them of on the basis of n rule \\vhich had come into force later.\n\nAs a result all the aprlications were disposed G of without reference to rule 8C.\n\nThe appellant contended that : (T) The approach of the High Court was vitiated by its failure to notice the crucial circumstance thnt the minerals belonged to the Government, (TI) The respondents had no vested or indefe<lsible right to obtain a lease or :i renewal to Quarry the minerals, (TIT) There \\Vere good reasons for banning the grant of lease to quarry black granite to private parties and (IV) The Government could not be compelled to grant leases \\~1hich would result in the destn1ction of the mineral resources of th~ or;:nntry.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it was submitted that (l) the ouestion of ownership of the minerals was irrelevant, (TI) It was not open to the appe11ant\n\n··~\n\nTAMIL NADU V. HIND STONE 743\n\nto exercise its subordinate legislative function in a manner to benefit itself as owner of the minerals, nor was it open to the appellant to create monopoly by such means, (Ill) There was violation of articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution, (IV) Rule 8-C had no application to renewals and (V) That in any event it would not have the effect Qf affecting applications made more\n\nthan 60 days before it can1e into force.\n\nAccepting the appeals, it was\n\nl-lliLD ; llule 8-C was 111ade in bonafi<le exercise 0£ the rule making power of the Appellant Government and not in its misuse to advance its own self interest. Making a rule which is perfectly in order is not to be considered a n1isuse of the rule making power, if it advances the interest of State, which really 111eans the people of the State.\n\nRivers, forests, minerals and as such other resojJrces constitute a nation's natural wealth.\n\nThese resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation.\n\nEvery generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop & conserve the natural resources qf the nation in th~ best possible way.\n\nIt is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the Nation. It is recognised by Parliament.\n\nParliament bas declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of. mines and the development of minerals. [751C-D, 753G-H]\n\n2. The Public interest which induced Parliament to make the declaration contained in S.2 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,\n\ni 957 has naturally to be the pnramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation of Mines & Minerals. Parliament's Policy is clearly discernible froln the provisions of the Act. It is the conservation and the prudent an<l discriminating exploitation of minerals, with a view to secure maximum\n\nbenefit to the community. There are clear sign posts to lead and guide the E subordinate legislating authority in the matter of the making of rules.\n\n[751G-H]\n\n3. The ether proyisions of the Act, particularly sections 4A, 17 and 18, indicate that the rule making authority under S.15 has not exceeded its powers in banning leases for carrying black granite in favour of private parties and in stipulating that the State Government themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by the State Government.\n\nTo view such a rule made by the Subordinate legislating body as a rule made to benefit itself merely l)ecause the State Government happens to be the subordinate legislating body is, but, to take too narrow a view of the functions of that body.\n\n[751H, 752A-BJ\n\nIf. C. Naraya11appa & Ors. v. Stale of Mysore & Ors. [ 1960] 3 SCR 742 G @ 745, 752-753 referred to.\n\n5. 'Vbenever there is a switch over from 'private sector' to 'public sector• it does not necessarily follow that a change of policy requiring express legislative sanction is involved.\n\nIt depends on the subject and the statute.\n\nBut if a decision is taken to ban private mining of a single minor mineral for the purpose of conserving it, such a ban, if it is otherwise within the bounds of the authority given to the Government by the Statute, cannot be said to B involve any change of policy. The policy of the Act rem&ins the same and\n\nit is, the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c.il.\n\nminerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community, E.'Xploitation of minerals by the private and/ or the public sector is contemplated.\n\nIf in the pursuit of the avowed policy of the Act, it is thought exploitation by the public sector is best and wisest in the case of a particular mineral and1 in consequence, the authority competent to make the subordinate iegislation makes a rule banning private exploitation of such mineral, which was hitherto permitted. There is no chaJlSC of policy merely because that was previously permitted is no longer permitted. [756A-D]\n\nAJunicipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo [1896] A.C 88, AtJorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General fol' the Dominion and the Ditillers and Brewers Association, [1896] A.C. 348, State of Uttar Ptadcsh and Others v. Hindustan Alunzinium Corporation Ltd. and Ors., [19i9] 3 SCR 709, G. K. Krishnan etc. v. The State of Tamil Nadu ilnd .1i11r. t:tc. [1975] 2 SCR 7 115 @ 721, Co1n1nonwealth of Australia v ..\n\nBank of New South Wales [1950) A.C. 235 referred to.\n\n6. The restrictions, freedom from which is guaranteed by Art. 301 would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free How or movement of trade. The At and the rules properly made thereunder are, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 301.\n\nEven otherwise Art. 302 which enables Parliament, by law, to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest also furnishes an answer to the claim based on the alleged contravention of Art. 301.\n\n[757F-H, 758A-B]\n\n7. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is a law enacted by Parliament and declared by Parliament to be expedient m the public interest. Rule 8-C has been made by the appellant Govt. by notification in the official Gazette, pursuant to the poWer conferred upon it by sec. 15 of the Act. A statutory rule, while ever subordinate to the parent statute, is, otherwise, to be treated as part of the statute and as effective. \"Rules made under the Statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. [758B-G]\n\nAtiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v.\n\nState of Assam & Ors. [1961] 1 SCR 809 The Automobile Transport Rajasthan Ltd., v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1963] 1 SCR 491 and State of U.P. & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [1961] 2 SCR 679, referred to.\n\n8. Rule 9 makes it clear that a renewal is not to be obtained automatically, for the mere asking.\n\nThe applicant for the renewal has, particularly, to satisfy the Government that the renewal is in the interests of mineral development and that the lease amount is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.\n\nThese conditions have to be fulfilled in addition to whatever criteria is applicable at the time of the grant of lease in the first instance, suitably adapted, of. course, to grant of renewal.\n\nNot to apply the criteria applicable in the first instance may lead to absurd results. Therefore rule 8-C is attracted in considering applications for renewal of leases also.\n\n[759A-D]\n\n9. While the applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed\n\nof in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or rene\\val of a lease and none can claiin a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions.\n\nIn the absence of any vested rights in any one, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the dJsposal of the application despite the fat_ that there is a long delay since the making of the application.\n\n[759G-H, 760!.~\n\n10. The language of Rule 8-C is clear that it can not have any application to lands in which the right to minerals belongs to the applicants themselves.\n\nIn the case of lands in which the right to minerals belongs to private owners and those owners seek permission to quarry black granite the applications will have to be dealt with under the relevant rules in Sec. III of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral concession Rules.\n\nRule 8-C does not impose a general ban on quarrying black granite but only imposes a bar on the grant of leases for quarrying black grnnite.\n\n[760D-F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2602-2604 of 1980.\n\nA\\ppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20-6-1980 of the Madras High Conrt in Writ Petition Nos. 4467 of 1977, 2933 and 4793 of 1978 .\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl. of India for the Appellant in CA\n\n2602/80.\n\nSoll l. Sorabjee for the Appellant in CA 2603/80.\n\nR. Krishnamurthy Adv. Genl. for the appellant in CA 2604/80.\n\nA. V. Rangam and K. Venkatawani for the Appellant in all the matters.\n\nY. S. Chitale (Dr.), Mrs. S. Ramachandran and Mukul Mudgal for Respondent Nos. 11 and 42.\n\nP. Chidambaram and A. S. Nambiyar for the Respondents.\n\nF. S. Nariman, A. V. Rangam and R. N. Sachthey for the interveners.\n\nV. Srinivasan, A. Venkatarayana and P. N. Ramalingam for Respondent No. 45.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-Entry 23 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is, \"Regulation of mines and mineral R development subject to the proviJ; ions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control .of the Union\".\n\nEntry 54\n\nof List I of the Seventh Schedule is \"Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest\". Thus while 'regulation of mines and mineral development' is ordinarily a subject for State legislation.\n\nParliament may, by law, declare the extent to which control of such regulation and development by the Union is expedient in the public interest, and, to that extent, it becomes a subject for Parliamentary legislation.\n\nParliament has accordingly enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. By S. 2 of the Act it is declared that it is expedient in the public interest that! the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent thereafter provided. It is now common ground between the parties that as a result of the declaration made by Parliament, by S. 2 of the Act, the State legislatures are denuded of the whole of their legislative power with resp_ect to regulation of mines and mineral development and that the entire legislative . field has been taken over by Parliament. That this is the true position in law is clear from the pronouncements of this Court in The Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Orissa & Ors.( 1) State of Orissa v. M.A., Tulloch & Co.(2) and Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar & Ors.(') S. 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, defines various expressions occurring in the Act. S. 3 (a) defines 'minor minerals' and it includes any mineral declared to be a minor =era! by the Central Government by a notifica tion in the Official Gazette. 'Black granite' has been so notified by the Central Government as a minor mineral. Section 4 to 9A are grouped under the heading 'General Restrictions on undertaking prospecting and mining operations'. These provisions as well as Sections 10 to 13 are made inapplicable to 'minor minerals' by S. 14. S. 4 prohibits all prospecting or mining qperations except under a licence or a lease granted under the Act and the rules made thereunder.\n\nS.4A(l) enables the State Government on a request made by the Central Government in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral develdpment to terminate a mining lease pre-maturely and grant a fresh mining lease in favour of a Government Company or Corporation owned or controlled by Government.\n\nPerhaps because s.4A(l) is inapplicable to minor minerals because of the provisions of S.14, S.4A(2) has been expressly enacted making somewhat similar provision, as in S.4A(l), in of 'minor minerals' also. S.4A(2)\n\n(I) [1961] 2 SCR 537\n\n(2) (1964) 4 SCil 461.\n\n(3) [1970) 2 SCil 100.\n\nJ enables the State Government, after consultation with the Central Government, if it is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of .) regulation of mines and mineral development so to do, to prematurely terminate a mining lease in respect of any minor mineral and grant a fresh lease in respect of such mineral in favour of a Government Company or Corporation owned or controlled by Government. S.5 imposes certain restrictions on the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases. S.6 prescribes the maximum area for which a prospecting licence or mining lease may be granted.\n\nS. 7 prescribes the period for which prospecting licences may be granted or renewed.\n\nS.8 prescribes the period for which mining leases may be granted or , renewed. S.9 provides for the payment of royalty and S.9A for the payment of dead rent.\n\nSections 10, 11 and 12 constitute a group of sections under the title 'Procedure for obtaining prospecting licences or mining leases in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the Government'.\n\nS.10 provides for making applications for prOSiP<:cting licences or mining leases in respect of any land in which the minerals vest in the Government. S.11 provides for certain preferential rights in favour of certain persons in the matter of grant of mining leases.\n\nS. 12 prescribes the Register of prospecting licences and mining leases to be maintained by the State Government.\n\nS.13 empowers the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases.\n\nIn particular we may mention that S.13(2) (a) empowers the Central Government to make rules providing for 'the persons by whom, and the manner in which, applications for prospecting licences or mining leases in respect of J:oand in which the minerals vest in the Government may be made and the fees to be paid therefor\". S.13(2) (f), we may add, empowers the Central Government to make rules providing for 'the procedure for obtaining a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of any J:oand in which the minerals vest in a person other than the Government and the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which, such\n\n~. licence or lease may be granted or renewed'.\n\nS. I 4 makes the pro-- visions of Sections 4 to 13 inapplicable to minor minerals. S.15 empowers the State Government to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases and other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and purposes connected therewith.\n\nS.15(3) provides for the payment of royalty in respect of minor\n\nJ minerals at the rate prescribed by the rules framed by the State Government. S.16 provides for the modification of mining leases \\ granted before October 25, 1949. S.17 enables the Central Government, after consultation with the State Government to undertake prospecting or mining operations in any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, in which event the Central\n\nA Government shall publish a notification in the official Gazette giving the prescribed particulars. The Central Government may also declare .that no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted in respect pf any land specified in the notification. S. l S casts a special duty on the Centra; I. Government to take all necessary steps for the conservation and development of minerals in India.\n\nSections 19 to 33 are B various miscellaneous provisions with which we are not now concerned.\n\nPursuant to the power vested in it under S.15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, the Government\n\nof Tamil Nadu has made the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession 1\n\nRules, 1959. Section II of the rules consisting of rules 3 to 16is_ entitled \"Government lands in which the minerals belong to the Government\".\n\nRule 8 prescribes the procedure for the kase of\n\nquarries to private persons.\n\nThe ordinary procedure is to publish a notice in the District Gazette inviting applications, thereafter to hold\n\nn auction and finally to grant a lease to the highest bidder. Rule SA which was introduced by way of an amendment in 1972, provides for a special procedure for the sanctioning of leases in favour of applicants who require the minerals for their existing industries or who have an industrial programme for the utilisation of the mineral in their own industry.\n\nRule SB was introduced in 1975 making special provision for the grant of leases for quarrying b1'ack granite.\n\nThe rule is as follows :\n\n\"S-B. Lease of quarries in respect of black granite to private persons (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in rules 8 and SA, the authority competent to grant leases in respect of quarrying black granite shall be the State Government.\n\n(2) An application for the grant of a quarrying lease in respect of any land shall be made to the Collector of thf.\n\nDistrict concerned in the prescribed form in triplicate and shall be accompanied by a fee of Rs. 1001-. The Collector shall after scrutiny, forward the application along with his remarks to the Director of Industries & Commerce who shall technically scrutinise the industrial programme given by the applicant and forward the application with his remarks to the Govetnment.\"\n\n\"(G. o. Ms. No. 993 Industries dt. 25-S-1975\". Rnle 8-C was introduced by G. 0. Ms.\n\nNo. 1312 Industries dated December 2,\n\n1977. By this rule leases for qaurrying black granite\n\nTAMii, NADIJ v. HIND STONE (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 749\n\nln favour of private persons are banned. Leases can only be granted in favour of a Corporation wholly owned by the State Government.\n\nIt is the vires of this rule which was nnder challenge before the High Court and is also under challenge now. It will be useful to extract the same. It is as follows :\n\n\"8-C Lease of quarries in respect of black granite to Government Corporation, etc.\n\n( 1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, on and from 7th December, 1977 no lease for quarrying black granite shall be granted to private persons.\n\n(2) The State Government themselves may engage in quarrying blaek granite or gmnt leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by the State Government.\n\nProvided that in respect of any land belonging to any private person, the consent of such person shall be obtained for\n\nsuch quarrying or lease\".\n\nRule 9 provides for renewal of leases and it is in the following terms :\n\n\"9. Renewal of lease.-{1) The Collector may on application renew for a further period not exceeding the period for which the lease was originally granted in each case if he is E satisfied that-\n\n(i) such renewal is in the interests of mineral development, and\n\n(ii) the lease amo)lnt is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.\n\n(2) Every application for renewal shall be made to Col- 4 lector, sixty days prior to the date of expiry of the lease :\n\nProvided that a lease, the period of which exceeds ten years shall not be renewed except with the sanction of the Director of Industries and Commerce\".\n\nA proviso was added to rule 9(2) in 1975 'Ind it said :\n\n\"provided also that the renewal for quarrying black granite shall be made by the Government\".\n\n) ~veral persons who held leases for quarrying black granite belonging to the State Government and whose leases were about to H expire, applied to the Government of Tamil Nadu for renewal of their leases.\n\nIn some of the cases applications were made long prior\n\nto the date of G. 0. Ms. No. 1312 by which Rule SC was introduced.\n\nSome applicatious were made after Rule S C came into force. There were also some applications for the grant of fresh leases for quarrying ( black granite. All the applications were dealt with after Rule S C came into force a.nd all of them were rejected in view of Rule\n\nSC.\n\nSeveral Writ Petitions were filed in the High Court questioning the vires of Rule SC on various grounds. Apart from canvassing the vires of Rule SC, it was contended that Rule SC did not aipply to grant of renewals of lease at all. It was also argued that in any event, in those cases in which the applications for renewal bad been made prior to the coming into force of Rule SC, their applications ....... should have been dealt with without reference to Rule\n\nSC.\n\nThe---· -.....\n\nMadras High Court while not accepting some of the contentions raised\n\non behalf of the aplicants, struck down Rule SC on the ground that it exceeded the rule making power given to the State Government under S.15 which, it was said, was only to regulate and not to prohibit the grant of mining leases. As a consequence all the applications were directed to be di!\\JlOSed of without reference to Rule SC.\n\nIt was also observed that even if Rule SC was valid it applied only to the grant of fresh leases and not to renewals.\n\nIt was also held that it was not open to the Government to keep the applications pending for a long time and then to dispose them of on the basis of a rule which had come into force later. The State Government has come in appeal against the judgment of the Madras High Court while the respondent-applicants have tried to sustain the judgment of the Madras High Court on grounds which were decided against them by the Madras High Court.\n\nThe learned Attorney General who appeared for the Government F of Tamil Nadu submitted that the approach of the High Court was vitiated by its failure to notice the crndal circumstance that the minerals belonged to the Government and the applicants had no vested or indefeasihle right to obtain a lease or a renewal to quarry the mine-.\n\nrals. There were good reasons for banning the grant of leases to quarry black granite to private parties and in the light of those reasons G the Government could not be compelled to grant leases which would result in the destruction of the mineral resources of the country. Shri\n\nK. K. Venugopal, learned counsel who led the argument for the respondents submitted that the question of o_wnership of the minerals was irrelevant. In making the rules the State Government was acting as a delete and not as the owner of the minerals. He submitted that it was H not open to the State Government to exercise its subordinate legislative function in a manner to benefit itself as owner of the minerals, nor was it open to the State Government to create a monopoly by such means.\n\nAccordin~ to Shri Venugopal creation of a monopoly in the State was essentially a legislative function and was incapable of delegation. It was claimed that there was violation of Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution. It was further claimed that S. 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957, enabled the State Government to make rules to regulate the grant of leases and not to prohibit them. In any case it was said that Rule 8G had no application to renewals and tbat in any event it would not have the effect of affecting applications made more than 60 days befc:o it came into force.\n\nRivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resources constitute a nation's natural wealth.\n\nThese resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation.\n\nEvery generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop and conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the Nation. It is recognised by Parliament. Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. It has enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. We have already referred to its salient provisions. S. 18, we have noticed, casts a special duty on the Central Government to take necessary steps for the conservation and development of minerals in India.\n\nS. 17 authorises the Central Government itself to undertake prospecting or mining operations in any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease. S. 4A empowers the State Government on the request of the Central Government, in the case of minerals other than minor mineral,, to prematurely terminate existing mining leases and grant fresh leases in favour of a Government Company or Corporation owned or controlled by Government, if it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development to do so. In the case of minor minerals, the State Government is similarly empowered, after consultaticm with the Central Government. The public interest which induced Parliament to make the declaration contained in S. 2 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. has naturally to be the paramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. Parliament's policy is clearly discernible from the provisions of the Act. It is the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community. There are clear sign posts to lead and guide the subordinate legislating authority in the matter of the making of roles. Viewed in the light shed by the other provisions of the Act, particularly sections 4A, 17 and 18\n\n'I!'\n\nit cannot be said that the rule making authority under S. 15 has exceeded its powers in banning leases for quaiTying black granite in favcur of private parties and in stipulating that the State Government themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by the State Government.\n\nTo view such a rule made by the Subordinate legislating body as a rule made to benefit itself merely because the State Government happens to be the subordinate legislatitng body, is, but, to take too narrow a view of the functions of that body.\n\nThe reasons that prompted the State Government to make Rule 8-C were explained at great length in the common counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government before the High Court. We find no good reason for not accepting the statements made in the counter affidavit.\n\nIt was said there :\n\n\"I submit that the leases for black granite are governed by the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1959 under which ori14nally there was scope for auctioning of quarries of minor minerals.\n\nIn amendment i'5ned in the G.O. dated 6-12-1972. under Rule 8-A it was indicated that the Collector may sanction leases in favour of applicants who are having an industrial programme to utilise the minerals in their own industry.\n\nThis provision is applicable to all minerals including black granite..\n\nHowever, it was found that there were several cases where lessees who obtained the black granite areas on lease by auction were not quarrying in a systematic and planned manner taking into consideration the welfare and safety measures of the workers as well as the conservation of minerals.\n\nEven after the introduction of the amendment under Rule 8-A in most cases, the industry set up was of a flimsy nature more to circumvent the rule than to really introduce industry including mechanised cutting and polishing. The lessees were also interested only in obtaining the maximum profit in the shortest period of time without taking into consideration the proper mining and development of the mineral.\n\nThere was also considerable wastage of new materials due to wasteful mmmg.\n\nTherefore, -Government issued a further amendment as Rule 8-B wherein the competent authority to grant leases in respect of the quarrying black granite was transferred from the Collector to the State Govenunent level.\n\nH They also prescribed a standard form and an application fee to be paid with the application. The amendment states that l he Director of Industries and Commerce shall technically\n\nscrutinise the industrial programme given by the applicant while forwarding the same to Government.\n\nAt the same time, in the G.O. issued along with amendment, it was stated that if any of the State Government Organisations like Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited, Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited, famil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited is interested to obtain a lease ior black granite in a particular area, preference will be given to Government undertaking over other private entrepreneurs for granting the leases applied for by them.\n\nHowever, in spite of these amendments to re.- gulate the grant of mining lease, there were a large number of lessees (exceeding 140), who were engaged in mining without proper technical guidance or safety measures etc. for the workers. These lessees made a strong representation to the then Government in 19 7 6 expressing that though they had given assurance to set up industries to use the granites they were not able to do so far various reasons. They also represented that they should be allowed to export the raw blocks of black granites. Therefore, Government had issued\n\na. Government Order dated 15-2-1977 relating to relaxation of the ban of export of raw blocks and provision for setting up a polishing or finishing unit was not made a pre-requisite.\n\nThey have also stated that the terms and conditions for the existing losses would remain in force. However, on an examination of the performance of the lessees over the pat several years, it h.as been found that excepting in a very few cases, none of the lessees had set up proper industries or developed systematic mining of the quarries.\n\nThe exports continue to be mainly on the raw b:ack granite materials and not cut and polished slabs. A large number of the leases were not operating ither due to speculation or lack of finance from the lessees.\n\nTherefore, Government decided that there should be no further grant of ]ease to private entrepreneurs for black granite.\n\nThis was mentioned in G.0.Ms. No. 1312 Industries dated 2-12-1977.\n\nWe are satisfied that Rule 8C was made in bonafide exercise of the rule making power of the State Government and not in its misuse to advance its own self-interest. We however guard ourselves against being understood that we h&ve accepted the position that making a rnle which is perfectly in order to be considered a misuse of the rule making power, if it advances the interest of a State, which really means the people of the State.\n\nOne of the submissions on behalf of the respondents \"'as that monopoly was a distinct legislative subject under entry 21 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and therefore monopoly, even in favour of a State Government can only be created by plenari and not subordinate legislation.\n\nParliament not having chosen to exercise its plenary power it was not open to the subordinate legislating body to create a monopoly by making a rule.\n\nOur attention was invited to H. C. Narayanappa & Ors. v. Stare of Mysore & Ors.( 1) where it was held that the expression 'Commercial and industrial monopolies' in entry 21 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was not confined to legislation to control of monopolies _ .... but was wide enough to include grant or creation of commercial or - ..,. industrial m, onopolics in favour of the State Government, also.\n\nWe are unable to agree with Shri Venugopal's submission.\n\nThe very decision cited by him furnishes the answer. The validity of a scheme for nationalisation of certain routes made pursuant to the powers conferred by Chapter IV A of the Motor Vehicles Act was under attack in that case. One of the grounds of attack was that \"by Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,\n\n\"Parliament had merely attempted to regulate the procedure for entry by the States into the business of motor transport in the State, and in the absence of legislation expressly undertuken by the State of Mysore in that behalf, that State was E incompetent to enter into the arena of motor transport business to the exclusion of private operators;\" Sustenance for the submission was sought to be drawn from the language of Art. 19 ( 6) (ii) which provides that nothing in Art. 19 ( l )\n\n(g) shall 'prevent the State from making any law rel'ating to' 'the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service. whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise'.\n\nThe argument was that the State or a Corporation owned or controlled by the State could carry on a trade, business, industry or senice to the exclusion. complete or partial, of citizens, only if the State made a Jaw relating to it.\n\nThe argument was repelled by the Court in these words :\n\n\"The plea sought to be founded on the phraseology used in Art. 19 ( 6) that the State intending to carry on trade or business must itself enact the law authorising it to carry on trade or business is equally devoid of force.\n\nThe exnression 'the State' as defined in Art. 12 is inclusive of the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legisla-\n\n,,_\n\n(I) [1960] J SCR 742@ 745, 752-753.\n\nture of each of the States. Under entry No. 21 of the Concurrent List, the Parliament being competent to legislate for creating commercial or trading monopolies, there is nothing in the Constitution which deprives it of the power to create a co=erial or trading monopoly in the constituent States.\n\nArticle 19(6) is a mere saving provision : its function is not to create a [power but to immunise from attack the exercise of legislative power falling within its ambit. The right of the State to carry on trade or busine; s to the exclusion of others does not arise by virtue of Art. 19(6). The right of the State to carry on trade or business is recognised by Art. 29R: authority to exclude COID[petitors in the field of such trade or business is conferred on the State by entrusting power to enact laws under entry 21 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, and the exercise of that power in the context of fundamental rights is secured from attack by Art. 19(6).\n\nIn any event; the expression 'law' as defined in Art. 13(3)\n\n(a) includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom, etc., and the scheme framed under s.68C may properly be regarded as 'law' within the meaning of Art. 19 ( 6) made by the State excluding private operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1){g)\".\n\nEarlier in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. v. The State of Punjab('), before the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution by which the present Article 298 was substituted for the old Article, the question arose whether it was beyond the competence of the executive Government to carry on a business without specific Jegislatuve sanction. The answer was that it was not. What was said by the Court in that case was incorporated in the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. In that case the facts were that the State of Punjab. by a series of executive orders had established for itself a monopoly in the business of printing and celling textbooks for use in schools.\n\nThe argument that legislative sanction was necessary to enable the State Government to carry on the business of printing and publishing text books was repelled and it was held that no fundamental right of\n\nthe petitioners who had invoked the jurisdiction of the Court had been infringed.\n\nAnother of the submissions of the learned counsel was that G.0.Ms.\n\nNo. 1312 dated December 2, 1977 involved a major change of policy. which was a legislative function and therefore beyond the competence\n\n(1) [1955]2 SCR 225.\n\nof a subordinate legislating body.\n\nWe do not agree with the submission.\n\nWhenever there is a switch over from 'private sector' to 'public sector' it does not necessarily follow that a change of policy requiring express legislative sanction is involved.\n\nIt depends on the subject and the statute.\n\nFor example, if a decision is taken to impose a general and complete ban on private mining of all minor minerals, such a ban may involve the reversal of a major policy and so it may require Legislative sanction. But if a decision is taken to ban private mining of a single minor mineral for the purpose of conserving it, such a ban, if it is ctherw:se within the bounds of the authority given to the Government by the Statute, cannot be said to involve any change of policy. The policy of the Act remains the same and it is, as we said, the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community.\n\nExploitation of minerals by the private and/ or the public sector is contempleted. If in the pursuit of the avowed policy of the Act, it is thought exploitation by the public sector is best and wisest in the case of a particular mineral and, in consequence, the authority competent to make the subordinate legislation makes a rule banning private exploitation of such mineral, which was hitherto permitted we are unable to see any change of policy merely because what was previously permitted is no longer permitted.\n\nOne of the arguments pressed before us was that Sec. 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act authorised the making of rules for regulating the grant of mining leases and not for prohibiting them as Rule 8-C sought to do, a.nd. therefore, Rule 8-C was ultra vires Act, S. 15.\n\nWell known cases on the subject right from Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo('), and Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion and the Distillers and Brewers Association of Ontario (2) upto State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. & Ors.,(\") were brought to our attention.\n\nWe do not think that 'Regulation has the rigidity of meaning as never to take in Prohibition'. Much df1Pends on the context in which the expression is used in the Statute aµd the object sought to be achieved by the contemplated regulation. It was observed by Mathew J. in G. K. Krishnan etc. etc. v. The State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. etc.,(') \"the word 'regulation' has no fixed connotation.\n\nIts meaning differs according to the nature of the thing to which it is applied\".\n\nTn modern statutes concerned as they are with economic and social activities, 'regulation'\n\n(!) [1896] A.C. 88. (2)\n\n[1896] A.C. 348. (3)\n\n[1979] 3 SCR 709. (4)\n\n[1975] 2 SCR 715@ 711\n\nmust. of necessity, receive so wide an interpretation that in certain A situations, it must exclude competition to the public sector from the private sector.\n\nMore so in a welfare State. It was pointed out by the Privy Council in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales(' )-and we agree with what was stated therein-that the problem whether an enactment was regulatory or something more or whether a restriction was direct or only remote or only incidental It. involved, not so much legal as political, social or economic consideration and tha.t it could not be laid down in no circumstances could the exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly, either in a State or Commonwealth agency, to be justified.\n\nEach case, it was said, must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstances and it might be that in regard to some economic activities and at some stage of social development, prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation.\n\nThe statute with which we are concerned, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, is aimed, as we have already said more than once, at the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minemls.\n\nSurely, in the case of a scarce mineral, to permit exploitation by the State or its agency and to prohibt exploitation by private agencies is the most effective method of conservation and prudent exploitation.\n\nIf you want to conserve for the future, you must prohibit in the present. We have no doubt that the prohibiting of leases in certain cases is part of the regulation contemplated by Sec. 15 of the Act.\n\nThe submission of the learned counsel that the impugned rule contravened Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution is equally without force.\n\nNow, 'the restrictions freedom from which is guaranteed by Art. 301 would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow or movement of trade\" (Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Asam & Ors.).(') And, \"regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory !'axes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of restrictions contemplated by Art. 301\". \"They are excluded from the purview of the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution for the simple reason that they do not hamper, trade, commerce or inter-course but rather facilitate them\" The Automobile Transport Rajasthan Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (3).\n\nThe Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is, without doubt a regulatory measure, Parliament having enacted it for the express purpose of \"the regulation of mines :.nd the development of minerals\".\n\nThe Act and the rules\n\n(1) [1950) A.C. 235.\n\n. (2) [1961] 1 SCR 809.\n\n(3) [1963] I SCR 491.\n\nproperly made thereunder are, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 301.\n\nEven otherwise Art. 302 which enables Parliament, by Jaw, to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State l!_nd another or within any pmt of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest also furnishes an answer to the claim based on the alleged contravention of Art. 301. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is a low enacted by Parliament and declared by Parliament to be expedient in the public interest.\n\nRule SC has been made by the State Government by notification in the official Gazette, pursuant to the power conferred upon it by Sec. 15 of the Act. A statutory rule. while ever subordinate to the parent statute, is, otherwise, to be treated as part of the statute and as effective. \"Rules made under the Statute must be treated for 11ll purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for al! purposes of construction or obligation. . (State of U.P. & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya)('); (See also Maxwell : Interpretation of Statutes, 1 lth Edn. pp. 49-50).\n\nSo, Statutory rules made pursuant to the power entrusted by Parliament are law made by Parliament within the meaning of Art. 302 of the Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the complex demands made upon modern legislation which necessitate the plenary legislating body to discharge its legislative function by laying down broad guidelines and standards, to lead and guide as it were, leaving it to the subordinate legislating body to fill up the details by making necessary rules and to amended the rules from time to time to meet unforeseen and unpredictable situations, all within the framework of the power entrusted to it by the plenary legislating body.\n\nState of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah(') was cited to us to show that rules did not become part of the statute. This was a case where by reference to Sec. 77 of the Mysore Forest Act which declared the effect of the rules, it was held that the rules when made did not become part of the Act.\n\nThat was apparently because of the specific provisions of Sec. 77 which while declaring that the rules wonld have the force of lllw stopped short of declaring that they would become part of the Act. In the absence of any express provision, as now, the ordinary rule as enunciated in Maxwell and State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya (supra) would perforce apply.\n\nThe next question for consideration is whether Rule SC is attracted when applications for renewal of leases are dealt with. The argument JI was that Rule 9 itself lllid down the criteria for grant of renewal of leases and therefore rule SC should be confined, in its application, to\n\n(I) [1961] 2 SCR 679 @ 702.\n\n(2) [1967] 2 SCR 361.\n\n'JAMIL NADU v. lllNDSTONE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 759\n\ngrant of leases in the first instance. We are unable to see the force of the submission. Rule 9 makes it clear that a renewal is not to be\n\nobtained automatically, for thl' mere asking.\n\nThe applicant for the renewal has, particularly, to satisfy the Government that the renewal is in the interests of mineral develqpment and that the lease amount is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.\n\nThese conditions have to be fulfilled in addition to whatever criteria is applicable at the time of the grant of lease in the first instance, suitably adapted, of course, to grant of renewal. Not to apply the criteria applicable in the first instance may lead to absurd results. If as a result of experience gained after watching the performance of private entrepreneurs in the mining of minor minerals it is decided to stop grant of leases in the private sector in the interest of conservation of the particular mineral resource, attainment of the object sought will be frnstrated if renewal is to be granted to private entrepreneurs without regard to the changed outlook. In fact, some of the applicants for renewal of leases may themselves be the persons who are responsible for the changed outlook. To renew leases in favour of such persons would make the making of Rule SC a mere exercise in futility.\n\nIt must be remembered that an application for the renewal of a lease is, in essence an application for the grant of a lease for a fresh period. We are, therefore, of the view that Rule BC is attracted in considering applications for renewal of leases also.\n\nAnother submission of the learned counsel in connection with the consideration of applications for renewal was that applications made sixty days or more before the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 (2-12-1977) should be dealt with as if Rule BC had not come into force. It was also contended that even applications for grant of leases made long\n\nbefore the date of G.0.Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule BC had not come into force.\n\nThe submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal !Pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of Rule BC notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8C came into force.\n\nWhile it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the 11PPlication disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. None has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence\n\nof any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the 8JPplication despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal of lses !llade long prior to the date of G.0.Ms.\n\nNo. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule SC did not exist.\n\nIn the view that we have taken on the several questions argued before us all the appeals arising out of applications for the grant or renewal!\n\nof leases for quarrying black granite in Government lands are allowed and the Writ Petitions filed in the Higb Court are dismissed. Special leave is granted in cases in which leave had not been previously granted. The appeals are allowed and disposed of in the same manner.\n\nThere are, however, a few appeals in which the applications were not for the grant or renewal of leases to quarry black granite in Government lands but were for permission to quarry black granite in Patta lands in which the right to minerals belonged to the applicantsprivate owners themselves. Apart from the fact that Rule 8C occurs in a group of Rules in Section II, which bears the head \"Government\n\nlands in which the minerals belong to the Government\" while the rules relating to lands in which the right to minerals belongs to private owners are dealt with in Section III.\n\nThe language of Rule 8C is clear that it cannot have any application to lands in which the right to minerals belongs to the uppficants themselves. Rule SC is only concerned with leases for quarrying black granite and it cannot, therefore, have any application to cases where no lease is sought from the Government.\n\nIn the case of lands in which the right to minerals belongs to private owners and those owners seek permission to quarry black granite the applications will have to be dealt with under the relevant rules in Sec. III of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rnles. Rule 8C, it may be noted, does uot impose a general ban on quarrying black gmnite but only imposes a bar on the grant of leases of quarrying black granite. Appeals and Special Leave Petitions which arise out of applications for the grant of permission to quarry bJoack granite in the Patta lands belonging to the applicants themselves, have therefore, to be dismissed.\n\nThe result is, Special Leave Petition Nos. 9257, 9259, 9260, 9271, 9273 to 9282 and 9284 of 1980 are dismissed and Special Leave Petition Nos. 9234 to\n\n9248. 9250 to 9256, 9258, 9261 to 9270, 9272, 9283, 9285, 9286, 9288, 9289 and 9290 of 1980 are granted and Appeals allowed.\n\nH Civil Apeal Nos. 2602 to 2604 of 1980 -are allowed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nOrdered accordingly.\n\nMGIPF-152 SCI/81-2.500-24-8·81", "total_entities": 150, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "11.\n\nHIND STONE ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HINDU STONE ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 5, 1981\n\n[R. 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"end_char": 17988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.17 enables the Central Government, after consultation with the State Government to undertake prospecting or mining operations in any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, in which event the Central\n\nA Government shall publish a notification in the official Gazette giving the prescribed particulars."}}, {"text": "Sections 19 to 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18378, "end_char": 18395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18514, "end_char": 18518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government\n\nof Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18589, "end_char": 18614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the power vested in it under S.15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, the Government\n\nof Tamil Nadu has made the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral 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K. Venugopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24877, "end_char": 24892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri\n\nK. K. Venugopal, learned counsel who led the argument for the respondents submitted that the question of o_wnership of the minerals was irrelevant."}}, {"text": "Venugopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25387, "end_char": 25396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordin~ to Shri Venugopal creation of a monopoly in the State was essentially a legislative function and was incapable of delegation."}}, {"text": "Articles 301 and 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25548, "end_char": 25568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25618, "end_char": 25623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26707, "end_char": 26712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26862, "end_char": 26867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27031, "end_char": 27036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27613, "end_char": 27617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 4A, 17 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28223, "end_char": 28245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28308, "end_char": 28313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29228, "end_char": 29274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "6-12-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29399, "end_char": 29408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In amendment i'5ned in the G.O. dated 6-12-1972."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31071, "end_char": 31118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time, in the G.O. issued along with amendment, it was stated that if any of the State Government Organisations like Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited, Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited, famil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited is interested to obtain a lease ior black granite in a particular area, preference will be given to Government undertaking over other private entrepreneurs for granting the leases applied for by them."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31120, "end_char": 31179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time, in the G.O. issued along with amendment, it was stated that if any of the State Government Organisations like Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited, Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited, famil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited is interested to obtain a lease ior black granite in a particular area, preference will be given to Government undertaking over other private entrepreneurs for granting the leases applied for by them."}}, {"text": "famil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31181, "end_char": 31234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time, in the G.O. issued along with amendment, it was stated that if any of the State Government Organisations like Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited, Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited, famil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited is interested to obtain a lease ior black granite in a particular area, preference will be given to Government undertaking over other private entrepreneurs for granting the leases applied for by them."}}, {"text": "15-2-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32041, "end_char": 32050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, Government had issued\n\na. Government Order dated 15-2-1977 relating to relaxation of the ban of export of raw blocks and provision for setting up a polishing or finishing unit was not made a pre-requisite."}}, {"text": "2-12-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32930, "end_char": 32939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1312 Industries dated 2-12-1977."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33518, "end_char": 33534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34024, "end_char": 34040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34499, "end_char": 34517, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34591, "end_char": 34634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34833, "end_char": 34848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the grounds of attack was that \"by Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,\n\n\"Parliament had merely attempted to regulate the procedure for entry by the States into the business of motor transport in the State, and in the absence of legislation expressly undertuken by the State of Mysore in that behalf, that State was E incompetent to enter into the arena of motor transport business to the exclusion of private operators;\" Sustenance for the submission was sought to be drawn from the language of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35060, "end_char": 35067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35109, "end_char": 35116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35740, "end_char": 35747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35949, "end_char": 35956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35992, "end_char": 36011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 is inclusive of the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legisla-\n\n,,_\n\n(I) [1960] J SCR 742@ 745, 752-753."}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36390, "end_char": 36403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36669, "end_char": 36679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29R", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36751, "end_char": 36759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36929, "end_char": 36945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37041, "end_char": 37051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37103, "end_char": 37113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.68C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37233, "end_char": 37238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37295, "end_char": 37302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37475, "end_char": 37485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37634, "end_char": 37645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38001, "end_char": 38016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the facts were that the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "December 2, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38531, "end_char": 38547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1312 dated December 2, 1977 involved a major change of policy."}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40212, "end_char": 40219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40454, "end_char": 40459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41068, "end_char": 41074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed by Mathew J. in G. K. Krishnan etc."}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 SCR 709", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41421, "end_char": 41437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 715", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41444, "end_char": 41460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43124, "end_char": 43131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 301 and 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43218, "end_char": 43238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43345, "end_char": 43353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43680, "end_char": 43688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 SCR 809", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 44224, "end_char": 44240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44330, "end_char": 44338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44356, "end_char": 44364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44670, "end_char": 44678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44965, "end_char": 44972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45630, "end_char": 45638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46329, "end_char": 46336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46530, "end_char": 46537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 679", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47136, "end_char": 47152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 361", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47165, "end_char": 47181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51247, "end_char": 51252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are, however, a few appeals in which the applications were not for the grant or renewal of leases to quarry black granite in Government lands but were for permission to quarry black granite in Patta lands in which the right to minerals belonged to the applicantsprivate owners themselves."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_761_763_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "CHHANGANLAL MANSUKHLAL & ANR.\n\nK. K. BHATT & ANR.\n\nFebruary 5, 1981\n\n[A. D. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND R. B. MISRA, JJ.) B\n\nGuiarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules 1965-Rules 48 and 49- .Scope of.\n\nThe parties are agreed that the provisions of Rule 49 are not attracted and no fee1 are payable under it at the stage of entry into a market area if the\n\nagricultural produce in question is covered by sub-rule(2) of Rule 48, i.e., when inch produce fulfils either of the following conditions :-\n\n(i) It is brought from outside the market area thereinto for use therein by the industrial concerns situated therein or for export and in respect thereof a declaration has been made and a certificate has been obtained in Form V.\n\n(ii) The sale or purchase of such produce comes within the purview of sub-section (3) of section 6 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act.\n\nTh.it interpretation of Rules 48 and 49 which flows directly from the language employed therein is correct. Rule 49 will have no a, pplication to any case which\n\nfalls within the ambit of sub-rule (2) of Rule 48. [763 D-E] E\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1967 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30-10-74/1-11-1974 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 766/71.\n\nSoli !. Sorabji, Vimal Dave, Subhash Parikh and Gopal Subhariimaniyan for the Appellants.\n\nS. H. Sheth, M. V. Go, rwami, Ambrish Kumar and Mukesh -Goswami for Respondent No. 1.\n\n!. L. Nain, M. N. Shroff and S. C. Patel for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.-Rule 49 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Marketi Rules, 1965, the vires and the reasonableness of which have\n\nbeen the main points of challenge in this appeal, runs thus : H\n\n\"49. ( 1) The fees on agricultural produce shall be payable as soon as it is brought into the principal market\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 2 5.C.R.\n\nyard or sub-market yard or market proper or market area as may be specified in the bye-laws :\n\nProvided that the fees so paid shall be refunded-\n\n{i) on production of sufficient proof that such pr6duce was not sold within the limits of the market area; or\n\n(ii) if such produce is brought from outside the market area into the market area for use therein by the industrial concerns situated in the market area or for export and in respect of which a declaration has been made and a certificate has been obtained in Form V subject to the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 48.\n\n(2) The licence fes payable under rule 56 or 57 shall be paid alongwith the application for licence but in case the market committee refuses the grant or renewal of a licence the fees recovered shall. be refunded to the applicant.\"\n\nIn order to interpret this Rule it is also necessary to set ont the provisions of Rule 48. They are : ·\n\n\"48. ( 1) The market committee shall levy and collect fees on agricultural produce bought or sold in the llllliket\n\narea at such rate as may be specified in the byelaws subject to the following minima and maxima viz.\n\n(1) rates when levied ad valorem shall not be less than 10 paise and shall not exceed 40 paise per hundred rupees.\n\n( 2) rates when levied in respect of cattle, sheep or goat shall not be less than 10 paise per animal and shall not exceed Rs. 2 per animal.\n\nExplanation :-For the purposes of this rule a sale of agricultural produce shall be deemed to have taken place in a market area if it has been weighed or measured or surveyed or delivered in case of cattle in the market area far the purpose of sale, notwithstanding the fact that the property in the agricultural produce has by reason of such sale passed to a person in a place outside the market area.\n\n( 2) No fees shall be levied on agricultural produce brought from outside the market area into the market area for use therein by the industrial concerns situated in the market area or for export and in respect of which declaration has been made and a certificate has been obtained in Form V:\n\n' ' \\ i ' ;,\n\n. iJ.\n\nCHHANGANLAL v. K. K. BHATT (Koshal, !.)\n\nProvided that if such agricultural produce brought into the market area for export is not exported or removed therefrom before the expiry of twenty days from the date on which it was so brought, the market committee shall levy and collect fees on such agricultural produce from the person bringing the produce into the market area at such rates as may be specified in the bye-laws subject to the maxima and minima specified in sub-rule (i):\n\nProvided that no fee shall be payable on a sale or purchase to which sub-section (3) oe section 6 applies.\"\n\nLearned counsel for the parties are agreed thilt the provisions of Rule 49 are not attracted and no fees are payable under it at the stage of entry into a market area if the agricultural produce In question is covered by sub-rule 2 of Rule 48, i.e. when such produce fulfils either of the following conditions :\n\n(1) It is brought from outside the market area thereinto for use therein by the industrial concerns situat- J) ed therein or for export and in respect thereof a declaration has been made and a crtificate has been obtained in Form V.\n\n(2) The sale or purchase of such produce comes within the purview of .sub-section (3) of section 6 of E the Gujarat Agricultural Pro<luce Markets Act.\n\nAfter hearing learned counsel for the parties, we accept this interpretation of Rules 48 & 49 which flows directly from the language employed therein, and hold that Rule 49 will have no application to any case which falls within the ambit of sub-rule (2) of Rule 48 .\n\nMr. Sorabjee does not press any other point in support of the appeal which is accepted to the extent of the above interpretation of Rules 48 & 49 but is otherwise dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "CHHANGANLAL MANSUKHLAL & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHHANGANLAL MANSUKHLAL & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. BHATT & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. K. BHATT & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 5, 1981\n\n[A. D. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND R. B. MISRA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Guiarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 822, "end_char": 831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules 1965", "statute": "Guiarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules 1965"}}, {"text": "Soli !. Sorabji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1316, "end_char": 1331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli !."}}, {"text": "Vimal Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1333, "end_char": 1343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabji, Vimal Dave, Subhash Parikh and Gopal Subhariimaniyan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Subhash Parikh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1345, "end_char": 1359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabji, Vimal Dave, Subhash Parikh and Gopal Subhariimaniyan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Gopal Subhariimaniyan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1364, "end_char": 1385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabji, Vimal Dave, Subhash Parikh and Gopal Subhariimaniyan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "S. H. Sheth", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1407, "end_char": 1418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. H. Sheth, M. V. Go, rwami, Ambrish Kumar and Mukesh -Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. V. Go", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1420, "end_char": 1428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. H. Sheth, M. V. Go, rwami, Ambrish Kumar and Mukesh -Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "rwami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. H. Sheth, M. V. Go, rwami, Ambrish Kumar and Mukesh -Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ambrish Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1437, "end_char": 1450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. H. Sheth, M. V. Go, rwami, Ambrish Kumar and Mukesh -Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mukesh -Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1455, "end_char": 1470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. H. Sheth, M. V. Go, rwami, Ambrish Kumar and Mukesh -Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "L. Nain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1497, "end_char": 1504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. Nain, M. N. Shroff and S. C. Patel for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1506, "end_char": 1518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. Nain, M. N. Shroff and S. C. Patel for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1523, "end_char": 1534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. Nain, M. N. Shroff and S. C. Patel for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1602, "end_char": 1608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.-Rule 49 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Marketi Rules, 1965, the vires and the reasonableness of which have\n\nbeen the main points of challenge in this appeal, runs thus : H\n\n\"49. ("}}, {"text": "Gujarat Agricultural Produce Marketi Rules, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1628, "end_char": 1676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sorabjee does not press any other point in support of the appeal which is accepted to the extent of the above interpretation of Rules 48 & 49 but is otherwise dismissed with no order as to costs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_764_770_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "7 li4\n\nKSHITISH CHANDRA BOSE\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF RANCHI\n\nFebruary 6, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARDARAJAN AND A. N. SEN, JJ.]\n\nRight to assail, in an appeal against the second judgment of the High Court, the correctness of its first judgment, explained.\n\nLaw relating to adverse possession and title by prescription, clarified.\n\nscond appeal bre-fore the High Court, scope of section 100 Civil Proacdure Code.\n\nAllowing the appeal and answering against the respondent municipality both on the question of title and adverse possession, the Court ·\n\n'D HELD : 1. The order of remand by the High Court being an inlcrlocutory judgment -which did not terminate the proceedings, it is open to the appellant to assail even the first judgment of the High Court and if it is held that the first judgment was legally erroneous, then all the subsequent proceedings, namely, the order of remand, the order passed after remand, the appeal and the second judgment given by the High Court in appeal against the order of remand would become non est.\n\n[767 D-F, 767 A-BJ\n\nKeshardeo Chan1ria v. Radha Kissen Cllan1ria & Ors. and \\vice versa) [1953] SCR 136; Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & Anr. (1960] 3 SCR\n\n590, followed.\n\n2 : 1 All that the law of adverse possession requires is that the possession must be continuous, open and without any attempt at concealment. It is not F necessary that the possession must be effective so as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner. Such a requirement may be insisted on where an ouster of title is pleaded, but that is not so in the instant case. [768 B-C]\n\n2 : 2. H a person asserts a hostile title even to a tank and despite the hOstile assertion of title no steps were taken by the owner to evict the trespasser, bis title by prescription would be complete after tlurty years. [769 F-G]\n\n3. 1'be High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal or findings of fact even if it was erroneous.\n\nIn the instant case, the High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code in reversing concurrent findings of fact given by the trial court and by the appellate court. [769 G-H, 770 Al\n\nPattabhiramaswamy v. Hanumayya, AIR 1959 SC 57, Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1097; Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. JanRbahadur Rai, [1963] 1 SCR 456; R. Ramachandran Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, [1963] 3 SCR 604,\n\nfollowed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1034 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30-9-1970 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 733 of 1967.\n\nV. S. Desai, D. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Chaudhury for the Appel- ~\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by /' FAZAL ALI, J.-This is a plaintiff's appeal by special leave against\n\n)' .;:>\n\n11 judgment and decree of the Patna High Court dated 30th September, C 1970 and arises in the following circumstances :-\n\nThe plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title and recovery of possession and also a permanent injunction restraining the defendant municipality from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff. It appears that prior to the snit, proceedings under s. 145 were started between the parties in which the Magistrate found that the plaintiff was not in possession but upheld the possession of the defendant on the land until\n\nevicted in due course of law.\n\nIn the suit the plaintiff based his claim in respect of plot No. 1735, Ward No. I of Ranchi Muuicipality on the ground that he had acquired title to the land by virtue of a Hukumnama granted to him by the landlord as far back as 17th April, 1912 which is Exhibit 18. Apart from the question of title, the plaintiff further pleaded that even if the\n\nland belonged to the defendant municipality, he had acquired title by\n\nprescrii[ltion by being in possession of the land to the knowledge of the municipality for more than 30 years, that is to say, from 1912 to 1957.\n\nThe trial court accepted the plaintiff's case and decreed the plaintiff's suit both on the question of title and adverse possession.\n\nThe defendant filed an appeal before the Additional Judicial Co=issioner, Ranchi (Chota Nagpur) which after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the finding of the trial court and maintained the decree of the trial court on both points. Thereafter, the respondent went up in second appeal to the High Court which was heard by a single Judge of\n\nthe Court who held that there was no clear ev!dence to show that the plaintiff had obtained title by adverse possession and by his judgment of 17-2-1967 (hereinafter to be referred to as the first judgmePt) remanded the case to the trial court for a decision only on the question of title.\n\nThe effect of the order of remand was that so far as plaintiff's case that he had acquired title by prescription was concerned, it was finally decided against him.\n\nAfter remand, the Additional\n\nJudicial Commissiouer held that the municipality had proved its title to the land in Qispute aud accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's suit.\n\nThe plaintiff then went up in aweal to the High Court which affirmed the finding of the Additional Judicial Commissioner and dismissed the appeal by its judgment of 30-9-1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 5econd judgment).\n\nHence, this appeal by special leave.\n\nAppearing for the appellant, Mr. V. S. Desai, submitted two points before us.\n\nIn the first place, he urged that the first judgment of the High Court by which it remanded the matter to the trial court for a finding on the question of title was legally erroneous inasmuch as the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reversing pure finding of fact given by the <wo courts below on the question of adverse possession as also on the question of title.\n\nSecondly, it was contended that even so the finding of the High Court on the question of adverse possession was given without at all D considering the materials and evidence on the basis of which the two courts had concurrently found that the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession. It is true that the plaintiff did not come up in appeal before this Court against the first judgment of the High Court obviously because the order passed by the High Court was not a final one but was in the nature of an interlocutory order as the case had E been remanded to the Additional Judicial Commissioner and if the said Court had affirmed the finding of the trial Court, no question of filing a further appeal to the High Court could have arisen. Thus, the appellant could not be debarred from challenging the validity of the first judgment of the High Conrt even after the second judgment by the High Court was passed in appeal against the order of remand. In F support of this contention, the counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v.\n\nSmt. Deorajin Debi & Anr.(1), where under similar circumstances this Court observed as follows :\n\n\"In our opinion the order of remand was an interlocu- G tory judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final orders.\"\n\nIn coming to this decision this Court relied on an earlier decision in the case of Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria & Ors. and vice versa (2) where the same view was taken.\n\n(I) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 590\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 136\n\n. '\n\nMt. Sinha appearing for the respondent was unable to cite any .authority of this Court taking a contrary view or overriding the decisions referred to above. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that it is open to the appellant to assail even the first judgment of the High Court and if we hold that this judgment was legally erroneous then a.II the subsequent proceedings, namely, the order of remand, the order passed after remand, the appeal and the second judgment given by the High Court in appeal against the order of remanil would become .non-est.\n\nWe have gone through the judgment of the High Court dated 17th February, 1967 and we find that the High Court has reversed the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below on the question of adverse possession without at all displacing the reasons given by the courts below or considering the important circumstances proved and relied on by them.\n\nThe High Court based its decision on three circumstances : In the first place it was of the opinion that no clear case of adverse possession was put forward by the plaintiff in his plaint, and all that had been pleaded was that certain building materials wern placed on the land in dispute for sonie time.\n\nHere, with due respect, we are constrained to observe that the High Court committed a serious error of record.\n\nThe allegations in paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 17 and 19 are clear and specific to show the nature of the overt acts committed by the appellant to the knowledge and notice of the defendant. It was not a question of a stray or sporadic act of possession exercised by the plaintiff but the plaint shows that there was a consistent course of conduct by which the plaintiff asserted his hostile title against municipality ever since 1912.\n\nIt has also been clearly alleged in the plaint 1hat in spile of the objection taken by the municipality the plaintiff had asserted his hostile title by giving notice to the municipal authorities and in the year 1953 even in a criminal case started between the parties it was found that the plaintiff was in possession.\n\nThe High Court has not at all adverted to any of the circumstances which have been considered by the courts below.\n\nFor instance, one of the most important facts which clearly proved adverse possession was that the plaintiff had let out the land for cultivatory purposes and used it himself from time to time without any protest from the defendant.\n\nDuring the period of 45 years no serious attempt was made by the municipality to evict the plaintiff knowing full well that he was asserting hostile title against the municipality in respect of the land.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, the first ground on which the High Court based its finding cannot be 'upported .\n\nIt was then observed by the High Court that mere sporadic acts of poisession exercised from time to time would not be sufficient for the\n\nacquisition of title by adverse possession. As discussed above, the High Court has not at all cared even to go through the evidence regardingthe nature of the acts said to have been committed by the appellant nor to find out whether they were merely sporadic or incidental.\n\nAnother reason given by the High Court was that the adverse po••ession should have been effective and adequate in continuity and in publicity.\n\nHere, the High Court has gone wrong on a point of Jaw.\n\nAll that the law requires is that the possession must be open and without any attempt at concealment.\n\nIt is not necessary that the possession must be so effective so as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner.\n\nSuch a requirement may be insisted on where an ouster of title is pleaded but that is not the case here.\n\nThe findings, however, clearly show that the possession of the plaintiff was hostile to the full knowledge of the municipality.\n\nIn this connection we might extract below the well considered findings recorded by the trial court and Additional Judicial Commissioner both on the question of title and that of adverse possession.\n\nTrial Court (Re-Title) :\n\n\"I have, therefore no doubt that these receipts relate to the suit land and, therefore, they show payment of rent by the plaintiff or hls father.\n\nThus, it has got to be held that the land belonged to the landlords within whose zamindari it lay. The plaintiff's father, therefore, obtained a valid title by the settlement from them.\"\n\n(Re-Adverse possession)\n\n\"I, therefore, find that the plaintiff has also obtained title by adverse possession inasmuch as he and ills father before him had been in continuous possession of this land from 1912 till 1957 when they were dispossessed by the order of the magistrate in the case nnder section 145 Cr.P.C.\"\n\nConsidering all these, I hold that the plaintiff has subsisting title to the suit land and he is entitled to khas possession of G the same.\"\n\nAdditional Judicial Commissioner (Re-Title)\n\n''There can be no doubt that Ex.ts. 5 to 5 (g) relate to the same lands for which the Hukurnnama (Ext. 18) was granted as they are for the same area as given in the Hukumnama and the first of these namely, Ext. 5 is for the very first year after the settlement and is dated 20-5-1913. Certainly by the Hukumnama (Ext. 18), which is unregistered document the\n\n. . \"\n\n• •\n\nland in suit could be settled and it could create good title in favour of the settlee as the settlement was for agricultural purpose and was accompanied by the delivery of possession and grant of rent receipts ...... P.Ws. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 8\n\n(Plaintiff) have stated about the constant possession of the plaintiff and his father.\"\n\n(Re-Adverse possession)\n\n\"Thus from the facts stated above it is quite clear that the plaintiff and his father were coming in possession of the land in suit since 1912 till the year 1954-55. The Municipality made several attempts to prevent the plaintiff and his father from storing building materials on the suit land from 1924 till 1954-55.\n\nThus the plaintiff's father is proved to have been in possession of the suit land both before and after the Municipal Survey of 1928-29. The oral evidence of P.Ws. 1, 6, 5, 8 and 9 also prove the plaintiff and his father were in actual possession of the suit land at all times after the settlement by the landlord in 1912. Hence, the presumption of correctness of the Municipal Survey entry has been successfully reputted in this case by the plaintiff.\n\nThe High Court was clearly in error in interfering with the aforesaid findings of fact.\n\nLastly, the High Court thought that as the land in question consisted of a portion of the tank or a land appurtenant thereto, adverse possession could not be proved. This view also seems to be wrong.\n\nIf a person asserts a hostile title even to a tank which, as claimed by the municipality, belonged to it and despite the hostile assertion of title no steps were taken by the owner, (namely, the municipality in this case), to evict the trespasser, his title by prescription would be complete after thirty years.\n\nOn a perusal of the first judgment of the High Court we are satisfied that the High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 100 in reversing pure concurrent findings of fact given by the trial court and the then appellate court both on the question of title and that of advcrsl' possession.\n\nIn the case of Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai( ') this Court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain\n\n(!) [1963] I S.C.R. 456\n\n2-214 SCI/81\n\nA second appeal on findings of fact even if it was erroneous. In this connection this Court observed as follows :\n\n\"It is settled law that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding \"\n\nof fact\n\nAs the two courts approached the evidence from a correct perspective and gave a concurrent finding of fact, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said finding.\"\n\nTo the same effect is another decision of this Court in the case of\n\nR. Ramachandran Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar(I) where the Court l observed as follows :- c\n\n\"But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate court, however, erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council observed, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be there is no juriscliction\n\nunder section 100 to correct that error.\"\n\nThe same view was taken in two earlier decisions of this Court in the cases of Pattabhiramaswamy v. Hanumayya(') and Raruha Singh\n\nv. Achal Singh.( 3 )\n\nThus, the High Court in this case had no jurisdiction after reversing E the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below on the question of adverse possession to remand the case to the Additional Judicial Commissioner on the question of title which also was concluded by the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two courts as indicat~<l above.\n\nThe conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that the first judgment of F the High Court remanding the case to the Additional Judicial Commissioner was clearly without jurisdiction and as a logical result thereof the order of remand and all proceedings taken thereafter would become void ab initio.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the G judgment of the High Court under appeal as also the judgment of the High Court dated 17th February, 1967 and decree the plaintiff's suit.\n\nIn the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\n(!} [19631 3 S.C.R. 604.\n\n(2) AIR 1959 S.C. 57.\n\n(3) A JR 1961 s.C. 1097 .\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. -~-- -f\"'<--~", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "li4\n\nKSHITISH CHANDRA BOSE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KSHITISH CHANDRA BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF RANCHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF RANCHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 li4\n\nKSHITISH CHANDRA BOSE\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF RANCHI\n\nFebruary 6, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARDARAJAN AND A. N. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Proacdure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1960] 3 SCR\n\n590", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1197, "end_char": 1214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2039, "end_char": 2050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1959 SC 57", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2223, "end_char": 2237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1961 SC 1097", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2268, "end_char": 2284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963] 1 SCR 456", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2325, "end_char": 2341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 SCR 604", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2389, "end_char": 2405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2623, "end_char": 2634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, D. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Chaudhury for the Appel- ~\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2636, "end_char": 2651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, D. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Chaudhury for the Appel- ~\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "N. R. Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, D. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Chaudhury for the Appel- ~\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2690, "end_char": 2701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, D. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Chaudhury for the Appel- ~\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2706, "end_char": 2717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, D. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Chaudhury for the Appel- ~\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2785, "end_char": 2794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by /' FAZAL ALI, J.-This is a plaintiff's appeal by special leave against\n\n)' .;"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":>\n\n11 judgment and decree of the Patna High Court dated 30th September, C 1970 and arises in the following circumstances :-\n\nThe plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title and recovery of possession and also a permanent injunction restraining the defendant municipality from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "30th September, C 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2916, "end_char": 2938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":>\n\n11 judgment and decree of the Patna High Court dated 30th September, C 1970 and arises in the following circumstances :-\n\nThe plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title and recovery of possession and also a permanent injunction restraining the defendant municipality from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3241, "end_char": 3247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th April, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3674, "end_char": 3690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I of Ranchi Muuicipality on the ground that he had acquired title to the land by virtue of a Hukumnama granted to him by the landlord as far back as 17th April, 1912 which is Exhibit 18."}}, {"text": "Additional Judicial Co=issioner, Ranchi (Chota Nagpur)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4187, "end_char": 4241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant filed an appeal before the Additional Judicial Co=issioner, Ranchi (Chota Nagpur) which after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the finding of the trial court and maintained the decree of the trial court on both points."}}, {"text": "17-2-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the respondent went up in second appeal to the High Court which was heard by a single Judge of\n\nthe Court who held that there was no clear ev!dence to show that the plaintiff had obtained title by adverse possession and by his judgment of 17-2-1967 (hereinafter to be referred to as the first judgmePt) remanded the case to the trial court for a decision only on the question of title."}}, {"text": "30-9-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5288, "end_char": 5297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff then went up in aweal to the High Court which affirmed the finding of the Additional Judicial Commissioner and dismissed the appeal by its judgment of 30-9-1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 5econd judgment)."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5420, "end_char": 5431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appearing for the appellant, Mr. V. S. Desai, submitted two points before us.", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5718, "end_char": 5745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 590", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7468, "end_char": 7487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7521, "end_char": 7526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mt. Sinha appearing for the respondent was unable to cite any .authority of this Court taking a contrary view or overriding the decisions referred to above."}}, {"text": "17th February, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8142, "end_char": 8161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have gone through the judgment of the High Court dated 17th February, 1967 and we find that the High Court has reversed the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below on the question of adverse possession without at all displacing the reasons given by the courts below or considering the important circumstances proved and relied on by them."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12200, "end_char": 12211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12212, "end_char": 12218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "20-5-1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12683, "end_char": 12692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 is for the very first year after the settlement and is dated 20-5-1913."}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14641, "end_char": 14647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15879, "end_char": 15890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_771_781_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "• '\n\nDUDH NATH PANDEY\n\nTHE STATE OF U.P.\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A. P. SEN, J.]\n\nIndian Penal Code-Section 302-For the offence of murder the nornial sn tence is sentence of life imprisonment and not of death-Witnesses failed ta rtveal the whole truth-Considerations to be taken into account while dealing\n\nwith the qurestion of sentence for the offence of murder.\n\nConcurrent findings of two courts below-Supreme Court, if could examine C their correctness.\n\nPlea of alibi-Its postulates.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that when the appellant, a motor-car driver who was living as a tenant in the out-house of the bungalow belonging to the famil; of the deceased, developed a fancy for the sister of the deceased. His overtures created D resentment in the family and the deceased took upon himself the task of preventing the appellant from pursuing his sister. The appellant's effort to take custody of the deceased's sister through legal proceedings had failed; sometime later on a complaint to the police that the appellant had been making indecent overtW'es towards her he was arrested. A day before the day of the occurrence the appellant was alleged to have threatened to kill the deceased if he oppooed his ( appel lant's) marriage with his sister. It was further alleged that while the deceased E was returning home on his scooter after leaving his sister in the school where she was working as a teacher, the appellant fired a shot at him with a pistol at which the deceased fell dead instantaneously.\n\nHe was convicted under section 302 J.P .C. and sentene:ed to death. order of conviction and sentence was confirmed by the High Court.\n\nOn the question of sentence\n\nTue\n\nHELD : 1. The Sessions Court and the High Court were right in convicting the appellant under section 302 l.P.C. [779 G]\n\n(a) The mere circumstance that two or more courts have taken the same view of facts does not shut out all further inquiry into the correctness of that view.\n\nConcurrence is not an insurance against the charge of perversity though a strong G case has to be made out in order to support the charge that findings of fact recorded by more than one court are perverse. The merit of the normal rule that concurrent findings ought not to be reviewed by this Court consists in the assumption that it is not likely that two or more tribunals would come . to the same conclusion unless it is a just and fair conclusion to come to.\n\n[718 E-GJ\n\n2. While dealing with the question of sentence for the offence of mu; der, the ll normal sentence is the sentence of life imprisonment and not of death. If in a same conclusion unless it is a just and fair conclusion to come to. [778 E-0]\n\nA balances do not choose to reveal the whole truth the Court while dealing with the question of sentence has to step in interstitially and take into account all reasonable possibilities having regard to the normal and natural course of human affairs. In the instant case it would be unsafe, on the evidence on record, to sentence the appellant to the extreme penalty of death. (780 HJ\n\nThe appellant, a poor motor-car driver, must have been offended enormously B when the deceased abuse_d him that he was a man of two paise worth and that if he attempted to marry his sister he would break his hands and feet and that his poverty was being put up as the reason why his sister would not be allowed to marry him.\n\nThe dispute thus assumed proportions of a fued over social status. The poor man was fretting that the rich man's daughter would not be allowed to marry him for the mere reason that he did not belong to an equal class of society. The appellant, rightly or wrongly, believed that the girl was not un- C willi11g to marry him. The incident of the previous evening could not be considered as affording \"sudden\" provocation to the appellant for thei crime committed by him on the following morning. It cannot reduce the offence of murder into a lesser offence, but the mental turmoil and the serue of being socially wronged through which the appellant was passing could not be overlooked while deciding the appropriate sentence. [780 B-D]\n\nD Secondly the fact that, apart from the gun-shot \\vound, the deceased had no other injury on his person except an abrasion on the left side of the chest evidently caused by the gun-shot itself coupled with the fact that the scooter was found\n\n\"standing\" on the road showed that the deceased stopped on seeing the appellant and that there was an exchange of hot words between them culminating in the murder. But since in the present case a part of the crucial evidence had been screened from the Court's scrutiny the possibility of an altercation between the E appellant and the deeeased cannot reasonably be excluded. (780 F-H]\n\n(3) The evidence of the defence witnesses has failed to establish the alibi of the appellants. The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence o( the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at another place. The plea therefore succeeds only if it is shown that the accused\n\nv.as so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place F where the crime was committed. But in the present case the evidence of the defence witnesses, accepting it at its face value, is consistent with the appellant's presence at the factory at the appointed hour and half an hour later at the scene of offence.\n\nSo short is the distance between the t\\vo points.\n\n[778 H; 779 DJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 163 G of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-8-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1264/ 78 and Murder Reference No. 9/78.\n\nR. C. Kohli for the Appellant.\n\n0. P. Rana ood K. K. Bhatta for the Respondent.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Complainant.\n\n,. •\n\nI r\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J .-A college-going boy called Vi jay Bhan Kishorc was shot dead on the morning of November 2, 1976 near the Hathi Park, Dayanand Ma_rg, Allahabad.\n\nThe appellant was con-\n\n• victed for that offence under section 302 of the Penal Code by the B \\ learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad and was sentenced to death. The order of conviction and sentence having been confirmed by the High Court of Allahabad by its judgment dated August 23,\n\n~-\\ 1979, the appellant has filed this appeal by Special Leave.\n\n~·\n\nVijay Bhan Kishore alias Pappoo was the son of an Advocate C called Brij Bhan Kishore who died in about 1967 leaving behind a widow, three daughters and Pappoo. The youngest of the three daughters was married while the two elder were working as school teachers. Out of those two, Ranjana Kishore was a teacher in the St.\n\nAnthony's Convent.\n\nThe appellant, Dudh Nath Pandey, who was a motor-car driver by occupation, used to live as a tenant in an out-house of a sprawling bungalow belonging to the family of the deceased, situated at 17,\n\nStanley Road, Allahabad.\n\nThe appellant develop-'A a fancy for E Ra'njana who was about 20 years of age when he came to live in the out-house. The overtures made by the appellant to Ranjana created resentment in her family and its only surviving male member, her brother Pappoo, took upon himself the task of preventing lhe appellant from pursuing his sister. As a first step, the appellant was turned out of th~ out-house. Soon thereafter, he filed an application before F the City Magistrate, Allahabad, asking for the custody of Ranjana, alleging that she was his lawfully wedded wife. That application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate after recording the statemerit of Ranjana, in which she denied that she was married to the appellant.\n\nThe appellant thereafter filed a habeas corpus petition in the Allahabad High Court alleging that Ranjana was detained unlawfully by the G members of her family, including her uncle K. P. Saxena, and asking that she be released from their custody. Ranjami denied in that proceedings too that she was married to the appellant or that she was unlawfully detained by the members of her family. The habeas corpus petition was dismissed by the High Court on November 8, 1973. On August 1, 1975, the Principal of St. Anthony's Convent made a com- H plaint to the police that the appellant had made indecent overtures to Ranjana. The appellant was arrested as a result of that complaint.\n\nl:X.UW\n\nOn November 1, 1976, Ranjana was having an evening stroll with her brother, the deceased Pappoo, in the compound of their house.\n\nThe app!'llant came there in a rikshaw, abused Pappoo and is alleged to have threatened to kill him, if he dared oppose his, the appellant's marriage with Ranjana. As a result of these various incidents and the family's growing concern for Ranjana's safety, Pappoo used to escort Ranjana every morning to the school where she was teaching.\n\nOn the following day, i.e. on November 2, 1976, Pappoo took Ranjana to her school on his scooter as usual.\n\nThe classes used to begin at 9-30 A.M. but Ranjana used to go to the school 30 to 40 minutes before time for correcting the students' home-work.\n\nAfter dropping Ranjana at the school, Pappoo started back for home on his scooter. While he was passing by the Children's Park, known as-the Hathi Park, the appellant is alleged to have fired at him with a country-made pistol.\n\nPappoo fen down from his scooter and died almost instantaneously.\n\nThe. occurrence is said to have been wi.tnessed by Harish Chandra (P. W. 3), a domestic servant of the family of the deceased and by Harish Chandra's friend Ashok Kumar (P. W. 1). Harish Chandra used fo live in the out-house of the deceased's bunglow at 17, Stanley Road, while Ashok Kumar, who generaHy lived at Kanpur, is said to have come to Allahabad the previous day in search of employment.\n\nAlmost immediately after Pappoo and Ranjana left the house on the scooter, Ashok Kumar and Harish Chandra too left the house as the former wanted to see the Hathi Park. They were nearabout the gate of the park, which is a few steps away from the scene of occurrence, when the deceased Pappoo was passing along on his scooter, after dropping Ranjana at the St. Anthony's Convent. Ashok Kumar and Barish Chandra are alleged to have seen the appellant, who was standing near the northern boundary of the park, firing a shot at Pappoo.\n\nThe appellant re-loaded his pistol and is said to have run away towards the south-east.\n\nAshok Kumar and Harish Chandra rushed to St. Anthony's Convent in a rikshaw and informed Raujaua Kishore about the muraer of her brother. Ranjaua went to the scene of incident along with them and on finding that her brother was dead, she went straight to the Cannington police station which is about 2 kms. away. She wrote out the report (Ex. Ka-1) in her own hand and submitted it to the officerin-charge of the police station at 9-45 A.M. In the meantime, information of the murder had reached the police station of Colonelganj, within the 'jurisdiction' of which the murder had taken place.\n\nI' •\n\nThe police deserve a word of appreciation because they did not, as usual, enter into a squabble as to in whose 'jurisdiction' the offence had taken place.\n\nH. R. L. Srivastava, the sub inspector attached to Colonelganj police station, went within minutes to the scene of offence and, believing that Pappoo was alive, sent him in a jeep to the Tej Bahadur Sapru hospital. A little later, P. S. I. Chandrapal Singh of the Cannington police station arrived on the scene and started the inveitigation.\n\nHe took charge of an empty cartridge-shell and the bloodstained earth and later, he sent the dead body of Pappoo for postmortem examination.\n\nP. S. I. Srivastava arrested the appellant at about 2-30 P .M. while c he was standing near a pan-shop in front of the Indian Telephone Industries, Naini, where he used to work. The appellant was taken to the scene of offence where he made a certain statement and took out a loaded pistol from a heap of rubbish lying on the Kamla Nehru Road, being the direction in which he had run away after killing Pappoo.\n\nThe Ballistic expert, Budul Rai, opined that the empty cartridge-shell, D which was lying at the scene of offence, was fired from that particular pistol.\n\nDr. G. S. Saxena, who conducted the post-mortem examination found a single gun-shot injury on the left side of the chest of the E deceased, below the armpit.\n\nThe injury had caused seven pellet wounds, each measuring 1 /3 inch in diameter.\n\nSeven pellets were recovered from the body. The injury, according to Dr. Saxena, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nThe appellant stated in his defence that he used to live in the house of the deceased as the guest of the family and not as a tenant and that Ranjana got intimate with him during that period. He left the house because she told him that there was danger to his life.\n\nThe murder of Pappoo, according to the appellant, was engineered by Dr. K. P.\n\nSaxena, the maternal uncle of the deceased.\n\nThe appellant denied his hand in the murder, saying that he had no reason to do so since the deceased's mother and the other members of the family desired that he should marry Ranjana.\n\nThe appellant examined five witnesses to prove his alibi, his contention being that he was on duty at the Indian Telephone Industries, H right from 8-30 A.M. on the date of the incident and that he was arrested from inside the factory at about 2-30 P.M. while on duty.\n\nA The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad, examined the\n\nDeputy Superintendent of Police, R. P. Bhanu, and the General Manager of the Indian Telephone Industries as Court witnesses.\n\nThe prosecution examined 13 witnesses in support of its case that the appellant had committed the murder of Pappoo.\n\nAshok Kumar (P.W. 1) and Harish Chandra (P.W. 3) were examined as eyewitnesses to the incident.\n\nR:i.njana Kishore (P.W. 2) was examined to prove the motive for the murder as also for showing that the deceased Pappoo had taken her to the school on his scooter. and that, soon thereafter, she was informed by the two eye-witnesses of the murder.\n\nRam Kishore (P.W. 4) was examined to prove the arrest of the appellant and the recovery of the loaded pistol.\n\nP. S. I.\n\nSrivastava (P.W. 9) and P.S.I. Chandrapal Singh (P.W. 10) deposed about the various steps taken during the course of investigation.\n\nDr.\n\nG. S. Saxena (P.W. 11) was examined in order to show the riature of the injuries suffered by the deceased while Budul Rai (P.W. 12) stated that the empty cartridge-shell which was lying at the scene of offence was fired from the particular pistol which is stated to have been recovered at the instance of the appellant. The other prosecution witnesses are mostly of a formal nature.\n\nWere this a case of circumstantial evidence, different considerations would have prevailed because the balance of evidence after excluding the testimony of the two eye witnesses is not of the standard required in cases dependent wholly on circumstantial evidence.\n\nEvidence of recovery of the pistol at the instance of the appellant cannot by itself prove that he who pointed out the weapon weilded it in offence. The statement accompanying the discovery is woefully vague to identify the authorship of concealment, with the result that the pointing out of the weapon may at best prove the appellant's knowledge as to where ihc weapon was kept.\n\nThe evidence of the Ballistic expert carries the proof of the charge a significant step ahead, but not near enough, because at the highest, it shows that the shot which killed Pappoo was fired from the pistol which was pointed out by the appellant.\n\nThe evidence surrounding the discovery of the pistol may not be discarded as wholly untrue but it leaves a few significant questions unanswered and creates a sense of uneasiness in the mind of a Criminal CO'Urt, the Court of conscience that it has to be : How could the appellant have an opportunity to conceal the pistol in broad-day light on a public thoroughfare? If he re-loaded the pistol as a measure of self protection, as suggested by the prosecution, why did he get rid of it H so quickly by throwing it near the Hathi Park itself ? And how come that the police hit upon DOile better thnn Ram Kishore (P.W. 4) to witness the .discovery of tl1e pistol ? Ram . Kishore had a!mldy\n\n....\n\ndeposed in seven different cases in favour of the prosecution and was , 'A evidently at the beck and call of the police.\n\nBut the real hurdle in the way of the appellant is the evidence of the eye witnesses : Ashok Kumar (P .W. 1) and Harish Chandra\n\n(P.W. 3). Shri R. C. Kohli who appears for the appellant made a . valiant attempt to demolish their evidence but in spite of the counsel's able argument, we find it difficult to hold that the eye-witnesses have perjured themselves by claiming to be present at the time and place of the occurrence. It is true that Harish Chandra, who was working as a domestic servant with the deceased's family, should normally have been doing his daily morning chores.\n\nFew masters would permit a household servant to go away on a sight-seeing spree right in the morning. But there are at le'!, st two plausible reasons which lend assurance to the claim that Harish Ch<mdra left the house almost immediately after the deceased Pappoo drove away with his sister Ranjana.\n\nAshok Kumar had come to Allahabad the previcms evening and he wanted to go to the Hathi Park where, though it is called a children's park, adults too find their merriment.\n\nThere is nothing fundalnentally improbable in Ashok Kumar coming to Allahabad in search of employment and equally, nothing inherently strange in the two friends going out on a frolic.\n\nAnd though a small consideration, it is relevant that the normal morning routine of Harish Chandra was to help in the kitchen but the 2nd November, 1976 was an Ekadashi day and therefore, there was not much to do for him.\n\nThe second reason is more weighty and almost clinches the issue. The evidence of Ranjana (P.W. 2) shows beyond the manner of doubt that Harish Chandra and Ashok Kumar broke to her the news of her brother's murder, while she was in the school. The events after the murper happened in such quick succession that there was no time for any one to contrive and confabulate. Within ten minutes of the occurrence, Ranjana was informed of the incident by the two eyewitnesses and within a few moments thereafter she went to the scene of the tragedy.\n\nHer F.l.R. (Ex. Ka-1) was recorded at the police station at 9-45 a.m. A fact of preponderating importance is that the story which Ranjana disclosed in the F.I.R. is precisely the same as the witnesses, including herself, narrated in the Court.\n\nThe F.I.R. is a brief document of a page and half. But it is remarkable that it mentions ( 1) that the appellant wanted to marry Ranjana and was harassing her towards that end; (2) that there was a quarrel between the appellant and Pappoo the previous evening, in which the former gave a threat of life to the latter (3) that Ranjana left for the school on the day of occurrence at 8-45 A.M.; and ( 4) that soon thereafter Harish\n\nChandra and Ashok Kumar met her at the school and conveyed to her that they had gone to see the Hathi Park when, while Pappoo was passing along the road, the Appellant fired a shot at him. We consider it beyond the normal range of human propensities that Ranjana could have built up the whole story within three quarters of an hour which intervened between the time that she learnt of her brother's murder and the lodging by her of the F.I.R. She could not have taken the risk of creating a false witness by placing Aslfok Kumar, who normally, resided in Kanpur, alongside Harish Chandra.\n\nWith the death of her brother, her own house was left without a male member.\n\nAt home was an ailing mother and tw;, other sisters, more or less of her own a_ge.\n\nThere was no one to advise her upon the hatching of a conspiracy to involve the appellant and she could not have been in a proper frame of mind to do anything of the kind on her own. Her inexperience of life, the promptness with which she gave the F.l.R. and the weqlth of details she mentioned therein afford an assurance that the story of the eye-witnesses is true in so far as it goes. Shri Kohli's submission that Ranjana's F.I.R. is anti-timed and must have been recorded late in the evening leaves us cold.\n\nShri Kohli has pointed a defect here and an improbability there in the evidence of the eye-witnesses but it has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently believed E that eVidence.\n\nWe do not suggest that the mere circumstances that two or more courts have taken the same view of facts shuts out all further inquiry into the correctness of that view.\n\nFor example, concurrence is not an insurance against the charge of perversity though a strong case has to be made out in order to support the charge that findings of fact recorded by more than one court are perverse, that is F to say, they are such that no reasonable tribunal could have recorded them. The merit of the normal rule that concurrent findings ought not to be reviewed by this Court consists in the assumption that it is not likely that two or lllPfe tribunals would come to the same conclusion unless it is a just and fair conclusion to come to. In the instant case, the view of the evidence taken by the Sessions Court and the G H; i.gh Court is, at least, a reasonable view to take and that is why we are not disposed, so to say, to re-open the whole case on evidence.\n\nWe have indicated briefly why we consider that the eye-witness account accords with the broad probabilities of the case.\n\nCounsel for the appellant pressed hard upon us that the defence H evidence establishes the alibi of the appellant. We think not.\n\nThe evidence led by the appellant to show that, at the relevant time, he was on duty at his usual place of work at Naini has a certain amount\n\nof plausibility but that is about all. The High Court and the Sessions Court have pointed out many a reason why that evidence cannot be accepted as true. The appellant's colleagues at the Indian Telephone Industries made a brave bid to save his life by giving evidence suggesting that he was at his desk at or about the time when the murder took place and further, that he was arrested from within the factory.\n\nWe do not want to attribute motives to them merelv because they were examined by the defence.\n\nDefence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, Courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses. Quite often, they tell lies but so do the prosecution witnesses.\n\nGranting that D. Ws. 1 to 5 are right, their evidence, particularly in the light of the evidence of the two Court witnesses, is insufficient to prove that the appellant could nqt have been present near the Hathi Park at about\n\n~-00 A.M. when the murder of Pappoo was committed. The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at another place.\n\nThe plea can therefore succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. The evidence of the defence witnesses, accepting it at its face value, is consistent with the appellant's presence at the Naini factory at 8-30 A.M. and at the scene of offence at 9.00 A.M.\n\nSo short is the distance between the two points. The workers punch their cards when they enter the factory but when they leave the factory; they do not have to pnnch the time of their exit. The appellant, in all prnbability, went to the factory at the appointed hour, left it immediately and went in search of his prey.\n\nHe knew when, precisely, Pappoo would return after dropping Ranjana at the school.\n\nThe appellant appears to have attempted to go back to his work but that involved the risk of the time of his re-entry being pnnched again.\n\nThat is how he was arrested at about 2-30 P.M. while he was loitering near the pan-shop in front of the factory.\n\nThere is no truth in the claim that he was arrested from inside the factory.\n\nThat settles the issue of guilt. We agree with the view of the High Court and the Sessions Court and uphold the appellant's conviction under section 302 of the Penal Code.\n\nThe question of sentence has gravely agitated our minds. A young college-going boy was murdered because he was trying to wean away\n\nhis sister from th_e influence of the appellant who had set his heart R upon her.\n\nBut there are two reasons why we are not disposed to confirm the death sentence. In the first place, the appellant was smarting\n\nunder the insult hurled at him by the deceased Pappoo, the previous evening.\n\nAs stated by Ranjana in the F.I.R., when the appellant proclaimed his determination to marry her, Pappoo retorted : \"You ar~ a ma'n of two Paisa's worth. How can you dare to marry my sister ? I will break your hands and feet.\" A poor motor-car driver that ihe appellant was, he must have been offended enormously that his poverty was being put up as the reawn why Ranjana would not be allowed to marry him. The dispute thus assumed the proportions of a feud over social status, the poor man fretting that the rich man's daughter would not be allowed to marry him for the mere reason that he did not belong to an equal class of society.\n\nAnd it is evident that he believed, rightly or wrongly, that Ranjana was not unwilling to take him as a husband. It is in the immediate background of the previous evening's incident that the question of sentence has perforce to be considered.\n\nThat incident cannot certainly be considered as affording \"sudden\" provocation to the appellant for the crime committed by him the next morning and, therefore, it cannot reduce the offence of murder into a lesser offence.\n\nBut, the mental turmoil and the sense of being socially wronged through which the appellant was passing cannot be overlooked while deciding which is the appropriate sentence to pass, the rule being that for the offence of murder, the normal sentence is the sentence of life imprisonment and not of death.\n\nSecondly, Harish Chandra and Ashok Kumar do not appear to have revealed the whole truth to the Court. If the appellant had fired a shot at Pappoo while the latter was driving along on his scooter, and if Pappoo, as is alleged, dropped dead, his scooter would have dragged him ahead and in that process he would have received some injury.\n\nThe scooter too would have been damaged, howsoever slightly. But it is strange that apart from the gun-shot wound, Pappoo had no other in jury on his person except an abrasion on the left side Of the chest which was evidently caused by the gun-shot itself.\n\nThe scooter was not dragged at all, except for the mark of pellets.\n\nAnd, most importantly, the scooter was not lying on the road but was \"standing\".\n\nPappoo s_eems to have' stopped on seeing the appellant and quite clearly, there was an exchange of hot words between them which culminated in Pappoo's murder.\n\nThe death of the brave, young lad which has deprived the familv of the succour of its only male member is to be deeply lamented. But, if witnesses on whose evidence the life of an accused hangs in the balance, do not choose to reveal the whole truth, the Court. while dealing with the question of sentence, has to step in interstitially and take into account all reasonable possibilities, having regard to the normal and natural course of human affairs.\n\nSince a part of the crucial event has been screened from the Court's A scrutiny and the possibility of [ln altercation between the appellant and !he dej:eased cannot reasonably be excluded, we consider it unsafe to sentence the appellant to the extreme penalty.\n\nfrt the result, we confirm the conviction of the appellant under • section 302 of the Penal Code but set aside the sentence of death n\n\nimposed upon him. We sentence the appellant to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe appeal is, accordingly, allowed partly.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed pnrt/.v.\n\nl 1", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "DUDH NATH PANDEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DUDH NATH PANDEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• '\n\nDUDH NATH PANDEY\n\nTHE STATE OF U.P.\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A. P. SEN, J.]\n\nIndian Penal Code-Section 302-For the offence of murder the nornial sn tence is sentence of life imprisonment and not of death-Witnesses failed ta rtveal the whole truth-Considerations to be taken into account while dealing\n\nwith the qurestion of sentence for the offence of murder."}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1793, "end_char": 1804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-8-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana ood K. K. Bhatta for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. K. Bhatta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5769, "end_char": 5781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana ood K. K. Bhatta for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5803, "end_char": 5819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Complainant."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5829, "end_char": 5841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Complainant."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5919, "end_char": 5930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I r\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J .-A college-going boy called Vi jay Bhan Kishorc was shot dead on the morning of November 2, 1976 near the Hathi Park, Dayanand Ma_rg, Allahabad."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6158, "end_char": 6168, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6325, "end_char": 6348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of conviction and sentence having been confirmed by the High Court of Allahabad by its judgment dated August 23,\n\n~-\\ 1979, the appellant has filed this appeal by Special Leave."}}, {"text": "Vijay Bhan Kishore alias Pappoo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6452, "end_char": 6483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·\n\nVijay Bhan Kishore alias Pappoo was the son of an Advocate C called Brij Bhan Kishore who died in about 1967 leaving behind a widow, three daughters and Pappoo."}}, {"text": "Brij Bhan Kishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·\n\nVijay Bhan Kishore alias Pappoo was the son of an Advocate C called Brij Bhan Kishore who died in about 1967 leaving behind a widow, three daughters and Pappoo."}}, {"text": "Pappoo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6605, "end_char": 6611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·\n\nVijay Bhan Kishore alias Pappoo was the son of an Advocate C called Brij Bhan Kishore who died in about 1967 leaving behind a widow, three daughters and Pappoo."}}, {"text": "Ranjana Kishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6732, "end_char": 6747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of those two, Ranjana Kishore was a teacher in the St.\n\nAnthony's Convent.", "canonical_name": "Ranjana Kishore"}}, {"text": "St.\n\nAnthony's Convent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6769, "end_char": 6791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of those two, Ranjana Kishore was a teacher in the St.\n\nAnthony's Convent."}}, {"text": "Dudh Nath Pandey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6809, "end_char": 6825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Dudh Nath Pandey, who was a motor-car driver by occupation, used to live as a tenant in an out-house of a sprawling bungalow belonging to the family of the deceased, situated at 17,\n\nStanley Road, Allahabad.", "canonical_name": "DUDH NATH PANDEY"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7006, "end_char": 7015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Dudh Nath Pandey, who was a motor-car driver by occupation, used to live as a tenant in an out-house of a sprawling bungalow belonging to the family of the deceased, situated at 17,\n\nStanley Road, Allahabad."}}, {"text": "E Ra'njana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7055, "end_char": 7065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant develop-'A a fancy for E Ra'njana who was about 20 years of age when he came to live in the out-house.", "canonical_name": "E Ra'njana"}}, {"text": "Ranjana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7174, "end_char": 7181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The overtures made by the appellant to Ranjana created resentment in her family and its only surviving male member, her brother Pappoo, took upon himself the task of preventing lhe appellant from pursuing his sister.", "canonical_name": "E Ra'njana"}}, {"text": "City Magistrate, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7470, "end_char": 7496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon thereafter, he filed an application before F the City Magistrate, Allahabad, asking for the custody of Ranjana, alleging that she was his lawfully wedded wife."}}, {"text": "K. P. Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7923, "end_char": 7935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereafter filed a habeas corpus petition in the Allahabad High Court alleging that Ranjana was detained unlawfully by the G members of her family, including her uncle K. P. Saxena, and asking that she be released from their custody.", "canonical_name": "K. P.\n\nSaxena"}}, {"text": "Ranjami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7989, "end_char": 7996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranjami denied in that proceedings too that she was married to the appellant or that she was unlawfully detained by the members of her family."}}, {"text": "November 8, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8194, "end_char": 8210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The habeas corpus petition was dismissed by the High Court on November 8, 1973."}}, {"text": "1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8222, "end_char": 8229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 1, 1975, the Principal of St. Anthony's Convent made a com- H plaint to the police that the appellant had made indecent overtures to Ranjana."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8434, "end_char": 8450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l:X.UW\n\nOn November 1, 1976, Ranjana was having an evening stroll with her brother, the deceased Pappoo, in the compound of their house."}}, {"text": "Ranjana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8452, "end_char": 8459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l:X.UW\n\nOn November 1, 1976, Ranjana was having an evening stroll with her brother, the deceased Pappoo, in the compound of their house.", "canonical_name": "E Ra'njana"}}, {"text": "November 2, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8932, "end_char": 8948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the following day, i.e. on November 2, 1976, Pappoo took Ranjana to her school on his scooter as usual."}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9502, "end_char": 9516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "occurrence is said to have been wi.tnessed by Harish Chandra (P. W. 3), a domestic servant of the family of the deceased and by Harish Chandra's friend Ashok Kumar (P. W. 1)."}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9584, "end_char": 9598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "occurrence is said to have been wi.tnessed by Harish Chandra (P. W. 3), a domestic servant of the family of the deceased and by Harish Chandra's friend Ashok Kumar (P. W. 1).", "canonical_name": "Harish\n\nChandra"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9608, "end_char": 9619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "occurrence is said to have been wi.tnessed by Harish Chandra (P. W. 3), a domestic servant of the family of the deceased and by Harish Chandra's friend Ashok Kumar (P. W. 1)."}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9729, "end_char": 9740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harish Chandra used fo live in the out-house of the deceased's bunglow at 17, Stanley Road, while Ashok Kumar, who generaHy lived at Kanpur, is said to have come to Allahabad the previous day in search of employment."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9764, "end_char": 9770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harish Chandra used fo live in the out-house of the deceased's bunglow at 17, Stanley Road, while Ashok Kumar, who generaHy lived at Kanpur, is said to have come to Allahabad the previous day in search of employment."}}, {"text": "Barish Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10244, "end_char": 10258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok Kumar and Barish Chandra are alleged to have seen the appellant, who was standing near the northern boundary of the park, firing a shot at Pappoo."}}, {"text": "St. Anthony's Convent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10512, "end_char": 10533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok Kumar and Harish Chandra rushed to St. Anthony's Convent in a rikshaw and informed Raujaua Kishore about the muraer of her brother."}}, {"text": "Raujaua Kishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10560, "end_char": 10575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok Kumar and Harish Chandra rushed to St. Anthony's Convent in a rikshaw and informed Raujaua Kishore about the muraer of her brother.", "canonical_name": "Ranjana Kishore"}}, {"text": "Ranjaua", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10609, "end_char": 10616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranjaua went to the scene of incident along with them and on finding that her brother was dead, she went straight to the Cannington police station which is about 2 kms.", "canonical_name": "E Ra'njana"}}, {"text": "Cannington police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranjaua went to the scene of incident along with them and on finding that her brother was dead, she went straight to the Cannington police station which is about 2 kms."}}, {"text": "Colonelganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10989, "end_char": 11000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ka-1) in her own hand and submitted it to the officerin-charge of the police station at 9-45 A.M. In the meantime, information of the murder had reached the police station of Colonelganj, within the 'jurisdiction' of which the murder had taken place."}}, {"text": "H. R. L. Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11228, "end_char": 11247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. L. Srivastava, the sub inspector attached to Colonelganj police station, went within minutes to the scene of offence and, believing that Pappoo was alive, sent him in a jeep to the Tej Bahadur Sapru hospital."}}, {"text": "Colonelganj police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11279, "end_char": 11305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. L. Srivastava, the sub inspector attached to Colonelganj police station, went within minutes to the scene of offence and, believing that Pappoo was alive, sent him in a jeep to the Tej Bahadur Sapru hospital."}}, {"text": "Tej Bahadur Sapru hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11415, "end_char": 11441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. L. Srivastava, the sub inspector attached to Colonelganj police station, went within minutes to the scene of offence and, believing that Pappoo was alive, sent him in a jeep to the Tej Bahadur Sapru hospital."}}, {"text": "P. S. I. Chandrapal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11459, "end_char": 11484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A little later, P. S. I. Chandrapal Singh of the Cannington police station arrived on the scene and started the inveitigation."}}, {"text": "P. S. I. Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11713, "end_char": 11732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. I. Srivastava arrested the appellant at about 2-30 P .M. while c he was standing near a pan-shop in front of the Indian Telephone Industries, Naini, where he used to work."}}, {"text": "Indian Telephone Industries, Naini", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11832, "end_char": 11866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. I. Srivastava arrested the appellant at about 2-30 P .M. while c he was standing near a pan-shop in front of the Indian Telephone Industries, Naini, where he used to work."}}, {"text": "Budul Rai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12146, "end_char": 12155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ballistic expert, Budul Rai, opined that the empty cartridge-shell, D which was lying at the scene of offence, was fired from that particular pistol."}}, {"text": "G. S. Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12283, "end_char": 12295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. G. S. Saxena, who conducted the post-mortem examination found a single gun-shot injury on the left side of the chest of the E deceased, below the armpit."}}, {"text": "Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12593, "end_char": 12599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injury, according to Dr. Saxena, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."}}, {"text": "K. P.\n\nSaxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13005, "end_char": 13018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The murder of Pappoo, according to the appellant, was engineered by Dr. K. P.\n\nSaxena, the maternal uncle of the deceased.", "canonical_name": "K. P.\n\nSaxena"}}, {"text": "Indian Telephone Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13349, "end_char": 13376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant examined five witnesses to prove his alibi, his contention being that he was on duty at the Indian Telephone Industries, H right from 8-30 A.M. on the date of the incident and that he was arrested from inside the factory at about 2-30 P.M. while on duty."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13527, "end_char": 13563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad, examined the\n\nDeputy Superintendent of Police, R. P. Bhanu, and the General Manager of the Indian Telephone Industries as Court witnesses."}}, {"text": "R. P. Bhanu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13612, "end_char": 13623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad, examined the\n\nDeputy Superintendent of Police, R. P. Bhanu, and the General Manager of the Indian Telephone Industries as Court witnesses."}}, {"text": "R:i.njana Kishore", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13919, "end_char": 13936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R:i.njana Kishore (P.W. 2) was examined to prove the motive for the murder as also for showing that the deceased Pappoo had taken her to the school on his scooter."}}, {"text": "Ram Kishore", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14168, "end_char": 14179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishore (P.W. 4) was examined to prove the arrest of the appellant and the recovery of the loaded pistol."}}, {"text": "P. S. I.\n\nSrivastava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14279, "end_char": 14299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. I.\n\nSrivastava (P.W. 9) and P.S.I. Chandrapal Singh (P.W. 10) deposed about the various steps taken during the course of investigation."}}, {"text": "P.S.I. Chandrapal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14313, "end_char": 14336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. I.\n\nSrivastava (P.W. 9) and P.S.I. Chandrapal Singh (P.W. 10) deposed about the various steps taken during the course of investigation."}}, {"text": "G. S. Saxena", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14427, "end_char": 14439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.\n\nG. S. Saxena (P.W. 11) was examined in order to show the riature of the injuries suffered by the deceased while Budul Rai (P.W. 12) stated that the empty cartridge-shell which was lying at the scene of offence was fired from the particular pistol which is stated to have been recovered at the instance of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ram . Kishore", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16369, "end_char": 16382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram ."}}, {"text": "R. C. Kohli", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16667, "end_char": 16678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri R. C. Kohli who appears for the appellant made a ."}}, {"text": "Harish Ch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17296, "end_char": 17305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st two plausible reasons which lend assurance to the claim that Harish Ch<mdra left the house almost immediately after the deceased Pappoo drove away with his sister Ranjana.", "canonical_name": "Harish\n\nChandra"}}, {"text": "2nd November, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17900, "end_char": 17918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And though a small consideration, it is relevant that the normal morning routine of Harish Chandra was to help in the kitchen but the 2nd November, 1976 was an Ekadashi day and therefore, there was not much to do for him."}}, {"text": "Ranjana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18070, "end_char": 18077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Ranjana (P.W. 2) shows beyond the manner of doubt that Harish Chandra and Ashok Kumar broke to her the news of her brother's murder, while she was in the school."}}, {"text": "Harish\n\nChandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19200, "end_char": 19215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is remarkable that it mentions ( 1) that the appellant wanted to marry Ranjana and was harassing her towards that end; (2) that there was a quarrel between the appellant and Pappoo the previous evening, in which the former gave a threat of life to the latter (3) that Ranjana left for the school on the day of occurrence at 8-45 A.M.; and ( 4) that soon thereafter Harish\n\nChandra and Ashok Kumar met her at the school and conveyed to her that they had gone to see the Hathi Park when, while Pappoo was passing along the road, the Appellant fired a shot at him.", "canonical_name": "Harish\n\nChandra"}}, {"text": "Aslfok Kumar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19724, "end_char": 19736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We consider it beyond the normal range of human propensities that Ranjana could have built up the whole story within three quarters of an hour which intervened between the time that she learnt of her brother's murder and the lodging by her of the F.I.R. She could not have taken the risk of creating a false witness by placing Aslfok Kumar, who normally, resided in Kanpur, alongside Harish Chandra."}}, {"text": "Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20354, "end_char": 20359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kohli's submission that Ranjana's F.I.R. is anti-timed and must have been recorded late in the evening leaves us cold."}}, {"text": "Naini", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22014, "end_char": 22019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence led by the appellant to show that, at the relevant time, he was on duty at his usual place of work at Naini has a certain amount\n\nof plausibility but that is about all."}}, {"text": "Naini factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23523, "end_char": 23536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of the defence witnesses, accepting it at its face value, is consistent with the appellant's presence at the Naini factory at 8-30 A.M. and at the scene of offence at 9.00 A.M.\n\nSo short is the distance between the two points."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24470, "end_char": 24481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24489, "end_char": 24499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28027, "end_char": 28038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28046, "end_char": 28056, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_782_788_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "DR. C. GIRIJAMBAL\n\nGOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, J.J\n\nContitution :; f fndia 1950, Article 16-Medical Officers of Dispensaries-- ] hrle raJegories-G.C.l.M., L.l.M. and D.A.M. degree holders-Different pay scale for each category-Whether valid.\n\nProfe.sional sen1ices-Pri11ciple of equal pay for equal work-Whether clin be invoked.\n\nThe appellant was selected for .the post of Medical Officer in the Local Fund, Ayurvedic Dispensary in the Zilla Parishad. She possessed a Diploma in Ayurvedic Medicine (D.A.M.). Her salary was fixed in the scale of Rs. 125- 220.\n\nHer representation to fix her pay in the higher scale had been rejected by the State Government on the ground that only candidates with 'A' class Registration could be given the higher scale of pay.\n\nUnder the Andhra Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Medical Practitioners Registration Act, 1956 holders of Diploma in Ayurvedic Medicine (D.A.M.), holders of Graduate of the College of Integrated Medicine (G.C.l.M.) and, holders of Licentiate in Indigenous Medicine (L.l.M.) were entitled to class 'A' Registration Certificate. Her application to the Andhra Board of Ayurveda for registration as 'A' class Practitioner was rejected.\n\nAllowing her petition, impugning the action of the Board of Ayurveda, the High Court held that being a person p0ssessing a diploma similar to the G.C.l.M. or L.I.M. she was entitled to be registered in class 'A' and that she should be given all the benefits of the higher pay scale of Rs. 180-320.\n\nThe scale of pay of Rs. 180-320 for Medical Officers holding L.I.M. was revised to Rs. 200-400. Sometime later the scales of pay were again revised.\n\nThe scale of Rs. 200-400 was split into two categories: (i) Rs. 530-1050 for Medical Officers holding L.I.M. and (ii) Rs. 430-800 for other Medical Officers.\n\nIn the first revision she was given the scale of Rs. 200-400 but under the second revision she was given only the scale of Rs. 430-800.\n\nHer representation to the Government for fixing her pa.y in the scale of Rs. 530-1050 having not been answered, she moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal which held that she was not entitled to a higher scale as she did not possess the requisite qualifications mentioned in the relevant government order.\n\nBefore this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that: (1) Medical Officers holding the degrees of G.C.I.M. or D.A.M. perform the same functions and discharge the same duties in dispensaries and that on the principle of equal pay for equal work,- the appellant should be given the pay scale meant\n\n....\n\n• • • }\n\nC. UIRIJAMBAL V. ANDHRA PRADESH 783\n\nfur Medical Officers holding G.C.l, M. because she was entitled to class 'A\" Re..\n\nA gistration Certificate and (2) since she had been fixed in the scale of Rs. 200- 400 under the first revision she should have been fixed under the second reviw\n\nsion in the scale of Rs. 530-1050 alongwith holders of L.l.M.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nIIELD ; 1. The contention that because her diploma was regarded as similar or equivalent to G.C.I.M. for registration purposes she should be given the pay B scale avail•ble to the holder of G.C.l.M. was rightly rejected by the tribunal.\n\n[787 E]\n\n2. The principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be invoked invariably in every kind of service. It cannot be invok~ in the area of professional services. [786 Pl\n\nill the instant case by rea.on of the fact that Medi<:al Officers holding the qualificatioos uf G.C.I.M. or L.I.M. or D.A.M. were placed incharge of Zilla\n\nPaiishad dispensaries, they cannot be treated on par with each other. If the State Government or the Zilla Parishads prescribes different scales of pay for each category of Medical Officers no fault could be found with such prescription. [786 H-787 Al\n\n3. The similarity or equality conferred on holders of G.CJ.M .. I.I.M •. and D.A.M. was for the purposes of registration as practitioners of modern medi~\n\ncine under the Registration Act, 1956, and not in the matter of proficiency.\n\nThe High Court in its order made it clear that for the purposes of registration under the Registration Act the appellant as a holder of D.A.M. was similar to G.C.I.M. and was entitled to class 'A' Registration Certificate. That these three categories were not equated in the matter of proficiency is borne out from the fact that right from the beginning the pay scales prescribed for these categories were different, highest pay scale being available to holders of G.C.I.M. the next lower being available to holders of L.l, M. and the lowest to medical prac~ titioners other than these two categories. [787 C-D]\n\n4. When the first revision was undertaken, the appellant was put in the pay scale of Rs. 200-400, the one which was also given to Medical OJ!icers holding L.I.M. because under the order of the High Court the appellant had been fixed initially in the scale of Rs. 180-320 and when that pay scale wa. revised to Rs. 200-400 she was required to be given that revised scale. When the second revision was undertaken it was open to the State Government to split the scale into two categories : one meant for Mroica.l OJ!icers hc>lding I.I.M. and the other for Medica.l Officers other than L.I.M. Since the appellant was not a holder of L.J.M. but fell in the other category she was properly fued in the lower revised pay scale or Rs. 430-800. [787 G-788 A] G CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Gvil Appeal No. 1173 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18-8-1977 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in Representation Petition No. 286/77.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Miss R. Vaigai and J, Rama Murthi for the Appellant.\n\nG. N. Rao for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question about the eligibility of the appellant to a higher pay scale under\n\nB G.O.M. No. 574 P.R. dated October 20, 1975 with etfect from • November 1, 1974.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the question may be stated : the appellant passed Diploma in Ayurvedic Medicine (DAM) from Kerala University in the year 1962, having studied this course for four years C and nine months with one more year of House Surgeoncy.\n\nBesides Ayurvedic Medicine this course consisted of Modern Medicine also. fhis Diploma is also included in the Second Schedule to the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970.\n\nAccording to the appellant the Government of Kerala had treated the holders of D.A.M. on par with holders of G.C.I.M. (Graduate of the College of Integrated D Medicine) arid LI.M. (Licentiate in Indigenous Medicine) in regard to registration of medical practitioners in modern medicine, and all the three were also entitled to Class 'A' Registration Certificate under the Andhra Ayurvedic and Homoepathic Medical Practitioners Registration Act, 1956 (hereinafter called 'the Registration Act').\n\nIn response to the advertisement published by the Zilla Parishad, Nellore the appellant applied for appointment to the post of Medical Officer, Local Fund Ayurvedic Dispensary, Duggarajapatnam, Ncllore District and after an interview on being selected she joined the duties of the post on December 26, 1963. It appears that her salary was fixed in tl1e pay scale of Rs. 125-220, though the post carried a higher salary according to the advertisement [in fact the advertisement mentioned two pay scales for the post-(i) Rs. 220- 425 for candidates holding the qualification of G.C.I.M. with Houe Surgeoncy and (ii) Rs. 180-320 for candidates holding the qualification of L.I.M.] The appellant, therefore, made representations to the concerned authorities saying that she was entitled to a higher pay scale but the authorities refused to give her the higher pay scale on the ground that only candidates with 'A' Class Registration could be given the scale of Rs. 180--320 and the pay scale of Rs. 125-220 was for candidates holding qualifications other than 'A' Class Registration.\n\nThe appellant, therefore, applied to the Andhra H Bc>ard of Ayurveda on payment of requisite fees to register her as 'A' Class Practitioner and on their refusal to do so she filed writ petition No. 3507 of 1969 in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n\nOn a\n\n• '\n\nc. GIRIJAMBAL v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Tulzapurkar, J.) 785\n\nconsideration of the provisions of the Registration Act the High Court held that the appellant being a person who possessed a Diploma similar to G .C.I.M. or L.I.M. was entitled to be registered in Class 'A' and the High Court further directed the Ziila Parishad that the appellant be given the higher pay-scale of Rs. 180-320. The High Court's directions were carried out and the appellant was given all the benefits of the higher scale of Rs. 180-320 with retrospective effect from the date of her appointment.\n\nIt appears that the pay scales of Medical Officers in Ziila Parishad and Panchayat Samitis were revised twice, once with effect from Maich 19, 1969 under G.O.M. No. 708 dated December 11, 1970\n\nand second time with effect from November 1, 1974 under G.0.M.\n\nNo. 574 P.R. dated October 20, 1975. As per G.O.M. No. 708\n\nthe then existing sc:ile of Rs. 220-425 (for M.Os. holding G.C.I.M.) was revised to Rs. 250-500 and the then existing scale of Rs. 180- 320 (for M.Os. holding L.l.M.) was revised to Rs. 200-400. Under G.O.M. No. 574 the then existing scale of Rs. 250-500 was again revised to Rs. 530-1050 and the existing scale of Rs. 200 to 400 was again revised by splitting the revision into two categories-(i) Rs. 530 to 1050 for M.Os. holding L.I.M. and\n\n(ii) Rs. 430-800 for other Medical Officers.\n\nUnder the first revision the appellant was given the scale of Rs. 200-400 and when the second revision was undertaken she was fixed in the revised pay scale of Rs. 430-800\n\nwith effect from November I, 1974. She represnted to the Government that she should be given the scale of Rs. 530-1050 as was done for M.Os. holding either G.C.l.M. or L.I.M. but she did not receive any reply from the Government whereupon the appellant filed a Representation Petition No. 286 of 1977 before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal seeking the relief of revised pay scales contending that since in the earlier writ petition No. 3507 of 1969 the High Court had accepted that her qualifications were similar or equivalent to holders of G.C.I.M. which entitled her to Class 'A' Registration, she was entitled to the scale of pay meant for Medical Officers holding G.C.I.M. from the date of her appointment and the benefits of all the revisions in that scale.\n\nAlternatively she contended that in any event at the time of the second revision she should have been treated on par with holders of L.I.M. and not lower and should have been fixed in the scale of Rs. 530-1050\n\nand not Rs. 430-800. The Tribunal rejected the Representation Petition holding that the appellant was not entitled to higher scale as H she did not possess the requisite qualifications mentioned in the\n\n3--214 SCI/81\n\nA G.O.M. 574 dated October 20, 1975, and hence the appeal to this Court.\n\nCounsel for the appellant reiterated before us the same two contentions which were urged before the Tribunal.\n\nIn the first place counsel pointed out that in the earlier writ proceedings the High Court had accepted the position that the appellant's qualifications were similar to the holders of G.C.I.M. and like the latter she was entitled to Class 'A' Registration and he, therefore, urged that the appellant was entitled to the pay scale meant for Medical Officers holding G.C.I.M. right from the date of her appointment, namely, December 26, 1963, and the benefits of all the revisions of that scale.\n\nIn support of this contention counsel sought to invoke the principle of equal pay for equal work as, according to him, Medical Officers holding either G.C.I.M. or D.A.M. perform the same functions and discharge the same duties in dispensaries run by Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis.\n\nSecondly, in the alternative counsel contended that in any event the appellant could not be regarded as holder of any lower qualification than a Medical Officer holding L.I.M. inasmuch as under the first revision effected by G.O.M. No. 708 both had been fixed in the revised pay scale of Rs. 200-400 and, therefore, when the second revision was effected under G.O.M. No. 574 the appellant should have been fixed in the revised scale of Rs. 530-1050 alongwith holders of L.I.M. and there was no justifi. cation for giving her a lower revised scale of Rs. 430-800. For the reasons which we shall presently indicate it is not possible to accept either of these contentions.\n\nDealing with the first contention we would like to observe at the outset that the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be invoked or applied invariably in every kind of service and certainly it cannot be invoked in the area of professional services when tl1ese are to be compensated. Dressing of any injury or wound is done both by a doctor as well as a compounder, but surely it carmot be suggested that for doing this job a doctor cannot be compensated more than the compounder.\n\nSimilarly, a case in Court of law is argned both by a senior and a junior lawyer, but it is difficult to accept that in matter of remuneration both should be treated equally.\n\nIt is thus clear that in the field of rendering professional services at any rate the principle of equal pay for equal work would be inapplicable.\n\nIn the instant case Medical Officers holding the qualification of G.C.I.M., or the qualification of L.l.M. or the qualification of D.A.M., though in charge of dispensaries run by Zilla Parishads, crumot, lherefore, be treated on par with each other and if the State\n\n• I\n\n...\n\n• I\n\n• '\n\n\" -\n\nc. GIR!JAMBAL v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Tulzapurkar, J.) 787\n\nGovernment or the Zilla Parishads prescribe different scales of pay for each category of Medical Officers no fault could be found with such prescription.\n\nThe gravamen of the appellant's contention has been that in earlier proceedings the High Court had accepted the position that a holder of D.A.M. (like the appellant) was similar to the holder of G.C.l.M. and as such the appellant alongwith the holders of G.C.l.M. was entitled to Class 'A' Registration Certificate and, therefore, in the matter of remuneration she should have been treated in the same manner as the holder of G .C.l.M. all thrcmghout her service.\n\nHowever, it needs to be clarified that the similarity or equality conferred on holders of G.C.l.M., L.I.M. and D.A.M. was for the purpose of their registration as practitioner of modern medicine under the Registration Act, 1956, all being put under Class 'A'\n\nRegistration and not in the matter of proficiency.\n\nThe High Court in its order bad also made it clear that for the purposes of registration under the Registration Act the appellant as a holder of D.A.M. was similar to G.C.l.M. and was entitled to Class 'A' Registration Certi ... ficate.\n\nThat these three categories were not equated in the matter of proficiency will be amply borne out by the fact that right from the beginning the pay scales prescribed for these categories werd different, highest pay scale being available to holders of G.C.l.M. the next lower being available to holders of L.l.M. and the lowest to Medical Practitioners other than G.C.l.M. and L.l.M. The contention of the appellant, therefore, that because her Diploma was regarded as similar or equivalent to G.C.l.M. for registration purposes she should be given the pay scale tbat was available to the holder of G.C.I.M. r.annot obvionsly be accepted and in our view, it was rightly rejected by the Tribunal.\n\nThe alternative contention also is liable to be rejected on the same basis. It is true that when the revision under G.O.M. No. 708 was undertaken the appellant was put in the pay scale of Rs. 200--400 which was also the pay scale prescribed for Medical Officers holding L.I.M. but that was because under the earlier order of the High Court tl1e appellant had been fixed initially in the pay scale of Rs. I 80-- 320-the pay scale also meant for Medical Officers holding L.l.M. and when that pay scale of Rs. 180--320 was revised to Rs. 200--400 she was required to be given that revised scale.\n\nWhen the second revision was undertaken as per G.O.M. No. 574 it was perfectly open to the State Government to split the revision into two categories, one meant for Medical Officers holding L.l.M. and the other for Medical Officers other than L.l.M. as has been done in the instant case and since the appellant was not a holder of L.I.M. but fell in the other\n\nA category she was, in our view, properly fixed in the lower revised pay scale of Rs. 43()....800.\n\nAs no other contention was urged the appeal is dismissed, but we make no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed. • ..", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "C. GIRIJAMBAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. GIRIJAMBAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, J.J\n\nContitution :; f fndia 1950, Article 16-Medical Officers of Dispensaries-- ] hrle raJegories-G.C.l."}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, J.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Medical Practitioners Registration Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 834, "end_char": 912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Andhra Board of Ayurveda", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1168, "end_char": 1192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her application to the Andhra Board of Ayurveda for registration as 'A' class Practitioner was rejected."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2122, "end_char": 2160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "530-1050 having not been answered, she moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal which held that she was not entitled to a higher scale as she did not possess the requisite qualifications mentioned in the relevant government order."}}, {"text": "Registration Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4002, "end_char": 4024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4155, "end_char": 4171, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5658, "end_char": 5674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Miss R. Vaigai and J, Rama Murthi for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Vaigai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5681, "end_char": 5690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Miss R. Vaigai and J, Rama Murthi for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Rama Murthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Miss R. Vaigai and J, Rama Murthi for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G. N. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5730, "end_char": 5739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5805, "end_char": 5816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question about the eligibility of the appellant to a higher pay scale under\n\nB G.O.M. No."}}, {"text": "Diploma is also included in the Second Schedule to the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6352, "end_char": 6448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6482, "end_char": 6502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the appellant the Government of Kerala had treated the holders of D.A.M. on par with holders of G.C.I.M. (Graduate of the College of Integrated D Medicine) arid LI.M. (Licentiate in Indigenous Medicine) in regard to registration of medical practitioners in modern medicine, and all the three were also entitled to Class 'A' Registration Certificate under the Andhra Ayurvedic and Homoepathic Medical Practitioners Registration Act, 1956 (hereinafter called 'the Registration Act')."}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6878, "end_char": 6894, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6926, "end_char": 6942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Zilla Parishad, Nellore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6997, "end_char": 7020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to the advertisement published by the Zilla Parishad, Nellore the appellant applied for appointment to the post of Medical Officer, Local Fund Ayurvedic Dispensary, Duggarajapatnam, Ncllore District and after an interview on being selected she joined the duties of the post on December 26, 1963."}}, {"text": "Ncllore District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7141, "end_char": 7157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to the advertisement published by the Zilla Parishad, Nellore the appellant applied for appointment to the post of Medical Officer, Local Fund Ayurvedic Dispensary, Duggarajapatnam, Ncllore District and after an interview on being selected she joined the duties of the post on December 26, 1963."}}, {"text": "December 26, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7236, "end_char": 7253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to the advertisement published by the Zilla Parishad, Nellore the appellant applied for appointment to the post of Medical Officer, Local Fund Ayurvedic Dispensary, Duggarajapatnam, Ncllore District and after an interview on being selected she joined the duties of the post on December 26, 1963."}}, {"text": "Houe Surgeoncy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7537, "end_char": 7551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "220- 425 for candidates holding the qualification of G.C.I.M. with Houe Surgeoncy and (ii) Rs."}}, {"text": "Andhra H Bc>ard of Ayurveda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, therefore, applied to the Andhra H Bc>ard of Ayurveda on payment of requisite fees to register her as 'A' Class Practitioner and on their refusal to do so she filed writ petition No."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8246, "end_char": 8271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3507 of 1969 in the Andhra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8379, "end_char": 8395, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "October 20, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11059, "end_char": 11075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal rejected the Representation Petition holding that the appellant was not entitled to higher scale as H she did not possess the requisite qualifications mentioned in the\n\n3--214 SCI/81\n\nA G.O.M. 574 dated October 20, 1975, and hence the appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "Registration Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14668, "end_char": 14690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14874, "end_char": 14890, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16857, "end_char": 16863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed. • .."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_789_795_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "• • •\n\n• \\\n\nAKHILESH PRASAD\n\nUNION TERRITORY OF MIZORAM\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[A. D. KosHAL AND A. N. SEN, JJ.J\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, section 197(2)-Whether Central Reserve Po!ice Force falls within the expression \"Armed Forces of the Union\" as used thereat- Section 3 (I) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act and Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHEID ' l : I. The Central Reserve Police Force squarely falls within the expression \"Armed Forces of the Union\" as used in sub\"\"5ection (2) of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [794 F]\n\n1 : 2. The expression must be given its ordinary meaning which would cer~ D tainly not be limited to the inclusion of only the military, naval and air-forces of the Union as defined in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [793 F-GJ\n\nI : 3. Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution clearly envisages armed forces other than the three well known forces of the State, namely, the naval, military and air-forces. [793 H, 794 A-BJ E\n\n1 : 4. Sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Centrai Reserve Police Force Act itself declares in no uncertain terms that the Central Reserve Police Force is an armed force of the Central Government which is the same thing as saying that it is a part of the \"Armed Forces of the Union\". [794 DJ\n\n1 : 5. Just because the Central Reserve Police Force is a reserve force it doea F not follow that it is not a regularly operating force. (794 E-F]\n\n1. The question whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant in the instant case, are or are not such as may be said to have been committed while he woo acting or purporting to act in the discharge of bis official dutly is to be left over. [794 GJ\n\nPancham Lal v. Dadan Singh, [1979J Criminal Law Journal 1018; S. B. Saha\n\nv. M. S. Kochar, [1980] 1 SCR 111-1979 Criminal Law Journal 1367, approved and followed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 439 of 1980 .\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20-2-1980 of the Gauhati High Court in Cr. Revision No. 173/78.\n\nIi. K. Puri for the Appellant.\n\nN. Nettar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.\n\nP. A. Francis, K. S. Gurumurthy and R. N. Poddar for the Intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against a judgment dated the 20th February, 1980, of a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court dismissing an application made by the appellant under sections 482 and 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that the proceedings pending in the Court of the Assistant District Magistrate, Aizawl which have been initiated through a police report against the appellant with a prayer that he be punished for offences under sections 307, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code alleged to have been committed by him on the 30th May, 1978, be quashed or, in the alternative, that the proceedings be transferred to a competent court beyond the territory of Mizoram.\n\n2. The relevant facts are not in dispute and may be stated briefly.\n\nOn the 30th May, 1978, a case was registered at the Vairengte Police Station at the instance of one Thanugura alleging that men of the Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter referred to as CRPF), of which the appellant is a member had fired shots at handyman Thara and a driver the two of whom received injuries in the arm and thigh respectively.\n\nAfter investigation the police submitted a report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the appellant to the Assistant District Magistrate Aizawl.\n\n3. Aggrieved by the commencement of proceedings against him in the Court of the Assistant District Magistrate, the appellant sought redress from the High Court through the application which has been dismissed by the impugned order. The prayer for quashing the proceedings contained in the application was based on various grounds G only one of which has now been canvassed before us and tha, t is that the offences attributed to the appellant are alleged to have been committed by him while he was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty as a member of the Armed Forces of the Union and that in view of the provisions of sulrsection 2 of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.P.C.) H no Court had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of those offences.\n\nThe prayer made in the alternative was supported by various assertions indicative of surcharged atmosRhere in Mizoram which had resulted in\n\n• •\n\nthe entire population becoming hostile to the appellant so that it A would not at all be safe for him to attend the Court at Aizawl.\n\n4. The learned Single Judge noted the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 197 of Cr. P.C. which runs thus :\n\n\"No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central G<Wernment.\"\n\nHe correctly analysed the section while holding that it would C operate only if\n\n( 1) the concerned accused was a member of the \"Armed\n\nForces of the Union\" and\n\n(2) the o!lence attributed to him was alleged to have been committed while he was acting or purporting to D act in the discharge of his official duty.\n\nThe learned Judge then proceeded to find out the meaning of the expression \"Armed Forces of the Union\" as occurring in the subsection, with reference to various provisions of the Army Act, of the Cr. P.C. the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the CRPF Act) and of entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, and thereafter concluded :\n\n\"If the expression 'Armed Forces' of the Union is understood as including any other armed forces of the Union, then the C.R.P.F. may be included therein, and not otherwise.\n\nConsidering the fact that the C.R.P.F. is a Reserve Police Force, the conventional interpretation to mean only the regular armed forces of the Union may be acceptable.\n\nMembers of the Police Force are holders of civil posts .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Jn AIR 1965 All 236 (238), it was held that the Armed Forces of the Union mean the regular Army, Navy and Air Force or any part of any one or more of them as defined in the Army Act, and it could never have meant the members of the National Cadet Corps who are not part of the regular forces of the Union.\"\n\nThe learned Judge then went on to decide the question as to whether the appellant was alleged to have committed the offences covered by\n\nthe proceedings against him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and decided it in the negative with the observations :\n\n\"The alleged occurrence is not such as may be said to have been directly and reasonably connected with performance of his official duty. It was neither in his official capacity nor under colour of his office. It does not, therefore, appear to have been while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.\n\nActive duty, as defined in the Act, means the duty to restore and preserve order in any local area in the event of any disturbance therein.\"\n\nHowever, the learned Judge left the question open with remarks :\n\n\"The question of necessity of sanction has to be determined from stage to stage as the case progresses ( 1979 Crl. L.J. 1018) ('). It may be considered at any stage of the proceeding and while considering, it is not necessary for the Court to confine itself to the allegations in the complaint, and the court can take into consideration all the materials on the record at the time the question is raised (1979 Cr!. L.J. 1367) .(') More materials may come up for consideration by the trial court and it will be inopportune to decide the question at this stage.\"\n\nthe\n\nOn the question of transfer the views of the learned Single Judge were:\n\n\"The petitioner has not alleged any thing directly against the Court itself.\n\nHis apprehension is a derivative one from the activities of the Drivers' Union and the meetings and publicity given to the incident.\n\nThe Mizoram Government in its affidavit have stated that the Qflicer in seisin of the case is a judicial officer without any administrative functions, and is not likely to be influenced by these events.\n\nThe contemporary events of publicity, meetings and processions are all past, and may not have benumbing effects in future.\n\nAt this stage, nothing having been alleged against the particular court, it is not reasonable on the part of the petitioner to apprehend that he will not\n\n(1) POJ1Cham Lal v. Dadan Singh.\n\n(2) S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar [1980] l S, C.R. 111\n\n• , I\n\n• •\n\nreceive a fair trial.\n\nThe judicial administration in Mizornm has to run according to law despite such events. If a case is transferred on the alleged grounds, there may be no end to such transfers.\n\nThat may cast reflection on the judiciary.\n\nThe other difficulty, namely, that the Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, which applies in Mizoram is not applicable elsewhere is also to be considered.\n\nThere will also be difficulties of examining witnesses in Mizo language at other places. Considering the above facts, it will not be desirable to transfer the case at this stage.\n\nThe Government of Mizoram will take appropriate measures for safety of the petitioner and his witnesses, and for conduct of the case in a befitting\n\natmosphere.\"\n\nIt was in the above premises that the learned Single Judge dismissed the appellant's application on both counts.\n\n5. The first question which falls for determination by us is as to whether the appellant was a member of the \"Armed Forces of\n\nth~ Union\" within the meaning of that expression as occurring in sub-secticn (2) of section 197 of the Cr. P.C.\n\nThe expression \"Armed Forces' has been defined in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 132, Cr. P .C. as meaning the military, naval and air forces, operating as land forces and as including any other armed forces of the Union so operating.\n\nThat definition however, is limited in its application, by the express language of that clause itself, to the interpretation of sections 129 to 132 of the Cr. P.C. and the argument, therefore, advanced in support of the impugned judgment that that definition will not govern the interpretation of section 197 cannot be said to lack plausibility. Nor has it been shown to us that the expression \"Armed Forces of the Union\" as occurring in sub-section (2) of section 197, Cr. P.C. is governed by a definition occurring elsewhere either in the Cr. P.C. or in any other statute.\n\nIn this situation it must be given its ordinary meaning which, it appears to us, would certainly not be limited to the inclusion of only the milltary, naval and air forces of the union.\n\nIn this connection a reference to the contents of entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India may be made with advantage.\n\nThey are;\n\n\"Naval, military and air forces; any other armed forces of the Union ...\n\n.\\ The entry clearly envisages armed forces other than the three well known force> of the State, namely the naval, military and air forces.\n\nAll tha'. remains to be done, therefore, is to find out answers to tbe following two questions :\n\n(a) Is the C.R.P.F. a force?\n\n(b) If question (aJ is answered in the affirmative, whether C.R.P.F. is an armed force?\n\nIn our upinion the answer to both tbe questions must be given in the affirmative in view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the CRPF Act which unfortunately do not appear to have been C brougbt to the notice of !he learned Single Judge.\n\nThat sub-section reads t!:; i; s :\n\n\"There shcJi continue to be an armed force maintained by the Central Government and called the Central Reserve Police Force.\"\n\nThe sub-section itself declares in no uncertain terms that tbe CRPF is an armed force of the Central Government which is tbe same thing as saying tbat it is a part of the \"Armed Forces of tbe Union\".\n\nWe may make it clear, however, that even if tbe provisions just above extracted were not available our answer to the two questions would still be in the affirmative. The reason given by tbe learned Single Judge for holding a contrary opinion, namely, that tbe force was \"only a reserve force and not a regular force\" by which expression he appears to mean that it was not a continually operating force does not commend our concurrence. Just because tbe CRPF is a reserve force it does not follow tbat it is not a regularly operating force and no provision of the CRPF Act has been pointed out to us such as may lend support to a contrary view.\n\n5. We hold !bat tbe CRPF squarely falls within the expression \"Armed Forces of the Union\" as used in sub-section (2) of section 197 of the Cr.P.C.\n\n6. We leave open the question whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant are or are not such as may be said to have been committed while he was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. This course we follow in view of the exposition of law contained in that paragraph quoted by us from tbe impugned judgment which makes a reference to 1979 Criminal Law Journal, 1018 and 1979 Criminal Law Jonrnal 1367, which exposition is not only correct according to learned counsel for all parties before us but al§.o has our full approval\n\n' -\n\n7. Learned counsel for the parties are also agreed that the case against the appellant be transferred to the Court of a Magistrate functioning at Gauhati.\n\nWe consider the proposal to be conducive to a fair trial and, accepting it, transfer the proceeilings to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati. We further direct that the State of Assam and the CRPF shall afford full protection to the life and liberty of the appellant.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "AKHILESH PRASAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AKHILESH PRASAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION TERRITORY OF MIZORAM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION TERRITORY OF MIZORAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• • •\n\n• \\\n\nAKHILESH PRASAD\n\nUNION TERRITORY OF MIZORAM\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[A. D. KosHAL AND A. N. SEN, JJ.J\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, section 197(2)-Whether Central Reserve Po!ice Force falls within the expression \"Armed Forces of the Union\" as used thereat- Section 3 (I) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act and Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution."}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 137, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 197(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264, "end_char": 273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Reserve Police Force Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 317, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 561, "end_char": 572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 580, "end_char": 606, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 835, "end_char": 846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 854, "end_char": 880, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 925, "end_char": 941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1136, "end_char": 1145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Reserve Police Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1233, "end_char": 1261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Centrai Reserve Police Force Act itself declares in no uncertain terms that the Central Reserve Police Force is an armed force of the Central Government which is the same thing as saying that it is a part of the \"Armed Forces of the Union\". ["}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Centrai Reserve Police Force Act itself declares in no uncertain terms that the Central Reserve Police Force is an armed force of the Central Government which is the same thing as saying that it is a part of the \"Armed Forces of the Union\". ["}}, {"text": "[1980] 1 SCR 111", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1915, "end_char": 1931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ii. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ii."}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2212, "end_char": 2221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Nettar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2231, "end_char": 2244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Nettar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P. A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2266, "end_char": 2279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Francis, K. S. Gurumurthy and R. N. Poddar for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "K. S. Gurumurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2281, "end_char": 2297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Francis, K. S. Gurumurthy and R. N. Poddar for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "R. N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Francis, K. S. Gurumurthy and R. N. Poddar for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2380, "end_char": 2386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against a judgment dated the 20th February, 1980, of a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court dismissing an application made by the appellant under sections 482 and 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that the proceedings pending in the Court of the Assistant District Magistrate, Aizawl which have been initiated through a police report against the appellant with a prayer that he be punished for offences under sections 307, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code alleged to have been committed by him on the 30th May, 1978, be quashed or, in the alternative, that the proceedings be transferred to a competent court beyond the territory of Mizoram."}}, {"text": "sections 482 and 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2611, "end_char": 2637, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 307, 326 and 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2891, "end_char": 2908, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "30th May, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2954, "end_char": 2968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against a judgment dated the 20th February, 1980, of a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court dismissing an application made by the appellant under sections 482 and 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that the proceedings pending in the Court of the Assistant District Magistrate, Aizawl which have been initiated through a police report against the appellant with a prayer that he be punished for offences under sections 307, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code alleged to have been committed by him on the 30th May, 1978, be quashed or, in the alternative, that the proceedings be transferred to a competent court beyond the territory of Mizoram."}}, {"text": "Mizoram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3086, "end_char": 3093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against a judgment dated the 20th February, 1980, of a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court dismissing an application made by the appellant under sections 482 and 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that the proceedings pending in the Court of the Assistant District Magistrate, Aizawl which have been initiated through a police report against the appellant with a prayer that he be punished for offences under sections 307, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code alleged to have been committed by him on the 30th May, 1978, be quashed or, in the alternative, that the proceedings be transferred to a competent court beyond the territory of Mizoram."}}, {"text": "Vairengte Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3217, "end_char": 3241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th May, 1978, a case was registered at the Vairengte Police Station at the instance of one Thanugura alleging that men of the Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter referred to as CRPF), of which the appellant is a member had fired shots at handyman Thara and a driver the two of whom received injuries in the arm and thigh respectively."}}, {"text": "Thanugura", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3265, "end_char": 3274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th May, 1978, a case was registered at the Vairengte Police Station at the instance of one Thanugura alleging that men of the Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter referred to as CRPF), of which the appellant is a member had fired shots at handyman Thara and a driver the two of whom received injuries in the arm and thigh respectively."}}, {"text": "Thara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3427, "end_char": 3432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th May, 1978, a case was registered at the Vairengte Police Station at the instance of one Thanugura alleging that men of the Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter referred to as CRPF), of which the appellant is a member had fired shots at handyman Thara and a driver the two of whom received injuries in the arm and thigh respectively."}}, {"text": "section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3591, "end_char": 3617, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4337, "end_char": 4346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4395, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4428, "end_char": 4434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4859, "end_char": 4870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Army Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5656, "end_char": 5664, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5686, "end_char": 5724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949", "statute": "the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.R.P.F.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5994, "end_char": 6002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the CRPF Act) and of entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, and thereafter concluded :\n\n\"If the expression 'Armed Forces' of the Union is understood as including any other armed forces of the Union, then the C.R.P.F. may be included therein, and not otherwise."}}, {"text": "AIR 1965 All 236", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6310, "end_char": 6326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Navy and Air Force or any part of any one or more of them as defined in the Army Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6404, "end_char": 6488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mizoram Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8299, "end_char": 8317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mizoram Government in its affidavit have stated that the Qflicer in seisin of the case is a judicial officer without any administrative functions, and is not likely to be influenced by these events."}}, {"text": "Mizornm", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8929, "end_char": 8936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judicial administration in Mizornm has to run according to law despite such events."}}, {"text": "Government of Mizoram", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9496, "end_char": 9517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Mizoram will take appropriate measures for safety of the petitioner and his witnesses, and for conduct of the case in a befitting\n\natmosphere.\""}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9980, "end_char": 9991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10092, "end_char": 10103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 129 to 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10383, "end_char": 10402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10552, "end_char": 10563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10712, "end_char": 10723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11093, "end_char": 11109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11117, "end_char": 11138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11740, "end_char": 11749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CRPF", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12093, "end_char": 12097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-section itself declares in no uncertain terms that tbe CRPF is an armed force of the Central Government which is tbe same thing as saying tbat it is a part of the \"Armed Forces of tbe Union\"."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12996, "end_char": 13007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Just because tbe CRPF is a reserve force it does not follow tbat it is not a regularly operating force and no provision of the CRPF Act", "statute": "Just because tbe CRPF is a reserve force it does not follow tbat it is not a regularly operating force and no provision of the CRPF Act"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13015, "end_char": 13021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13887, "end_char": 13921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We consider the proposal to be conducive to a fair trial and, accepting it, transfer the proceeilings to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati."}}, {"text": "State of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13950, "end_char": 13964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We further direct that the State of Assam and the CRPF shall afford full protection to the life and liberty of the appellant."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_796_807_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "LALAPPA LINGAPPA & ORS.\n\nLAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS LTD., SHOLAPUR\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n(A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ,]\n\nPayment of Gratuity Act 1972-Section 4(1)--Scope of-Permanent worker1 on unauthorised leave-On termination of services whether entitled to gratuity under section 4(1)-Badli workers-If entitled to gratuity for badli period on being made permanent.\n\nC fVords ond phrases-\"Continuous service\"-\"Actually e111ployed\" and \"actua~\n\nally worked\" meaning of.\n\nInterpretation of statutes-Sc 1cial welfare legislation-Principles of interpreta~ tion.\n\nGratuity is payable to an employee on the termination of his employment a[ter he has rendered continuous service under the conditions mentioned in section 4(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972.\n\nThe term \"continuous service\" has been defined in section 2(c) to mean uninterrupted service and includes service which is intenupted, ar11ong others, by leave or cessation of work not due to any fault of the employ,, e concerned. Explanation I to this section provides that an en1ployee, who is not in uninterrupted service for one year, shall be deemed to be in continuous service, if he has been actually employed by an employer during the twelve months immediately preceding the year for not less than 240 days except when he is employed in a seasonal establishment. Explanation II provides that an employee of a seasonal establishment shall be deemed to be in continuous service, if he has actually worked for not less than 15% of the number of days on which the establishment was in operation during that year.\n\nCertain perm.anent employees of the respondent, on termination of their employment, made a claim for P'<Yment of gratuity in respect of every year during which they were in permanent employment irrespective of whether they had actually worked for 240 days or not.\n\nOn being made permanent the badli workers claimed gratuity in respect of the period prior to their being made permanent irrespective of whether in those years they had been actually employed for 240 days or not\n\nThe respondent, however, paid gratuity calculating the number of years in which they were actually employed for 240 days.\n\nAs regards the permanent employees, the Labour Coort held that they were governed by the substantive part of the definition of continuous service in section 2(c) npon the basis that there was no break in service; and as regards R the badli employees, it held that they were not entitled to gratuity in respect of the years in which they W<\"e not actually employed for 240 days since they fell within Explanation I of section 2 ( c) of the Act.\n\nThe Appellate Authority upheld the view of the Labour Court.\n\nOn appeal, as regards the permanent employees the High Court held that unauthorised absence from work resulted in a break of service and, therefore, the employees were not in uninterrupted service and fell outside the substantive part of section 2(c) but came within Explanation I. As regards badli workers it upheld the view of the authorities.\n\nIn appeal it was contended that the permanent employees, even if they were absent without leave for a number of days in a year and had actually worked for less than 240 days due to absence without leave, were entitled to gratuity under section 4 (I) since the jural relationship of employer and employee continued during that period.\n\nThe badli employees on being made permanent became entitled to gratuity for the badli period because of the fact that they were re~ quired to report for work at the factory irrespective of whether they were provided with employment or not on any day.\n\nDismissing the appeal.\n\nHELD : I. The High Court was right in holding that the permanent employees Were not entitled to payment of gratuity under section 4(1) for the years in which they remained absent without leave and had actually worked for less than\n\n240 days in a year. [806 A]\n\nThe expression \"actually employeed\" used in Explanation I and \"actually worked\" used in Explanation II, having regard to the context and plll'p06e with which they were enacted, are synonymous. An employee, who is not in uninterrupted service for one year is deemed to be in continuous service, even though he falls outside the substantive part of the definition in section 2 ( c) provided he has been actually employed for 240 days in a year. In the case of seasonal establishments, however, it is difficult to predicate the number of days on \\Vhich the establishment would be in operation in the year and an employee of such a seasonal establishment shall be deemed to be in continuous service, if he has actually worked for not less than 75% of the number of days on which the establishmen~ was in operation. [802 F-H]\n\nThe bad/i workers do not fall within the substantive part of the definition of \"continuous service'', but are covered by Explanation I. They are, therefore, not entitled to payment of gratuity for the badli period i.e. in respect of the years in which no work was allotted to them due to their fallure to report to duty. Simply because a worker is required everyday to attend the mills for ascertaining whether work would be provided to him or not, he cannot be deemed to have rendered servic, e and would not, on that account, be entitled to claim gratuity. Gratuity is paid for services rendered. [807 C; 806 DJ\n\nDelhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. lts Workmen, [1969] 2 SCR 307 at 338, followed.\n\nIn construing a social welfare legislation, the Court should adopt a beneficient rule of construction. If a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more bene- H ficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed. Where the language is plain and unambiguous the Court must give effect to it whatever may\n\nA be the consequences. In that caso the words Of the statute speak the intention Of the legislature. The. argument Of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in co:11Struction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are two meth<>is of construction. Jn their anxiety to advance\n\nbneficient purpose of legislation,. the Courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there; is none. [804 G-H)\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 436 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1-9-1978 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 200/78.\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 930 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order of the President, Industrial-Court, Bombay (Appellate Authority appointed under Payment of Gratnity Act, 1972), in Appeal PGA Nos. 34/78 D and 36 to 119 /79.\n\nR. S. Kulkarni, Mrs. V.?ena Devi Khanna and V. N. Ganpule for the Appellants and intervener.\n\nF. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.\n\nThe facts giving rise to these appeals are these : Eighty-five permanent employees of the respondent who were on the regular muster roll, on termination of their employment, made a claim for payment of gratuity for the entire period of their service, i.e., in respect of G every year during which they were in permanent employment, irrespective of !he fact whether they had actnally worked for 240 days in a year or not.\n\nTwenty-five badli employees of the respondent, who were on the badli register, upon being made permanent, made a similar claim for payment: of gratnity for the badli period, i.e. in respect of the period prior to their being made permanent, irrespective of H the fact whether in those years they had been actnally employed for 240 days or not. The r<espondent, however, calculated the number of years in which these employees were actnally employed for at least\n\n• '\n\n240 days in a year and paid gratuity accordingly. The Labour Court, which is the Controlling Authority, held in relation to the permanent employees that they were governed by the substantive part of the definition of 'continuous service' in s. 2(c) of the Act, upon the basis that there was no break in service, i.e., there was no question of their actual employment or actual working for 240 days or more, but as regards the badli employees, it held that they were not entitled to gratuity in respect of those years in which they were 11ot actually employed for 240 days since they fell within Explanation I to s. 2(c) of the Act.\n\nThat view of the Controlling Authority was affirmed in appeal by the President of the Industrial Court. who is the Appellate Authority.\n\nThe High Court while upholding the view of these authorities in respect of the bad/is, has, however, reversed their decision with regard to the permanent employees on the ground that unauthorised absence from work result.s in a break of service and, therefore, they were not in uninterrupted service and fell outside the substantive part of s. 2 ( c) but came within Explanation I.\n\nIn support of these appeals, it was urged that the High Court was in error in equating the phrase 'actually employed' with 'actually worked'. It was submitted that though the word 'service' has not been defined in the A_ct, the emphasis is on the subsistence of the contract of employment.\n\nIt is urged that the word 'employed' connotes a c0ntract of employment and both the permanent employees and badli employees, therefore, fall within the substantive part of the definition of 'continuous service' in s. 2(c).\n\nIn substance, the contention is that Explanation I to s. 2(c) covered only those cases where there was a break in continuity of service, by reason of discharge from service and re-employment.\n\nIn regard to the permanent employees, it is urged that they would be deemed to be in continuous service for purposes of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 4 of the Act so long as their names are borne on the permanent muster roll.\n\nIn other words, the submission was that the jural relationship of employer and employee continues irrespective of whether they had actually worked for 240 days or not. With regard to the badli employees, it is urged that once a person is given a badli card it matters little whether he actually works for 240 days 1>r not, since he had to report for work and his employment is at the volition of the employer. Thus, the absence of the badli employees on the days on which they were not provided with work, although they reported for duty and there was an endorsement made to that effect in the badli card, could not be treated as interruption of service. It was pointed out that the badli employees had been put at par with the permanent employees and enjoyed all such benefits such as bonus,\n\nretrenchment compensation, lay-off compensation, provident fund benefits, benefits under the Employees' State Insurance Act nd the Workmen's Compensation Act, leave under the Factories Act, etc., and there was no reason why they should be deprived of the benefit of gratuity for those years in which they had worked for less than 240 days because of their absence without leave. We are afraid, this line of reasoning cannot be accepted being against the scheme of the Act.\n\nTwo questions arise in these appeals. The first is as to whether permanent employees are i:ntitled to payment of gratuity under subs. ( 1) of s. 4 of the Act for the years in which they remained absent without leave for a number of days in a year and had actually worked for less than 240 dayi;, due to absence withont leave.\n\nThe second is as to whether the badli employees are entitled to such gratuity on beco1ning permanent employees, for the badli period in respect of the years in which there was no work allotted to them due to their failure to report to duty. These questions relate to the years in which these employees were not actually employed for 240 days in a year, due to their absence without leave.\n\nThe Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), is enacted to introduce a scheme for payment of gratuity for certain industrial and commercial establishments, as a measure of social security. It has now bee:n universally recognised that all persons in society need protection against loss of income due to un employment arising out of incapacity to work due to invalidity, old age etc. For the wage earning papulation, security of income, when the worker becomes old or infirm, is of consequential importance.\n\nThe provisions of social security measures retiral benefits like gratuity, provident fund and pemion (known as the triple benefits) are of special importance. In bringing the Act on the statute book the intention of the legislature wa1s not only to achieve uniformity and reasonable degree of certainty, bnt also to create and bring into force a self-contained, all-embracing, complete and comprehensive code relating to gratuity. 11Je significance of this legislation lies in the acceptance of the principle of gratuity as a compulsory, statutory retiral benefit.\n\nFor a proper appreciation of the question involved, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act. Sub-section ( l) of s. 4 reads as follows :\n\n4. (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,-\n\n(a) on his superannuation, or\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\n(b) on his retirement or resignation, or A\n\n( c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease;\n\nProvided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement;\n\nProvided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity, payable to him shall be paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement.\n\nThe expression 'continuous service' has been defined in s. 2 ( c) of the Act in these terms :\n\n2. ( c) \"continuous service\" means uninterrupted service and includes service which is interrupted by sickness, accident, leave, lay-off, strike or a lock-out or cessation of work not due to any fault of the employee concerned, whether such uninterrupted or interrupted service was rendered before or after the commencement of this Act.\n\nExplanation 1.-In the case of an employee who is not in uninterrupted service for one year, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service if he has been actually employed by an employer during the twelve months immediately preceding the year for not less than-\n\n(i) 190 days, if employed below the ground in a mine, or\n\n(ii) 240 days, in any other case, except when he is employed in a seasonal establishment.\n\nExplanation 11.-An employee of a seasonal establishment shall be deemed to be in continuous service if he bas actually worked for not less than seventy-five per cent of the number of days on which the establishment was in operation during the year.\n\nThe Act is a piece of social we1fare legislation and deals with matters relating to payment of gratuity which, like pension, provident\n\n4-214 SCJ/81\n\nfund etc., is a retiral benefit.\n\nInterrupted service by reason of sickness, leave, lay-off, strike, lock-ont. or cessation of work not due to any fault of the employee concerned should not be regarded as a break in continuity of his service.\n\nThe inclusive part of the definition ot 'continuous service' in s. 2(c) is to amplify the meaning of the expression by including interrupted service under certain contingencies which, but for such inclusion, would not fall within the ambit of the expression 'continuous service'. There were compelling reasons why the legislature gave an enlarged meaning to the expression 'continuous service' in s. 2(c) of the Act, so that the workers who have rendered long and meritorious service are not deprived of their right to gratuity by reason of absence from duty due to circumstances beyond their control\n\nThe two Explanations have been inserted by the legislature to define the words 'one completed year of service' to benefit a class of employees who are not in uninterrupted service for one year. These Explanations employ a fiction which converts service of (a) 190 days, if employed below the ground in a mine, (b) 240 days, in any other case except when employed in a seasonal establishment, in a period of 12 calendar months, or (c) 75 per cent of the number of days which the seasonal establishment was in operation, to be one complete year.\n\nThe main point in controversy in these appeals is as to whether the expression 'actually employed' in Explanation I to s. 2(c) must, in the context in which it appears, mean 'actually worked'. The iegis- Jature has, no doubt, used two different expressions, namely, 'actually employed', in Explanation I and 'actually worked' in Explanation II.\n\nBut, they are, in our view,, having regard to the context and purpose with which they have been enacted, synonymous. Explanation I deals with the case of an .employee who is not in uninterrupted service for one year.\n\nSuch an employee shall be deemed to be in continuous service even though he falls outside the substantive part of the definition in s. 2(c) provided he has been actually employed for 240 days in a year. The expression 'actually employed' in Explanation I must, therefore, mean 'actually worked'. There is a reason why a different expression is used in Explanation II. In the case or a seasonal establishment it is difficult to predicate the number of days on which the establishment would be in operation in the year and an employee of such a seasonal establishment shall, therefore, be deemed to be in continuous service if he has actually worked for not less than 75% of the number of days on which the establishment was in operation.\n\n• •\n\n• I.\n\nThe history of the legislation is set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill.(') The Bill adopted bys. 2(c) the definition of the expression 'continuos service' as defined in s. 2 (b) of the Kerala Industrial Employees' Payment of Gratuity Act, 1970\n\nand s. 2(c) of the West Bengal Employees' Payment of Compulsory Gratuity Act, 1971, which reads :\n\n2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires,-\n\n( c) \"continuous service\" means uninterrupted service and includes service which is interrupted by sickness, accident, leave, strike which is not illegal or a lock-out or cessation of work not due to any default of the employee concerned.\n\nThe Bill was referred to a Select Committee, and the Select Committee by its Report presented to the Lok Sabha on May 2, 1972 proposed three vital changes in the definition of the expression 'continuous service' in c. 2 ( c) , namely, ( 1) for the purpose of computation of the period of continuous service, the entire period whether interrupted or uninterrupted, before or after the commencement of the Act, had to be taken into account, (2) the period of strikes or lay-offs were to be considered as part of 'continuous service', and (3) the benefit of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 4 was to be extended by alegal fiction in the care of an employee who was not in uninterrupted service for one year. subject to the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Explanations I and IT.\n\nThe legislative intent is brought out in the Report of the Select Committee. The Note of the Committee with regard to the two Explanations bears out that the expression 'actually employed' in Explanation I and the eXIPression \"actually worked' in Explanation II\n\nwere used in the same sense.\n\nThe Note reads : (') F .-.\n\nThe Committee also feel that an Explanation may be added to the definition of 'continuous service' to the effect that an employee who works-\n\n(a) in a mine below the ground for 190 days, or\n\n(b) in any other case, for 240 days. in a year, should be deemed to be in continuous service.\n\nl • The Committee also feel that in the case of persons\n\n• '\n\nemployed in seasonal establishments, such persons, would ---\n\n(1) Bill No. 154 of 1971 published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II, Section 2 dated December 10, 1971 at P. 1027 (p. 1034).\n\n(2) Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II-Section 2 dated May 2, 1972 p. 324\n\nA be deemed to be in continuous service if they had been employed for 75 per cent of the days during which the establishment had been in operation during the season.\n\nthat wos the intention with which the two Explanations were added to the definition of 'continuous service' ins. 2(c) of the Act.\n\nThe expression 'continuous service' in the context of a gratuity scheme was interpreted by this Court in M/s Jeewanlal (1929) Lld., Calcutta v. Its W0tkme11( ') as follows ;\n\n\"Continuous service\" in the context of the scheme of gratuity framed by the tribunal in the earlier reference postulates the continuance of the relationship of master and servant between the employer and his employees. If the servant resigns his tmployment service automatically comes to an end. If the employer terminates the service of his employee that again brings the continuity of service to an end.\n\nIf the service of an employee is brought to an end by the operation of any law that again is another instance where the continuance is disrupted; but it is difficult to hold that merely because an employee is absent without obtaining leave that itself would bring to an end the continuity of his service.\n\nSimilarly, participation in an illegal strike which may incur the punishment of dismissal may not by itself bring to an end the relationship of master and servant It may be a good cause for the termination of service provided of course the relevant provisions in the standing orders in that behalf are complied with; but mere participation in an illegal f:tnlce cannot be said to cause breach in continuity for the purposes of gratuity. (emphasis added)\n\nThe legislature has departed from the meaning given by this Court ...-_ in the above case to the expression 'continuous service' bv incorporating the words 'not due to any fault on the part of the employee concerned', to give to that expression a restricted legal connotation.\n\nIn construing a social welfare legislation, the court should adopt a beneficient rule of construction; if a Section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed.\n\nWhen, however, the lan!!Uae is plain and unambiguous, as here, we must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences, for, in that case, the words of the statute\n\n(1) [19621-1 S.C.R. 717 at 722-723.\n\n• I\n\n• '\n\n• '\n\nL. LIN GAPPA v. LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS (Sen, J.) 8 0 5\n\nspeak the intention of the legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the legislature and not for the courts to consider.\n\nThe argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscur\" and there are two methods of construction.\n\nIn their anxiety to advance beneficient purpose of legislation, the courts must not yield to the temptation of se_eking ambignity when there is none.(')\n\nIn dealing with interpretation of sub-s. ( 1) of s.4, we must keep in view the scheme of the Act. Sub-s. ( 1) of s.4 of the Act incorporates the concept of gratuity being a reward for long, continuous and meritorious service.\n\nThe emphasis therein is not on 'continuity of employment', but on rendering of 'continuous service'.\n\nThe legislature inserted the two Explanations in the definition to extend the benefit to em, ployees who are not in uninterrupted service for one year subject to the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. By the use of a legal fiction in these Explanations, an employee is deemed to be in 'continuous service' for purposes of sub-sec. (1) of s.4 of the Act.\n\nThe legislature never intended that the expression 'actually employed' in Explanation I and the expression 'actually worked' in Explanation II should have two different me, anings because it wanted to extend the benefit to an employee who 'works' for a particular number of days in a year in either case. In a case falling under Explanation I, an ellliPloyee is deemed to be in continuous service if he has been actually employed for not less than 190 days if employed below the ground in a mine, or 240 days in any other case, except when he is employed in a seasonal establishment.\n\nIn a case falling under Explanation II, an employee of a seasonal establishment, is deemed to be in continuous service if he has actually worked for not less than 75 per cent of the number of days on which the establishment was in operation during the year.\n\nIn our judgment, the High Court rightly observed : \"It is important to bear in mind that in Explanation I the legislature has used the words 'actually employed'. If it was contemplated by Explanation I that it was sufficient that there should be a subsisting contract of employment, then it was not necessary for the legislature to use the words 'actually employed'.\" It is not permissible to attribute redundancy to the legislature to defeat the purpose of enacting the Explanation.\n\nThe expression 'actually employed' in Explanation I to s.2\n\n( c) of the Act must, in the context in which it appears, mean 'actually H worked'. It must accordingly be held that the High Court was right\n\n(1) Craies on Statutes, 6th Edn. pµ. 84--91.\n\nin holding that the permanent employees were not entitled to payment of grntuity . under sub-s. ( 1) of s.4 of the Act for the years in which they remained absent without leave and had actually worked for less than 240 days in a year.\n\nAs regards badli employees, there can be no doubt that they are not in uninterrupted service and, therefore, they do not fall within the substantive part of the definition 'continuous service' i11 s.2(c), but are covered by Explanation I. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co.\n\nv. Its Workmen(') the Court, while dealing with a gratuity scheme, repelled the contention urged on behalf of the badli employees that since they had to register themselves with the managemnt of the textile mills and were requtred every day to attend the mills for ascertaining whether work would be provided to them or not, the condition requiring that they should have worked for not less than 240 days in a year to qualify for gratuity was unjust and observed:\n\nIf gratuity is to be paid for service rendered, it is diffiout to appreciate the grounds on which it can be said that ·\n\nbecause for maintaining his name on the record of the badli workmen, a workman is required to attend the mills he may be deemed to have rendered service and would on that account be entitled afao to claim gratuity.\n\nStanding Order No. 3 as settled by the Industrial Court uuder s.36(3) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for Operatives in Cotton Textile Mills, in so far as material, provides '\n\n(3) Operatives shall be classed as (1) Permanent; (2) Probationer; (3) Hadlis; (4) Temporary Operatives; and (5)Apprentices.\n\nxx xx\n\nA \"badli\" is one who is employed on the post of a permanent operative or probationer who is temtPorarily absent.\n\nxx xx It is not denied that the Management has got \"' separate register for the badli employees and that those who need work and when !hey call at the gate of the mills for work, such number of them are employed by the mills to fill up the vacancies of permanent operatives or pro- H bationers who are abs(, nt on a particular day either on account of illness or for any other cause.\n\n(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 30'7 at 338.\n\n• •\n\nL. L!NGAPPA v. LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS (Sen, J.) 807\n\nThe Report of the Badli Labour Enquiry Committee, Cotton Tex- :tile Industry, 1967, no doubt shows that the badli employees are an\n\nintegral part of the textile inc!::.stry and that they enjoy most of the benefits of the permanent employees; but there may not be . any continuity of service as observed by this Court in the Delhi Cloth Mills' case (supra). The badli employees are nothing but substitutes. They are like 'spare ll)en' who are not 'employed' while waiting for a job : Conlon v. Glasgow(').\n\nVal/abhdas Kanji (P) Ltd. v. Esmail Kaya .& Ors.(') taking the view to the contrary, does not appear to lay down a good law. Accordingly, we uphold the view that the badli employees are not covered by the substantive part of the definition of 'continuous service' in s.2(c), but came within Explanation I and, therefore, are not entitled to payment of gratuity for the badli period, i.e. in respect of the years in which there was no work allotted to lhem .due to their failure to report to duty.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the appeals must fail and are accordingly dismissed.\n\nThere shall be no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\n(1) 36 Scottish Law Reporter 652.\n\n(2) [1978] Lab. I.C. 809.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "LALAPPA LINGAPPA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LALAPPA LINGAPPA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS LTD., SHOLAPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAXMI VISHNU TEXTILE MILLS LTD., SHOLAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 85, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHOLAPUR\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n(A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ,]\n\nPayment of Gratuity Act 1972-Section 4(1)--Scope of-Permanent worker1 on unauthorised leave-On termination of services whether entitled to gratuity under section 4(1)-Badli workers-If entitled to gratuity for badli period on being made permanent."}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972", "statute": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283, "end_char": 295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972", "statute": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 716, "end_char": 728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972", "statute": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972"}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 736, "end_char": 764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 817, "end_char": 829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972", "statute": "the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972"}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2602, "end_char": 2611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2930, "end_char": 2942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3275, "end_char": 3284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4276, "end_char": 4285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 307", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Appellate Authority appointed under Payment of Gratnity Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. S. Kulkarni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Kulkarni, Mrs. V.?ena Devi Khanna and V. N. Ganpule for the Appellants and intervener."}}, {"text": "V.?ena Devi Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6752, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Kulkarni, Mrs. V.?ena Devi Khanna and V. N. Ganpule for the Appellants and intervener."}}, {"text": "V. N. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6775, "end_char": 6788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Kulkarni, Mrs. V.?ena Devi Khanna and V. N. Ganpule for the Appellants and intervener."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6825, "end_char": 6838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "B. N. Srikrishna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "R. P. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6858, "end_char": 6869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "H. S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6871, "end_char": 6884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "Shardul S. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6889, "end_char": 6906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6975, "end_char": 6978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7064, "end_char": 7081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, B. N. Srikrishna, R. P. Kapur, H. S. Parihar and Shardul S. Shroff for the Respondents ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-The controve:rsy in these two appeals by special leave against a judgment of the Bombay High Court and an order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay, turns on the construction of the expression 'continuous service' as defined in s.2 ( c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972."}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Appellate Authority appointed under Payment of Gratnity Act, 1972", "statute": "Appellate Authority appointed under Payment of Gratnity Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7234, "end_char": 7263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8397, "end_char": 8404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9267, "end_char": 9271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9814, "end_char": 9821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9878, "end_char": 9885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10152, "end_char": 10156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11130, "end_char": 11149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11201, "end_char": 11214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11642, "end_char": 11646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act", "statute": "State Insurance Act"}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12221, "end_char": 12250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13455, "end_char": 13459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14405, "end_char": 14409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16235, "end_char": 16242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17104, "end_char": 17111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17681, "end_char": 17688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18500, "end_char": 18504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18545, "end_char": 18574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18580, "end_char": 18587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Gratuity Act, 1970", "statute": "Payment of Gratuity Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Payment of Compulsory Gratuity Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18618, "end_char": 18658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19085, "end_char": 19096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bill was referred to a Select Committee, and the Select Committee by its Report presented to the Lok Sabha on May 2, 1972 proposed three vital changes in the definition of the expression 'continuous service' in c. 2 ( c) , namely, ( 1) for the purpose of computation of the period of continuous service, the entire period whether interrupted or uninterrupted, before or after the commencement of the Act, had to be taken into account, (2) the period of strikes or lay-offs were to be considered as part of 'continuous service', and (3) the benefit of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 4 was to be extended by alegal fiction in the care of an employee who was not in uninterrupted service for one year."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19541, "end_char": 19545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Compulsory Gratuity Act, 1971", "statute": "Payment of Compulsory Gratuity Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20555, "end_char": 20564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20656, "end_char": 20665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23738, "end_char": 23741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23802, "end_char": 23805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24369, "end_char": 24372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25770, "end_char": 25773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26068, "end_char": 26071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26397, "end_char": 26403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.36(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27341, "end_char": 27348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27356, "end_char": 27393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 30", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28105, "end_char": 28123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28521, "end_char": 28538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "any continuity of service as observed by this Court in the Delhi Cloth Mills' case (supra)."}}, {"text": "s.2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28970, "end_char": 28976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_808_816_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "BHAGWAN DASS JAIN\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nIncome-tax Act, 1961, S. 23(2)(i) & Constitution of India 1950, Seventh Schedule List I, Entry 82 and List II, Entry 49-Income-Incorne froni hou.e\n\nproperty-Self-occupied property-Whether on1ounts to income-Legislative practice-Interpretation of entries in Lists.\n\nfYords and Phrases-'lncome'-Meaning of-Constitution of India, 1950.\n\nSeventh Schedule List I, Entry 82.\n\nSection 22 tn 27 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 relate to the levy and computation of tax on income from house property.\n\nSection 23(2) (i) states that where the property consists of a house in the occupation of the owner for the purposes of his residence, the annual value of such house shall first be determined in the same manner as if the property had been let and further be re~ duced to one half of the amount so <let.ermined or one thousand eight hundred rupees whichever is less.\n\nWhere the property consists of more than one house in the occupation of the owner for the purposes of his own residence. Section 23(2)(ii) provides that the provisions of clause (i) shall apply only in respect of one of such houses which the assessee may at his option specify in that behalf.\n\nThe petitioner, an assessee under the Act, contended before the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, that inclusion of any amount under section 23(2) of the Act in his income was unconstitutional as there could be no income at all in such a case accruing to him in a true sense of that term and that the liability that was sought to be imposed under the Act in respect of his residential house was in its pith and substance a tax on building falling under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and hence Parliament could not impose the said liability under a law made in exercise of its legislative power under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule which authorised it only to levy 'taxes on income other than agricultural income'. The High Court rejected the plea and dismissed the Writ Petition.\n\nIn the Special Leave Petition. to this Court it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that as he was not deriving any monetary benefit by residing in his own house, no tax could be levied on him, on the ground that he is deriv~ ing income from that house, and that the word 'income' only means realisation of monetary benefit and that in the absence of any such realisation. the inclusion of any amount by way of notional income under section 23(2) of the Act in the chargeable incon1e was impermissible as it was outside the scope of Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nDismissing the Special Leave Petition,\n\n* '\n\n• •\n\nBHAGWANDASS V. UNION 809\n\nHELD ; 1. The tax levied under the Income-tax Act is on the income A\n\nough computed in an artificial way) from house property and not on house property. Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is not, therefore, attracted.\n\nThe levy in question squarely falls under Entry 82 of Li't I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. [816 C-Dl\n\n2. The expression 'income' means 'a thing that comes in'.\n\nIncome is also define.d. as the gain derived from land capital or labour or any two or more B of them.\n\nEven in its ordinary economic sense, the expression 'income' include not merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of a property but al&o what one saves by using it oneself. That which can be converted into income can be reasonably regarded as giving rise to income.\n\n[812 B, 816 BJ\n\n3. (i) The Government of In<lia Act, 1935 was enacted when the Indian C Income-tax Act, 1922 was in force.\n\nSection 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 provided for levy of income tax on the basis of the bona fide annual value of th1! property even when it was in the occupation of the assessee for the purposes of his own residence. While enacting Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 the British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which was probably the only law relating to tax: on incomes in force in British India.\n\nSimilarly D the Constituent Assembly while enacting Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution must have understood that the \\Vord 'incun1e' us;:d\n\nin that Entry would in any event include within its scope all items which came within the definition of inco1nc and were subjected to charge in the Indian lncon1e-tax Act, 1922 which was in force at the time the Con<.; titutinn\n\n\\\\<IS adopted. [815 D-FJ\n\n(ii) The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in their view is borne out from Article 270(1) of the Constitution 'Nhich provides fer collection of taxes on income by the Government of India and distribution thereof bet\\vecn the Union and the States.\n\nArticle 366(i) \\Vhich Jcfinc~ 'agricultural income' <1s defined for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian Income-tax and Article 366(29) which defines 'tax on income' as including a tax in the nature of excess profits tax.\n\nIn the circumstance'> it would not be \\Vrong to construe the \\VOn.1 incon1e in Entry 82 as including all items whil,:h were taxable under the conten1poraneous law relatJng to tax on inco1nes which \\Vas in force at the time \\Vhc11 the Constitution was enacted. [815 G-816 Al\n\n4. This Court in 1\\ra1'inclw11dra Mafadal v. Commissioner of fncome-ta:r.\n\nBombay City 1955 SCR 829. held that the word 'income' in Entry 82 is capable\n\nof a wider meaning than \\Vhat was given to it in the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nG 1922 or the English Act of 1918. [814 HJ\n\n' In Australia the annual value of the tax payers' residence owned by him- .!elf or used rent free is taken for consideration for purposes of levy of inco1ne tax.\n\nIn England too in the case of a residence of the assessee, computation of income i5 on the basi<> of presumed income.\n\n[815 A]\n\nRcscl1 v. The Fcd('r{lf Co111111issioner of Taxation, 66 C.L.R. 198 at p. 224 and Gu1c1·11ors of th1? Rotunda Hospital Dublin v. Conzan (7 T.C. 517 at 586\n\n587) Simon's Income tax (second Edn.) Vol. I p. 502 referred to.\n\n6. It is we11-settled that the entries in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to\n\nthe Constitution should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense and each and every subject mentioned in the entries should be read as including within its scope all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly Lnd reasonably be comprehended in it.\n\nWords in the Constitution conferring legislative power should receive a liberal construction and should be interpreted in their widest amplitude. [811 H-812 BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition No. 872(1 •\n\nof 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 27-10-79 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. No. 636/78.\n\nShiv Dayal, Mrs. Bagga and Mr. S. Bagga for the Petitioner.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-The short question which arises for consideration in this petition for special leave to appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to include in the income of the assessee any amount calculated in accordance with section 23(2) of the Act in respect of a house in the occupation of the assessee for the purposes of his own residence. The petitioner who is an assessee under the Act contended before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution that inclusion of any amount under section 23(2) of the Act in his income was unconstitutional as there could be no income at all in such a case accruing to him in the true sense of that term, the liability that was sought to be imposed under the Act in respect of his residential house was, therefore, in its pith and substance a tax on building falling under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and hence Parliament could not impose the said liability under a law m'ade in exercise of its legislative power under Entry S2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which anthorised it only to levy taxes on income other than agricultural income. The High Court reject. ed the plea of the petitioner and dismissed the writ petition. The petitioner has now applied to this Court for special leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court.\n\nWhen the petition came up for hearing on Febniary 5, !981 before us, we did not find that there wa• 'any ground to grant special H leave to appeal but since the case was argued with some persistence, we decided to give reasons for rejecting the prayer of the petitioner which we proceed to give hereunder :\n\n• '\n\nSection 4 of the Act lays down that where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates income-tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for 1hat yea~ in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of the total income of the previous year or previous years, as the case npy be, of every person.\n\nSection 14 of the Act mentions 'income from house property' as one of the heads of income liable to charge. Sections 22 to 27 of the Act relate specifically to the levy and computation of tax on income from house property. Section 22 provides that the annual value of property consisting of any buildings <Jr lands appurtenant thereto of which the assessee is the owner, other than such portions of such property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business or profession carried on by him the profits of which are chargeable to income-tax, shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head \"income from house property\". Section 23(2) (i) of the Act\n\nstates that where the property consists of a house in the occupation of the owner for the purposes of his own residence, the annual value of such house shall first be determined in the same manner as if the property had been let and further be reduced by one-half of the amount so determined or one thousand and eight hundred rupees, whichever is less. Section 23(2) (ii) of the Act provides that where the property consists of more than one house in the occupation of the owner for the purpooes of his owu residence, the provisions of clause (i) of section 23 (2) shall apply only in respect of one of such houses, which the assessee may, at his option, specify in that behalf. There are some other ancillary and incidental provisions in the Act dealing with the Computation of the annual value of such property with which we are not concerned in the present petition.\n\nF The argument urged on behalf of the petitioner is that as the petitioner is not deriving any monetary benefit by residing in his own b()use, no tax can be levied on him on the ground that he is deriving income from that house. It is contended that the word 'income' only means realisation of monetary benefit and that in the absence of any such realisation by the assessee, the inclusion of any amount by way G of notional income under section 23 (2) of the Act in the chargeable income was impermissible, as it was outside the scope of Entry 82 , of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nEntry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution ff <:mpowers Parliament to levy 'taxes on income other than agricultural income'. Now it is well-settled that the entries in the list in the\n\nSeventh Schedule to the Constitution should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense and each and every subject mentioned in the entries should be read as including within its scope all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it. Words in the Constitution conferring legislative power should receive a liberal construction and should be interpreted in their widest amplitude.\n\nThe expression 'income' according to Oxford Dictionary means 'a thing that comes in'.\n\nIncome may also be defined as the gain derived from land, capital or labour or any two or more of them.\n\nC In Resch v. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation(') Dixon, J. of the High Court of Australia observed :\n\n\"The subject of the income tax has not been regarded as income in the restricted sense which contrasts gains of the nature of income with capital gains, or actual receipts with increases of assets or wealth.\n\nThe subject has rather been regarded as the substantial gains of persons or enterprises considered over intervals of time and ascertained or estimated by standards appearing sufficiently just, but nevertheless practical and sometimes concerned with avoidance or evasion n1ore than \\Vith ac(:uracy or precision of estimation.\n\nTo include the annual value of the taxpayer's residence owned by himself or used rent free and to fix it at five. percent of the capital value has not been considered to introduce a new subject [Hardinge's Case (1917) 23 C.L.R. 119].\n\nTo treat part of the undistributed profits earned during the current year as part of the assessable income of the shareholder imports no new subject [Cornell's case\n\n(1920) 29 C.L.R. 39 cf. Kellow-Falkiner Pty. Ltd. v.\n\nFederal Commissioner of Taxation (1928) 34 A.L.R. 276], nor does it to substitute, in the case of a foreign-controlled business, for taxable income ordinarily cakulated a percentage of gross receipts fixed by the discretionary judgment of the Commissioner [British Imperial Oil Cases\n\n(1925) 35 C.LR. 422; (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153]. (emphasis supplied)\n\nIn Simon's Income Tax (Second Edition) Volume I, page 502 dealing with the question of computation of income under Schedule H 'A' to the English Income-tax Act, which related to tax on the income attributable to property, it is stated as follows :-\n\n(I) 66 C.L.R. 198 at p. 224\n\n' ..\n\n\"It is now clear however, that A\n\n( l) income tax is but one tax imposed by the Income Tax Acts;\n\n(2) incon1e tax is a tax upon income; and\n\n( 3) Sched. A is but ono of five Schedules which provide varying methods of estimating the measure of that income from different sources for the purposes of\n\ncharge to tax.\n\nThe theory behind Sched. A is that the possession of an interest i11 property gives rise to incon1e, a theory which is 1wt always horne out in fact.\n\nThat there may be no income in fact is disregarded when the asse,,, ment is made.\n\nThe actual ur hypothetical income has to be measured by some standard for the purposes of taxation and the standard prescribed is the annual value.\n\nThis principle has been subject to adverse comment, but once the theory is appreciated, the method may be understood and any confusion of thought, created by the words of the charging section, dispelled.\n\nThe use to which land is put docs not (apart from the excepted concerns mentioned in the proviso to para. l of Sch ed. A above) prevent it from being assessed under Sched. A; but if a trade which is not one of those excepted concerns is carried on property which is owned by the trader and is assessed under Sched.\n\nA, an allowance for the annual value is made in computing the profits of the trade''. (emphasis supplied) In the Governors of the Rotunda Hospital, Dublin v. Coman(') which was a case arising from Ireland, Lord Atkinson observed thus :\n\n\"It would, I think, be well to bear in mind that, to use Lord Macnaghten's words in his celebrated judgment in the London County Council v.\n\nThe Attorney General ( 4 T.C.\n\n265) (1901 A.C. 35), ''Income Tax .... \"is a tax on income\". When the amount of the income to be taxed under the Act of 1842 and the Acts amending it comes to be measured, different standards are selected, and the words \"profits or gains\" are used in reference to all the Schedules In the Act of 1842 to describe the income, the subject of charge.\n\nThe standard selected as a measure of the amount of the income to be taxed under Schedule A in respect of lands, tenements, hereditaments and heritages capable of occupation is the annual value.\n\nIf the owner of such pro- --(!) 7 T.C. 517 at 586-587\n\nperties as these should be himself in occupation of them, it by no means follows that he will, in fact, derive from them an income equal to this annual value; but, as he has the use and enjoyment of the properties, it is, for the purposes of the Statute, presumed that he does derive from them an income equal in amount to this annual value, and the tax is accordingly, under Schedule A, assessed upon this presumed\n\nincome\". (emphasis supplied) .\n\nIn Navinchandra Mafatlal '. The Commis, sioner of Income-tax, Bombay City(!) while justifying the levy of income tax on capital gains under section 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 enacted by the Central Legislature in exercise of the power conferred under Entry No. 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 corresponding to Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, Das, J. (as he then was) having observed at page 837 thus:\n\n\"What, then, is the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the word \"income\"? According to the dictionary it means \"a thing that comes in\". (See Oxford Dictionary, Vol. V, page 162; Stroud, Vol. II, pages 14- 16). In the United States of America and in Australia both of which also are English speaking countries the word \"income\" is understood in a wide sense so as to include a capital gain. Reference may be made to Eisner v. Macomber (1920) 252 U.S. 189; 64 L.Ed. 521, Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka (1925) 255 U.S. 509; 65 L.Ed. 751, and United States v. Stewart (1940) 311 U.S. 60; 85 L. Ed. 40, and Resch. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1942) 66 C.L.R. 198. In each of these cases very wide meaning was ascribed to the word \"income\" as its natural meaning''\n\nproceeded to hold at page 838:\n\n\"As already observed, the word should be given its widest connotation in view of the fact that it occurs in a legislative head conferring legislative power\".\n\nIn the above case this Court held that the word \"income\" in Entry No. 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 should be given a meaning wider than the connotation H given to it in the English Income-tax Act, 1918 under which income attributable to property was chargeable under Schedule 'A' thereof.\n\n(I) [1955] S.C.R. 829.\n\n< •\n\n• ..\n\nNow coming to the specific question of the charge arising under section 23(2) of the Act it is already seen that in Australia the annual value of the tax payer's residence owned by himself or used rent free is taken for consideration for purposes of levy of income tax.\n\nIn England too in the case of a residence of the assessee, computation of income is made on the basis of presumed income. In D. M.\n\nVakil v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') which was a case ansmg under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the High Court of Bombay held that under section 9 of that Act the tax was payable by an assessee in respect of the bona fide annual value of the property irrespective of the question whether he received that value or not.\n\nThe High Court of Gujarat has also !&ken the same view in Sakarlal Balabhai v. Income Tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle\n\nIV, Ahmed a bad & A nr. (')\n\nThere is one other circumstance which persuades us to take the view that computation of income for purposes of levy of income tax in accordance with section 23(2) of the Act is justifiable under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It is to be borne in mind that the Government of India Act, 1935 was enacted when the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 was in force.\n\nSection 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 provided for levy of income tax on the qasis of the bona fide annual value of the property even when it was in the occupation of the assessee for the purposes of his own residence.\n\nWhile enacting entry 54 of list I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, the British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which was probably the only law relating to tax on incomes in force in British India then.\n\nSimilarly the Constituent Assembly while enacting Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution must have understood that the word 'income' used in that Entry would in any event include within its scope all items which came within the definition of income and were subjected to charge in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which was in force at the time the Constitution was adopted.\n\nThat the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in their view is borne out from Article 270 ( 1) of the Constitution which provides for collection of taxes on income by the Government of India and distribution thereof between the Union and the States, Article 366(1) which defines 'agricultural income' as agricultural income as defined for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian Income--\n\ntax and Article 366(29) which defines 'tax on income' as including a tax in the nature of an excess profits tax. In the circumstances ii\n\n(1) 14 I.T.R. 298.\n\n(2) 100 J.T.R. 97.\n\nwould not be wrong to construe the word 'income' in Entry 82 as including all items which were taxable under the contemporaneous law relating to tax on incomes which was in force at the time when the Constitution was enacted when as observed by this Court in the case of Navinchandra Mafatlal (supra) the word 'income' in Entry 82 is capable of a wider meaning than what was given to it in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 or the English Act of 1918.\n\nEven in its ordinary economic sense, the expression 'income' includes not merely what is received or what comes in hy exploiting the use of a property but also what one saves by using it oneself. That which can be converted into income can be reasonably regarded as C giving rise to income. The tax levied under the Act is on the income (though computed in an artificial way) from house property in the above sense and not on house property.\n\nEntry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is not, therefore, attracted. The levy in question squarely falls under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh\n\nD Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nHence we do not find any merit in the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the leave prayed for is refused and the petition is dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n• ..", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "BHAGWAN DASS JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWAN DASS JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWAN DASS JAIN\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 23(2)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 466, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 490, "end_char": 510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 585, "end_char": 598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 23(2)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1073, "end_char": 1090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1341, "end_char": 1352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1409, "end_char": 1422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1756, "end_char": 1772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, an assessee under the Act, contended before the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, that inclusion of any amount under section 23(2) of the Act in his income was unconstitutional as there could be no income at all in such a case accruing to him in a true sense of that term and that the liability that was sought to be imposed under the Act in respect of his residential house was in its pith and substance a tax on building falling under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and hence Parliament could not impose the said liability under a law made in exercise of its legislative power under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule which authorised it only to levy 'taxes on income other than agricultural income'."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1936, "end_char": 1952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2542, "end_char": 2555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2668, "end_char": 2684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BHAGWANDASS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2757, "end_char": 2768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the Special Leave Petition,\n'\n\n• •\n\nBHAGWANDASS V. UNION 809\n\nHELD ; 1.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWAN DASS JAIN"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2818, "end_char": 2832, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2963, "end_char": 2979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3099, "end_char": 3115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian C Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3679, "end_char": 3708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3724, "end_char": 3733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian C Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian C Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3741, "end_char": 3768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3978, "end_char": 4045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 270(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4735, "end_char": 4749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4827, "end_char": 4846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "815 D-FJ\n\n(ii) The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in their view is borne out from Article 270(1) of the Constitution 'Nhich provides fer collection of taxes on income by the Government of India and distribution thereof bet\\vecn the Union and the States."}}, {"text": "Article 366(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Article 366(29)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5041, "end_char": 5056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Vhat was given to it in the Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5597, "end_char": 5646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "814 HJ\n\n' In Australia the annual value of the tax payers' residence owned by him- .!elf or used rent free is taken for consideration for purposes of levy of inco1ne tax."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5860, "end_char": 5867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England too in the case of a residence of the assessee, computation of income i5 on the basi<> of presumed income."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6266, "end_char": 6282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vhat was given to it in the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Vhat was given to it in the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6833, "end_char": 6858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 27-10-79 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. No."}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Dayal, Mrs. Bagga and Mr. S. Bagga for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Bagga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6897, "end_char": 6902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Dayal, Mrs. Bagga and Mr. S. Bagga for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6911, "end_char": 6919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Dayal, Mrs. Bagga and Mr. S. Bagga for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6982, "end_char": 6995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-The short question which arises for consideration in this petition for special leave to appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to include in the income of the assessee any amount calculated in accordance with section 23(2) of the Act in respect of a house in the occupation of the assessee for the purposes of his own residence."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7107, "end_char": 7118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7390, "end_char": 7403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7579, "end_char": 7607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner who is an assessee under the Act contended before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution that inclusion of any amount under section 23(2) of the Act in his income was unconstitutional as there could be no income at all in such a case accruing to him in the true sense of that term, the liability that was sought to be imposed under the Act in respect of his residential house was, therefore, in its pith and substance a tax on building falling under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and hence Parliament could not impose the said liability under a law m'ade in exercise of its legislative power under Entry S2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which anthorised it only to levy taxes on income other than agricultural income."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "S2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8235, "end_char": 8251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Constitution is whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer while computing the liability of an assessee to tax under the Incometax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Febniary 5, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the petition came up for hearing on Febniary 5, !"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8866, "end_char": 8875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9249, "end_char": 9259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 22 to 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9357, "end_char": 9374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9472, "end_char": 9482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9874, "end_char": 9887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10257, "end_char": 10270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10454, "end_char": 10464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11213, "end_char": 11223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11342, "end_char": 11358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11407, "end_char": 11423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11586, "end_char": 11602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12273, "end_char": 12296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C In Resch v. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation(') Dixon, J. of the High Court of Australia observed :\n\n\"The subject of the income tax has not been regarded as income in the restricted sense which contrasts gains of the nature of income with capital gains, or actual receipts with increases of assets or wealth."}}, {"text": "Hardinge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13039, "end_char": 13047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "percent of the capital value has not been considered to introduce a new subject [Hardinge's Case (1917) 23 C.L.R. 119]."}}, {"text": "Cornell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To treat part of the undistributed profits earned during the current year as part of the assessable income of the shareholder imports no new subject [Cornell's case\n\n(1920) 29 C.L.R. 39 cf."}}, {"text": "Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13652, "end_char": 13657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "emphasis supplied)\n\nIn Simon's Income Tax (Second Edition) Volume I, page 502 dealing with the question of computation of income under Schedule H 'A' to the English Income-tax Act, which related to tax on the income attributable to property, it is stated as follows :-\n\n(I) 66 C.L.R. 198 at p. 224\n\n' ..\n\n\"It is now clear however, that A\n\n( l) income tax is but one tax imposed by the Income Tax Acts;\n\n(2) incon1e tax is a tax upon income; and\n\n( 3) Sched."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13794, "end_char": 13808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ireland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15349, "end_char": 15356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "emphasis supplied) In the Governors of the Rotunda Hospital, Dublin v. Coman(') which was a case arising from Ireland, Lord Atkinson observed thus :\n\n\"It would, I think, be well to bear in mind that, to use Lord Macnaghten's words in his celebrated judgment in the London County Council v.\n\nThe Attorney General ( 4 T.C.\n\n265) (1901 A.C. 35), ''Income Tax .... \"is a tax on income\"."}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15363, "end_char": 15371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "emphasis supplied) In the Governors of the Rotunda Hospital, Dublin v. Coman(') which was a case arising from Ireland, Lord Atkinson observed thus :\n\n\"It would, I think, be well to bear in mind that, to use Lord Macnaghten's words in his celebrated judgment in the London County Council v.\n\nThe Attorney General ( 4 T.C.\n\n265) (1901 A.C. 35), ''Income Tax .... \"is a tax on income\"."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15451, "end_char": 15461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "emphasis supplied) In the Governors of the Rotunda Hospital, Dublin v. Coman(') which was a case arising from Ireland, Lord Atkinson observed thus :\n\n\"It would, I think, be well to bear in mind that, to use Lord Macnaghten's words in his celebrated judgment in the London County Council v.\n\nThe Attorney General ( 4 T.C.\n\n265) (1901 A.C. 35), ''Income Tax .... \"is a tax on income\"."}}, {"text": "Navinchandra Mafatlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Navinchandra Mafatlal '."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16750, "end_char": 16760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16770, "end_char": 16797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16890, "end_char": 16957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17001, "end_char": 17017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17039, "end_char": 17042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 corresponding to Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, Das, J. (as he then was) having observed at page 837 thus:\n\n\"What, then, is the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the word \"income\"?"}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17326, "end_char": 17350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States of America and in Australia both of which also are English speaking countries the word \"income\" is understood in a wide sense so as to include a capital gain."}}, {"text": "S. 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17556, "end_char": 17562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "S. 509", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17632, "end_char": 17638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "S. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17696, "end_char": 17701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18154, "end_char": 18221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "English Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18296, "end_char": 18324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18512, "end_char": 18525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the English Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the English Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18923, "end_char": 18950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18956, "end_char": 18976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In D. M.\n\nVakil v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') which was a case ansmg under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the High Court of Bombay held that under section 9 of that Act the tax was payable by an assessee in respect of the bona fide annual value of the property irrespective of the question whether he received that value or not."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18993, "end_char": 19002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19180, "end_char": 19201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Gujarat has also !&"}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19483, "end_char": 19496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19555, "end_char": 19571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "is to be borne in mind that the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19596, "end_char": 19657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19679, "end_char": 19706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19722, "end_char": 19731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19739, "end_char": 19766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19990, "end_char": 20043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20049, "end_char": 20125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20197, "end_char": 20210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While enacting entry 54 of list I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, the British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which was probably the only law relating to tax on incomes in force in British India then."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20294, "end_char": 20310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the British Parliament must have had in its view the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20534, "end_char": 20548, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "That the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20617, "end_char": 20681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 270", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20714, "end_char": 20725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "That the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "That the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Article 366(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20886, "end_char": 20900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "That the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "That the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Article 366(29)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21043, "end_char": 21058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "That the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "That the Constitution makers had the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21607, "end_char": 21634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22134, "end_char": 22150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22488, "end_char": 22494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_817_825_EN", "year": 1981, "text": ", '\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nM. B. PATNAIK & ORS .\n\nFebruary 11, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nDisciplinary Proceedings in a service matter-Order of reversion quashed by the High Court on a technical ground-Propriety of the second enquiry on merits-Whether it is necessary that the enquiry which had been held in part by more than one enquiry offecers should be continued by the satne enquiry officers until the end-Original enquiry officers ceased to hold their 1'epec1ivc offices by rcasori of their promotion to higher posts-Whether t11e second enquiry\n\ndone by them while holding the higher promotional posts are bad and without C authority of law.\n\nAllowing the appeals by special leave, the Court,\n\nHELD: (1) When an earlier order of reversion was quashed on a techni~ cal ground, a second enquiry on merits could be held and it is open to the disciplinary authority to continue the proceedings in accordance with Jaw.\n\nThe order of reinstatement pursuant thereto is not a bar to the second enquiry.\n\n[820 F-GJ\n\nSuperintendent (Tech. I), Central Excise I.D.D. Jahalpur and Ors. v. Pratap Rai, [1978] 3 S.C.R. 729; Anand Narain Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.LR. 1979 S.C. 1923, followed.\n\n(2) It is not at all necessary that the enquiry which had been held in part by more than one enquiry officers should be continued by the same enquiry officers until the end. The post which the members of the Inquiry Committee held originally might have been ceased to exist at a later stage, or one or more of the members of the Inquiry Committee may no longer be awilable either on account of retirement or due to any other cause. For that reason, it could not be held that the enquiry could not be continued at all. Therefore, there could be no valid objection to the supplementary enquiry being continued by the very two individuals, in the instant case even after they had coosed to hold their respective offices which they held at the time of the original enquiry.\n\n[823 G-H, 824 AB]\n\nGeneral Manager, Eastern Railway and another v. Jwala Prasad Singh, [1970] 1 sec 103, applied.\n\n[Having regard to the long lapse of time, the offence having been alleged to have been committed in or about 1955, the Court held that the fresh enquiry need not be held, and accepted the equitable offer of the Union Railways and directed payment of Rs. 12,000 /· to each of the respondent employees.]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 10-1-1979 of thoe Orissa High Court in O.J.C. Nos. 1261/76, 833/77 and 834/77.\n\n5-214 SCI/81\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 389 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 10-1-1979 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 832/77.\n\nM. M. Abdul Khadar, P.A. Francis, Gurumurthy and R. N. Pvddar for the Appellants.\n\nAmlan Ghosh for the Respondent•.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.-These appeals by special leave have been filed against two judgments of a Division Bench of the Onssa High Court (C. A. No. 389 of 1981) arising out of the judgment in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 832 of 1977 and C. As. Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979 arising out of Original Jurisdiction Cases Nos. 1261 of 1976 and 833 and 834 of 1977 respectively. P. N. L. Das, the respondent in C.A.\n\nNo. 389 of 1981 was appointed as a Booking Clerk in the South Eastern Railway in 1955 and had been duly confirmed at that post.\n\nM. B.\n\nPatnaik, the respondent in C. A. No. 2119 of 1979, was working as a confumed Commercial Clerk at Khurda Road in the South Eastern Railway, having been appointed in January-February 1964. D. Sahu and S. C. Mitra, the respondents in C.As. Nos. 2120 and 2121 of 1979 respectively were working as confirmed Booking Clerks in the South Eastern Railway at about the same time.\n\nA departmental enquiry was initiated against these four respondents and three others, namely, Ch. N. Murty, B. S. N, Rao and B. Papa Rao in 1964 on the basis of a report of the Travelling Insipector of Accounts, and two charges were framed against them.\n\nThe second charge was not pressed, , md we are, therefore, concerned only with the disciplinary proceeding relating to the first charge, which led to the removal of all the seven persons from service.\n\nThe first charge framed against these six persons was this:-\n\n\"On 20th May, 1959, 47 third-class express tickets had been issued from Khurda Road to Howrah for a total fare of Rs. 497.73 and these were accounted short on the plea of over-issue of these tickets on 12-5-59. The record at Howrah Station indicated that the tickets were actually sold on 20-5-59 and not on 12-5-59.\n\nThe result was the fare amounting to Rs. 497.73 had been misappropriated on 20th December, 1959 by tampering with the figure relating to 12-5-59 in the cash book.\n\nThe record foils of foreign eXiPress fare tickets issued on 12-5-59 were fraudulently cancelled and the sum of Rs. 493.53 already accounted in the cash book 11gainst those\n\n' I\n\ntwo foreign express tickets was erased, and to balance the sum a fictitious sale of 4 7 tickets had been entered in the cash book.\"\n\nSeveral points had been raised in the Writ Petition (Original Jurisdiction Case) No. 832 of 1977. But when that case was taken up the learned counsel for the petitioner P. N. L. Das confined his arguments only to two points, namely ( 1) that though the Evidence Act does not strictly apply, suspicion and conjecture cannot form the basis of any conclusion in any departmental enquiry and (2) reasonable opportunity of defending himself had not been given to the petitioner P. N. L.\n\nDas.\n\nThe disciplinary authority and punishing authorit), namely, the General Manager, constituted an Enquiry Comm; uee consisting of the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road and the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, namely, Shri K. Julhe and Shri B. B.\n\nChatterjee.\n\nIn the midst of the enquiry Shri K. Julhe was transferred and thereafter his successor in office Shri B. K. Patnaik and Shri B. B.\n\nChatterjee, the Assistant Accounts Officers, bGarden Reach continued the enquiry.\n\nThe Enquiry Officers found the appellants in these appeals guilty of the charge.\n\nThe punishing authority, the General Manager, on the representation of the respondents in C. As. Nos. 2119- 2121 of 1979, directed a supplementary enquiry to be held. Notice of the supplementary enquiry was given in April 1967. At that time Shri\n\nB. K. Patnaik, who succeeded Shri K. Julhe as the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road as stated above, had been promoted as a Divisional Commercial Superintendent and was posted at Kharagpur while Shri B. B. Chatterjee, who was Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, had been promoted as the Divisional Accounts Officer and had been posted at Adra.\n\nThese very persons issued the notice for continuing the enquiry after the General Manager directed the supplementary enquiry. It is at this stage that P. N. L. Das, the appellant in C. A.\n\nNo. 389 of 1981 challenged in 0. J.C. No. 579 of 1971 the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Board. In that Writ Petition, Misra and Panda, JJ. of the Orissa High Court while negativing several other contentions\n\nraised on behalf of P. N. L. Das, directed that the supplementary enquiry pending against P. N. L. Das shall be continued by the officers holding the post of Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda \\{oad\n\nand the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach and not by Shri B. K. Patnaik who had been promoted as the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and was posted at Kharagpur and ceased to be Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road and by Shri B. B .. Chatterjee who had been promoted as the Divisional Accounts Officer and posted at Adra and ceased to be the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach.\n\nIn W. Ps. (O.J.C.) Nos. 1261/76 and 833 and 834/77 Misra and Mohanty, JJ of the Orissa High Court found that by the time tl:\\e decision in the said 0. J. C. No. 579 of 1971 was rendered by Misra and Panda, JJ on 20-9-72, the enquiry against the respondents in C.As. Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979 had been disposed of and the disciplinary authority had taken into account the material collected in the supplementary enquiry and found the respondents in these three appeals guilty, in consequence of which these respondents were removed from service by the punishing authority.\n\nWrit Petitions (O.J.C.) Nos. 1271/76 a\\ld 833 'lllld 834/77 were filed for challenging the removal of the respondents in C. As. Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979 from service.\n\nMisra and Mohanty, JJ held in these three Writ Petitions in their judgment dated 10-1-79 that in view of what has been stated in the decision in Writ Petition (O.J.C.) No. 579 of 1971 (P. N. L. Das v. Union of India & Ors.(1) the supplementary enquiry made by Shri B. K. Patnaik who had ceased to be the Assisl'ant Co=ercial Superintendent, Khnrda Road and Shri B. B. Chatterjee who had ceased to be the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, must be held !o be without authority of law, and having regard to the fact that the case of the railway administration was not that the material gathered in the supplementary enquiry had not been used by the enquiry officers and the disciplinary authority, the finding of gnilt 'lllld the imposition of punishment on the basis of that finding could not be sustained. Accordingly, the learned judges allowed these Writ Petitions (0.J.C.) Nos. 1261/76 and 833 and 834/77 and quashed the order made in the disciplinary proceedings and directed that each of the three petitioners before them, namely, the respondents in C. As. Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979 shall be deemed to be continuing in service and would be entitled to appropriate service benefits on that footing.\n\nMr. Pal, who appeared fqr the Railway Administration before Misra and Mohanty, JJ in these three Writ Petitions requested the learned judges to indicate that it is opebn to the disciplinary authority to continue the proceeding in accordance with law. We are of the opinion that the learned cour.sel was perfectly justified in doing so.\n\nThis Court has held in Anand Narain Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh(') that when the earlier order of reversion was quashed on a technical ground, a second enquiry on merits could be held and that the order of reinsl'atement pursuant to the quashing of the earlier order on a technical ground is not a bar, and this Court negatived the contention that after t11e earlier order of reversion was quashed by the High Court and the govern-\n\n1) (1972) Vol. 38 Cuttack Law Times.\n\n(2) AIR 1979 S.C. 1923.\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nment servant was reinstated, no second enquiry on the very same charge could be held and no second order of reversion could be legally and validly made. A similar view has been taken by this Court in Superintendent (Tech. I), Central Excise l.D.D. Jabalpur and Ors. v. Partap Rai(') in which it has been held that where an order passed in appeal vacates the order of the First Tribunal on purely technical grounds and expressly states that it was being passed without prejudice, which me11ns that it was not an order on merits of the case, such an order does not debar fresh adjudicatory proceedings which my be justified under the law and that when an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of the principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and all !hat is done is that the inherent defect is removed but the proceedings are not terminated. But Misra and Mohanty, JJ declined to consider favourably the request of the learned counsel for the Railway Administration before them namely, that they should indicate that it is open to the disciplinary authority to continue the proceeding in accordance with law on the ground that 15 years had elapsed since the charges were framed and the petitioners before them namely, the respondents in C. As. Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979, had been suffering on account of being subjected to disciplinary proceedings for such a long time and that it would be a mockery of justice if aftr the lapse of so many years the enquiry should commence again on the same charges.\n\nWhen the supplementary enquiry, mentioned above, commenced and P. N. L. Das, the respondent in C. A. No. 389 of 1981 was examined, he insisted upon production of certain documents and witnesses but they were not made available here on the plea that the documents were not available and the witnesses whq appeared to he ticket collectors, could not be co-related. However, as already stated, he was adjudged guilty of the charge on the footing that he had misappropriated the sale proceeds of express fare tickets.\n\nMisra and Mohanty, JJ observed in their judgment in W.P. (O.J.C.) No. 832/ 77 that there is no positive material worth the name to support the charge and lead to the conclusion that tickets had actually been ul!Iized, that the relevant documents appeared not to have been preserved on account of negligence on the part of the administration and that on the ground that the evidence is not available prejudice cannot be allowed to be caused to the petitioner before them by relying upon suspicion and conjecture as evidence.\n\nThe learned judges further observed that as things stood it is indeed difficult for them to hold tliat there is any evidence on record to support the charge.\n\nIn that view they allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the punishment imposed on\n\n(1) [1978/ 3!S.C'.R. 729.\n\nA P. N. L. Das and held that he continnes to be in ser•1ice and is entitled 1.o all the service benefits admissible to him.\n\nThese Civil Appeuls by special leave have been filed against these judgments of the Orissa High Court.\n\nIn the course of hearing of these appeals it was represented to us that C. N. Murthy, B. S. N. Rao and B. Papa Rao have since retired and that all payments have been made to them in fu!J. It was also represented that even P. N. L. Das had been reinstated and all arrears etc. due to him have been [paid.\n\nMr. M. M. Abdul Khader, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in all these cases, submitted that the view expressed in P. N. L. Das v. Union of India & Ors. (supra) that the supplementary enquiry directed to be held by the disciplinary authority should be held only by officers holding the post of Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda; Road and Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach and not by the officers who had held those posts at the time of the original enquiry and ceased to hold posts subsequently, is incorrect. The learned counsel submitted that this position would appear from the decision of this Court in General Manager, Eastern Railway and another v. Jwala Prasad Singh(') referred to in the Judgment of the learned judges of the Orissa High Court itself.\n\nThe learned judges of the Orissa High Court have extracted the following passage from the judgment of this Court in General Manager, Eastern Railway and another v. Jwala Prasad Singh\n\n(supra) in heir judgment :-\n\n\"In our opinion the above procedure does not leave any scope for the guidance of a member of an Inquiry Committee consisting of more than one person by the impression formed by him about the truthfulness or otherwise of a particular witness examined during the inquiry.\n\nFrom the stage antecedent to the framing of the charges everything is recorded in writing.\n\nThe allegations on which the charges are based are made known to the railway sernmt and he is called upon to file his written statement after looking into all the relevant records.\n\nThe oral evidence of all the witnesses tendered during the enquiry is recorded in writing.\n\nWhereas here the oral evidence is recorded in the presence of three persons constituting the Inquiry Committee, any impression created by the demeunour of a particular witness on the mind of any one member cannot affect the conclusion afterwards arrived at jointly by them. It cannot be suggested that all the three persons would record\n\n(l) [1970] 1 s.c.c. 103.\n\n• •\n\n.. ,-..\n\nUNION v. M. B. PATNAJK (Varadarajan, !.) 823\n\ntheir impressions separately about the demeoanour of a witness and it is quite possible that a particular witness may appear to one member of the committee to be nntruthful without his being considered so by the others. The members of the Inquiry Committee cannot record their findings separately, but it is their duty to record findings on each of the charges together with the reoasons therefor. It is to be noted that the duty of the Inquiry Committee ends with the making of the report. The Disciplinary Authority has to consider the record of the inquiry and arrive at its own conclusion on each charge. Whatever may be the impression created by a particular witness on the mind of one member of the Committee, the same is never translated into writing and the Disciplinary Committee merely goes by the written record after giving a personal hearing to the railway servant if he asks for it.\n\nEven if the Inquiry Committee makes a report absolving the railway servant of the charges against him, the Disciplinary Authority may, on considering the entire record come to a different conclusion and impose a penalty. This is amply borne out by a judgment of this Court in Union of India v. H. C. Goel (A.I.R. 1964 S.C.\n\n364) where it was said that neither the findings nor the recommendations of the Inquiry Committee are binding on the Government.\n\nIn such a state of affairs a change in the personnel of the Inquiry Committee after the proceedings are begun and some evidence recorded cannot make any difference to the case of the railway servant. The record will speak for itself and it is the record consisting of the documents and the oral evidence as recorded which must form the basis of the report of the Inquiry Committee. The Committee is not the punishing authority and the personal impression of a member of the Committee cannot possibly affect the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. In a state of affairs like this, we cannot see any reason for holding that any kn.own principle of natural justice is violated when one member of the Committee is substituted by another.\"\n\nIt would appear from the above extract that it is not at all necessary that the enquiry which bad been held in part by more\n\nthan one enquiry officers sl1ould be continued by the same enquiry H officers until the end.\n\nThe post which the members of the Inquiry Committee held originally might have been ceased to exist at a later\n\nstage, or one or more of the members of the Inquiry Committee may no longer be available either on account of retirement or due to any other cause.\n\nFor that reason, it could not be held that the enquiry could not be continued at all.\n\nTherefore, there could be no valid objection to the supplementary enquiry being continued by the very two individuals, even after they had ceased to hold their respective offices which they held at the time of the original enquiry.\n\nThe plea of malafides raised against the two Enquiry Officers on behalf of P. N. L. Das, the respondent in C.A. No. 389 of 1981 before Misra and Panda JJ, when Writ Petition (0.J.C.) No. 579/71 was heard was rejected by the learned Judges who have observed in their judgment that after hearing the counsel they were satisfied that no good fpundation has been laid for the plea of malafides, bias or prejudice by the enquiry officers and it was also conceded by the learned counsel who appeared for P. N. L. Das in that Writ Petitfon that on the material on records it may be difficult for him to persuade them to hold in favour of the petitioner before them in regard to the plea of mala fides.\n\nTherefore, we are clearly of the opinion there could be no bar to B. K. Patnaik and B. B. Chatterjee who were originally the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road and Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach respectively, holding the supplementary enquiry even after they ceased to hold their respective offices by reason of their promotion as Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Kharagpur and Divisional Accounts Officer, Adra sometime before the commencement of the supplementary enquiry.\n\nHowever, we agree with Misra and Mohanty JJ of the Orissa High Court that it would be inequitable for a fresh enquiry being made into the charge framed against the respondents in S. As. Nos. 2119- 2121/79 or to go into tho merits of the case against P. N. L. Das the respondent in C.A. No. 389 of 1981, having regard to the long lapse of time, the offences having been stated to have been committed in about 1955.\n\nMr. M. M. Abdul Khader, learned counsel for the appellants in these appeals represented before us that no recovery will be made from S/Shri Ch. R. Murty, B. S. N. Rao and B. Papa Rao who have retired from service and also from P. N. L. Das the respondent in C.A. No. 389 of 1981 who has been reinstated subsequent to the decision of the Orissa High Court in Writ Petition (0.J.C.) No. 832 of 1977.\n\nWe, accordingly, dismiss these appeals and direct the parties to bear their respective costs.\n\nAdvocates fee Rs. 1,000/-, one set.\n\nIt was also represented before us by Mr. M. M. Abdul Khader that Rs. 22,400/-, Rs. 19,250/- and Rs. 19,250/- would be payable to the respondents in C.A. Nos. 2119-2121/79 respectively if these\n\n• •\n\nUNION v. M. B. PATNAIK (Varadarajan, J.) 825\n\nappeals had been disposed of against the Railway Administration on merits and that the Administration would, however, pay Rs. 12,000/- to each of these person, namely, M. B. Patnaik, D. Sahu and S. C.\n\nMisra.\n\nWe accept this offer as being beneficial to these three respondents in C.As. Nos. 2119-2121 of 1979 who will be entitled to recover from the Railway Administration a sum of Rs. 12,000/- each up to 22-1-81 on account of arrears of salary etc. payable to them from the date of their suspension.\n\nV.D.K .\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. B. PATNAIK & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. B. PATNAIK & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 11, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 S.C.R. 729", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1122, "end_char": 1141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2091, "end_char": 2098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. M. Abdul Khadar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khadar, P.A. Francis, Gurumurthy and R. N. Pvddar for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "M. M. Abdul Khadar"}}, {"text": "P.A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khadar, P.A. Francis, Gurumurthy and R. N. Pvddar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Gurumurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2821, "end_char": 2831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khadar, P.A. Francis, Gurumurthy and R. N. Pvddar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. N. Pvddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2836, "end_char": 2848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khadar, P.A. Francis, Gurumurthy and R. N. Pvddar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Amlan Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2870, "end_char": 2881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amlan Ghosh for the Respondent•.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.-These appeals by special leave have been filed against two judgments of a Division Bench of the Onssa High Court (C. A. No."}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2948, "end_char": 2959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amlan Ghosh for the Respondent•.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.-These appeals by special leave have been filed against two judgments of a Division Bench of the Onssa High Court (C. A. No."}}, {"text": "P. N. L. Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3308, "end_char": 3320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N. L. Das, the respondent in C.A.\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "P. N. L.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "M. B.\n\nPatnaik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3475, "end_char": 3489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. B.\n\nPatnaik, the respondent in C. A. No.", "canonical_name": "M. B. PATNAIK & ORS"}}, {"text": "D. Sahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3669, "end_char": 3676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Sahu and S. C. Mitra, the respondents in C.As."}}, {"text": "S. C. Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3681, "end_char": 3692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Sahu and S. C. Mitra, the respondents in C.As.", "canonical_name": "S. C.\n\nMisra"}}, {"text": "South Eastern Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3807, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2120 and 2121 of 1979 respectively were working as confirmed Booking Clerks in the South Eastern Railway at about the same time."}}, {"text": "Ch. N. Murty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3948, "end_char": 3960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A departmental enquiry was initiated against these four respondents and three others, namely, Ch.", "canonical_name": "Ch. N. Murty"}}, {"text": "B. S. N", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Murty, B. S. N, Rao and B. Papa Rao in 1964 on the basis of a report of the Travelling Insipector of Accounts, and two charges were framed against them.", "canonical_name": "B. S. N. Rao"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3971, "end_char": 3974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Murty, B. S. N, Rao and B. Papa Rao in 1964 on the basis of a report of the Travelling Insipector of Accounts, and two charges were framed against them."}}, {"text": "B. Papa Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3979, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Murty, B. S. N, Rao and B. Papa Rao in 1964 on the basis of a report of the Travelling Insipector of Accounts, and two charges were framed against them."}}, {"text": "20th May, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4377, "end_char": 4391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first charge framed against these six persons was this:-\n\n\"On 20th May, 1959, 47 third-class express tickets had been issued from Khurda Road to Howrah for a total fare of Rs."}}, {"text": "Howrah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first charge framed against these six persons was this:-\n\n\"On 20th May, 1959, 47 third-class express tickets had been issued from Khurda Road to Howrah for a total fare of Rs."}}, {"text": "12-5-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4575, "end_char": 4582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "497.73 and these were accounted short on the plea of over-issue of these tickets on 12-5-59."}}, {"text": "20-5-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4662, "end_char": 4669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The record at Howrah Station indicated that the tickets were actually sold on 20-5-59 and not on 12-5-59."}}, {"text": "20th December, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4767, "end_char": 4786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "497.73 had been misappropriated on 20th December, 1959 by tampering with the figure relating to 12-5-59 in the cash book."}}, {"text": "P. N. L. Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5335, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when that case was taken up the learned counsel for the petitioner P. N. L. Das confined his arguments only to two points, namely ( 1) that though the Evidence Act does not strictly apply, suspicion and conjecture cannot form the basis of any conclusion in any departmental enquiry and (2) reasonable opportunity of defending himself had not been given to the petitioner P. N. L.\n\nDas.", "canonical_name": "P. N. L.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "P. N. L.\n\nDas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5639, "end_char": 5652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when that case was taken up the learned counsel for the petitioner P. N. L. Das confined his arguments only to two points, namely ( 1) that though the Evidence Act does not strictly apply, suspicion and conjecture cannot form the basis of any conclusion in any departmental enquiry and (2) reasonable opportunity of defending himself had not been given to the petitioner P. N. L.\n\nDas.", "canonical_name": "P. N. L.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "K. Julhe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5899, "end_char": 5907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disciplinary authority and punishing authorit), namely, the General Manager, constituted an Enquiry Comm; uee consisting of the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road and the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, namely, Shri K. Julhe and Shri B. B.\n\nChatterjee.", "canonical_name": "K. Julhe"}}, {"text": "B. B.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5917, "end_char": 5934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disciplinary authority and punishing authorit), namely, the General Manager, constituted an Enquiry Comm; uee consisting of the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road and the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, namely, Shri K. Julhe and Shri B. B.\n\nChatterjee.", "canonical_name": "B. B .. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "K. Julhe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5970, "end_char": 5978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the midst of the enquiry Shri K. Julhe was transferred and thereafter his successor in office Shri B. K. Patnaik and Shri B. B.\n\nChatterjee, the Assistant Accounts Officers, bGarden Reach continued the enquiry.", "canonical_name": "K. Julhe"}}, {"text": "B. K. Patnaik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6039, "end_char": 6052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the midst of the enquiry Shri K. Julhe was transferred and thereafter his successor in office Shri B. K. Patnaik and Shri B. B.\n\nChatterjee, the Assistant Accounts Officers, bGarden Reach continued the enquiry.", "canonical_name": "M. B. PATNAIK & ORS"}}, {"text": "B. B.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6062, "end_char": 6079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the midst of the enquiry Shri K. Julhe was transferred and thereafter his successor in office Shri B. K. Patnaik and Shri B. B.\n\nChatterjee, the Assistant Accounts Officers, bGarden Reach continued the enquiry.", "canonical_name": "B. B .. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Kharagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time Shri\n\nB. K. Patnaik, who succeeded Shri K. Julhe as the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road as stated above, had been promoted as a Divisional Commercial Superintendent and was posted at Kharagpur while Shri B. B. Chatterjee, who was Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, had been promoted as the Divisional Accounts Officer and had been posted at Adra."}}, {"text": "B. B. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6696, "end_char": 6712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time Shri\n\nB. K. Patnaik, who succeeded Shri K. Julhe as the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road as stated above, had been promoted as a Divisional Commercial Superintendent and was posted at Kharagpur while Shri B. B. Chatterjee, who was Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, had been promoted as the Divisional Accounts Officer and had been posted at Adra.", "canonical_name": "B. B .. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Adra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time Shri\n\nB. K. Patnaik, who succeeded Shri K. Julhe as the Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road as stated above, had been promoted as a Divisional Commercial Superintendent and was posted at Kharagpur while Shri B. B. Chatterjee, who was Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach, had been promoted as the Divisional Accounts Officer and had been posted at Adra."}}, {"text": "P. N. L. Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6998, "end_char": 7010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is at this stage that P. N. L. Das, the appellant in C. A.\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "P. N. L.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7152, "end_char": 7157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that Writ Petition, Misra and Panda, JJ."}}, {"text": "Panda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7162, "end_char": 7167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that Writ Petition, Misra and Panda, JJ."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7180, "end_char": 7197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Orissa High Court while negativing several other contentions\n\nraised on behalf of P. N. L. Das, directed that the supplementary enquiry pending against P. N. L. Das shall be continued by the officers holding the post of Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda \\{oad\n\nand the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach and not by Shri B. K. Patnaik who had been promoted as the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and was posted at Kharagpur and ceased to be Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road and by Shri B. B .. Chatterjee who had been promoted as the Divisional Accounts Officer and posted at Adra and ceased to be the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach."}}, {"text": "B. B .. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7702, "end_char": 7720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Orissa High Court while negativing several other contentions\n\nraised on behalf of P. N. L. Das, directed that the supplementary enquiry pending against P. N. L. Das shall be continued by the officers holding the post of Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda \\{oad\n\nand the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach and not by Shri B. K. Patnaik who had been promoted as the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and was posted at Kharagpur and ceased to be Assistant Commercial Superintendent, Khurda Road and by Shri B. B .. Chatterjee who had been promoted as the Divisional Accounts Officer and posted at Adra and ceased to be the Assistant Accounts Officer, Garden Reach.", "canonical_name": "B. B .. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Mohanty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7922, "end_char": 7929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1261/76 and 833 and 834/77 Misra and Mohanty, JJ of the Orissa High Court found that by the time tl:\\e decision in the said 0."}}, {"text": "20-9-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8073, "end_char": 8080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "579 of 1971 was rendered by Misra and Panda, JJ on 20-9-72, the enquiry against the respondents in C.As."}}, {"text": "10-1-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8678, "end_char": 8685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misra and Mohanty, JJ held in these three Writ Petitions in their judgment dated 10-1-79 that in view of what has been stated in the decision in Writ Petition (O.J.C.) No."}}, {"text": "Pal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9809, "end_char": 9812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pal, who appeared fqr the Railway Administration before Misra and Mohanty, JJ in these three Writ Petitions requested the learned judges to indicate that it is opebn to the disciplinary authority to continue the proceeding in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "C. N. Murthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of hearing of these appeals it was represented to us that C. N. Murthy, B. S. N. Rao and B. Papa Rao have since retired and that all payments have been made to them in fu!J. It was also represented that even P. N. L. Das had been reinstated and all arrears etc.", "canonical_name": "Ch. N. Murty"}}, {"text": "B. S. N. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13816, "end_char": 13828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of hearing of these appeals it was represented to us that C. N. Murthy, B. S. N. Rao and B. Papa Rao have since retired and that all payments have been made to them in fu!J. It was also represented that even P. N. L. Das had been reinstated and all arrears etc.", "canonical_name": "B. S. N. Rao"}}, {"text": "M. M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14039, "end_char": 14057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. M. M. Abdul Khader, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in all these cases, submitted that the view expressed in P. N. L. Das v. Union of India & Ors. (", "canonical_name": "M. M. Abdul Khadar"}}, {"text": "Ch. R. Murty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20746, "end_char": 20758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. M. M. Abdul Khader, learned counsel for the appellants in these appeals represented before us that no recovery will be made from S/Shri Ch.", "canonical_name": "Ch. N. Murty"}}, {"text": "M. B. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21550, "end_char": 21563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,000/- to each of these person, namely, M. B. Patnaik, D. Sahu and S. C.\n\nMisra.", "canonical_name": "M. B. PATNAIK & ORS"}}, {"text": "S. C.\n\nMisra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21577, "end_char": 21589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,000/- to each of these person, namely, M. B. Patnaik, D. Sahu and S. C.\n\nMisra.", "canonical_name": "S. C.\n\nMisra"}}, {"text": "22-1-81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21789, "end_char": 21796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,000/- each up to 22-1-81 on account of arrears of salary etc."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_826_840_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RADHAKANTA DEB & ANR.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS,\n\nORI SSA\n\nFebruary 13, 1981\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VARADARAJAN AND A. N. SnN, JJ.]\n\nPrivate v. Public endowments-Tests to deiennine on the facts of cacfi ca5e whether an endowment is of a private or oJ a public nature, explained.\n\nAllowing the appeal by ce11ificate, the Court\n\nHELD : The tests which provide sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case whether an endowment is of a private or of a pubiic nature are : ( 1) Where the origin of the endowment cannot be ascertained, the ques tion whether the user of the temple by members of the public is as of right; (2) The fact that the control and management vests either in a lnrge body of persons or in the members of the public and the founder does not retain any control over the management. Allied to this may be a circumstance where the evidence shows that there is provision for a scheme to be framed by associating the members of the public at large; (3) Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and t'he recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties ore dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature; ( 4) Where the evidence shows that the founder of the endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or contributions to be made by members of the public to the temple, this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the private nature of the endowment. [833 A-El\n\nDeoki Nandan v. Murlidhar, [1956] SCR 756; Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji\n\nv. S. P. Salli, Special Officer-inCharge of the Hindu Religious Trusts & Ors., [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 583; Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Ba/ajiwale v.\n\nGopal Vinayak Gosavi & Ors., [1960] 1 SCR 773; Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, [1971] 3 SCR 680, Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa Owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan v. The Charity Com1nissioner, State of Bombay, [1976] 3 SCR 518; Gurpur Guni Venkataraya Narasltima Prabhu & Ors. v. B. G. Achia, Assistant Commissioner, lli11du Endowment Mangalore & Anr., [1977] 3 SCC 17, followed.\n\nIn the instant case : (i) Ex. A. an ancient document executed as far back as February 18, 1895, the authenticity and the genuineness of which is beyond question, clearly and conclusively show that the endowment was of a private nature and the intention of the founder was merely to inste.l a famtly deity in the temple. (ii) The fact that the temple was of a massive structure of about 25 yards in height, by itself, divorced from other things, could not prove that the temple was a public one. (iii) The Shebaits or the Marfatdars were appointed by the founders of the. endowment and the entire management and control of the ten1ple \\v<tS retained by the family.\n\n(iv) The fact t'hat b'1ogs\n\n.r41\n\n.,-.\n\n• •\n\nwere offered during the day which \\\\-US in consonance with the rules observed A by the public is not of much consequence because bhogs are offered even in private temples.\n\n(v) aause 15 merely provides that if in future the family becomes extinct and no fit person could be found then any of the Baisnab Sarnpraday or any reputed Hindu of the village could take action, namely, to perform the work of the deity. This was a contingent provision and here also the founders did not confer the duty of performing all the work on the 1nembers of the public but they chose or selected only a particular person belonging B to a particular community which also shows that even if the fan1ily was to become extinct, the private nature of the endowment was not to be changed.\n\nIndeed if the intention was to instal the idol in the temple by way of a public endowment, clause. 14 would have clearly provided that in cnse the family become extinct the members of the public or of the brotherhood or the Government could have taken over the management.\n\nOn the other hand, the interpretation of the various clauses of the documents clearly shows that suffi C cient care has been taken by the Pani family to see that the dedication to the family deity is not changed even if the family becomes extinct. [833 H, 834 A, 838 G-H, 839 C, E-H, 840 A-Bl\n\nCxv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 318 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 31-7-1969 of the Orissa High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 78/58.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Appellant.\n\nG. S. Chatterjee for the Respondent. • The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Ar.1, J. This appeal by certificate granted under Art. 133 of the Constitution is directed against a Division Bench judgment dated July 31, 1969 of the Orissa High Court and arises in the following circumstances.\n\nThe appellants-plaintiffs had instituted a suit under s. 62 (2) of the Orissa Religious Endowment Act, 1939 (Act No. 4 of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') (this Act applies only to public endowments) to set aside the order dated 4-8-1950 of the respondentdefendant by which the temple of the appellants, whose deity was Radhakanta Deb, was declared to be a public temple and a trust and the endowment was held to be of a, public nature and, therefore, was to be governed by the Act. The Subordinate Judge decreed the appellants-plaintifis suit holding that the deity installed iu the temple was a family deity of the Pani family and the endowment being of a private nature, the Act had no application anrl the Order passed by the respondent regarding the management was set aside.\n\nThe Respondent (Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa) filed an appeal in the High Court against the decision of the\n\nSubordinate Judge which was heard by the Division Bench referred to above. The High Court reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and held that the temple and the deity installed therein being a public endowment fell within the four corners of the Act and the respondent was fully entitled to pass orders for its management.\n\nHence, this appeal by certificate before us.\n\nThe sole question that falls for determination in this appeal is as to whether or not the appellant-temple was a public endowment as alleged by the respondent or a family deity as alleged by the appellant.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants, P. K. Chatterjee, has submitted that the approach made by the High Court was wholly incorrect and it has misconstrued the evidence and documents produced in the case to show that the endowment was a private one and the deity installed in the temple was purely a family deity having nothing to do with the public.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the judgment of the High Court thaf the endowment was of a public nature.\n\nThe concept of a private endowment or a private trust is unknown to English law where all trusts are public trusts of a purely charitable and religious nature.\n\nThus, under the English law what is a public trust is only a form of Cla-itable Trust. Dr. Mukherjee in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (1952 Edition) has pointed out that in English law the Crown is the constitutional protector of all properties subject to charitable trusts as these trusts are essentially matters of public concern. The learned author has further pointed out that one fundamental distinction between English and Indian law lies in the fact that there can be religious trust of a private character under the Hindu law which is not possible in English law. It is well settled that under the Hindu Iliw, however, it is not only permissible but also very common to have private endowments which though are meant for charitable purposes yet fhe dominant intention of the founder is to instal a family deity in the temple and worship the same in order to effectuate the spiritual benefit to the family of the founders and his descendants and to perpetuate the memory of the founder.\n\nIn such cases, the property does not vest in God but in the beneficiaries who have installed the deity. In other words, the beneficiaries in a public trust are the general public or a section of the same and not a determinate body of individuals as a result of which the remedies for enforcement of charitable trust are somewhat different from those which can be availed of by beneficiaries in a private trust.\n\nThe members of the public may not be debarred\n\n• •\n\n.,,\n\nfrom entering the temple and worshipping the deity but their entry into the temple is not as of right. This is one of the cardinal tests of a private endowment.\n\nSimilarly, even the Mahomedan law recognises the existence of a private trust which is also of a charitable nature and which is generally called Waqf-allal-Aulad, where the ultimate benefit is reserved to God but the property vests in the beneficiaries and the income from the property is used for the maintenance and support of the family of the founder and his descendants. In case the family becomes extinct then the Waqf becomes a public waqf, the property vesting in God.\n\nA public Waqf under the Mahomedan law is called Waqf-fi-sabi-lil-lah.\n\nThe question as to whether the religious endowment is of a private nature or of a public nature has to be decided with reference to the facts proved in each case and it is difficult to lay down any test or tests which may be of universal application. It is manifest that where the endowment is lost in antiquity or shrouded in mystery, there being no document or revenue entry to prove its origin, the task of the court becomes diilicult and it has to rely merely on circumstantial evidence regarding the nature of the user of the temple. In the instant case, however, as there are two documents which clearly show the nature of the endowment, our task is rendered easier. It is well settled that the issue whether a religious endowment is a public or a private one must depend on the application of legal concept of a deity and private endowment, as may appear from the facts proved in each case. The essential distinction between a private and a public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specified individuals, in the latter they are the general public or class of unascertained people. This doctrine is well-known and has been accepted by the Privy Council as also by this Court in a large catena of authorities. This being the essential distinction between the nature of a public or a private endowment, it follows that one of the crucial tests to determine the nature of the endowment would be to find out if the management of the property dedicated is in the hands of the strangers or members of the public or in the hands of the founders or their descendants.\n\nOther factors that may be considered would be the nature of right of the worshippers, that is to say, whether the right to worship in the temple is exercised as of right and not as a matter of concession. This will be the strongest possible circumstance to indicate that the endowment was a public one and the beneficiaries are the worshippers and not particular family. After all, an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and the property dedicated to the temple vests in the deity. If the main worshippers are the members of the public who worship as a matter of right then the real purpose is to confer benefit on God.\n\nSome of the circumstances from which a public endowment can be inferred may be whether an endowment is made by a person who has\n\n110 issue and who after installing the deity entrusts the management to members of the public or strangers which is a clear proof of the intention to dedicate the temple to public and not to the members of the\n\n8 family. Where, however, it is proved that the intention of the testator or the founder was to dedicate the temple merely for the benefit of the members of the family or their descendants, the endowment would be of a private nature.\n\nThe mere fact that members of the public are allowed to worship by itself would not make an endowment public unless it is proved that the members of the public had a right to worship in the temple. In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar(') this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"The distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former the beneciaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the general public or a class D thereof.\n\nWhile in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment.\n\nThe cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertainql group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.\" (Emphasis supplied)\n\nThis view was reiterated in a later decision of this Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, Special Officer-In-Charge of the Hindu Religious Trusts & Ors.(2) where S. K. Das, J. as he then was, speak- H ing for the Court clarified the law thus :\n\n(1) [1956] S.C.R. 756.\n\n(2) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 583.\n\n...\n\n\"But the most usual and commonest fonn of a private A religious trust is one created for the worship of a family idol ln which the public are not interested ...... Dealing with\n\nth(\\ distinction between public and private endowments ln Hindu law, Sir Dinshah Mulla has said at p. 529 of his principles of Hindu Law (!Ith edition)\n\n'Religious endowments are either public or private. In a public endowment the dedication is for the use or benefit of the public.\n\nWhen property is set apart for the worship of a family god in which the public are not interested the endowments is a private one'.\"\n\nIn Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Ba/ajiwale v.\n\nGopal Vinayak Gosavi & Ors.(') the same principles were reiterated and it was pointed out that the entries made in the Inam Register showing the nature of the endowment were entitled to great weight and taken with the vastness of the temple, the mode of its construction, the long user by the public as of right and grants by Rulers and other persons were clear pointers to the fact that the endowment was of a public nature.\n\nIn the case of Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das,(') this Court laid down some important tests to detennine the nature of the endowment.\n\nIn this connection, the folc\n\nlowing observations need specific mention :- E\n\n\"Therefore, evidence that sadhus and other persons visiting the temple are given food and shelter is not by itself indicative of the temple being a public temple or its properties being subject to a public trust.\n\nEvidence that the mahants used to celebrate Hlndn festivals when members of the public used to attend the temple and give offerings and that the public were admitted to the temple for darshan and worship is also not indicative of the temple being one for the benefit of the public .... The fact that members of the public used to come to !he temple without any hindrance also does not necessarily mean that the temple is a public temple, for members of the public do attend private temples. . ... Yet, the Privy Council held that the general effect of the evidence was that the lamily had treated the temple as family property and !he mete fact of the members of the public having come to the temple and having made offerings and the mela having been held which\n\n(I) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 773\n\n(2) [1971]3 S.C.R.680\n\nA gave popularity to the temple and increased its esteem in the eyes of the public and the fact that they were never turned away were not enough to hold the temple and the properties as a public trust.\n\nThus, the mere fact of the public having been freely admitted to that temple cannot mean that courtbs should readily infer therefrom dedication to the public. The value of such public user as evidence of dedication depends on the circumstances which give strength to the inference that the user was as of right.\"\n\nIt may thus be noticed that this Court has invariably held that the mere fact that the members of the public used to visit the temple for the purpose of worship without any hindrance or freely admitted therein would not be a clear indication of the nature of the endowment. It is manifest that whenever a dedication is made for religious purposes and a deity installed in a temple, the worship of the deity is a necessary concomitant of the installation of the deity, and therefore, the mere factum of worship would not determine the nature of the endowment. Indeed if it is proved that the worship by the members of the public is as of right that may be a circumstance which may in some cases conclusively establish that the endowment was of a public nature. In Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa Owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan v. The Charity Commissioner State of Bombay(') all the aforesaid cases were summarised and the principles indicated above were reiterated.\n\nIn Gurpur Guni Venkataraya Narashima Prabhu & Ors. v. B. G.\n\nAchin, Assistant Commissioner, Hindu Endowment, Mangalore & Anr.( 2) Krishna Iyer, J., reiterated these very principles in the following words :\n\n\"The Jaw is now well settled that 'the mere fact of the public having been freely admitted to the temple cannot mean that courts should readily infer therefrom dedication to the public. The value of such public user as evidence of dedication depends on the circumstances which give strength to the inference that the user was as of right'. (See Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das-[1971] 3 SCR 680, 689).\"\n\n\n(2) [1977) 3 s.c.c. 17\n\n•,.\n\nI I\n\nThus, on a conspectus of the authorities mentioned above, the A following tests may be !aid down as providing sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case whether an endowment is of a private or of a public nature :\n\n( !) Where the origin of the endowment cannot be ascertained,\n\nthe question whether the user of the temple by members B of the public is as of right;\n\n(2) Tue fact that the control and management vests either in a large body of persons or in the members of the public and the founder does not retain any control over the management. Allied to this may be a circumstance where the evidence shows that there is provision for a C scheme to be framed by associating the members of the pnbllc at large;\n\n(3) Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the D temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature.\n\n( 4) Where the evidence shows that the founder of the E endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or contributions to be made by members of the public to the temple, this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the private nature of the endowment.\n\nFortunately, in this case there are two important documents Ext.\n\nF ,,; A and Ext. 1-from which the nature of the endowment can be clearly spelt out and we would examine these documents in the light of the tests and the principles enunciated above because after going through the judgment of the High Court we are satisfied that the High Court has not properly construed some of the important features contained in the documents and the evidence and has in fact overlooked certain important aspects which completely negative the fact that the endowment was of a public nature.\n\nExt. A is an ancient document executed as far back as February 18, 1895.\n\nThe authenticity and the genuineness of this document is beyond question and the High Court itself has described this document as a document which has created the present endowment.\n\nEven though the document may not be treated. as having itself\n\n6-214 SCI/81\n\nA created the endowment bnt it gives clear indlcation that the endow ment was created near about the date when this document was exe cuted. Some of the extracts of this document which are nndisputed, in our opinion, clearly and conclusively show that the endowment was of a private nature and the intention of the founder was merely\n\nto instal a family deity in the temple. In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way. For the proper management of the deity's property and the Sebapuja of the deity in future, we lay down the following directions out of our own accord.\n\nE :.-.\n\n1. .... we hereby appoint the said Adwait Charan Das Babaji, Sutradhari Gaudeswar Sampraday Baisnab by caste, worship and Sebapuja of the deity by profession as the Tatwabadharak and Se bait and hereby (appoint) him by this trust deed and we become aloof from those duties E vesting in him the following properties of the deity . ...\n\n2. From this day the said Babaji will manage all the immovable and movable properties of the deity as the Sebait and Tatwabadharak.\n\nHe will realise the usufructs of the property and after g.Ving the rent of the lands, he will manage the day-to-day Bhog and the festivities of the deity well according to the previous customs and rules and in the way we were doing and will keep the surplus amount in the store of the deity.\n\n3. Tbe day-to-day Bhoga and the festivities of the deity will be done according to the income of the properties of the deity and will never exceed the said income.\n\n4. The said Babaji cannot incur any loan on behalf of the deity nor can he sell, mortgage, keep as surety or trust\n\n' r\n\n• •\n\n• '\n\nany of the immovable or movable properties iwr can he A misappropriate any cash kind ornament or utensils of the deity.\n\n6. If the said Babaji does anything contrary to the conditions laid down in items 4 & 5 written above he Will beremoved from his right of Sebaitship and Tatwabadharakship by us or our heirs who will appoint another fit man in his place and take the charge of all the properties in the store of the deity .. ...\n\n9. As the properties maintained herein have been endowed to the deity before, we or our successors had or will have IW claim on this and any such claim made, shall be void.\n\n11. Now or in future the man appointed as Tatwabadharak will work according to rules and directions mentioned herein and for the Sebapuja of the deity the directions and the menus are determined here for all days to come. 12 ..... All other necessary expenses of the Jatra\n\n(festivals) repairing of the temple, utensils and the oma- E ments of the deity, etc. will be done according to the income.\n\n14. Any pious man of our family at present and in future will see whether the work of the deity is being performed according to the direction as aforesaid by the F appointed Tatwabadharak and will take proper action as mentioned above.\n\n14. If in future there be no fit man in our family, any of the Baisnab Sampraday and any Hindu of reputation of the village and of the locality is entitled to take such action, we have no obiection to this.\" G (Emphasis supplied) The intention which can be gathered from this document is placed beyond doubt by a later document Ext. 1 which was executed on 17-11-1932 and is in the nature of a settlement Deed, the relevant portions of whch may be quoted thus :- H \"Our foref.1thers for the good of our family by making the family deity Sri Radhakanta Deb Thakur, erecting a\n\ntemple befitting. His installation, installing Him therein and endowing the landed properties as described in the schedule below, used to carry out all the Sebap11ia work of the deity in orderly manner by meeting the expenses from out of the income and yield of the said properties ...... As the said Lalit Charan Das and Raghunath Pani a person of our family together misappropriated by utilising the income and yield of the properties of the deity in illegal expenditures and without carrying on the Sebapuja work in proper manlier caused heavy damage to the movable and immovable nroperties of the deity in different unfair means, we have removed them from Sebapuja work of the deity and also from management and custody of the deity's properties. . . If the work of the deity is carried on for some time more in the manner in which the work is being managed now. then the temple established by our forefathers as a mark of pride of our family and all the Debuttor properties of the deity will be destroyed in toto and the noble glory of the forefathers will perish . . . . . .\n\nWe by this deed of trustee order determination appointed you as trustee for the Sebapuja work of our family deity Shri Radhakanta Deb Thakur and for the work of looking after His properties, according to the following conditions and terms, so that from today onwards on the strength of this deed of trustee order determination you from Chela to Bara chela by carrying on the Sebapuja, offerings, religious ceremonies and festivals and by preserving and looking after all the debuttor properties, realise the income and yield therefrom according to convenience. ..\n\n10. If we or any body amongst us misappropriate any money or property by taking secretly from the tenants or borrowers, we and our successors will be liable for punhhment according to criminal Jaw and you can realise any compensation you intend to -take either mutually or with the help of the court. We and our sons and grandsons shall be bound and liable to pay. .. •:•\n\n22. But if you might have obtained, any amount on Joan against the income of the debuttor property and anything that you might have spent from your own pocket for the improvement of the deity of the muth and to save the property, we will be bound and liable to repay the said\n\n' '\n\namount alongwith just aud prescribed rate of interest, and we shall repay. If we do not repay voluntarily you and JIPUr successors will realise from us and from our and from our sou's and grandsons' existing and to be acquired movable and immovabb properties and from the existing and to be acquired debuttor properties of the deity according to law.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied) Considering the iwo documents together the fundamental features, which fiow from the recitals extracted above, may be summarised as follows:-\n\n(1) That the deity was installed in the temple purely as c a family deity and the dedication M.s made only for a group of individuals who may be connected with the family of the Panis who were the founders of the deity.\n\nThis clearly establishes that the intention of the founders was to dedicate their properties and instal the deity in the temple only for purposes D of the Pani family, and their descendants.\n\nA peruial of the recitals extracted above would unmistakably show that there can be no two opinions on this question.\n\n(2) Extensive private properties belonging to the Pani family alone were dedicated for the maintenance of the temple and the deity and there is nothing to show that any contribution was called for from members of the public nor is there auy averment in the deed to show that there was any stipulation for taking offerings from the members of the public to worship in the temple.\n\n(3) There was no provision for framing any scheme by associating the members of the public or consulting them.\n\nIn fact, Ext. 1 shows that even after the descendants of the founders had fallen on evil days and were not in a position to provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of the temple yet they appointed\n\nUdayanath Pattanayak to manage the affairs of the deity and bound themselves personally to reimburse the Manager for any out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with the maintenance of the temple.\n\nThis circumstance manifestly proves that the endowment was of a purely private nature right from the time it was created till 1932 when the management\n\n(4)\n\nwas changed and continned to be of the same nature . . Indeed, the personal undertaking contained in Ext. 1 clearly shows that there was never any intenlion to treat the temple as a public one but the intention was, if at all, to continue it in the name of the family so long as the family continued. ~\n\n' Thero is no recital in any of the documents to show that the members of the public or the,1 villagers of the place where the temple was si(Uated were entitled to worship as of right.\n\nOn the other hand, PWs 1 to 6 who were examined by ' the appellants-plaintiffs have categorically stated\n\n1 that members of the public were not allowed to wotship in the temple as of right.\n\nIn this connection FW 1 stated as follows :-\n\n\"Members of the public have no right to\n\n1 have Darsan of, or to offer bhog to the deity.\n\nThe villagers do not make Kirtan before the deity or\n\n' take any part in any festivity of the deity. , The deity has no Bahari Jatra. No member of the public made any gift to the deity.\n\nNo khairat is ever given.\n\nThe properties of the Thakur are all\n\n(sic) with rent.\"\n\nPW. 5 stated that the disputed deity was instailed by the family of the other Panis and not by his ancestors and that the deity was not their family deity and was not dedicated to the public. As against this oral evidence, the defence examined DW 1, Raghunath Pani, whose evidence has been rejected both by the Trial court F and the High Court.\n\nThus, apart frOlll the unimpeachable documentary evidence discussed above, even the oral evidence to prove -..-.._ that the endoWlllent was of a private nature is clear and has not been rebutted by the defence.\n\nIn this state of the evidence we are indeed surprised to find how the High Court could ho!P that the endoWlllent was, of a public nature.\n\nThe High Court seems to have been carried away by factors or considerations which are of a very minor nature and by themselves do not prove that the endowment was of a public nature. For instance, one of the circumstances that weighed with the High Court was that the temple was a massive structure of about 25 yards in U height.\n\nThat by itself, divorced from other things, could not prove that the temple was a public one.\n\nSo far as the oral evidence is concerned, the High Court observed thus :\n\n\"Apart from the above features disclosed by the oral evidence which are indicative of the institution having been treated as a public one. the recitals in some of the clauses of the two documents.-(Exts. A & 1) also unequivocally indicate an intention of dedication in favour of public.\"\n\nThese observations are not at all borne out by the evidence of PWs. 1 to 5 which is the only oral evidence led in the case, the evidence of DW 1 having been rejected by the trial court as also the High Court.\n\nThe High Court took into consideration the fact\n\nthat certain properties were neded for the maintenance of the c temple and Seba-puja and other ceremonies were being performed by the Shebaits and Marfatdars.\n\nThe High Court overlooked the fact that Shebait or the Marfatdars were appointed by the founders of the endowment and the entire management and control of the temple was retained by the family.\n\nWe are unable to agree as to how in these circwnstances could it be said that the endowment wa~ D of a public nature.\n\nAnother circumstance that weighed with the High Court was that bhogs were offered during the day which,· according to the High Court, was in consonance with the rules observed by the public. 1 his circumstai; ce also is not of much consequence because bhogs are offered even in private temples.\n\nThe High Court also seems to have relied on clause 15 of Ext. A to come to its decision that the endowment was of a public nature. The High Court was\n\nof the view that under this clause in certain contingencies any member of the Vaishnav sect or Hindu resident of the village was F authorised to exercise the powers and functions mentioned in clause 7 of the deed.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with the interpretation placed by the High Court on clause 15 of Ext. A.\n\nClause 15 merely provides that if in future the family becomes extinct and no fit person could be found then any of the Baisnab Sampraday or any reputed Hindu of the village could take action, G namely, to perform the work of the deity.\n\nThis was a contingent provision and here also the founders did not confer the duty of performing all the work on the members of the public but they chose or selected only a particular person belonging to a particular community which als0 shows that even if the family was to becomel extinct, the private nature of the endowment was not to be chang- H ed.\n\nIndeed if the intention was to instal the idol in the temple by way of a public endowment, clause 15 would have clearly provided\n\nthat in case the family became extinct the members of the public or of the brotherhood or the Government could have taken over the management.\n\nOn the other hand, the interpretation of the various clauses of the documents clearly shows that sufficient care has been taken by the Pani family to sec that the dedication to the family deity is not changed even if the family becomes extinct.\n\nHaving, therefore, carefully perused the oral and the documentary evidence in the case we are satisfied that the COlllClusions arrived at by the High Court are wrong and are based on misinterpretation of Ext. A and Ext. 1 and misreading of the oral evidence led in the case, which, as we have shown, runs counter to the C conclusions arrived at by the High Court.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, decree the plaintiffs-appellants suit and restore the judgment of the trial court. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, the appellants will be entitled to costs of the appeal in this Court quantified at Rs. 4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only).\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal Qllowed.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "RADHAKANTA DEB & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Radhakanta Deb Thakur", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS,\n\nORI SSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS, ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 13, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 94, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS,\n\nORI SSA\n\nFebruary 13, 1981\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VARADARAJAN AND A. N. SnN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1960] 1 SCR 773", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1962, "end_char": 1978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 3 SCR 680", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2050, "end_char": 2066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 SCR 518", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Baisnab Sarnpraday", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3366, "end_char": 3384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(v) aause 15 merely provides that if in future the family becomes extinct and no fit person could be found then any of the Baisnab Sarnpraday or any reputed Hindu of the village could take action, namely, to perform the work of the deity.", "canonical_name": "Baisnab Sarnpraday"}}, {"text": "clause. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3928, "end_char": 3938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4518, "end_char": 4535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Decree dated 31-7-1969 of the Orissa High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4579, "end_char": 4595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Rathin Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4632, "end_char": 4648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondent. •", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "FAZAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4715, "end_char": 4720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Ar.1, J. This appeal by certificate granted under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4771, "end_char": 4779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4989, "end_char": 4994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Religious Endowment Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5006, "end_char": 5042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Radhakanta Deb", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5267, "end_char": 5281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') (this Act applies only to public endowments) to set aside the order dated 4-8-1950 of the respondentdefendant by which the temple of the appellants, whose deity was Radhakanta Deb, was declared to be a public temple and a trust and the endowment was held to be of a, public nature and, therefore, was to be governed by the Act.", "canonical_name": "Radhakanta Deb Thakur"}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6486, "end_char": 6502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellants, P. K. Chatterjee, has submitted that the approach made by the High Court was wholly incorrect and it has misconstrued the evidence and documents produced in the case to show that the endowment was a private one and the deity installed in the temple was purely a family deity having nothing to do with the public.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7186, "end_char": 7195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Mukherjee in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (1952 Edition) has pointed out that in English law the Crown is the constitutional protector of all properties subject to charitable trusts as these trusts are essentially matters of public concern."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13669, "end_char": 13678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emphasis supplied)\n\nThis view was reiterated in a later decision of this Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, Special Officer-In-Charge of the Hindu Religious Trusts & Ors.(2) where S. K. Das, J. as he then was, speak- H ing for the Court clarified the law thus :\n\n(1) [1956] S.C.R. 756."}}, {"text": "Dinshah Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14064, "end_char": 14077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\n\"But the most usual and commonest fonn of a private A religious trust is one created for the worship of a family idol ln which the public are not interested ...... Dealing with\n\nth(\\ distinction between public and private endowments ln Hindu law, Sir Dinshah Mulla has said at p. 529 of his principles of Hindu Law (!"}}, {"text": "[1960] 1 S.C.R. 773", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16113, "end_char": 16132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17781, "end_char": 17793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) Krishna Iyer, J., reiterated these very principles in the following words :\n\n\"The Jaw is now well settled that 'the mere fact of the public having been freely admitted to the temple cannot mean that courts should readily infer therefrom dedication to the public."}}, {"text": "[1971] 3 SCR 680", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18272, "end_char": 18288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 18, 1895", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20413, "end_char": 20430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A is an ancient document executed as far back as February 18, 1895."}}, {"text": "Gopinath Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21218, "end_char": 21231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Bhagyarathi Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21243, "end_char": 21259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Alekha Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21261, "end_char": 21272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Dinabandhu Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21284, "end_char": 21299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Basudeo Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21324, "end_char": 21336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "N arsinha Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21341, "end_char": 21355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Balabhadra Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21366, "end_char": 21381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Padhakanta Deb", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21435, "end_char": 21449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way.", "canonical_name": "Radhakanta Deb Thakur"}}, {"text": "Tanki Bajyapati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21553, "end_char": 21568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Tanki Baheli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21570, "end_char": 21582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Kharida Swata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21587, "end_char": 21600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to fortify our conclusions, it may be necessary to give certain important recitals from this document which may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That I Gopinath Pani, my father Bhagyarathi Pani, Alekha Pani, father of Dinabandhu Pani and father's brother of Basudeo Pani and N arsinha Pani father of Balabhadra Pani-minor, having made the image of our family deity Sri Padhakanta Deb installed it in a temple which was built by them in Depur Sasan in Pipli Division and they endowed the Tanki Bajyapati, Tanki Baheli and Kharida Swata properties given below from the usufruct of which day-to-day Sibapuja and J anijatra of the deity was managed by them as the Sebait and Marfatdar and we are also managing in the same way."}}, {"text": "Adwait Charan Das Babaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21984, "end_char": 22008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we hereby appoint the said Adwait Charan Das Babaji, Sutradhari Gaudeswar Sampraday Baisnab by caste, worship and Sebapuja of the deity by profession as the Tatwabadharak and Se bait and hereby (appoint) him by this trust deed and we become aloof from those duties E vesting in him the following properties of the deity . ..."}}, {"text": "Sutradhari Gaudeswar Sampraday Baisnab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22010, "end_char": 22048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we hereby appoint the said Adwait Charan Das Babaji, Sutradhari Gaudeswar Sampraday Baisnab by caste, worship and Sebapuja of the deity by profession as the Tatwabadharak and Se bait and hereby (appoint) him by this trust deed and we become aloof from those duties E vesting in him the following properties of the deity . ..."}}, {"text": "Babaji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22310, "end_char": 22316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From this day the said Babaji will manage all the immovable and movable properties of the deity as the Sebait and Tatwabadharak.", "canonical_name": "Babaji"}}, {"text": "Babaji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22887, "end_char": 22893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Babaji cannot incur any loan on behalf of the deity nor can he sell, mortgage, keep as surety or trust\n\n' r\n\n• •\n\n• '\n\nany of the immovable or movable properties iwr can he A misappropriate any cash kind ornament or utensils of the deity.", "canonical_name": "Babaji"}}, {"text": "Tatwabadharakship", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23280, "end_char": 23297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the said Babaji does anything contrary to the conditions laid down in items 4 & 5 written above he Will beremoved from his right of Sebaitship and Tatwabadharakship by us or our heirs who will appoint another fit man in his place and take the charge of all the properties in the store of the deity .. ...\n\n9.", "canonical_name": "Tatwabadharakship"}}, {"text": "Tatwabadharak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23655, "end_char": 23668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now or in future the man appointed as Tatwabadharak will work according to rules and directions mentioned herein and for the Sebapuja of the deity the directions and the menus are determined here for all days to come.", "canonical_name": "Tatwabadharakship"}}, {"text": "Baisnab Sampraday", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24312, "end_char": 24329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If in future there be no fit man in our family, any of the Baisnab Sampraday and any Hindu of reputation of the village and of the locality is entitled to take such action, we have no obiection to this.\"", "canonical_name": "Baisnab Sarnpraday"}}, {"text": "17-11-1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24606, "end_char": 24616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 which was executed on 17-11-1932 and is in the nature of a settlement Deed, the relevant portions of whch may be quoted thus :- H \"Our foref.1thers for the good of our family by making the family deity Sri Radhakanta Deb Thakur, erecting a\n\ntemple befitting."}}, {"text": "Radhakanta Deb Thakur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24790, "end_char": 24811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 which was executed on 17-11-1932 and is in the nature of a settlement Deed, the relevant portions of whch may be quoted thus :- H \"Our foref.1thers for the good of our family by making the family deity Sri Radhakanta Deb Thakur, erecting a\n\ntemple befitting.", "canonical_name": "Radhakanta Deb Thakur"}}, {"text": "Lalit Charan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25126, "end_char": 25142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His installation, installing Him therein and endowing the landed properties as described in the schedule below, used to carry out all the Sebap11ia work of the deity in orderly manner by meeting the expenses from out of the income and yield of the said properties ...... As the said Lalit Charan Das and Raghunath Pani a person of our family together misappropriated by utilising the income and yield of the properties of the deity in illegal expenditures and without carrying on the Sebapuja work in proper manlier caused heavy damage to the movable and immovable nroperties of the deity in different unfair means, we have removed them from Sebapuja work of the deity and also from management and custody of the deity's properties. . ."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Pani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25147, "end_char": 25161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His installation, installing Him therein and endowing the landed properties as described in the schedule below, used to carry out all the Sebap11ia work of the deity in orderly manner by meeting the expenses from out of the income and yield of the said properties ...... As the said Lalit Charan Das and Raghunath Pani a person of our family together misappropriated by utilising the income and yield of the properties of the deity in illegal expenditures and without carrying on the Sebapuja work in proper manlier caused heavy damage to the movable and immovable nroperties of the deity in different unfair means, we have removed them from Sebapuja work of the deity and also from management and custody of the deity's properties. . ."}}, {"text": "Chela", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26243, "end_char": 26248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We by this deed of trustee order determination appointed you as trustee for the Sebapuja work of our family deity Shri Radhakanta Deb Thakur and for the work of looking after His properties, according to the following conditions and terms, so that from today onwards on the strength of this deed of trustee order determination you from Chela to Bara chela by carrying on the Sebapuja, offerings, religious ceremonies and festivals and by preserving and looking after all the debuttor properties, realise the income and yield therefrom according to convenience. .."}}, {"text": "Bara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26252, "end_char": 26256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We by this deed of trustee order determination appointed you as trustee for the Sebapuja work of our family deity Shri Radhakanta Deb Thakur and for the work of looking after His properties, according to the following conditions and terms, so that from today onwards on the strength of this deed of trustee order determination you from Chela to Bara chela by carrying on the Sebapuja, offerings, religious ceremonies and festivals and by preserving and looking after all the debuttor properties, realise the income and yield therefrom according to convenience. .."}}, {"text": "Panis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27821, "end_char": 27826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis supplied) Considering the iwo documents together the fundamental features, which fiow from the recitals extracted above, may be summarised as follows:-\n\n(1) That the deity was installed in the temple purely as c a family deity and the dedication M.s made only for a group of individuals who may be connected with the family of the Panis who were the founders of the deity."}}, {"text": "Udayanath Pattanayak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28870, "end_char": 28890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 shows that even after the descendants of the founders had fallen on evil days and were not in a position to provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of the temple yet they appointed\n\nUdayanath Pattanayak to manage the affairs of the deity and bound themselves personally to reimburse the Manager for any out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with the maintenance of the temple."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Pani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30570, "end_char": 30584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against this oral evidence, the defence examined DW 1, Raghunath Pani, whose evidence has been rejected both by the Trial court F and the High Court."}}, {"text": "Shebait", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32265, "end_char": 32272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court overlooked the fact that Shebait or the Marfatdars were appointed by the founders of the endowment and the entire management and control of the temple was retained by the family."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32879, "end_char": 32888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33178, "end_char": 33186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33286, "end_char": 33295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33308, "end_char": 33317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33993, "end_char": 34002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_841_849_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "...\n\n.. '\n\nOM PRAKASH SUD ETC. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF J & K & ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nFebruary 16, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.] B\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article 14-Allotment of resin-Industrial pa/icy decision of State-Object of-Balanced economic and regional development of State--Selection of quota seekers-Article 14 wltetlier violated.\n\nThe petitioners in their writ petitions to this Court alleged that they were C carrying on small scale industries for the manufacture of resin and turpentine oil and that they applied to the Government for allotment of resin for their industries but the Government referring to their policy decision of March 20, 1978 refused to make any allotment, \"'1d that they purchased raw material from the open market and managed to run their industries. They further alleged that while they were refused allotment of supply of raw-materials, the State, respondent No. 1 made allotments to respondent nos. 4 to 16 D although most of them were not even formally resistered at the time of 111llking tho impugned orders of allotment and that they were consequently adversely discriminated against, while respondent nos. 4 to 16 were favoured and as such the impugned orders of allotment were liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.\n\nThe State, respondent No. 1 contested the writ petition, denied the E material allegations of the petitioners and alleged th<>t the allocations were made in conformity with the State Industrial Policy decision of securing the balanced economic and regional development of the State: that there wa~ a preponderance of industries in the Jammu Region, and that the industries of the petitioners as well as respondent nos. 4 t'o 16 were also functioning in that region.\n\nAllotments of resin were made districtwise, 110 applications were received and considered and aUotment was made to respondents nos. 4 F to 16.\n\nOn the question whether the orders Of the 1st respondent allotting quotas of resin to respondent nos. 4 to 16 were arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nHELD: l(i) Respondent No. 1 has not explained as to bow and on what basis if any, the allotments were made by the impugned orders in favour of the new allottees respondent nos. 4 to 16 whose industries were located in the Jammu region. [847 CJ\n\n(ii) Although the State Government has taken reli•nce on the State\n\n\" Industrial Policy decision, it does not appear to have followed it in practice, ' except in the cases of five respondents. No reasonable basi1 bad been H adopted in making the allotments in favour of the new allottoes and denying the allotments to tho petitionol'I. [849 E-FJ\n\n2. The rule of equality does not mean mathematical equality. It permits of practical inequalities.\n\nWhat is needed is that the selection of quota seckeJS as in the instant case should have a rational rela•tion to the object sought to be achieved in the industrial policy decision of the State. If the selection or differentiation is arbitrary and lacks a rational basis it offends Article 14. [849 DJ\n\n3. \"Equaolity before the Law\" or \"equal protection of the laws'' within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India means absence Of any arbitrary discrimination by the law or in. their administration. No undue favour to one or hostile discrimination to another should be shown. A classi fication is reasonable when it is not an arbitrary selection but rests on differences pertinent to the subject in respect of which the classification is made. The classification permissible must be based on some real and subs- C tantial distinction, a just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained and cannot be made arbitrary and without any substantial basis.\n\n[848 H-849 A]\n\nState of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, [1952] SCR 284 referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 3464-65, 5908 & 3231 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. N. Kacker, K. N. Bhatt and Surendara Raju for the Petitioners in W. P. Nos. 3464-65/80 and 5908/80.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, E. C. Agarwala, R. Satish and V. K. Pandita for E the Petitioner in WP 3231/80.\n\nL. N. Sinha, Att Genl and Altaf Ahmed fur R. 1. in WPs 3464- 65/80.\n\nY. S. Chitaley and Vineet Kumar for R. 14 in WP 3231/80 and for R. 2 in WPs 3464-65 /80.\n\nR R. P. Bhatt ; md N. R. Chaudhary for R. 4 in WP 3464/80.\n\nP. R. Mridul and Naunit Lal for R. 7 in WP 3231/80 and for R. 2 in WP 3464-65 /80.\n\nAnil Dev Singh and Ashok Grover for R. 15 in WP 3231/80 and R. 3 in WPs 3464-65/80\n\nG S. K. Bhattacharya and Suresh Sethi for RR. 6 and 12 in WP 3464- 65 /80.\n\nSatish Vij for R. 15 in WP 3464-3465/80.\n\nS. Balakrishnan and S. K. Bhattacharya for R. 16 in WP No. 3231/ 80.\n\nH The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J.-'By these writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioners have challenged the orders of the\n\n~ ..\n\n• ,\n\n' •\n\n• '\n\nfirst respondent (the State of Jammu and Kashmir) allotting quotas of A resin to respondents.\n\nAccording to the petitioners these orders denying similar treatment to them are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.\n\n2. The material facts in the four petitions are similar. The industries of which the petitioners are partners are admittedly small scale in- B dustries for the manufacture of resin and turpentine oil. The industries of the petitioners' in Writ Petitions Nos. 3465 of 1980 and 3231 of 1980 were provisionally registered but revalidated for short periods.\n\nThe industry of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3464 of 1980 was provisionally registered, revalidation was applied for but was not granted. The industry of the petitioner in.Writ Petition No. 5908 o!f 1980 C was formally registered. It appears that the petitioners were applying to the Government for allotment of resin as well as raw material for their industries but the Government referring to their policy decision of March 20, 1978 refused to make any allotment of Oleo resin to them.\n\nThe petitioners i, n Writ Petition Nos. 3464 and 5908 of 1980 have alleged that they purchased raw-material from the open market and D somehow managed their industries to run for a certain period.\n\n3. Resin is admittedly a forest product extracted from \"Chir trees\".\n\nIt has been alleged that only three States of India, namely, Himachal\n\nPradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir have Chir forests.\n\nThe petitioners have alleged that the State of Himachal Pradesh and E Uttar Pradesh stopped selling resin for the last several years in view of establishment of factories in public and joint sectors and that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was selling resin by public auction. Sometime after October 1978 the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it has been further alleged, virtually created monopoly in favour of three existing industrial units and committed to supply them about 17,000 M. T. of F resin for long time to come.\n\nThere is a public sector unit in J ammu which consumes about 3,000 tons of resin per year. Several small scale industries, according to petitioners, were assured supply of resin even as late as 1979 notwithstanding the Government's aforesaid industrial policy. In such a situation, being unable to procure raw-materials for their industries, the petitioners approached the relevant authorities G including the Deputy Minister of Industry and the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir for allotment of raw-materials but to no avail. (For the sake of convenience we shall hereinafter refer only to the respondents and Annexures in W. P. No. 3231of1980). The petitioners further allege that while they we.re refused allotment of supply of raw- H materials, respondent No. 1 made allotments to respondents No. 4 to 16 (hereinafter called \"allottee respondents\") although most of them\n\nwere not even formally registered at the time of making the impugned orders of allotment.\n\nThe petitioners contend that in the circumstances they were adversely discriminated against while respondents Nos. 4 to 16 were favoured and as such the impugned orders are liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.\n\n4. The impugned orders have been annexed as Annexures N to\n\nZ-1.\n\nThe letter of allotment (Annexure 'X') in favour of M/s. Sud Pine Industries (respondent No. 27) is in the following terms:-\n\n\"Sub : Supply of resin to M/s. Sud Pine Inc!ustries Kunc wani for their factory at Talab Jammu.\n\nGovermnent Order No. 175 DIC/1980 dated 30-5-1980.\n\nIn partial modification of Government order No. 2. DIC of 1979 dated 20-1-1979 sanction is accorded to the SU[lply of crude (oleo) resin 700 tonnes per annum by the Forest Deptt. to Ml s. Sud Pine D Industries for their factory at Kunjwani Talab Jammu on the terms and conditions specified in the above said order. The supply of resin shall be subject to its being reviewed by the Govermnent with due regards to its availability from year to year.\n\nBy order of the Govt. of J &K.\n\nSd/-\n\n(Sheikh Ghulam Rasool) Secretary to Government.\"\n\nThe orders as per annexures L to W in favour of respondents 17 to 26 are identical in material parts. It will be sufficient if the material portion of Annexure N is quoted. It runs thus.\n\n\"Sanction is accorded to the supply of crude (oleo) resin by the Forest Department to M/s. Kashmir R & T Works, Srinagar, for their factory at Srinagar, subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement to be entered into between the Forest Department and the party and on the following specific conditions :-\n\n1. The Forest Department will supply Crude (oleo) resin @ 700 TPA to the firm from the date the Unit is formally registered subject to its being reviewed with due regard to its availability from year to year;\n\n2. The resin will be supplied @ Rs. 320/- per quintal, A unless otherwise reviewed on year to year basis.\n\n3. The cost of empty tin will be charged @ Rs. 5/- per tin in addition to the above rate;\n\n4. By order of the Government at Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nSd/- Sheikh Ghulam Rasool Secretary to Government.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\n5. n is obvious that the industries of these respondents were not formally registered at the time of the impugned orders of allotment.\n\n6. The State of Jammu and Kashmir (Respondent No. 1) have filed a counter affidavit. They have not denied the material allegations of the petitioners but they say that the allocations have been made in order to implement the industrial policy of the State Government as enunciated in a \"Report of the Development Review Committee, Jammu and Kashmir\" a committee headed by Shri L. K. Jha, the Governor of the State. Respondent No. 1 has quoted from the report the 'Goals' of the industrial policy which read :\n\n\"The balanced economic development of the State will obviously, be one of the foremost concerns of the Government.\n\nThey would like to emphasis maximum self-sufficiency and self-reliance consistently with the need to promote the requisite and desirable degree of inter-dependence with other parts of the country.\n\nThe objective will be to secure the most prudent and beneficial utilization of the natural resources and skills peculiar to this State; to achieve the maximum possible rate of economic growth, consistently with the need to secure a degree of balanced regional development as well as balance between the rural areas and the urban, to maximise State per capita income, and to generate the maximum employment potential.\n\nMany areas of the State are as cut off, isolated and poor as they were at the dawn of independence.\n\nWe have to improve the living standards in these specially backward areas for whom in terms of the quickost mode of transportation, Srinagar is more distant than the State is from Kerala.\n\nMany sections of the community similarly, like Scheduled Castes; Guiara and Bakarwalas and other hackward class need to be assisted in their speedy uplift.\n\nA Ladakh needs 11 visible acceleration of the tempo of its development so that our people in this far flung and difficult frontier area can realise the full fruits of development in the\n\nshorte~! possible time.\"\n\nRespondent No. 1 has given the district wise break-up of the appli- B cations received from different regions. It is as follows :\n\nJammu Udaypur Rajouri Poonch Doda Katbua Anantnag Srinagar Outsiders\n\nGRAND TOTAL\n\n63 10\n\n1 1 1 9 2 11 12\n\nApplications 110\n\nThey have also shown the allotments of resin districtwise. The industries: of the respondents No. 4 to 16 are also small scale industries. The break-up of the small scale industries as given in Annexure R.II (in W.P. No. 3464) shows that Jammu has the largest number of units namely, 10, Second comes Srinagar with 4, then come Udampur with 3, Kathua (in Jammu Division), Anantnag and Baramul!a (in Kashmir Division), with one each. Rajouri in Jammu Division has none. It appears that the industries of the present applicants are also in the Jammu region and those of respondents No. 4 to 16 also appear to have been located in the Jammu region. In their affidavit at para 3 respondent No. 1 has stated that all the applications for allocation of resin were considered from time to time at various levels by the State Government and it was decided on May 30, 1980 as follows :\n\n(a) The allotment of resin to the existing unit should be rationalised;\n\n(b) Applications received from various districts be considered for allotment of resin.\n\nThe State Government have submitted that they made no promise of supply of raw-material in favour of any of the petitioners. The petitioners have submitted, in our opinion, correctly, that as there were already 10 units functioning in small scale sector in the Jammu region and inasmuch as the allottee respondents' industries were also located in the Jammu region, allocations in their favour would be inconsistent with the Government's industrial policy.\n\n7. In the instant case, respondent No. 1 as well as the other parties has taken reliance on their industrh1l policy statement as stated above. We have already quoted the relevant portions of the State Industrial policy statement. The Government have stated that they have considered all the 110 applications including those of the petitioners coming from industrialists of different parts of the country.\n\nThey have stated, and their statement is corroborated by the documenls, that there is preponderance of industries in the Jammu region and industries of the petitioners as wel! as respondents No. 4 to 16 were also functioning in the same region. Respondent No. 1 has not explained as to how and on what basis, if any, the allotments were made by the impugned orders in favour of the new allottees whose industries were located in the Jammu region.\n\nPawan Kumar Sharma, the petitioner in W.P. No. 3231 of 1980 states that his industry was provisionally registered under the Provisional Registration Certificate dated 29-1-1976. It was further extended for further short periods. He says that as there was assurance from the authorities that raw-materials will be allotted to him after he completed the installation of requisite machinery.\n\nThe J. K. Resin and Turpentine Industries of petitioner Om Prakash Snd, was provisionally registered in the year 1975. He was also approaching the Government from time to time to get allotment of the raw-materials but got no favourable reaction from the Government. He states that he had already established his factory and got it insured for a sum of Rs. 6.80 lakhs. He obtained raw-material from the open market and was running his industry.\n\nPetitioner, Ravindra Dutt of M/s. Dinesh Resin and Turpentines\n\nin W.P. No. 3465 of 1980 alleges that his industry was provisionally ~, registered on 25-10-1975 which was extended upto April, 1979. Letter of 31st May, 1979 shows that his industry was later on formally registered as a small unit. This factory was producing resin and turpentine out of the resin which he purchased from open auction.\n\nHe was approaching the Government from time to time to get requisite quantity of raw-materials but failed to get it.\n\nPetitioner, Shamlal Kapoor, Direclor of Jammu Resin Enterprises Private Limited, alleges that his industry was formally registered with the Government of J & K. He alleges that his industry was functioning for a long time and trying to get necessay quota of raw-materials from respondent No. 1. He was approaching the Government to get requisite quota. Sud Pine Industries, was provisionally registered on H 10-3-1978 and formally registered on 10-10-1978. It appears from Annexure N, in respect of respondent M/s Kashmir R & T Works\n\n(respondent No. 17), Annexure 0 in respect of M/s. Sun Shine R & T Industries (respondent No. 18), Annexure Pin respect of M/s. Woolan Paints and Chemicals Scopore (respondent No. 19) Annexure Q in respect of Mis. Pine Wood Products Company (respondent No. 20), Annexure R in respect of M/s. Haji Mast Ali Slaria (respondent No. 21), Annexure S in respect of M/s. Phyto Chemicals (respondent No.\n\nB 22), Annexure T in respect of M/s. New Himalayan Paints and Chemicals (respondent No. 23), Annexure U in respect of M/s. S. K.\n\nChemical (respondent No. 24), Annexure V in respect of M/s.\n\nRajindra R & T (respondent No. 25) and Annexure W in respect of M/s. Bharat Paints and Chemicals (respondent No. 26) that the c\n\nallotments were made in their favour \"from the date the unit is formally_ registered'.' which shows that industries were not even registered at the time of the impugned orders of this allotment. Respondent M/s.\n\nRajindra R & T Industries, Udhampur, appears to stand on a different footing.\n\nHe appears to have fulfilled all the conditions required for allocation of resin in accordance with the policy of the State of J&K.\n\nThe industry is an experienced one and thei factory started production of resin and turpentine at Hoshiarpur since 1948. It is a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act and has long experience in the business including resin and turpentine since 1948. The industry set up a factory in 1970 in the rural industrial estate near Udhampur which is a backward area. The industry was provisionally registered in 1970 and fonnal registration was granted on 29-2-1974. It applied for adequate quantities of raw-materials and was allotted only 200 tons although it had been sanctioned 1500 per ton per annum since 1975.\n\nRespondent M/s. Sud Pine Industries, M/s. Kashmir R&T Works, Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and M/s. K. C. Soni Bakshi also appear to be on different footings. It appears from Annexures 'X' and 'Y' that F the first two indnstries have already been formally registered. They are existing nnits having already started production. So far as respondent M/s Bakshi Resin and Turpentine is concerned, it had already set np factory and started production. It was provisionally registered as early as 1976 and the unit is located in a backward area. So far as respondent\n\nG K. C. Soni Resin & Turpentine is concerned, it was formally registered on 19-4-79. This unit is located in a remote backward area of the State.\n\n8. \"Equality before the Law\" or \"equal protection of the laws\" within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India means absence of any arbitrary discrimination by the law or in their adminis- H tration.\n\nNo undue favour to one or hostile discrimination to another should be shown.\n\nA classification is reasonable when it is not an arbitrary selection but rests on differences pertinent to the subject\n\n• '\n\nin respect of which the classification is made.\n\nThe classification A\n\npermissible must be based on some real and substantial distinction, a just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained and cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis .. . ....... (See State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali(1). The classification must not be arbitrary but be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to B be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out.\n\nThose qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the law.\n\nIn order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia . which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others, and (2) that that C differentia mnst have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\nThe differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them.\n\nWe are not unaware that the rule of equality does not mean mathematical equality and that it permits of practical inequalities.\n\nBut what is needed is that the selection of quota seekers as in the\n\ncase in hand should have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved in the industrial policy decision of the State. If the selection or differentiation is arbitrary and lacks a rational basis it offends Article 14.\n\n9. In the instant case, although the State Government has taken reliance on the State Industrial Policy decision referred to above, they do not appear to have followed it in practice, except in the cases of the five respondents referred to above.\n\nIn fact no reasonable basis has been adopted in making the allotments in favonr of the new allottees and denying allotments to the petitioners. In the circumstances the petitions are partly allowed, the impugned orders. / , of allotments except in favour of respondents, M/s Rajindra Res~ and Turpentine Industries, M/s Sud Pine Industries, M/s Kashmir ; R & T Works, M/s Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and .. M/s K. C.\n\nSoni Resin & Tnrpentine are quashed.\n\nThe petitions are partly allowed.\n\nThe Rules are made absolute except as against these five respondents. The respondent No. 1, the State of Jammu and Kashmir, is directed to make the other allotments of the raw-materials to the • applicants in the light of the observations made above . '\n\n10. Respondent No. 1 shall pay costs of Rs. 100.00 to each of the petitioners. •\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition partly allowed . '\n\n(I) [1952] S.C.R. 284\n\n7-214 SCI/81", "total_entities": 111, "entities": [{"text": "OM PRAKASH SUD ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH SUD ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF J & K & ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF J & K & ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 16, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 87, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 16, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK, 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. 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CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334, "end_char": 344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 20, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in their writ petitions to this Court alleged that they were C carrying on small scale industries for the manufacture of resin and turpentine oil and that they applied to the Government for allotment of resin for their industries but the Government referring to their policy decision of March 20, 1978 refused to make any allotment, \"'1d that they purchased raw material from the open market and managed to run their industries."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1286, "end_char": 1296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1663, "end_char": 1668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 contested the writ petition, denied the E material allegations of the petitioners and alleged th<>t the allocations were made in conformity with the State Industrial Policy decision of securing the balanced economic and regional development of the State: that there wa~ a preponderance of industries in the Jammu Region, and that the industries of the petitioners as well as respondent nos."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2081, "end_char": 2091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3087, "end_char": 3097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. N. Kacker, K. N. Bhatt and Surendara Raju for the Petitioners in W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "K. N. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3997, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. N. Kacker, K. N. Bhatt and Surendara Raju for the Petitioners in W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Surendara Raju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. N. Kacker, K. N. Bhatt and Surendara Raju for the Petitioners in W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4087, "end_char": 4103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, E. C. Agarwala, R. Satish and V. K. Pandita for E the Petitioner in WP 3231/80."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4105, "end_char": 4119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, E. C. Agarwala, R. Satish and V. K. Pandita for E the Petitioner in WP 3231/80."}}, {"text": "R. Satish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4121, "end_char": 4130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, E. C. Agarwala, R. Satish and V. K. Pandita for E the Petitioner in WP 3231/80."}}, {"text": "V. K. Pandita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, E. C. Agarwala, R. Satish and V. K. Pandita for E the Petitioner in WP 3231/80."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4186, "end_char": 4197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Att Genl and Altaf Ahmed fur R. 1."}}, {"text": "Altaf Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4212, "end_char": 4223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Att Genl and Altaf Ahmed fur R. 1."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitaley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley and Vineet Kumar for R. 14 in WP 3231/80 and for R. 2 in WPs 3464-65 /80."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4274, "end_char": 4286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley and Vineet Kumar for R. 14 in WP 3231/80 and for R. 2 in WPs 3464-65 /80."}}, {"text": "R R. P. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4345, "end_char": 4358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R R. P. Bhatt ; md N. R. Chaudhary for R. 4 in WP 3464/80."}}, {"text": "N. R. Chaudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4364, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R R. P. Bhatt ; md N. R. Chaudhary for R. 4 in WP 3464/80."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4405, "end_char": 4417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and Naunit Lal for R. 7 in WP 3231/80 and for R. 2 in WP 3464-65 /80."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and Naunit Lal for R. 7 in WP 3231/80 and for R. 2 in WP 3464-65 /80."}}, {"text": "Anil Dev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh and Ashok Grover for R. 15 in WP 3231/80 and R. 3 in WPs 3464-65/80\n\nG S. K. Bhattacharya and Suresh Sethi for RR."}}, {"text": "Ashok Grover", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh and Ashok Grover for R. 15 in WP 3231/80 and R. 3 in WPs 3464-65/80\n\nG S. K. Bhattacharya and Suresh Sethi for RR."}}, {"text": "G S. K. Bhattacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh and Ashok Grover for R. 15 in WP 3231/80 and R. 3 in WPs 3464-65/80\n\nG S. K. Bhattacharya and Suresh Sethi for RR.", "canonical_name": "G S. K. Bhattacharya"}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4598, "end_char": 4610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh and Ashok Grover for R. 15 in WP 3231/80 and R. 3 in WPs 3464-65/80\n\nG S. K. Bhattacharya and Suresh Sethi for RR."}}, {"text": "Satish Vij", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satish Vij for R. 15 in WP 3464-3465/80."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Balakrishnan and S. K. Bhattacharya for R. 16 in WP No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bhattacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Balakrishnan and S. K. Bhattacharya for R. 16 in WP No.", "canonical_name": "G S. K. Bhattacharya"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4856, "end_char": 4866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 5007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J.-'By these writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioners have challenged the orders of the\n\n~ ..\n\n• ,\n\n' •\n\n• '\n\nfirst respondent (the State of Jammu and Kashmir) allotting quotas of A resin to respondents."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5161, "end_char": 5171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6368, "end_char": 6373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been alleged that only three States of India, namely, Himachal\n\nPradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir have Chir forests."}}, {"text": "Himachal\n\nPradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6383, "end_char": 6400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been alleged that only three States of India, namely, Himachal\n\nPradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir have Chir forests."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6402, "end_char": 6415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been alleged that only three States of India, namely, Himachal\n\nPradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir have Chir forests."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6420, "end_char": 6437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been alleged that only three States of India, namely, Himachal\n\nPradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir have Chir forests."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners have alleged that the State of Himachal Pradesh and E Uttar Pradesh stopped selling resin for the last several years in view of establishment of factories in public and joint sectors and that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was selling resin by public auction."}}, {"text": "E Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners have alleged that the State of Himachal Pradesh and E Uttar Pradesh stopped selling resin for the last several years in view of establishment of factories in public and joint sectors and that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was selling resin by public auction."}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6670, "end_char": 6696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners have alleged that the State of Himachal Pradesh and E Uttar Pradesh stopped selling resin for the last several years in view of establishment of factories in public and joint sectors and that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was selling resin by public auction."}}, {"text": "J ammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7011, "end_char": 7017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a public sector unit in J ammu which consumes about 3,000 tons of resin per year."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8162, "end_char": 8172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sud Pine Industries", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8327, "end_char": 8346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of allotment (Annexure 'X') in favour of M/s. Sud Pine Industries (respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sud Pine Inc!ustries Kunc", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8427, "end_char": 8452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27) is in the following terms:-\n\n\"Sub : Supply of resin to M/s. Sud Pine Inc!ustries Kunc wani for their factory at Talab Jammu."}}, {"text": "Talab Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8479, "end_char": 8490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27) is in the following terms:-\n\n\"Sub : Supply of resin to M/s. Sud Pine Inc!ustries Kunc wani for their factory at Talab Jammu."}}, {"text": "30-5-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8533, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "175 DIC/1980 dated 30-5-1980."}}, {"text": "Kunjwani Talab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8776, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Ml s. Sud Pine D Industries for their factory at Kunjwani Talab Jammu on the terms and conditions specified in the above said order."}}, {"text": "Sheikh Ghulam Rasool", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9033, "end_char": 9053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of J &K.\n\nSd/-\n\n(Sheikh Ghulam Rasool) Secretary to Government.\""}}, {"text": "Kashmir R & T Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Sanction is accorded to the supply of crude (oleo) resin by the Forest Department to M/s. Kashmir R & T Works, Srinagar, for their factory at Srinagar, subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement to be entered into between the Forest Department and the party and on the following specific conditions :-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9382, "end_char": 9390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Sanction is accorded to the supply of crude (oleo) resin by the Forest Department to M/s. Kashmir R & T Works, Srinagar, for their factory at Srinagar, subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement to be entered into between the Forest Department and the party and on the following specific conditions :-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Forest Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9591, "end_char": 9608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Forest Department will supply Crude (oleo) resin @ 700 TPA to the firm from the date the Unit is formally registered subject to its being reviewed with due regard to its availability from year to year;\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Rasool", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10057, "end_char": 10070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- Sheikh Ghulam Rasool Secretary to Government.\""}}, {"text": "L. K. Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10629, "end_char": 10638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have not denied the material allegations of the petitioners but they say that the allocations have been made in order to implement the industrial policy of the State Government as enunciated in a \"Report of the Development Review Committee, Jammu and Kashmir\" a committee headed by Shri L. K. Jha, the Governor of the State."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11775, "end_char": 11781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have to improve the living standards in these specially backward areas for whom in terms of the quickost mode of transportation, Srinagar is more distant than the State is from Kerala."}}, {"text": "Guiara", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11849, "end_char": 11855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many sections of the community similarly, like Scheduled Castes; Guiara and Bakarwalas and other hackward class need to be assisted in their speedy uplift."}}, {"text": "Udampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12738, "end_char": 12745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3464) shows that Jammu has the largest number of units namely, 10, Second comes Srinagar with 4, then come Udampur with 3, Kathua (in Jammu Division), Anantnag and Baramul!a (in Kashmir Division), with one each."}}, {"text": "Kathua", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12754, "end_char": 12760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3464) shows that Jammu has the largest number of units namely, 10, Second comes Srinagar with 4, then come Udampur with 3, Kathua (in Jammu Division), Anantnag and Baramul!a (in Kashmir Division), with one each."}}, {"text": "Jammu Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12765, "end_char": 12779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3464) shows that Jammu has the largest number of units namely, 10, Second comes Srinagar with 4, then come Udampur with 3, Kathua (in Jammu Division), Anantnag and Baramul!a (in Kashmir Division), with one each."}}, {"text": "Anantnag", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12782, "end_char": 12790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3464) shows that Jammu has the largest number of units namely, 10, Second comes Srinagar with 4, then come Udampur with 3, Kathua (in Jammu Division), Anantnag and Baramul!a (in Kashmir Division), with one each."}}, {"text": "Baramul!a", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12795, "end_char": 12804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3464) shows that Jammu has the largest number of units namely, 10, Second comes Srinagar with 4, then come Udampur with 3, Kathua (in Jammu Division), Anantnag and Baramul!a (in Kashmir Division), with one each."}}, {"text": "Kashmir Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12809, "end_char": 12825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3464) shows that Jammu has the largest number of units namely, 10, Second comes Srinagar with 4, then come Udampur with 3, Kathua (in Jammu Division), Anantnag and Baramul!a (in Kashmir Division), with one each."}}, {"text": "Rajouri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12843, "end_char": 12850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajouri in Jammu Division has none."}}, {"text": "May 30, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 has stated that all the applications for allocation of resin were considered from time to time at various levels by the State Government and it was decided on May 30, 1980 as follows :\n\n(a) The allotment of resin to the existing unit should be rationalised;\n\n(b) Applications received from various districts be considered for allotment of resin."}}, {"text": "Pawan Kumar Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14761, "end_char": 14779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pawan Kumar Sharma, the petitioner in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "29-1-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14928, "end_char": 14937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3231 of 1980 states that his industry was provisionally registered under the Provisional Registration Certificate dated 29-1-1976."}}, {"text": "J. K. Resin and Turpentine Industries", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15155, "end_char": 15192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J. K. Resin and Turpentine Industries of petitioner Om Prakash Snd, was provisionally registered in the year 1975."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Snd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J. K. Resin and Turpentine Industries of petitioner Om Prakash Snd, was provisionally registered in the year 1975."}}, {"text": "Ravindra Dutt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15608, "end_char": 15621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioner, Ravindra Dutt of M/s. Dinesh Resin and Turpentines\n\nin W.P. No."}}, {"text": "25-10-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15746, "end_char": 15756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3465 of 1980 alleges that his industry was provisionally ~, registered on 25-10-1975 which was extended upto April, 1979."}}, {"text": "31st May, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15804, "end_char": 15818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Letter of 31st May, 1979 shows that his industry was later on formally registered as a small unit."}}, {"text": "Shamlal Kapoor", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16127, "end_char": 16141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioner, Shamlal Kapoor, Direclor of Jammu Resin Enterprises Private Limited, alleges that his industry was formally registered with the Government of J & K. He alleges that his industry was functioning for a long time and trying to get necessay quota of raw-materials from respondent No."}}, {"text": "Jammu Resin Enterprises Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16155, "end_char": 16194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioner, Shamlal Kapoor, Direclor of Jammu Resin Enterprises Private Limited, alleges that his industry was formally registered with the Government of J & K. He alleges that his industry was functioning for a long time and trying to get necessay quota of raw-materials from respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sud Pine Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16468, "end_char": 16487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sud Pine Industries, was provisionally registered on H 10-3-1978 and formally registered on 10-10-1978."}}, {"text": "10-3-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16523, "end_char": 16532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sud Pine Industries, was provisionally registered on H 10-3-1978 and formally registered on 10-10-1978."}}, {"text": "10-10-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16560, "end_char": 16570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sud Pine Industries, was provisionally registered on H 10-3-1978 and formally registered on 10-10-1978."}}, {"text": "Kashmir R & T Works", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16629, "end_char": 16648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from Annexure N, in respect of respondent M/s Kashmir R & T Works\n\n(respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Kashmir R & T Works"}}, {"text": "Sun Shine R & T Industries", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16701, "end_char": 16727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17), Annexure 0 in respect of M/s. Sun Shine R & T Industries (respondent No."}}, {"text": "Woolan Paints and Chemicals Scopore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16778, "end_char": 16813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18), Annexure Pin respect of M/s. Woolan Paints and Chemicals Scopore (respondent No."}}, {"text": "Haji Mast Ali Slaria", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16942, "end_char": 16962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20), Annexure R in respect of M/s. Haji Mast Ali Slaria (respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rajindra R & T", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17238, "end_char": 17252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24), Annexure V in respect of M/s.\n\nRajindra R & T (respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bharat Paints and Chemicals", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17307, "end_char": 17334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25) and Annexure W in respect of M/s. Bharat Paints and Chemicals (respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rajindra R & T Industries, Udhampur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17579, "end_char": 17614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent M/s.\n\nRajindra R & T Industries, Udhampur, appears to stand on a different footing."}}, {"text": "State of J&K.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17776, "end_char": 17789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He appears to have fulfilled all the conditions required for allocation of resin in accordance with the policy of the State of J&K.\n\nThe industry is an experienced one and thei factory started production of resin and turpentine at Hoshiarpur since 1948."}}, {"text": "Hoshiarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17889, "end_char": 17899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He appears to have fulfilled all the conditions required for allocation of resin in accordance with the policy of the State of J&K.\n\nThe industry is an experienced one and thei factory started production of resin and turpentine at Hoshiarpur since 1948."}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17946, "end_char": 17968, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Udhampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18126, "end_char": 18134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The industry set up a factory in 1970 in the rural industrial estate near Udhampur which is a backward area."}}, {"text": "29-2-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18250, "end_char": 18259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The industry was provisionally registered in 1970 and fonnal registration was granted on 29-2-1974."}}, {"text": "Kashmir R&T Works", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18454, "end_char": 18471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent M/s. Sud Pine Industries, M/s. Kashmir R&T Works, Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and M/s. K. C. Soni Bakshi also appear to be on different footings.", "canonical_name": "Kashmir R & T Works"}}, {"text": "Bakshi Resin & Turpentine", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18473, "end_char": 18498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent M/s. Sud Pine Industries, M/s. Kashmir R&T Works, Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and M/s. K. C. Soni Bakshi also appear to be on different footings.", "canonical_name": "Bakshi Resin and Turpentine"}}, {"text": "K. C. Soni Bakshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18508, "end_char": 18525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent M/s. Sud Pine Industries, M/s. Kashmir R&T Works, Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and M/s. K. C. Soni Bakshi also appear to be on different footings."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Resin and Turpentine", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18760, "end_char": 18787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as respondent M/s Bakshi Resin and Turpentine is concerned, it had already set np factory and started production.", "canonical_name": "Bakshi Resin and Turpentine"}}, {"text": "G K. C. Soni Resin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18971, "end_char": 18989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as respondent\n\nG K. C. Soni Resin & Turpentine is concerned, it was formally registered on 19-4-79."}}, {"text": "19-4-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19047, "end_char": 19054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as respondent\n\nG K. C. Soni Resin & Turpentine is concerned, it was formally registered on 19-4-79."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19203, "end_char": 19213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19221, "end_char": 19242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21098, "end_char": 21108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajindra Res~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21634, "end_char": 21647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of allotments except in favour of respondents, M/s Rajindra Res~ and Turpentine Industries, M/s Sud Pine Industries, M/s Kashmir ; R & T Works, M/s Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and .. M/s K. C.\n\nSoni Resin & Tnrpentine are quashed."}}, {"text": "Turpentine Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21652, "end_char": 21673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of allotments except in favour of respondents, M/s Rajindra Res~ and Turpentine Industries, M/s Sud Pine Industries, M/s Kashmir ; R & T Works, M/s Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and .. M/s K. C.\n\nSoni Resin & Tnrpentine are quashed."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Resin & Turpentine", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21731, "end_char": 21756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of allotments except in favour of respondents, M/s Rajindra Res~ and Turpentine Industries, M/s Sud Pine Industries, M/s Kashmir ; R & T Works, M/s Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and .. M/s K. C.\n\nSoni Resin & Tnrpentine are quashed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_850_853_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF ASSAM\n\nv •\n\n.llTENDRA KUMAR SENAPATI & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 17, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nLand Acquisition Act, 1894, sections 23 and 34-Agreen1ent between the parties reduced in writing to accept a specified sun1 by a specified date two years after the land acquisition-Whether the words \"would not n1ake any\n\nfurther claini in regard to con1pn1.1atio11\" liou.ld exclude further clain1s of interests under the Act.\n\nAccepting the State appeal, negativing the clnirn for interest and disn1issing the original writ petition, the Court,\n\nHELD : The expression \"would not make nny further claim in regard to compensation\" in the agreement dated the 24th February, 1969 was clearly used by the petitioners-respondents not in the sense in which it is used in sections 23 and 34 of the Land Acq_uisition Act but more comprehensively meaning reimbursement in full satisfaction of their claim in respect of the acquisition.\n\nThe condition attached by then1 to the relinquishment of their claim was that the agreed amount must be paid to them before 31st March 1969, which agreement would sho\\V that by the acceptance of the quantified sum of Ro;;. 4,41,202.45 they condoned the delay in payment and also relinquished all future claims to interest. If it were otherwise, the respondents would have expressly reserved their right to claim interest under section 34 of the Act. [853 A-B, D-fl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1947 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 17.3.1970 of the Gauhati High Conrt in Civil Rule No. 1151/69.\n\nF s. N. Chowdhary for the Appellant.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee for Respondent No. 2.\n\nV. S. Desai, B. P.'Maheshwmi andS11resh Sethi and Miss Asha Jain~-._ for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgme\\1t of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by certificate granted under subclause (a) of clause ( 1) of article 133 of the Constitution of India by the High Conrt of Assam and Nagaland against its judgment dated 17th March, 1970 accepting a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India which arose in the circumstances that follow.\n\n• '\n\nH Land measuring 7.60 acres and situated at Lawshtnn, Bishnupur, • Shillong, belonged to the 5 respondents when a notification undr section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the\n\n• '\n\n' •\n\nAct) was published in respect thereof on 27th March 1967. Three days later the possession of the land was taken over by the Collector, United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Shillong.\n\nProceedings for the award of compensation to the respondents were pending when negotiations took place between the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam and two of !he respondents who agreed to the reduction of the cost of acquisition of the land from Rs. 6,17,683.50 to Rs. 4,63,262.57 (inclusive of cost of establishment and contingency amounting to Rs . 22,060.12).\n\nThereafter the Under Secretary to the Go¥ernment of Assam in the Home and Political/Department wrote to respondent No. 2 a letter dated 21st February, 1969 detailing the agreement arrived at between the Chief Secretary and the respondents and requesti'ng them-\n\n\"to please submit immediately a wiitten document signed by all the co-sharers of the land to the effect that yourself and all other co-sharers are agreeable to accept the L. A. cost of Rs. 4,41,202.45 for land at Bishnupur and that you and your co-sharers will make no further claim for the land thus acquired by Government.\"\n\nThe respondents lost no time in sending their reply which was dated 24th February 1969 ankd in which they stated that the delay in payment had caused to them great hardship and that they had agreed to reduce !he cost of the acquisition in the course of their discussion with the Chief Secretary whom they had urged \"at the same time that the payment should be made immediately.\" The reply was signed by all the five respondents and was accompanied by an agreement (also signed by all of them), the text of which may be set out in extense :\n\n\"We, all !he co-shares interested in the land acquisition case for constrnction of quarters for Special Branch Staff of Police Department at Lawsohtun, Bishnupur, Shillong, hereby agree in response to the Government Letter No. 356/ 66155 dated the 21st February, 1969 to accept the land acquisition cost of Rs. 4,41,202.45P (Rupees four lakhs forty one thousand two hundred and two and forty five paise only) subject to Government making payment within the 31st March, 1969 for our land measuring more or less 7.60 acres at Lawsohtun, Bish'nupur, Shillong.\n\n\"We further agree that we will make no further claim in regard to compensation for the same land provided actual\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\npayment is received within the above period of 31st March,\n\n1969.\"\n\nThe agreement between the parties was reduced by the Collector to an award dated the 25th March 1969 and on the very next day the sum of Rs. 4,41,202.45 was paid to the respondents.\n\nOn 31st March 1969 the respondents made an application to the Oiief Secretary claiming interest at the rate of 12t per cent per anuum on the amount last mentioned. As there was no response from the Chief Secretary, the respondents applied to the Collector on 7th July, 1969 requesting him to pay interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 6% per annum for the period from 30th March 1967 to 26th March 1969 under section 34 of the Act which runs thus :\n\n\"When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon\n\nat the rate of six per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited.\"\n\nThe Collector informed the respondents by a letter dated 31st July 1969 that no action was necessary \"at this stage\". It was then that the respondents knocked at the door of the High Court.\n\n2. The High Court was of the opinion that the agreement between the parties covered only the amount of \"compensation\" as described in the various sections of the Act including sections 23 and 34 and that interest had to be paid on such compensation by reason of the statutory requirement enacted in that behalf by section 34.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, accepted the petition filed before it and held that the F Collector was bound to pay to the respondents interest on the amount covered by the award at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 30th\n\nMarch 1967 (being the date on which the possession of the land was ·----x_\n\ntaken over by the Collector) to the date of payment, i.e., 26th March\n\n1969. It directed the Collector to dispose of the petition dated the 7th July 1969 made to him by the respondents in accordance with law.\n\n3. The short point requiring determination by us is whether the agreement arrived at between the parties in February 1969 embraced only the \"compensation\" within the meaning of that term as used in the. Act or covered also the payment of interest under section 34 thereof. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion H that the interpretation placed on the agreement by the High Court cannot be sustained and that the respondents are not entitled to any interest on the sum already paid to them.\n\n• '\n\n• '\n\n...\n\n• '\n\n4. Although it is true that in the agreement dated the 24th February 1969 which the respondents signed and sent to the Government along with their letter of that date they stated that they would not make any furher claim in regard to \"compensation\", but that expression, in our opinion, was clearly used by them not in the sense in which it is used in sections 23 and 34 of the Act but more comprehensively, mea'ning re-imbursement in full satisfaction of their claim in respect of the acquisition. That this was so was made clear in the letter addresed to them by the Under Secretary in which he expressly stated that-\n\n\"you and your co-sharern will make no further claim for the land thus acquired by the Government.\"\n\nThe Under Secretary did not use the word \"compensation\" in his letter nor did the respondents use it in their reply in which, on the other hand, they made a grouse of the hardship which the delay in payment bad caused to them and brought it to the pointed attention of the under Secretary that immediate payment was an essential part of the bargain. In the agreement signed by them (as pointed out above) they no doubt used the word \"compensation\" but they added that they would make no further claim in regard to it if actual payment was received by them before the 31st March, 1969.\n\nThe condition thus attached by them to the agreement would show that by the acceptance of the quantified sum of Rs. 4,41,202.45 they condoned the delay in payment and also relinquished all future claims to interest. If it were\n\notherwise, there is no reason why the respondents would not have expressly reserved their right to claim interest under section 34 of the Act. The tenor of the two letters coupled with the agreement leads to no other conclusiOn.\n\n4. In the result the appeal succeeds and is accepted.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court is set aside and the respondents' petition decided by it is dismissed but with no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF ASSAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ASSAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "llTENDRA KUMAR SENAPATI & OTHERS\n\nFebruary", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JITENDRA KUMAR SENAPATI & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 785, "end_char": 803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1375, "end_char": 1385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F s. N. Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1574, "end_char": 1591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F s. N. Chowdhary for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1612, "end_char": 1627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1651, "end_char": 1662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, B. P.'Maheshwmi andS11resh Sethi and Miss Asha Jain~-._"}}, {"text": "B. P.'Maheshwmi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, B. P.'Maheshwmi andS11resh Sethi and Miss Asha Jain~-._"}}, {"text": "andS11resh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1680, "end_char": 1696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, B. P.'Maheshwmi andS11resh Sethi and Miss Asha Jain~-._"}}, {"text": "Asha Jain~-", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, B. P.'Maheshwmi andS11resh Sethi and Miss Asha Jain~-._"}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgme\\1t of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by certificate granted under subclause (a) of clause ( 1) of article 133 of the Constitution of India by the High Conrt of Assam and Nagaland against its judgment dated 17th March, 1970 accepting a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India which arose in the circumstances that follow."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1877, "end_char": 1888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1896, "end_char": 1917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2029, "end_char": 2040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2048, "end_char": 2069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bishnupur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2176, "end_char": 2185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• '\n\nH Land measuring 7.60 acres and situated at Lawshtnn, Bishnupur, • Shillong, belonged to the 5 respondents when a notification undr section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the\n\n• '\n\n' •\n\nAct) was published in respect thereof on 27th March 1967."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United Khasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three days later the possession of the land was taken over by the Collector, United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Shillong."}}, {"text": "21st February, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3024, "end_char": 3043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 a letter dated 21st February, 1969 detailing the agreement arrived at between the Chief Secretary and the respondents and requesti'ng them-\n\n\"to please submit immediately a wiitten document signed by all the co-sharers of the land to the effect that yourself and all other co-sharers are agreeable to accept the L. A. cost of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shillong", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4181, "end_char": 4189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he co-shares interested in the land acquisition case for constrnction of quarters for Special Branch Staff of Police Department at Lawsohtun, Bishnupur, Shillong, hereby agree in response to the Government Letter No."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4475, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,41,202.45P (Rupees four lakhs forty one thousand two hundred and two and forty five paise only) subject to Government making payment within the 31st March, 1969 for our land measuring more or less 7.60 acres at Lawsohtun, Bish'nupur, Shillong."}}, {"text": "Bish'nupur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,41,202.45P (Rupees four lakhs forty one thousand two hundred and two and forty five paise only) subject to Government making payment within the 31st March, 1969 for our land measuring more or less 7.60 acres at Lawsohtun, Bish'nupur, Shillong."}}, {"text": "31st March 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4984, "end_char": 4999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31st March 1969 the respondents made an application to the Oiief Secretary claiming interest at the rate of 12t per cent per anuum on the amount last mentioned."}}, {"text": "7th July, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5240, "end_char": 5254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As there was no response from the Chief Secretary, the respondents applied to the Collector on 7th July, 1969 requesting him to pay interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 6% per annum for the period from 30th March 1967 to 26th March 1969 under section 34 of the Act which runs thus :\n\n\"When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon\n\nat the rate of six per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited.\""}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5397, "end_char": 5407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st July 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5793, "end_char": 5807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector informed the respondents by a letter dated 31st July 1969 that no action was necessary \"at this stage\"."}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6103, "end_char": 6121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7015, "end_char": 7025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7654, "end_char": 7672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8957, "end_char": 8967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_854_865_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nR. C. JAIN & ORS.\n\nFebruary 17, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ,]\n\nPayn1ent of Bonus Ac:t, 1965-Section 32(iv)-Whether applicable to Delhi Developrnent Authority-Tests for detcnnining whether a body is a local authority.\n\nSection 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to employees employed by an establishment engaged in any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or State Government or a local authority.\n\nThe Delhi Development Authority, a statutory body created under the Delhi Development Act, 1957 for the development of Delhi according to plan, paid bonus to its employees for a period of ten years upto the year 1973-74, but later discontinued payment of bonus on the a<lvice of the Ministry of La\\v.\n\nThe employees' petition impugning the action of th~ Authority in stopping the payment of bonus was allowed by the High Court.\n\nOn the question whether the Delhi Development Authority i.s authority\" and whether the provisions of the Payment of Bonus attracted :\n\na \"local A<.:t are\n\nE Allowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The Delhi Development Authority is endowed with all the usual <l'ttributes and characteristics of a 'local authority' and therefore the provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act are not attracted. [865 A]\n\nThe expression 'local authority' is not defined in the Payment of Bonus Act.\n\nThe General Clauses Act defines it to mean a municipal committee or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund.\n\nIt is not a sound rule of interpretation to import the definition of an expression in one Act into another.\n\nThe definition of 'Local Fund' in the Fundamental Rules, Treasury Code and elsewhere cannot be imported into the definition of Local Authority in the General Clauses Act and thus into the Delhi Development Act. An authority, in order to be a local authority, must be of like nature and character as a municipal committee etc. possessing among others many, if not all, of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a municipal committee.\n\nIt must possess one essential feature, namely, that it is Iega1ly entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control and management of a municipal or local fund.\n\n[857 B-H]\n\nThe distinctive attribut'e5 and characteristics of a local authority are :\n\n(i) It must have separate legal existence as a corporate body; (ii) it must not be a mere governmental agency but a 1ega11y independent entity; (iii) it must function in a defined area and 1nust ordinarily be elected \\.vbo1ly or partly,\n\n...\n\n• '\n\n, '\n\nUNION V. R C. JAIN 855\n\ndirectly or indirectly by the inhabitants of the area; (iv) it must enjoy a certain <lcgree of autonomy, which, though not complete, must be appreciable; (v) the statute must entrust the authority with such governmental functions and duties as r.re usually entrusted to a municipal body for providing such amenities, as health and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation etc. to the inhabitants; (vi)it n1ust have power to raise funds in the furtherance of its activities and the fulfilment of the projects entrusted to it by levying taxes, rates, charges, fees etc. all of which n1ay be in addition to the moneys provided by Government. What is essential is that the control and management of the fund must'vest in the authority.\n\n[858 B-EJ\n\nMunicipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Delhi & Anr. [1968] 3 S.C.R. 251 @ 288 and Valiibhai Muliibhal So11eii and Anr. v. The State of Bombay (Now Guiarat) & Ors. [1964] 3 S.C.R. 868, referred\n\nto.\n\nThe Delhi Development Authority is a body corporate. It consists of a chairman, vice chairman and a certain number of official members and nonofficial members who are representatives of the Municipal Corporation Dehli to be elected by the Councillors and the aldermen of the Municipal Corporation\n\nand three representatives of the Metropolitan Council to be elected by that Counci\\. The object with which the Authority is established is ''to promote D and secure the development of Delhi according to plan\" in accordance with the\n\nprovisions of the Act. [859 D-F]\n\nThe Authority is required to maintain its own Fund which was not a Consolidated Fund or a separate Development Fund but is the Fund of the Development Authority. To this Fund are to be credited all the moneys received from the Central Government by way of grants, loans, advances or otherwise; all moneys received by way of loans of debentures; all fees and charges received by the Authority; all moneys received from the disposal of lands, buildings and other properties, all moneys received by way of rents and profits or in any other manner. The fund is required to be applied towards meeting the\n\nexpense~ incurred by the Authority in the administration of the Act and for no other purposes. The Act empowers the Authority to impose penalties on persons for undertaking or carrying out development in contravention of the master plan or without permission, approval or sanction reQ_uired to be given by the Authority.\n\n[860 EG]\n\nAn equally important feature with which the Authority is clothed is its pov.'er to make regulations-a power which is analogous to the power given to municipalities to frame bye-laws. [862 G]\n\nThe salient features of the Act show that the Delhi Development Authority is constituted for the specific purpose of planned de; ve]opment of Delhi which is a governmental function ordinarily entruted to municipal bodies. It has an element of popular representation though some of the members are indirectly\n\nei; cted. It enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy within the bounds prescribed by the Act. The fact that some supervision is exercised by the Central Government does not detract from the autonomy because the supervision exercised is the usual supervisory power which every State Government exercises over municipalities, District Boards etc. [863 AD]\n\nThe tern1 \"taxation\" used with reference to the power of a local authority to raise funds is to be understood not in any fine a-nd nanow sense to include\n\nA only compulsory exactions but in a broad generic sense to include fees levied essentialiy for services rendered. Today the distinction between a tax and a fee bas withered away both being compulsory exactions of money by a public authority.\n\nThe crucial test is to see whether the public authority is authorised by statute to make a compulsory extension of money adn not to see whether\n\nthe money so exacted is to be utilised for specific or general purposes.\n\n[863 G-HJ\n\nThere is no valid reason to hold that the betterment charge which the Authority can impose upon an owner of a property in respect of the increase jn the value of the property is a fee and not a tax.\n\nThe charge is not levied on the basis of the increase in the value of property consequent on the deve~ lopment of the area. In other words it is a charge on the accrued capital gain\n\n\\\\1hich may bear no proportion whatsoever to the cost of development. [864 El\n\nThe fact that the Delhi Development Act refers in several sections to \"local authority concerned\" meaning thereby the ordinary local authority (as for example the Delhi Municipal Corporation) functioning in the area discharging a multiplicity of civic functions as distinguished from the Delhi Development Authority, which performs one of the several functions that a Jocal authority performs, is no ground for holding that rhe Delhi Develop-- ment Authority is not a local authority. The Authority is endowed with alt the usual attributes and characteristics of a local authority. [864 H]\n\nNor does the fact that other Municipal Acts provide for the reconstitution of a dissolved or superseeded municipality while the Delhi Developn1ent Act does not provide for such reconstitution of the Authority after it fulfills its assigned functions make it any the less a local authority.\n\nBy the very nature of the work entrusted to it its life is transcient; \\vhen the work is accomplished and there is no need for its continued existence it is dissolved. It is by what it is during its life and not by what its shape would be after it has performed its assigned functions that 1t can be determined '\\'hether the authority is a local authority as defined in the General Clauses Act. [865 B-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3351 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27-2-1979 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 1139/78.\n\nAbdul Khader, S. P. Nayar and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Appellant.\n\nP. R. Mirdul and P. N. Gupta for Respondents 1-5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The question for consideration in this appeal is whether the Delhi Development Authority is a 'local Authority' whose employees are taken out of the purview of the Payment of Bonus Act 1965, by Sec. 32(iv) of that Act, which provides that B nothing in the Act shall apply to employees employed by an establishment engaged in any industry carried on by or under the authority of any Department of the Central Government or State Government or\n\n• '\n\n• '\n\na Local Authority. It appears that for about ten years prior to 1973- 74 bonus was paid to the employees of the Delhi Development Authority but it was stopped thereafter on the advice of the Ministry of Law.\n\nThe employees questioned the stoppage of the payment of bonus by filing Civil Writ Petilio'n No. 1139/79 in the Delhi High Court.\n\nThe High Court allowed the Writ Petition and the Union of India and the Delhi Development Anthority have preferred this appeal, after obtaining special leave of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nThe expression 'Local Authority' is not defined in the payment of Bonus Act.\n\nOne must, therefore, turn to the General Clauses Act to ascertain the meaning of the expression.\n\nS.3 (31) defines Local Authority as follows :\n\n\"Local Authority shall mean a Municipal Committee, District Board, Body of Port Commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund\".\n\n'Local Fund' is again not defined in the General Clauses Act.\n\nI) Though the expression appears to have received treatment in the Fundamental Rules and the Treasury Code, we refrain from borrowing the meaning attributed to the expression in those rules as it is not a sound rule of interpretation to seek the meaning of words used in an Act, in the definition clause of other statutes.\n\nThe definition of an expression in one Act must not be imported into another. \"It E would be a new terror in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some\n\nAct which is not incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone\" (per Loreburn L.C. in Macbeth v. Chislett.(').\n\nFor the same reason we refrain from borrowing upon the definition of 'Local Authority' in enactments such as F the Cattle Trespass Act 1871 etc. as the High Court has done.\n\nLet us, therefore, concentrate and confine our attention and enquiry to the definition of 'Local Authority' in Sec.3(31) of the General Clauses Act.\n\nA proper and careful scrutiny of the language of Sec.3(31) suggests that an authority in order to be a local Autho- G rity, must be of like naturo.,, and character as a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, posses2ng, therefore, many, if not all, of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a Municipal Committee, District Board, or Body of Port Commissioners, bu1, possessing one essential feature, namely, that it is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, the control and management.\n\nH of a municipal or lqcal fund.\n\nWhat then are the distinctive attributes ------·-\n\n(!) [1910] AC 220\n\nand characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as Corporate bodies.\n\nThey must not be mere Governmental agencies but must be legally independent entities.\n\nNext, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of the area. Next, they musl enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them.\n\nThe autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependence may vary considerably but, an &])preciablc measure of autonomy there must be.\n\nNext, they must be entrusted by Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies, such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services etc. etc.\n\nBroadly we may say that they may be entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be Governmental duties and functions.\n\nFinally, they must have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities and the fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges, or fees.\n\nThis may be in addition to moneys provided by Government or obtained by yorrowing or otherwise.\n\nWhat is essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in the authority.\n\nIn Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Delhi & Anr.,(1) Hidayatullah, J., described some of the attributes of local bodies in this manner :\n\nF \"Local bodies are subordinate branches of governmental activity.\n\nThey are democratic institutions managed by the representatives of the people.\n\nThey function for public purposes and take away a part of the government affairs in local areas.\n\nThey are political sub divisions and agencie~ which exerdse a part of State !unctions.\n\nAs they are G intended to carry on local self-government the power ot taxation is a necessary adjunct to their other powers.\n\nThey function under the supervision of the Government''.\n\nIn Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and A nr. v.\n\nThe State of Bombay (Now Gujarat) & Ors.(') one of the questions was H whether the State Trading Corporation was a local Authority as\n\n(1) [1968j 3 S.C.R. 251@ 288.\n\n(2) [19641 3 S.C.R. 686\n\n• '\n\nt •\n\n• '\n\ndefined by Sec. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It was held that it was not, because it was not an authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, control or management of a local fund.\n\nJt was observed that though the Corporation was furnished with funds by the Government for commencing its business that would not make the funds of the Corporation 'local funds'.\n\nKeeping in mind what we have said above, we may now take a close look at the provisions of the Delhi Development Act.\n\nThe Delhi Development Act, 1957, is 'an Act to provide for the development of Delhi according to plan and for matters ancillary thereto'.\n\nThe act extends to the whole of the Union Territory of Delhi.\n\nSec. 2(d) defines \"development\" as meaning, with its grammatical variations \"the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes redevelopment'.' Sec. 3 empowers the Central Government to constitute an authority !o be called the Delhi Development Authority.\n\nThe Authority is to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with the usual corporate attributes. The authority is to consist of a chairman, a Vice Chairman and a certain number of official and nonofficial members.\n\nThe non-official members are to include two representatives of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to be elected by the Councillors and aldermen of the Municipal Corporation from among themselves and three representatives of the Metropolitan Council for the Union Territory of Delhi to be elected by the members of the Metropolitan Council from among themselves. The objects of the authority as set out in Sec. 6 are \"to promote and secure the development of Delhi according to plan\" and for that purpose to \"have the power to acquire, hold and dispose of land and other property\", and \"to carry out building, engineering, mining and other operations, to execute works in connection with supply of water and electricity, disposal of sewage and other services and amenities and generally to do anything necessary or expedient for purposes of such development and for purposes incidental thereto\".\n\nSec.7 requires the Authority to carry out a civic survey of, and prepare a master plan for, Delhi.\n\nThe master plan is to define various zones into which Delhi may be divided for the purposes of development and indicate the manner in which the land in each zone is proposed to be used (whether by the carrying out thereon of development or otherwise) and the stages by which any such development shall be carried out.\n\nThe master plan may also provide for any at.her matter which is necessary for the proper development of Delhi. Scc.8 provides for the preparation of zonal development plans and Sec.8(2) prescribes what a zonal deve-\n\nIopment plan may contain or specify.\n\nSec.9 provides for the submission of all plans to the Central Government by the Authority for approval.\n\nSec. 12 empowers the Central Government to declare any area in Delhi to be a 'development area' for the purposes of the Act.\n\nIt further provides that after the commencement of the Act no development of land shall be undertaken or carried out, without the permission of the Authority, if the area is a development area, and without the approval or sanction of the local authority concerned if the area is an area other than a development area.\n\nSec.13 prescribes the procedure to be followed. ft provides for a fee (to be prescribed by the Rules) to accompany every application to 9btain permission under Sec. 12.\n\nSec. 15 empowers the Central Government to acquire any land which is required for the purpose of development or for any other purpose under the Act.\n\nAfter acquiring the land the Central Gowrnment may tra'nsfer the land to the Authority or any local authority on payment by the Authority or the local authority of the compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act and all the charges incurred by the Government.\n\nThereafter, subject to any directions given by the Central Government the Authority or, as the case may be, the local authority concerned may dispose of the land, after or without undertaking or carrying out any development thereon, to such persons, in such manner and subject to sucbi terms and conditions as it considers expedient for securing the development of Delhi according to plan.\n\nSec. 22 authorises the Central Government to place at the disposal of the Authority all or any developed and undeveloped lands in Delhi vested in the Union for the purpose of development in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nSec. 23 obliges the Authority to have and maintain its own fund to which are to be credited-\n\n\" (a) all moneys received by the Authority from the Central Government by way of grants, Joans, advances or otherwise;\n\n( aa) all moneys received by the Authority from sources other than the Central Government by way of loans or debentures;\n\n(b) all fees and charges received by the Authority under this Act;\n\n( c) all moneys received by the Authority from the disposal of lands, buildings and other properties, movable and immovable; and\n\n( d) all moneys received by the Authority by way of rents and profits or in any other manner or from ny other source.\"\n\n• '\n\n' •\n\n• •\n\nThe fund is required by S.23(2) to be applied towards meeting A the expenses incurred by the Authority in the administration of the Act and for no other purposes.\n\nSec. 24 enjoins a duty on the authority to prepare a budget in respect of the financial year next ensuing showing the estimated receipts and expenditure. Copies of the budget are to be forwarded to the Central Government.\n\nSec. 25 requires the accounts of the Authority to be audited annually by the B Comptroller and Auditor General of India.\n\nSec. 26 requires the Authority to prepare a report of its activities and submit the same to the Central Government. Sec. 27 provides for the constitution of pension and Provident Funds. Sec. 28 empowers the authority to authorise any person to enter into or upon any land or building with or without assistance of workmen for the purposes specified in the C Section.\n\nSec. 29 provides for penalties for persons undertaking or carrying out development in contravention of the master plan or zol\\al development plan or without permission, approval or sanction required by Sec. 12.\n\nSec. 30 provides for the making of an order of demolition of a building where development has been commenced D or completed in contravention of the master plan, zonal plans or the permission, approval or sanction referred to in Sec. 12.\n\nSec. 31 enables the Authority to make an order requiring development to be discontinued where development has been commenced in contravention of the master plan or zonal development plan or without obtaining permission, approval or sanction as required by Sec. 12.\n\nE Sec. 33 provides that all fines realised in connection with prosecutions under the Act shall be paid to the Authority or, as the case may be, the local authority concerned. Sec. 36 empowers the Authority lo require the local authority within whose local limits an area has been developed to assume responsibility for the maintenance of amenities which have been provided in the area by the Authority and F for the provision of the amenities which have not been provided by fhe Authority. Sec. 37 empowers the Authority to levy upon the owner of a property or any person having an interest therein a betterment charge in respect of the increase in value of the property as a consequence of any development having been executed by the Authority in any development area or as a consequence of any area G other than a development area having been benefid by the development. Sec. 38 provides for the assessment of betterment charge by the Authority and Sec. 39 provides for the settlement of betterment charges by Arbitrators to be appointed by the Central Government. Sec. 40(2) authorises the recovery of any arrear of betterment charge as an arrear of land revenue. Sec. 40A further pro- H vides that any money due to the Authority on account of fees or charges, or from the disposal of lands, buildings or other properties\n\nto be recovered by the Authority as arrears of land revenue. Sec. 41 obliges the Authority to carry out such directions as may be issued to it from time to time by the Central Government. Sec. 42 requires the Authority to furnish reports, returns and other information to the Central Government as may be required from time to time.\n\nSec. 46 provides for the authentication of permissions, orders, decisions, notices and other documents by the Secretary or any other officer authorised by the Authority in that behalf.\n\nSec. 4 7 declares every rnmber and every officer a'nd other employee of the Authority to be a public servant within the meaning of Sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSec. 52 enables the Authority to delegate any power exercisable by it under the Act except the power to make regulations to such officer or local Authority as may be ment:oned in the notification.\n\nSec. 56 empowers the Central Government to make rules and Sec. 57 enables the Authority, with the previous approval of the Central Government to make regulations consistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder to carry out the purposes of the Act.\n\nEvery rule and every regulation made under the Act is rcqu:red to be laid before each House of Parliament by Sec. 58.\n\nSec. 59 empowers the Central Government to dissolve the authority if it is satisfied that the purposes for which the authority was established have been substantially achieved so as to render unnecessary its continued existence.\n\nWe see that the Delhi Dcveloprn.; nt Authority is constituted for the specific purpose of 'the development of Delhi according to plan'.\n\nPlanned development of towns is a Governmental function which is traditionally en\\rusted by the various Municipal Acts in different States to municipal bodies.\n\nWith growing specialisation, along with the growth of titanic metropolitan complexes, legi, latures have felt the need for the creation of separate town-planning or development authorities for individual cities.\n\nThe Delhi Development Authority is one such. It is thus an authority, to which is entrusted by Statute\n\na Governmental function ordinarily entrusted to municipal bodies.\n\nAn important feature of the entrustment of Governmental function is the pcwer given to the Authority to make regu!jltions (which are required to be laid before Parliament). The power to make regulation is analogous to the power usually given to municipalities to [rame bye-laws.\n\nThe activities of the Authority are limited to the local area of the Union Territory of Delhi.\n\nThe High Court appears to have assumed that the Delhi Development Authority has extra-territorial powers extending to peripheral areas in the adjoining States.\n\nThere is no basis in the Statute for the assumption made by the High Court.\n\n• •\n\n• '\n\nThere is then an element of popular representation in the consti- A tution of the Authority.\n\nRepresentatives of the inhabitants of the locality, three elected from among the members of the Delhi Municipal Corporation and two elected from among the members of the Delhi Metropolitan Council, figure among its members.\n\nWhat of autonomy?\n\nThe Master Plan and the Zonal plans B prepared by the Authority have to be approved by the Central Government, the budget has to be forwarded to the Central Government, annual returns have to be submitted to the Government and the directions that the Central Government may give have to be carried out.\n\nBut within these bounds, the Authority enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy, as is seen from the summary of the provisions C of the Act which has been set out by us.\n\nThe powers of the Central Government over the Delhi Development Authority are the usual supervisory powers which every State Government exercises over municipalities, district boards etc.\n\nSuch powers of supervision do not make the municipalities disautonomous and mere satellites.\n\nWe finally come to the important question whether the legislature has vested any power of taxation in the Authority.\n\nOne of the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent was that the fund of the Authority, required to be maintained by\n\n~.cc. 23 of the Delhi Development Act, was not a local fund as no part of it flowed directly from any taxing power vested in the Delhi Development Authority.\n\nThe submission of the learned counsel was that the fees collected under Sec. 12 of the Act and the charges levied under Sec. 37 of the Act did not part-take the character of tax but were mere fees which were the quid pro quo for the services which were required to be performed by the Delhi Development Authority under the Act.\n\nWe were referred to Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Orissa & Ors.(I) We are unable to agree with the submission made on behalf of the respondents.\n\nIn the first place when it is said that one of the attributes of a local authority is the power to raise funds by the method of taxation, taxation is to be understood not in any fine and narrow sense as to include only those compulsory exactions of money imposed for public purpose and requiring no consideration to sustain it, but in a broad generic sense as to also include fees levied essentially for services rendered. It is now well recognised that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee; both are compulsory exactions of money by public authority. In deciding the qnestion whether an authority is a local authority, our concern is only to find out whether the public\n\n(!) [196lj 2 S.C.R. 537\n\nauthority is authorised by Statute to make a compulsory exaction of money and not with the further question whether the money so exacted\n\nis to be utilised for specific or general purposes. In the second place the Delhi Development Authority is constituted for the sole purpose of the planned development of Delhi and no other purpose and there is a merger, as it were, of specific and general purposes.\n\nThe statutory situation is such that the distinction between tax and fee has withered away.\n\nIn the third place we see no reason to hold that the charge contemplated by Sec. 37 is a fee and not a tax.\n\nThe case cited: The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Orissa & Ors.,(1) hl!s no application. That was a case .where the Government was empowered to levy a cess for the purpose of the development of the mining areas in the State. The cess levied was not to become a part of the consolidated fund and was not subject to an appropriation in that behalf; it went into the special fund earmarked for carrying out the purpose of the Act.\n\nThere was a definite corelation between the proposed services and the im11ost levied and it could e legitimately claimed that the rate-payer in substance was compensating the State for the services rendered by it to him.\n\nIn the present case there is no consolidated fund and no separate development\n\nfuad.\n\nThere is only one fund, the Fund of the Delhi Development Authority. What is more important, nor is there any question of any co-relation between the betterment charge and the expenditure incurred by the Authority in carrying out the purposes of the Act.\n\nThe charge is not levied on the basis of the expenditure incurred. It is levied on the basis of the increase in the value of the 11roperty consequent on the development of the area; one may say the charge is on the accrued capital gain; it may bear no proportion whatsoever to the cost of development.\n\nA submission of the learned counsel was that the Delhi Development Act itself referred in several places to local authorities as distinguished from Delhi Development Authority. It is true that in Sections 12, 15, 30, 31, 34, 36, 42 and some other provisions we find a reference to 'local authority concerned' meaning thereby the ordinary G local authority functioning in the area discharging a multiplicity of civic functions.\n\nThe Delhi Municipal Corporation for example is one such local authority. The Delhi Development Authority is constituted for performing one of the several functions which a local authority may perform. That the local authorities performing other functions are referred to as 'local authorities' in the Act by which the Delhi\n\nH Development Authority is created, while the Delhi Development Authority is referred to as the Authority, is no ground for holding\n\n(1) [1961] S.C.R. 537\n\n• •\n\nthat the Delhi Development Authority is not a 'local authority' as defined by Sec. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act.\n\nThe Delhi Development Authority is endowed with all the usual attributes and characteristics of a 'local authority' and there is no reason to hold that it is not a 'local authority'.\n\nAnother submission of the learned counsel which was pressed upon us was that every statute dealing with municipalities and providing for their supersession .and/or disolution invariably provided for reconstitution of the municipality after a stipulated period wherea1 dissolution in the case of the Delhi Development Authority meant a complete extinction of the authority since the Act did not provide for its reconstitution.\n\nOur attention was drawn to the municipalities Acts of various States.\n\nWe are unable to see the force of the submission. The very nature of the work entrnsted by the legislature to the development authority is such that its life can be but transient.\n\nWhen the work is accomplished and there is nu need for its continued existence it is dissolved and its life becomes extinct. It is by what it is during its life and not by the consideration whether there is life after death and whether it can have many lives, that we determine whether the Delhi Development Authority is a local authority as defined in S.3(31) of the General Clauses Act.\n\nOn a consideration of all the aspects of the matter placed before us we are of the opinion that the Delhi Development Auhority is a Local Authority and therefore, the provision of the Payme\"nt of Bonus Act are not attracted. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed and the Writ Petition filed in the High Court is dismissed.\n\nHowever, we do wish to observe that the Delhi Development Authority may not only be a model for development activities but may strive to be a model employer too. Bonus was paid to the employees for over ten years and we were not told of any reason for withdrawing this J_,.-- benefit from the employees. Merely because the Law Department advised that they were not bound to pay bonus, they were not obliged to withd.raw the benefit. The question which ought to have been considered was not whether they were legally bound to pay bonus but whether in the context of sound management-labour relations, bonus should continue to be paid. It is a matter which we earnestly desire\n\nthe Delhi Development Authority may reconsider. There is no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed .\n\n8-2!4SCI/81", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. C. JAIN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. C. JAIN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 17, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 17, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK, 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 32(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 297, "end_char": 317, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 557, "end_char": 584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Development Authority, a statutory body created under the Delhi Development Act, 1957 for the development of Delhi according to plan, paid bonus to its employees for a period of ten years upto the year 1973-74, but later discontinued payment of bonus on the a<lvice of the Ministry of La\\v."}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 672, "end_char": 677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Development Authority, a statutory body created under the Delhi Development Act, 1957 for the development of Delhi according to plan, paid bonus to its employees for a period of ten years upto the year 1973-74, but later discontinued payment of bonus on the a<lvice of the Ministry of La\\v."}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1322, "end_char": 1342, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1426, "end_char": 1446, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1453, "end_char": 1472, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1905, "end_char": 1924, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1943, "end_char": 1964, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 S.C.R. 251", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3627, "end_char": 3646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 3 S.C.R. 868", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3738, "end_char": 3757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this Fund are to be credited all the moneys received from the Central Government by way of grants, loans, advances or otherwise; all moneys received by way of loans of debentures; all fees and charges received by the Authority; all moneys received from the disposal of lands, buildings and other properties, all moneys received by way of rents and profits or in any other manner."}}, {"text": "fact that the Delhi Development Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7224, "end_char": 7259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7383, "end_char": 7410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "864 El\n\nThe fact that the Delhi Development Act refers in several sections to \"local authority concerned\" meaning thereby the ordinary local authority (as for example the Delhi Municipal Corporation) functioning in the area discharging a multiplicity of civic functions as distinguished from the Delhi Development Authority, which performs one of the several functions that a Jocal authority performs, is no ground for holding that rhe Delhi Develop-- ment Authority is not a local authority."}}, {"text": "Delhi Develop-- ment Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7648, "end_char": 7678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "864 El\n\nThe fact that the Delhi Development Act refers in several sections to \"local authority concerned\" meaning thereby the ordinary local authority (as for example the Delhi Municipal Corporation) functioning in the area discharging a multiplicity of civic functions as distinguished from the Delhi Development Authority, which performs one of the several functions that a Jocal authority performs, is no ground for holding that rhe Delhi Develop-- ment Authority is not a local authority."}}, {"text": "Nor does the fact that other Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7811, "end_char": 7853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8476, "end_char": 8495, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8690, "end_char": 8702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, S. P. Nayar and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8704, "end_char": 8715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, S. P. Nayar and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nSubhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8725, "end_char": 8739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, S. P. Nayar and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mirdul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8760, "end_char": 8772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mirdul and P. N. Gupta for Respondents 1-5."}}, {"text": "P. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8777, "end_char": 8788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mirdul and P. N. Gupta for Respondents 1-5."}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9039, "end_char": 9064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 32(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9069, "end_char": 9080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act 1965"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Law", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9519, "end_char": 9534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that for about ten years prior to 1973- 74 bonus was paid to the employees of the Delhi Development Authority but it was stopped thereafter on the advice of the Ministry of Law."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9649, "end_char": 9665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1139/79 in the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9717, "end_char": 9731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and the Union of India and the Delhi Development Anthority have preferred this appeal, after obtaining special leave of this Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act 1965"}}, {"text": "payment of Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9932, "end_char": 9952, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9988, "end_char": 10007, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10053, "end_char": 10056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Bonus Act 1965", "statute": "the Payment of Bonus Act 1965"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10370, "end_char": 10389, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10853, "end_char": 10863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It E would be a new terror in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some\n\nAct which is not incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone\" (per Loreburn L.C. in Macbeth v. Chislett.(')."}}, {"text": "Loreburn L.C.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11063, "end_char": 11076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It E would be a new terror in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some\n\nAct which is not incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone\" (per Loreburn L.C. in Macbeth v. Chislett.(')."}}, {"text": "Cattle Trespass Act 1871", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11221, "end_char": 11245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec.3(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11391, "end_char": 11400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cattle Trespass Act 1871", "statute": "the Cattle Trespass Act 1871"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11408, "end_char": 11427, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec.3(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11479, "end_char": 11488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cattle Trespass Act 1871", "statute": "the Cattle Trespass Act 1871"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13814, "end_char": 13826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(1) Hidayatullah, J., described some of the attributes of local bodies in this manner :\n\nF \"Local bodies are subordinate branches of governmental activity."}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14678, "end_char": 14688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14696, "end_char": 14721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15156, "end_char": 15177, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15184, "end_char": 15211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15382, "end_char": 15391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Delhi Development Act, 1957", "statute": "The Delhi Development Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15647, "end_char": 15653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Delhi Development Act, 1957", "statute": "The Delhi Development Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16069, "end_char": 16099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The non-official members are to include two representatives of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to be elected by the Councillors and aldermen of the Municipal Corporation from among themselves and three representatives of the Metropolitan Council for the Union Territory of Delhi to be elected by the members of the Metropolitan Council from among themselves."}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Council for the Union Territory of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16230, "end_char": 16283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The non-official members are to include two representatives of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to be elected by the Councillors and aldermen of the Municipal Corporation from among themselves and three representatives of the Metropolitan Council for the Union Territory of Delhi to be elected by the members of the Metropolitan Council from among themselves."}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16407, "end_char": 16413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16898, "end_char": 16903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17494, "end_char": 17502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17572, "end_char": 17577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17677, "end_char": 17684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18122, "end_char": 18128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18282, "end_char": 18289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18292, "end_char": 18299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Gowrnment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18471, "end_char": 18488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After acquiring the land the Central Gowrnment may tra'nsfer the land to the Authority or any local authority on payment by the Authority or the local authority of the compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act and all the charges incurred by the Government."}}, {"text": "Sec. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19102, "end_char": 19109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19336, "end_char": 19343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20029, "end_char": 20036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20169, "end_char": 20176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20392, "end_char": 20399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20514, "end_char": 20521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20630, "end_char": 20637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20700, "end_char": 20707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20882, "end_char": 20889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21084, "end_char": 21091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21094, "end_char": 21101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21322, "end_char": 21329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21332, "end_char": 21339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21588, "end_char": 21595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21600, "end_char": 21607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21773, "end_char": 21780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22088, "end_char": 22095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22471, "end_char": 22478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22549, "end_char": 22556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 40(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22665, "end_char": 22675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 40A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22765, "end_char": 22773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22985, "end_char": 22992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23112, "end_char": 23119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23258, "end_char": 23265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23444, "end_char": 23450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23575, "end_char": 23582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23590, "end_char": 23607, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23610, "end_char": 23617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23808, "end_char": 23815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23866, "end_char": 23873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24172, "end_char": 24179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24182, "end_char": 24189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Authority", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24927, "end_char": 24954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Development Authority is one such."}}, {"text": "Delhi Metropolitan Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25982, "end_char": 26008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Representatives of the inhabitants of the locality, three elected from among the members of the Delhi Municipal Corporation and two elected from among the members of the Delhi Metropolitan Council, figure among its members."}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27079, "end_char": 27100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27294, "end_char": 27301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27342, "end_char": 27349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29007, "end_char": 29014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30406, "end_char": 30427, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 12, 15, 30, 31, 34, 36, 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30553, "end_char": 30588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi\n\nH Development Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31103, "end_char": 31133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the local authorities performing other functions are referred to as 'local authorities' in the Act by which the Delhi\n\nH Development Authority is created, while the Delhi Development Authority is referred to as the Authority, is no ground for holding\n\n(1) [1961] S.C.R. 537\n\n• •\n\nthat the Delhi Development Authority is not a 'local authority' as defined by Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31349, "end_char": 31359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31367, "end_char": 31386, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.3(31)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32605, "end_char": 32612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32620, "end_char": 32639, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Auhority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32742, "end_char": 32768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a consideration of all the aspects of the matter placed before us we are of the opinion that the Delhi Development Auhority is a Local Authority and therefore, the provision of the Payme\"nt of Bonus Act are not attracted."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_866_893_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RAMESHCHANDRA KACHARDAS PORWAL & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. ETC.\n\nFebruary 17, 1981\n\n(R. S. PATHAK, 0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY A~D BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article 91 ( 1) (~)-Maharashtra Agricultural • P1oduce Marketing, (Regulation) Act 1963, SS : and 6 & Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Afarketing (Regulation) Rules 1963, Rule 5-Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Acl 1966, SS. 8, 10 and 11 'ii:,_.\n\nBilzar Agricultural Produce Marketing Act 1960 Sections 5, 15-Trading in specified agricultural produce-State Government--Setting up of new market area-Whether valid.\n\nNotification declaring that traditional trading acllvlty in old market area be shifted to new 1narket-Whether permissible-lnf1ingement of fundamental right to carry on trade-Whether arises.\n\nAdtninistrative law-Principles of natural justice-Markel yard disestablisfred at one place and established at another place-l>uty to invite and hear objections-Whether arise3.\n\nThe Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1963 provides for the regulation of the marketing of agricultural produce in market area6 to be established therefor in the State, M<Lrket Committees to be constituted for purposes connected with such markets, establishment of Market Fund for purposes of the Market Committees, and for purposes connected with these matters. Section 3 empowers the Government b:r a notification to be published in the Official Gazette, to declare its intention of regulating the marketing of :such agricultural produce in such areas as rnay be specified and section 4 provides that the marketing of the agricultural produce shall be regulated. under lhe Act in the area specified in the notificatior. SeC'tlnn\n\n5 ( J) provides a principal market for every market area and On( or more subsidiary markets, and section 5(2) empowers the Director to est:Lblish the principal market for the marketing of specified agricultural produce. Section 6 provides that no person shall use any place in the market area fo: the marketing of the declared agricultural produce or operate in the market ara or in any market therein as\n\nd trader, conunission agent, broker, processor, 'veighma-n, measurer, surveyor, warehouseman or in any other capacity in rela ion to the marketing of the declared agricultural produce, on and after the date on which the declaration under section 4(1) is made. Section 6(2) prov.des that section 6(1) shall not apply to sales by retail, sales by an agriculturist who sells his own produce; and sales by a person to a-nother .for the latter's per >Onal consumption.\n\nTI1e Maharashtra Agricultural Prnduce Marketing (Regulation) Rules, 1963 were promulgated pursuant to the power confe1 Ted by section 60 of the Act.\n\nRule 5 provides that no person shall market any declared agricullutal produce in any place in a market area other than the r rincipal market or subsidiary\n\n• '\n\nR. K. PORWAL v. MAHARASHTRA 867\n\nn1arket established therein. The proviso to the rule enables the Director of A Aitark.eting to authorise a Market Committee to permit a trader or commission agent to market declared agricultural produce or to permit any other market functionary to operate at any place within the market area as may be nientioned by the Market Comn1ittee in the licence granted to such trader.\n\nThe petitioners who were wholesale traders in onions and potatoes in their writ petitions to the Supreme Court assailed the notices requiring them to carry on business in regulated agricultural produce in the market yard at the specified areas of the State, and at no other place, contending that : ( 1) the 1963 Act,\n\nJid not invest the Director of Marketing or the Market Committee with any po\\ve'r, to co1npel a trader to transfer this activity from a previously existing\n\nffiarket to a principal or subsidiary market established under section 5 of the Act (2) Rule 5 was inconsistent with section 6 and therefore ultra vires. (3) The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 and the Agricultural Pro duce Marketing Acts of other States such as Karnataka provided or indicated by an express provision tha.t once a market was established it was not permisible to market or trade outside the market and that the absence of such an expre'3s provisiou in the 1963 Act :-.howed that no such ban was coutemplatcd by the Act. ( 4) The transactions between trader and trader and transa-ctions by which the agricultural produce was imported intothe 111arket area from outside the market areas were outside the purview of the Act and if section 5 and rule 5 were intended to cover such tranactions also they \\Vere invalid. (5) The statue itself imposed and provided for stringent supervision and control, sufficient to regulate transactions between traders and traders, that it was superfluous to insist that such transactions do take place in the market only. (6) Section 6 of the Act made a distinction between (a) the use of any place jn the market area for the marketing of the declared agricultural produce, and (b) the operation in the market areas or in any market therein as a trader, commission agent, broker etc. in relation to the marketing of agricultural produce and that the distinction was in reality a distinction between a sale by a producer to a trader and a subsequent sale by a trader to a trader, and consequently the ban imposed by Rule 5 applied only to a sale of the agricultural produce by a producer to a trader.\n\n(7) Section 13(1A) which declared the area comprising greate~ Bombay a market area for the purposes of the Act was invalid as it was wholly unreasonable to constitute such a large area into a single market area. ( 8) when a market yard was dis-established at one place and _.-----.-.--.. established at another place it was the duty of the concerned authority to invite and hear objections and failing to do so, was a violation of the principles of natural justice and the notification establishing the market yard elsewhere was bad.\n\nI '\n\nDismissing the writ petitions and appeals :-\n\nl-lELD: 1. (i) The power cunferred by S. 5 of the Act to establish a principal market or a subsidiary market carries with it the power to dis-csta-blish such market. Section 5 of the Act, read \\Vith section<; 14 and 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act vest enongh power in the Director to close H an existing market and establish it elsewhere. The repealed Act of 1939 also empowered the State Government to declare any market area to be a principal market yard for the area. 'The power to issue notifications, orders etc. includes\n\nSUPREME COURT REP, JRTS\n\n(1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA the power to exercise in like manner to add to, 'mend, vary or rescind any notification, order, rule etc.\n\nAny other construction would frustrate the object of the legislation. [880 A-C, 881 C, D]\n\nBapubhai Ratanchand Shah v. State of Bomlay LVII 1955 Born.\n\nL.R. p. 892, 903-904, approved.\n\n(ii) Rule 5 is not ultra vires.\n\nJf for the n1ore effective regulation of marketing it is thought that all marketing ope1 ations in respect of declared agricultural produce should be carried on only i 11 the principal and subsidiary markets established under the Act, it cannot be ; aid that a rule made fei:, that purpose is beyond the competence of the rule making authority under the Act. [881G, 882C]\n\n(iii) 'fhe submission that all regulatory mea:; ures contemplated by the Act and the Rules may be enforced equally effecthely wherever business in agricultural produce is carried on in the market ar!a outside the principal and subsidiary markets as within the principal and sub:ddiary markets is without force.\n\nIf that is done, the regulation will very soar. be reduced to a farce.\n\nThe Market Committee will be forced to employ an unduly large number of officers.\n\nThe producer's interest will not be properly serv!d because a producer will not be able to deal face to face with several trader> and would have little chance of obtaining the best price for his produce. T:1is cannot happen if he is persuaded to take his produce to the place of busiress of an individual trader outside the principal or subsidiary market. There .s a greater possibility of abuse and greater likelihood of the object of the Act being frustrated. Fair price to the agriculturist will soon be a mirage and the !Vil sought to be prevented will persist. [882 E-H]\n\nKewal Krishan Puri & Anr. v. State of PuHjab & Ors. [1979]\n\n3 S.C.R. p. 1217, 1247, referred to.\n\n2. There can be no question of any incoHsistency between section 6 and rule 5. Section 6 is applicable to both the sltuations before and after the establishment of mairkets, and is expressly declared to be subject to the rules prc.viding for regulating the marketing of agricultural produce in the market~-~ area by stipulating that the marketing shall be carried on in the market esta blished in the market area. [883F, D~E]\n\n3. 'The rule prescribing that no marketing operation in any declared agri~ cultural produce shall be carried on outside th! principal or subsidiary market-;\n\nis consistent and in consonance with the sche1 nc of the Act and is within the competence of the rule making authority and is reasonable. Absence of an express provision in the Act to the effect that once a market is established it was not permissible to market or trade in agricultural prcxluce outside the market itself merely means that greater latitude is given to the rule making authority to introduce regulation of marketing by stages and to b&n all marketing activity outside the market. This cannot I !ad to the inference that the rule making authority has no po\\ver to make a rule banning marketing activity\n\n' '\n\n, •\n\nR. K. PORWAL V. MAHARASHTRA 869\n\noutside the market once the market is established even when such a ban is found A to be necessary. [884 B, 883 H-884 Al\n\n4. (i) The assumption that the Act was conceived in the interest of the agriculturists on1y and intended for their sole benefit is not well founded.\n\nOne of the principal objects sought to be achieved by the Act is the securing of a fair price to the agriculturist for his produce oy the elimination of middlemen\n\nand other detracting factors.\n\nBut that is not the only object. The Act is intended to regulate marketing of agricultural and certain other produce. The marketing of agricultural produce is not confined to the first transaction of sale by _the producer to the trader but must necessarily include all subsequent tran&--\n\nactions in the course of the movement of the commodity into the ultimate hands of the consumer so long, of course, as the commodity retains its original character &S agricultural prcx:1uce. While middlemen are sought to be eliminated, it is wrong to view the Act as one aimed at legitimate and genuine traders. [884D- F]\n\n(ii) Promotion of grading, standardisation of agricultural produce, weighn1ent, the provision for settlement of disputes arising out of transactions connected with the marketing of agricultural produce and oo.cilliary matters\n\nare as much to the benefit of the producer as the consumer. Oearly there- D fore the regulation of marketing contemplated by the Act involves benefits to the traders too in a large way.\n\nRegulation of marketing of agricultural produce, if confined to the sales by producers within the marketing area to traders, wilt very soon lead to circumvention in the guise of sales by traders to traders or import of agricultural produce from outside the market area to within the market area. [884G-885BJ\n\n5. (i) It is not correct to say that the statute itself imposed and provided for such stringent supervision, and control sufficient and more, to regulate transactions between traders and traders, that it was superfluous to insist that\n\nsuch transactions do take place in the market only. The other supervisory measures in the Act cannot be said to be sufficient to make it unnecessary for the traders to move their places of business into the market. No amount of supervision may be as effective as when all the transactions take place within the market. Nor is effective supervision at all possible if traders are dispersed all over the market area. The rendering of services to the traders also will be far easier. Therefore, localising marketing i'i helpful and necessary for regula~ tion and control and for providing facilities. [887E-888A]\n\n(ii) The requirement that the locus of transactions of sale and purchase of agricultural produce, including those between trade and trader, should be in the market cannot be said to be harsh or an excessive restriction on the Fundamental Right to carry on trade. [888B]\n\n6. The proviso to ru1e 5 speaks of operating at any place within the mar~ ket area by a trader, commission agent or other market functionary after obtaining a licence while the main provision refers to the marketing of dee~ tared agricultural produce at any place in the market area. It cannot be contended that 1he proviso is unrelated to the main provision. According\n\nA to ordinary canons of construction the proper function of a proviso is to accept and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within rhe general language of the main enactment. [888F-G]\n\n7. There was nothing unreal arid unreasonable in establishing a single market for a large area. It had become imperative in the public interest that the markets should be shifted from their former place to the new area.\n\nThe present village was chosen because it was free from congestion, conveniently located near another trunk road.\n\nA railway line linking with both the Western Railway and the' Central Railway and so on. There is, therefore, nothing unreasonable in the statutory declaration of Greater Bombay and Turbhe Villa.ge as a market area; nor in the establishment of a single market in Turbhe Village, for the entire market area. [889B-E]\n\n8. Where a market yard was dis-established at one place and established at another place, no exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function is involved.\n\nAll that is involved is the declaration by a notification of the Government that a certain place shall be a principal market yard for a market area, upon which declaration certain statutory provision.<;; at once spring into action and certain consequences prescribed by statute follow forthwith. The making of the decla ration in this context is an act legislative in character ood does not obligate the observance of the rules of natural justice. [89!C-F]\n\nBaits v. Lord Hai/sham (1972) I WLR 1373 & Tulsipur Sugar Co. v. Notified Arca Committee [1980] 2 SCR 1111 referred to.\n\n9. The seeming confusion in the large number of notifications issued by the Government from time to time was not the result of any arbitrary or erratic action on the part of the Government but was the result of a desire to accommodate the traders as much as possible. The old markets had existed from ancient days and it had become necessary to establish modem market yar9s\n\nwith conveniences and facilities. When this was sought to be done there were representations by the traders and the Government thought that it was advisable to give the traders sufficient time to enable them to prepare themselves fo move into the new market yards.\n\nThe notifications establishlng new market yards V.'ere therefore, cancelled and the old markets were allowed to function for some-\n\n' •\n\ntime. L'lter when th'°' time was thought to be ripe, notifications establishing new market yards were once again issued.\n\n[893 F, D-E]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 692, 937-1063, 1111- G 1115, 1558/80, 5441-62, 6217 /80 and 6529-6551180.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 3297 & 2689 of 1979.\n\nH Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Orders dated 25-5-1979 & 22-1-1979 of the Karnataka High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 551/77 & W.P. Nos. 551/77 and 6555/78.\n\n' 4\n\nR. K. PORWAL V. MAHARASHTRA\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1895 of 1979 .\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-1-1979 of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. No. 35/76.\n\nAND B\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1507 oj 1980.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2-5-1980 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 394 of 1980.\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1715-1716 of 1980.\n\nAppeals by special from the Judgements and Orders dated 30-8-1979 and 2-5-1980 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. Nos. 5136/78 & 840/80.\n\nS. V. Gupte, V. M. Tarkunde, Soli l. Sorabjee, K. K. Venugopal, K. N. Bhatt and T. S. Sundrajan for the Petitioners in WP Nos. 692,\n\n937-~063 and 1111-1115/80.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, R. P. Bhatt and A. K. Goel for the P0titioner in W.P. No. 1558/80.\n\nS. G. Sundraswamy, Ravindran, Vijay Kumar Verma and K. N.\n\nBhat for the Appellant in CA Nos. 1895/79 & 2689/79.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, K. R. Nagaraja, P. K. Rao and Aloke Bhattacharya for the Appellant in CA No. 3297 /79.\n\nSoU l. Sorabjee, B. P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi and Miss Asha F _/~ lain for the Appellant in CA No. 1507/80.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, attorney General, 0. P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 1 in WP Nos. 692, 937-1063 and 1111-1115/80.\n\nA. K. Goyal for the Petitioner in WP 5441-62 of 1980.\n\nK. K. Singhvi, A. K. Gupta, Brij Bhushan and N. P. Mahindru for RR-3 in WP 692, 937-1063, 1111-1115/80 and RR in WP No. 1558/80.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Attorney General and N. Nettar for RR-1 in CA 1895 and 2689/79 .\n\nB. Keshava Iyengar, Advocate General and N. Nettar for State of Karnataka in CA 1895 & 2689/79.\n\nH -\n\nEl. B. Datar, Miss Madhu Maalchandani and R. B. Datar for RR-2 in CA 1895 & 2689/79.\n\nK. K. Singhvi, N. P. Mahindru and A. K. Gupta for RR No. 3 in WP Nos. 5441-62/80.\n\n8 S. S. Javali, B. P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar and Ravi Prakash for Interc\n\nvener in CA Nos. 1895/79.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, R. B. Mehta, B. P. Sinha and Naresh K. Sharma for the Intervener in WP No. 692/80. ' ,\n\nLal Narain Si{lha, Attorney General, R. B. Mehta, B. P. Singh,-··y- Ravi Prakash, Ranjit Kumar and Naresh K. Sharma for RR 3-5 in CA ' 1507/80.\n\nK. G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for State of Bihar in CA 1507 /80.\n\nS.S. Ray and M. P. Jha for the Appellant in CA 1715-1716/80.\n\nO Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, R. B. Mehta, B. P.\n\nSingh.\n\nRavi Prakash, Ranjit Kumar, Naresh K. Sharma and J. S. Rathare for RR 3-5 in CA Nos. 1715-1716/80.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, K. R. Nagaraja, P. K. Rao and Aloke Bhattacharya for Petitioner in WP 6217 /80, 6529-6551/80.\n\nE H. B. Datar, Miss Madhu Maolchandani and R. B. Dattar for the\n\nRespondent (Market Committee).\n\nH. B. Datar and N. Nettar for RR (State of Knrnataka).\n\nK. G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the State of Bihar in CA 1715-1716/80.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, P. K. Rao, Aloke Bhattacharya and K. R. Nagaraja for the Petitioner in WP 6529-51/80. ~---\n\nN. Nettar for the Respondent in WP No. 6529-51/80.\n\nThe Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nReluctant traders, nu-willing to move their places of business into the markets or market yards, as they are differently called in the States of Maharashtra, Bihar and Karnaraka, set up ' by respective Market Committees under various State Agricultural PrP.. duce Marketing Acts, offer their resistance through these Writ Petitions H and Civil Appeals.\n\nWe will first recite the facts in one of the cases , (Writ Petition No. 692 of 1980) and thereafter consider the questions niised in that os well as the other cases.\n\nThe Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 692 of 1980 is a trader presently carrying on business in 'GU11' and other co=odities at 1221 Bhavani Peth, Pune. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 4A(2) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, by a notification dated July 6, 1961, the locality known as Bhavanipeth and Nanapeth of the Pune City was declared as one of the principal market yards for the market area consisting of Pune City and Haveli Talukas.\n\nThe market area had been so declared by a notification dated May 1, 1957, pursuant to a declaration that it was intended to regulate the purchase and sale of 'gur\" in the market ciea. The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, was repealed and replaced by the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce\n\nMarketing (Regulation) Act, 1963.\n\nBy Sec. 64 of the Act the notifications previously issued etc. under the provisions of the repealed Act were kept alive for the purposes of the new Act. On March 23, 1971, the present Market Committee known as Krishi Utpanna Bazar samiti, Pune, was constituted under Sec. 4 (I) of the 1963 Act. On April 21, 1971, the Director of Agricultural Marketing published a notification declaring his intention to regulate marketing of a large number of commodities in the market area of Haveli and Pune City Taluks. On October 4, 1975, the Director of Agricultural Marketing, Maharashtra State,\n\nexercising his powers under Sec. 5(2) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963, declared the locality known as Market Yard Gultekadi as the principal market for the market area for the marketing of various commodities specified in the notification.\n\nThereafter on October 8, 1975, a Circular was issued to all Adatis, merchants, and licence holders, particularly wholesale dealers dealing in Gur. Halad, Dhania, etc. in the vicinity of Bhavanipcth-Nanapeth informing them that Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth will cea5e to be a market from the midnight of October 13, 1975 and that the market yard Gultekadi had been declared as the principal market for the market area. The circular went on to say that anyone carrying on business anywhere except Gultekadi was liable to be prosecuted. The result of the notification dated October 4, 1975, and the Circular dated October 8, 1975 was that it was not permissible for anyone to\n\ncan-y on trade in any of the notified agricultural commodities outside the Gultekadi market yard on and after October 14, 1975. It meant that traders like the petilioner who had for generations been carrying on business in these commodities in Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth had perforce to move into Gultekadi market yard if they wanted lO stay in the business. Consequent upon representations made by the Pune Merchants Chamber and the interim order in a Writ Petition filed in the Bombay High Court by the Chamber the date notified for the commencement of the functioning of the Principal Market in Gullekadi\n\nwas postponed from time to time.\n\nFinally, by a public notice dated March 6, 1980, all wholesale traders, commission agents and other~\n\ndealing in agricultural produce in Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth and surrounding areas were informed that with effect from March 17, 1980, whole.<ale trade in the regulated agricultural produce could be carried on in the Gultekadi market yard only.\n\nThe petitioner seeks to resist the situation thus sought to be forced upon him and challenges the notifiction dated October 4, 1975, and the consequential notices requjring liim to carry on business in regulated agricultural prodl!ce in the GuLtekadi market yard and at no other place.\n\nSimilarly, lit -~ Writ Petition Nos. 937 to 1063 of 1980 and Writ Petition Nos. 1111 to 1115 of 1980, 132 other traders who are presently carrying on business in the existing market of Bhavanipeth-N anapeth question the notification and the notices following the notification.\n\nIn Writ Petition Nos. 1558 of 1980 and 5441 to 5462 of 1980 the petitioners are wholesale traders in onions and potatoes who carry on their business in the Maulana Azad Road Market in Bombay.\n\nThey complain against a notification dated December 5, 1978 by which it was declared that after January 26, 1979, marketing of potatoes and onions shall be carried on at the Principal Market at Turbhe and at no other place. It appears that initially, for the market area comprising Greater Bombay and Turbhe Village in Thana Taluka, the newly established market at Turbhe was declared as the Principal Market and the existing markets at Maulana Azad Road and Mahatma Phule Manclai were declared subsidiary markets. This was by a notification dated January 15, 1977. Later by the impugned notification dated December 5, 1978, the subsidiary markets were abolished and the market at Turbhe alone was declared as the Principal Market for the area comprising Greater Bombay and Turbhe village.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1963 did not invest the Director of Marketing or the Market Committee with any power to compel a trader to transfer his activity from a previously exisling market to a principal or subsidiary market established under Sec. 5 of the Act. There was no provision in the Act by which a trader could be compelled. to market declared agricultural produce in the principal or subsidiary market established under Sec. 5 and in no other place. This was a feature which distingnished it from the Bombay Act of 1939 and the Agricultural Produce Marketing Acts of some other States.\n\nRule 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Rules, 1967, which purported to provide that no person shall market any declared agricultural produce\n\n-~·.\n\n, •\n\nin any place in a market area other than the Principal Market or subsidiary market established therein was ultra vires. It was also submitted that once a principal or subsidiary_ market was established at one place there was no provision in the Act which enabled the principal or subsidiary market to be transferred to another place. In any event it was urged that the notification was an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on their trade. It was also submit_ted. and this appeared to be the main thrust of the argument of most of the counsel for the various petitioners that the Act did not cover transactions between trader and trader and transactions by which the agricultural produce was imported into the market area from outside the market area. Secs. 5 and 6 and Rules 5 and 6 had to be so read-the language permitted such a construction-as to make. a distinction between a sale of agricultural produce by a producer to a trader which had to be within a: market and a subsequent sale by a trader to a trader which could be anywhere in the market area.\n\nIt was submitted that if Sections 5 and 6 and Rules 5 and 6 were to be construed as compelling transactions between trader and trader also to take place within a market they were invalid. In the petitions of the Bombay merchants it was further urged that Sec. 13(1A) which was a special provision declaring Greater Bombay and Turbhe village a Market Area was unreasonable and invalid.\n\nFor a proper appreciation of the submissions made, it is necessary to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1963 and the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Rules\n\n1967. The long title of the Act is \"An Act to regulate the marketing of agricultural and certain other produce in market areas and markets to be established therefor in the State; to confer powers upon Market Commiltees to be constituted in connection with or acting for purposes connected with such markets; to establish Market Fund for purposes of the Market Committees and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid\".\n\nSec. 2 (1 )(h) defines 'market\" as meaning \"any principal market established for the purposes of this Act and also a subsidiary market\". Sec. 2(1) (i) defines \"market area\" as meaning\n\n\"an area specified in a declaration made under Sec. 4\".\n\nSec. 2(1) (o) defines \"retail sale\" as meaning \"in relation to any agricultural produce, sale of that produce not exceeding such quantity as a Market Committee may by bye-laws determine to be a retail sale\". Sec. 2(1) (t) defines \"trader\" as meaning \"a person who buys or sells agricultural produce, as a principal or as duly auth-orised agent of one or more persons\" .\n\nSec. 3 empowers the Government to declare its intention of regulating the marketing of such agricultural produce, in such area as may be\n\nspecified in a notification to be published in the official Gazette. Objections or suggestions which may be received by the State Government within a specified period are to be considered by the State Government.\n\nThereafter, Sec. 4 provides, the State Government may declare, by another notification that the marketing of the agricultural produce specified in the notification shall be regulated under the Act in the area specified in the notification.\n\nThe area specified shall be the 11U1rket area. Sec. 5 (1) provides that there shall be a principal market for every market area and there may also be one of more subsidiary markets.\n\nSec 5 (2) empowers the Director, by notification, to establish any place in any market area to be the principal market for the marketing of agricultural produce specified in the notification.\n\nSubsidiary markets may also be established likewise.\n\nSec. 5 is important and it may, therefore, be extracted here :\n\n\"5 (1 ) For every market area, there shall be established a principal market, and there may be established one or more subsidiary markets.\n\n(2)The Director shall, as soon as possible after the issue of a notification under sub-section {l) of section 4, by a notification in the Official Gazette establish any place (including any structure, enclosure, open place or locality) in any market area to be the principal market for the marketing of the agricultural produce specified in that notification; and may by the same notification, or by like notification, establish in any other like places in the market area, subsidiary markets for the marketing of such agricultural produce\".\n\nSec. 6 provides that, no person shall use any place in the market area for the marketing of the declared agricultural produce or operate in the market area or in any market therein as a trader, conlffiission agent, broker, processor, weighman, 1neasurer, surveyor, warehouseman or in any other capacity in relation to the marketing G of the declared agricultural produce, on and after the date on which the declaratiDn under Sec. 4( 1) is made, except in conformity with the terms and conditions of a licence granted by the Market Committee or by the Director when a Market Committee has not yet started functioning.\n\nIt is important to mention here that Sec. 6(1) is expressly made subject to the rules providing for regulating the H marketing of agricullural produce in any place in the market area.\n\nSec. 6(2) also provides that Sec. 6(1) shall not apply to sales by retail; sales by an agriculturist who sells his own produce; and sales\n\n' •\n\n' •\n\nby a person to another for the latter's personal consumption.\n\nSec. 6 also may be extracted here :\n\n\" ( 6)(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of the rules providing for regulating the marketing of agricultural produce in any place in the market area, no person shall, on and alter the date on which the declaration is made under sub-section ( 1) of section 4, without, or otherwise than in conformity with the terms and conditions of, a licence (granted by the Director when a Market Committee has not yet started functioning; and in any other case, by the Market Committee) in this behalf, -\n\n(a) use any place in the market area for the marketing of the declared agricultural produce, or\n\n(b) operate in the market area or in any market therein as a trader, commission agent, broker, processor, weighman, measurer, surveyor, warehouseman or in any other capacity in relation to the marketing of the declared agricultural produce.\n\n(2) Nothing in sub-section (I) shall apply to sales by retail; sttles by an agriculturist who sells his own produce; nor to sales by a person where he himself, sells to another who buys for his personal consumption or the consumption of any member of his family.\"\n\nSec. 7 empowers the Market Committee, subject to rules made in that behalf and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit to grant or renew a licence for the use of any place in the market area for marketing of the agricultural produce or for operating therein as a trader etc. The Market Committee may refuse to grant or renew any licence for reasons to be recorded in writing. Sec. 8 enables the Market Committee to suspend or cancel any licence. Sec. 10 makes provision for the constitution of a Board by the Market Committee for the settlement of disputes between buyers and sellers or their agents inclu\" sive of disputes relating to quality, weight, payment etc.\n\nSec. 11 provides for the establishment of a Market Committee by the State Government.\n\nSections 12 and 13 deal with the incorporation and constitution of Market Committees.\n\nSec. 13 (IA) makes special provision for Greater Bombay and Turbhe village.\n\nThe area corn\" prising Greater Bombay and Turbhe village is deemed to be a market area for the purposes of the Act and a Market Committee is constituted with a different composition from other Market Committees.\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981) 2 S.C.R,\n\nSec. 29 enumerates the powers and duties of Maket Committees. It is the duty of a Market Committee to implement the provisions of the Act, the rules and bye-laws made thereunder in the market area, to provide such facilities for marketing of agricultural produce therein as the Director may from time to time direct and to do such other acts as may be required in relation to the superintendence, direction and control of markets or for regulating marketing of agricultural produce in any place in the market area. The Market Committee is also empowered to maintain and manage the market, including admissions to, and conditions for use of, markets; to regulate marketing of agricultural produce in the market area of the market; to establish ce11tres for the collection of such agricultural produce in the market area as the Slate Government may notify from time to time; to collect, maintain, disseminate and supply information in respect of production, sale, storage, processing, prices and movement of agricultural produce (including information relating to crops, statistics and marketing intelligence) ; to take all possible steps to prevent adulteration; to promote grading and standardisation of agricultural produce; and, to enforce the provisions of the Act, rules and bye-Jaws and conditions of licences.\n\nSec. l OA enables the Market Committee to open Collection Centres for marketing of notified produce.\n\nAny person wishing to sell any notified produce in a market area may tender such produce at the collection centre.\n\nSec. 31 makes it competent to a Market Committee to levy and collect fees from every purchaser of agricultural produce marketed in the market area.\n\nSec. 35 enables a Market Committee to employ a Secretary and such other officers and servants as may be necessary for the management of the market, for the collection, maintenance, dissemination and supply of information relating to crops, statistics and marketing intelligence and for carrying out its dnties under the Act.\n\nSec. 36 provides for the creation of Market Fund and Sec. 37 enumerates the purposes for which the Market Fund may be expended.\n\nAmong those purposes are the acquisition of a site or sites for the market, maintenance, development and improvement of the market, construction of, and repairs to buildings necessary for the purposes of such market and the health, convenience and safety of persons using it, maintenance of standard weights and measures, collection and dissemination of information, propaganda for agricultural improvement and orderly marketing etc. etc.\n\nSection 46 makes a contravention of the provisions of Section 6 ( 1) punishable. Section 60 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying into effect the purposes of tl:ie Act.\n\nPursuant to the power conferred by Sec. 60 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963, rules have\n\n' ~-\n\n' •\n\nbeen made. _Rule 5 prescribes that no person shall market any de~- A Jared agricultural produce in any place in a market area other than the principal market or subsidiary market established therein. The proviw to Rule 5 enables the Director of Marketing to authorise a Market Committee to permit a trader or Commission Agent to market declared agricultural produce or to permit any other market functionary to operate at any place within the market area as may be mentioned by the Market B Committee in the licence granted to such trader. This is obviously, a reserve power vested in the Market Committee to be exercised but in exceptional cases, and, on an express authorisation from the Director, subject to the terms and conditions imposed by him. Rule 6 prescribes the procedure by which any person desiring to use any place in a market area for marketing of any declared agricultural produce or for operating therein as a trader, coilllllission agent or broker may obtain c\n\na licence.\n\nHe is required to make an application in the prescribed form and submit with the application a solvency certificae, cash security or bank guarantee and a character certificate.\n\nThe Director or the Market Committee as the case may be, may grant or renew a licence, after satisfying himself or itself about the solvency certificate, cash security or bank guarantee, the capacity of the applicant for providing adequate equipment for smooth conduct of the business and the conduct of the applicant. If the licence is refused, reasons are required to be recorded in writing.\n\nRule 7 deals with the grant of licences to warehousemen, measurers, surveyors, processors, weigbmen, etc. Rule 8(2) bans the employment of a broker in relation to marketing of any declared agricultural produce except in relation to marketing of such produce by a trader with another trader. Rule 12 stipulates that every declared agricultural produce shall be sold by public auction. Rule 15 requires every declared agricultural produce to be weighed by licensed weighmen or measurer. Rule 16, 17 and 18 deal with the preparation of records in connection with the transactions of purchase of declared agricultural produce.\n\nRule 20 obliges every purchaser of declared agricultural produce to make payment lo the seller or his commissio~ agent immediately after the sale on the same day. Rule 21 prohibits the adulteration of declared agricultural produce in the market area or market. Rule 22 provides for grading and standardisation of agricultural produce. Rule 25 provides for inspection of weights and measures. Rule 27 requires the Markei Committee to publish a daily list of prices of the different varieties and grades of declared agricultural produce marketed in the market area.\n\nThere are several other rules providing for the constitution of Market Committees, preparation of their budgets, discharge of their other duties etc., but for our purpose it may not be necessary to refer to them.\n\nWe have seen that Sec. 5 authorises the establishment of a principal market and one or more subsidiary markets.\n\nQuite obviously the power to es!'ablish a principal market or a subsidiary market carries with it the power to dis-establish (if such an expression may be used) such market. Quite obviously again, the power given by Sec. 5 to establish a principal or subsidiary market may be exercised from time to time.\n\nThese follow from Sections 14 and 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act. So, Sec. 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963, read with Sections 14 and 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act vest enough power in the Director to close an existing market and establish it elsewhere. Sec. 4A(2) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, (the C Act which preceded the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation) Act, empowered the State Government to declare any , enclosure, building or locality in any market area to be a principal market yard for the area and other enclosures, building$ or localities to be one or more sub-market yards for the area.\n\nThere was a proviso to\n\nSec. 4A(2) which provided that out of the enclosures, buildings or localities declared to be market yards before the commencement of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets (Amendment) Act 1954, one shall be declared to be the principal market yard for the market area and others, if any, to be one or more sub-market yards for the area.\n\nBefore the 1954 amendment Act Vakhar Bagh was the market yard for a certain market area. In October 1954, (after the 1954 amendment came into force) Vakhar Bagh was declared as the principal market yard for the market area under the proviso to S. 4A(2) of the Act. A few days later another notification was issued declaring some other place as the principal market yard for the market area. Vakhar Bagh was not even declared as a sub-market yard. The effect was that Vakhar Bagh Market Yard ceased to be a market yard.\n\nThis was questioned in Bapubhai Ratanchand Shah v. The State of Bombay.(') The argument was that Vakhar Bagh had necessarily to be declared as a Principal Market Yard since there was no sub-market yard under the proviso to Sec. 4A(2) and that once having been so declared another market yard could not be substituted in its place. This argument was repelled by Chagla, C. J. and Tendolkar, J. It was oberved (at p. 903, 904) :\n\n\"Now, s. 4A(2) confers upon the Government the power to declare any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to oo a principal market yard for the area and other ehclosures, buildings or localities to be one or more sub-\n\n(1) LVII-1955 Bombay Law Reporter p. 892, 903, 904.\n\n.. •\n\n' •\n\nmarket yards for the area. It is clear that by reason of s. 14 of the General Clauses Act any power that is conferred on Government can be exercised from time to time as occasion requires.\n\nTherefore, it would be clearly competent to the State Government to declare from time to time which ; hould be the principal market yard and which should be submarket yards. It is also clear under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act that when a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power to exercise in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-Jaws so issued''. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ''under s. 4A(2) Government can by issuing notifications from time to time after the principal market yards which have been set up and which did not exist before the passing of the Amending Act\".\n\nWe agree. Any other construction may frustrate the very object of the legislation.\n\nNothing may be expected to remain static in this changing world of, ours.\n\nA market which is suitably and conveniently located today may be found to be unsuitable and !nconvenient tomorrow on account of the development of the area in another direction or the congestion which may have reduced the market into an 1mposst01e, squalid place or for a variety of other reasons.\n\nTo so inte11Pret the provisions of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act as prohibit the abolition of a market once established and bar the transfer of the market to another place would, as we said, be to defeat the very object of the Act.\n\nNeither the text nor the context of the relevant provisions of the Act warrant such a prohibition and bar and there is no reason to imply any such.\n\nOn the other hand Sections 14 and 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act warrant our readig into Sec. 5 a power to close a market and establish it elsewhere.\n\nThe submission that Rule 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Rules 1967 which provides that no person G shall market any dcdarcd agricultural produce in any plaee in a market area other than the principal market or subsidiary market established therein ;, ultra vires, is, in our opinion, equally without force.\n\nSec. 60 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying into effect the purposes of the Act. It cannot hut be said that the establishment of a principal and subsidiary :narkets H for the marketing of declared agricultnral produce and the bar against marketing operations being carried on elsewhere than in the markets so\n\n~214 SCI/81\n\nestablished is only to further and to give effect to the purposes o{\n\nthe Act. The scheme of the Act shows that the agricnltural produce whose marketing is proposed to be regulated should first be notified, a market area has to be declared in resipect of the notified agricnltural produce, a Market Committee has to be constituted for the market area, a principal market and one or more subsidiary markets have to be established for every market area, traders etc. have to be licenced and the Market Committee is required to provide facilities for marketing of agricultural produce, to superintend, direct and control the markets and regulate marketing of agricultural produce.\n\nRegulation of marketing of notified agricultural produce and the establishment of principal and subsidiary markets are among the prime objects of the Act. If for the more effective regulation of marketing it is thought that aJl marketing operations in re51Pect of declared agricultural produce should be carried on only in the principal and subsidiary markets established under the Act, we do not see how it can possibly be said that a rnle made for that purpose is beyond the competence of the rule making authority under the Act. It is not difficult to visualise the impossibility of effective regulation if marketing operations are allowed to be carried on outside the principal and subsidiary markets, anywhere in the market area. The submission was that all the regulatory measures contemplated by the Act and the rnles may be enforced equally effectively wherever business in agricultural produce is carried on in the market area outside the principal and subsidiary markets as within the principal and subsidiary markets.\n\nOn the face of it, it is difficult to accept this submission.\n\nThe regulation will become impossible and will soon be reduced to a furce if traders are allowed to carry on marketing operations in every nook and corner of the market areru.\n\nThe Market Committee will be forced to employ an unduly large number of officers who will have to run hither and thither, all over the market area. The regulation and control will soon become unmanageable.\n\nNor will t}, e producers' interests be properly served.\n\nWhere a producer brings his produce to the market, he will deal face to face not with one but with several traders, with a greater chance of getting the best price for his produce.\n\nThi~ cannot happen if he is persuaded to take his produce to the place of business of an individual trader outside the principal or subsidiljl')' market.\n\nThere is a greater possibility of abuse and greater likelihood of the object of the Act being frustrated. Fair price to the agriculturist will soon be a mirage and the evil sought to be prevented will persist. In Kewal Krishan Puri & Anr. v. State of Pun; ab & Ors.(') this Court had occasion to observe\n\n(1) [1979] 3 S.C.R. p. 1217@ 1247. '\n\n\"No body can be allowed to establish a purchasing centre of his own at any place he likes in the market area\n\nwithout there being such a permission or authority from the Market Committee.\n\nAfter all the whole object of the Act is the supervision and control of the transactions of purchase by the traders from the agriculturists in order to prevent exploitation of the latter by the former. The supervision and control can be effective only in specified localities and places and not throughout the extensive market area.\"\n\nOne of the submissions of the learned Counsel was that Section\n\n<6 of the Act contemplated the use of any place in the market area for the marketing of the declared agricultural produce on obtaining a licence from the Market Committee and, therefore, Rule 5 whlch banned marketing at any place outside the principal and subsidiary markets though such place was within the market area; was mconsistent with Section 6 and hence ultra vires.\n\nThe submission ignores the circumstance that Section 6 is ap[plirnble to both the situations before and after the establishments of markets. Where a market area is specified under Sec. 4 of the Act but no markets are yet established, marketing is regulated by licensing the traders etc. under Sec. 6. , After markets are established also, traders have to be licensed under Sec.\n\n6. But Sec. 6 is expressly declared to be subject to the rules providing for regulating the marketing of agricultural produce in any place in the market area. Rule 5 is a rule providing for regulating the mar keting of agricultural produce in the market area by stipulating that\n\nthe marketing shall be carried in the market established in the market area.\n\nSection 6 is, therefore, subject to Rule 5.\n\nThere can be no question of any inconsistency between Section 6 and Rule 5.\n\nYet another submission of the learned counsel was that the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act 1939 and the Agricultural Produce Marketing Acts of other States such as Karnataka provided or indicated by express provision that once a market was established it was not permissible to market or trade in agricultural produce 0utside the market, and that the absence of such an express provision in the Maharashtra Act showed that no such ban was contemplated by the Act.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the submission.\n\nAbsence of an express provision in the Act itself merely means that greater latitude is given to the rule making authority to introduce regulation of marketing by stages and to ban all marketing activity outside the market.\n\nThe latitude given to the rule making authority cannot lead to the\n\nA inference that the rule making authority ha& no power to make a rule banning marketing activities outside the market once the market is established, even when such a ban is found to be necessary.\n\nWe therefore, hold that the rule prescribing that no marketing operation in any declared agricultural produce shall be carried on outside the principal or subsidiary markets is consistent and iu consonance with the scheme of the Act and is within the competence of the rule making authority and l:hat it is reasonable.\n\nNext we pass on to the main submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the transactions between trader and trader and transactions by which the agricultural produce was imported into the market area from outside the market area were outside the purview of the Act and that if Sec. 5 and Rule 5 were intended to cover such transactions also they were invalid.\n\nThe basic assumption of the submission was that the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act was conceived in the interests of the agriculturists only and intended for their sole benefit. This basic assumption is not well founded. It is true that one of the principal objects sought to be achieved by the Act is the securing of a fair price to the agriculturist for his produce, by the elimination of middlemen and other detracting factors.\n\nBut, it would be wholly incorrect to say that the only object of the Act is to secure a fair price to the agriculturist. As the long title of the Act itself says, the Act is intended to regulate the marketing of agricultural and certain other produce. The marketing of agricultural produce is not confined to the first transaction of sale by the producer to the trader but must necessarily include all subsequent transactions in the course of the movement of the commodity\n\ninto the ultimate hands of the consumer, so long, of course, as the commodity retains its original character as agricultural produce. While middlemen are sought to be eliminated, it is wrong to view the Act,-~-. as one aimed at legitimate and genuine traders. Far from it.\n\nThe regulation and control is as much for their benefit as it is for the benefit of the producer and the ultimate consumer. The elimination of middlemen is as much in the interest of the trader as it is in the interest of the producer. Promotion of grading and standardisation of agricultural produce is as much to his benefit as to the benefit of the producer or consumer. So also proper weighment. The provision for settlement of disputes arising out of transactions connected with the marketing of agricultural produce and ancillary matters is also for the benefit of the trader. It is because of these and various other services performed by the Market Committee for the benefit of the trader that the trader is required to pay a fee.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear\n\n• •\n\nthat the regulation of marketing contemplated by the Act involves benefits to traders too in a large way.\n\nIt is also clear to our mind that the regulation of marketing of agricultural produce, if confined to the sales by producers within the market area to traders, will very soon lead to its circumvention in the guise of sales by traders to traders or import of agricultural produce from outside the market area to withiµ the mark; et area.\n\nThe Shirname Committee which was appointed by the Maharashtra Government to review the working of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1939 considered the matter and reported as follows : (para 86) :\n\n\"They (th_e traders) have argued that imported produce has nothing to do with the legislation meant to confer benefits on the agriculturist. We are afraid that this view is untenable. In our opinion, the benefits sought to be conferred by the Act are not compartmental inasmuch as a regulated market seeks to benefit the agriculturist within its area only.\n\nThe problem of regulation is to be viewed in the wider context.\n\nThis was well emphasised by the Royal Commission on Agriculture which stated that 'the establishment of properly regulated markets can act as a powerful agent in bringing about a reform which is much needed, primarily in the interest of the cultivator, and secondly, in that of all engaged in trade and commerce in India'. It is in this larger perspective that an answer to the question is to be found.\n\nMoreover, no agricultural produce goes by a particular brand with the result that the produce brought from a particular source cannot be distinguished from the one secured from the other. If the produce imported from outside the market area were to be exempted from the scope of the market regulation, it would only provide an additional opportunity for the traders to circumvent the provisions of the Act and Rules even in respect of the agricultural commodities produced within the market area.\n\nWe, therefore, rccommnd that once a commodity is regulated in a market, it >hould be subjected to regulation irrespective of its source or final destination.\"\n\nAgain they said in paragraph 95 as follows :\n\n\"We wish to record here that there appears to be a doubt among the traders as well as the Market Committees about the precise position of sales of commodities after they are bought from agriculturists by traders vis-a-vis the provi-- sions of the Act and the Rules. It has been the belief of\n\nthe traders that the law is for the benefit of agriculturists and on this ground they have pleaded that its scope should be restricted only to the dealings with them. We are afraid that this plea is not tenable. The benefit of a, regulated market will no doubt primarily accrue to the agriculturists but traders also will be profitted by it.\n\nFurthermore, no market can be regulated effectively unless and until the regulation covers all the stages of marketing within a particular area. Above all, it i~ not possible to distinguish between 'the agricultural produce subjected to resale or changing bands between the traders themselves and the one sold by the agriculturists through the commission agents to the traders.\n\nWe, therefore, recommend that all transactions including the resales between the traders and traders in respect of the agricultural commodities, which are regulated. should be covered by the Act and the Rules. Thus in a regulated market, trading in agricultural commodities irrespective of the fact as to whether they are produced in the market area or sold by the agriculturists or not, will be brought within the scope of the legislation.\"\n\nNor are we without any guidance from this Court itself in answering the question posed.\n\nIn Mohammadbhai Khudabux Chhippa & Anr.\n\nv. The State of Gurajat & Anr.,(') it was pointed out while dealing with the provisions of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, as follows (at p. 899) :\n\n\"Next it is urged that the provisions in the Act also affect transaction between traders and traders, and also affect produce not grown within the market area if it is sold in the market area.\n\nThat is undoubtedly so.\n\nBut if control has to be effective in the interest of the agricultural producer such incidental coutrol of produce grown outside the market area and brought into the market yard for sale is necessary as otherwise the provisions of the Act would be evaded by alleging that the particular produce sold in the market yard was not grown in the market area.\n\nFor the same reasons transactions between traders and traders have to be controlled, if the control in the interest of agricultural producers and the general public has to be effective.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the Act and the Rules and Bye-laws therennder cannot be struck down\n\n(I) [1962) Supp/. 3 S.C.R. 875 @ 899.\n\non this ground.\n\nThe contention under this head there- A fore must fail\".\n\nAgain in Ram Chandra Kai/ash Kumar & Co. & Ors. v. State of\n\nU; P. & Anr.,(I) dealing with the contention that fee could be charged only on those transactions in which the seller was the producer and not on any other transaction this Court disapproved the view taken by the Mysore High Court and approved the view taken by the Patna High Court that fee could be levied on a transaction of buying and selling between a dealer and a dealer.\n\nDealing with the contention that the agricultural produce not produced in the market area was outside the purview of the, Act, it was observed (at p. 1134):\n\n\"It is also not correct to say that the agricultural produce must have been produced in the market area in which the first levy is made. It might have been produced in another market area or even outside the State of Uttar\n\nPradesh but if a transaction of sale and purchase takes D place of an agricultural produce as defined in the Act and covered by the notification within a particular market area then fee can be charged in relation to the said transaction\".\n\nOne of the submissions strenuously pressed before us was that the statute itself imposed and provided for such stringent supervi-< sion, and control, sufficient and more, to regulate transactions between traders and traders, that it was superfluous to insist that\n\nsuch transactions do take place in the market only.\n\nWe do not agree.\n\nHuman ingenuity is such that vents and escapes will always be found in any system of controls.\n\nWe are unable to '\"Y that the other supervisory measures for which there is provision in the Act are sufficient to make it unnecessary for the traders to move their places of business into the market,.\n\nNo amount of supervision may be as effective as when all the transactions take place within the market.\n\nNor is effective supervision at all possible if traders are dispersed all aver the market area.\n\nEvery Market Committee will then require a large contingent of officers for the purpose of supervision only.\n\nThe rendering of services to the traders also will be far easier and, in the ultimate analysis, it will be in the interests of the traders themselves, at any rate in the interests of the vast majority of the traders, that transactions between traders and traders also are carried on in the market only. There cannot be any doubt\n\n(!) AIR 1980 SC 1124 @ 1134.\n\nthat localising marketing is helpful and necessary for regulation and control and for providing facilities. If all transactions are carried on in the market under the watchful aud at the same time, helpful vigil of the Market Committee and its officers, there is surely a greater chance of the success of the objectives of the statute.\n\nWe are therefore, not prepared to hold that the requirement that the locus of all transactions of sale and purchase of agricultural produce, including those between trader and trader, should be in the market is harsh and au excessive restriction on the Fnndamental Right to carry on trade.\n\nIt was the submission of the learned connsel that Sec. 6 of the Maharashtra Act made a distinction between (a) the use of any place in the market area for the marketing of the declared agricultural produce and (b) the operation in the market area or in any market therein as a trader, commission agent, broker, etc. in rela,. tion to the marketing of agricultnral produce and that the distinction was in reality a distinction between a sale by a producer to a trader and a subsequent sale by a trader to a trader. The argnment was that Rule 5 which banned marketing of a ny declared market agricultnral produce in a'ny place in a market area other than the principal market or subsidiary market established therein applied only to a sale of the agricultural produce by a producer to trade.\n\nWe do not see any warrant for the submission of the learned counsel in the laugnage employed in Sec. 6 or Rule 5.\n\nIf the legislature or the rule making authority wanted to make a distinction between a sale of agricultural produce by a producer to a trader and a subsequent sale by a trader to a trader, nothing would have been simpler thau to say so instead of adopting the circumlocutous way in which the learned counsel claims it has been said.\n\nThe proviso to Rule 5 speaks of operating at any place within the market area by a trader, commission agent, or other market functionary after obtaining a licence while the main provision refers to the marketing of declared agricultural produce at any place in the market area.\n\nSurely it cannot be contended that the proviso is unrelated to the maiu provision.\n\nAccording to ordinary cannons of construction the proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment.\n\nIt, therefore, shows that no such distinction as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners was in the mind of the legislature or the rule making authority.\n\nThe onion and potato merchants of Bombay advanced a special plea that Sec. 13(1A) which declared the area comprising Greater\n\n'Bombay and Turbhe village a market area for the purposes of thf<\n\nAct was invalid as it was wholly unreasonable to constitute such a large area into a single market area.\n\nThe validity of the notification establishing a market at Turbhe was attacked as unreasonable.\n\nIt was said that it was unreal and unreasonable to establish a single market for so large an area and that, at such an inconvenient place as Turbhe village.\n\nIt has been explained in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent that the existing markets in Maulana d Road and Mahatma Phule Mandai were highly congested and located in areas which were over-crowded with the result that it took several hours to even unload onions and potatos from the trucks which carried them.\n\nIt has become imperative in the public interest that the markets should be shifted from Maulana Azad Road and Mahatma Phule Mandai.\n\nTurbhe village was chosen as an area free from congestion and conveniently located as it was on the main trunk road from Pune. It was also very near th~ otl1er trunk Road going towards the East.\n\nA Railway linking the area with both the Western Railway and the Central Railway net works was fast coming up. It was also pointed ont that 60% ofl\n\nthe population of Greater Bombay resided in the Northern suburbs and the new market was much nearer to the majority of the residen!S and traders of Greater Bombay.\n\nWe are unable to see anything unreasonable in the statutory declaration of Greater Bombay and Turbhe village as a market area; nor, are we able to Sl)e anything unreasonable, in view of the circumstances mentioned by the respondents, in the establishment of a single market in T urbhe village for the entire market area.\n\nIt was also said that neither the Gultekdi market nor the Turbhe market had any convenience or facility or was ready for use on the date on which it was notified as the Principal Market for the concerned market area.\n\nOn the material placed before us we are satisfied that all reasonable conveniences and facilities are now available in both the markets, whatever might have been the situation on the respccthe dates of notification.\n\nWe refrain for embarking into an enquiry as to the situation 9btaining on the dates of notification.\n\nWe do my that a place ought not to be notified as a market unless it is ready for use as a market with all reasonable facilities and conveniences ~.ut we do not conceive it to be our duty to pursue the matter to the extreme limit of quashing the notification when we find that all reasonable facilities and conveniences are now available.\n\nWhile a nbtification may be quashed if nothing has been done beyond pub lishing the notification, in cases where some facilities and conveniences\n\nhave been provided but not some others which are necessary the.- Court may instead of quashing the notification give appropriate timebound directions for providing necessary facilities and conveniences.\n\nOn the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that all reasonable facilities and conveniences are now provided.\n\nWe are also satisfied that the traders have been making one desperate attempt after another to avoid moving into the new markets and they have been successful in stalling the notifications from becoming effective for quite a number of years.\n\nIn the Writ Petitions and Civil Appeals from Karnataka State, similar questions have been raised.\n\nThough the broad scheme of the Karnataka Act is th.e same as the Maharashtra Act, there are some differences which however are not basic.\n\nInstead of a twotier scheme, Market Area and Markets, as under the Maharashtra Act, the Karnataka Act has a three-tier scheme, Market Area, Market and sub-market and market-yard, sub-market yard and sub-yard.\n\nMarket Area is a larger area within which smaller areas are declared as a Market and sub-markets. Within a market are located a market yard and market sub-yards and within a sub-market is located a sub market yard.\n\nThe 'market yard' in the Karnataka Act is what corresponds to a 'market' in the Maharashtra Act.\n\nUnlike the Maharashtra Act, the Kamataka Act itself [S. 8(2)] expressly provides that no place in the Market or the sub-market, except the market-yard, subyard or the sub-market yard as the case may be, shall be used for the purchase or sale of notified agricultural produce.\n\nOriginally, after the words \"purchase or sale of notified agricultural words\" occurred the words \"belonging to a producer\" in Section 8(2). The words \"belonging to a producer\" were omitted by a 1976 amendment and this makes the provisions of S. 8(2) applicable to transactions between trader and trader too.\n\nThe shifting of market yard from one place to another and the application of the Act to transactions between traders and traders are what were principally questioned in the Karnataka cases.\n\nSubstantially the same submissions as in the Maharashtra cases were made and we have already dealt with them.\n\nWe my now turn to the. Bihar cases.\n\nThe Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, follows roughly the same pattern as the other Acts.\n\nA market area has to be first declared within which the marketing of specified agricultural produce is proposed to be regulated.\n\nFor every market area there is to be a principal market yard and one or more sub market yards.\n\nIn between the market area and the market yard there is to be a market but market does not seem to play any part in the scheme of the Act as it now stands after the 1974 amendments. However it should be mentioned here that Rule 80,.\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nwhich is still on the Statute Book, provides that a market shall he established for a market area and that after the establishment of a market, a notification under Sec. 5 (declaring market yards) shall be issued.\n\nSec. 15 of the Act provides that no specified agricultural produce shall be bought or sold at any place within the market area other than the principal market yard or sub-market yard established therein except such quantity as may be prescribed for retail sale or personal consumption.\n\nThe arguments advanced in the Maharashtra and Karnataka cases were advanced in the Bihar cases also.\n\nFor the\n\neasons already mentioned we reject the submission.\n\nIn one of the Bihar cases it was further submitted that when a market yard was disestablished at one place and established at another place, it was the duty of the concerned authority to invite and hear objections.\n\nFailure to do so was a violation of the principles of natural justice and the notification disestablishiug the market yard at one place and establishing it elsewhere was therefore, bad.\n\nIt was said that even as there was express provision for inviting and hearing objections before a \"market area\" was declared under the Act, so should objections be invited and heard before a 'market yard' was established at any particular place. The principles of nature justice demanded it. We are unable to agree.\n\nWe are here not concerned with the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function where the very nature of the function involves the application of the rules of natural justice, or of an administrative function affecting the rights of persons, wherefore, a duty to act fairly.\n\nWe are concerned with legislative activity; we are concerned with the making of a legislative instrument. the declaration by notification of the Government that a certain place shall be a principal market yard for a market area, upon which declaration certain statutory provisions at once spring into action and certain consequences prescribed by statute follow forthwith.\n\nThe making of the declaration, in the context, is certainly an act legislative in character and does not oblige the observance of the ruks of natural justice. In Bates v. Lord Hailsham,(1) Megarry J., pointed out that the rules of natural justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, primary or delegated, and in Tulsipur Sugar Co. v. Notified Area Committee,(') our brothers Desai and Venkataramaiah JJ approved what was said by Megarry J., and applied it to the field of wnditional legislation too.\n\nIn Paul Jackson's Natural Justice (Second Edn.), it has been pointed out (at p.169) :\n\n\"There is no doubt that a Minister, or any other body, in making legislation, for example, by statutory instrument\n\n(I) (1972) I W.L.R. 1373.\n\n(2) [19801 2 S.C.R. 1111.\n\nor by-law, is not subject to the rules of natural justice- Bates v. Lord Hai/sham of St.\n\nMarylebone (1972) I W.L.R. 1373-any more than is Parliament itself; Edinburgh and Dalkeith Ry. v. Wauchope (1842) 8 CI. & F. 71 O,\n\n720 per Lord Brougham; British Railways Board v. Pickin\n\n(1974) A.C. 765\".\n\nProf. H. W. R. Wade has similarly pointed iu his Administrative • Law (4th Edn.): \"There is no right to be heard before the making of legislation, whether primary or delegated, unless it is provided by statutes\".\n\nThere is, therefore, no substance in the invocation of the rules of natural justice.\n\nOne of the submissions in the Bihar cases was that the declaration of places as market yards was made in such an erratic fashion that the exercise of the power could only be termed as an arbitrary misuse of power. The facts in Civil Appeal No. 1507 of 1980 were that on September 16, 1964, a certain area was declared as a principal market yard and Amgola, Chandwara, Sarai Said Ali and Brahmpura were declared as Suh market yards.\n\nOn February 23, 1978 instead of the principal market yard declared by the notification of September 16, 1964, Muradpur Dulla was declared as principal market yard.\n\nThe sub-market yards were abolished.\n\nBy another notification dated April\n\n9. 1979, all the market yards notified on September 16, 1964 were\n\nallowed to continue as before, but it was also simultancuci>ly made known that such market yards wodd be c!oscct on spec•ticd dates and merchants were advised to move their business into the Muradpur Dulla principal market yard as early as possible.\n\nFinally by a notification dated July 3, 1979, the previous notification dated April 9, 1979 was cancelled and Muradpur Dulla market yard was alone notified as the principal market yard.\n\nThe facts in the other two appeals were that on Septemlx!r 19, 1963, Gaya town was declared as a market area.\n\nOn April 6, 1964, Chandauti was declared as the market proper under Sec.5(2) (ii) of the Bihar Act. By a notification dated April 7, 1964, Mahalia Purani Godown was declared as principal market yard and Kedarnath Market was declared as the sub-market yard for the market area.\n\nOn October 19, 1973, Mahalia Purani Godown was once again declared as the Pdncipal Market Yard. Subsequently on February 28, 1978, Chandauti was declared as the Princ; pal Market Yard.\n\nThis meant that Mahalia Purani Goclo.vn ceased to be a market yard and Kedarnath Market ceased to be a sub-market yard.\n\nBut, again on April 9, 1979, another notification was issued, to the effect that Moha!la Purani Godown would continue as the market yard as before.\n\nFinally on June 27, 1979, Chandauti was\n\n~---~·\n\n' ;\n\ndeclared as the Principal Market yard once more.\n\nThis was questioned in Writ Petitions filed in th(l, Patna High -court. The Patna High Court rejected all but one of the contentions raised.\n\nThe only contention which was accepted was that the procedure prescribed by Rule\n\n80 was not followed before Chandauti was declared as the principal market yard by the notification dated February 28, 1978. Rule 80,\n\nas already mentioned by us provides that a market shall be established for a market area and that after the establishment of a market a notification declaring the market yard shal! be issued.\n\nThe contention which was accepted was that a market had not been established before a market yard was declared.\n\nAgainst the judgment of the High Court the merchants have filed Civil Appeal No. 1715 of 1980\n\nand the State of Bihar has filed Civil Appeal No. 36 of 1980.\n\nNotwithstanding the filing of the appeal, the State of Bihar chose to issue a fresh notification after observing the procedure prescribed by Rule\n\n80.\n\nThis was again questioned in the High Court.\n\nThe High Court upheld the notification.\n\nThe merchants have preferred Civil Appeal No. 1716 of 1980 against the judgment of the High Court.\n\nFrom the history of events it may appear as if declarations regarding market yards have been made in a most erratic fashion but a_s pointed out by the learned Attorney General who appeared for the State of Bihar it was not madness.\n\nThere was a method.\n\nThe old markets had existed from ancient days and it had become necessary to establish modern market yards with conveniences and facilities.\n\nWhen this was sought to be done there were representations by the traders and the Government appears to have thought that it was advisable to give the traders sufficient time to enable them to prepare themselves to move into the new market yards.\n\nThe notifications establishing new market yards were therefore, cancelled and the old markets were allowed to function for some time.\n\nLater when the time was thought to be ripe, notifications establishing new market yards were once again issued. It is, therefore seen that the seeming confusion was not the result of any arbitrary or erratic action on the part of the Government but was the result of a desire to accommodate the traders as much as possible.\n\nWe, therefore, see no force in any of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners.\n\nAH the Writ Petitions and Civil Appeals are therefore, dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetitions and Appeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 251, "entities": [{"text": "RAMESHCHANDRA KACHARDAS PORWAL & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMESHCHANDRA KACHARDAS PORWAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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("}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4569, "end_char": 4578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "statute": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "statute": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 13(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5476, "end_char": 5490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5534, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(7) Section 13(1A) which declared the area comprising greate~ Bombay a market area for the purposes of the Act was invalid as it was wholly unreasonable to constitute such a large area into a single market area. ("}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6096, "end_char": 6100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6224, "end_char": 6233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6296, "end_char": 6315, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REP, JRTS\n\n(1981] 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6597, "end_char": 6637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "includes\n\nSUPREME COURT REP, JRTS\n\n(1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA the power to exercise in like manner to add to, 'mend, vary or rescind any notification, order, rule etc."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8538, "end_char": 8547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8560, "end_char": 8569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oearly there- D fore the regulation of marketing contemplated by the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11092, "end_char": 11164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Greater Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13708, "end_char": 13722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, therefore, nothing unreasonable in the statutory declaration of Greater Bombay and Turbhe Villa.ge as a market area; nor in the establishment of a single market in Turbhe Village, for the entire market area. ["}}, {"text": "Turbhe Villa.ge", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13727, "end_char": 13742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, therefore, nothing unreasonable in the statutory declaration of Greater Bombay and Turbhe Villa.ge as a market area; nor in the establishment of a single market in Turbhe Village, for the entire market area. ["}}, {"text": "Turbhe Village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13808, "end_char": 13822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, therefore, nothing unreasonable in the statutory declaration of Greater Bombay and Turbhe Villa.ge as a market area; nor in the establishment of a single market in Turbhe Village, for the entire market area. 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P.\n\nSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18237, "end_char": 18249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, R. B. Mehta, B. P.\n\nSingh.", "canonical_name": "B. P.\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "J. S. Rathare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18301, "end_char": 18314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ravi Prakash, Ranjit Kumar, Naresh K. Sharma and J. S. Rathare for RR 3-5 in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "E H. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18463, "end_char": 18476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E H. B. Datar, Miss Madhu Maolchandani and R. B. Dattar for the\n\nRespondent (Market Committee)."}}, {"text": "Madhu Maolchandani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18483, "end_char": 18501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E H. B. Datar, Miss Madhu Maolchandani and R. B. Dattar for the\n\nRespondent (Market Committee).", "canonical_name": "Madhu Maalchandani"}}, {"text": "R. B. Dattar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18506, "end_char": 18518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E H. B. Datar, Miss Madhu Maolchandani and R. B. Dattar for the\n\nRespondent (Market Committee).", "canonical_name": "R. B. Dattar"}}, {"text": "H. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18560, "end_char": 18571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. B. Datar and N. Nettar for RR (State of Knrnataka).", "canonical_name": "R. B. Dattar"}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18895, "end_char": 18910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nReluctant traders, nu-willing to move their places of business into the markets or market yards, as they are differently called in the States of Maharashtra, Bihar and Karnaraka, set up ' by respective Market Committees under various State Agricultural PrP.. duce Marketing Acts, offer their resistance through these Writ Petitions H and Civil Appeals."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19061, "end_char": 19072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nReluctant traders, nu-willing to move their places of business into the markets or market yards, as they are differently called in the States of Maharashtra, Bihar and Karnaraka, set up ' by respective Market Committees under various State Agricultural PrP.. duce Marketing Acts, offer their resistance through these Writ Petitions H and Civil Appeals."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19074, "end_char": 19079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nReluctant traders, nu-willing to move their places of business into the markets or market yards, as they are differently called in the States of Maharashtra, Bihar and Karnaraka, set up ' by respective Market Committees under various State Agricultural PrP.. duce Marketing Acts, offer their resistance through these Writ Petitions H and Civil Appeals."}}, {"text": "Karnaraka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19084, "end_char": 19093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nReluctant traders, nu-willing to move their places of business into the markets or market yards, as they are differently called in the States of Maharashtra, Bihar and Karnaraka, set up ' by respective Market Committees under various State Agricultural PrP.. duce Marketing Acts, offer their resistance through these Writ Petitions H and Civil Appeals."}}, {"text": "Pune", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19581, "end_char": 19585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "692 of 1980 is a trader presently carrying on business in 'GU11' and other co=odities at 1221 Bhavani Peth, Pune."}}, {"text": "Sec. 4A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19626, "end_char": 19636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19644, "end_char": 19689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 6, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19715, "end_char": 19727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4A(2) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, by a notification dated July 6, 1961, the locality known as Bhavanipeth and Nanapeth of the Pune City was declared as one of the principal market yards for the market area consisting of Pune City and Haveli Talukas."}}, {"text": "Pune City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19783, "end_char": 19792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4A(2) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, by a notification dated July 6, 1961, the locality known as Bhavanipeth and Nanapeth of the Pune City was declared as one of the principal market yards for the market area consisting of Pune City and Haveli Talukas."}}, {"text": "May 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19969, "end_char": 19980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The market area had been so declared by a notification dated May 1, 1957, pursuant to a declaration that it was intended to regulate the purchase and sale of 'gur\" in the market ciea."}}, {"text": "Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20096, "end_char": 20141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20248, "end_char": 20255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "statute": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "March 23, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20401, "end_char": 20415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 23, 1971, the present Market Committee known as Krishi Utpanna Bazar samiti, Pune, was constituted under Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20512, "end_char": 20518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "statute": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "April 21, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20543, "end_char": 20557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 21, 1971, the Director of Agricultural Marketing published a notification declaring his intention to regulate marketing of a large number of commodities in the market area of Haveli and Pune City Taluks."}}, {"text": "Haveli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20724, "end_char": 20730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 21, 1971, the Director of Agricultural Marketing published a notification declaring his intention to regulate marketing of a large number of commodities in the market area of Haveli and Pune City Taluks."}}, {"text": "Pune City Taluks", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20735, "end_char": 20751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 21, 1971, the Director of Agricultural Marketing published a notification declaring his intention to regulate marketing of a large number of commodities in the market area of Haveli and Pune City Taluks."}}, {"text": "October 4, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20756, "end_char": 20771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 4, 1975, the Director of Agricultural Marketing, Maharashtra State,\n\nexercising his powers under Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20861, "end_char": 20870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "statute": "The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "October 8, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21129, "end_char": 21144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on October 8, 1975, a Circular was issued to all Adatis, merchants, and licence holders, particularly wholesale dealers dealing in Gur."}}, {"text": "Dhania", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21269, "end_char": 21275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Halad, Dhania, etc."}}, {"text": "October 13, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21410, "end_char": 21426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the vicinity of Bhavanipcth-Nanapeth informing them that Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth will cea5e to be a market from the midnight of October 13, 1975 and that the market yard Gultekadi had been declared as the principal market for the market area."}}, {"text": "Gultekadi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21602, "end_char": 21611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circular went on to say that anyone carrying on business anywhere except Gultekadi was liable to be prosecuted."}}, {"text": "October 14, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21891, "end_char": 21907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of the notification dated October 4, 1975, and the Circular dated October 8, 1975 was that it was not permissible for anyone to\n\ncan-y on trade in any of the notified agricultural commodities outside the Gultekadi market yard on and after October 14, 1975."}}, {"text": "Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22025, "end_char": 22045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It meant that traders like the petilioner who had for generations been carrying on business in these commodities in Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth had perforce to move into Gultekadi market yard if they wanted lO stay in the business."}}, {"text": "Pune Merchants Chamber", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22178, "end_char": 22200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequent upon representations made by the Pune Merchants Chamber and the interim order in a Writ Petition filed in the Bombay High Court by the Chamber the date notified for the commencement of the functioning of the Principal Market in Gullekadi\n\nwas postponed from time to time."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22255, "end_char": 22272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequent upon representations made by the Pune Merchants Chamber and the interim order in a Writ Petition filed in the Bombay High Court by the Chamber the date notified for the commencement of the functioning of the Principal Market in Gullekadi\n\nwas postponed from time to time."}}, {"text": "Gullekadi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22373, "end_char": 22382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequent upon representations made by the Pune Merchants Chamber and the interim order in a Writ Petition filed in the Bombay High Court by the Chamber the date notified for the commencement of the functioning of the Principal Market in Gullekadi\n\nwas postponed from time to time."}}, {"text": "March 6, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22452, "end_char": 22465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, by a public notice dated March 6, 1980, all wholesale traders, commission agents and other~\n\ndealing in agricultural produce in Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth and surrounding areas were informed that with effect from March 17, 1980, whole.<ale trade in the regulated agricultural produce could be carried on in the Gultekadi market yard only."}}, {"text": "March 17, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22634, "end_char": 22648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, by a public notice dated March 6, 1980, all wholesale traders, commission agents and other~\n\ndealing in agricultural produce in Bhavanipeth-Nanapeth and surrounding areas were informed that with effect from March 17, 1980, whole.<ale trade in the regulated agricultural produce could be carried on in the Gultekadi market yard only."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23562, "end_char": 23578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They complain against a notification dated December 5, 1978 by which it was declared that after January 26, 1979, marketing of potatoes and onions shall be carried on at the Principal Market at Turbhe and at no other place."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23615, "end_char": 23631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They complain against a notification dated December 5, 1978 by which it was declared that after January 26, 1979, marketing of potatoes and onions shall be carried on at the Principal Market at Turbhe and at no other place."}}, {"text": "Turbhe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23713, "end_char": 23719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They complain against a notification dated December 5, 1978 by which it was declared that after January 26, 1979, marketing of potatoes and onions shall be carried on at the Principal Market at Turbhe and at no other place."}}, {"text": "Thana Taluka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23838, "end_char": 23850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that initially, for the market area comprising Greater Bombay and Turbhe Village in Thana Taluka, the newly established market at Turbhe was declared as the Principal Market and the existing markets at Maulana Azad Road and Mahatma Phule Manclai were declared subsidiary markets."}}, {"text": "January 15, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24067, "end_char": 24083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was by a notification dated January 15, 1977."}}, {"text": "Turbhe village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24293, "end_char": 24307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later by the impugned notification dated December 5, 1978, the subsidiary markets were abolished and the market at Turbhe alone was declared as the Principal Market for the area comprising Greater Bombay and Turbhe village."}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24639, "end_char": 24645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24826, "end_char": 24832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26293, "end_char": 26309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 13(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26523, "end_char": 26534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27348, "end_char": 27354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27485, "end_char": 27494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27580, "end_char": 27586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27590, "end_char": 27599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27798, "end_char": 27807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27961, "end_char": 27967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28325, "end_char": 28331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28601, "end_char": 28607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28737, "end_char": 28742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28984, "end_char": 28990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29290, "end_char": 29299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29731, "end_char": 29737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30156, "end_char": 30166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30386, "end_char": 30395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30534, "end_char": 30543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30563, "end_char": 30572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30746, "end_char": 30752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31046, "end_char": 31055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31895, "end_char": 31901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32274, "end_char": 32280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32344, "end_char": 32351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32565, "end_char": 32572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 12 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32652, "end_char": 32670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32739, "end_char": 32746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Greater Bombay and Turbhe village is deemed to be a market area for the purposes of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32839, "end_char": 32930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33069, "end_char": 33076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Greater Bombay and Turbhe village is deemed to be a market area for the purposes of the Act", "statute": "Greater Bombay and Turbhe village is deemed to be a market area for the purposes of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34604, "end_char": 34611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34753, "end_char": 34760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35079, "end_char": 35086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35132, "end_char": 35139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35648, "end_char": 35658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35702, "end_char": 35711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35729, "end_char": 35739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35872, "end_char": 35879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38964, "end_char": 38970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39275, "end_char": 39281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39383, "end_char": 39401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39421, "end_char": 39440, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39446, "end_char": 39452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39537, "end_char": 39555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39575, "end_char": 39594, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 4A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39685, "end_char": 39695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39703, "end_char": 39748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 4A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40102, "end_char": 40112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Vakhar Bagh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40590, "end_char": 40601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In October 1954, (after the 1954 amendment came into force) Vakhar Bagh was declared as the principal market yard for the market area under the proviso to S. 4A(2) of the Act."}}, {"text": "S. 4A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40685, "end_char": 40693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Vakhar Bagh Market Yard", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40908, "end_char": 40931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect was that Vakhar Bagh Market Yard ceased to be a market yard."}}, {"text": "Sec. 4A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41184, "end_char": 41194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41322, "end_char": 41328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument was repelled by Chagla, C. J. and Tendolkar, J. It was oberved (at p. 903, 904) :\n\n\"Now, s. 4A(2) confers upon the Government the power to declare any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to oo a principal market yard for the area and other ehclosures, buildings or localities to be one or more sub-\n\n(1) LVII-1955 Bombay Law Reporter p. 892, 903, 904."}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41340, "end_char": 41349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument was repelled by Chagla, C. J. and Tendolkar, J. It was oberved (at p. 903, 904) :\n\n\"Now, s. 4A(2) confers upon the Government the power to declare any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to oo a principal market yard for the area and other ehclosures, buildings or localities to be one or more sub-\n\n(1) LVII-1955 Bombay Law Reporter p. 892, 903, 904."}}, {"text": "s. 4A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41395, "end_char": 41403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41742, "end_char": 41747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41755, "end_char": 41774, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42072, "end_char": 42077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42085, "end_char": 42104, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42476, "end_char": 42484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pret the provisions of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43135, "end_char": 43207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43543, "end_char": 43561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pret the provisions of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act", "statute": "Pret the provisions of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43581, "end_char": 43600, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43625, "end_char": 43631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pret the provisions of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act", "statute": "Pret the provisions of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Rules 1967", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43721, "end_char": 43785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44027, "end_char": 44034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Rules 1967", "statute": "the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Rules 1967"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48205, "end_char": 48214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48284, "end_char": 48293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48419, "end_char": 48425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48532, "end_char": 48538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.\n\n6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48612, "end_char": 48619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48625, "end_char": 48631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48976, "end_char": 48985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49075, "end_char": 49084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50711, "end_char": 50717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Royal Commission on Agriculture", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53883, "end_char": 53914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was well emphasised by the Royal Commission on Agriculture which stated that 'the establishment of properly regulated markets can act as a powerful agent in bringing about a reform which is much needed, primarily in the interest of the cultivator, and secondly, in that of all engaged in trade and commerce in India'."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54166, "end_char": 54171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was well emphasised by the Royal Commission on Agriculture which stated that 'the establishment of properly regulated markets can act as a powerful agent in bringing about a reform which is much needed, primarily in the interest of the cultivator, and secondly, in that of all engaged in trade and commerce in India'."}}, {"text": "Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56642, "end_char": 56687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 57965, "end_char": 57982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(I) dealing with the contention that fee could be charged only on those transactions in which the seller was the producer and not on any other transaction this Court disapproved the view taken by the Mysore High Court and approved the view taken by the Patna High Court that fee could be levied on a transaction of buying and selling between a dealer and a dealer."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 58018, "end_char": 58034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(I) dealing with the contention that fee could be charged only on those transactions in which the seller was the producer and not on any other transaction this Court disapproved the view taken by the Mysore High Court and approved the view taken by the Patna High Court that fee could be levied on a transaction of buying and selling between a dealer and a dealer."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar\n\nPradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58497, "end_char": 58520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It might have been produced in another market area or even outside the State of Uttar\n\nPradesh but if a transaction of sale and purchase takes D place of an agricultural produce as defined in the Act and covered by the notification within a particular market area then fee can be charged in relation to the said transaction\"."}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 1124", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60034, "end_char": 60050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60738, "end_char": 60744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61575, "end_char": 61581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 13(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62721, "end_char": 62732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T urbhe village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64455, "end_char": 64470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to see anything unreasonable in the statutory declaration of Greater Bombay and Turbhe village as a market area; nor, are we able to Sl)e anything unreasonable, in view of the circumstances mentioned by the respondents, in the establishment of a single market in T urbhe village for the entire market area."}}, {"text": "Though the broad scheme of the Karnataka Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66188, "end_char": 66232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Unlike the Maharashtra Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66851, "end_char": 66877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66904, "end_char": 66911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unlike the Maharashtra Act", "statute": "Unlike the Maharashtra Act"}}, {"text": "Section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67254, "end_char": 67266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unlike the Maharashtra Act", "statute": "Unlike the Maharashtra Act"}}, {"text": "S. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67370, "end_char": 67377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unlike the Maharashtra Act", "statute": "Unlike the Maharashtra Act"}}, {"text": "Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67780, "end_char": 67824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68514, "end_char": 68520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960", "statute": "The Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68564, "end_char": 68571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960", "statute": "The Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Megarry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70578, "end_char": 70585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bates v. Lord Hailsham,(1) Megarry J., pointed out that the rules of natural justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, primary or delegated, and in Tulsipur Sugar Co. v. Notified Area Committee,(') our brothers Desai and Venkataramaiah JJ approved what was said by Megarry J., and applied it to the field of wnditional legislation too."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70769, "end_char": 70774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bates v. Lord Hailsham,(1) Megarry J., pointed out that the rules of natural justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, primary or delegated, and in Tulsipur Sugar Co. v. Notified Area Committee,(') our brothers Desai and Venkataramaiah JJ approved what was said by Megarry J., and applied it to the field of wnditional legislation too."}}, {"text": "Venkataramaiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70779, "end_char": 70793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bates v. Lord Hailsham,(1) Megarry J., pointed out that the rules of natural justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, primary or delegated, and in Tulsipur Sugar Co. v. Notified Area Committee,(') our brothers Desai and Venkataramaiah JJ approved what was said by Megarry J., and applied it to the field of wnditional legislation too."}}, {"text": "Paul Jackson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70898, "end_char": 70910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Paul Jackson's Natural Justice (Second Edn.),"}}, {"text": "H. W. R. Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71456, "end_char": 71469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. H. W. R. Wade has similarly pointed iu his Administrative • Law (4th Edn.): \""}}, {"text": "September 16, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72020, "end_char": 72038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1507 of 1980 were that on September 16, 1964, a certain area was declared as a principal market yard and Amgola, Chandwara, Sarai Said Ali and Brahmpura were declared as Suh market yards."}}, {"text": "Chandwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72107, "end_char": 72116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1507 of 1980 were that on September 16, 1964, a certain area was declared as a principal market yard and Amgola, Chandwara, Sarai Said Ali and Brahmpura were declared as Suh market yards."}}, {"text": "Sarai Said Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72118, "end_char": 72132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1507 of 1980 were that on September 16, 1964, a certain area was declared as a principal market yard and Amgola, Chandwara, Sarai Said Ali and Brahmpura were declared as Suh market yards."}}, {"text": "Brahmpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72137, "end_char": 72146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1507 of 1980 were that on September 16, 1964, a certain area was declared as a principal market yard and Amgola, Chandwara, Sarai Said Ali and Brahmpura were declared as Suh market yards."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72186, "end_char": 72203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 23, 1978 instead of the principal market yard declared by the notification of September 16, 1964, Muradpur Dulla was declared as principal market yard."}}, {"text": "Muradpur Dulla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72293, "end_char": 72307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 23, 1978 instead of the principal market yard declared by the notification of September 16, 1964, Muradpur Dulla was declared as principal market yard."}}, {"text": "April\n\n9. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72416, "end_char": 72430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By another notification dated April\n\n9."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72773, "end_char": 72785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally by a notification dated July 3, 1979, the previous notification dated April 9, 1979 was cancelled and Muradpur Dulla market yard was alone notified as the principal market yard."}}, {"text": "Septemlx!r 19, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72976, "end_char": 72995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in the other two appeals were that on Septemlx!r 19, 1963, Gaya town was declared as a market area."}}, {"text": "Gaya town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72997, "end_char": 73006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in the other two appeals were that on Septemlx!r 19, 1963, Gaya town was declared as a market area."}}, {"text": "April 6, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73042, "end_char": 73055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 6, 1964, Chandauti was declared as the market proper under Sec.5(2) (ii) of the Bihar Act."}}, {"text": "Chandauti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 73057, "end_char": 73066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 6, 1964, Chandauti was declared as the market proper under Sec.5(2) (ii) of the Bihar Act."}}, {"text": "Sec.5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73107, "end_char": 73115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahalia Purani Godown", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73178, "end_char": 73199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated April 7, 1964, Mahalia Purani Godown was declared as principal market yard and Kedarnath Market was declared as the sub-market yard for the market area."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73320, "end_char": 73336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 19, 1973, Mahalia Purani Godown was once again declared as the Pdncipal Market Yard."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73429, "end_char": 73446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently on February 28, 1978, Chandauti was declared as the Princ; pal Market Yard."}}, {"text": "Mahalia Purani Goclo.vn", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73519, "end_char": 73542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This meant that Mahalia Purani Goclo.vn ceased to be a market yard and Kedarnath Market ceased to be a sub-market yard."}}, {"text": "Kedarnath Market", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73574, "end_char": 73590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This meant that Mahalia Purani Goclo.vn ceased to be a market yard and Kedarnath Market ceased to be a sub-market yard."}}, {"text": "April 9, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73638, "end_char": 73651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, again on April 9, 1979, another notification was issued, to the effect that Moha!la Purani Godown would continue as the market yard as before."}}, {"text": "Moha!la Purani Godown", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73705, "end_char": 73726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, again on April 9, 1979, another notification was issued, to the effect that Moha!la Purani Godown would continue as the market yard as before."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 74644, "end_char": 74658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1715 of 1980\n\nand the State of Bihar has filed Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 75235, "end_char": 75249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the history of events it may appear as if declarations regarding market yards have been made in a most erratic fashion but a_s pointed out by the learned Attorney General who appeared for the State of Bihar it was not madness."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_894_909_EN", "year": 1981, "text": ".A MAN MOHAN TULi\n\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS.\n\nFebruary 18, 1981 lJ [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. D. KosHAL AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.I\n\nDelhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, section 158 and rule 26 of the Terminal Tax Rule frarned under the Act, interpretation of-Exigibility of Terminal Tax, explained.\n\nMan Mohan Tuli, appellant in C.A. 2004/80, is the owner of a piece of land situate on the Grand Trunk Road near the sixth n1ilestone as one goes from Delhi to Ghaziabad.\n\nAppellant Tuli has constructed various bui1dings on his land for use as godowns and has rented them out to various transport companies engaged in bringing goods from other States and storing them before their transhipment to Delhi and other States beyond Delhi. The trucks carrying the goods for various destinations pass along the G .T. Road and move into Tuli's land.\n\nAfter the trucks enter the ln, nd, the goods are unloaded into the godowns, sorted out and reloaded into the respective trucks meant for various destinations. Thereafter, the trucks move out of the land and, passing through the Union Territory of Delhi after crossing the border line, proceed to their destinations. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi by is Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 directed that a Terminal Tax post be set up at the entrance to Tuli's land in order to collect terminal tax on goods carried into that land.\n\nA writ was filed before the High Court by the owners of transport companies as also by Tuli for quashing the orders of the Corporation seeking to levy Terminal Tax on the goods which were not meant for Delhi but for places beyond Delhi. The High Court held that the Corporation was legally entitled to levy Terminal Tax at the point of territory of the Union Territory of Delhi even though the goods were sorted out in the godown of Tuli, resorted out and re-loaded since as they while passing through tlle territory of Delhi undoubtedly entered the said territory.\n\nHence the appeal'\\ by special leave by appellant Tuli and others,\n\nAllowing the appeal in part, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. It is well settled that taxing statutes must be strictly interpreted giving every benefit of doubt to the tax-payer.\n\nA Terminal Tax could be levied only by the Corporation or the State which is the final destination of the goods sent from any other area. A Terminal Tax signifies that there must be a terminus for the journey of the goods.\n\nTerminus means the point to which main action tends, goal, end, finishing point, the point at which some thing comes to an end. [899 D, 901 B-D]\n\n2.1. From a consideration of the decided cases of the Supreme Court, the following propositions emerge :-\n\n(i) Terminal tax and octroi are similar kinds of levies which are closely interlinked with (a) destination of the goods (b) the user in the local area\n\nM. M. TULi v. M.C.D. 895\n\n-on arrival of the goods.\n\nWhere the goods merely pass through a local area A without being consumed therein the mere fact that the transport carrying the .goods halt within the local area for transhipment or allied purposes would not justify the levy of either the terminal tax or octroi duty. This is because tho halting of the goods is only for an incidental purpose to effectuate tho journey .of the goods to the final destination by unloading, sorting and reloading them\n\nat a particular place. [803 A-Cl\n\n(ii) There is a very thin margin of difference between a terminal tax. and octroi. In the case of the former (terminal tax) the goods reach their final\n\ndestination and their entry into the area of destination immediately, attracts, payment of terminal tax irrespective of their user.\n\nIn the case of octroi, however, the tax is levied on goods for their use and consumption. [903 D-El\n\n(iii) But at the same time, the goods while halting at a local area 1 should leave for their destination within a reasonable time which may depend on circumstances of each case and if the goods are kept within the area for such a long and indefinite period that the purpose of reaching the final destination lying in a dicerent area is frustrated or defeated, they may be exigible to terminal tax. [903 E-FJ\n\n(iv) \\\\'here the goods enter into a local area which is also the destination -Of the goods either temporarily or otherwise, the terminal tax would be leviable.\n\nFor instance, if A consigns goods from Patna in Bihar to Delhi in the name of X and X after having received the goods at Delhi rebooks or reloads the same on a transport for Chandigarh in the name of Y, terminal tax would be\n\nIeviablt~ by the Corporation at Delhi because the destination of the goods in the first instance was Delhi and that by itself would attract the imposition of terminal tax.\n\nThe fact that X rebooks them to Chandigarh Would not make any difference because the act of rebooking by X at Delhi would constitute a fresh transaction by which the goods after having been carried into Delhi are further exported to Chandigarh.\n\nOn the other hand, when there is one continuous journey of the goods from Patna to Chandigarh without any break, the final destination would be Chandigarh even though the goods may have to be halted in Delhi for the purpose of unloading, sorting and\n\n! reloading and may have to be kept in Delhi for a reasonable time.\n\nIn such ~~-a case terminal tax would not be exigible. [903 G-H, 904 A-CJ\n\nPun; ab Flour & General Mills v. Lahore CorpOraJion, A.I.R. 1947 F.C. 14; The Central India Spinning & Weaving & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., The Empress G Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha, [1958]\n\nSCR 1102; Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd, Bangalore v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, [1961] 3 SCR 707; Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anrv. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242; Burmah Shell Oil Storage & • Distributing Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgaum Borough Municipality, [1963] Supp.\n\n2 SCR 216; Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. The State of Assam, [1964] 5 SCR 975, followed.\n\nChamplain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 67 L Ed. U.S. 309, quoted with approval.\n\n2.2. What would be a reasonable time for interpretation of the goods or halting, in the instant case, at the godown of Tuli, will naturally depend upon the special features or circumstances of each case, namely, the nature of the goods, the tin1e taken in loading, sorting and unloading, the obstacles or diffi .. culties which may be faed by the transporters and similar other factors. Nor- , mally, a time of two to three days or even a week should be sufficient to clear the goods for its journey to the ultimate destination. It may sometimes happen that goods may have to be kept in the godowns 1n the territory of Delhi for circumstances beyond the control of the consignee or the consignor, for example, a garnishee order. In considering what is reasona.ble time these circumstances would have to be taken into consideration. [906 H, 907 A-C] •\n\n2.3. Rule 26 of the Terminal Tax Rules will have to be interpreted on tho footing that seclion 178 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 does C not contemplate levy of terminal tax for goods meant for destinations other thain. De1hi.\n\nThe v, rord \"imn1ediately\" appearing in Rule 26 has to be liberally construed so as to imply a reasonable period and if the export is delayed the, rules may apply if a reasonable explanation has been given. So far as niles regarding taking of passes, etc., a•t the barrier are concerned they would, of course, apply but subject to the conditions under which terminal tax can be imposed under section 178 of the Act \\vhich is the main charging section. {907\n\nC-EJ\n\nAmtit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. The. Union of India I.L.R. 1973(1) Delhi 237, distinguished.\n\n3.1. Section 178 of the Dehli Municipal Corporation Act, cannot be interpreted so as to justify imposition of ternllnal tax even on goods which merely passed through the territory of Delhi, although their destination is not Delbi\n\nbut places beyond Delhi. [908 F-G]\n\n3.2. I\\iferely because the goods after having been unloaded in the gOOown of appellant Tuli are sorted, reloaded in different trucks and thereafter pass through\n\nthe territory of Delhi, they do not become exigible to terminal tax. [908 G-H]\n\n3.3. Rule 26 of the Terminal Tax cannot be interpreted so that exemption could be granted only if the goods are exported immediately which means within a very short time irrespective of any other consideration. Terminal tax can br. leviable only if it is proved that the goods remained at the godown for an indefinite and unexplained period which could not be said to be reasonable 1--.\n\nin the circumstances. [908 H, 909 A-Bl\n\n3.4. Whete the goods arc Ca-rried by trucks into the territory of Delhi and G unloaded there and are ah.o 1ncant for Delhi and soon thereafter may be rebooked by the receiver of the gocxls to some other place, terminal tax wou1d be levirble because in this case there are two separate transa-ctions-(i) by which the goods are meant for Delhi and (ii) by which after having reached and having been unloaded at Delhi they are rebooked and reloaded for some other p1ace and which therefore is a fresh and different transaction. In such a case, terminal tax would be leviable at the entry point in theterritory of Delhi. [909 H B-Cl\n\n3.5. The direction given by the High Court to the Terminal Tax Officer to fix a reasonable time for unloading, sorting and reloading the goods which are\n\n' •\n\nr • -\n\n\"\" '\n\nM. M. TUU '\" M.C.D. (Fazal Ali,!.) 897\n\nmeant for difercnt destinations takin£ into consideration the quantity of the A goods. the ti1ne for unloading, sorting etc. aud for further reloading and transhipment r; hould be done within a tin1e to be fixed by a Tern1inal Tax. Officer is correct. [909 E-FJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civi, J Appeal Nos. 2004- 2005 of 1980.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n~ 13-10-1978 of the Delhi High Court in LPA Nos. 73/77 and 103177.\n\nMadan Bhatia and Sushi/ Kumar for the Appellant in both the appeals.\n\nR. B. Datar, Lalit Bhardwaj and Miss Madhu Mulchandani for Respondent Nos. 1-3.\n\nP. R. Rao, S. R. Venkataraman, P. C. Kapur, R. C. Bhatia and S. L.\n\nSharma for Respondent ND. 5 in Civil Appeal No. 2004/80.\n\nN. B. Si\"ha and S. K. Sinha for Respondent No. 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J. These appeals by special leave are directed against a Division-Bench common judgment dated October 13, 1978 of the High Court of Delhi by which the Letters Patent Appeals were allowed and the impugned Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 passed by the Terminal Tax Officer, Municipal Corporation of Delhi were quashed.\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and may be summarised as follows.\n\nManmohan Tuli, appellant in C.A. No. 2004/80, is the owner of a piece of land situate on the Grand Trunk Road near the sixth milestone as one goes from Delhi to Ghaziabad.\n\nAppellant Tuli has constructed various buildings on his land for use as godowns and has rented them out to various transport companies ._l_ ~., ngagcd in bringing good from other States and storing them before their transhipment to Delhi and other States beyond Delhi.\n\nThe trucks carrying the goods for various destinations pass along the G.T. Road and move into Tuli's land.\n\nIt is not disputed that after the trucks enter the land, the goods arc unloaded into the godowns, sorted out and reloaded into the respective trucks meant for various destinations. There-\n\n• '\n\n• •\n\nafter the trucks move out of the land and passing through the Union\n\nTerritory of Delhi after crossing the border line, proceed to their destinations. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation') by its Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the 'inpugned orders') directed that a Terminal Tax post be set up at the entrance to Tuli's land in order to collect\n\nI0-214SCI/81\n\nA terminal tax on goods carried into that land The Ghaziabad Nagar Palika also purported to levy terminal tax on such goods but this levy was neither assailed before the High Court nor has been challenged before us and is therefore left out of conideration. A writ was filed before the High Court by the owners of transport compiinies as a.lso by Tull for quashing the orders of the Corporation seeking kl levy terminal tax on the goods which were not meant for Delhi tut for places beyond Delhi. Further details are not necessary for the decision of these appeals and both the appeals (C.A. Nos. 2004 and 2005 of 1980) will be disposed of by a common judgment.\n\nThe High Court vide the impugned judgment was of the opinion C that even though the goods were stored in the godown of Tuli, sorted out and reloaded but as they while passing through the territory of Delhi undoubtedly entered the said territory, the Corporation was legally entitled to levy terminal tax at the point of entry into the Union Territory of Delhi. The case of the appellant was that the goods were not\n\nD meant either to be used or consumed in Delhi nor was Delhi the final destination of the goods. It was a different matter that as the goods were to be sent to destination beyond Delhi the transport carrying the goods had perforce to pass through the territory of Delhi. It was thus contended that the goods were not carried into the territory of Delhi but were merely carried through the territory of Delhi to other destinations which were beyond Delhi. It was argued that s. 178 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') had in terms no application to the case and that therefore the terminal tax imposed by the impugned orders was legally invalid.\n\nThe counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that even though F the goods may have been meant for other destinations but as they were unloaded in the godown and reloaded in various trucks and actually entered into the territory of Delhi, they were factually carried into the\n\nDelhi territory and that was sufficient to empower the Corporation to.~.l. levy the terminal tax. According to the argument of the counsel for the Corporation, the question of destination was not at all germane for G the purpose of adjudicating the competency of the Corporation to levy terminal tax at the point of entry into Delhi.\n\nThus, the entire question turns upon the interpretation of s. 178 of the Act and some Rules framed under the Act. Relevant portion of section 178 runs thus : B \"178 (1). On and from the date of the establishment of the Corporation under section 3, there shall be levied on a11 goods carried by railway or road into the Union Territory of Delhi\n\nM. M. TULi v. M.C.D. (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nfrom any place outside thereof, a terminal tax at the rates specified in the Tenth Schedule.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThe crucial words which have to be interpreted are : 'goods carried by railway or road into the Union Territory of Delhi from any place outside Delhi'. The contention of the appellant is than.the words 'goods carried into the Union Territory' clearly indicate that: the final destination of the goods must be Delhi and by virtue of this fact, the natural consequence would be that the goods should be carried from other places either by rail or by road into the territory of Delhi.\n\nThis argument was reinforced by the words 'terminal tax' used in s. 178 which imply that the terminus of the journey of the goods must be Delhi and only in that event the Corporation would be competent to levy a terminal tax.\n\nThis argument was sought to be rebutted by the respoo.dents on the ground that the words 'carried into the Union Territory of Delhi' should be interpreted independently and literally so as to indicate that even if the goods passed through Delhi, the moment they entered into the territory of Delhi terminal tax became exigible.\n\nSo far as. this aspect of the argument is concerned, we ar(1 unable to accept the same because it is well setlled that taxing statutes must be strictly interpreted giving every benefit of doubt to the tax . payer.\n\nBefore, however, examining the respective contentions of the parties it may be necessary to refer to the authorities dealing with the history of terminal tax or octroi duty. To begin with, it is not disputed that the pcwer to subject the goods either to octroi or to terminal tax squarely falls within entries numbers 52 and 56 of List II to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.\n\nIn Punjab Flour & General Mills v. Lahore Corporation(') the Court while drawing a distinction between the type of taxes referred to as terminal taxes in Entry No. 58\n\n_.of List I of Schedule 7 to the Government of India Act, and those described as cesses in Entry No. 49 of List II thereof observed as follows :\n\n• •\n\n\"There appears to us a definite distinction between the type of taxes referred to as terminal truces in Enlry No. 58 of List I of Sch. 7 and the type of taxes referred to as cesses on the entry of goods into a local area in Entry No. 49 of List IL The former taxes must be (a) terminal (b) confined to goods and passengers carried by railway or air.\n\nThey must be chargeable at a rail or air terminus and be\n\n(!)_AIR 1947 F.C. 14.\n\nreferable to services (whether of carriage or otherwise) rendered or to be rendered by some rail or air transport organisation.\n\nThe essential features of the cesses referred to in Entry No. 49 of List II are on the other hand simply\n\n(a) the entry of goods into a ddinite local area and (b) the requirement that the goods should enler for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein. . . . The grounds of taxation under the two entries are, as indicated above, radically differenl, and there is no case for suggesting that taxation under the one entry limits or interferes in any way with taxation under the other.\"\n\nIn The Central India Spinning & Weaving & Manufacturing Co.\n\nLtd., The Empress Mills, Nagpur v.\n\nThe Municipal Committee, Wardha(') this Coort examined the entire matter exhaustively and after giving the history of terminal tax or oclroi observed as follows :\n\n\"ll 'terminal' besides the above meaning has an addi- D tional meaning also and that meaning signifies the termini or the jurisdictional limits of the municipal area even then the construction to be placed on the term should be the one that favours the tax-payer, in accordance with the principle of construction of taxing statutes, which must be strictly construed and in case, of doubt must be construed against E the taxing authorities and doubt resolved in favour of the\n\ntax-payer.\"\n\n\"The legislative history of this tax thus shows that octroi was Jeviable on the entry of goods in a local area when the goods were for consumption, use or sale therein.\n\nThe substituted tax was terminal tax on goods imported into or exported from a local area and by rules this tax in the case of Wardha Municipal Committee was imposed on certain class of goods imported and on others exported by railway\n\nor road.\"\n\n\"That by the substitution of tcrn1inal tax on gocxls imported into a local area the nature of the tax had not been altered from what it was when octroi was in force or when instead of \"terminal tax\" octroi (\\vithout refund) was substi~ tuted . . . . . . . Therefore terminal \\ax on goods imported or exported is similar in its incidence and is payable on\n\n(t) [1958] S.C.R. 112\n\nXI. M. TULi \"' M.C.D. (Foal Ali, J.)\n\ngoods 011 their journey e11<ling within the rnunicipal limits or comn1cncing thcreiron1 and not V\\i'here the goods v.1ere 1nerely in transit through the municipal limits and had their terminLIS eiscwhere.\"\n\n90 I\n\n'T!Jcrefore, according to the Federal Court 'terminal\" ll has rferencc to the terminus of the railway or air, i.e., the end of journey.\"\n\nA close \"nalysis of this decision, therefore clearly discloses that a tern-iinal tax signified that there must be n tcrn1inus for the journey of the goods.\n\nThc word 'terminus' according lo Oxford Dictionary C means-a point ituatcd at or forrning the end or extrcrnity of son1e~ thing. situated at the end of a line of railway.\n\nIn other words, tenninus 111eansthe point to \\Vhich main action tends, goali end, finishing point, the point at which something comes to an end.\n\nIn Corpus Juris Vol. 62 at p. 729 the word 'terminal' in connection with transportation means the fixed beginning or ending point of a given run. It D would thus appear that a terminal tax could be levied only by the Corporation or the State which is the final destination of the goads sent from any other area.\n\nA similar view was taken by a later decisiou of this Court in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mill.1 Cu. Ltd. Bangalore v. Corporafio11 oi the Ci1y of Bangalore(') where Kapur, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows :\n\n\"The history of these taxes therefore shows that in the Devolut; on Rules under the Government oi India Act, 1915 octroi, terminal tax and taxes on professions and callings\n\nwere three distinct heads of taxation. . . Therefore, when s. 142-A was added in the Government of India Act, 1935, its operation was limited to entry 46 of List II and had no reference to entry 49 which deals with cesses on entry of goods.\n\nThe position under the Constitution is exactly the samt and therefore neither s. 142-A of the Government of India Act, 1935 nor Art. 276 has any effect on entry 49 in the Government of India Act, 1935 or entry 52 in the Constitution.\"\n\nIn this case also a distinction between a terminal tax and octroi was clcaily brought out.\n\nIn Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr. v.\n\n• The State oi Utwr Pradesh & Am'.(2) while defining a local area within B\n\n(!) [1961] 3 .>.C.R. 707.\n\n(2) [1961] J S.C.R. 242.\n\nA the meaning of Entry 52 of List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Court observed as follows :\n\n\"We are of opinion that the proper meaning to be attached to the words 'local area' in Entry 52 of the Constitution, (when the area is a part of the State imposing the B law) is an area administered by a local body like a municipality, a district board, a local board, a union board, a Panchayat or the like.\" In Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgaum Borough Municipality(') this Court again fully discussed the matter and Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Court stressed the essen- C tial distinction between octroi and terminal tax in the following\n\nwords:\n\n\"Octrois and terminal taxes were different taxes though they resembled in one respect, namely, that they were leviable in respect of goods brought into a local area. While terminal mxes were leviable on goods 'imported or exported' from the Municipal limits denoting thereby that they were connected with the traffic of goods, octrois, according to the legislative practice then obtaining were, Jeviable in respect of goods brought into a Municipal area for consumption or use or sale.\n\n~·~·· ...\n\nThe history of these two taxes clearly shows that while terminal taxes were a kind of octroi which were concerned only with the entry of goods in a local area irrespective of whether they would be used there or not; octrois were ta.xes on goods brought into the area for consumption, use or sale.\n\nF They were leviable in respect of goods put to some use or other in the area but only if they were meant for such user.\" ...,. l ·\n\nIn Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. The State of Assam(') Gujendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court drew a very apt distinction regarding the concept of import and observed as follows :-\n\n\"In that connection, the legislative history of the octroi duty was examined and it was held that the concept of import requires that the goods which are brought into must mix up with the mass of the property in the local area where the . goods are alleged to have been imported. If the goods are\n\njust carried and not mixed with the mass of the property in the area through which they are carried, they cannot b~ said\n\n(1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 216.\n\n\n\"·-·\n\nM. M. TULi v. M.C.D. (Fazal Ali, J.) 903\n\nto have been imported into that area . . . . . . . . . . The word A \"carried\" is of much wider denotation, and it would be unreasonable to limit its scope by introducing considerations which are relevant in dealing with the question of import.\"\n\nThus, from a consideration of the cases cited above, the following prqpositions emerge :- B\n\n(1) Terminal tax and octroi are similar kinds of levies which are closely interlinked with ( 1) destination of the goods,\n\n(2) the user in the local area on arrival of the goods.\n\nWhere the goods merely pass through a local area without being consumed therein the mere fact that the transport carrying the goods halt within the local area for transhipment or >allied purposes would not justify the levy of either the terminal tax or octroi duty.\n\nThis is because the halting of the goods is only for an incidental purpose to effectuate the journey of the goods to the final destination by unloading, sorting and reloading them at a particular place.\n\n(2) There is a very thin margin of difference between a terminal _tax and octroi. In the case of the former (terminal tax) the goods reach their final destination and their entry into the area of destination immediately attracts payment of terminal tax irrespective of their user. In the case of octroi, however the fax is levied on goods for their nse and consum1Ption.\n\n( 3) But at the same time, the goods while halting at a local area should leave for their destination within a reasonable time which niay depend on circumstances of each case and if the goods are kept within the area for such a long and indefinite period that the purpose of reaching the final destination lying in oa different area is frustrated or defeated, they may be exigible to terminal tax.\n\n( 4) Where the goods enter into a local area which is also the destination of the goods either temporarily or otherwise, G the terminal tax would be leviable. For instance, if A consigns goods from P.afna in Bihar to Delhi in the name of X and X after having received the goods at Delhi rebooks or reloads the same on a transport for Chandigarh in the name of Y, terminal tax would be leviable by the Corporation at Delhi beC'ause the destination of the goods H in the first instance was Delhi and that by itself would attract the imposition of terminal tax.\n\nThe fact that X\n\nrebooks them to Chandigarh \\VOuid not n1akc any difference because the act of rebooking by X at Delhi would constitute a fresh transaction by \\vhich the goods after having been carried into Delhi are further exported to Chandigarh.\n\nOn the other hand, when there is one continuou~ journey of 1hc good~ fro1n Patna to Ch',-tndigarh \\Vithout any break. the final dctination v.could be Chandigarh even though the gocids lll<t:.r haYe to be halted in Delhi for the purpose o'.' unloading. sorting a!1d reloading and may have to he ke:pt in [)clhi for a reasonable time.\n\nIn such a case tcn11i11al tax \\vould not he cxigiblc.\n\nThese principles arc also spelt out by the American law on the subject \\Vhich deals \\l\\ith intcr-'.--1~1tc tranpllrt of goods.\n\nIn A1n.erican Jmispruclence (2d. Vol. 15. p. 689, para 49) the following statem•.:nt is niadc, which is spelt out fron1 various American decisions including those of the U.S. Supreme Court :\n\n\"In the determination of whether a transportation of persons or property constitutes interstate or intrastate con1merce, the essc\"ntial character or unity of the movement is the decisive factor.\n\nWhile the intention of the shipper or passenger is probab'.y the most important single factor in determining whether transportation is interstate or intrastate intention alone ha-s b;;:cn aid not to he a controlling factor in making such determination.\n\nInter-state journeys are to be measured by the commonly awcpted sense of the 1ransport.ati0n concept ...... l\"he parties cannot, by dcscriptiY2 tern1s of co'ntract, convert a local business, serving as an agency of a transp~1rt~1tion con1pany. into an interstate con1mercc husiness, nor. conversely, may a through shipment be transformed into intrastate cornnurce\n\nby separating the rate into its co1npone; it parts, charging 1ocal rates, and issuing Jocal \\Vaybills''.\n\nSimilar observation:; are to be found in th.:: atnc volume of Anierican Jurisprudence (p. 697, para 56) which re:atc to the continuity of t:ansit of goods and may be extracted !hus :\n\n''The cruci; I question to be sctt!eu in determining \\Vhcther ;_; ersonal property n1oving 111 intcrtatc co1nmcrce is suhjcct to local taxation l~ that of its continuity of trar.si t and this question IS to be dL'tc:rmin.:J by vanous L1ctors, an1ong which arc the intention nf the owner, the co11trol he retains In change cl i:~ ti 11 a tio ii. the ugei:cy by\n\n\\1. M. TULi v. M.C.D. (Fa;.a/ Aii, J.) 905\n\nwhich the transit is eflcckd. and th•c occasion or purpose A of tht? interruption during v.-hich th~ ax is sought to be levied. fntcnt, \\\\hile not alone conclusive, is probably the most l1nportant single dctrn1inant of contir:uous carriagl..'.\n\nH a break in the interstate journey is caused by the'\n\n,:xic,1cies or convcnie11cs of the c:hos~11 n1cans of tran~ port:ition. consideration of the safety of the goous during transit. or natural causes over which the taxpayer has no\n\ncon1rc'1. the continuity of the transit rcn1ains uni111µaircd\".\n\nThe tol:owing state-1ncnt of lnv occurs 1n the s;1n1:.· \\'olun1l' ( p::ra 57, p. 698) :-\n\n\"Ii during transit. property is stored f,,, an indefinite link lor other than natural causes or for lack of facilities for immediate transportation, it is subject to state or lecal laws, including inspection laws ...... On the other hand, if the entry of goods into a warehouse is a convenient ink:rmediate step in the process of getting them to their final destination, they remain in interstate or foreign comn1ercc until they reach those points\".\n\nIn the case of Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brnt!/eboro(') one important aspect of the matter has ken dealt with, viz., the fact that if the goods halt in an intermediate State whilst on their journey to their destination for a Jong period due to circunistanccs beyond the control of the own•er. whether or not the goods lose ', he nature of th:; interstate transaction and could be free fron1 thl? t, ttte taxation, \\\\'a:-; clearly highlighted by hefollowing observations :-\n\n\"'Longs of puip \\Vcod which have been plao2d in a river to b2 floated info another state are in interstate co111mercc, so as to be free from state taxation, although, because of the high wat•er in a connecting river into which they \\vill ultin1atcly pass. it is unsafe to permit thcn1 to enter that river, and they are tcn1porarily hed in a boon1 'near the mouth of its tributary\".\n\nIn the sa1nc case, C.J. l'aft indicat12d the various apects of\n\n_.. interruptions in the journey and the incidence thereof and observed as follows :-\n\n''The doubt arises whon there journey, aml when the property,\n\n(1) 67 L Ed. US 309.\n\nar.:'. int•:rruption:-. in tlil: in its transp0rtatic.11, i.:;\n\nunder the complete control of the owner during the passage If the inrerruptions are only to promote the safe or convenient transit, then the continuity of the interstate trip is qot broken.\n\nChief among these are the intention of the owner, the control he Petains to change destination, the agency by which the transit is effected, the actual continuity of the transportation, and the occasio'n or purpose of the interruption during which the tax is sought to be levied\".\n\nIn Voume 78 L Ed at p. 13 8 the test laid down was that if the shipment was made in good faith to a destination and the interruption was not indefinite but reasonable the co'ntinuity of the journey cannot be said to be broken. It was also pointed out that where the interruption of the movement of commodities at an intermediate point\n\nis not incidental to the transporation, the shipment loses the character of interstate commerce so as to be exigible to local taxation.\n\nIn this connection, the following observations were made :\n\n\"If the shipment has been made in good faith to a destination the interruption is not indefinite, but is reasonable and solely in furtherance of the intended transportation of the shipment to its ultimate destination, then the continuity of the jonrney is not broken by the delay nor by the mere power of the owner there to destroy its character as interstate commerce ....... any interruption of the movement of commodities at an inrermediate point between origin and final destination that is not incidental to the transportation or the use of the means of transportation or, being so incidental, is used or extended for purposes of the owner not incidental to the transport transportation or the mea'ns used therefor, breaks the continuity in transit and subjects the shipment to local taxation at the point of interruption\".\n\nWe have laid special stress on tl1e circumstances under which the terminal tax becomes leviable if the halt or interruption of the goods at an intermediate point is for an indefinite and unexplained period.\n\nThe answer to the question as to what would be a reasonable time for interruption of the goods or hlting in the instant case at the godown of Tuli, will naturally depend on the special features or circu1nstances of each cases, .viz., the nature of the goods,\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nM. M. TULi v. M.C.D. (Fazal Ali,/.) 907\n\nthe time taken in loading, sorting and unloading, the obstacles or difficulties which may be faced by the transporters and similar other factors.\n\nNormally, a time of two to three days or even a week should be sufficient to clear the goods for its journey to the ultimate destination. It may sometimes happen that goods may have to be kept in th~ godowns in the territory of Delhi for circumstances beyond the control of the consignee or the consignor, e.g., wl)ile the goods are lying in a godown at Delhi a dispute occurs between the concerned parties as a result of which an injunction is issued by a court restraining the transporters from moving the goods.\n\nIn considering what is reasonable time these circumstances would have to be taken into consideration.\n\nIt, was, however, argued before us that according to the Terminal tax Ru1es framed under the Act, Rule 26 exempts goods from terminal tax if the same are exported immediately ahd are declared to b~ intended for immediate export.\n\nIn view of the interpretation we have placed on s. 178 it is obvious that the word 'immediately' appearing in Rule 26 has to be liberally construed so as to imply a reasonable period and if the export is delayed the rules may apply if a reasonable explanation has been given.\n\nSo far as rules regarding taking of passes, etc., at the barrier are concerned they would, of course, apply but subject to the conditions under which terminal tax can be imposed under s. 178 of the Act which is the main charging section.\n\nThe High Court appears to have placed some reliance on Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. The Union of l11dia(') in coming to the conclusion that in the instant case the Corporation was legally entitled to levy terminal tax.\n\nWith dTh~ re3pect to the Judges of the High Court who decided the Appeals, we would like to point out that the case just above referred to is clearly distinguishable from the present appeals.\n\nThe most crucial fact in the Delhi decision was that the goods were bei'ng carried into the Union Territe>ry of Delhi for the purpose of sale at Delhi. Thus, the case proceeded on the admitted position that the goods were carried from Ghaziabad into the Delhi territory for sale at Delhi.\n\nThe final destination of the goods being Delhi, there can be no doubt that the Corporation was fully entitled to levy terminal tax on such goods.\n\nIn this connection, the High Courc observed as follows :-\n\n\"Th•c Petitioner-company was i'ncorporated under the companies Act, 1956, and it had its registered office at G. T. Road, Ghaziabad, in the State of Uttar Pradesh ....\n\n(I) I.LR. 1973 (I) Delhi 237.\n\n~---\n\nIt has a factory, intt\"r oliu, at Ghaziabad for ntanufacturing the said \\lanaspati products.\n\nIn the course of its business, lhe company carried <111d still carries its products by railway and/or road into tlic Union -rcrrit~1ry of D1..\":lhi from Ghaziabad for th., purpose of sa'.c al DJhi.\n\nThe words \"shall be :evied on all goods carried by railway or road\" i\"n sub-section (I) show ckarly that the section imposes terminal tax on the carriage or moven1ent of goods fro1n outside the L'nicn rrcrritory of Delhi into the said Territory.\n\nIn other \\Vords, the taxable event is the carriage or movcn1cnt of goods into thi: Union \"fcrritory of Delhi\".\n\nThe observations last •extructed must be nndcrstood m the light of the admitted facts in A twit Banaspati Company's case (supra).\n\nWe are unable to accept that case as an authority for the proposition that even if the final destination of the goods was not Delhi but as the goods were carried through the territory ol' Delhi, they would still be extgible to terminal tax. fn the impugned judgment the High Court, however, seems to have laid undue emphasis and special stress on th•e fact that the goods were carried into the Union territory of Delhi, the moment they passed through it even though the destinatio\"n of the goods may be some other area.\n\nThis appeared, according to the High Court. the real purport and intention of s. 178.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this view which is patently wrong and does not at all now from the plain and unambiguous language of s. 178 of the Act nor docs s. 178 warrant such an i'ntcrpretation. fhus, our concluions are as fo:Jcnvs :-\n\n(1) The High Court was wrong in interpreting s. 178 of the Act so as to justify imposition of termiml tax even on goods which merely passed through the territory of Delhi, although their destination is i1ot Delhi but places beyond Delhi.\n\n(2) The High Court was wrong in holding that merely\n\nb2causc the goods after having been unloaded in the godown of appellant Tuli arc sorted, reloaded in different trucks and thereafter pass through the territory of Dc:hi, they become exigiblc to t•erminal tax.\n\n(3) The High Court \\\\as wron~ i\"n interpreting Rule 26 literally and hr:!ding that cxcn1ption could be grant-\n\n' •\n\nM. M. TULi v. M.C.D. (Faal Ali, J.) 909\n\ned only if the goods are exported immediately which means within a very short time irrespective of any other consideration.\n\nIn view of our interpretation of s. 178, Rule 26 must be interpreted in the light of the object of s. 178 and terminal tax can be leviable only if it is proved that the goods remained at the godown for an indefinite and unexplained period which could not be said to be reasonable as\n\ndiscuss•od by us in the circumstances.\n\n( 4) Where the goods are carried by trucks into the territory of Delhi and unloaded there a'nd arc also meant\n\nfor Delhi and soon thereafter may be rebooked c by the receiver of the goods to some other place, terminal tax would be leviable becau~2 in this case there are two separate transactions-( 1) by which the goods arc meant for Delhi, and (2) by which after having reached and having been unloaded at Delhi they are rebooked and reloaded for some other D place and which therefore is a fresh and different transaction.\n\nIn such a case, terminal tax would be leviable at the entry in the territory of Delhi.\n\nWe might mention that the High Court whilo holding that terminal tax is exigible has construed the word 'immediately' in Rule 26 li!erally and directed the Terminal Tax Officer to fix a reasonable time for unloading, sorting and reloading the goods which are mea'nt for different destinations taking into consideration the quantity of the goods, the time for unloading, sorting, etc., and has further directed that reloading or tra'nshipment should be done within a time to be fixed by the Terminal Tax Officer.\n\nThough the directions given are correct but they will ha vc to be construed in the light of the various factors which we have referred to.\n\nRule 26 will have to be int, orpreted on the footing that s. 178 of the fact does not contemplate levy of terminal tax for goods meant for destinations oth>cr than Delhi.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment exeo:pt the pmtion quashing the impugned orders.\n\nThat portion we uphold (though on grounds different from the ones given by the High Court) in the light of the decision given and the observations made by us regarding the interpretation of s. 178 of the Act.\n\nIn the special circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs,\n\nV.D.K, Appeal allowed", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "A MAN MOHAN TULi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAN MOHAN TULI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 18, 1981 lJ [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. D. KosHAL AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.I\n\nDelhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, section 158 and rule 26 of the Terminal Tax Rule frarned under the Act, interpretation of-Exigibility of Terminal Tax, explained."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 461, "end_char": 466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Man Mohan Tuli, appellant in C.A. 2004/80, is the owner of a piece of land situate on the Grand Trunk Road near the sixth n1ilestone as one goes from Delhi to Ghaziabad."}}, {"text": "Ghaziabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Man Mohan Tuli, appellant in C.A. 2004/80, is the owner of a piece of land situate on the Grand Trunk Road near the sixth n1ilestone as one goes from Delhi to Ghaziabad."}}, {"text": "Tuli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 839, "end_char": 843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trucks carrying the goods for various destinations pass along the G .T. Road and move into Tuli's land."}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1173, "end_char": 1203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Delhi by is Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 directed that a Terminal Tax post be set up at the entrance to Tuli's land in order to collect terminal tax on goods carried into that land."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1223, "end_char": 1235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Delhi by is Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 directed that a Terminal Tax post be set up at the entrance to Tuli's land in order to collect terminal tax on goods carried into that land."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1240, "end_char": 1252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Delhi by is Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 directed that a Terminal Tax post be set up at the entrance to Tuli's land in order to collect terminal tax on goods carried into that land."}}, {"text": "Tuli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1828, "end_char": 1832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the Corporation was legally entitled to levy Terminal Tax at the point of territory of the Union Territory of Delhi even though the goods were sorted out in the godown of Tuli, resorted out and re-loaded since as they while passing through tlle territory of Delhi undoubtedly entered the said territory."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From a consideration of the decided cases of the Supreme Court, the following propositions emerge :-\n\n(i) Terminal tax and octroi are similar kinds of levies which are closely interlinked with (a) destination of the goods (b) the user in the local area\n\nM. M. TULi v. M.C.D. 895\non arrival of the goods."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4359, "end_char": 4364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, if A consigns goods from Patna in Bihar to Delhi in the name of X and X after having received the goods at Delhi rebooks or reloads the same on a transport for Chandigarh in the name of Y, terminal tax would be\n\nIeviablt~ by the Corporation at Delhi because the destination of the goods in the first instance was Delhi and that by itself would attract the imposition of terminal tax."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4368, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, if A consigns goods from Patna in Bihar to Delhi in the name of X and X after having received the goods at Delhi rebooks or reloads the same on a transport for Chandigarh in the name of Y, terminal tax would be\n\nIeviablt~ by the Corporation at Delhi because the destination of the goods in the first instance was Delhi and that by itself would attract the imposition of terminal tax."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4494, "end_char": 4504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, if A consigns goods from Patna in Bihar to Delhi in the name of X and X after having received the goods at Delhi rebooks or reloads the same on a transport for Chandigarh in the name of Y, terminal tax would be\n\nIeviablt~ by the Corporation at Delhi because the destination of the goods in the first instance was Delhi and that by itself would attract the imposition of terminal tax."}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 SCR 707", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5677, "end_char": 5693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 242", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 5 SCR 975", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5949, "end_char": 5965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6034, "end_char": 6040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7023, "end_char": 7060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7551, "end_char": 7562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7718, "end_char": 7729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Cl\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9276, "end_char": 9281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9786, "end_char": 9790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "909 E-FJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civi, J Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Madan Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9955, "end_char": 9967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia and Sushi/ Kumar for the Appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "Sushi/ Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9972, "end_char": 9984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia and Sushi/ Kumar for the Appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10025, "end_char": 10036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar, Lalit Bhardwaj and Miss Madhu Mulchandani for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Lalit Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10038, "end_char": 10052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar, Lalit Bhardwaj and Miss Madhu Mulchandani for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Madhu Mulchandani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10062, "end_char": 10079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar, Lalit Bhardwaj and Miss Madhu Mulchandani for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "P. R. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10106, "end_char": 10115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Rao, S. R. Venkataraman, P. C. Kapur, R. C. Bhatia and S. L.\n\nSharma for Respondent ND."}}, {"text": "S. R. Venkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10117, "end_char": 10135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Rao, S. R. Venkataraman, P. C. Kapur, R. C. Bhatia and S. L.\n\nSharma for Respondent ND."}}, {"text": "P. C. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10137, "end_char": 10148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Rao, S. R. Venkataraman, P. C. Kapur, R. C. Bhatia and S. L.\n\nSharma for Respondent ND."}}, {"text": "R. C. Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Rao, S. R. Venkataraman, P. C. Kapur, R. C. Bhatia and S. L.\n\nSharma for Respondent ND."}}, {"text": "S. L.\n\nSharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10167, "end_char": 10180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Rao, S. R. Venkataraman, P. C. Kapur, R. C. Bhatia and S. L.\n\nSharma for Respondent ND."}}, {"text": "N. B. Si\"ha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10232, "end_char": 10243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. B. Si\"ha and S. K. Sinha for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10248, "end_char": 10259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. B. Si\"ha and S. K. Sinha for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "FAzAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10327, "end_char": 10335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J. These appeals by special leave are directed against a Division-Bench common judgment dated October 13, 1978 of the High Court of Delhi by which the Letters Patent Appeals were allowed and the impugned Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 passed by the Terminal Tax Officer, Municipal Corporation of Delhi were quashed."}}, {"text": "Manmohan Tuli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10756, "end_char": 10769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manmohan Tuli, appellant in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Ghaziabad Nagar Palika", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12001, "end_char": 12023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation') by its Orders dated May 23, 1975 and July 7, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the 'inpugned orders') directed that a Terminal Tax post be set up at the entrance to Tuli's land in order to collect\n\nI0-214SCI/81\n\nA terminal tax on goods carried into that land The Ghaziabad Nagar Palika also purported to levy terminal tax on such goods but this levy was neither assailed before the High Court nor has been challenged before us and is therefore left out of conideration."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13503, "end_char": 13509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14399, "end_char": 14405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14474, "end_char": 14485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14577, "end_char": 14586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14800, "end_char": 14814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15387, "end_char": 15393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16439, "end_char": 16455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16661, "end_char": 16671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wardha Municipal Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18898, "end_char": 18924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substituted tax was terminal tax on goods imported into or exported from a local area and by rules this tax in the case of Wardha Municipal Committee was imposed on certain class of goods imported and on others exported by railway\n\nor road.\""}}, {"text": "Foal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19420, "end_char": 19428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. TULi \"' M.C.D. (Foal Ali, J.)\n\ngoods 011 their journey e11<ling within the rnunicipal limits or comn1cncing thcreiron1 and not V\\i'here the goods v.1ere 1nerely in transit through the municipal limits and had their terminLIS eiscwhere.\""}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20745, "end_char": 20750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. Bangalore v. Corporafio11 oi the Ci1y of Bangalore(') where Kapur, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows :\n\n\"The history of these taxes therefore shows that in the Devolut; on Rules under the Government oi India Act, 1915 octroi, terminal tax and taxes on professions and callings\n\nwere three distinct heads of taxation. . ."}}, {"text": "Rules under the Government oi India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20870, "end_char": 20915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21035, "end_char": 21041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules under the Government oi India Act, 1915", "statute": "Rules under the Government oi India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21061, "end_char": 21090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21296, "end_char": 21302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21312, "end_char": 21341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21346, "end_char": 21354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21389, "end_char": 21418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21754, "end_char": 21770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22280, "end_char": 22292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgaum Borough Municipality(') this Court again fully discussed the matter and Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Court stressed the essen- C tial distinction between octroi and terminal tax in the following\n\nwords:\n\n\"Octrois and terminal taxes were different taxes though they resembled in one respect, namely, that they were leviable in respect of goods brought into a local area."}}, {"text": "Gujendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23405, "end_char": 23419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State of Assam(') Gujendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court drew a very apt distinction regarding the concept of import and observed as follows :-\n\n\"In that connection, the legislative history of the octroi duty was examined and it was held that the concept of import requires that the goods which are brought into must mix up with the mass of the property in the local area where the ."}}, {"text": "P.afna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25995, "end_char": 26001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, if A consigns goods from P.afna in Bihar to Delhi in the name of X and X after having received the goods at Delhi rebooks or reloads the same on a transport for Chandigarh in the name of Y, terminal tax would be leviable by the Corporation at Delhi beC'ause the destination of the goods H in the first instance was Delhi and that by itself would attract the imposition of terminal tax."}}, {"text": "U.S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27294, "end_char": 27312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 689, para 49) the following statem•.:nt is niadc, which is spelt out fron1 various American decisions including those of the U.S. Supreme Court :\n\n\"In the determination of whether a transportation of persons or property constitutes interstate or intrastate con1merce, the essc\"ntial character or unity of the movement is the decisive factor."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34473, "end_char": 34479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34886, "end_char": 34892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35902, "end_char": 35915, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Banaspati Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36803, "end_char": 36820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations last •extructed must be nndcrstood m the light of the admitted facts in A twit Banaspati Company's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37437, "end_char": 37443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37585, "end_char": 37591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37612, "end_char": 37618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37738, "end_char": 37744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "hi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38151, "end_char": 38153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The High Court was wrong in holding that merely\n\nb2causc the goods after having been unloaded in the godown of appellant Tuli arc sorted, reloaded in different trucks and thereafter pass through the territory of Dc:hi, they become exigiblc to t•erminal tax."}}, {"text": "Faal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38333, "end_char": 38341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The High Court \\\\as wron~ i\"n interpreting Rule 26 literally and hr:!ding that cxcn1ption could be grant-\n\n' •\n\nM. M. TULi v. M.C.D. (Faal Ali, J.) 909\n\ned only if the goods are exported immediately which means within a very short time irrespective of any other consideration."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38510, "end_char": 38516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38576, "end_char": 38582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40127, "end_char": 40133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40566, "end_char": 40572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_910_929_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "MST. ZOHARA KHATOON\n\nJI.\n\nMOHD. IBRAHIM\n\nFebruary 18, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. D. KOSHAL AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nCrifninal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 125 ( 1 ), Explanation (b )-Whether hfa1.dstrate conipetcnt to award nu1intrna11ce if under the personal law of the' Jl.t!ohornedan.5, tlie lrife obtained a valid divorce and had completed the period oj 1ddar-\"wife'' whether includ:es a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce froni her husband and has not re1narried.\n\nThe appellant was the legally married wife of the respondent. As he wil fully neglected her, she filed an application before the Magistrate for mainte nance under Section 125 of the , Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The Magis trate accepted the a-llegation of the appellant that she had been neglected by the respondent without reasonable or probable cause and awarded maintenance at Rs. 100/- per n1onth for the appellant and the minor child.\n\nThe Hi.h Court held that clause (b) of the explanation to Section 125 (I) of the Code had no application to the facts of the case and that so far as the appellant was concerned, she was not entitled to any maintenance. It however afirmed the order of the Magistrate fixing Rs. 40/- per month as maintenance for her minor son.\n\nfn the appeal, it was contended that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and is based on wrong interpretation of clause (b) of the explanation to Section 125(1) of the Code.\n\nAccepting the. Appeal1,\n\nF (Per Fazal Ali & Vardarajan, JJ.)\n\nHELD : 1. In the instant case Section 127 does not apply at all because the respondent has not filed any application for cancellation of the maintenance on the grounds mentioned in Section I27(3)(b) of the 1973 Ccxle but this case is squarely covered by Clause (b) of the ExplanaHon to S. 125(i) of that Code as a reiult of which the appellant in the eye of law continues to be the wife oi G the respondent, despite the decree for dissolution of marriage. [925 II, 926 A-B]\n\n2. It is clear that the 1898 Code by virtue of S. 488 provided a sUmmary remedy for awarding maintenance to neglected wives irrespective of the caste. creed, community or religion to which they belonged. Sections 488 and 489 were the corresponding provisions of the 1898 Code which were couched almost in the same language as ss. 125 and 127 of the 1973 Code having some important additions that h<!!ve been made under tbe 1971 Code. A provision like clause (b) of the Explanation to S. 125(1) of the 1973 Code was conspicuously absent in s. 488 of the old Code and has been added by the 1973 Code. [914 H,\n\n915 A, D, 917 C.D]\n\nZOHRA KHATOON V. MOHD. IBRAHIM 911\n\nNanak Chand v. Shd Chandra Kishare Agarwala & Ors. [1970] I SCR 565, A Ram Singh v. State & Anr. AIR 1963 All. 355, Nalini Ranjan Chakravarty v.\n\nSmt. Kiran Rani Chakravarty AIR 1965 Pat. 442, Mahabir Agarwal/a v. Gita Roy [1962) 2 Cr. L.J. 528, referred to:\n\n3. The ~Iohomedan Law on the subject was that where a woman governed by the Mohon1cdoo. Law was awarded maintenance, the same would cease from the date of divorce given by the husband and the completion of the period of B Jddat.\n\n[917 G-H]\n\n.,.\n\nIn re Shckhannzian AIR 1930 Bombay 178, Syed Said v.\n\nA-feera Bee 20\n\nM.L.J. 12, Mohamed Ra/dmul/ah & Anr. AIR 1947 Madras 416, Aahimunnissa & Ors. v. Mohd. Ismail AIR 1956 Hyderabad 14, Din Mohanunad's V.I.L.R. 1883 226, referred to.\n\n4. Although a l\\{ohomedan wife had a right to be awarded maintenance by the Magistrate under s. 488 of the old Code, the said right ceased to exist if she \\vas divorced by her husband and had observed the period of Iddat. This was the undoubted position of law under the 1898 Code as amended by the 1955 Amending Act. [920 A-BJ\n\n5. Clause (b) has made a distinct departure from the earlier Code in that D it has widened the definition of wife and, to some extent, overruled the personal law of the parties so far &5 proceedings for maintenance under Section 125 arc concerned. Under Clause (b), the wife continued to be a wife within the meaning of the provisions of the Code even though she has been divorced by her husband or has otherwise obtained a divorce and has not remarried. It foJJows, therefore, that the divorce \"resulting from the aforesaid dissolution of the 1narriage is also a legal divorce under the Mohomedan Law by virtue of the E statute (1939 Act). [920 E-F, 921 BJ\n\n6. Under the .l'vfohomedan Law the commonest form of divorce is a unila~ teral pronouncerneut of divorce of the wife by the husband according to the various fonns recogniSed by the Jaw.\n\nA divorce given unilaterally by the hus.-- band is especially peculiar to Mohomedan Law. In no other law has the husband got a unilateral right to divorce his wife by a simple declaration because other Iav.1s, viz., the Hindu Law or the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, contemplate only a dissolution of marriage on certain grounds brought about by one of the spouses in a court of law. [921 C-D]\n\n7. A wife thus had a statutory right to obtain divorce from the husbruid through the court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act.\n\nThe Act provided for the wife an independent remedy which could be resorted to by her G without being subjected to a pronouncement of divorce by the husband. It is, therefore, in the background of this Act that the words 'has obtained a divorce from her husband' in clause (b) of the Explanation have to be construed. Thus the High Court in considering the effect of these words seems to have over look ed the dominant object of the statutory remedy that was made available to the wife under the Act of 1939 by which the wife could get a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds mentioned in the 1939 Act by petitioning the civil H court without any overt act on the part of the husband in divorcing her. The High Court also failed to consider the legal consequences ll.owing from the\n\nA decree passed by, the Court dissolving the inarriage, viz., a legal di\\'orcc under the Mohomedan law. [922 D-F]\n\n8. The interpretation put by the High Court on the second limb of clause\n\n(b) is not correct.\n\nThis seems to be borne out fron1 the provisions of tohn medan la\\v itself. 1t would appear that under the Mohomedan la\\\\I there are three distinct modes in which a 1\\luslim marriage can be dissolved and the rela- B tionship of the husband and \\Vife terminated so as to result in an irrevocable\n\ndivorce. [922 F-GJ\n\n9. It is, therefore, manifest that clause (b) of Explanat:on to\n\nS. 125\n\nenviages all the three modes, whet-her a \\Vife is divo:rced unilaterally by the husband or whether she obtains divorce under the mode numbers 2 and 3, she continues to be a wife for the purpose of getting maintenance under S. 125 of the 1973 coJc.\n\nIn these circumstances the High Court was not at all justified ir. t<1h.ing the two scpar<1.te clauses 'who has been divorced' and 'had obtained a divorce front her husbund' coniunctively so as to indicate <1 divorce proceeding from the. husba.nd anrt the husband alone and in not treating a dissolution of marriage under the 1939 Act as a legal divorce. [924 B-D]\n\n10. A clear distinction has been made beteen dissolution of n1arriage hrought about by 1he husband in exercising: his unilateral right to divorce and the act of .the \\Vife in obtaining a decree for dissolution of the marriag:e from a civil court under the Act of 1939. [925 E-F]\n\n11. The two limbs of clause (b) of the Explanation to S. 125(1) have separate and different legal incidents-one is reflected in clause (b) of sub~ Section (3) of S. 127 and the. other in clause (c) of sub-section (3) of S. 127.\n\n[925 G-H]\n\n(Per A. D. Koslial, J. concurrinR)\n\n1. The \\.Vord 'divorce' is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure and may legitirn.<itely be regarded <is having been used in clause (b) of sub-section 1 of Section 125 in the dictiona•ry sense.\n\nAs ordin'.1rily understood, 'divorce' is nothing more nor less than another name for dissolution of marriage, whether the same result from the act of parties or is a consequence of proceedings at law. It would be wrong to regard the v.to terms as not be synonyn1ous v; ith each other, unless the legjslature makes a direction to the contrary. [927A, C-Dl\n\n2. According to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Proccd11re. a fullfledged wife is entitled to maintenance.\n\nBy reason of clause (b) even a divo:ced wife ha<; th<it right provided that she has not re-married.\n\nIf that clause envisaged only divorce by voluntary nction of the husband, the second limb of the clause \\vhich makes the definition of 'wife' inclusive of a woman \\vho has 'obtained a divorce from the husband' would be rendcr.ed otiose.\n\nThe word obtained may well be u:oied in the sense of 'procured with effort' :1nd would ccrtainiy describ~ correctly a situation where son1ething is ac, hieved by a person. through his exertion in spite of opposition from others.\n\n[928 E, F-(}]\n\n3. Divorce by the Act of the husband, is not recognised by any system of Jaw except that applicable to Muslims. Members of the other main comrnunities inhabiting India, i.e. Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, etc. have perforce to go to courts in order to Obtain divorce. If clause (b) was intended to\n\n' •\n\nZOHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Fazal AU,!.) 913\n\nrn!:lracc only cases of divorce brought about by the Act of the husband, its A applicability would be limited, by and large, only to Muslims, which per se\n\nappears to be an absurd proposition. [929 C-D]\n\n4. The expression 'a \\voman who has obtained a divorce from her husband' has therefore tO be interpreted as including a wife who has been granted a decree of dissolution of marriage by the Court. [929 E]\n\nDeacock v. Deacock [1958] 2 All E.R. 633 referred to .\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 761 of 1980.\n\nApperu by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20-10-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 822 of 1978.\n\nJagdish Kumar Aggarwal for the Appellant.\n\nNemo for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of Murtaza Pazal Ali & A. Varda.rajan JJ was delivered by Fazal Ali, J., A. D. Kasha!, J. gave a concurring Opinion.\n\nFAzAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated October 20, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) by which a revision filed by the respondent for setting aside an order of maintenance passed by the trial Magistrate was accepted and the said order was quashed.\n\nThe facts of the appeal lie within a narrow compass hut the case involves a substantial question of law.\n\nUnfortunately, as the respondent did not appear despite service, we had to rely mainly on the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and had also to consider various aspects that could be stressed by the respondent if he had appeared. The appellant, Mst. Zohara Khatoon, wa, s a legally\n\n~-~ married wife of Mohd. Ibrahim.\n\nAs Mohd. Ibrahim oon after the marriage wilfully neglected her she filed an application before the trial Magistrate on September 17, 1974 under s. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the '1973 Code') in order to fix maintenance for her and her minor son. The Special Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki (U.P.), after hearing the parties, allowed the application by his order dated December 29, 1976 and fixed • •\n\n• •\n\nthe maintenance at Rs. 100/- (Rupees one hundred) per month both for the wife and the child. The Magistrate also accepted the a!Jega>- tion of the appellant that she had been neglected by the husband without reasonable or probable cause. The order of the Magistrate was upheld by the Sessions Judge in revision .\n\n11 -!14 SCI/81\n\nBefore the Magistrate, the respondent-husband had taken the defence that as the, appellant had brought a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and wilful neglect which was decreed by the civil court on 15-1-1973 and she was living separately, she ceased to be the wife of the respondent and was, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under s. 125 ors. 127 of the 1973 Code. Ultimately, the husband moved the High Court under s. 482 of the 1973 Code for quashing the order of the Magistrate as it was vitiated by an error of law.\n\nIn t~ High Court, the argument of the appellant was that in view of clause (b) of the Explanation to s. 125 (1) of the 1973 Code, she continued to be the wife despite obtaining a decree for dissolution of marriage and thus )ler right to maintenance would not be affected by the decree passed by the civil court.\n\nThe High Court after hearing the parties was of the view that clause (b) of the Explanation referred to above would apply only if the divorce proceeded from the husband, that is to say, the said clause would not apply unless the divorce was given unilaterally by the husband or was obtained by the wife from the husband.\n\nIn other words, the High Court thought that as, in the instant case, the dissolution of marriage was brought about by the wife uuder the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the '1939 Act') the decree under the said Act did not amount to a divorce by the husb'and because the marriage was dissolved by operation of law only.\n\nHence clause (b) of the Explanation to s. 125(1) had no application and the appellant was not entitled to any maintenance under s. 125 of the 1973 Code, so far as she was concerned.\n\nThe High Court, however, ma'ntained the order of the Magistrate so far as the minor son was concerned and fixed his maintenance at Rs. 40/- per month.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous nnd is based on a wrong interpretation of clause (b) of the Explanation to s. 125(1) of the 1973 Code.\n\nAfter having gone through the var<ous rrovisions of the 1973 Code, particularly ss. 125 and 127 we are mtisfied that the contentions raised by the counsel for the appellant are well founded and must prevail.\n\nln order to decide the issue in question it may be necessary to give a hricf survey of the corresponding provisions of the Code of Crimin~!\n\nProce, lurc, 1898 (h<:rcinafter referred to as the '1898 Code') to show the nature and ambit of the provisions relating to the award of maintenance.\n\nSections 488 and 489 were the corresponding provisions of the 1898 Code which were couched almost in the same language as\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nZOHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Fazal Ali, !.) 915\n\nss. 125 and 127 of the 1973 Code minus s.ome important addition§ that A have been made under the 1973 Code.\n\nThe relevant portion of s. 488 of the 1898 Code may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain itself, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect Dr refusal, order such person to make a monthly <illowance for the maintenance of his wife or snch child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding (five hundred rupees) in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs.\"\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to the other provisions of s. 488 of the said Code as the same are not germane for the purpose of ckdding this appeal. It may, however, be noted that a provision 'ike clause\n\n{b) of the Explanation to s. 125{1) of the 1973 Code was conspi- I) cuously absent from s. 488 and has been added by :he 1973 Code.\n\nWe shall deal with the legal effect of this provision a little later.\n\nA perusal of s. 488 would clearly reveal that it carves out an independent sphere of its own and is a general law providing a summary machinory for determining the maintenance to be awarded by the \\1agistrate under the circumstances mentioned in the section. rrh~ provisions E may not be inconsistent with other parallel Acts in so far as '1:laintcnance is concerned, but the section undoubtedly excludes to some extent the application of any other Act.\n\nAt the same t.ime, it cannot be said that the personal law of the parties is completely exclt!ded for all purposes. For instance, where the validity of a marriage or mode of divorce or cessation of marriage under the personal law of a party F is concerned that would have to be determined according to the said personal law.\n\nThus, the exclusion by s. 488 extends only to the '4.' !juantum of the maintenance and the circumstances acder which it\n\n, could be granted.\n\nThe scope of s. 488 of 1898 Code was w\"sidercd by this Court in Nanak Chand v. Shri Chandra Kisho.'e Auw; vala Ill.\n\nOrs.(') where the following observations were made:--· c;\n\n\"We are unable to see any inconsistency bet\\v•2en i_he Maintenance Act and s. 488 Cr.P.C ....... The hw ··:' substantially similar before and nobody c 0cr sugre , tcd 'k; t Hindu Law, as in force immediately hfrre the \"''''Jiw \":ement of this Act, insofar as it dealt with the mahilemr.ce.\n\nof children, was in any way inconsistent withs. 488 Cr. P, C .\n\n(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 565.\n\nThe scope of the two laws is different.\n\nSection 488 provides a summary remedy and is applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. Recently the question came before the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singh v. State (AlR 1963 All. 355), before the Calcutta High Court in Mahabir Agarwal/a v. Gita Roy [1962] 2 Cr. L.J. 528 and before the Patna High Court in Nalini Ranjan v. Kiran Rani (AIR 1965 Pat. 442). The three High Courts have, in our views, correctly come to the conclusion that s. 4(b) of the Maintenance Act does not repeal or affect in any manner the provisions contained in s. 488, Cr.P.C.\"\n\nIt would be seen that this Court approved of the decisions in the cases of Ram Singh, Mahabir Agarwal/a and Nalini Ranjan mentioned in the observations extracted above.\n\nIn order to undrstand the prqper scope of s. 488 of the 1898 Code which is almost the same as that of s. 125 of the 1973 Code, it may be necessary to examine the decisions which were referred to with approval by this Court in Nanak Chand's case (supra). In Ram Singh v. State & Anr.,(') Kailash Prasad, J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act is intended to be a substitute for the provisions of s. 488 Cr. P.C. In fact the provisions of sec. 18 of the Act cannot be a substitute for s. 488 Cr.P.C. The latter provision is general and is 31>plicable to a wife, irrespective of her religion, but the former is applicable to the case of Hindus only. It could not, therefore, be intendd to be a substitute for s. 48 8 Cr. P. C.\"\n\nTo the same effect is the decision of the Patna High Court in Nalini 1,..\n\nRo•zfan Clwkravarty v. Smt. Kiran Rani Ch\"kravarty(2) where the\n\nfollowing observations were made :-\n\n\"Before the enactment of 1956, it was well settled that the right conferred by section 488 Cr.P.C. was independent of the personal law of the parties. The right of maintenance under section 488 was irrespective of the nationality or creed of the parties, the only condition precedent to the possession of that right being in the case of a wife the acceptance of the conjugal relation. Further, s. 488 provided for only\n\n(!) AIR 1963 All. 355.\n\n(2) AIR 1965 Pat. 442\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nZOHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Fazal Ali, J.) 917\n\na speedy remedy and a summary procedure before a Magis- A trate against starvation of a deserted wife or child.\n\nThis section did not cover the civil liability of a husband or a father under his personal law to maintain his wife and children.\"\n\nThe Calcutta High Court also took the same view in Mahabir 8 Agarwalla v. Gita Roy CJ where the following observations were made:-\n\n\"An alternative but not inconsistent summary remedy was provided by section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure not only to the Hindu wife but generally to wives irrespective of religion for recovery of maintenance from !lie C husband.\n\nThe two remedies were, however, not co-extensive.\"\n\nThus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is clear that the 1898 Code by virtue of s. 488 provided a summary remedy for awarding maintenance to neglected wives irres, pective of D caste, creed, community or religion to which they belonged. It was in this context that the Courts referred to above considered the effect of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and other similar Acts.\n\nThis, however, does not conclude the controversy.\n\nThe miportant questiQn still remains : Was the Magistrate competent to a.ward maintenance if urider the personal law of the Mahomedans the \"life had been validly divorced and had completed the period of ldd; it? In fact, s. 489 of the 1898 Code, as amended by the 1955 Amending Act, had empowered the Magistrate to make any alteration in the payment of the maintenance on proof of a change in the circumstances.\n\nSimilarly, s. 489(2), which is extracted below, provided t111t the Magistrate could cancel the maintenance in consequence of a decision\n\n~· .. of any competent court :\n\n\"(2) Where it awears to the Magistrate that .. in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court, 3 .iy order made under Section 488 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly.\"\n\nThus, consiJoring the scheme of ss. 488 and 489 it was generally 11ccep- 1ed as geod bw by all the High Courts that where a woman governed\n\nby the Mahomedan law was awarded maintenance, the same would cease from the date of divorce given by the husband and the com- H pletion of the period of Iddat. That this is the Mahomedan law on\n\n(I I 11962] 2 Cr. L.J. 528.\n\nA the subject admits of no doubt and bas not been controverted before us.\n\nWe would however, refer to a few decisions on this point to support our point of view.\n\nIn Jn re Shekhanmian(') while defining the consequences of a divorce and its impact on s. 488 of the 1898 Cede a division Bench of B the Bombay High Court observed thus :-\n\n\"A talak when it becomes irrevocable puts an end to conjugal relationship which had subsisted between :he parties, and the divorced wife would not be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband beyond the period of iJdat from the date of such irrevocable divorce. S. 488 Criminal P.C., has in no manner abrogated this part of the per'C111al law of the parties.\n\nThe existence o! conjugal relations in the case of Mahomcdans has to be determined by reference to the provisions of the Mahomedan Law and not by considerations of equity and good conscience as ucde1'tood in any other system of law.\"\n\nTo the same effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in Syed Sold v. Mccram Bee (2) where in division Bench observed thus :\n\n\"A ~1agistrat1..:, ho\\vcver, exercising summary powers conR fcrrcd on him hy s. 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, can make or enforce an order to that effect only if the relationship of husband and wife exists between the two, but in order to deteymine this, and only to that extent, we must ascertain the effect in Mahomedan law of au irreversible divorce on conjugal relations.\"\n\nIt was further held in that case that a divorce becomes irrevocable after the wife has observed the period of iddat which is usually three months or if she was pregnant, the date of delivery so that she may be free to . '.... marry again.\n\nThis view was reiteraled by the Madras High Court in\n\na later decision in In re Mohamed Rahimullah & Anr. (\") where Yahya Ali, J. observed thus :-\n\n\"The foundation upon which Ss. 488 & 489, Criminal P .C. rest, so far as granting of maintenance by the husband to the wife is concerned, is that the relationship of husband and wife subsists between them.\n\nWhen that relationship is lawfully dissolved and there is no marital tie either in reason or upon any canon of justice or even upon the language of\n\n(I) AIR 1930 Bombay 178.\n\n(2) 20 M.L.J. 12\n\n(3) AIR 1947 Madras 461.\n\n• •\n\nZOHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Fazal Ali, !.) 919\n\nSs. 488 and 489 how the husband can be directed to continue A to maintain his divorced wife.\"\n\nThe Hyderabad High Court also took the same v; ew in Rahimunnissa & Ors. v. Mohd. Ismail(') and after con, idering the entire law on the subject Bilgrami, J. observed thus :-\n\n'\"All these grounds can be sullicicnt or valid for refusal of maintenance to a wife with whom the tie of marriage subsists, but when this tie is dissolved, all these defences cannot be set up and the right of the wife to maintenance during the \"iddat\" period is absolute under the Mahomedan law; the only Pbligation which binds a wife during this period is that she .; liould not remarry.\"\n\nIn a very early case of the AJlahalYad High Court-Di11 lYi<ilwmmad's cwe(')-Mahmood, J. pointed out that while the enactment regarding maintenance was of a general nature being applicable to Mahomedans as also to Hindus, Buddhists, and other communities vet the legislature never intended to restrict the Mahomcdan law of Divorce.\n\nThe Judge, further held that the right to maintenance came to a'1 end when the conjugal relationship between the husband and the wife ceased to exist.\n\nIn this connection, Mahmood, J. observed as fillows :\n\n\"The enactment under which that order was made does\n\nnot relate more especiaJly to Muha=adans than to Hindus, E Buddhists, Indo-Britons, Europeans, or any other branch of the general community, and the Legislature could never hayc irtcnded by it to interfere with or restrict the Muhammadan law of divorce ...... The whole of Chapter XLl, Crimi11:1l Procedure Code. so far as it relates to the maintenance of wives, contemplates the existence of the wuiupl relation as a condition precedent to an order of maintenance and, on general principles, it foJlows that as soon \"' the conjugal relation ceases, the order of maintenance must aho cease to have any enforceable effect. When and in what manner a cessation of the conjugal relation takes place, is a question which, ex necessitate rei, must be determined according to the personal law fo which the parties concerned arc subject ...... The right to maintenance conferred by s. 536 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a statutory right, which the Legislature has framed irrespective of the nationality er creed of the parties, the only condition precedent to the possession\n\n(l) AIR 1956 Hydrabad 14\n\n(2) V. l.L.R. (1813) 226\n\nA of that right, in the case of a wife, being the existence of the conjugal relation.\"\n\nThus, a review of the decisions referred to above clearly reveals that although a Mahomedan wife had a right to be awarded maintenance by the Magistrate under s. 488 of the Code, the said right ceased to exist if she was divorced by her husband and had observed : he period of iddat. This was the undoubted position of law under the 1298 Code as amended by the 1955 Amending Act.\n\nThe serious question to be determined in this appeal is as to how far the 1973 Code has made a distinct departure from the previous Code and changed the legal position of a woman after divorce. f>ection\n\n125 of the 1973 Code is couched almost in the same language ass. 488 of the earlier Code with the important exception that an 1:xplanation has been added after sub-clause (1) of s. 125 which runs thus :\n\n\"Explanation-For the purposes of this Chapter.-\n\n( a) \"minor\" means a person who, under the provisions ot the Indian Majority Act, 1875 is deemed not to have attained his majority;\n\n(b) \"wife includes a woman whn has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and bis not remarried.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nWe are however not concerned with clause (a) of ihe E\"planation.\n\nClause (b) has made a distinct departure from the earlier Code in that it has widened the definition of wife and, to some extent, overruled the F personal law of the parties so far as the proceedings for maintenance under s. 125 are concerned. Under clause (b), the wife continues to be a wife within the mea0ning of the provisions of the Code even though she has been divorced by her husband or has otherwise ohtained a divorce and has not remarried. The decision in this case turns upon the interpretation of clause (h). The High Court has construec the G words 'who has been divorced or has obtained a divorce from her hus .. band' as signifying that in both cases the divorce must proceed from the husband and should be the act of the husband and not !l , at of the wife.\n\nIn taking this view, the High Court obviously seem' to have been guided by the consideration that a dissolution of marri2ge brought about at the instance of the wife under the 1939 Act does not amount H to a divorce by the husband under the Mahomedan law and henct1 the second limb of clause (b) also does not apply.\n\nAlthough there may be some substance in the view taken by the High Court yet whst it\n\n' •\n\nWHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Fazal Ali, J.) 921\n\noverlooked was whereas a dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act may not necessarily end in a divorce but other consequences such as declaration that the marriage was a nullity, a decree for judicial separation, etc. but under the 1939 Act when the marriage is dissolved by the Court at the instance of the wife, the only result that follows is that the wife stands divorced from the husband by operation of law and no other relief can be granted by the court under t, he 1939 Act after a decree for dissolution is passed.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the divorce resulting from the aforesaid dissolution of the marriage is also a legal divorce under the Mahomedan law by virtue of the statute (1939 Act).\n\nThat this is so wou.\\d be manifest from the circumstances which we shall mention hereafter.\n\nThere can be no doubt that under the Mahomedan law the commonest form of divorce is a unilateral declaration of pronouncement of divorce of the wife by the husband according to the various forms recognised by the law.\n\nA divorce given unilaterally by the husband is especially peculiar to Mahomedan law.\n\nIn no other law has the husband got a unilateral right to divcrce his wife by a simple dedaration because other laws, viz., the Hindu law or the Pmsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, contemplate only a dissolution of marriage on certain grounds brought about by one of the spouses in a Court of law.\n\nBefore the enactment of the Act of 1939 a woman under pure Mahomedan law had no right to get a decree for divorce from the husband if he refused to divorce her.\n\nThis was undouhtdly the fundamental concept of divorce as laid duwn by the Mahomctian law.\n\nAs, however, some of the Muslim Jurists and Theologists were of the view that where a husband becomes importent or disappears for a large number of years or treats his wife with great cruelty, the wife should have some right to approach the Qazi for dissolving the marriage.\n\nRelying on these anthorities the legislature intervenerl and p>assed the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 under which the wife was conferred a legal right to move the civil court for a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds specified in s. 2 of the Act of\n\n1939. This is spelt out from the statement of Objects and Reasons of tl1e Act of 1939, the relevant portion of which may be extracted thus:\n\n\"There is no proviso in the Hanafi Code of Muslim Law enabling a married Muslim woman to obtain a decree from the Court dissolving her marriage in case the husband neglects to maintain her, makes her life miserable by deserting or persistently maltreating her or absconds leavin~ her unprovid· ed for and under certain other circumstances. The absence of such a provision has entailed unspeakable misery to innumer-\n\nA able Muslim women in British India.\n\nThe Hanafi Ju; i<; ts. however, have clearly laid down that in cases in which the application of Hanafi Law causes hardship, it is permissible to apply the provisions of the \"Maliki, Shafii or Hambali Law\".\n\nActing on this principle the Ulemas have issued\n\nfatwas to the effect that in cases enumerated in clause 3, Part A of this Bill (now see section ?. of the Act), a married Muslim woman may obtain a decree dissolving her marriage ... As the Courts are \"'T to he<itate to apply the Maliki Law to the case cf a :rv1tFlirn. \"'on1an, legislation recognizing and enforcing the abovcmcntioncd principle is called for in order to relieve thr suff,?r'.n~; s cf cGunt'lcss Muslim women.\"\n\nOne of the grounds ·.vas that a st1it could be brought if the husband had neglected or failed to provide 111<•1ten1nce for the wife for a period of two years.\n\nAfter the Act of 1939, a wif: thus had a statntorv right to obtain divorce from the husband through the Court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act.\n\nThe Act provided for the wife an i'ldependent remedy which could be resorted to by her without being subjected to a pronouncement of divorce by the husband. It is, therefore. in the background of this Act that the words 'has obtained a divorce from her liusband' in clause (b) of the Explanation have to be constructed.\n\nThus the High Court in considering the effect of these words seems to have overlooked the dominant ob.iect of the statutory remedy that was made available t0 the wife under the Act of 1939 11y • .. , hich the wife could get a dr-rrcc f('r di'-solution of marriage en the ground~ mentioned in the 1939 Act bv petiti0ning the civil court with0ut any overt act on the part of the husband in divorcing her.\n\nThe Hih Court also failed to consider the Ieeal consequences flowing from 11-:e decree passed by the court discolvinf! the marriage. viz., a legal div0rce under\n\nthe Maho.medan law.\n\nIn these circumstances we are. therefore, satisfied that the interpretation put by the High Court on the second limb of clause (b) is not correct.\n\nThis seems to be borne out from the provisions ., f Mahomedan law itself.\n\nIt wonlr1 arpear that under the Mahorneclan law there are three d:stinct moies in which a muslim marriage can he dissolved and the relations hi!' of the husband and the wife terminated so as to result in an irrevocable divorce.\n\n( 1) Where the hmband unihtcrallv gives a divorce according to any of the forms approved by the Mahomedan law, viz .. Talaq ahsan, which consisss of a single pronounce-\n\n' ,\n\n• A\n\nWHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Fazal Ali, /,) 923\n\nment of divorce during tuhr (Period between menstruations)\n\nfollowed by abst:nence from sexual intercourse for the period\n\nt1i i<ldat; 01 Talak hasan which consāsts of three prcnounce-\n\n111cn1s 111:!.de during lhc successive tuhrs, no intercourse\n\ntaking place between three tuhrs: and lastly Talak-ul-bidaat\n\ner ta/ai:-i-badai which consi<ts of three pronouncements\n\nmade during a single tuhr either in one sentence or in\n\nthree sentences signifying a clear intention to divorce the\n\nwife, for instance, the husband saying 'I divorce thee irrevocably' or 'l divorce thee, f divorce thee, I divorce thee',\n\nThe third form referred to above is however not recognised\n\nby the Shiah law, In the instant case, we are concerned with\n\nthe appel'ant who appears to be a Sunni and governed by\n\nthe Hanafi law ( vide Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan\n\nLaw, Sec, 311, p, 297) .\n\nA divorce or talaq may be given orally or in writing and\n\nit hecomes irrevocable if the period of iddat is observed\n\nthough it is not necessary that the woman divorced should D\n\ncome to know of the fact that she has been divorced by her\n\nhusband.\n\n(2) By an agreement between the husband and tl:ie wife\n\nwherel'ly a wife obtains divorce by relinquishing either her\n\nentire or part of the dower.\n\nThis mode of divorce is called\n\n'khula'. or Mubarat.\n\nThis form of divorce is initiated by\n\nthe wife and comes into existence if the husband gives con\n\nsent to the agreement and releases her from the marriage tie, Where, however, both parties agree and desire a separation\n\nresulting in a divorce, it is called mubarat, The gist of\n\nthese modes is that it comes into existence with the consent\n\nof both the parties particularly the husband because with\n\nout his consent this mode of divorce would be incapable\n\nof being enforced, A divorce may also come into existence\n\nby virtue of an agreement either before or after the marriage\n\nby which it is provided that the wife should be at liberty to\n\ndivorce herself in specified contingencies which are of a\n\nreasonable nature and which again are agreed to by the\n\nhusband.\n\nIn such a case the wife can repudiate herself in\n\nthe exercise of the power and the divorce would be deemed\n\nto have lleeii pronounced by the husband, This mode of\n\ndivorce is called 'Tawfeez' (vide Mulla's Mohmedan Law,\n\nSec. 3f4, p. 300).\n\n(31 By obtaining a decree from a civil court for disso\n\nIutinn of marriage under s, 2 of the Act of 1939 which also\n\namounts to a divorce (under the law) obtained by the wife.\n\nFor the purpose of maintenance, this mode is governed not by clause (b) but by clause (c) of sub-section (3) of s. 127 of the 1973 Code; whereas the divorce given under modes\n\n(1) and (2) would be covered by clause (b) of sub-section\n\n(3) of s. 127.\n\nThese are the three distinct modes in which a dissolution of marriage can be brought about. It is, therefore, manifest that clause (b) Explanation to s. 125 envisages all the three modes, whether a wife is divorced unilaterally by the husband or where she obtains divorce under mode numbers 2 and 3, she continues to be a wife for the purpose of getting maintenance under s. 125 of the 1973 O<k In these Circumstances the High Court was not at all justified in taking the two separate clauses 'who has been divorced' and 'has obtained a divorce from her husband' conjunclively so as to indicate a divorce proceeding from the husband and the husband alone and in not treating a dissolution of marriage under the 1939 Act as a legal divorce.\n\nWe might like to mention here that the 1973 Code has by extending the definition of wife, not excluded the various modes of divorce but has merely abrogated that part of the Mahome.dan law under which the wife ceased to get maintenance if the conjugal relationship of the husband and wife came to an end. Nevertheless, the personal law is applied fully and kept alive by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of s. 127 which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"(b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was .payable on such divorce, cancel such order :-\n\n(i) in the case where such sum was paid before such order, from the date on which such order was made,\n\n(ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of the period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by the husband to the woman.\"\n\nThis clause refers to Mode No. I, that is to say, where the husband unilaterally divorces his wife. For the application of clause (b), two conditions are necessary-\n\n( I) that an application for cancellation of the maintenance is made by the husband under s. 127(2), and\n\n- .. \\,, -\n\n' •\n\n... -.i\n\n' •\n\nlUHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Fazal Ali, I.) 925\n\n(2) that after the wife has been divorced by the husband A she has received the whole of the sum which under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was payable on divorce.\n\nIn other words, under the Mahomedan Law the husband could still get the maintenance cancelled after divorcing his wife according B to personal law if he paid the entire dower specified at the time of marriage .\n\nWe would however, like to point out one peculiar aspect of the provisions of s. 127. While clause (b) of sub-section (3) of s. 127 does provide for cancellation of the maintenance on payment of dower if a woman has been divorced, the said clause does not contemplate cancellation of maintenance where a woman obtains divorce from her husband through a civil court under the provisions of the Act of 1939.\n\nIn this connection clause (c) of subsection (3) of s. 127, which is extracted below, clearly provides that where a woman obtains a divorce from her hnsband the amount of maintenance cannot be cancelled until she voluntarily relinquishes or surrenders her rights to the same:-\n\n\"the woman has obtained a divorce from her husband and that she had voluntarily surrendered her rights to maintenance after her divorce, cancel the order from the date thereof.\"\n\nThus, a clear distinction has been made between dissolution of marriage brought about by the husband in exercising his unilateral right to divorce and the act of the wife in obtaining a decree for the dissolution of marriage from a civil court unger the Act of 1939.\n\nWe might further add that our conclusion that the second limb of clause (b) of the Explanation to s. 125 applies also to a situation, where a dissolution of marriage resulting in a decree for divorce\n\nbrought about by the Act and at the instance of the wife, is fortified and reinforced by the language of clause (c) of sub-section (3) of s. 127 under which maintenance cannot be cancelled on the application of the husband unless the wife voluntarily surrenders her rights to maintenance or relinquishes the same and not otherwise. Thus, the two limbs of clause (b) of the Explanation to s. 125(1) have separate and different legal incidents--one is reflected in clanse (b) of subsection (3) of s. 127 and the other in clause (c) of sub-section (3) of s. 127.\n\nIn view o1' the reasons given and the circumstances discu8sed by us, it is manifest that in the instant case s. 127 does not apply at all\n\nbecause the husband has not given any application for cancellation of the maintenance on the grounds enshrined in s. 127 (3) (b) of the 1973 Code but this case is squarely covered by clause (b) of the Ex planation to s. 125(1) of the 1973 Code as a result of which the appellant in the eye of law continues to be the wife of the respondent,\n\ndespite the tkcrce lo,. dissclufon of marr:age.\n\nThe Magistrate was, thcre[ore, fully justified in granting maintenance to the appellant. The High Court, therefore, erred in quashing the order ol the Magistrate, we, therefore, allow this appčal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Magistrate granting maintenance of a consoli dated amount of Rs. 100/- per month for the appellant and her minor child.\n\nIt would be open to the appellant to apply to the Magistrate for a warrant to realise the arrears of 1naintcnance, if any.\n\nKosHAL, J .-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother Fazal Ali, J ., with whom I find myself in general agreement. However, as I would like to highlight a parti cular aspect of the matter, I am appendiag a short note of my own.\n\n2. Sub-section ( I ) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) confers on a Magistrate of the First Class the jurisdiction, inter alia, to order maintenance to be paid by a husband to his wife or his minor or destitute children.\n\nThe case propounded by the wife in the present proceedings is Crnt in spite of the decree of dissolution of marriage passed in her favour by a Civil Court on the 15th January, 1973, she continues to be the wife of the respondent for the purposes of the said sub-section (1) by reason of the definition of the term \"wife\" contained in clause (b) of the Explanation appended to that sub-section.\n\nThat clause runs thus: \"Explanation :-For the purposes of this chapter,-- '(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . .\n\n'(b) \"wife\" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not re-married.\" The claim of the wife has been turned down by the High Court on the ground that this clause is inapplicable to her case inasmuch as-\n\n(i) the appellant has obtained only a decree of dissolution of marriage and not a divorce, and\n\n(ii) the expression \"from the husband\" as used in the clause extracted above envisages divorce by voluntary H action of the husband which is missing in this case, the dissolution of marriage having been obtained from the court, and, therefore, not from the husband.\n\nZOHRA KHATOON v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Koshal, J.) 92 7\n\n3. The word 'divorce' is not defined in the Code and may legi- A\n\ntimateiy be regarded as having been used in clause (b) above extracted in the dictionary sense.\n\nWebster's Third New International Dic\n\ntionary states it to mean, amongst other things,.-\n\n\" (a) legal dissolution in whole or in part of a marriage relation usually by a court or other body having competent B authority;\n\n\" (b) an absolute dissolution of a valid marriage made by\n\ndecree of court for lawful cause arising after the marriage (distinguished from annulment) ;\n\n\"(c) a formal separation of man and wife by the act of one\n\nparty or by consent according to established custom.\"-\n\nAs ordinarily understood, therefore, divorce is nothing more nor\n\nless than another name for dissolution of marriage, whether the same\n\nresults from act of parties or is a consequence of proceedings at law,\n\nand it would, in our opinion, be wrong to regard the two terms as not being synonymous with each other, unle'8 the legislature makes a direction to the contrary.\n\nWe need hardly point out that section 125\n\nof the Code contains no such direction.\n\n4. Deacock v. Deacock, [1958] 2 All. E.R. 633 supports the view just expressed.\n\nIn that case the English Court of Appeal was\n\ncBJled upon to interpret sections 16 ( 1) and 19 ( 3) of the Matrimonial E Causes Act, 1950 which posed a similar problem.\n\nThe relevant por\n\ntions of those provisions are reproduced below:\n\n\"16(1) Any married person who alleges that reasonable\n\ngrounds exist for supposing that the other party to the marriage is dead may present a petition to the court to have\n\nit presumed that the other party is dead and to have the marriage dissolved, and the court, if satisfied that such\n\nreasonable grounds exist, may make a decree of presumption\n\nof death and of dissolution of the marriage.\n\n\"19(3) On any decree for divorce or nullity of marriage,\n\nthe court may , if it thinks fit, by order direct the husband to\n\npay to the wife, during their joint lives, such monthly or\n\nweekly sum for the maintenance and support of the wife as\n\nthe court may think reasonable . . . \"\n\nAn argument was raised that a decree for dissolution of marriage\n\nas envisaged in section 16(1) does not amount to a decree for divorce R mentioned in section 19(3) and that, therefore, there was no juris diction in the Court to direct the husband to pay the wife any main-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO!~TS\n\n\ntenance in pursuance of the latter section.\n\nHodson, L.J., with whom Morris, L.J., and Vaisey J., fully agreed, repelled the argument thus:\n\n'It is said (and I confess that this argument does not produce very much impact on my mind) that there is a distinction between the words \"dissolution of marriage\" and \"divorce\", and that, as section 19 contains the word \"divorce\" and section 16 does not, there is no statutory power to apply for maintenance at all in the case of presnpmption of death .......... In my view the word \"dis- solution relates to the marriage bond itself, whereas the word \"divorce\" relates to the parties to the marriage bond; and it is apt to refer to \"divorce\" when speaking of parties \"and dissolution\" when speaking of the bond.\n\n'As the decree in this case shows, what has been done, or what has been purported to be done, by the court was to dissolve the marriage; and the word \"dissolved\" is used in thls and in all other decrees, as it has been used for years: the word \"divorce\" is not used'.\n\nThus according to the Court of Appeal the expressions \"divorce\" and \"dissolution\" were really two facets of the same situation.\n\n5. The matter may be looked upon from another angle in so far E as section 125 of the Code is concerned.\n\nAccording to its provisions a full-fledged wife is obviously entitled to maintenance.\n\nBy reason of clause (b) above extracted, even a divorced wife has that right provided that she has not re-married.\n\nCould then it be argued with any plausibility that a wife who h_as been granted a decree of dissolution of marriage by a Civil Court but has not been divorced by a voluntary F act of her husband was intended by the legislature not to be entitled to the benefit of clause (b)? The answer must be an emphatic no and this answer follows from the terms of clause (b) itself. It that clause envisaged only divorce by voluntary action of the husband, the second limb of the clause which makes the definition of \"wife\" inclusive of a woman who has 'obtained a divorce from the husband' would G be rendered otiose. The word obtained' may well be used in the sense of 'procured with effort' and would certainly describe correctly a situation where something is achieved by a person through his exertion in spite of opposition from others.\n\nAccording to Webster, again the word 'obtain' signifies:\n\nH \"(a) to gain or attain possession or disposal of, usually by some planned action or method, \"(b) to bring about or call into hein.g, etc.\"\n\n' •\n\n> •\n\nI \\\n\ni ,.\n\n• ..\n\n...\n\nZOHRA KHATUN v. MOHD. IBRAHIM (Koshal, J.) 929\n\nIf a person sues another person for the recovery of property and the suit is resisted but ultimately decreed and the plaintiff recovers possession of the property from the defendant he may properly be <lescribed as having obtained the property from the defendant although this result has come about not because the defendant obliged the plaintiff but because of the coercive process of the court.\n\nSimilarly information contained in a statement brought about by coercive methods used against a helpless person would still be information obtained from him even though he is not a willing party to the statement.\n\n6. There is another good reason why the narrow interpretation placed by the High Court on clause (b) above extracted cannot be accepted.\n\nDivorce by the act of the husband is, broadly speaking, not recognised by any system of law except that applicabie to Muslims (barring variations of personal law by custom).\n\nMembers of the other main communities inhabiting India, i.e., Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, etc., have perforce to go to courts in order to obtain divorce. If clause (b) was intended to embrace only cases of divorce brought about by the act of the husband, its applicability would be limited, by and large, ofrly to Muslims, which per se appears to us to be an absurd proposition.\n\n7. For the reasons stated I would interpret the expression \"a woman who has obtained a divorce from her husband\" as including E a wife who has been granted a decree of dissolution of marriage by the Court. That snch is the case here is admitted on all hands. In the result, therefore, the appeal is accepted, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of tl1e learned Magistrate granting an amonnt of Rs. 100/- per month as maintenance to the appellant and her minor child is restored.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed .\n\n• '\n\n\" ,\n\n12-214 SCI/81", "total_entities": 160, "entities": [{"text": "MST. ZOHARA KHATOON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MST. ZOHARA KHATOON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHD. IBRAHIM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. IBRAHIM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IBRAHIM\n\nFebruary 18, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. D. KOSHAL AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. 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D. Koslial", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7658, "end_char": 7671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[925 G-H]\n\n(Per A. D. Koslial, J. concurrinR)\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "A. D. Koslial"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7735, "end_char": 7761, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7840, "end_char": 7849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7853, "end_char": 7864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8264, "end_char": 8275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9106, "end_char": 9111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Members of the other main comrnunities inhabiting India, i.e. Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, etc."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Kumar Aggarwal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9983, "end_char": 10005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Kumar Aggarwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Nemo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nemo for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Murtaza Pazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10068, "end_char": 10085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Murtaza Pazal Ali & A. Varda.rajan JJ was delivered by Fazal Ali, J., A. D. Kasha!,"}}, {"text": "A. Varda.rajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10088, "end_char": 10102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Murtaza Pazal Ali & A. Varda.rajan JJ was delivered by Fazal Ali, J., A. D. Kasha!,"}}, {"text": "A. D. Kasha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10138, "end_char": 10149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Murtaza Pazal Ali & A. Varda.rajan JJ was delivered by Fazal Ali, J., A. D. Kasha!,", "canonical_name": "A. D. Koslial"}}, {"text": "FAzAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated October 20, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) by which a revision filed by the respondent for setting aside an order of maintenance passed by the trial Magistrate was accepted and the said order was quashed."}}, {"text": "Zohara Khatoon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10860, "end_char": 10874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Zohara Khatoon, wa, s a legally\n\n~-~ married wife of Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Ibrahim", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10913, "end_char": 10926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Zohara Khatoon, wa, s a legally\n\n~-~ married wife of Mohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. IBRAHIM"}}, {"text": "September 17, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11048, "end_char": 11066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ibrahim oon after the marriage wilfully neglected her she filed an application before the trial Magistrate on September 17, 1974 under s. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the '1973 Code') in order to fix maintenance for her and her minor son."}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11073, "end_char": 11079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11087, "end_char": 11118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Special Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki (U.P.)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11223, "end_char": 11268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki (U.P.), after hearing the parties, allowed the application by his order dated December 29, 1976 and fixed • •\n\n• •\n\nthe maintenance at Rs."}}, {"text": "15-1-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11930, "end_char": 11939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 -!14 SCI/81\n\nBefore the Magistrate, the respondent-husband had taken the defence that as the, appellant had brought a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and wilful neglect which was decreed by the civil court on 15-1-1973 and she was living separately, she ceased to be the wife of the respondent and was, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under s. 125 ors."}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12069, "end_char": 12075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12154, "end_char": 12160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12360, "end_char": 12366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13031, "end_char": 13072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 125(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13292, "end_char": 13301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939", "statute": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13381, "end_char": 13387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939", "statute": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 125(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13780, "end_char": 13789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939", "statute": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "ss. 125 and 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13889, "end_char": 13904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939", "statute": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Sections 488 and 489", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14309, "end_char": 14329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 125 and 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14494, "end_char": 14509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14627, "end_char": 14633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15316, "end_char": 15322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15490, "end_char": 15496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15552, "end_char": 15558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15681, "end_char": 15687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16472, "end_char": 16478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16604, "end_char": 16610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16842, "end_char": 16848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16849, "end_char": 16855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1970] 1 S.C.R. 565", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17126, "end_char": 17145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17189, "end_char": 17200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17387, "end_char": 17407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recently the question came before the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singh v. State (AlR 1963 All."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17462, "end_char": 17481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "355), before the Calcutta High Court in Mahabir Agarwal/a v. Gita Roy [1962] 2 Cr."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17552, "end_char": 17568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.J. 528 and before the Patna High Court in Nalini Ranjan v. Kiran Rani (AIR 1965 Pat."}}, {"text": "s. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17701, "end_char": 17708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17800, "end_char": 17806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17808, "end_char": 17814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17893, "end_char": 17902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.\"\n\nIt would be seen that this Court approved of the decisions in the cases of Ram Singh, Mahabir Agarwal/a and Nalini Ranjan mentioned in the observations extracted above."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17904, "end_char": 17919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.\"\n\nIt would be seen that this Court approved of the decisions in the cases of Ram Singh, Mahabir Agarwal/a and Nalini Ranjan mentioned in the observations extracted above."}}, {"text": "Nalini Ranjan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17926, "end_char": 17939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.\"\n\nIt would be seen that this Court approved of the decisions in the cases of Ram Singh, Mahabir Agarwal/a and Nalini Ranjan mentioned in the observations extracted above."}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18030, "end_char": 18036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18090, "end_char": 18096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18214, "end_char": 18225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to undrstand the prqper scope of s. 488 of the 1898 Code which is almost the same as that of s. 125 of the 1973 Code, it may be necessary to examine the decisions which were referred to with approval by this Court in Nanak Chand's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Kailash Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18275, "end_char": 18289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kailash Prasad, J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act is intended to be a substitute for the provisions of s. 488 Cr."}}, {"text": "Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18343, "end_char": 18378, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18494, "end_char": 18500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act", "statute": "There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18536, "end_char": 18543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act", "statute": "There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18582, "end_char": 18588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act", "statute": "There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18589, "end_char": 18595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18805, "end_char": 18810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19081, "end_char": 19092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19093, "end_char": 19099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19184, "end_char": 19195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19396, "end_char": 19402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19976, "end_char": 19987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20304, "end_char": 20310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahomedans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20778, "end_char": 20788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The miportant questiQn still remains : Was the Magistrate competent to a.ward maintenance if urider the personal law of the Mahomedans the \"life had been validly divorced and had completed the period of ldd; it?", "canonical_name": "Mahomedans"}}, {"text": "s. 489", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20875, "end_char": 20881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 489(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21078, "end_char": 21087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21365, "end_char": 21376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 488 and 489", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21519, "end_char": 21534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22101, "end_char": 22107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22151, "end_char": 22168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Jn re Shekhanmian(') while defining the consequences of a divorce and its impact on s. 488 of the 1898 Cede a division Bench of B the Bombay High Court observed thus :-\n\n\"A talak when it becomes irrevocable puts an end to conjugal relationship which had subsisted between :he parties, and the divorced wife would not be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband beyond the period of iJdat from the date of such irrevocable divorce."}}, {"text": "S. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22454, "end_char": 22460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22829, "end_char": 22846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in Syed Sold v. Mccram Bee (2) where in division Bench observed thus :\n\n\"A ~1agistrat1..:, ho\\vcver, exercising summary powers conR fcrrcd on him hy s. 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, can make or enforce an order to that effect only if the relationship of husband and wife exists between the two, but in order to deteymine this, and only to that extent, we must ascertain the effect in Mahomedan law of au irreversible divorce on conjugal relations.\""}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22996, "end_char": 23002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23004, "end_char": 23030, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mahomedan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23234, "end_char": 23243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in Syed Sold v. Mccram Bee (2) where in division Bench observed thus :\n\n\"A ~1agistrat1..:, ho\\vcver, exercising summary powers conR fcrrcd on him hy s. 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, can make or enforce an order to that effect only if the relationship of husband and wife exists between the two, but in order to deteymine this, and only to that extent, we must ascertain the effect in Mahomedan law of au irreversible divorce on conjugal relations.\"", "canonical_name": "Mahomedans"}}, {"text": "Yahya Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23656, "end_char": 23665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Yahya Ali, J. observed thus :-\n\n\"The foundation upon which Ss."}}, {"text": "Ss. 488 & 489", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23715, "end_char": 23728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 488 and 489", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24171, "end_char": 24186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24270, "end_char": 24290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Hyderabad High Court also took the same v; ew in Rahimunnissa & Ors."}}, {"text": "Bilgrami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24411, "end_char": 24419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ismail(') and after con, idering the entire law on the subject Bilgrami, J. observed thus :-\n\n'\"All these grounds can be sullicicnt or valid for refusal of maintenance to a wife with whom the tie of marriage subsists, but when this tie is dissolved, all these defences cannot be set up and the right of the wife to maintenance during the \"iddat\" period is absolute under the Mahomedan law; the only Pbligation which binds a wife during this period is that she .;"}}, {"text": "AJlahalYad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24861, "end_char": 24882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a very early case of the AJlahalYad High Court-Di11 lYi<ilwmmad's cwe(')-Mahmood, J. pointed out that while the enactment regarding maintenance was of a general nature being applicable to Mahomedans as also to Hindus, Buddhists, and other communities vet the legislature never intended to restrict the Mahomcdan law of Divorce."}}, {"text": "Mahmood", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25337, "end_char": 25344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Mahmood, J. observed as fillows :\n\n\"The enactment under which that order was made does\n\nnot relate more especiaJly to Muha=adans than to Hindus, E Buddhists, Indo-Britons, Europeans, or any other branch of the general community, and the Legislature could never hayc irtcnded by it to interfere with or restrict the Muhammadan law of divorce ...... The whole of Chapter XLl, Crimi11:1l Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "s. 536", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26299, "end_char": 26305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26796, "end_char": 26802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27400, "end_char": 27406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Majority Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27536, "end_char": 27561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28038, "end_char": 28044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Majority Act, 1875", "statute": "the Indian Majority Act, 1875"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29112, "end_char": 29130, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindu law or the Pmsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30299, "end_char": 30351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31074, "end_char": 31115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31258, "end_char": 31262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939", "statute": "the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "is no proviso in the Hanafi Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31426, "end_char": 31458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32181, "end_char": 32189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no proviso in the Hanafi Code", "statute": "There is no proviso in the Hanafi Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36775, "end_char": 36781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37084, "end_char": 37090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37214, "end_char": 37220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37373, "end_char": 37379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37595, "end_char": 37601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38368, "end_char": 38374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39183, "end_char": 39192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39761, "end_char": 39767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39808, "end_char": 39814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40141, "end_char": 40147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40912, "end_char": 40918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41153, "end_char": 41159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41403, "end_char": 41412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41510, "end_char": 41516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41567, "end_char": 41573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41685, "end_char": 41691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41829, "end_char": 41835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41932, "end_char": 41941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42610, "end_char": 42616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KosHAL, J .-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother Fazal Ali, J .,"}}, {"text": "section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42903, "end_char": 42914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th January, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43317, "end_char": 43335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case propounded by the wife in the present proceedings is Crnt in spite of the decree of dissolution of marriage passed in her favour by a Civil Court on the 15th January, 1973, she continues to be the wife of the respondent for the purposes of the said sub-section (1) by reason of the definition of the term \"wife\" contained in clause (b) of the Explanation appended to that sub-section."}}, {"text": "Webster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44530, "end_char": 44537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Webster's Third New International Dic\n\ntionary states it to mean, amongst other things,.-\n\n\" (a) legal dissolution in whole or in part of a marriage relation usually by a court or other body having competent B authority;\n\n\" (b) an absolute dissolution of a valid marriage made by\n\ndecree of court for lawful cause arising after the marriage (distinguished from annulment) ;\n\n\"(c) a formal separation of man and wife by the act of one\n\nparty or by consent according to established custom.\"-"}}, {"text": "section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45422, "end_char": 45433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45628, "end_char": 45639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Matrimonial E Causes Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45664, "end_char": 45694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46554, "end_char": 46567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Matrimonial E Causes Act, 1950", "statute": "the Matrimonial E Causes Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 19(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46623, "end_char": 46636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Matrimonial E Causes Act, 1950", "statute": "the Matrimonial E Causes Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Hodson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46817, "end_char": 46823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hodson, L.J., with whom Morris, L.J., and Vaisey J., fully agreed, repelled the argument thus:\n\n'It is said (and I confess that this argument does not produce very much impact on my mind) that there is a distinction between the words \"dissolution of marriage\" and \"divorce\", and that, as section 19 contains the word \"divorce\" and section 16 does not, there is no statutory power to apply for maintenance at all in the case of presnpmption of death .......... In my view the word \"dis- solution relates to the marriage bond itself, whereas the word \"divorce\" relates to the parties to the marriage bond; and it is apt to refer to \"divorce\" when speaking of parties \"and dissolution\" when speaking of the bond."}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46841, "end_char": 46847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hodson, L.J., with whom Morris, L.J., and Vaisey J., fully agreed, repelled the argument thus:\n\n'It is said (and I confess that this argument does not produce very much impact on my mind) that there is a distinction between the words \"dissolution of marriage\" and \"divorce\", and that, as section 19 contains the word \"divorce\" and section 16 does not, there is no statutory power to apply for maintenance at all in the case of presnpmption of death .......... In my view the word \"dis- solution relates to the marriage bond itself, whereas the word \"divorce\" relates to the parties to the marriage bond; and it is apt to refer to \"divorce\" when speaking of parties \"and dissolution\" when speaking of the bond."}}, {"text": "Vaisey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46859, "end_char": 46865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hodson, L.J., with whom Morris, L.J., and Vaisey J., fully agreed, repelled the argument thus:\n\n'It is said (and I confess that this argument does not produce very much impact on my mind) that there is a distinction between the words \"dissolution of marriage\" and \"divorce\", and that, as section 19 contains the word \"divorce\" and section 16 does not, there is no statutory power to apply for maintenance at all in the case of presnpmption of death .......... In my view the word \"dis- solution relates to the marriage bond itself, whereas the word \"divorce\" relates to the parties to the marriage bond; and it is apt to refer to \"divorce\" when speaking of parties \"and dissolution\" when speaking of the bond."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47105, "end_char": 47115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47148, "end_char": 47158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47993, "end_char": 48004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.K.A.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51170, "end_char": 51176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_930_937_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "CIIlEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF\n\nANDHRA PRADESH & ANR.\n\nV. J. CORNELIUS ETC.\n\nFebruary 18, 1981\n\n[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nAndhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules 1969, Rule 3(2) & Fundan1ental Rules, Rule 22(a) (ii)-Fixation of pay-Provision that juriior e1nployee in selection grade of lower post not to draw more pa!' than his senior holding y-- C a higher post-Validity of. (\n\nTo implement the recomn1endations of a oneman Pay Comn1ission, the State Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969 iiroviding for the revision of pay and creation of selection grade posts.\n\nThe selection grade scale was fixed by adding three increments to the maximU.m\n\nof the revised scale of pay.\n\nWhile implementing the pay scales, the Government realised that a senior holding a perma.nent post in one category but holding a post in the next higher grade on promotion would draw less pay in the higher post than a junior in the lower category who was given the selection grade.\n\nTo avoid the anomalous situation thus created the Government by an executive order directed that the pay of an employee placed in selection grade shall be so fixed as not to exceed the pay of his senior working in the higher post on promotion.\n\nThis executive instruction was struck down by the High Court as being \"iolative of Articles 14 and 16 and also on the ground that the executiveinstruction could not prevail over Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (ii).\n\nF The Government thereupon introduced Rule 5(2) in the Rules with retrospective effect from the date of the original order. In D. Krishnamurthy & Ors v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. this rule was struck down by the High Court as being violative of Articles 14 and 16.\n\nNo appeal was, however, :._ __ preferred from the judgment of the High Court striking down the rule.\n\nInstead of following a uniform policy in reviSing the pay of all employees G in compliance with the direction of the High Court, the Government re-fixed the pay of some of the employees holding selection grade posts but declined to do so in the case of others on the ground that the re-fixation would be done only in the case of employees who had secured such directions.\n\nIn the appeals by tho Government to this Court it was contended that it was wrong to suggest that since no appeal had been preferred against the H judgment of the High Court in D. Krishnamurthy's case all the judgments t:X the High Court involving a similar question had become final D. Krishnnmurthy's case related to an altogether different category of em.· ployees of the State Government.\n\n• I\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHEID : I. When the Higb Court issues a writ, direction or order under Art 226 of the Constitution, it is not open to the State Government to imple ment the decision with regard to some and deny relief to others, although they\n\nbelong to the same class of persons, and are equally governed by the principle& laid down. The State Government is expected to adopt a uniform policy in\n\nregard to all its employees. [936 C-DJ B\n\n2, Replacement of an executive instruction by the State Government by a rule framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution, for the fixation of pay of a per~ son promoted to the Selection Grade at a stage lower than the minimum of the scales of pay of such Selection Grade so as not to exceed the pay of his seniors working in the higher posts on promotion, does not cure the constitutional vico inherent in the Government action as the provision is violative of Arts. 14 and C 16 of the Constitution. [935 G-HJ\n\n3. The judgment of the High Court, by which sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969 having been struck down as offending A1ts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and as being not in conformity with FR 22(a) (ii) not having been appealed from, had attained a finality and\n\nthe re-fixation of pay, if any, had to be done as if sub-r. (2) of r. 5 never D existed. [937 BJ\n\n4. It is not open to the Government to question the correctness of the judgment of the Jfigh Cou11 when it had attained finality, particularly when in compliance \\Vith the directions, it had re-fued the pay of some of the employees in the Selection Grade posts, on the pretext that the right of appeal was not Jost in the case of others in respect of whom no such direction has been issued.\n\nAt E any rate, the point not having been taken before the High Court, could not be allowed to be raised for the first time under Art. 136 of the Constitutien.\n\n[936 HJ\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 383 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12-6-1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 313 of 1975.\n\nConnected with\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 1434-85/77, 2669/79 & 2670/79, 1763-1781/ 77, 2511, 2625, 2679, 2776/77, 332, 333, 909 & 930/78 and S.L.Ps.\n\n1768-70/76, 1769/77, 4246, 4379/77 and 251/79.\n\nP. Rama Reddy, G. S. Narayana and G. N. Rao for the Appellant in all the matters .\n\nB. Parthasarthy for the Respondent in CAs 383/76, 1443/77, 1444/77 (for R. 5), CA 1456/77 (for RR. 2 & 4), CA 1461/77 for ( R.17), CA 1463/77 for RR-1 & 2 and R. 10 in CA 1464/77 for R.1 H in CA 1466/77 for R.1, 1468/77 for both the Respondents, 1470/ 77 for R. 1, CA 1476177 for R. 2, 1481 for RR, 1767/77 for R. 1,.\n\n1768/77 for RR 1, 2, 4, and 5-8, 1773/77 for RR 1-4 and 5 2625/ 77 for R 1, 2511/77 for all the Rfu. 132/78 for R.3, 930f78 for RR. SLP 1769/76 for RR 1-4, 5 & 7.\n\nK. Ram Kumar and Mrs. J. Rarnacha11dran for the RR in CA 1472/77, CA 1473/77 for RR 1-5, 7, 8, 14, 15 and CA 1485 for all RRs.\n\nA. Subba Rao in CA 1434 for RRl. 3, 4, 7 .• 8, 9 & 11, in CA 1440/77 for RR 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13 & 16, in CA 1457 /77 for Respondent (Sole), CA 1459/77 for RR 2, 3 and 4, CA 1484/77 for RR 1-2, 16-20, 22, 23, 28, 30, 32, 35 and in CA 1764/77 for Respondent (Sole).\n\nG. Narasimhulu for all the Respondents in CA 1781/77.\n\nB. Kanta Rao for RR 1-3 in CA 1441/77, in CA 1442/77 for RR. 4, 8-11, 14, 15, 23 and 24, in CA 1769/77 for RR 1-35, 37-47, 49-62, 64, 65, 67-79, 81-83, 85, 87, 89, 91-99, 101-104, 106-108, 110-114, 116-117, 119-123, in CA 2670 for RR 1-5, 7-12 and 14-16 D and 19-20 and in SLP 251/79 for RR 1-8.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-This and the connected 81 appeals by special leave and seven special leave petitions directed against various judgments and E orders of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, raise a common question: Whether it is permissible for the State Government of Andhra Pradesh to enforce sub-r.\n\n(2) of r. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') issued by the State Government under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution.\n\nThat depends\n\nI<' on whether the Government is competent to withhold the Selection Grade pajscales contrary to FR 22(a) (ii) to which the respondents ___ were entitled on their being appointed to Selection Grade posts. The Government tries to justify such fixation of pay at a lower level than the minimum of the Selection Grade pay-scales on the basis that it was to ensure that seniors holding higher posts do not draw in such G higher posts a pay less than what is drawn by their jun[ors in the lower posts in the Selection Grade.\n\nThe litigative propensities of the Government know no bounds. , The Government still assumes that it is within their powers to fix the pay of the respondents lower than the minimum of the pay scales of H the Selection Grade posts to which they were promoted although the High Court has unequivocally struck down the impugned. sub:r. (_2) of r. 5 of th~ Rules as ultra vires the State Government bemg v10lat1ve\n\n_,_\n\n-- 4 -\n\n• •\n\nCHIEF 5ECY. TO GOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. CORNELIUS 933 (Sen, J.) of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and being contrary to FR 22 A (a)(ii). It is somewhat unfortunate that the GO\\ornment should have embarked upon this course of action, thereby subjecting thousands of their employees into this fruitless litigation, which is nothing but an exercise in futility, resulting in wasteful expenditure of public money.\n\nWe wish to impress upon the Government that they are in duty bound to respect the judgments and orders of the\" courts pro- B nouncing upon the constitutional validity of the various rules, orders and 11otifications issued by the Executive .\n\nTo bring out the point involved, it is newssary to state a few facts.\n\nBy G.O. MS. 173, Finance, dated June 13, 1969, the State Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969, providing for revision of pay and creation of Selection Grade posts, the number of such Selection Grade posts for every category being limited to 15% of the total number of posts in that category with a view to implement the recommendations of the One-man Pay Commission appointed for the purpose.\n\nThe Selection Grade scale was fixed by adding three increments to the maximum of the revised scale of pay. The pay-scales for the Selection Grade so fixed were found to have a higher start than the minimum pay prescribed for the next higher category of posts.\n\nSome of the senior persons holding permanent posts in one category, but holding posts in the next higher category on promotion were found to draw less pay in the higher posts as compared to their juniors in the lower category who were given the Selection Grade scale of pay. The Government felt that this would result in serious discontentment among the senior employees holding higher posts but drawing less pay than the minimum prescribed for the Selection Grade in the lower category. At a meeting of the Secretaries to Government held on June 24, 1969, it was decided to set right this anomalous position, by the issue of an executive order.\n\nConsequently, the Government issued a departmental instruction in U.O. Note No. 808/PC/69-I dated July 26, 1969, directing that the pay of an employee placed in the Selection Grade shall be so fixed as not to exceed the pay of his seniors working in the higher post on promotion.\n\nPara 3 (iii) of the U.O. Note was as follows:\n\n(iii) Since in many cases, the minimum of the 'selection grade' is higher than the minimum of the next higher grade, there is a possibility of a junior appointed to 'selection grade' hereafter drawing more pay than his senior who has already been promoted to higher grade.\n\nWith a view to .tvoid snch an anomaly, it will be necessary to prescribe that a person H promoted to a 'selection grade' shall draw the minimum f the remedy was by way of an appeal. That ju<lginent has attamed a ·\n\nA promotion category should be drawing less than such minimum his pay shall be limited to the pay being drawn by such senior, in his own scale.\n\nThe direction contained in para 3(iii) of the aforesaid U.O. Note was struck down by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S. A. Prabhakar & Ors.\n\nv. Government of Andhra Pradesh by his judgment dated December 26, 1973, on the ground that the executive instruction could not prevail over FR 22{a) (ii) and secondly, fixation of pay at anything lower than the minimum of the scale of pay sanctioned for the Selection Grade posts was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 and was also contrary to the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Art. 39 of the Constitution, according to which there shall be equal pay for equal work. The learned Judge was of the view that the Government having created Selection Grade posts carrying a certain scale cf pay and having appointed persons to those posts, it was not open to them to allow that pay to some and deny to others on the ground that their seniors working elsewhere were not drawing the same scale of pay.\n\nThe Government preferred a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J., and made a grievance that while the writ petition was pending the offending U .0. Note (No. 808/PC/ 69-I dated July 26, 1969) had been substituted by sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of the Rules issued under GO MS 215, Finance, dated September 5, 1973, with retrospective effect from March 19, 1969.\n\nThat being so, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal observing that the appropriate remedy was to file a review petition.\n\nAgainst the judgment of the Division Bench, the Government preferred a petition for grant of special leave in the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution, being SLP (Ciy:il) No. 1878 of 1975 and this Court issued a showcause notice to the respondents on September 28, 1975. But the Special Leave Petition was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn on October 27, 1978, in view of the fact that a review petition had been filed.\n\nSub-r. (2) of r. 5 of the Rules, inserted by G.O. MS. 215, F1nance, dated September 5, 1973, reads:\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) or any other rule relating to fixation of pay, if a person in any post is promoted or appointed to the selection grade in that post he shall draw the minimum of such selection grade provided that if any of his seniors, who is promoted or appointed by transfer to a higher post, draws a pay in that\n\n• •\n\n(Sen, /.) higher post less than such minimum, his pay shall be limited A to the pay so drawn by his senior.\n\nExplanation.-For the PllllPOSe of this sub-rule, a person shall be deemed to be a senior tO another even though both of them belong to two different classes, categories/ grades, provided these-two are sources for promotion or appointment by transfer to a higher post.\n\nIn D. Krishnamurthy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (Writ Petition No. 4459 of 1972), Muktadar, J., by his judgment dated August 12, 1974, struck down the rule as it was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The. learned Judge observed that in view of the decision of this Court in B. S. Vadera v. Union of India & Ors.(') it was settled Jaw that rules framed under the proviso to Art 309 of the Constitution, whether retrospective or prospective in effect, must be enforced, if framed by the appropriate authority, unless it can be shown that the rules so framed are in violation of any of the rights guaranteed under Part Ill or any other provision of the Constitution.\n\nHe was of the view that sub-r. (2) of r.5 of the Rules does not satisfy the test because it takes away the rights to equality before the law and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 16 and was, therefore, void and uncon;; titutional.\n\nHe was dealing with the case of Deputy Tahsildars in the Nizamabad District who were promoted to the Selection Grade bnt could not draw their pay of Selection Grade because it exceeded the pay of their irr.mediate seniors working as Tahsildars, by reason of sub-r. (2) of r.5 of the Rules. The learned Judges observed that if FR 22(a) (ii) was appli cable, nnd there was no reason why it should not be made applicable, the pay of the Deputy Tahsildars in the Selection Grade could not be fixed at less than Rs. 500 which was the minimum of the time-scale . -.4 fixed for the Selection Grade of Deputy Tahsildars. According to him, -sub-r. (2) of r.5 was per se discriminatory because a Deputy Tuhsildar in the Selection Grade with no seniors promoted to a higher post could draw minimum pay of snch Selection Grade; but a Deputy Tahsildar in the Selection Grade who unfortunately had a senior iPr<>- moted to a higher post who drew a pay in that higher post which was less tha.n the minimum of the scale of pay of Selection Grade Deputy ' #\n\nTahsildar, could not draw more pay than that drawn by his senior, although he was performing the same duties and discharging the same responsibilities attached to such Selection Grade posts for which higher emoluments had been prescribed. The learned Judge observed : \"To • 1 put in the words Chinnappa Reddy, J. it amounts to denial of the\n\n(I) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 575.\n\nA principle of 'equal pay for equal work' enshrined in Art. 39 of the Constitution as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy and violates Arts. 14 and 16 which guarantee equality before the law and equal opportunity in the matter of public employment.\"\n\nThe appellant, in the supplementary affid-avit filed by the Deputy Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh, Finance and Planning Department {Finance Wing) admits that the judgment of Muktadar, J., in Krishnamurthy's case supra had become final because steps were not taken in time to go in appeal; but, nonetheless, asserts that since the matter before the learned Judge related to Selection Grade Deputy Tahsildars, it was wrong to suggest that all the judgments of the High Court involving a similar question h-ad become final, or that the Government had lost its right of appeal in other similar matters. We are really at a loss to appreciate this attitude on the part of lhe Government in showing scant respect to the High Court -although the judgments had become final and the point involved was one and the same.\n\nD There has been total failure on the part of the Government to realie that the replacement by sub-r. (2) of r.5 of the Rules, of the executive instruction contained in the U.0. Note, does nc! cure the constitutional vice inherent in the governmenl'al action.\n\nThis is nothing but a plea of justification for the Government had, . in the meanwhile, on the strength of the offending U.O. Note and snb-r.\n\n(2) of r. 5, promoted thousands of their employees to SeJection Gratle posts in different departments, but fixed their pay at a tPOint lower than !he pay drawn by their seniors in the next higher grade. There h-ave been several judgments of the High Court and of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal on writ petitions filed by the persons so affected.\n\nThe Government, instead of following a uniform policy, have refixed the pay of some of the employees holding Selection Grade posts,-- ~- in compliance with the directions of the High Court, but declined to do so in the c-ase of others on the pretext that the re-fixation would be\n\nG done only in the case of ema:iloyees who have secured such directions.\n\nIt is impressed upon us that the Government wants a decision on merits as the matter involved a question of principle. We were asked\n\nto determine the validity of sub-r. (2) of r.5. It was urged that the Government wants a clear pronouncement on the extent of their powers • in the matter relating to fixation of pay of a person appointed to the Selection Grade, in accordance with sub-r.(2) of r.5. We are afraid, the question does not arise in these appeals. It is quite clear fr,)m the judgments under appeal that the validity of sub-r. (2) of r.S was not in question. We are constrained!<> oerve that if the Government wanted\n\n, •\n\nCHIEF SECY. TO GOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. CORNELIUS 937 (Sen, J.) to question the correctness of the judgment in D. Krishnamurthy's case, the 'selection grade' provided that if his senior in the higher finality which cannot now be upset. In that judgment, Muktadar, J ., struck down sub-r. (2) of r.5 as ultra vire~ the Government as being violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and as being not in conformity with FR 22(a) (ii). The effect of the judgment of Muktad:ir, J., in Krishnamurthy's case (supra) is that sub-r.\n\n(2) of r.5 is wiped out for all purposes and the re-fixation will have to be done as if sub-r. (2) of r. 5 never existed. The whole attempt of the Government in filing these appeals is to retrieve the lost ground which cannot be permitted.\n\nIn the result, the appeals and the specioal leave petitions are dis- C missed. There shall be no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals & Petitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "CIIlEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF\n\nANDHRA PRADESH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. J. CORNELIUS ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. J. CORNELIUS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 97, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 18, 1981\n\n[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 469, "end_char": 545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1342, "end_char": 1360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969", "statute": "the State Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1718, "end_char": 1736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. Krishnamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2391, "end_char": 2407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeals by tho Government to this Court it was contended that it was wrong to suggest that since no appeal had been preferred against the H judgment of the High Court in D. Krishnamurthy's case all the judgments t:X the High Court involving a similar question had become final D. Krishnnmurthy's case related to an altogether different category of em.·", "canonical_name": "D. Krishnamurthy"}}, {"text": "D. Krishnnmurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2498, "end_char": 2514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeals by tho Government to this Court it was contended that it was wrong to suggest that since no appeal had been preferred against the H judgment of the High Court in D. Krishnamurthy's case all the judgments t:X the High Court involving a similar question had become final D. Krishnnmurthy's case related to an altogether different category of em.·", "canonical_name": "D. Krishnamurthy"}}, {"text": "Art 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2708, "end_char": 2715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3520, "end_char": 3528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3640, "end_char": 3688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969"}}, {"text": "P. Rama Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4915, "end_char": 4928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rama Reddy, G. S. Narayana and G. N. Rao for the Appellant in all the matters ."}}, {"text": "G. S. Narayana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4930, "end_char": 4944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rama Reddy, G. S. Narayana and G. N. Rao for the Appellant in all the matters ."}}, {"text": "G. N. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rama Reddy, G. S. Narayana and G. N. Rao for the Appellant in all the matters ."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4999, "end_char": 5014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Parthasarthy for the Respondent in CAs 383/76, 1443/77, 1444/77 (for R. 5), CA 1456/77 (for RR."}}, {"text": "K. Ram Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5482, "end_char": 5494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Ram Kumar and Mrs. J. Rarnacha11dran for the RR in CA 1472/77, CA 1473/77 for RR 1-5, 7, 8, 14, 15 and CA 1485 for all RRs."}}, {"text": "J. Rarnacha11dran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Ram Kumar and Mrs. J. Rarnacha11dran for the RR in CA 1472/77, CA 1473/77 for RR 1-5, 7, 8, 14, 15 and CA 1485 for all RRs."}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5610, "end_char": 5622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Subba Rao in CA 1434 for RRl."}}, {"text": "G. Narasimhulu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5884, "end_char": 5898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Narasimhulu for all the Respondents in CA 1781/77."}}, {"text": "B. Kanta Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5939, "end_char": 5951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Kanta Rao for RR 1-3 in CA 1441/77, in CA 1442/77 for RR."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6280, "end_char": 6283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-This and the connected 81 appeals by special leave and seven special leave petitions directed against various judgments and E orders of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, raise a common question: Whether it is permissible for the State Government of Andhra Pradesh to enforce sub-r.\n\n(2) of r. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') issued by the State Government under proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-This and the connected 81 appeals by special leave and seven special leave petitions directed against various judgments and E orders of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, raise a common question: Whether it is permissible for the State Government of Andhra Pradesh to enforce sub-r.\n\n(2) of r. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') issued by the State Government under proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-This and the connected 81 appeals by special leave and seven special leave petitions directed against various judgments and E orders of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, raise a common question: Whether it is permissible for the State Government of Andhra Pradesh to enforce sub-r.\n\n(2) of r. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') issued by the State Government under proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "State Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.-This and the connected 81 appeals by special leave and seven special leave petitions directed against various judgments and E orders of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, raise a common question: Whether it is permissible for the State Government of Andhra Pradesh to enforce sub-r.\n\n(2) of r. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') issued by the State Government under proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7836, "end_char": 7851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 13, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8530, "end_char": 8543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "173, Finance, dated June 13, 1969, the State Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969, providing for revision of pay and creation of Selection Grade posts, the number of such Selection Grade posts for every category being limited to 15% of the total number of posts in that category with a view to implement the recommendations of the One-man Pay Commission appointed for the purpose."}}, {"text": "State Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8549, "end_char": 8625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 24, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9729, "end_char": 9742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a meeting of the Secretaries to Government held on June 24, 1969, it was decided to set right this anomalous position, by the issue of an executive order."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10881, "end_char": 10896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The direction contained in para 3(iii) of the aforesaid U.O. Note was struck down by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S. A. Prabhakar & Ors."}}, {"text": "December 26, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10982, "end_char": 10999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Government of Andhra Pradesh by his judgment dated December 26, 1973, on the ground that the executive instruction could not prevail over FR 22{a) (ii) and secondly, fixation of pay at anything lower than the minimum of the scale of pay sanctioned for the Selection Grade posts was violative of Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11226, "end_char": 11241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11321, "end_char": 11328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 26, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11944, "end_char": 11957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "808/PC/ 69-I dated July 26, 1969) had been substituted by sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of the Rules issued under GO MS 215, Finance, dated September 5, 1973, with retrospective effect from March 19, 1969."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12054, "end_char": 12071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "808/PC/ 69-I dated July 26, 1969) had been substituted by sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of the Rules issued under GO MS 215, Finance, dated September 5, 1973, with retrospective effect from March 19, 1969."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12104, "end_char": 12118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "808/PC/ 69-I dated July 26, 1969) had been substituted by sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of the Rules issued under GO MS 215, Finance, dated September 5, 1973, with retrospective effect from March 19, 1969."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12360, "end_char": 12373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the judgment of the Division Bench, the Government preferred a petition for grant of special leave in the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12380, "end_char": 12388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 28, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12509, "end_char": 12527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1878 of 1975 and this Court issued a showcause notice to the respondents on September 28, 1975."}}, {"text": "October 27, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12601, "end_char": 12617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Special Leave Petition was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn on October 27, 1978, in view of the fact that a review petition had been filed."}}, {"text": "Muktadar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13612, "end_char": 13620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4459 of 1972), Muktadar, J., by his judgment dated August 12, 1974, struck down the rule as it was violative of Arts.", "canonical_name": "Muktad:ir"}}, {"text": "August 12, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13648, "end_char": 13663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4459 of 1972), Muktadar, J., by his judgment dated August 12, 1974, struck down the rule as it was violative of Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13709, "end_char": 13724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13919, "end_char": 13926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14430, "end_char": 14445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nizamabad District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14553, "end_char": 14571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was dealing with the case of Deputy Tahsildars in the Nizamabad District who were promoted to the Selection Grade bnt could not draw their pay of Selection Grade because it exceeded the pay of their irr.mediate seniors working as Tahsildars, by reason of sub-r. (2) of r.5 of the Rules."}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 S.C.R. 575", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15884, "end_char": 15903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15961, "end_char": 15968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16053, "end_char": 16068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishnamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16371, "end_char": 16384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, in the supplementary affid-avit filed by the Deputy Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh, Finance and Planning Department {Finance Wing) admits that the judgment of Muktadar, J., in Krishnamurthy's case supra had become final because steps were not taken in time to go in appeal; but, nonetheless, asserts that since the matter before the learned Judge related to Selection Grade Deputy Tahsildars, it was wrong to suggest that all the judgments of the High Court involving a similar question h-ad become final, or that the Government had lost its right of appeal in other similar matters.", "canonical_name": "D. Krishnamurthy"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19098, "end_char": 19113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Muktad:ir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19215, "end_char": 19224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of the judgment of Muktad:ir, J., in Krishnamurthy's case (supra) is that sub-r.\n\n(2) of r.5 is wiped out for all purposes and the re-fixation will have to be done as if sub-r. (2) of r. 5 never existed.", "canonical_name": "Muktad:ir"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_938_947_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,\n\nBANGALORE ETC. ETC.\n\nB. C. SRINIVASA SETTY, ETC. ETC.\n\nFebruary 19, 1981\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nGoodwill of a nett:ly conunenced business-Whether, (i) a capital asset and\n\n(ii) if so, an asset falling within the contemplation of section 45 of Income Tax Acr, 1961 giving rise to a capital gain.\n\nC The assessee, a registered firm, manufactured and sold agarbattis.\n\nClause\n\n(13) of the Ins1ru1ncnt of Partnership executed on 28th of July, 1954 and subsequently extenda~ by another instrument dated 31st March, 1964 showed that the goodv;1ill of the firm had not been valued, and the valuation would be made on dissolntion of the partnership. The assessee firm was dissolved by a deed dated 31st December, 1965. At the time of dissolution the goodwill of the firm was valued at Rs. 1,50,000/-. A new partnership by the same name io was constituted under an instrument subsequently and it took over all the assets including the goodwill and liabilities of the dissolved firm.\n\nThe Income Tax Offieer made an assessment on the dissolved firm for the assessment year 1966- 67 but did not include any an1ount on account of the gains arising on transfer of the goodwill. 'fhc Commissioner, being cf the view that the assessment order was prejudicial to the Revenue, decided to invoke his revisional jurisdiction and setting aside the assessment order directed the Incon1e Tax Officer to E make a fresh assessment r1fter taking into account the capital gain arising on the sale of the goodwill. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in appeal accepted the contention of the assessee that the sale did not attract tax on capi ... ta! gains under section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The High Court o~ Karnataka on a reference, at the instance of the Commissioner of Income Tnix\n\naffirmed the Tribunal's view and held that the value of the consideration receiveed by the assessee for the transfer of its goodwill was not liable to capit&l gains f1 tax under section 45 of the Income Tax Act. Hence the three a'Jlpeals as to the taxability of the transfer of the goodwill to capital gain tax.\n\nDismissing the appeals, the Court\n\nHEID: 1. The gocxlwill generated in a newly commenced business cannot be described as an asset within the terms of section 45 of the Income Tax Act, G 1961 and therefore its transfer i'l not subject to Income Tax under the head \"capit_al gains\". [946 B-C]\n\n2.1. Goodwill denotes the benefit arising from connection and reputation.\n\nThe benefit to the business varies with the nature of the business and also from one business to another. No business commenced for the first time possesses goodwill fronL the start. It is generated as the business. is carried on and may be augmented with the passage of time.\n\nA variety of elements goes into its making, and its composition varies in different trades and in different businesses in the same trade, and while one element may preponderate in one business, another may dominate in another business.\n\nAnd yet because of its intangible\n\n' •\n\nC.I.T, V. B. C. SRINIV ASA 939\n\n-natW'e, it remains insubstantial in form and nebulous in character. In a progres• A sing business goodwill tends to show progrive increase.\n\nAnd in a failing business it may begin to wane.\n\nIts value may fluctuate from one moment to another depending on changes in the reputation of the business.\n\nIt is affected by everything relating to the business, the personality and business rectitude of the owners, the nature and character of the business, its name and reputation, ill location, its impact on the contemporary inarket, the prevailing socio-economic ecology, intrOOuction to old customers and agreed absence of competition. Thero B can be no account in value of the factors producing it.\n\nIt is also lillpossible to predicate the moment of its birth. It comes silently into the world, unhearalded • and unproclaimed and its impact may not be visibly felt for an undefined period.\n\n--4\n\n' •\n\nImperceptible at birth it exists enwrapped in a concept, growing or fluctuating with the numerous imponderables pouring into, and affecting the business. [942 F, H, 943 A, E-H, 944 Al\n\nCrultwell v. Lye, 1810, 17 Ves 335; Churton v. Douglas, 1859 John 174; Tregu v. Hun1, 1896 A.C. 7; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Muller &: Co.'s Margarine Limited, [1901] A.C. 217. quoted with approval.\n\n3.1. Section 45 of the Income Tax Act operates if there is a transfer of a carital asset giving rise to a profit or gain. The expression \"capital asset\" def med in section 2 ( 14) to mean \"property of any kind held by an assessee\" is of the widest amplitude and covers all kinds of property except the property expressly excluded by clauses (i) to (iv) of the sub-section which do not include goodwill. [942 D-E]\n\n3.2. Section 45 is a charging section, charging the profits or gains. arising from the transfer of a capital asset to income-tax, according to the detailed provisions for computing the profits or gains under that head. The charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code~ When there is a case to which the computation provisions caonnot apply at all, it is e\\'ident tha-t such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section.\n\n(944 C, D-E]\n\n3.3. The mode of computation and deductions set forth in section 48 provides the principal basis for quantifying the income chargeable under the head \"capital gains\". Section 48 contemplates an asset in the acquisition of which it is possible to envisage a co5t. The intent goes to the nature and character of the asset, that it is an asset which possesses the inherent quality of being available on the expenditure of money to a person seeking to acquire it.\n\nNone of the provisions pertaining to the head \"capital gins\" suggests that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost at all can be conceived.\n\n[945 A, C-E]\n\n3.4. The date of acquisition of the asset is a material factor in applying the computation rrovisions perta-ining to capital gains. The \"cost of acquisition\" mentioned in section 48 ilnplies a date of acquisition, an inference as strengthen~ ed by the provi<iions of sections 49, 50 and sub-section (2) of section 55. If the goodwill generated in a new business is regarded as acquired at a cost and subsequently passes to an assessee in any of the modes specified in sub-section ( 1) of section 49, it v.ill become necessry to determine the cost of acquisition to the previous owner.\n\nI-laving regard to the nature of the asset, it will be \\IDpoosibTeto determine such cost of acquisition. Nor can sub-section (3) of\n\n.ection 55 be nvoked, because the date of acquisition by the previous owner will remain unknown. [945 F-G, H. 946 A]\n\nA Commissioner of J, zcon1c-tax v. K. Rathnam Nadar, (1969) 71 I.T.R. 433- (Mad.); Conunissioner of Income-tax v. Chunilal Prabhudas & Co., (1970) 76 l.T.R. 566 (Cal.); Jagdev Su1gh A1unuCk v.\n\nComnlissioner oj Income-tax,\n\n(1971) 81 I.T.R. 500 (Delhi); Commissioner of Income-tax v. E.\n\nJacob,\n\n(1973) 89 I.T.R. 88 (Kerala): con1missioner of Income-tax v. Honie IndustrfeJ & Co., (1977) 107 l.T.R. 609 (Born.); Commissioner of Income-tax v. Michel Postal, (1978) 112 I.T.R. 315 (Born.); Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jaswant B Lal Dayabhai, (1978) 114 J.T.R. 798 (M.P.) approved.\n\nConunissioner of !11con1c-ta.l. v. Mohanbha1 Pamablzai, (1978) 91 I.T.R. 393 (Guj.); K. N. Daftary v. Conunissioner of !11con1e-tax (1977) 106 I.T.R. 998, overruled. c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1146 of 1975,\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 4-7-1974 of the Karnataka High Court i'n l.T.R. No. 38/72.\n\nCONNECTED WITH\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1378 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1-12-1975 of the Karnataka High Court in I.T.R.C. No, 32/74,\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 926 of 1973.\n\nE From the Judgment and Order dated 2-11-1972 of the Kera!a\n\nHigh Court in Income Tax Reference No. 120/70.\n\nC.A. No. 1146/75.\n\nSoli J, Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. General, B. B. Ahuja and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Appellant.\n\nT. A. Ramachandran, B. Partha Sarathi and Miss R. Vaigai for the Respondent.\n\nK. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener.\n\nC.A. No. 1378/76.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, Addi- Sol. General, B. B. Ahuja and Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nVineet Kumar and A. K. Srivastava for the Respondent.\n\nC.A. No. 926/73.\n\nMiss A.\n\nV. S. Desai, K. C. Dua and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant. ..\n\nA. S. Nambiar and P. P. Namboodiri for the Respondent,\n\n' •\n\n' •\n\nj •\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-The question in these appeals is whether the transfer of the goodwill of a newly commenced business can give rise to a capital gain taxable under s. 45, Income Tax Act, 1961.\n\nThe assessee, a registered firm, mo nufactured and sold agarbattis.\n\nClause ( 13) gf the Instrument of Partnership executed on 28th July, 1954 showed that the goodwill of the firm had not been valued, and the valuation would be made ou dissolution of the partnership. The period of the partnership was extended by an instrument dated 31st\n\nMarch, 1964, and it contained a similar clause (13). Subsequently, the assessee firm was dissolved by a deed dated 1st December, 1965.\n\nAt the time of disolution, it seems, the goodwill of the firm was valued at Rs. 1,50,000/-. A new partnership by the same name was constituted under an instrument dated 2nd December, 1965 and it took overall the assets, including the goodwill, and liabilities of the dissolved firm.\n\nThe Income-Tax Officer made an assessment on the dissolved firm for the assessment year 1966-67 but did not include any amount on account of the gain arising on transfer of the goodwill.\n\nThe Commissioner, being of the view that the assessment order was prejudicial\n\nto the Revenue, decided to invoke his revisional jurisdiction and setting aside the assessment order directed the Income-Tax Officer to make E a fresh assessment after taking into account the capital gain arising on the sale of the goodwill.\n\nIn appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the assessee maintained that the sale did not attract tax on capital gains nnder s. 45 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. Accepting the contention, the p Tribunal allowed the appeal.\n\nAt the instance of the Commissioner of Income-Tax it referred a question of law to the High Court of Karnataka which, as reframed by the High Court, reads as follows\n\n\"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that no capital gains can arise under s. 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the G traasfer by the assessee firm of its goodwill to the newly constituted firm ?\"\n\nBy its judgment dated 4th July, 1974 the High Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the value of the consideration received by the assessee for the transfer of its goodwill was not liable H to capital gains tax under s. 45 of the Act. Civil Appeal No. 1146 of 1975 is directed against that judgment.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1378 of 1976 arises out of a judgment by !he same High Qmrt in which it has followed its earlier view.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 926 of 1973 has been preferred against tl1e judgment of the Kerala High Court where a similar opinion has been expressed, but in respect of the provisions of s. 12-B, Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nAt the relevant time s. 45, Income Tax Act, 1961 provided :\n\n\"45.(1) Any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall, save as otherwise provided in sections 53 and 54, be chargeable to income-tax under the head \"Capital gains\", and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place.\"\n\nThe section operates if there is a transfer of a capital asset giving rise to a profit or gain. _ The expression \"capital asset\" is defined in s. 2 (14) to mean \"property of any kind held by an assessee\". It is of the widest amplitude, and apparently covers all kinds of property except the property expressly excluded by clauses (i) to (iv) of the sub-section which, it will be seen, do not include goodwill. But the definitions in s. 2 are subject to an overall restrictive clause. That is expressed in the opening words of the section : \"unless the context otherwise requires\".\n\nWe must therefore enquire whether contextually s. 45, in which the expression \"capital asset\" is used, excludes goodwi!l.\n\nGoodwill denotes the benefit arising from connection and reputation.\n\nThe original definition by Lord Eldon in Cruttwell v. Lye(') that goodwill was nothing more than \"the probability that the old customers would resort to the old places\" was expanded by Wood V. C. in Churton_ v. Douglas(') to encompass every positive advantage \"that has been acquired by the old firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was previously carried on or with the name of the old firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business\".\n\nIn Trego v. Hunt(') Lord Herschell described goodwill as a connection which tended to become permanent because of habit or otherwise. The benefit to the business varies with the nature of the busine.ss and also from one business to another. No business commenced for the first time possesses ------\n\n(1) 1810 17 Yes 335.\n\n(2) 1859 John 174.\n\n(3) 1896 A.C. 7.\n\n• '\n\n• '\n\ngoodwill from the start. It is generated as the business is carried on and may be augmented with the passage of time.\n\nLawson in hiS \"Introduction to the Law of Property'' describes it as property of a highly peculiar kind.\n\nIn Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal Ill v. Chunilal Prabhudas & Co.,(') the Calcutta]ligh Court reviewed the different approaches to the concept :\n\n\"It has been horticulturally and botanically viewed as \"a seed sprouting\" or an \"acorn growing into the mighty oak of goodwill\". It has been geographically described by locality.\n\nIt has been historically described by locality.\n\nIt has been historically explained as growing and crytallising traditions in the business. It has been described in terms of a magnet as the \"attracting force\". In terms of comparative dynamics, goodwill has been described as the \"differentfail return of profit\".\n\nPhilosophically it has been held to be intangible.\n\nThough immaterial, it is materially valued.\n\nPhysically and psychologically, it is a \"habit\" and sociologically it is a \"custom\". Biologically, it has been described as Lord Macnaghten in Trego v. Hunt as the \"sap and life\" of the business. Architecturally, it has been described as the \"cement\" binding together the business and its assets as a whole and a going and developing concern.\"\n\nA variety of elements goes into its making, and its composition varies in different trades and in different businesses in the same trade, and while one element may preponderate in one business,. another may dominate in another business. Amd yet because of its intangible nature, it remains insubstantial in form and nebulous in character.\n\nThose features prompted Lord Macnaghten to remark in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Muller & Co.'s Margarine Limited(') that although goodwill was easy to describe, it was nonetheless difficult to define.\n\nIn a progressing business goodwill tends to show progressive increase.\n\nAnd in a failing business it may begin to wane. Its value may fluctuate from one moment to another depending on changes in the reputation of the business. It is affected by everything relating to the business, the personality and business rectitude of the owners, the nature and character of the business, its name and reputation, its location, its impact on the contemporary market, the prevailing socio-economic ecology, introducton to old customers and agreed absence of competition. There can be no account in value of the factors producing it. It is also impossible to predicate the moment of its birth. It comes silently\n\n(I) [1970] 76 J.T.R. 566.\n\n(2) [1901] A.C. 217.\n\ninto the world, unheralded and unproclaimed and its impact may not be visibly felt for an undefined period.\n\nImperceptible at birth it exists enwrapped in a concept, growing or fluctuating with the numerous imponderables pouring into, and affecting, the business.\n\nUndoubtedly, it is an asset of the business, but is it an asset contemplated by s. 45 ?\n\nSection 45 charges the profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset to income-tax.\n\nThe asset must be one which falls within the contemplation of the section. It must bear that quality which brings s. 45 into play. To determine whether the goodwill of a new business is such an asset, it is permissible, as we shall presently show, to refer to certain other sections of the head, \"Capital gains\".\n\nSection 45 is a charging section.\n\nFor the purpose of imposing the cbarge, Parliament has enacted detailed provisions in order to compute the profits or gains under that head. No existing principle or provision at variance with them can be applied for determining the chmgeable profits and gains. All transactions encompassed by s. 45 must fall under the governance of its computation provisions. A transaction to which those provisions cannot be 11pplied must be regarded as ncYer intended by s. 45 to be the subject of the cbarge.\n\nThis inference flows from the general arrangement of the provisions in the Income-tax Act, where under each head of income the charging provision is accompanied by a set of provisions for computing the income subject to that charge.\n\nThe character of the computation provisions in each case bears a relationship to the nature of the charge. Thus the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section. Otherwise one would be driven to conclude that while a certain income seems to fall within the charging section there is no scheme of computation for quantifying it. The legislative pattern discernible in the Act is against such a conclusion. It must be borne in mind that the legislative intent is presumed to run uniformly through the entire conspectus of provisions pertaining to each head of income. No doubt there is a qualimtive difference between the charging provision and a computation provision.\n\nAnd ordinarily the operation of the charging provision cannot be affected by the construction of a particular computation provision. But the question here is whether it is possible to apply the computation provision at all if a certain interpretation is pressed on the charging provision. That pertains to the fundamental integrality of the statutory scheme provided for each head.\n\n• '\n\nThe point to consider then is whether if the expression \"asstt\" in \\ s. 45 is construed as including the goodwill of a new business, it is\n\n• -\n\n•- -\n\n1== - J ii\n\npossible to apply the computation sections for quantifying the profits A and gains on its transfer.\n\nThe mode of computation and deductions set forth in >. 48 provide the principal basis for quantifying the income chargeable under the head \"Capital gains\".\n\nThe section provides that the income chargeable under that had shall be computed by deducting from the full value B of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset :\n\n\"(ii) the cost of acquisition of the capital asset ...... \"\n\nWhat is contemplated i~ an asset in the acquisition of which 1! \" possible to envisage a cost. The intent goes to the nature and character of the asset, that it is an asset which possesses the inherent quality of being av-ailable on the expenditure of money to a person seeking to acquire it. It is immaterial that although the asset belongs to such a class it may, on the facts of a certain case, be acquired without the payment of money. That kind of case is covered by s. 49 and its cost, for the purpose of s. 48 is dctedmined in accordance with those provisions..\n\nThere are other provisions which indicate that s. 48 is concerned with an asset capable of acquisition at the cost. S. 50 is one such provision. So also is sub-section (2) of s.55. None of the provisions pertaining to the head \"Capital gairis\" suggests that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost at afl can be conceived. Yet there are assets which are acquired by way of production in which no cost element can be identified or envisaged. From what has gone before, it\n\nis apparent that the goodwill generated in a new business has been so regarded. The elements which create it have already been detailed. In such a case, when the asset is sold and the consideration is brought to tax, what is charged is the capital value of the asset and not any profit or gain.\n\nIn the case of goodwill generated in a new business there is the further circumstance that it is not possible to detennine the date when it comes into existence. The date of acquisition of the asset is a. material factor in applying the computation provisions pertaining to capital gains. It is possible to say that the \"cost of acquisition\" mentioned in s. 48 implies a d1te of acquisition, and that inference is strengthened by the provisions of ss. 49 and 50 as well as sub-section (2) of s.55.\n\nIt may also be noted that if the goodwill generated in a new busine!! is regarded as acquired at a cost and subsequently passes to an assessec in any of the modes specified in sub-section ( 1) of s. 49, it will become necessary to determine the cost of acquisition to the provious\n\nowner.\n\nHaving regard to the nature of the aseet, it will be impossible Il-214 SCl/81\n\n'946 'llPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R. _\n\nA tn dc<crmine such cost of acquisition. Nor can sub-section (3) of s. 55\n\nbl' invoked, because the date of acquisition by the previous owner will remain unknown.\n\nWe arc of opinion that the goodwill generated in a newly commenced business cannot be described as an \"\"asset\" within the terms of s. \"45 and therefore its transfer is not subject to income-tax under the head \"Capital gains\".\n\nThe question which has been raised before us, has been considered by some High Courts, and it awears that there is a conflict of opinion.\n\nThe Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Rathnam Nadar( 1), the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nChunilal Prabhudas & Co., (supra) the Delhi High Court in Jagdev Singh Mumick v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. E. C. Jacob('), the Bombay High Court in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Home Industries & Co.(4) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Michel Postal(•) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jaswant Lal Dayabhai(6 ) have taken the view that the receipt on the transfer of goodwill generated in a busiuess is not subject to income-tax as a capital gain. On the other side lies the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai(7 ) and the Calcutta High Court in K. N. Daftary v. Commissioner of Incometax(8) that even if no cost is incurred in building up the goodwill of the business, it is nevertheless a capital asset for the purpose of capital gains, and the cost of acquisition being nil the entire runount of sale proceeds relating to the goodwill must be brought to tax under the head \"Capital gains\". It is apparent that the preponderance of judicial opinion favours the view that the transfer of goodwill initially generated in a business does not give rise to a capital gain for the purposes of income-tax.\n\nUpon the aforesaid considerations, Civil Appeal No. 1146(T) of 1975 and Civil Appeal No. 1378 of 1976 must be dismissed.\n\n(1) [19691 71 J.T.R. 433.\n\n(2) [1971] 81 J.T.R. 500.\n\n(3) [1973] 89 J.T.R. 88. •\n\n(4) [19771 107 J.T.R. 609.\n\n(5) [19781 112 I.T.R. 315\n\n(6} [1978] 114 J.T.R. 798.\n\n(7) [19781 91 J.T.R. 393.\n\n(8) [1977] 106 J.T.R. 998.\n\nJ •\n\nCivil Appeal No. 926 of 1973 raises the same question with refe- A rence to s. 12B, lndian Income Tax Act, 1922. As the relevant statutory provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 are substantially similar to the corresponding provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, that appeal is also liable to be dismissed.\n\nAccordingly, the appeals are dismissed with costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals dim1isscd.", "total_entities": 99, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,\n\nBANGALORE ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BANGALORE ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. C. SRINIVASA SETTY, ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. C. SRINIVASA SETTY, ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 19, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 19, 1981\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 564, "end_char": 580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause\n\n(13) of the Ins1ru1ncnt of Partnership executed on 28th of July, 1954 and subsequently extenda~ by another instrument dated 31st March, 1964 showed that the goodv;1ill of the firm had not been valued, and the valuation would be made on dissolntion of the partnership."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 756, "end_char": 775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee firm was dissolved by a deed dated 31st December, 1965."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1558, "end_char": 1587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in appeal accepted the contention of the assessee that the sale did not attract tax on capi ... ta!"}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1718, "end_char": 1738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court o~ Karnataka", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1744, "end_char": 1767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court o~ Karnataka on a reference, at the instance of the Commissioner of Income Tnix\n\naffirmed the Tribunal's view and held that the value of the consideration receiveed by the assessee for the transfer of its goodwill was not liable to capit&l gains f1 tax under section 45 of the Income Tax Act."}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2299, "end_char": 2309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5469, "end_char": 5479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6107, "end_char": 6117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 49, 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6242, "end_char": 6252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6424, "end_char": 6434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Soli J, Sorabjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J, Sorabjee, Addi.", "canonical_name": "Soli J, Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "B. B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8074, "end_char": 8085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, B. B. Ahuja and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nSubhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8095, "end_char": 8109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, B. B. Ahuja and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "A.\n\nSubhashini"}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8130, "end_char": 8148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. A. Ramachandran, B. Partha Sarathi and Miss R. Vaigai for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Partha Sarathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8150, "end_char": 8167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. A. Ramachandran, B. Partha Sarathi and Miss R. Vaigai for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Vaigai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8177, "end_char": 8186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. A. Ramachandran, B. Partha Sarathi and Miss R. Vaigai for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. K. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8208, "end_char": 8221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener."}}, {"text": "S. P. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Dinesh Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8236, "end_char": 8247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parkh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8249, "end_char": 8260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener."}}, {"text": "C. B.\n\nSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Vineeta Caprihan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8281, "end_char": 8297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener."}}, {"text": "B. L. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8302, "end_char": 8313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Goswami, S. P. Mehta, Dinesh Vyas, P. H. Parkh, C. B.\n\nSingh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and B. L. Verma for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8354, "end_char": 8370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi- Sol.", "canonical_name": "Soli J, Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8408, "end_char": 8418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, B. B. Ahuja and Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8439, "end_char": 8451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vineet Kumar and A. K. Srivastava for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vineet Kumar and A. K. Srivastava for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nV. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8517, "end_char": 8532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A.\n\nV. S. Desai, K. C. Dua and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant. .."}}, {"text": "K. C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8534, "end_char": 8543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A.\n\nV. S. Desai, K. C. Dua and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant. .."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A.\n\nV. S. Desai, K. C. Dua and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant. ..", "canonical_name": "A.\n\nSubhashini"}}, {"text": "A. S. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8590, "end_char": 8603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Nambiar and P. P. Namboodiri for the Respondent,\n\n' •\n\n' •\n\nj •\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-The question in these appeals is whether the transfer of the goodwill of a newly commenced business can give rise to a capital gain taxable under s. 45, Income Tax Act, 1961."}}, {"text": "P. P. Namboodiri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8608, "end_char": 8624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Nambiar and P. P. Namboodiri for the Respondent,\n\n' •\n\n' •\n\nj •\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-The question in these appeals is whether the transfer of the goodwill of a newly commenced business can give rise to a capital gain taxable under s. 45, Income Tax Act, 1961."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8705, "end_char": 8711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Nambiar and P. P. Namboodiri for the Respondent,\n\n' •\n\n' •\n\nj •\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-The question in these appeals is whether the transfer of the goodwill of a newly commenced business can give rise to a capital gain taxable under s. 45, Income Tax Act, 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8862, "end_char": 8867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8869, "end_char": 8889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st\n\nMarch, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9226, "end_char": 9243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period of the partnership was extended by an instrument dated 31st\n\nMarch, 1964, and it contained a similar clause (13)."}}, {"text": "1st December, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9347, "end_char": 9365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the assessee firm was dissolved by a deed dated 1st December, 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10295, "end_char": 10300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10308, "end_char": 10328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Karnataka", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-Tax it referred a question of law to the High Court of Karnataka which, as reframed by the High Court, reads as follows\n\n\"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that no capital gains can arise under s. 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the G traasfer by the assessee firm of its goodwill to the newly constituted firm ?\""}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10692, "end_char": 10697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10705, "end_char": 10725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "4th July, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10837, "end_char": 10851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated 4th July, 1974 the High Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the value of the consideration received by the assessee for the transfer of its goodwill was not liable H to capital gains tax under s. 45 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11055, "end_char": 11060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11337, "end_char": 11354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "926 of 1973 has been preferred against tl1e judgment of the Kerala High Court where a similar opinion has been expressed, but in respect of the provisions of s. 12-B, Indian Income Tax Act, 1922."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11435, "end_char": 11440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11444, "end_char": 11471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11495, "end_char": 11500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11502, "end_char": 11522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11676, "end_char": 11694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11993, "end_char": 11997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12283, "end_char": 12287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12479, "end_char": 12484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Eldon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12657, "end_char": 12662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original definition by Lord Eldon in Cruttwell v. Lye(') that goodwill was nothing more than \"the probability that the old customers would resort to the old places\" was expanded by Wood V. C. in Churton_ v. Douglas(') to encompass every positive advantage \"that has been acquired by the old firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was previously carried on or with the name of the old firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business\"."}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13170, "end_char": 13179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Trego v. Hunt(') Lord Herschell described goodwill as a connection which tended to become permanent because of habit or otherwise."}}, {"text": "Calcutta]ligh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13823, "end_char": 13842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal Ill v. Chunilal Prabhudas & Co.,(') the Calcutta]ligh Court reviewed the different approaches to the concept :\n\n\"It has been horticulturally and botanically viewed as \"a seed sprouting\" or an \"acorn growing into the mighty oak of goodwill\"."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14615, "end_char": 14625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Biologically, it has been described as Lord Macnaghten in Trego v. Hunt as the \"sap and life\" of the business."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16474, "end_char": 16479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16483, "end_char": 16493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16698, "end_char": 16703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16898, "end_char": 16908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16973, "end_char": 16983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the purpose of imposing the cbarge, Parliament has enacted detailed provisions in order to compute the profits or gains under that head."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17227, "end_char": 17232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17392, "end_char": 17397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17507, "end_char": 17521, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18997, "end_char": 19002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20092, "end_char": 20097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20131, "end_char": 20136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20237, "end_char": 20242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20306, "end_char": 20311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20365, "end_char": 20369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21331, "end_char": 21336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 49 and 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21424, "end_char": 21437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21468, "end_char": 21472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21671, "end_char": 21676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21960, "end_char": 21965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22426, "end_char": 22443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Rathnam Nadar( 1), the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nChunilal Prabhudas & Co., (supra) the Delhi High Court in Jagdev Singh Mumick v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. E. C. Jacob('), the Bombay High Court in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Home Industries & Co.(4) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Michel Postal(•) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jaswant Lal Dayabhai(6 ) have taken the view that the receipt on the transfer of goodwill generated in a busiuess is not subject to income-tax as a capital gain."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22744, "end_char": 22761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Rathnam Nadar( 1), the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nChunilal Prabhudas & Co., (supra) the Delhi High Court in Jagdev Singh Mumick v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. E. C. Jacob('), the Bombay High Court in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Home Industries & Co.(4) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Michel Postal(•) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jaswant Lal Dayabhai(6 ) have taken the view that the receipt on the transfer of goodwill generated in a busiuess is not subject to income-tax as a capital gain."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22883, "end_char": 22908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Rathnam Nadar( 1), the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nChunilal Prabhudas & Co., (supra) the Delhi High Court in Jagdev Singh Mumick v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. E. C. Jacob('), the Bombay High Court in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Home Industries & Co.(4) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Michel Postal(•) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jaswant Lal Dayabhai(6 ) have taken the view that the receipt on the transfer of goodwill generated in a busiuess is not subject to income-tax as a capital gain."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23149, "end_char": 23167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other side lies the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai(7 ) and the Calcutta High Court in K. N. Daftary v. Commissioner of Incometax(8) that even if no cost is incurred in building up the goodwill of the business, it is nevertheless a capital asset for the purpose of capital gains, and the cost of acquisition being nil the entire runount of sale proceeds relating to the goodwill must be brought to tax under the head \"Capital gains\"."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23232, "end_char": 23251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other side lies the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai(7 ) and the Calcutta High Court in K. N. Daftary v. Commissioner of Incometax(8) that even if no cost is incurred in building up the goodwill of the business, it is nevertheless a capital asset for the purpose of capital gains, and the cost of acquisition being nil the entire runount of sale proceeds relating to the goodwill must be brought to tax under the head \"Capital gains\"."}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24234, "end_char": 24240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24249, "end_char": 24269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "As the relevant statutory provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24271, "end_char": 24342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24408, "end_char": 24428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_948_949_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS\n\nFebruary 19, 1981\n\n[A. D. KosHAL AND R. B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nConstitutiou of India-Article 133(l)(a) and (c) (before (lf/lendn1en1l Certificate issutd, not in confonnity with law-Supreme Court, if could revokethe cenificate-Special leave, if could be rranted after revoking the certificate.\n\n1. If the certificate granted by the Court under sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution, as it then stood, did not cooform to leg:al requirements in as much as it did not specify the substantial question of law wkich, accordin~ to High Court, required determination and no reasons ig\n\nrespect of ssuance of the certificate appeared therein, the certificate could be revoked. [948 HJ\n\nD Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxn?idas Raghunat/1 Gadit [19711 1 S.C.C. 276; Sardar B11hadur S. Indra Singh Trust v. Conunissioner of Inconie Tax, /Jengal [1972] I S.C.R. 392 followed.\n\n2. In such a situation if it could be made out that a substantial question of law really required determination, this Court could treat the appeal as one by special leave after condoning the delay. In the instant case no such question is E' involved at all and, therefore, special leave cannot be granted.\n\n[949 B-C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDJCTION : Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 25-3-1969 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 1195of1970.\n\nU. R. Lalit, P. H. Parekh and Miss Ma11ik Tarkunde for the Appellant.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL J.\n\nA preliminary objection bas been raised by Mr.\n\nRangam to the effect that the certificate granted by the court under G sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution of India, as it then stood, does not conform to legal requirements inasmuch as-\n\n(a) it does not specify the substantial question of law which the High Court states require determination; and\n\n(b) no reasons in •upport ol the issu11.nco of th~ certified~\n\nappoar tbocoilt.\n\n' •\n\nEXPRESS NEWSPAPERS v. MADRAS (Koshal, !.) 949\n\nThe preliminary objection is well fonnded in view of the decisions A of this Court in Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit(') and in Sardar Bahadur S. Indra Singh Trust v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Bengal(').\n\nFaced with this situation Mr. Lalit wanted us tO' treat the appeal as one by special leave and prayed that such leave be granted now afterl B condoning the delay.\n\nThat would have been certainly a reasonable course to follow if it was made out that a substantial question of law really requires determination.\n\nWe have gone through the impugned judgment and find that no such question is involved at all.\n\nWe, therefore, refuse special leave, revoke the certificate granted by the High Court and dismiss the appeal but with no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\n(I) [1971] l S; C.C. 276.\n\n(2) [1972] 1 S.C.R. 392.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 17, "entities": [{"text": "EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 19, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF MADRAS\n\nFebruary 19, 1981\n\n[A. D. KosHAL AND R. B. MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 133(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423, "end_char": 434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1365, "end_char": 1382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Decree dated 25-3-1969 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "U. R. Lalit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1410, "end_char": 1421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, P. H. Parekh and Miss Ma11ik Tarkunde for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1423, "end_char": 1435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, P. H. Parekh and Miss Ma11ik Tarkunde for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Ma11ik Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1445, "end_char": 1460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, P. H. Parekh and Miss Ma11ik Tarkunde for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1525, "end_char": 1531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL J.\n\nA preliminary objection bas been raised by Mr.\n\nRangam to the effect that the certificate granted by the court under G sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution of India, as it then stood, does not conform to legal requirements inasmuch as-\n\n(a) it does not specify the substantial question of law which the High Court states require determination; and\n\n(b) no reasons in •upport ol the issu11.nco of th~ certified~\n\nappoar tbocoilt."}}, {"text": "Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1584, "end_char": 1590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL J.\n\nA preliminary objection bas been raised by Mr.\n\nRangam to the effect that the certificate granted by the court under G sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution of India, as it then stood, does not conform to legal requirements inasmuch as-\n\n(a) it does not specify the substantial question of law which the High Court states require determination; and\n\n(b) no reasons in •upport ol the issu11.nco of th~ certified~\n\nappoar tbocoilt."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1696, "end_char": 1707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1715, "end_char": 1736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lalit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2308, "end_char": 2313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faced with this situation Mr. Lalit wanted us tO' treat the appeal as one by special leave and prayed that such leave be granted now afterl B condoning the delay."}}, {"text": "[1972] 1 S.C.R. 392", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_950_961_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SRI SRI KALIMATA THAJ(URANI & SRI SRI RAGHUNATH\n\nJEW & ORS. ETC. v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 20, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nWest Bengal Land Refornzs Act, 1955, S. 2(8) Proviso and Explanation, S. 20B(3), (4) and (5); West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 &\n\nU'e.H Bengal Land Reforms (Ame11dn11ent) Ac1, 1977-Constitutional validity of. ~\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Articles 14, 19(l)(e), (g) and Nimh Schedule Entry Nos. 60 and 81-Violation of Fundamental Rights-Complaint of-Court . to determine whether restrictions contain quality of reasonableness.\n\nThe West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 permitted a tenant (land-holder} to get the land cultivated by a bargadar, on the basis that the bargadar would D share the produce, and the Act contained provisions for enforcement of the right of the tenant to get such share. Section 17 permitted the tenant to terminate the cultivation of the land by a bargadar and resume possession for his own cultivation on certain contingencies, one of them being that he requires it bona fide for personal cultivation.\n\nThe West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 provided for the E reduction in tho ceiling area of the tenant, and incorporated sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 20B of the 1955 Act, which provided that where the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the cultiYation of the land, the facility of cultivating the land personally by the tenant should be denied to him.\n\nThe West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1977 inserted a Provis<> and an Explanation to clause (8) of section 2 of the 1955 Act, which provided P that a person or member of his family should reside in the greater part of the\n\nyear in the locality where the land is situated and the principal source of his in- \\ come is derived from the land and that 'family' shall have the same meaning as •- in clause (c) of section 14.\n\nThe petitioners in their writ petitions to this Cou1t assailed : ( 1) The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 as also amendments made to the said Act uptO' 1977, contending that the 1955 Act \\Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act of 1972 was in the nature of a Ceiling Act prescribing a particular ceiling for the area of the land which should be retained by the tenant and that sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of s. 20B of the 1955 Act were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as being discriminatory and arbitrary Once the tenant was given the right of personal cultivation and was permitted to get the land cultivated by a bargadar on the basis. that the bargadar would share the produce, there was no warrant for not allowing the tenant to resume the land where a bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the land and to deny the right of cultivating the land personally by the tenant, and (2) the Provis<>\n\nKALIMATA THAKURANI v. UNION 951\n\nand the Explanation to section 2 of the 1955 Act deprive the petitioners of their A rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (e) and (g) of the Constitution in as much as it prevents them from either going to or residing in any other place in India and places a serious curb on their right to carry on an occupation other than agriculture.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents it was submitted that the rigour of sub-sections\n\n(3) and (4) can be softened if clause (d) of section 17 is read down and inter- B preted in a way as to permit a tenant to resume the land under clause (d) of section 17 if the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the land.\n\nDis.missing the writ petitions :\n\nHELD: l(i). The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 including the Amendment Act of 1972 and the proviso introduced by the Amendment Act of C 1977 are constitutionally valid. [961 G]\n\nIn the instant case the 1955 Act and the Amendment Act of 1972 having been added to the Ninth Schedule as Entry Nos. 60 and 81 prior to April 24, 1973, are immune fron1 challenge as being violative of Part III of the Constitution. [954 Al\n\nWaman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 271, referred to. 0\n\n(ii) Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the 1955 Act are the only grounds on which a tenant can get the land back for his per~ sonal cultivation.\n\nThe -'Piltingency where the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the land is neither mentioned, nor directly or indireCtly contemplated by them.\n\nThe contention of the respondent cannot be accepted for it would introduce something into section 17 \\Vhich is not there and this is diametrically E opposed to the well-known canons of interpretation. [956 D-E)\n\n(iii) There is no logical justification for the provisions of sub-sections (3) and\n\n(4) of section 20B. When once the cultivator chooses to bring a bargadar on the ]and the interest of the bargadar is protected and has been made heritable.\n\nBut when the bargadar on his own volition surrenders or abandons the land~ there is no reason why the tenant should not be allowed to resume cultivation and p instead be compelled to get the land cultivated by some other person nominated by the authority concerned under section 49 of the 1955 Act.\n\nThis provision, therefore, appears to be extremely harsh and works serious injustice to the rights of the tenants particularly after the ceiling area of the tenant has been considerably reduced by the Amendment Act of 1972. [956 F-G]\n\n(iv) Though the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 20B G perilously border on arbitrariness and a-mount to serious curbs on the fundamental right of the cultivator to pursue his occuption, they cannot be struck down because thev are contained in the Amendment Act of 1972 which has been placed in th~ Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 1973. It will, however, be for the legislature which is the best judge of the needs of its people to give, a suitable relief to the tenant and soften the rigours of these harsh provisions. [957 C-Dl H\n\n(2)_ The object of the proviso is to safegu&rd the interest of the tenant himself S•.1 that he may give wholehearted attention to the personal cultivation of\n\nthe land.\n\nThe proviso does not debar him from following any other occupation but once a tenant wants to have the land to himself for personal cultivation he must elect whether to pursue the profession of cultivation or some other occupation. Thus, even though there is some amount of restriction both on the right of the petitioners to reside or follow any other occupation, such a restriction cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. [958 C, E-Fl\n\nIn the instant case the restriction does not amount to complete deprivation of the right of the tenant to reside elsewhere' because the words 'for the greater part of the year' leave sufficient scope to the tenant to residei elsewhere for a part of the year if he so desires.\n\nIt is not necessary that the. tenant should himself reside in the viilage for the greater part of the year.\n\nIt is sufficient if any member of the family which includes his wife, unmarried adult, married adult, minor son and so on remains in the village.\n\nThis would amount to substantial compliance of the conditions of the proviso. The restriction, therefore, is partial and in public interest.\n\n[958 G, 959 DJ\n\n(3) Whenever a complaint of violation of fundamental rights is made the Court has to determine hether or not the restrictions imposed contain the quality of reasonableness.\n\nIn assessing these factors a doctrinaire approach should nut be made but the essential facts and realities of life have to be duly considered. Our Constitution aims at building up a socialist state and the cstabiishment of an egalitarian society and if reasonable restrictions are placed on the fundamental rights in public interest, they can be fully justified in law.\n\n[959 F-G]\n\nState o! A1adra~ v. Jr. G. Row, [1952] SCR 597, referred to.\n\nE ( 4) As the proviso operates equally to all the tenants governed by it no\n\nquestion of discrimination arises. ·[961 F]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1345, 1635/79, 458,\n\n935. 1418 and 1692/80.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nSukumar Ghosh for the Petitioners in WP No. 1345/79.\n\nS. N. Kacker, Govinda Mukhoty and Rathin Das for the Respondent in WP No. 1345/79.\n\nP. Keshva Pillai for the Petitioner in WP No. 1635/79.\n\nRathin Das for Respondent No. 2 and Ors. In WP No. 1635/79.\n\nBimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A. K. Sen Gupta for the Petitioner in WP No. 458/80.\n\nS. N. Kacker and Rathin Das for Respondent No. 2 and Ors. in WP No. 458/80.\n\nS. C. Majumdar, Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A. K.\n\nSen for the Petitioner in WP No. 935/80.\n\nKAL!MATA THAKURANI v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 953\n\nSripal Singh for the Petitioners in WP No. 1418 of 1980 and A ,1692/80.\n\nRathin Das !or Respondent Nos. 2 and Ors. in WP Nos. 935, 1418 & 1692/80.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL\n\nALI, J.\n\nThese petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution have been filed in order to challenge the vires of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the '1955 Act' j as also various amendments made to the said Act upto 1977.\n\nThe first plank of argument related to the constitutional validity of the 1955 Act.\n\nThe second plank of argument was confined to the validity . of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Amendment Act of 19720 which was in the nature of a ceilhig Act prescribing a particular ceiling of the area of land which,, sould be retained by the tenant.\n\nSo fur as the Ceiling Act, viz., the Amendment Act of 1972 is concerned, it is conceded by the counsel for the petitioners that the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Act is clearly concluded by a recent decision of this Court in Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.(1) where a Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Acts passed by the. States concerned.\n\nIn view of this decision the learned counsel for the petitioners was fair enough to state that he does not want to press his contention regarding the constitutional validity of the Ceiling Act.\n\nSimilarly, tho learned counsel for the petitioners fairly conceded that as the 1955 Act, alongwith its amendments upto 1972, has been placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, it was immune from challenge and was saved by the protective umbrella contained in Art. 3 lB of the Constitution. In this cQrulection, this position was made absolutely cl.ear in Wanum Rao's case (supra) where this Conrt observed as\n\nfollcw~ :\n\n\"Thus, in so far as the validity of Article 3 lB read with the Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that all Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 197 3 will receive the full protection of Article 3 lB. Those laws and regulatians will not be open to challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.\"\n\n(l) AIR 1981 SC 271\n\nIn the instant case, it is clear that the 1955 Act as also the Amendment Act of 1972 were added to the Ninth Schedule, being entry Nos. 60 and 81, prior to April 24, 1973.\n\nIn these circumstances, it is manifest that the aforesaid Acts arc completely immune from challenge on the ground that they are violative of any of the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, was fully justified in making the concession before us.\n\nThe argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in\n\nW.P.\n\nNo. 1345 of 1979, which has been adopted by the counsel for the petitioners appearing in other petitions, centres round the validity of-\n\n(1) The West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977 (published in the Gazette Extraordinary on 3-2-1978), and (2) Section 20B, sub-sections (3), ( 4) and ( 5), of the 1955 Act.\n\nSo far as the challenge to the constitutional validity of this section was concerned, it was confined only on the ground that the said sub-sections were violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India as being discriminatory and arbitrary.\n\nIt was contended that once the land holder, viz., the tenant was given the right of personal cultivation and was permitted to get the land cultivated by a Bargadar on the basis that the bargadar would share half the produce, there was no warrant for not allowing the tenant to resume the land where the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the land.\n\nIn order to consider this argument, it may be necessary to examine the status of the bargadar under the 1955 Act.\n\nSection 2(2) defines bargadar thus:\n\n\"'Bargadar' means a person who under the system generally known as adhi, barga or bhag cultivates the land of another person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that person and includes person who under the system generally known as kisani cultivtes the land of another person on condition of receiving a share of the produce of such land from that person.\"\n\nSection 16 of the 1955 Act provides that where the tenant brings in a bargadar on the land, the produce of the land may be shared in the proportion of 50 : 50 or 75: 25.\n\nThere are also provisions in the 1955 Act for enforcement of the right of the tenant to get his share of the produce from the bargadar which have not been challenged before us.\n\nIt would be seen that s. 17 permits the cultivator to terminate the cultivation of the land by a bargadar and resume possession under his own cultivation if the conditions mentioned in clauses\n\n(a), (b) and (d) of sub-section (1) of s. 17 are satisfied.\n\nClause A<\n\n(d) may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That the person owning the land requires it bona-fide for bringing it under personal cultivation.\"\n\nThus, the cultivator has a right to get back the land for personal cultivation if he requires it for his bona fide use and proves the same B' to the satisfaction of the authority appointed under s. 17 (1) .\n\nIt was argued by the counsel for the petitioners that on a parity of reasoning contained in s. 17, there was no reason why-where the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the land-the facility of cultivating the land personally by the tenant should be denied C to him.\n\nSub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of s. 20B of the 1955 Act run thus. :\n\n''(3) If such oflicer or authority determines that the bargadar had not voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the cultivation of the land which was being cultivated by him as such and what he had been compelled by force or otherwise to surrender or abandon the cultivation of such land, such officer or authority shall restore the bargadar to the cultivation of the land, or where the bargadar is not available or is not willing to be restored to the cultivation of such land, the person whose land was so cultivated shall not resume personal cultivation Of the land but he may, with the permission of such officer or authority, get the land cultivated by any person, referred to in section 49, who is willing to cultivate the land as a bargadar.\n\n( 4) If such ofliccr or authority determines that the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the cultivation of the land which was cultivated by him as such, the person whose land was being so cultivated shall not resume personal cultiv-ation of such land but he may, with the permission of such officer or authority, have the land cultivated by any person, referred to in section 49, who is willing to cultivate the land as a bargadar.\n\n(5) Any contravention of the provisions of sub-section\n\n(3) or sub-section (4) shall be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months,\n\no~ with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.\"\n\nSub-sections (3) and ( 4) prescribe the procedure which is to be adopted where a bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the\n\nSUPREME CO\\JRT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\ncult!vation of the land.\n\nUnder these provisions, the tenant is not allowed to resume personal cultivation but has to get the land cultivated by some other person with the permission of the officer or authority concerned.\n\nRealising the force of the argument, Mr. S. N. Kacker, appear ing for the State of West Bengal, with his usual persuasiveness submitteJ that sub-sections (3) and (4) are extremely harsh but the rigoms of these sub-sections can be softened if we read down s. 17(d) amt interpret it in such a way as to permit a tenant to resume the land under clause ( d) of s. 17 if the Bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the land.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this argument because it will amount not only to distorting and misinterpreting clause ( d) but also to causing serious violence to its plain language, which cannot be done.\n\nIt would appear that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub--section\n\n(1) of s. 17 of the 1955 Act are the only grounds given on which a tenant can get the land back for his personal cultivation.\n\nThe contingency where the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the land is neither mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) nor is directly or indirectly contemplated by them.\n\nIn these circumstances. if we accept the contention of Mr. Kacker it would amount to introducing something into s. 17 which is not there and this is diametrically opposed to the well-known canons of interpretation.\n\nWe are, however, constrained to observe that there does not appear to be any logical justification for the provisions of sub-sections\n\n(3) and (4) of s. 20B.\n\nIt is understandable that when once the cultivator chooses to bring a bargadar on the land, the interest of the bargadar should be duly protected and has been made heritable.\n\nSo far, there can be no objection and such a course is in consonance with the object of the statute.\n\nBut when the Bargadar on his own volition surrenders G or abandons the land, there is no reason why the tenant should not be allowed to resume cultivation and instead be compelled to get the land cultivated by some other person nominated by the authority concerned under s. 49 of the 1955 Act.\n\nThis provision therefore appears to us to be extremely harsh and works serious injustice to the rights of the tenants particularly after the H ceiling area of the tenant has been considerably reduced by the Amendment Act of 1972.\n\nThus, the tenant having a small area guaranteed to him for his unit, he should have at least fuller and\n\nmore eft:cCve rights to get that area cultivated by him or even by a bargadar of his choice subject to resuming the same, if the bargadar surrenders or abandons the land.\n\nThe amendment doubtless recognisei; the right of the ownership of the tenant within the ceiling area\n\nand yet to deny him the r; ght of resuming cu!tivation of the land from the bargadar inducted by him after the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the same and forcing or imposing someone else to cultivate the land on behalf of the tenant appears to be contrary to the very tenor and spirit which sections 17 and 20B of the 1955 Act seem to subserve. Unfortunately, however, though the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) [and (5) of s. 20B, which is only\n\na. penal section] perilously border on arbitrariness and amounts to serious urbs on the fundamental right of the cultivator to pursue his occ •pation, we cannot however strike down these provlS!ons because they are contained in the Amendment Act of 1972 which has been placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 1973, and therefore fall within the protective umbrella and are immune from challenge.\n\nIt will, however, be for the leg; slature which is the best judge of the needs of its people to give a suitable relief to the tenant and soften the rigours of the harsh provisions of sub-sections (3), ( 4) and ( 5) of s. 20B on the lines indicated by us.\n\nWith these observations, the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners on this ground are overruled.\n\nWe now come to the second plank of the argument which comprises the challenge to the proviso and the Explanation to s. 2 of the 1955 Act.\n\nThis provision having been brought into force after the\n\n24th of April, 1973, falls beyond the ambit of Art. 31B and is not covered by the protective umbrella of that Article. In these circumstances, the challenge to the constitutionality of this provision could F be entertained by us. Mr. Kacker did not controvert this position.\n\nThe impugned proviso and the Explanation which were added to clause (8) of s. 2 by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977, may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"Provided that such person or member of his family G resides for the greater part of the year in the locality where the land is situated and the principal source of his income is produced from such land.\n\nExplanation-The term \"family\" shall have the same meaning as in clause (c) of section 14K.\"\n\nIt wa~ submitted that the proviso insists that the cultivator or member of his family must reide in the locality where the land i&\n\n958 SUPREl\\tlE COURT REPOR1S [ J 98 l) 2 S.C.R.\n\nsituate for the greater part of the year and thus deprives the petitioners of their right guaranteed to them under Art. 19( 1) ( e) and\n\n(g) o[ the Constitution inasmuch as :t compels the pct11ionc1 to reside in the vil'iagll and prevents the111 from either going to or residing in any other place in India. The second ground of challenge to the constitutionality of the proviso was that it places a serious curb on the right of the petitioners to carry on their occupation other than agriculture\n\nAs regards the first argument, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel because the object of the proviso is to safeguard the interest of the tenant himself so that he may give whole-hearted attention to the personal cultivation of the land which has been secured for him by virtue of a valuable piece of agrarian reform.\n\nIf the tenant is allowed to go out of the village and reside at other places then the benefit conferred by the 1955 Act cannot be fully utilised by the tenant and would frustrate the very purpose for which agrarian reforms are meant. Moreover, the land is given to the tenant as the tiller of the soil fundamentally for the reason that cultivation is his main source of sustenance as is mentioned in the proviso itselt.\n\nIf, therefore, the principal source of sustenance of the tenant is agriculture it would be futile for the tenant to say that be should be permitted to follow other avocations or occupations in the main which will defeat the very purpose for which the proviso has been enacted.\n\nThe proviso does not debar him from following any other occupation but once a tenant wants to have the land to himself for personal cultivation be must elect whether to pursue the profession of culiivation or some other occupation. Thus, even though there is some amount of restriction bo.tb on the right of the petitioners to reside or follow any other occupation, such a restriction cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. It is well settled that where a restriction is imposed by the legislature in public interest in order to advance a particular purpose or carry out the dominant ob.iect, such a restriction is undoubtedly a reasonable one within the meaning of clauses ( 4) and ( 5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nMoreover, in the instant cast, the restriction does not amount to complete deprivation of the right of the tenant to reside elsewhere because the words 'for the greater part of the year' leave sufficient scope to the tenant to reside elsewhere for a part of the year if be so desires.\n\nFurthermore, the Explanation adopts the definition of \"family\" which is the same as defined in s. 14K of the 1955 Act which runs thus :\n\n\"(i) himself and his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters, if any,\n\n\\; ALIMATA THAKURANI r. l!'>;!O~ (Fazal Ali, J.) 959\n\n(ii) his unmarried adult son, if any, who does not hold any land as a raiyat,\n\n(iii) his married adult son. if any, where neither such adult son nor the wife nor any minor son or unmarried daughter of such adult son holds any land as a raiyat,\n\n(iv) widow of his predeceased son, if any, where neither such widow, nor any minor son or unmarried daughter of such widow holds any land as a raiyat,\n\n(v) minor son or unmarried daughter, if any, of his predeceased son, where the widow of such predeceased son is dead any minor son or unmarried daughter of such prec deceased son does not hold any land as a raiyat,\n\nbut shall not include any other person.\"\n\nThus, it is not necessary that the tenant should himself reside in the village for the greater part of the year and it is sufficient if any member of the family which includes his wife, unmarried adult married adult, minor son and so on, remains in the village and this would amount to substantial compliance of the conditions of the proviso.\n\nThe restriction, therefore, is partial and in pnblic interest and bears 'a close nexus with the object of the 1955 Act, viz., to achieve agrarian\n\nreforms.\n\nThe fundamental rights enshrined in Art 19 of the Constitution are not absolute and unqualified but are subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed under sub-clauses (4) and (5) of Art 19.\n\nWhenever a complaint of violation of fundamental rights is made the Court has to determine whether or not the restrictions imposed contain the quality of reasonableness.\n\nIn assessing these factors a doctrinaire approach should not be made but the essential facts and realities of life have to be duly considered. Our Constitution aims at building up a socialist state and the establishment of an egalitarian society and if reasonable restrictions are placed on the fundamental rights in public interest, they can be fully justified in law.\n\nTue principles laying down the various tests of reasonablenes have been very aptly enunciated in the case of State of Madras v.\n\nV. G, Row( 1) which is almost the locus classicus on the subject in question, In that case Shastri, C.J,, speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is important in this test of reasonableness,\n\n(I) [1952) S.C.R. 597 ..\n\ncontext to bear in mind that the wherever prescribed, should be '\n\napplied to each individual statute ; mpugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.\"\n\nThe case has been consistently followed by later decisions of this.\n\nCourt right uptodate.\n\nC Another important factor to consider the reasonableness of restrictions is if the restrictions imposed are excessive or dispreportionate l to the needs oi a particular situation.\n\nFurther, if the restrictions are in implementation of the directive principles of the Constitution the same would be upheld as being in public interest because the individual interest must:o yield to the interest of the community at large for only D then a welfare state can fiourish.\n\nApplying these tests to the facts of the present case we are satisfied that the restrictions contained in the i1lJiPugned proviso cannot besaid to be unreasonable for the following reasons :\n\nThe dominant object of the proviso is to abolish 1he ageold institutions of absentee land-holders by insisting that the cultivator to whom land is allotted must give full and complete attention to the soil and as a result of which there will be a maximum utilisation of the agricultural resources which would increase production.\n\nUnder the Amendment Act of 1972 an adult unmarried person is entitled to hold an area up to 2.50 hectares which is equal to 6. 72 acres, a tenant with a family of two or more is entitled to hold 12.36 hectares and a tenant having a family of five or more is entitled to hold 7 hectares which is equal to 12.23 acres being the maximum area permissible. Thus, the area left to the tenant is quite vast and appreciable and if the tenant wants to bring this area under cultivation in right earnest it would hardly leave him time to quit the village and pursue other avocations of life.\n\nIt is obvious that the tenant has to remain in the village for the purpose of cultivating the lands, sowing the seeds, growing it and harvesting it.\n\nThese processes would doubtles11 require the presence of the tenant for a greater part of the year which i11 what the proviso predicates. If the\n\ntenant is permitted to leave the village for more than half the year then the very purpose of giving such a vast area for cultivation to a tenant will be foiled.\n\nMoreover, the proviso merely insists that the tenaut should remain in the village or its periphery for \"greater part of the year\" which appears to be not only reasonable but absolutely essential if the land has to be cultivated in a scientific manner in order to yield the maximum possible production, which would result in better and equitable distribution of agricultural products for the use of the people of the country.\n\nAnother aspect of the proviso is that the land is given to the tenant only if his main source of sustenance is from agriculture so\n\nC ' that the land may be reserved only for the tiller of the soil and none else.\n\nHence, the restrictkms imposed, therefore, by the proviso are undoubtedly in public interest and in consonance with the concept of promoting and accelerating agrarian reforms which is the prime need of the hour.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, the challenge that the proviso violates Art. 19(1) (e) and (g) must fail.\n\nThe last contention put forward by the petitioners was that the proviso is also violative of Art. 14 inasmuch as it is extremely arbitrary and discriminatory. We are unable to uphold the challenge on\n\nthe ground that the proviso violates Art. 14 because we do not find E any element of arbitrariness in the proviso. If the statute insists that the tiller of the soil must remain in the village for a greater part of the year in order to cultivate the land which has been given to him and thereby increase the produce of the land, no serious prejudice is caused to the tenant because that is the purpose for which he has himself secured the land. Secondly, as the proviso operates equally F to all the tenants governed by it no question of discrimination at all arises.\n\nThus, this argument also is wholly untenable and must fail.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we hold that both the Act of 1955, including the Amendment Act of 1972, and the proviso introduced G by the Amendment Act of 1977 are constitutionally valid.\n\nAs we have made certain observations regarding the harshness of the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of s. 20B of the 1955 Act, let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Hon'ble Chief Minister of West Bengal.\n\nThe petitions are dismissed without any order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\n14-214SCI/81 Petitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 111, "entities": [{"text": "SRI SRI KALIMATA THAJ(URANI & SRI SRI RAGHUNATH\n\nJEW & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRI SRI KALIMATA THAKURANI & SRI SRI RAGHUNATH JEW & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Refornzs Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 2(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196, "end_char": 203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Land Refornzs Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Refornzs Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "S. 20B(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229, "end_char": 238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Land Refornzs Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Refornzs Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 293, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 385, "end_char": 406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414, "end_char": 435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 607, "end_char": 641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 870, "end_char": 880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1120, "end_char": 1148, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1269, "end_char": 1280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1511, "end_char": 1539, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1601, "end_char": 1610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1910, "end_char": 1920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1997, "end_char": 2031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2352, "end_char": 2358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act", "statute": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2393, "end_char": 2403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act", "statute": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act", "statute": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3009, "end_char": 3022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act", "statute": "Vas constitutionally invalid and that the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the bargadar would share the produce, there was no warrant for not allowing the tenant to resume the land where a bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the land and to deny the right of cultivating the land personally by the tenant, and (2) the Provis<>\n\nKALIMATA THAKURANI v. UNION 951\n\nand the Explanation to section 2 of the 1955 Act deprive the petitioners of their A rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (e) and (g) of the Constitution in as much as it prevents them from either going to or residing in any other place in India and places a serious curb on their right to carry on an occupation other than agriculture."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3477, "end_char": 3487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act and the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3854, "end_char": 3868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Amendment Act", "statute": "Act and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "April 24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "60 and 81 prior to April 24, 1973, are immune fron1 challenge as being violative of Part III of the Constitution. ["}}, {"text": "AIR 1981 SC 271", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4049, "end_char": 4064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4134, "end_char": 4144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Amendment Act", "statute": "Act and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4498, "end_char": 4508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Amendment Act", "statute": "Act and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Amendment Act", "statute": "Act and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5717, "end_char": 5731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8093, "end_char": 8103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8126, "end_char": 8139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukumar Ghosh for the Petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker, Govinda Mukhoty and Rathin Das for the Respondent in WP No.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Kacker"}}, {"text": "Govinda Mukhoty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8194, "end_char": 8209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker, Govinda Mukhoty and Rathin Das for the Respondent in WP No."}}, {"text": "Rathin Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8214, "end_char": 8224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker, Govinda Mukhoty and Rathin Das for the Respondent in WP No.", "canonical_name": "Rathin Das"}}, {"text": "P. Keshva Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8264, "end_char": 8280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Keshva Pillai for the Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "Bimal Kumar Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8381, "end_char": 8398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A. K. Sen Gupta for the Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "L. Arvind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8405, "end_char": 8414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A. K. Sen Gupta for the Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8419, "end_char": 8434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A. K. Sen Gupta for the Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Majumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8550, "end_char": 8564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Majumdar, Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A. K.\n\nSen for the Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "A. K.\n\nSen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Majumdar, Bimal Kumar Datta, Mrs. L. Arvind and A. K.\n\nSen for the Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "Sripal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8702, "end_char": 8714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAL!MATA THAKURANI v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 953\n\nSripal Singh for the Petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "Rathin Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8775, "end_char": 8785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rathin Das !", "canonical_name": "Rathin Das"}}, {"text": "FAZAL\n\nALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8894, "end_char": 8904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL\n\nALI, J.\n\nThese petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution have been filed in order to challenge the vires of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the '1955 Act' j as also various amendments made to the said Act upto 1977.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL\n\nALI"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8932, "end_char": 8942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9322, "end_char": 9350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "So fur as the Ceiling Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9549, "end_char": 9574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10350, "end_char": 10364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act", "statute": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10469, "end_char": 10475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act", "statute": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act"}}, {"text": "Wanum Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10565, "end_char": 10574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this cQrulection, this position was made absolutely cl.ear in Wanum Rao's case (supra) where this Conrt observed as\n\nfollcw~ :\n\n\"Thus, in so far as the validity of Article 3 lB read with the Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that all Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 197 3 will receive the full protection of Article 3 lB. Those laws and regulatians will not be open to challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.\""}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10667, "end_char": 10676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act", "statute": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10694, "end_char": 10708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act", "statute": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10777, "end_char": 10791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act", "statute": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act"}}, {"text": "April 24, 197 3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10801, "end_char": 10816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this cQrulection, this position was made absolutely cl.ear in Wanum Rao's case (supra) where this Conrt observed as\n\nfollcw~ :\n\n\"Thus, in so far as the validity of Article 3 lB read with the Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that all Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 197 3 will receive the full protection of Article 3 lB. Those laws and regulatians will not be open to challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.\""}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10853, "end_char": 10862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act", "statute": "Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Act"}}, {"text": "AIR 1981 SC 271", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11086, "end_char": 11101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act as also the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11150, "end_char": 11179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11206, "end_char": 11220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act as also the Amendment Act", "statute": "Act as also the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11812, "end_char": 11840, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "3-2-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11890, "end_char": 11898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1345 of 1979, which has been adopted by the counsel for the petitioners appearing in other petitions, centres round the validity of-\n\n(1) The West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977 (published in the Gazette Extraordinary on 3-2-1978), and (2) Section 20B, sub-sections (3), ( 4) and ( 5), of the 1955 Act."}}, {"text": "Section 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11909, "end_char": 11920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act as also the Amendment Act", "statute": "Act as also the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12139, "end_char": 12146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act as also the Amendment Act", "statute": "Act as also the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12154, "end_char": 12175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12695, "end_char": 12707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13121, "end_char": 13131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13492, "end_char": 13497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13703, "end_char": 13708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14062, "end_char": 14067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14167, "end_char": 14172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14390, "end_char": 14396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15108, "end_char": 15118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15557, "end_char": 15567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16299, "end_char": 16311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Realising the force of the argument, Mr. S. N. Kacker, appear ing for the State of West Bengal, with his usual persuasiveness submitteJ that sub-sections (3) and (4) are extremely harsh but the rigoms of these sub-sections can be softened if we read down s. 17(d) amt interpret it in such a way as to permit a tenant to resume the land under clause ( d) of s. 17 if the Bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the land.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Kacker"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16332, "end_char": 16352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Realising the force of the argument, Mr. S. N. Kacker, appear ing for the State of West Bengal, with his usual persuasiveness submitteJ that sub-sections (3) and (4) are extremely harsh but the rigoms of these sub-sections can be softened if we read down s. 17(d) amt interpret it in such a way as to permit a tenant to resume the land under clause ( d) of s. 17 if the Bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the land."}}, {"text": "s. 17(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16513, "end_char": 16521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16615, "end_char": 16620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16966, "end_char": 16971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17326, "end_char": 17332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if we accept the contention of Mr. Kacker it would amount to introducing something into s. 17 which is not there and this is diametrically opposed to the well-known canons of interpretation."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17379, "end_char": 17384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17633, "end_char": 17639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18191, "end_char": 18196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 17 and 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19130, "end_char": 19149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19267, "end_char": 19273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19573, "end_char": 19587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19913, "end_char": 19919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20180, "end_char": 20184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th of April, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20260, "end_char": 20279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision having been brought into force after the\n\n24th of April, 1973, falls beyond the ambit of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20307, "end_char": 20315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20611, "end_char": 20615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20635, "end_char": 20663, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 14K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20980, "end_char": 20991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21291, "end_char": 21302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23403, "end_char": 23410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23814, "end_char": 23820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ALIMATA THAKURANI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23928, "end_char": 23945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, the Explanation adopts the definition of \"family\" which is the same as defined in s. 14K of the 1955 Act which runs thus :\n\n\"(i) himself and his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters, if any,\n\n\\; ALIMATA THAKURANI r. l!'>;!O~ (Fazal Ali, J.) 959\n\n(ii) his unmarried adult son, if any, who does not hold any land as a raiyat,\n\n(iii) his married adult son."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23959, "end_char": 23968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, the Explanation adopts the definition of \"family\" which is the same as defined in s. 14K of the 1955 Act which runs thus :\n\n\"(i) himself and his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters, if any,\n\n\\; ALIMATA THAKURANI r. l!'>;!O~ (Fazal Ali, J.) 959\n\n(ii) his unmarried adult son, if any, who does not hold any land as a raiyat,\n\n(iii) his married adult son.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL\n\nALI"}}, {"text": "Art 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25171, "end_char": 25177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25328, "end_char": 25334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26099, "end_char": 26106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue principles laying down the various tests of reasonablenes have been very aptly enunciated in the case of State of Madras v.\n\nV. G, Row( 1) which is almost the locus classicus on the subject in question, In that case Shastri, C.J,, speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is important in this test of reasonableness,\n\n(I) [1952) S.C.R. 597 ..\n\ncontext to bear in mind that the wherever prescribed, should be '\n\napplied to each individual statute ; mpugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29803, "end_char": 29813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29931, "end_char": 29938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30076, "end_char": 30083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 20B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30972, "end_char": 30978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31065, "end_char": 31076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have made certain observations regarding the harshness of the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of s. 20B of the 1955 Act, let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Hon'ble Chief Minister of West Bengal."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_962_988_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "HARCHARAN SINGH\n\nv. smv RANI AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 20, 1981\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J\n\nService by refusal-Notice den1anding arrears and seeking eviction is sen' by registered post but refused by the tenant-Whether the tenant could be imputed rhe knowledge of the contents thereof so that upon his failure to com~ ply with the notice the tenant could be said to have committed wilful default in payment of rent-U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction), (Central Act X), 1952, section 14(1) scope of-General Clauses Act 1897, section 27, Jndtan Evidence Act, section 114.\n\nThe appellant was inducted in the year 1964 as a tenant of the suit premises on an yearly rental payable by December 31, every year. Since the appellant did not pay the rent for the years 1965, 1966 a combined notice dated November 9, 1966 demanding payment of arrears and seeking ejectment on tern1ination of tenancy, was sent by registered post by the respondents. The appellant refused to receive the notice on November 10, 1966. On his failure to comply with the requisitions contained in the notice, the respondents filed a suit against the appe11ant seeking eviction as well a'i recovery of rents and mesne profits.\n\nHaving lost before the trial court and the first appellate court, the respon dents came up before the High Court in second appeal. The High Court accepted the findin of fact recorded by the first appellate court that there was i:tervice of the notice on the appellant by refusal and held that when notice was tendered to the tenant and when the latter refused to accept the same knowledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him. The High Court allowed the landlords' appeal and granted three months time to the appellant to vacate the shop. Hence, the tenant's appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD: (By majority) Pu Tulzapurkar, J. (On behalf of A. P. Sen, J. and himself).\n\n1 : t. The presumptiom that are raised under section 27 of the General Chtuseli .Act, 1897 and section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, make it clear that, when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication, the addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof. [971 E-Fl\n\n1 :2. Before the knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed1 it is not necessary tlmt the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the\n\naddres•ee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate pef'on the contents ihould be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed <0nvelopo. [971 D-EJ\n\n...\n\n---.\\\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH V, SHIVRANI 963\n\nVan1an Vithal Kulkarni and Ors. v.\n\nKhanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar.\n\nA A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 247, explained and dissented from.\n\nMahboob Bi v. Alva/a Lachmiah, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 324, held inapplicable.\n\nSltri J.Vath and another v. Smt. Sartuwati Devi Jaiswal, A.I.R. 1964 All. 52; Fanni Lal v. Smt. Chironja, (1972) Allahabad Law Journal 499; Ganga Ram\n\nv. Smt. Phulwati, (1970) Allahabad Law Journal 336 (FB); Kodali Bapayya B and Ors. v. Yadavalli Venkataratnam and Ors., A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 884, approved.\n\nHarihar Banerji and Ors. v. Ramshashi Roy and Ors., A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102, referred to.\n\n2: I. The suit under section 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act (Central Act X of 1952), in the instant case was maintainabae. Under section 14(1) of the Central Act, which in pari materia with 0 section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of the tenant on any ground other than those specified in clauses (a) to\n\n(f) and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in clauses\n\n(a) to (f). [973 E-F]\n\nB/wgwa11 Dass v. Paras Nath, [1969] 2 SCR 297, followed.\n\n2 : 2. All the courts rightly dealt with the matter as being governed by the U.P. Cantonments (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, X of 1952--a Central Act and not by U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 much less by the later U.P. (Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972. [966 E-FJ\n\nPer Desai, J. Contra.\n\n!. Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 is a socially beneficient statute and should be construed according to well recognised canons of construction. The words used in the statute, if they are plain and unambiguous must be applied as they stand, however, strongly it may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of the legislature.\n\nHowever, if two constructions are possible and legitimate ambiguity arises from the language employed that which enlarges the protection of a socially beneficient statute rather than one which restricts it should be preferred and adopted.\n\nIn other words the construction which would be more consistent with the policy and attainment of the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant unless the landlord establishes a ground for eviction should be preferred. Further where two constructions are possible the one which would accord with reason and justice must be preferred. [975 G-H,\n\n976 A, D, G]\n\nInland Revenue Comn1issio11ers v. Hinchy, 1960 A.C. 748, H. L. at 767=\n\n(1960) 1 All India Reports 505 at 512; River Wear Commissioners v. Adam- \"' son, (1877) 2 A.C. 743 & 765, quoted with approval.\n\nMohd. Shafi v. Additional District & Stssions Judge (VII), Allahabad antl Others, [1977] 2 S.C.C. 226; Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh & Ors.,\n\n\nA 2 : 1. The substitution of the expression, \"arrears of rent for not less than\n\nfour months'\" in sub-clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 20 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 is a contemporaneous legislative exposition bringing out clearly the legislative in tention that the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant if the rent is ill arrears for not less than four months.\n\nBefore the landlord can commence action under sub-clause (a): (i) the tenant must have committed default in payment of rent for a period of four months, and\n\n(ii) a notice has to be served, giving the tenant locus poenitentiae to repair the default within month.\n\n[978 B-CJ\n\n2 : 2. Two ingredients emerge from the expression \"the tenant is in arrears. of rent for not less than four months\" : (i) that the rent is payable by month and (ii) the tenant has committed default in payment of rent for four different months and that this default subsists and continues on the date when the land lord invokes the provision of clause (a) and proceeds to serve a notice of. demand.\n\nAgain, if within a period of one month from the date of receipt of notice, the tenant pays up thy arrears of rent he does not lose the protection of the Rnt Act. [978 G-H, 979 Al\n\n2 : 3. It is implicit in the expression \"the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months\" that the legislature clearly intended to cover those cases of default in payment of rent under clause (a) where the contract of lease pro-- vided for payment of rent every month meaning thereby that the unit for liabi lity to pay rent is one month and secondly the tenant has committed default on four different occasions of four different months or four different units agreed upon for payment of rent and that too after the liability to pay the same has acoepted. [979 A-CJ\n\n2 : 4. Section 20(2) (a) of the Rent Act, 1972 does not attract cases whert• the landlords ac:cept rent on an yearly basis. The language of the section doesnot admit of a construction, namely, that even if the rent is payable by year, once the year is over and a period of four months has elapsed he could be said to be \"a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months\". In tbe instant case, the parties are ad idem that the rent is payable by year at the rate of Rs. 100/· per annum. In such a <:ase it could not be said that this tenant was in arrears of rent for not less than four months.\n\nHis case would not be covered by section 20(2) of the Rent Act and, therefore, the landlord would not be entitled to a decree for eviction on this ground and that was the sole ground on which eviction has been ordered. [980 C-D, 981 AB]\n\n3. The amended section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal only if the High Court was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law. Sub-section G\n\n(4) cast a duty on the court to formulate such substantial questiOn of law and the appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated. It would also be open to the respondent at the hearing of he appeal to contend that the case does not involve such a question. Thus, the High C.Ourt ordinarily <:annot and did not interfere with the concurrent :findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. [981 G-H, 982 A]\n\nH In the facts of this case, there was a concurrent :finding that the statutory notice as required by section 20(2)(a) was not served upon the tenant and, therefore, the High Court was in error in interfering with this finding of fact.\n\n[982 B-C]\n\n.• .,\n\n' -\n\n• \\\n\n·~\n\n- r\n\nHAR CHARAN SINGH V. SHIVRANI 965\n\nR. Ramachandrmi Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 605; Mst.\n\nA Durga Chaudhrain v. lawahar Choudhary, 1890 LR 17 IA, 122; Goppulal v.\n\n\n4 : 1. Mere refusal of a registered letter would not permit a presumption to be raised that not only the service was legal, but the refusal was the conscious act flowing from the knowledge of the contents of the Jetter. [987 CJ B\n\n4 : 2. This concept that the registered envelope properly addressed and returned with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable presumption that the addressee refused it with the knowledge of the contents is wholly borrowed from the western jurisprudence. Not considering the specific Indian conditions and the approach of rural Indian to registered letters, but merely going in with the technical rules of Evidence Act would cause more harm and lead to injustice through Jaw. [985 G-H, 986 A]\n\n4 : 3. The Rent Act does not seek to evict a mere defaulter. That is why a provision for notice has been made. H even after notice the default continues, the tenant can be condemned as wilful defaulter. He could not be dubc\n\nbed guilty of conscious, wilful, contumacious, intentional conduct even when he D did not know what was in the registered envelope. It would be atrocious to impute any such knowledge to a person who has merely been guilty of. refusing to accept the registered notice.\n\nWhere service of notice is a condition precedent, a dubious service held established by examining the postman who must be delivering hundreds of postal envelopes and who is ready to go to the witness box after a long interval to say that he offered the envelope to the addressee and he refused to accept the same, would be travesty of justice. And if this E condition precedent is not fully satisfied, the subsequent conduct cannot be said to be wilful. [987 E-G]\n\nFanni/al v. Smt. Chironja, (1972) All. Law J. 499 (D.B.) dissented to.\n\nAppabhai Motibhai v, Laxmichand Zaverchand & Co., A.I.R. 1954 Bom.\n\nF' 159, held inapplicable.\n\nMahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 314; Amarjit Singh Ber/I\n\nv. Lachman Das; Waman Vithal Kulkarni &: Others v. Khant!era Ram Rao Sholilpurkar, A.I.R. 1935 Born. 247, quoted with approval.\n\n5. The argument that it would be impossible to serve the notice as statu- G\n\ntorily prescribed, once it is held that no knowledge of the contents of the refused letter could be imputed to the tenant, is incorrect. The notice is required to be served in the manner prescribed by section 106 of Transfer of\n\nProperty Act which, inter alia, provides for affixing a copy of the notice on the premises in possession of the tenant. Therefore, it cannot be said that the approach of the Court would render it impossible for the landlord to meet with H the statutory requirement of service of notice before commencing the action fot oeviction. [988 B-C]\n\nA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1402 of\n\n1979. .. .. -: .... : l\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16-2-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 430/ 70.\n\nP. C. Bhartari for the Appellant.\n\nL. M. Singhvi and Pramod Swarup for the Respondent.\n\nThe Jndgment of V. D. Tulzapurkar, J. and A. P. Sen, J. was delivered by Tulzapurkar, J. D. A. Desai, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. This is a tenant's appeal by special leave directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 16, 1979 in Second Appeal No. 430 of 1970 whereby the High Court decreed the respondents' (landlords) suit for ejectment against the appellant (tnant) and the only question of substance raised in the appeal is whether when the landlords' notice demanding arrears and seeking eviction is sent by registered post and is refused by the tenant the latter could be imputed the knowledge of the contents thereof so that upon his failure to comply with the notice the tenant could be ilaid to have committed wilful default in payment of rent ?\n\nThe question arises in these circumstances : The appellant occupied shop No. 5 in Ivanhoe Estate, situated at Landure Cantonment, Mussorie, originally owned by one Parvij Waris Rasool, on an yearly rental of Rs. 250 payable by December 31, every year.\n\nThe property at all material times was admittedly governed by the U.P. Cantoment,. (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, X of 1952-a Central Act and, in my view, all the Courts below rightly dealt with the matter as being governed by that Act and not by U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, much less by the later U.P. (Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.\n\nThe respondents purchased the aforesaid EState form its previous owner on November 27, 1964 and the previous owneI\n\nattomed the tenancy of the appellant to the respondents along with the rental due from him for the year 1964. The appellant continued to be the tenant of the shop during the years 1965 and 1966 as well but since he did not pay the rent the respondents on November 9, 1966 gave a combined notice demanding paym_ent of arrears and seeking ejectment on termination of tenancy which was refused by him on November, 10, 1966.\n\nOn his failure to comply with the requisitions contained in the notice the respondents filed a suit against the appellant seeking eviction as well as recovery of rents and mesne profits. i.\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar, J.) 967\n\nThe suit was resisted by the appellant, inter alia, on the ground that the rent of the accommodation payable to the previous owner was Rs. 250 per annum less 10% rebate on account of repairs; that in 1964 at the intervention of some common friends he agreed to vacate and did surrender the residential portion of the shop comprising two rooms, one kitchen, one bath room and one varandah at the back of the shop in consideration of respondents relinquishing the rental of Rs. 250 due from him for the year 1964; that for the years 1965 and 1966 the rental for the remaining shop was reduced by agreement to Rs. 50 per annum less rebate for repairs and that he had sent a cheque for the amount due to the respondents. He denied that he has committed default in payment of rents and averred that no notice of demand and ejectment was served on him and consequently prayed for dismissal of the suit.\n\nOn an appreciation of the evidence led by the parties before it the Trial Court came to the conclusion that initially the rent fixed was Rs. 250 per year but after the respondents' purchase of the property the appellant vacated the residential portion of the shop under an agreement arrived at between the parties whereunder there was relinquishment of rent due for 1964 and that the rent for the main shop was fixed at Rs. 100 per annum and that no rebate of any kind had been agreed to at any time on account of repairs.\n\nRegarding the arrears of rent outstanding against the appellant the Trial Court held that rent for the years 1965 and 1966 had not been paid and was due from him but it held that the notice dated November 9, 1966 was not served on the appellant and hence he could not be held to have committed wilful default in payment of arrears of rent.\n\nIn this view of the matter the Trial Court dismissed the suit insofar as the relief of eviction was . / concerned but decreed 1t for arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 100 per\n\nannum.\n\nAggrieved by that judgment and decree the respondents filed an appeal to the District Court, Dehradun. The learned District Judge concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the rental for the year 1964 h.ad been relinquished and that the rental of the front portion of the shop had been fixed at Rs. 100 per annum. He further held that the notice was tendered to the appellant on November 10. 1966 but he declined to accept it and hence there was service by refusal, but in his opinion despite such service it could not be presumed that the appellant had knowledge about the contents of that notice and consequently he could not be said to have committed any wilful default in the payment of rent. In the result the appeal was dismissed.\n\nThe reS1POndents preferred Second Appeal No. 430 of 1970 to the High Court. In that appeal the tenant sought to reagitate the question\n\n. r\n\nwhether or not the notice was tendered to him and was refused by him on the ground that the finding had been recorded by the District Court without application of mind to the statement on oath made by him to the effect that no postman had ever gone to him with a registered letter either on 9th or 10th November, 1966 and he had not declined to receive any registered letter but the High Court refused to entertain the contention inasmuch as it found that the learned District Judge had referred to this part of the appellant's evidence as also the postman's evidence on the point and that on an appreciation of such rival evidence on record he had recorded a finding that the notice was tendered to the appellant but it was refused by him; in other words in the absence of animus being attributed to the postman the District Judge had preferred the postman's evidence to that of the appellant's.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, accepted the finding of fact recorded by the District Court that there was service of the notice on the appellant by refusal. On the further question as to whether when such refusal had been established, the appellant could be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice, the High Court, following its two previous decisions in Shri Nath and another v. Smt. Saraswati Devi Jaswal(I) and Fanni Lal\n\nv. Smt. Chironja(\"), held that when notice was tendered to the tenant and when the latter refused to accept the same, knowledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him. The District Judge's view in this behalf was thus reversed and since there was failure on the part of the appellant to pay the rent within one month of the service of notice upon him, the High Court held that he had committed wilful default within the meaning of s. 14(a) of the Act.\n\nAccordingly the High Court allowed the appeal and the respondents' prayer for ejectment was granted but the appellant was given three months' time to vacate the accommodation.\n\nThe tenant has come up in appeal to this Court .\n\nCounsel for the appellant venement!y contended before us that the High Court was in errorin taking the view that when service by refusai had been effected the tenant must be deemed to have knowledge about the contents of the notice, for, no such presumption could be drawn especially wheu it was clear ou evidence that neither the registered envelope was opened either by the tenant or by the postman nor the cone\n\ntents thereof read before the same was returned to the postman.\n\nHe further urged that the envelope bore the seal of Shri S. P. Singh, Advocate and the appellant could not, therefore, know that the notice was from his landlords; he also pointed out that the appellant was illiterate and did not know English and since the address on the envelope as\n\n(I) A.LR. 1964 All. 52.\n\n(2) 1972 A.L.J. 499.\n\nI '\n\nt •\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar, l.) 969\n\nwell as the seal of the lawyer were in English the appellant could not even know who the sender of the notice was.\n\nCounsel, therefore, urged that in the peculiar circumstances of the case the learned District Judge had rightly recorded a finding that the knowledge of the contents ct the notice could not be imputed to the appellaut and, therefore, the appellant could not be regarded as a wilful defaulter in the matter of payment of rent. In support of this contention strong reliance was placed by him on the decision of the Bombay High Court fo. the case of Vaman\n\nVithal Kulkarni and Ors. v. Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar(') where the following observations of Beaumont, C. J., appear at page 251 :\n\n\"In case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered letter containing the notice was sent to them duly addressed, and service is alleged to have been refused. In fact the refusal was not proved, as the postman who took the letter and brought it back was not called.\n\nBut in any case, even if the refusal had been proved, I should not be prepared to hold that a registered letter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought back unopened, was well served.\n\nThere are, I know, some authorities in this Court to the contrary, but it seems to me\n\nimpossible to say that a letter has been served so as to bring the contents to the notice of the person to whom the letter is addressed, if the agent for service states that in fact the notice was not served, although the reason may have been that the addressee declined to accept it. One cannot assume that because an addressee declines to accept a particular sealed envelope he has guessed correctly as to its contents.\"\n\nCounsel also referred to some other decisions including that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah(') but. these other decisions do not touch the aforesaid aspect of visiting the addressee with the knowledge of the contents of the refused notice but have expressed the view that refusal of registered notice without more may not amount to proper service and hence it is unnecessary to consider them.\n\nBut placing strong reliance upon the observations of Chief Justice Beaumont quoted above counsel for tile appellant urged that the High Court ought to have confirmed the finding of the learned District Judge that the appellant could not be presumed to have known the contents of the notice or that the notice was one demanding arrears\n\n<Jf rent simply because he refused to accept the same.\n\nOn the other hand, counsel for the respondents contended before us that both under s. 2 7 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and s. 114 of\n\n(I) A.J.R. 1935 Born. 247.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 324.\n\nthe Indian Evidence Act presumption of due service could arise if the notice was sent to the tenant by properly addressing the same, prepaying and sending the same by registered post and it was pointed out that in the instan~ case as against the denial by the appellant there was positive oath of postman (Kund Ram P.W. 2) who was examined by the respondents to prove the fact that the registered letter containing e notice was tendered to the appellant and when he declined to accept it\n\nthe postman bad made endorsement in his hand on the envelope \"Refused.\n\nReturned to the sender\". Counsel, therefore, urged that in view of such positive evidence of postman led by the respondents which had been accepted by the learned District Judge, the High Court was justified in holding that the appellant must be imputed wit)1 the knowledge of the contents of the notice. In this behalf counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the Privy' Council decision in Harihar Banerji and Ors. v. RamshciShi Roy and Ors.(') and Madras decision in Kodali Bapayya and Ors. v. Yadaval/i Venkataratnam and Ors.(') and the two decisions of the Allahabad High Court relied upon by the\n\nIUgh Court.\n\nCounsel pointed out that the Madras High Court in Koda/i Bapayya's case (supra) and the Allahabad High Court in its Full Bench decision in Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati(8 ) have dealt with the Bombay decision and have expressed their disagreement with the view expressed therein.\n\nSection 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic- 'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served l)y post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.\n\nThe section thus arises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the\n\neontents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more.\n\nSimilar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 884.\n\n(3) 1970 A.L.J. 336.\n\n--' .\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar, l.) 971\n\nmay presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a Jetter is sent by post by pre-paying and iProperly addressing it the same has been received by the addreseee.\n\nUndoubtedly, the presumptions both under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise.\n\nIn the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept.\n\nIn other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal.\n\nIn such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope.\n\nIt would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed. with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised unde.r s. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nTurning to the. Bombay decision in Vaman Vithal's case (supra), G~ we would like to point out two aspects that emerge clearly from the very observations which have been strongly relied upon by counsel for the appellant.\n\nIn the first place, the observations clearly show that the refusal to accept the notice was not satisfactorily proved in !he case inasmuch as the postman who took the letter and brought Hi 1t back had not been examined; consequently the further observations made by the leaned Chief Justice were unnecessary for decision on the point and as such will have to be regarded as obiter.\n\nA Secondly, while making those observations the learned Chief Justice\n\nwas himself conscious of the fact that there were some authorities of that Court taking the contrary view.\n\nHaving regard to these aspects it is difficult to hold that the concerned observations lay down the correct legal position in the matter.\n\nIn any event we approve of the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in its three decisions, B namely, Sri Nath's case, Fanni Lal's case and Ganga Ram's case\n\n(supra) and would confirm the High Court's finding on the point in favour of the respondents.\n\nCounsel for the appellant then faintly argued that the respondents suit was not maintainable under s. 14 (1 ) of the Act inasmuch as no permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained by the respondents before filing the suit as required by s. 14 and in this behalf reliance was placed on s. 14(a) of the Act which ran thus :\n\n'14. Restrictions on eviction.-No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds, namely :\n\n(a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of de mand from the landlord.\"\n\nAccording to counsel for the appellant the aforesaid provision cleady shows that under the Act two safeguards were available to a tenant-\n\n(i) eviction could not be had by any landlord except on one or more of the grounds specified in els. (a) to (f) of s. 14 and (ii) no suit for eviction even on those gronnds specified in els. (a) to (f) could be instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate, and admittedly the landlords in the instant case had filed the suit against the appellant without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate.\n\nHe, therefore, urged that the Civil Court ha.d no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the decree was without jurisdiction.\n\nIt must be observed that no such contention was raised by the appellant in any of the Courts below presumably because the appellant as well as this lawyer knew how an identical provision contain~ ed in s. 3 (I) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,-an allied enactment, had been judicially interpreted by this Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Paras Nath(').\n\nSection 3 of the U.P.\n\nAct 3 of 1947 ran thus :\n\n(1) [19691 2 S.C.R. 297.\n\nl , ...\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai,/.) 973\n\n\"3. Restrictions 011 evictions.-Subji; ct to any order passed under sub-section ( 3), no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following groun\\is :\n\n(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand.\"\n\nThis Court in Bhagwa11 Dass case Asupra) has explained at page 305 Of the report the legal position arising on a grammatical construction of s. 3(1) thus :\n\n\"Section ( 3) 1 does not restrict the landlord's right to evict his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in els. (a) to (g) of that sub-section. But if he wants to sue his tenant for eviction on any ground other than those mentioned in\n\nthose clauses then he has to obtain the permission of the D District Magistrate whose discretion is subject to any order passed under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 by the Commissioner. These are the only restrictions placed on the power of a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of his tenant.\"\n\nIt would be conducive to judicial discipline to interpret an identical B provision contained in s. 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1952 in a similar manner.\n\nIn other words, under s. 14(1) of the concerned Central Act permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of his\n\ntenant on any ground other than those specified in els. (a) to ( f) and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in els. (a) F \\ to (f). (If may be stated that both the enactments have since been\n\n<i. repealed). It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the instant suit filed by the respondents against the appellant could not be entertained by the Civil Court.\n\n• ...\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs and we grant the appellant six months time to vacate.\n\nDESAI, J.-I have very carefully gone through the judgmen~ 8i prepared by my learned brother Mr. Justice V. D. Tulzapurkar, but I regret my inability to agree with the same.\n\nThe relevant facts leading to the appeal by special leave have been succinctly set out in the main judgment and therefore, I would straightway proceed to deal with the three important questions raised in this appeal.\n\nThe first and the principal question which goes to the root of the matter is about the construction of section 20(2) (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1971 ('Rent Act' for short). It reads as under:\n\n\"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds;-\n\n(2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds namely:\n\n(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a demand : \"\n\nThere is a proviso to this sub-section which is not material for the purpose of this appeal.\n\nA brief resume of concurrently found facts which would highlight the question of construction would be advantageous.\n\nAppellant was inducted as a tenant of the premises by its former owner on a rent of Rs. 250 /- per annum in the year 1964, on a request by the then landlord, appellant-tenant surrendered a portion of the premises, comprising two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a verandah at the back of the shop; retaining only possession of the shop, consequently reducing the rent by agreement between the parties at the rate of Rs. 100/- per annm11. It is thus an agreed and incontrovertible fact that the appellant-tenant is a tenant of a shop on an yearly rent of Rs. 100/-, payable at the end of every year.\n\nThe focus should immediately be turned to the provision of Jaw under which the landlord seeks to evict this tenant.\n\nAccording to respondent-landlord she served notice dated Novber 9, 1966, terminating the tenancy of the appellant as the appellant-tenant was a defaulter within the meaning of s. 20(2) (a) and, therefore, she 8 was entitled to a decree for eviction as she has satisfactorily proved all the requirements or ingredients of s. 20(2)(a).\n\nAccepting the finding of fact that the appellant is a tenant liable to pay rent\n\n• < r\n\nI ._ .\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SH!VRANI (Desai, J.) 975\n\n(ii! Rs. 100/- per annum, the crux of the matter is whether his case is covered by s. 20(2) (a).\n\nWhat does s. 20(2) (a) postulate and what are its components which when satisfied, the landlord would be entitled to evict the\n\ntenant?\n\nOn analysis following ingredients of s. 20(2)(a) would\n\nemerge each of which will have to be satisfied before the landlord B • would be eligible to obtain a decree for eviction, viz :\n\n(i) Tenant must be a tenant of premises governed by the Rent Act;\n\n(ii) That the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months;\n\n(iii) That such a teua\\1t has to pay rent in arrears within a period of one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand.\n\n, In this case, the tenant is a tenant of premises governed by the\n\nRent Act.\n\nThe crucial question is whether the second ingredient, as extracted above, is satisfied by the landlord.\n\nThe attention has to be focused on the expression 'in arrears of rent for not less than four months'.\n\nWhat does this expression signify?\n\nAs contended on behalf of the respondent that whatever be the default in payment of E rent, the notice can be served after the default has continued for a period of four months, and failure to comply with the requisition in the notice would disentitle the tenant to the protection of Rent Act.\n\nAltednatively it was contended that the expression in arrears of rent for not less than four months' on a literal grammatical construction would signify that rent is payable by the month and that the tenant F has committed a default in payment of four monthi' rent and further failed to comply with the requisition made in the notice within the stipulated period of one month and only then the protective umbrella of the Rent Act would be removed and the tenant would be exposed to a decree for eviction.\n\n• J\n\nThe two rival constructions raised a question of construction of a sub-section in a statute primarily enacted as can be culled out from the long and shon title of the Rent Act, being regulation of letting and rent and arbitrary eviction of tenant from the premises to which the rent Act would apply. It is a socially benefi.cient statute and\n\nin construing such statute cenain well recognised canons of construen tion have to be borne in mind.\n\nUndoubtedly, the dominant purpose in construing the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature.\n\nThis intention, and, therefore, the meaning of the statute, is primarily to be sought in the words nsed in the statute itself, which must, if they are plain and unambiguous, be applied as they stand, however strongly it may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of legislature (see Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Hinchy) Cl. In approaching the matter from this angle, it is a duty of the Court to give fair and full effect to statute which is plain and unambiguous without regard to the particular consequence in a special case.\n\nEven while giving liberal construction to socially beneficient legislation, if the language is plain .and simple the making of a law being a matter for the legislature and not cowts, the Court must adopt the plain grammatical construction (see River\n\nWear Commissioners v. Adamson).(') The Court must take the law as it is.\n\nAnd, accordingly, it is not entitled to pass judgment on the propriety or wisdom of making a law in the particular form and further the Court is not entitled to adopt the construction of a statute on its view of what Parliament ought to have done.\n\nHowever, when two constructions are possible and legitimate ambiguity arises from the language employed, it is a plain duty of the Court to prefer and adopt that which enlarges the protection of a socially beneficient statute rather than one which restricts it. In Mohd. Shafi v. Additional District & Sessions Judge (VII), Allahabad and Others,( 3) this Court while interpreting the explanation (iv) to s. 21 of the Rent Act observed that where the language is susceptible of two interpretations, the Court would prefer that which enlarges the protection of the tenants rather than one which restricts it. It was further observed that the construction that the Court adopted would be more consistent with the policy and attainment of the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant unless the landlord establishes a ground for eviction.\n\nSimilarly in Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh & Ors.,(4) while interpreting the provision of s. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, this Court observed that the Court was called upon to interpret a land refQmls law are not just an ordinary state and, therefore, the socio-economic thrust of the law in these areas should not be retarded by judicial construction but filliped by the legal process without parting from the object of the Act.\n\nIt must also be emphasised that where two constructions are possible, the one that must be preferred is one which would accord with reason and justice (see H. H. Mahara; a-\n\n(1) 1960 A.C. 748, H.L. at 767; (1960) I All E.R. 505 at 512\n\n(2) [1877] 2 A. C. 743 & 765\n\n(3) [1977] 2 s.c.c. 226\n\n(4) [1976] 2 s.c.c. 152.\n\n• ..\n\nI\\ (\n\n• ·,\n\n' t\n\nI ! ..\n\n~ t ...\n\ni e ..\n\n• •\n\n.,,-·\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. Sll!VRANI (Desai, .I.) 977\n\ndhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior & Ors.\n\nv. Union of India & Another.(') Bearing in mind this interpretative approach let us hark back to the expression used in s. 20(2) (a) and ascertain whether the exception is susceptible of one construction only or more than one construction and whether there is ambiguity and if so, in which direction the interpretative jurisprudence must move .\n\nThe expression \"the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months\" may suggest that the tenant is in arrears of rent for one or any number of months and that the tirrears have fallen due four months back meaning thereby that within four months there was no attempt on the pan of the tenant to pay up the arrears and cure the default.\n\nThis construction would imply that if the tenant fa in arrears of rent for one month only, an action under the relevant clause can be commenced against him if this infault has continued for a period of four months even if the tenant has paid rent for subsequent months and on the expiry of the period of four months from the date on which the rent had become due and payable for one month a notice of demand can be served and on the failure of the tenant to comply with the requisition made in the notice he would be liable to be evicted. In other words, a period of four months must elapse between the date of default and the service of\n\nnotice irrespective of the fact whether the default is in payment of one month's rent or more than one month's rent.\n\nIn this construction it is implicit that failure to pay rent for four different months is not a sine qua non for commencing action under s. 20(2) (a).\n\nWhat is of the essence of matter is that a period of four months must elapse between the date of default complained of and service of notice under s. 20(2) (a). It was said that the legislature has given locus poenitentiae to the tenant to repair the default within the period of four months.\n\nThis approach overlooks the obvious that before action can be commenced under s. 20(2 )(a) a notice has to be served and tenant is given locus poenitentiae to repair the default withiu one month. It appears that by s. 43 Qf the Rent Act the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 ('Repealed Act' for short) was repealed.\n\nSection 3 of the Repealed Act enumerated grounds on which a tenant could be evicted.\n\nSub-clause (a) of s. 3 provided that the landlord would\n\n~ be entitled to eviction of a tenant if the tenant was 'in arrears of rent for more than three months' and had failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of the notice of demand. The language employed in the repealed provition led ---·--- (!) [1971 J 1 s.c.c. 85\n\nthe Court to hold that whatever be the default in payment of rent, a period of three months should have expired from the date of default whereafter alone the landlord would be entitled to serve a notice as provided in the relevant sub-clause.\n\nIt was so held by the Allahabad High Court in Ram Swan Das v.\n\nL. B.ir Sain,(') but this decision was overruled in Jitendra Prasad v. Mathur Prasad.(•) In order to avoid any such controversy, in the Repealing statute the expression 'arrears of rent for more tlmn three months' has been substituted by the expression 'arrears of rent for not less than four months'.\n\nThis is contemporaneous legislative exposition which clearly brings out the legislative intention that the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant if the rent is in arrears for not less than four months.\n\nTherefore, it would clearly imply that before the landlord can commence action under sub-clause (a), the tenant must have committed default in payment of rent for a period of four months. Therefore, the first suggested construction is not borne out by the language employed in the section.\n\nThe question still remains : what does the expression 'in arrears of rent for not less than four months' signify ? It is implicit in tho expression that the rent must be payable by month.\n\nIrrespective of the fact whether the tenancy is a yearly tenancy or a monthly tenancy, it is implicit in sub-clause (a) that either by the contract of lease or by oral agreement or by long usage the tenant is liable to pay rent at the end of every month. In other words, the unit for computation of rent is one month, that is, rent btcomes due and payable every month.\n\nIt is only such a tenant who may fa]J in arrears for a period of four months.\n\nEvery month the tenant would be liable to pay the rent in the absence of a contract to the contrary.\n\nThus the rent becomes due and payable at the end of every month.\n\nAs soon as the month is over the rent becomes duci and payable and failure on the part of the tenant to pay the same would dub him as a tenant in arrear of rent for one month. If thiaprocess goes on meaning thereby that a period of four months having expired and for each o[ the four months the rent when 1t became due and payable was not paid, then alone the tenant could be said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months, Two definite ingredients emerge from the expression 'the tenant is in arrears of rent for not Jess than four months' ' (i) that the rent is payable by month; and (ii) the tenant has committed default iJJ payment of ren1 for four different months and that this default subsists and continues on the date when the landlord invokes tbCi\n\n(1) 1958 A11ahaharl Weekly Reports 62. 121 1960 A1lahabad Law Journal 21L\n\n• .. ..\n\n~· I •\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai, J.) 979\n\nprovision of clause (a) and proceeds to serve a notice of demand.\n\nAgain, if within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice the tenant pays up the arrears of rent he does not I06e the protection of the Rent Act. . The legislature clearly intend•\n\ned to cover those cases of Qefault in payment of rent under clause\n\n(a) where the contract of lease provided for payment of rent every month meaning thereby that the unit for liability to pay rent is one month and secondly the tenant has committed default on four different occasions of four different months or four different units agreed upon for payment of rent and that they differ the facility to pay the same has accrued. As stated earlier this is implied in the expression 'the tenant is, in arrears of rent for not less than four months.\n\nIn this connection one can profitably refer to s. 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which reads as under :\n\n\"Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, i! such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payme:it thereof until the expiration m the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), the (2) (Court shall pass a decree) for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession.\"\n\nThe expression used there is that the rent is payable by month and the tenant is in arrears for a period of six months.\n\nIn the Rent Act under discussion, a conjoint expression is used that a tenant is in arrears of rent for a period of not Jess than four months.\n\nIt only means that where the rent is payable by month and the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and that i' the clearest intention discernible from the language used in the\n\nrelevant clause.\n\nIt was, however, contended that this construction would give an undeserved advantage to the defaulting tenant where the rent is not payable by month.\n\nThe contention is that a landlord who had agreed to accept rent on an yearly basis would be at the mercy of the tenant because even if the default is contumacious the landlord would not be entitled to evict the tenant and that such could not be the intention of the legislature.\n\nIt was, therefore, said that the expression 'the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four\n\nmonths' is also susciptible of the meaning that where the rent i5 payable by year and after the year is over and the rent has become due and payable if the tenant has not paid the rent for four months his case would be covered by \"Clause (a). If a tenant is llllder a contract with the landlord to pay rent at the end of a specific year agreed to between the parties, could he be said to be a tenant m\n\narrears for not less than four months even if he has defaulted in payment of rent at the end of one year 7 How can a tenant who is to pay rent on the expiry of a specified year be in arrears of rent for not less than four months ? And if that construction is adopted,. a tenant who has committed default in payment of rent for qne month and the default has continued without repair for a period of tour months even though he has paid rent for subsequent montM he would be liable to be evicted, a construction which ought to be rejected on legislative exposition by change in expression adopted in the repealed Act and substituted in the present Act discussed herein above. If that construction is re1ected it would be difficult to accept the construction that even of the rent is payable by year once the year is over and a period of four months .has elapsed he,\n\ncould be said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months.\n\nThe language does not admit of this construction.\n\nTherefore, where the rent is payable by the year clause (a) is not E attracted.\n\nNow the wild apprehension expressed on behalf of the landlord that such a construction would give an unfair advantage to a tenant who is liable to pay yearly rent need not detain us because the wisdom of enacting a law in a certain manner is for the legislature to decide and not for the court to impose.\n\nIt may be that the legislature would have intended that such landlords who relied on the F income from rent month after month must have a sanction which can be applied if the tenant commits default in payment of rent of four different months but a landlord who apparently does not depend upon the rental income hy agreeing to accept yearly rent need not have that sanction and it would be still open to such a landlord to file a suit merely for recovery of rent and not for eviction.\n\nSuch a thing G is not unknown to law because in permanent tenancy and in tenancies of long duration the landlords can only sue for rent and not for eviction on the tenant committing default in payment of rent. Therefore, on examining both the rival constructions one which extends the protection deserves to be accepted in view of the fact that the legislature never intended to provide a ground for eviction for failure H to pay rent in case of leases where yearly rent was reserved.\n\nRent Act was enacted to fetter the right of re-entry of landlord and tim construction accords with the avowed obje<; t of the Rent Act.\n\n• •\n\n• )\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai, !.) 981\n\nIn the instant case the parties are ad idem that the rent is payable by year at the rate of Rs. 100 /- per annum.\n\nIn such a case it could not be said that this tenant was in arrears of rent for not less than .four months.\n\nHis case would not be covered by s. 20(2) (a) of the Rent Act and, therefore, the landlord wovld not be entitled to a decree for eviction on this ground and that was the sole ground on whicl1 eviction has been ordered .\n\nThe second contention is that the High Court was in error in interfering with the concurrent finding of facts while hearing second appeal in February, 1979 and that too without framing the point of\n\nlaw which arose in the appeal.\n\nThe disputed fiuding of fact is about the service of notice. If a landlord seeks eviction on the ground of tenant's default in payment of rent under s. 20(2) (a) it is obligatory upon him to serve a notice of demand of the rent in arrears on the tenant and can only seek eviction if the tenant fails to comply with the requisition made in the notice.\n\nThe appellant tenant in terms <:ontended that no notice was served upon hint.\n\nOn the assertion of the respondent landlord that notice dated November 9, 1966, was 1ie£Ved upon the appellant tenant on November 10, 1966, but he refused to accept the same and the refutation thereof by the tenant that no notice was offered to him by the postman nor was any notice rnfused by him, a triable issue arose between the parties. The learned trial judge framed Issue No. 7 on the question of service of notice.\n\nHe recorded a finding that the appellant tenant was not served a notice of demand and of ejectment and answered the issue in favour of the appellant tenant. On appeal by the respondent landlord the appellate court framed point no. 2 on the question of ser'(ice of notice and answered it by observing that the defendant tenant refused to accept the registered notice but no knowledge can be attributed to him of the contents of the registered envelope and, therefore, the tenant could not be said to be guilty of wilful default on the expiry of one month after the service of notice.\n\nHe accordingly confirmed the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff landlord is not liable to a decree of eviction on the ground mentioned in s. 20(2) (a). The landlord approached the High Conrt in second appeal.\n\nWhen this appeal was heard, section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code after its amendment of 1976 was in force.\n\nIt restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal only if the High Court was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law.\n\nSub-section 4 cast a duty on the court to formulate such a substantial question of law and the appeal has to be heard on 'the question so formulated.\n\nIt would also be open to the respondent\n\nat the hearing of the appeal to contend that the case does not involve such a question.\n\nEven prior to the amendment of Section 100, the High Court ordinarily did not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact.\n\nThis position has been repeatedly asserted and one need not go in search of precedent to support the proposition.\n\nHowever one can profitably refer to R. Ramachandran Ayyar v.\n\nRamalingam Chettiar. (') After examining the earlier decisions and the decision of the Privy Council in Mst. Durga Chaudhrain v. lawahar Choudhary(') Gajendragadkar J. speaking for this Court in terms. spelt out the jurisdiction of the High Conrt in second appeal as under :\n\n\"Bnt the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by lower appellate Court however erroneous the same conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council observed, how- . ever gross or inexecusable the error may seem to be, there is no jurisdiction under s. 100 to correct th'lt error\".\n\nThis view was re-affirmed in Goppulal v. Dwarkadhishji(') wherein after reproducing the concurrent finding of fact this Court observed that this co'ncurrent finding of fact was binding on the High Court in second appeal and the High Court was in error in holding that there was one integrated tenancy of six shops.\n\nIn the facts of this case, there was a concurrent finding that the statutory notice as required by s. 20(2) (a) was not served upon the tenant and, therefore, the High Court was in error in interfering with this finding of fact.\n\nHowever, it is not necessary to base the judgment on this conclusion because it was rightly said on behalf of the respondent that whether the notice was offered to the petitioner tenant and he refused to accept the same the finding is not concurrent because the appellate court has held that the notice was offered but the tenant refused to accept the same and, therefore, on the refusal to accept the notice there was no concurrent finding.\n\nThis contention is legitimate because the appellate court held that notice as required by law was not served because even if the tenant refused to accept the notice the knowledge of the contents of the . registered envelope not opened by him cannot be imputed to him, and, therefore, there was no service of notice as :required bys. 20(2) (a). The first appellate court was of the view that in the absence of knowledge of the demand of rent in arrears as alleg(:d in the notice the tenant cannot be !aid\n\n\n(2) 1890 LR 17 IA 122\n\n(3) [ 1969] 3 S, C.R. 989\n\nI •\n\n• )\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Daai, !.) 983\n\nto be guilty of wilful default so as to be denied the protection of the A Rent Act.\n\nThis accordingly takes me to the third contention in this appeal.\n\nThe third contention is that even if this Conrt agrees with the High Court in holding that the notice in question was tendered by the postman to the appellant tenant and he refused to accept the same and, therefore, this refusal amounts to service within the meaning of s. 20(2)(a), yet as the knowledge of the contents of the noJice would reflect on subsequent conduct as wilful or contumacious, it is not sufficient that a notice is served or tendered and refused but it must further be shown that in the event of refusal the tenant did it with the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope and his subseque'nt conduct is motivated. The question then is; Wht would be the effect of a notice sent by registered post and refused by a tenant on the question of his knowledge about the contents of the notice and his failure to act? Would it tantamount to an intentional conduct evidencing wilful default on his part ? This aspect cannot be merely examined in the background of some precedents or general observations. One has to examine this aspect in the background of Indian conditions or in the words of Krishna Iyer, J., 'the legal literacy in rural areas and the third world jurisprudence.'\n\nBefore we blindly adhere to law bodily imported from western countries we must not be oblivious to the fact that the statutes operating in the western countries are meant for a society if not\n\n100 per cent., 99 per cent. literate. We must consciously bear in mind that our society especially in the semi-urban and rural areas is entirely different and wholly uncomparable to the western society.\n\nA literate mind will react to a problem presented to him in a manner other than an illiterate mind because illiteracy breeds fear and fear oriented action cannot be rationally examined on the touchstone of legal presumptions.\n\nTo articulate the point as it arises in this case, let one put his feet in the shoes of a rural illiterate person to whom a registered envelope by a postman is presented. Does it require too much of imagination to conclude that be will be gripped with fear and he may react in a manner which will be his undoing ? He would believe that by refusing to accept the registered envelope he would put off the evil rather than accept the same and approach a person who can advise him and meet the situation.\n\nCan this action of fear gripped mind inflict upcn the person an injury !lowing from the assumption that he not only refused the registered envelope with the conscious knowledge of the fact that it contained a notice by a lawyer on behalf of his landlord and that it accused him of wilful\n\nA default in payment of rent and that if he would act rationally he would repair the default by tendering the rent within the period of one month granted by the statute? If he is deemed to have acted consciously is it conceivable that he would invite injury by sheer refusal to accept the registered envelope rather than know the contents or make them knowable to him and meet the charge of wilful 8 default.\n\nAs was said, again by Krishna Iyer, J., which bears quotation :\n\n\"The Indian Courts interpret laws the Anglo-Indian way, the rules of the game having been so inherited.\n\nThe basic principles of jurisprudence are borrowed from the sophisticated British system, with the result that there is an exotic touch about the adjectival Jaw, the argumentative method and the adversary system, not to speak of the Evidence Act wirh all its technicalities\".(')\n\nLord Devlin recently said :\n\n0 \"If our business methods were as antiquated as our legal methods, we would be a bankrupt country .... There is need for a comprehensive enquiry into the rules of our procedure backed by a determination to adopt it to fit the functions of the welfare State\".\n\nE Thio is much more apposite in the conditions of our society and this was noticed by Beaumost, C. J. way back in fourth decade of this century in Waman Vithal Kulkarni & Others. v.\n\nKhanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar. (2) An exactly identical question arose before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.\n\nThe facts found were that the registered letter containing the notice was sent to defendants F 4 & 5 duly addressed and service was alleged to have been refused.\n\nThe contention was two-fold that the refusal was not proved but alternatively it was contended that even if it was proved, the addressee could not be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope.\n\nThe pertinent observation is as under :\n\nG \"In the case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered Jetter\n\ncontaining the notice was sent to them duly addressed, and service is alleged to have been refused.\n\nIn fact the refusal was not proved, as the postman who took the Jetter and brought it back was not called.\n\nBut in any case, even if the refusal had been proved, I should not be prepared to hold\n\n(I) The Social Dimensions of Law and Justice in Contemporary India by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, p. 207\n\n(2) AIR 1935 Born. 247\n\n• (\n\n.. •\n\n• )\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai, J.) 985\n\nthat a registered Jetter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought back unopened, was well served.\n\nThere are, I know, some authorities in this Court to the contrary, but it seems to me impossible to say that a letter has been served so as to bring the contents to the notice of the person to whom the letter is addressed, if the agent for service states that in fact the notice was not served, although the reason may have been that the addressee declined to accept it. One cannot assume that because an addressee declines to accept a particular sealed envelope he has guessed eorrectly as to its contents.\n\nMany people in this country make a practice of always refusing to accept registered letters, a practice based, I presume, on their experience that such documents usually contain something unpleasant.\n\nSo that, it is clear that this notice was not served on three of the defendants\".\n\nLl:arned counsel for the respondent tried to distinguish this deci- siOll by observing that the court did hold that the refusal was not D proved and, therefore, the rest of the observation was obiter. It is not for a moment suggested that the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is binding on this Court but the reasoning which appealed to the Division Bench in 1935 is all the more appoiite at present. The Division Bench noticed that in the society E from which the defendants came, there was a feeling that such registered letters usually contained something unpleasant.\n\nIs there anything to suggest that this feeling is today displaced or destroyed?\n\nThe Division Bench further noticed that many people in India make a practice of always refusing to accept registered letters and the practice according to the Division Bench was based on their F -experience that such documents usually contained something unpleasant. The reaction is to put off the evil by not accepting the envelope. Could such ignorant illiterate persons be subjected to a legal inference that the refusal was conscious knowing the contents of tire document contained in the registered envelope ? To answer it in the affirmative is to wholly ignore the Indian society.\n\nAnd this G concept tllat the registered envelope properly addressed and returned with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable presumption that the addressee refused it with the knowledge of the contents is wholly borrowed from the western jurisprudence.\n\nI believe it is time that we ignore the illusion and return to reality. Reference was also '!Ude to Appabhai Motibhai v.\n\nLaxmichand Zaverchand & Co.,( 1) H G>nt !hat case does not touch the point. In Mahboob Bi v. Alva/a\n\n(l) AIR 1954 Born. 159\n\nLachmiah,(') an almost identical question figured before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In that case the Rent Controller issuro a notice in respect of the proceedings initiated before him by the landlord for the eviction of the tenant, to the tenant by registered post and the envelope was returned with the endorsement of refusal and the Rent Controller set down the proceedings for exparte hearing and passed a decree for eviction.\n\nThe tenant under the decree of eviction preferred an appeal in the City Small Causes Court.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised by the respondent-landlord that the appeal was . barred by limitation as it was filed six days after the time allowro for filing the appeal.\n\nThe appellant-tenant countered this by saying that he had no knowledge of the proceedings before the Rent Controller and that he was never served with the notice of proceedings before the Rent Controller.\n\nThe relevant rule permitted service of 11otice by registered post.\n\nAfter examining the relevant rule the Court accepted the contention of the tenant observing as under :\n\n\"Moreover nothing has been placed before me to show that there is any duty cast upon any person to receive every letter or notice. sent by registered post, nor does the refusal to receive has been made the subject-matter of any presumption which may arise under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act.\n\nThen again, there is the practical difficulty of having to import the knowledge of the date of hearing or the precise proceedings with which the registered notice is concerned in the case of a mere refusal to receive a registered notice\".\n\nThe Court thus was of the view that even if refusal amounted to service, yet it is not service as required by law to fasten a liability o'n the tenant because no presumption can be raised that the refu!al was With the conscious knowledge of the contents of the registered\n\nenvelope. Undoubtedly, our attention was also drawn to a contrary view taken by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Fanni/al v. Smt. Chironja.(') It was contended that even if the registered letter was refused no presumption of knowledge of the contents of the letter could in law the raised against the tenant.\n\nIn support of the submission reliance was placed on Amariil Singh Btdi\n\nv. Lachchman Das, an unreported decision of a single judge of the Allahabad High Court, and the decision of Beaumont, C.\n\nJ. in Waman Vithal Kulkarn;'s case. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court did not accept the view of Beaumont, C.J.\n\nTho Court was of the opinion that a presumption of fact would arise under\n\n(I) A1R 1964 A.P. 314.\n\n(2) (1972) 70 Allahabad Law Journal 499.\n\n• \" .\n\n/ •\n\nHARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai,!.) 987\n\ns. 114 of the Evidence Act that the refusal was with the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope.\n\nThe Court has not considered the specific Indian conditions, the approach of rural Indians to registered letters and has merely gone by the technical rules of Evidence Act, which, as experience would show, could sometimes cause more harm and lead to injustice through law.\n\nThe contrary Allahabad decision does not commend to me.\n\nOn the contrary, the Bombay view is in accord with the conditions of society in rural India and I do not propose to make any distinction even with regard to urban areas where also there are a large number of illiterates.\n\nEven in the case of a semi-literate person who is in a position to read and write he could not be accused of legal literacy.\n\nTherefore, it is not possible to accept the submission that mere refusal would permit a presumption to be raised that not only the service was h:gal but the refusal was the conscious act flowing from the knowledge of the contents of the letter.\n\nHow dangerous this presumption is can be easily demonstrated, and how it would lead to miscarriage of justice can be manifestly established.\n\nOnce knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope is attributed to a person to whom a registered envelope is sent and who has refused to accept the same, that this was an act accompanied by the conscious knowledge of the contents of the letter he who may be an innocent defaulter or presumably no defaulter at all, would be charged with a contumacious conduct of being a wilful defaulter.\n\nThe Rent Act does not seek to evict a mere defaulter.\n\nThat is why a provision for notice has been made.\n\nIf even after notice the default continues, the tenant can be condemned as wilful defaulter.\n\nCould he be dubbed guilty of conscious, wilful, contumacious, intentional conduct even when he did not know what was in the registered envelope ? In my opinion, it wonld be atrocious to impute any such knowledge to a person who has merely been guilty of refusing to accept the registered notice.\n\nWhere service of notice is a condition precedent, a dubious service held established by examining the postman who must be delivering hundreds of postal envelopes and who is ready to go to the witness box after a long interval to say that he offered the envelope to the addressee and he refused to accept the same, would be travesty of justice.\n\nAnd if this condition precedent is not fully satisfied, the consequent conduct cannot be said to be wilful. In a slightly different context in Commis\n\nsioner of Income-tax, Keral, a v.\n\nThayaballi Mulla Jeevaji Kapasi (deed.),(') this Court held that service of the notice under\n\n(1) [1968] 8 Supreme Court Journal 91.\n\ns. 34(1) (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, within the period of limitation being a condition precedent, to the exercise of jurisdiction, if no notice is issued or if the notice issued is shown to be invalid, then the proceedings taken by the Income-tax Ollicer without a notice or in pursuance of an invalid notice would be illegal and void.\n\nIt was, however, contended that if the Court accepts the legal contention as canvassed on behalf of the appellant it would be impossible tc serve the notice as statutorily prescribed.\n\nThis wild apprehension is wholly unfounded.\n\nThe notice is required to be served in the manner prescribed by s. 106 of Transfer of Property Act which, inter-alia, provides for affixing a copy of the notice 011 the premises in possession of tenant.\n\nTherefore, it cannot be said that the approach of the Court would render it impossible for the landlord to meet with the statutory requirement of service of notice before commencing the action for eviction.\n\nHaving, therefore, examined the three vital contentions, in my n opinion the suit of the landlord must fail on the ground that the rent was not payable by month and, therefore, section 20(2) (a) i~ not attracted.\n\nAnd further, even if it is attracted, as the statutory notice as required by s. 20(2) (a) was not served, a decree for eviction cannot be passed on the only ground of default in payment of rent.\n\nE I would accordingly allow this appeal and dismiss the suit of the respondent for eviction but with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n• it ,\n\n• (", "total_entities": 150, "entities": [{"text": "HARCHARAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARCHARAN SINGH V", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v. smv RANI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIV RANI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 20, 1981\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J\n\nService by refusal-Notice den1anding arrears and seeking eviction is sen' by registered post but refused by the tenant-Whether the tenant could be imputed rhe knowledge of the contents thereof so that upon his failure to com~ ply with the notice the tenant could be said to have committed wilful default in payment of rent-U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction), (Central Act X), 1952, section 14(1) scope of-General Clauses Act 1897, section 27, Jndtan Evidence Act, section 114."}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. 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C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12347, "end_char": 12361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. C. Bhartari for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12382, "end_char": 12395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi and Pramod Swarup for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12400, "end_char": 12413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi and Pramod Swarup for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V. D. Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12451, "end_char": 12468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jndgment of V. D. Tulzapurkar, J. and A. P. Sen, J. was delivered by Tulzapurkar, J. D. A. Desai, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.", "canonical_name": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "D. A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12524, "end_char": 12535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jndgment of V. D. Tulzapurkar, J. and A. P. Sen, J. was delivered by Tulzapurkar, J. D. A. Desai, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.", "canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12568, "end_char": 12579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TULZAPURKAR, J. This is a tenant's appeal by special leave directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 16, 1979 in Second Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "February 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12706, "end_char": 12723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TULZAPURKAR, J. This is a tenant's appeal by special leave directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 16, 1979 in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Mussorie", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13383, "end_char": 13391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 in Ivanhoe Estate, situated at Landure Cantonment, Mussorie, originally owned by one Parvij Waris Rasool, on an yearly rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Parvij Waris Rasool", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13417, "end_char": 13436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 in Ivanhoe Estate, situated at Landure Cantonment, Mussorie, originally owned by one Parvij Waris Rasool, on an yearly rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "December 31, every year", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13480, "end_char": 13503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "250 payable by December 31, every year."}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13773, "end_char": 13811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14244, "end_char": 14260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant continued to be the tenant of the shop during the years 1965 and 1966 as well but since he did not pay the rent the respondents on November 9, 1966 gave a combined notice demanding paym_ent of arrears and seeking ejectment on termination of tenancy which was refused by him on November, 10, 1966."}}, {"text": "November, 10, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14390, "end_char": 14408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant continued to be the tenant of the shop during the years 1965 and 1966 as well but since he did not pay the rent the respondents on November 9, 1966 gave a combined notice demanding paym_ent of arrears and seeking ejectment on termination of tenancy which was refused by him on November, 10, 1966."}}, {"text": "District Court, Dehradun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16678, "end_char": 16702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by that judgment and decree the respondents filed an appeal to the District Court, Dehradun."}}, {"text": "November 10. 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16990, "end_char": 17007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further held that the notice was tendered to the appellant on November 10."}}, {"text": "9th or 10th November, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17781, "end_char": 17807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r\n\nwhether or not the notice was tendered to him and was refused by him on the ground that the finding had been recorded by the District Court without application of mind to the statement on oath made by him to the effect that no postman had ever gone to him with a registered letter either on 9th or 10th November, 1966 and he had not declined to receive any registered letter but the High Court refused to entertain the contention inasmuch as it found that the learned District Judge had referred to this part of the appellant's evidence as also the postman's evidence on the point and that on an appreciation of such rival evidence on record he had recorded a finding that the notice was tendered to the appellant but it was refused by him; in other words in the absence of animus being attributed to the postman the District Judge had preferred the postman's evidence to that of the appellant's."}}, {"text": "s. 14(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19271, "end_char": 19279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20057, "end_char": 20068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further urged that the envelope bore the seal of Shri S. P. Singh, Advocate and the appellant could not, therefore, know that the notice was from his landlords; he also pointed out that the appellant was illiterate and did not know English and since the address on the envelope as\n\n(I) A.LR."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20922, "end_char": 20939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention strong reliance was placed by him on the decision of the Bombay High Court fo."}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21060, "end_char": 21068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar(') where the following observations of Beaumont, C. J., appear at page 251 :\n\n\"In case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered letter containing the notice was sent to them duly addressed, and service is alleged to have been refused.", "canonical_name": "Beaumont"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22132, "end_char": 22157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel also referred to some other decisions including that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah(') but."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22968, "end_char": 22972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22982, "end_char": 23007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23012, "end_char": 23018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23082, "end_char": 23101, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kund Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23384, "end_char": 23392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Indian Evidence Act presumption of due service could arise if the notice was sent to the tenant by properly addressing the same, prepaying and sending the same by registered post and it was pointed out that in the instan~ case as against the denial by the appellant there was positive oath of postman (Kund Ram P.W. 2) who was examined by the respondents to prove the fact that the registered letter containing e notice was tendered to the appellant and when he declined to accept it\n\nthe postman bad made endorsement in his hand on the envelope \"Refused."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24096, "end_char": 24102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Madras decision in Kodali Bapayya and Ors."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24207, "end_char": 24227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the two decisions of the Allahabad High Court relied upon by the\n\nIUgh Court."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24290, "end_char": 24307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel pointed out that the Madras High Court in Koda/i Bapayya's case (supra) and the Allahabad High Court in its Full Bench decision in Ganga Ram v. 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Smt."}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24539, "end_char": 24549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24557, "end_char": 24582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25728, "end_char": 25734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25742, "end_char": 25761, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26198, "end_char": 26203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26211, "end_char": 26230, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26248, "end_char": 26254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 10, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26590, "end_char": 26607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept."}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27211, "end_char": 27216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27224, "end_char": 27243, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27261, "end_char": 27267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27275, "end_char": 27294, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28070, "end_char": 28075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28083, "end_char": 28108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28113, "end_char": 28119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28127, "end_char": 28146, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28165, "end_char": 28171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay decision in Vaman Vithal's case (supra), G~ we would like to point out two aspects that emerge clearly from the very observations which have been strongly relied upon by counsel for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Vaman Vithal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28184, "end_char": 28196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay decision in Vaman Vithal's case (supra), G~ we would like to point out two aspects that emerge clearly from the very observations which have been strongly relied upon by counsel for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29179, "end_char": 29183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event we approve of the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in its three decisions, B namely, Sri Nath's case, Fanni Lal's case and Ganga Ram's case\n\n(supra) and would confirm the High Court's finding on the point in favour of the respondents."}}, {"text": "Fanni Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29192, "end_char": 29201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event we approve of the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in its three decisions, B namely, Sri Nath's case, Fanni Lal's case and Ganga Ram's case\n\n(supra) and would confirm the High Court's finding on the point in favour of the respondents."}}, {"text": "Ganga Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29213, "end_char": 29222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event we approve of the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in its three decisions, B namely, Sri Nath's case, Fanni Lal's case and Ganga Ram's case\n\n(supra) and would confirm the High Court's finding on the point in favour of the respondents."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29425, "end_char": 29430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29575, "end_char": 29580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29623, "end_char": 29631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30335, "end_char": 30340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30974, "end_char": 30978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31007, "end_char": 31045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31149, "end_char": 31158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bhagwa11 Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31761, "end_char": 31774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Bhagwa11 Dass case Asupra) has explained at page 305 Of the report the legal position arising on a grammatical construction of s. 3(1) thus :\n\n\"Section ( 3) 1 does not restrict the landlord's right to evict his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in els. ("}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31888, "end_char": 31895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32291, "end_char": 32295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32529, "end_char": 32537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32644, "end_char": 32652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33419, "end_char": 33424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DESAI, J.-I have very carefully gone through the judgmen~ 8i prepared by my learned brother Mr. Justice V. D. Tulzapurkar, but I regret my inability to agree with the same."}}, {"text": "section 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33914, "end_char": 33927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Novber 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35471, "end_char": 35485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to respondent-landlord she served notice dated Novber 9, 1966, terminating the tenancy of the appellant as the appellant-tenant was a defaulter within the meaning of s. 20(2) (a) and, therefore, she 8 was entitled to a decree for eviction as she has satisfactorily proved all the requirements or ingredients of s. 20(2)(a)."}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35590, "end_char": 35598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35735, "end_char": 35746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35973, "end_char": 35981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35998, "end_char": 36006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36162, "end_char": 36173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenant must be a tenant of premises governed by the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36314, "end_char": 36374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39379, "end_char": 39389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And, accordingly, it is not entitled to pass judgment on the propriety or wisdom of making a law in the particular form and further the Court is not entitled to adopt the construction of a statute on its view of what Parliament ought to have done."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39815, "end_char": 39820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40359, "end_char": 40363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40371, "end_char": 40399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H. H. Mahara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40866, "end_char": 40878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must also be emphasised that where two constructions are possible, the one that must be preferred is one which would accord with reason and justice (see H. H. Mahara; a-\n\n(1) 1960 A.C. 748, H.L. at 767; (1960) I All E.R. 505 at 512\n\n(2) [1877] 2 A. C. 743 & 765\n\n(3) [1977] 2 s.c.c."}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41319, "end_char": 41327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42787, "end_char": 42795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42949, "end_char": 42957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43174, "end_char": 43186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43311, "end_char": 43316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Qf the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43317, "end_char": 43332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43366, "end_char": 43404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43447, "end_char": 43456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43551, "end_char": 43555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47591, "end_char": 47602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47632, "end_char": 47669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52355, "end_char": 52363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52923, "end_char": 52931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54362, "end_char": 54370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54462, "end_char": 54473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54719, "end_char": 54728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55027, "end_char": 55038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55450, "end_char": 55464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Durga Chaudhrain v. lawahar Choudhary(') Gajendragadkar J. speaking for this Court in terms."}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55882, "end_char": 55888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56330, "end_char": 56338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LR 17 IA 122", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 57419, "end_char": 57431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57936, "end_char": 57947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58783, "end_char": 58795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One has to examine this aspect in the background of Indian conditions or in the words of Krishna Iyer, J., 'the legal literacy in rural areas and the third world jurisprudence.'"}}, {"text": "Devlin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61153, "end_char": 61159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Devlin recently said :\n\n0 \"If our business methods were as antiquated as our legal methods, we would be a bankrupt country .... There is need for a comprehensive enquiry into the rules of our procedure backed by a determination to adopt it to fit the functions of the welfare State\"."}}, {"text": "Beaumost", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61524, "end_char": 61532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E Thio is much more apposite in the conditions of our society and this was noticed by Beaumost, C. J. way back in fourth decade of this century in Waman Vithal Kulkarni & Others.", "canonical_name": "Beaumont"}}, {"text": "V.R. Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62604, "end_char": 62621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in any case, even if the refusal had been proved, I should not be prepared to hold\n\n(I) The Social Dimensions of Law and Justice in Contemporary India by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, p. 207\n\n(2) AIR 1935 Born."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64348, "end_char": 64353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench further noticed that many people in India make a practice of always refusing to accept registered letters and the practice according to the Division Bench was based on their F -experience that such documents usually contained something unpleasant."}}, {"text": "Lachmiah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65394, "end_char": 65402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "159\n\nLachmiah,(') an almost identical question figured before the Andhra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "sec. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66739, "end_char": 66747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Waman Vithal Kulkarn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67808, "end_char": 67828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the submission reliance was placed on Amariil Singh Btdi\n\nv. Lachchman Das, an unreported decision of a single judge of the Allahabad High Court, and the decision of Beaumont, C.\n\nJ. in Waman Vithal Kulkarn;'s case."}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68125, "end_char": 68131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indians to registered letters and has merely gone by the technical rules of Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68320, "end_char": 68408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thayaballi Mulla Jeevaji Kapasi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70730, "end_char": 70761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a slightly different context in Commis\n\nsioner of Income-tax, Keral, a v.\n\nThayaballi Mulla Jeevaji Kapasi (deed.),(')"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70864, "end_char": 70872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70884, "end_char": 70904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71500, "end_char": 71506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71510, "end_char": 71534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72025, "end_char": 72038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72139, "end_char": 72147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_2_989_991_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nCHARAN SINGH\n\nFebruary 20, 1981\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]\n\nPuniab Police Rules 1934- Rule 16.38-Scope of-Rule in the nature of\n\ndpartmental instruction-Cannot override Crin:inal Proced11te Code and Prt!- vention of Corruption Act,\n\nThe Punjab Police Rules, 1934 lay down the procedure to be followed in imposing punishn1ent on a police officer found guilty of mis-c.onduct or a criminal offence and make an exhaustive provision for departmental inquiries. Rule 16.38 lays down the guidelines to be followed by the Superintendent of Police in dealing with a complaint about the commission of a criminal offence by a police olf1c~r in connection with his official relations with the public. It enjoins upon the Superintendent to give immediate information to the District Magistrate who thereupon has to decide whether investigation of the complaint should be conducted by a police officer or by a Magistrate.\n\nThe respondent, a police officer, was convicted of oo offence under section S(l)(d) rend with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to JlUffer imprisonment.\n\nOn the ground that there \\Vas non-compliance with the provisions of Rule\n\n16.38 of the Rules a single Judge of the High Court acquitted the respondent.\n\nSetting aside the order of acquittal _and remanding the case to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with -law.\n\nHELD : The High Court was wrong in acquitting the respondent. [990 DJ\n\nRule 16.38 is not designed to be a condition precedent to the launching of a prosecution in a Criminal Court. It is in the nature of instructions to the department and is not me311t to be of the nature of a sanction or permission for a prosecution; nor can it override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. [991 A-BJ\n\nHoshiar Singh v. The State LXVII-1965 Punjab Law Reporter 438 @ 442, approved.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1976 .\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-11-1973 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 396 /72.\n\n0. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant.\n\nK. K. M anchanda and B. Datta for the Respondent\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The respondent was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Ludhian>a, of an offence under Sec. 5(1){d) read with Sec. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to B pay fine of Rs. one hundred. On appeal, a learned Single Judge of the High Court acquitted the respondent on the ground that there was non- COID!Pliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. An application for the grant of a Certificate under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution was moved before the learned Single Judge and was granted. The learned Single Judge observed that when Cl the case was argued before him, an earlier judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Hoshiar Singh v. The State(') was not brought to bis notice and that had the decision been brought to his notice he would not have allowed the appeal merely on the ground that there was no compliance with Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules.\n\nD The learned Single Judge of the High Court was clearly wrong in acquitting the respondent on the ground that there was non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38. A perusal of Chapter XVI of the Punjab Police Rules shows that the provisions of the Chapter deal with Departmental punishments and the procedure to be followed in imposing such punishments.\n\nGuidance is given as to how Police Officers E guilty of misconduct and criminal offences may be dealt with. The Chapter begins with Rule 16.1, the first clause of which is as follows:\n\n\"No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules\".\n\nThereafter the rules refer in some detail to the various punishments which may be imposed and provide for suspension, subsistence etc.\n\nRule 16.24 makes exhaustive provision for the procedure in Departmental enquiries. Provision for review and appeal is made in the subsequent rules.\n\nRule .16.38 prescribes---more correctly we may say- Rnle 16.38 lays down the gnide-lines of the procedure to be followed when a Superintendent of Police receives any complaint abont the commission of a criminal offence by a police officer \"in connection with his official relations with the public\". The Superintendent of Police is enjoined to give immediate information to the District Magistrate who is thereupon to decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a Police Officer or by a Magistrate. It is stated that thouh 'a judicial prosecution shall normally follow', the matter may be disposed of departmentally if the District Magistrate so orders,\n\n(I) LXVIl-1965 Punjab Law Reporter 438 @ 442\n\n• • •\n\n• ( J\n\n• ..... -\n\nPUNJAB v. CHARAN SINGH (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 991\n\nfor reflsons to be recorded. The further Departmental procedure is prescribed by the remaining clauses. It is clear that Rule 16.38 is not designed to be a condition precedent to the launching of a prosecntion in !I Criminal Court; it is in the nature of instructions to the Department and is not meant to be of the nature of a sanction or permission for a proGecution. Nor can it override the provisions of the Criminal\n\nProcedure Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. We agree with the observations of Dua and Mahajan JJ. in Hoshiar Singh v.\n\nThe State (supra) where they said :\n\n\" ......... I do not think Rule 16.38 was intended or could have the effect of imposing as a condition precedent to the trial of a police officer iu a Court of law, a sanction or an order by th' District Magistrate, as contemplated therein .\n\nThe language appears to me to be confined only to departmental enquiries. The investigation for establishing a prima facie case is merely meant to guide the District Magistrate, uncontrolled by the opinion of the Superintendent of Police, whether or not a departmental proceeding should be initiated against the guilty party, and it is the procedure and the punishment controlling the departmental proceedings alone, which appear to have been prescribed by this rule\".\n\nWe have, therefore, no option but to set aside the order of acquittal\n\npassed by the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court E for fresh disposal in accordance with law. It is so ordered.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed •\n\nMGIPF-214 SCI/81-2500-12-9-81", "total_entities": 24, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHARAN SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHARAN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nCHARAN SINGH\n\nFebruary 20, 1981\n\n(0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Puniab Police Rules 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 272, "end_char": 297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "The Punjab Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1059, "end_char": 1087, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1799, "end_char": 1827, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2106, "end_char": 2115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2123, "end_char": 2133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. M anchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2154, "end_char": 2170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. M anchanda and B. Datta for the Respondent\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The respondent was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Ludhian>a, of an offence under Sec."}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. M anchanda and B. Datta for the Respondent\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The respondent was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Ludhian>a, of an offence under Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2398, "end_char": 2407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2421, "end_char": 2427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2439, "end_char": 2467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2742, "end_char": 2767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2821, "end_char": 2832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "the Punjab Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3042, "end_char": 3059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Single Judge observed that when Cl the case was argued before him, an earlier judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Hoshiar Singh v. The State(') was not brought to bis notice and that had the decision been brought to his notice he would not have allowed the appeal merely on the ground that there was no compliance with Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules."}}, {"text": "Chapter XVI of the Punjab Police Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3492, "end_char": 3530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Procedure Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5463, "end_char": 5514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the observations of Dua and Mahajan JJ."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5558, "end_char": 5565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the observations of Dua and Mahajan JJ."}}, {"text": "12-9-81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed •\n\nMGIPF-214 SCI/81-2500-12-9-81"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_12_21_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RAM CHANDER\n\nv.\n\n:STATE OF HARYANA\n\nFebruary 25, 1981\n\n. '.\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J ·\n\nRole ofa Judge trying a criminal i; ase explained-Evidence Act, setio~ j65 read with section 172{2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whethef a 'Judg~' in a crimi11, al case .. 111ay put any quesfion. t() /e wiflless and jf so,,, what are its\n\n/imitations-Ev'illence Act, sectioi1 }!, ~; ope of. · ·\"' = ' . ;, ·~. • ' L '; • ·•,;'• ' 1\n\n.,,:, The appellant Ram Cha11der <ind. Mange were tried by the, learitelf',.:Additional Sessions Judge, .Jind, for the murder of Dunni. Both were convicted under\n\nsf<!.J01i 3q2 read with section M Inpian Penal Code' ad SCl)terycef! io in1prion ment ror life. On appeal the High Court a9quitted Mange but. cc/nfirmed . the conviction' and sentence ofkiun Chander. 'In appeai hy '.i; pecial leave. it was contended lhat the' conviction alld sentence were vitiated as the principle' of fair . trial 'was abandoned by. the Sessions Judge 'who rebuked. the. Witnesses and threatened them with prosecution for perjury . and based his. c; onviction on such\n\neiitmted evidence. ·.\" . • •.. . . -\n\n. Allowing the appcl}l, the Court' ' ' . .rq ·~- . .. ] : . :_..,,.~ . ,; . •• . .\n\nHELD : 1 : I. If a Gdminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the presidin.g judge must cease t~ be :a pectator and. mere recording. lllchine. !He must become .a , participant in .the triai by evincing inteliigent aclie)nforest by putting questions fo witnesses 'iii orcter tO a'scertain\n\nth~ truth. The Court has wide powers and nlust actively partiCipate: in th{ frial fo elicit the fruth and!O proteci the' weak and the innocent.' It is rthe dui:f.,;11wa ]tidge to discovec the.truth and for that purpose, he may :·\"ask . any question; .in\n\nany.form, at any time, of any witn1>ss, or of the parties, about any fact, .relevant or irrelevant\". But this he must. clo,· without unduJy. trespassing upon the functions of the public prosecutor and the defence'counsel, without any hint of partisanship and without appearing to frighten, coerce, confuse, intimidate or bully wilnesse~. He must take the prosecution and the .defence with him. The Coi1rt, the prosecution and the defence must work as a team whose goal isjustice, a team whose captain is !he\n\n0'judge. The judge, ''like the conductor of a choir, itmst, by force of personality, induce his team .. to work in harmony; subdue the raucous, encQwage the timid; conspire with the_young, flatter aryd\"<>I,<!.\" (1411, F,\n\nD; 15E-F] r\n\n;'', Sessions J11dg~, Neitore' v. Jntna Rainana Reddy nd .. Altl\"., LLJC 1972 AP -683, approved. \"'\n\nJones v. N; tional C?al Board, [ 1957] 2 All E.R. 155, quoted with approal.\n\n1 : 2; In the instan't c'ase, the questions put by the learned Sessions Judge, particularly the threats held out to the witnesses that if they changed their H statements thy would involve themselves in prosecution for perjury were certainly intimidating, coming as they did from the presiding judge. In an effort to compel\n\nthe witnes.scs. to speak .\"°hat he thought must be truth, the learned Sessions Judge, very:_ wrongly, firmly rebuked them and vifiually. threatened: them with-, prosecu~\n\ntionS rOr pCrjWy: ~- HC left 'bis seat a'.nd Cii'tCred theriilg.' The 'Princii)1e' .of \"fair tnaI\".Wa'sabandonCd. [19F-H] ·'- 1\" 'Jt:'> - '~ .; i.; -· . 1 -_.·; i; \" 1 '\n\n;,, j'.i..fr.~\"'.: -:-.-'.~ ;·, ,-. ' ·.-_.·!·.;. ·; :~ ;_.;1-. ;; ~;.::;_•1;:1 ;~,-'.~;-_;_<ii/;:~:.--·.·· ,,1 . , '; : : -2.,. lpe Evidence -Act conta_ins dtailed provisions, dealing . whh. state_ments of persons_who cannot. be. called as witne$ses. _and former1 statements. of _pens\n\nWhO ire called aswi, tiiCsseS. Th~ PrOvislollS would ipf; ear_iO. becOil?.e c:.4uridant it thC 'eVidenee or 3 whriCSs' i~ to be lesie\"d iind 3.cCepted or iCiectCd with rerCrence tO -the 'foimer'Stitement Of arioiheCwnneS~ on the iround. that such; (ofinCr 'sta~ menittnders t1ie evidence highly'. probable -or: improbable.. Even :assd.olliig:· that\n\nnd:er .. certain cirqimstancs it_ is permissible _t~- use, t_he_ first_ inf9nnatio:n. Jeport und1.'t' the first part of section 11 there is in the present case no question, of invoking the first part Or section 11, which is inapplicable· sinCc, thC nrst inf0rrD.3iiO.ti:\n\nreport.is now not ought t_o be used as b<:ing inconsisten~ wi_th. -the• prosecution\n\n~#~'.~ ~Or\"ca~ firsti~~tiOll por\"tJie u~'by, rsO~ .. '.tq,.t!tC: -~~n.d .. Dart of section ll. 1 120 H2IA 20 F~G] - i ·• :,__ \"'\" _, ,) ' _. .. r\"\" .. 1 -- 1 ,.,!! ,1 ··; !.•;!_'~ ~'.~.,~· •,..:: ~;,,,~~.:1, i ·;~·;:1· ': ·.::.1: 'l :·:r1<1 '\";!,:'.~-:~; ·.:-;~!~ ., ';,,, Ram.Kumar Pande ••The State of Madhya Pradesh, [l9J5} ~·,, S.C,!L. 519@\n\n522, d.issed .. ti'J , ... .• ·,.1••. 113 ,.,._,. ?:.i. n•i'-.·\n\n. .-.-:: !.\"J;;.J,·::; , .. .. ,,~. - ...... ~- ....... ,_.,,. -\n\n- .... :'\" cin11NAF APi>tU.,\\'il: Juit1soicr10N:Crliri1i1.t1 AiiperuNd; 390/75.\n\ni:'; :ai t<,:.!,';:,; ··:: '.~:.,, :iu '.i'f: )/i.' 1.r::rr~ :.·,' _;!:. .. : J':i.1 ~:·; ; j ... ,,, Appeal :by 'special, leave<from .the' Judgment and.Order dated ; Z.7.1975 .of! Punjab.& Haryana High Court; in Cr\"A. No. l554/74 •\n\n. '•.,._.,.,.-!• -·(•, ·-· .. .. _ , , ._, r 1 __ .•, t .. , . .; , , ' .. ·, 1\n\n:,~;'.KaP, fl; Sibai~ subhqsh -.Skar\"!,{/'. a?d, 1:Rav(d~(]: 13!1, a J?r the\n\ni'PP~Ilant: ... ,, .. •. ;'!, ,;,_c, ·\" ., .,. , -,,, . , ,,, ,,., •. J(, G •• Bhagat and R..!f1Poddar. for the, Respondent. \"''<'\"'/; . , . .\n\n: ,.; The.Ju.dgment; o,(the, Curt, was de!ivered , bY•, ,. ',;; ruilf 'f\" ,,.; •·,•'1 Lp-· ·• ._._ • -'• _: •.,·•r r-'- ! , ·\":It'\":. i;,:J?, t f.,.;_, _,.-. · ' CHINNAPPA REDDY, J: , What is the true role of a jud_ge trying a _., ,_ •' • '\n\n- \"''\"!-' ~-- ·- • - ,., • : .. , , ' - f < • ' ' • ' .. '1 ' , '. : • \". ' • ciiminal 'case ?; • Js he to ' assume the role of'a 'referee hi. 'a football\n\nmatch lit rt: ,; inp;;;,\"in a:Ctickei'rnatch, occasionaily answering,' as Pollock arid Maitlnd(1) ''p6iilt 'oui, ''the question. 'How is-that'' oi, F is heTo, iri the words o( Lora . Kenning 'drop 'the mantle of a judge\n\n, ..... '\"\"'-\"J ·-·} \"''''' -· ' ,.., ..•. , . '.··.· ~._ ...... - •• . a:nd '.assume the \"role' of an advocate ?(') Is be to be a' . spectator bra 'participant' at the trial? is(passivitY or actlvi!yfo' niark his attitude?. Ii he desires to questio~ 'ahy of the whnesses; rfiow'far can\n\nJi.~. go? Can he put. on the glo!es a, n, d 'have a go', '\\t., th~ 1witness who he suspects is . lying or is he to be.son and suave 1 These are some G\n\n- - . . •·· •, - . •· . - ' , • ' - , r. ' -. of the ... questions .. which, we,. are compelled to ask ourselves 1n this appeal on. account of the manner in. whih the judge who' tried the.\n\ncase put \"questions to orne of the wiinesss. ' .\n\n- . - ' ......\n\n- '. '\n\n (i) Pollock 3ncfMa.itJand: The HiStory of English laW.\n\n(2~ Jones v .. National _.C!oa~, Board, ._[1957] 2 All.E.R. 155. \\ H\n\nThe adversary system of trial being what it is, there is an unfortunate tendancy for a judge presiding over a trial to assume the role of a referee or an umpire and to allow the trial to develop into a contest between the prosecution and the defence with the inevitable distortions flowing from combative and competitive element entering the trial procedure. If a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the presiding judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine. He. must_ become a participant in the trial by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.· As one of us had occasion to say in the past.\n\n\"Every criminal trial is a voyage of discovery . in which truth is the quest. It is the duty of a presiding Judge fo explore every avenue open to him in order to discover the fruth and to advance the cause of justice. For that purpose he is expressly invested by section 165 of the Evidence Act with the right to put questions to witnesses. . Indeed_ the right givep. to. a Judge is so wide that he may 'ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time; of any witness, or of the parties about any fact, relevant or irrelevant. Section :172 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables the Court to send for the policediarfos in a case and use them to aid It in the trial. The record\n\nof the proceedings of the committing Magistrate may alo be perused by the Sessions Judge to further aid him in the trial.\"(1)\n\nWith such wide powers, the Court must actively participate in the trial to elicit the truth and to protect the weak and the innocent.\n\nIt must, of course, not assume the role of a prosecutor in putting questions. The functions of the counsel, particularly those of the\n\nPublic Prosecutor, are not to be usurped by the judge, by descending into the arena, as it were.\n\nAny questions put by the judge must be so as not to frighten, coerce, confuse or intimidate_ the witnesses.\n\nThe danger inherent in a judge adopting a much too stern an attitude towards witnesses has been. explained by Lord Justice Birkett :\n\n\"People accustomed to the procedure of the Court are likely to be over-awed or frightened, or cofused; or distressed when under the ordeal of prolonged questioning 'from the presiding Judge. Moreover, when the questfoning takes on a sarcastic or ironic tone as it is apt to do, or when it takes on a hostile note as is sometimes almost inevitable, the danger is\n\n(I) Session Judge, Ne/lore v. /11t11a Ramana Reddy (ILR 1972 AP 683).\n\nnot only that witnesses will be unable to present the evidence they may wish, but the parties may begin to think, quite wrongly it may be, that the judge is not holding the scales of justice quite eventualy\"(1)\n\nIn Jones v. National Coal Board Lord [Justice Denning observed :\n\n\"The Judge's part in all this is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions of witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been over looked or left obscure; to see that the advoctes behave themselves seemly and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevancies and discourage repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the points that the advocates are making and can assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of the judge and assumes the role of an advocate; and the change does not become him well.\"\n\nWe may go further than Lord Denning and say that it is the duty of a judge to discover the truth and for that purpose he may \"ask any question, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact, relevant orirrelevant\" (Sec. 165 Evidence Act). But this he must do, without unduly trespassing upon the functions of the public prosecutor and the defence counsel, without any hint of partisanship and without appearing to frighten or bully witnesses.\n\nHe must take the prosecution and the defence with him.\n\nThe Court, the' prosecution and the defence must work as a team whose goal is justice, a team whose captain is the judge. The judge, 'like the conductor of a choir, must, by force of personality, induce his team to work in harmony; subdue the raucous, encourge the timid, conspire with the young, flatter and old'.\n\nLet us now take a look at the facts of the case before us. Ram Chander and, Mange were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind, for the murder of Dunni. Both were convicted under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nOn appeal the High Court acquitted Mange but confirmed the conviction of Ram Chander. The prosecution case was that on February 14, 1974, at about 11 a.m. Dunni was proceeding from his field towards the village, Sucha Khera and was\n\n(1) Extracted by Lord Denning in Jones v.\n\nNational . Board [1957] H 2 All.E.R; 155.\n\npassing near the field . of Ram Chander a1id Mange when he was attacked 'by them with Jatus (wooden pegs fixed to a cart). They inflicted several injuries on Dunni.\n\nMewa (P.W.9) who was working in his field tried to rescue Ram Chander. He was given a lathi blow on his head'. On hearing the alarm raised by Dunni, Hari Chand (P~W.8) and Jiwana (P.W.2) and others came there and witnessed the occJii; rence. The assailants ran away.\n\nJiwana the . Lambardar proceeded to ti).e village to inform the relatives of Dunni . . :d~ the way he met bh:n Singh (P.W. 10), ad told P, ini about the 9ccurrel1<; e~ Jiwana thereafter went to the Police Station at Narwana and lodged the First Information'Report at' ab()ut s.is p.m. The\n\nSb Inspector of Polke went to the village. He held the inquest and . . .. µ ·. . • - .. . sent the .. dead body f9r post mortem exammatiOn .. He looed for\n\nJvf ewa and Hari _Chan'cl.\n\nBoth . of them were not avilable in the village, . A constable . \\iras: sent to fetch thein from Sucha Khera.\n\nNeither elf' them was brought that night.\n\nNet morning he was able . to examine Mewa but Hari Chand \\Vas 1iott~ be found. Hari Chand was finally examined on 16th. the Doctor who conducted the . autopsy found 01.irteen injuries on the body of Dunni.\n\nThee were\n\nfracturesof the left partial,. frontal .and occipital bones. Accmding to the Dctor that was due t~· \"co~1pression of brain with 1uliiple .. fractures of skull'\\ On February 'ts, 1974, at about 4 P.M .. the\n\n.Ooto; als~ axmined Mewa nd found on the right side of his\n\n.had n abain 1\" xl/4''. ·\n\nIn suppr~ of its case the prosecution examfoed P. W s. 2, 8 nd .9 as eye wirneses to the occurrence. P.W. IO was examined to speak to the information alleged to have been given to him by P.Ws. 2\n\natd 8 tht the deceased had been beateri by the two accused\n\nprsons. ~P.W. 2 did not support the prosecution case and was declared ; hstile. P.Ws. 8 and 9, the remaining ey~ witnesses seemingly. supported the prosecution case in varying degrees in the , examination-in-cl)ief, but they made some damaging admissions in cross-examinati()n. P.W. 9 even in examination-in-chief stated that\n\n., Mange was notarmed with any weapon though he. was present alongwith Ram Chander .. The learned Sessions Judge convicted both . Ram Chander and Mange but having regard to the e':'idence of\n\nP.W. 9 the High (:ourt acquitted Mange and.confirmed the convic- . tion of.Ram -Chander.\n\nIt ws' argued by Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Counsel for the H appellant that in view of the several statements made by P.Ws. ll and 9 in their cross examination, their evidence should not have been\n\n\"'(\n\n---< '\n\naccepted by the Courts below.\n\nShri Sibal also submitted that the accused did not have a fair trial as the learned Sessions Judge particularly assumed the role of a Prosecutor.\n\nHari Chand, P.W. 8 said in his examination-in-chief that when he was working in his field he heard a noise from the side of the field of Mange. He and Jiwana (P.W. 2) went in that direction.\n\nFrom a distance they saw Mange and Ram Chander giving blows to Dunni with dandas.\n\nBy the time they went near, Ram Chander and Mange ran away. They saw Mange tying a piece of cloth round the head. of Dunni. Dunni was bleeding and was hardly able to\n\nbreathe~ . They . .went to the village to inform the.people about the occurrence. On the.way they met P.W. IO and told him about Dunni. having been beaten by the two accused. Later that day he went to Sucha Khera for offa; ial work.\n\nThe police examined him on 16.2.74. We have already referred to the circumstance that .he was not available for examination by the Police on 14th and 15th.\n\nHe sought to explain his absence from the village by stating that he went to Sucha Khera in connection with his 'Official work. In cross-examination he admitted that he did not mention this fact in the Roznamcha (daily .:-diary). ·.He also admitted that the village Sucha Khera. was not within his jurisdiction. He further admitted that the notice for serving which he went to Sucha Khera was with regard to water shoot No. 14750 at Sucha Khera. In answer to a question whether he only saw the accused running away or doing something else, he categorically stated that he did not see those persons causing injuries but only saw t)lem running away.\n\nThereupon the Sessions Judge told him that in his examination-inchief he had said that he had seen Mange and Ram Chander causing injuries and that if he made inconsistent statements oii material points he could be prosecuted for perjury. The Sessions Judge has made a note to this effect in the deposition itself. In answer to a further question P.W. 8 stated that when they were running away their backs were towards him.\n\nThe Sessions fudge once again repeated the warning which he had given earlier. The Sessions note with regard to the. first warning is in the following words:\n\n\"The witness has been explained right here his statement\n\nwhich has gone on record and he has been told that in examination-in-chief he has said that he had seen Mange and Ram H Chander causing injuries.\n\nHe had also been informed that\n\na person can be prosecuted for perjury if on material points inconsistent statements are made.\"\n\nThe second warning which was given by the learned Sessions Judge has been recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in the following words:\n\n\"As was pointed out to you yesterday also, it is once more pointed out to you that in examination-in-chief yesterday, you clearly stated before the Court that you saw Ram Chander and Mange causing injuries to Dunni. Later on in cross-examination by Shri Shamsher Singh you said that you saw the accused persons running away. You have already been warned about the consequences of inconsistent replies. Without fear or favour tell the Court, which of the two statements is correct and whether you saw Mange and Ram Chander causing injuries to Dunni or not.\"\n\nTo this questiorn the answer of the witness was that when he was at some distance _he saw them causing injuries but by the time he went near they had run away. P. W. 9 stated even in his chief examination that when he saw Mange and Ram Chander, they were running in the direction of Denuda.\n\nRam Chander had a danda.\n\nMange was empty handed. They started beating a person who was coming from Denuda side. He tried to rescue, the person. He was given a blow on his head with a stick.\n\nHe felt giddy and sat down.\n\nHe did not know what happened afterwards because he was feeling faint. He came tohis senses when Lambardar andPatwari came there.\n\nThen he went to his '!illage: He stated in cross-examination that on 15th. he was .calkd by.the Police and taken to the field and from the field he was taken to Narwana where he was kept in: the Police Station upto 16th.\n\nHe was allowed to go away after his statement was recorded by the Magistrate under S. 164_ Cr. Procedure Code.\n\nJiwana was also there at that time. When he was asked whether the statement which .he made to the Magistrate was tutored his reply was \"Yes, the statement was told\". Later again he said \"I gave the statement as told by the police.\" He stated that he was not beaten but only threatened.\n\nHe further stated that the day before he gave evidence in Court he was threatened by the Police that if he did not give the statement he would himself be involved in a case.\n\nHe also said that he wanted to say whatever he actually saw but the police did not agree and said that he must give the entire statement as mentioned by them.\n\nDuring the course of the cross-examination of\n\n---...<--\n\nI r\n\nI \"\n\n\\ '\n\nthe witness the learned Sessions Judge made two notes which may be A extracted here. The first note runs :\n\n\"This time the witness says that the police said that the police will make a case against him. Previously the witness was not prepared to go to that extent. I wonder whether the witness understands the difference between two things namely that the Police will make a case against him and between this that if he changed his statement he will involve himself in a case. The matter to be appreciated at appropriate stage.\n\nThe second note is as follows :\n\n\"I will examine the witness through Court questions as to which part of' the statement he admits to be correct without fear of the police. The learned defence counsel may proceed further to build up his defence.\"\n\nThereafter the learned Sessibns Judge himself put some questions to the witness. The witness said that he did not tell the Magistrate that he was making the statement under the pressure of the Police.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge then put him the following question : \"You have said that even before me yoti are makihg a statement under the pressure of the police.\n\nPlease state whether you mean it. and you were giving the statement under pressure of the police.\" The answer was that \"I am giving the statement freely.\" The learned Sessions Judge put him a few more questions one of which was whether he was honestly stating that Mange was bare headed and Ram Chander had a dunda.\n\nThe witness answered that lie said so honestly.\n\nThe questions put by the learned Sessions Judge, particularly the threats held out to the witnesses that if they changed their statements they would involve themselves in prosecutions for perjury were certainly intimidating, coming as they did from the presiding judge. The learned Sessions Judge appeared to have become irate that the witnesses were not sticking to the statements made by them under sections 161 and 164 and were probably giving false evidence before him. In an effort to compel them to speak what he thought must be the truth, the learned Sessions Judge, very wrongly, in our opinion, firmly rebuked them and virtually threatened them, with prosecutions for perjury. He left his seat and entered the ring, we may say.\n\nThe principle of 'fair trial' was abandoned. We find it impossible to justify the attitude adopted by the Sessions Judge and we also find it\n\nA impossible to accept any portion of the evidence of P. Ws 8 and 9, the two alleged eye witnesses.\n\nShri Bhagat very ingeniously argued that the evidence of P.Ws 8 and 9 could yet be acted upon to the extent their evidence was substantiated by the first information report given by P.W.2.\n\nWhen we pointed out that neither PW 8 nor PW9 was the author of the first information report and, therefore, the report could not be used to corroborate their evidence, Shri Bhagat suggested that we could do so by invoking the provisions of Section 11 of the Evidence Act.\n\nHe relied upon the following observations of Beg J. in Ram Kumar\n\nPande v. The State of Madhya Pradesh :(1)\n\n\"No doubt, an F.I.R. is a previous statement which can, strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict the maker of it. But, in this case, it had been made by the father of the murdered boy to whom all the important facts of the occurrence, so far as they were known up to 9.15 p.m. on 23-3-1970, were bound to have been communicated. If his daughters had seen the appellant inflicting a blow of Harbinder Singh, the father would certainly have mentioned it in the F.I.R. We think that omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilitie> of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case\".\n\nBeg, J, apparently had the first part of Section 11 in mind and thought that the presence of the daughters at the scene was inconsistent with the failure of the father to refer to their presence in the first information report having regard to the circumstances under which the report must have been made.\n\nEven assuming that under certain circumstances it .is permissible to use the first information report under the first part of Section 11 (we say nothing about the correctness of the view), there is in the present case no question of invoking the first part of Section 11, which is inapplicable since the first information report is now not sought to be used as being inconsistent with the prosecution case.\n\nNor do we think that the first information report can b.e used by resort to the second part of section 11.\n\nThe Evidence Act contains detailed provisions dealing with statements of persons who cannot be called as witnesses and former statemenLS of persons who are called as witnesses. These\n\n<ll [1975] 3 s.c.R. 519@ s22 .\n\nprovisions would appear to become redundant if the evidence of a witness is to be tested and accepted or rejected with reference to the former statement of another witness, on the ground that such former statement renders the evidence _highly probable or improbable.\n\nWe can do no better than to refer to Stephen, the framer of the Section who said : \"It may possibly be argued that the effect of the second paragraph of Section 11 would be to admit proof of such facts as these (viz. statements as to facts by persons not called as witness; transactions similar to but unconnected with the facts in issue; opinions formed by persons as to facts in issue or relevant facts). It may, for instance, be said: A (not called as a witness) was heard to declare that he had seen B commit a crime. This makes highly probable that B did commit that crime. Therefore A's declaration is a relevant fact under Section 11 this was not the intention of the section as is shown by the elaborate provision contained in the following part of Chapter 11 (Sections 31 to 39) as the particular classes of statements, which are regarded as relevant facts either because the circumstances under which they are made invest them with importance, or because no better evidence can be got. The sort of facts which the section was intended to include are facts which either exclude or imply more or less distinctly the existence of the facts sought to be proved\". We, therefore, do not think that section 11 may be invoked in the present case, in the manner suggested by the learned counsel. In the result we acc)pt the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and direct the appellant to be set at liberty forthwith. - -\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "RAM CHANDER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ram H Chander", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 241, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dunni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 576, "end_char": 581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mange were tried by the, learitelf',.:Additional Sessions Judge, .Jind, for the murder of Dunni.", "canonical_name": "Dunni"}}, {"text": "Inpian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 644, "end_char": 661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4136, "end_char": 4146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4219, "end_char": 4229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4668, "end_char": 4691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Pande ••The State of Madhya Pradesh, [l9J5} ~·,, S.C,!L. 519@\n\n522, d.issed .. ti'J , ... .• ·,.1••. 113 ,.,._,. ?:"}}, {"text": "Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6852, "end_char": 6857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(i) Pollock 3ncfMa.itJand: The HiStory of English laW.\n\n(2~ Jones v .. National .C!oa~, Board, .[1957] 2 All."}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7894, "end_char": 7905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8188, "end_char": 8214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Birkett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9049, "end_char": 9056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "explained by Lord Justice Birkett :\n\n\"People accustomed to the procedure of the Court are likely to be over-awed or frightened, or cofused; or distressed when under the ordeal of prolonged questioning 'from the presiding Judge."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9752, "end_char": 9759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "not only that witnesses will be unable to present the evidence they may wish, but the parties may begin to think, quite wrongly it may be, that the judge is not holding the scales of justice quite eventualy\"(1)\n\nIn Jones v. National Coal Board Lord [Justice Denning observed :\n\n\"The Judge's part in all this is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions of witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been over looked or left obscure; to see that the advoctes behave themselves seemly and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevancies and discourage repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the points that the advocates are making and can assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies.", "canonical_name": "Denning"}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10445, "end_char": 10452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may go further than Lord Denning and say that it is the duty of a judge to discover the truth and for that purpose he may \"ask any question, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact, relevant orirrelevant\" (Sec.", "canonical_name": "Denning"}}, {"text": "Sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10662, "end_char": 10670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Chander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11322, "end_char": 11333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Chander and, Mange were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind, for the murder of Dunni.", "canonical_name": "Ram H Chander"}}, {"text": "Mange", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11339, "end_char": 11344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Chander and, Mange were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind, for the murder of Dunni."}}, {"text": "Sec. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11455, "end_char": 11463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11474, "end_char": 11481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11482, "end_char": 11499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram Chander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11614, "end_char": 11625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the High Court acquitted Mange but confirmed the conviction of Ram Chander.", "canonical_name": "Ram H Chander"}}, {"text": "February 14, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11660, "end_char": 11677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was that on February 14, 1974, at about 11 a.m. Dunni was proceeding from his field towards the village, Sucha Khera and was\n\n(1) Extracted by Lord Denning in Jones v.\n\nNational ."}}, {"text": "Dunni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11696, "end_char": 11701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was that on February 14, 1974, at about 11 a.m. Dunni was proceeding from his field towards the village, Sucha Khera and was\n\n(1) Extracted by Lord Denning in Jones v.\n\nNational .", "canonical_name": "Dunni"}}, {"text": "Sucha Khera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11753, "end_char": 11764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was that on February 14, 1974, at about 11 a.m. Dunni was proceeding from his field towards the village, Sucha Khera and was\n\n(1) Extracted by Lord Denning in Jones v.\n\nNational ."}}, {"text": "Mewa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12026, "end_char": 12030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mewa (P.W.9) who was working in his field tried to rescue Ram Chander."}}, {"text": "Hari Chand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12175, "end_char": 12185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the alarm raised by Dunni, Hari Chand (P~W.8) and Jiwana (P.W.2) and others came there and witnessed the occJii; rence."}}, {"text": "Jiwana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12198, "end_char": 12204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the alarm raised by Dunni, Hari Chand (P~W.8) and Jiwana (P.W.2) and others came there and witnessed the occJii; rence."}}, {"text": "n Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12403, "end_char": 12410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d~ the way he met bh:n Singh (P.W. 10), ad told P, ini about the 9ccurrel1<; e~ Jiwana thereafter went to the Police Station at Narwana and lodged the First Information'Report at' ab()ut s.is p.m. The\n\nSb Inspector of Polke went to the village."}}, {"text": "Narwana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12510, "end_char": 12517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d~ the way he met bh:n Singh (P.W. 10), ad told P, ini about the 9ccurrel1<; e~ Jiwana thereafter went to the Police Station at Narwana and lodged the First Information'Report at' ab()ut s.is p.m. The\n\nSb Inspector of Polke went to the village."}}, {"text": "Polke", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12600, "end_char": 12605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d~ the way he met bh:n Singh (P.W. 10), ad told P, ini about the 9ccurrel1<; e~ Jiwana thereafter went to the Police Station at Narwana and lodged the First Information'Report at' ab()ut s.is p.m. The\n\nSb Inspector of Polke went to the village."}}, {"text": "Sucha Khera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12865, "end_char": 12876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\iras: sent to fetch thein from Sucha Khera."}}, {"text": "Mewa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12959, "end_char": 12963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to examine Mewa but Hari Chand \\Vas 1iott~ be found."}}, {"text": "Hari Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12968, "end_char": 12978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to examine Mewa but Hari Chand \\Vas 1iott~ be found."}}, {"text": "s. 2, 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13486, "end_char": 13493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mange", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14020, "end_char": 14025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mange was notarmed with any weapon though he."}}, {"text": "Ram Chander", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14088, "end_char": 14099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was present alongwith Ram Chander .. The learned Sessions Judge convicted both ."}}, {"text": "Ram -Chander.\n\nIt ws' argued by Shri Kapil Sibal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14284, "end_char": 14332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram -Chander."}}, {"text": "Sibal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14546, "end_char": 14551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sibal also submitted that the accused did not have a fair trial as the learned Sessions Judge particularly assumed the role of a Prosecutor."}}, {"text": "16.2.74", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15391, "end_char": 15398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police examined him on 16.2.74."}}, {"text": "14th and 15th.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15505, "end_char": 15519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the circumstance that .he was not available for examination by the Police on 14th and 15th."}}, {"text": "Ram H Chander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16925, "end_char": 16938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "first warning is in the following words:\n\n\"The witness has been explained right here his statement\n\nwhich has gone on record and he has been told that in examination-in-chief he has said that he had seen Mange and Ram H Chander causing injuries.", "canonical_name": "Ram H Chander"}}, {"text": "Shamsher Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17479, "end_char": 17493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on in cross-examination by Shri Shamsher Singh you said that you saw the accused persons running away."}}, {"text": "Denuda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18066, "end_char": 18072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 9 stated even in his chief examination that when he saw Mange and Ram Chander, they were running in the direction of Denuda."}}, {"text": "Lambardar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18393, "end_char": 18402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He came tohis senses when Lambardar andPatwari came there."}}, {"text": "andPatwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18403, "end_char": 18413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He came tohis senses when Lambardar andPatwari came there."}}, {"text": "S. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18732, "end_char": 18738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jiwana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18761, "end_char": 18767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jiwana was also there at that time."}}, {"text": "sections 161 and 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21364, "end_char": 21384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21949, "end_char": 21955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Bhagat very ingeniously argued that the evidence of P.Ws 8 and 9 could yet be acted upon to the extent their evidence was substantiated by the first information report given by P.W.2."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22375, "end_char": 22385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22453, "end_char": 22456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He relied upon the following observations of Beg J. in Ram Kumar\n\nPande v. The State of Madhya Pradesh :(1)\n\n\"No doubt, an F.I.R. is a previous statement which can, strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict the maker of it."}}, {"text": "23-3-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22817, "end_char": 22826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in this case, it had been made by the father of the murdered boy to whom all the important facts of the occurrence, so far as they were known up to 9.15 p.m. on 23-3-1970, were bound to have been communicated."}}, {"text": "Harbinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22927, "end_char": 22942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If his daughters had seen the appellant inflicting a blow of Harbinder Singh, the father would certainly have mentioned it in the F.I.R. We think that omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilitie> of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case\"."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23112, "end_char": 23122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23235, "end_char": 23245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23627, "end_char": 23637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23761, "end_char": 23771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24004, "end_char": 24014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24226, "end_char": 24229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24538, "end_char": 24545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We can do no better than to refer to Stephen, the framer of the Section who said : \"It may possibly be argued that the effect of the second paragraph of Section 11 would be to admit proof of such facts as these (viz."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24654, "end_char": 24664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25131, "end_char": 25141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 31 to 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25270, "end_char": 25287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25703, "end_char": 25713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25934, "end_char": 25940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_137_141_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SMT. KHATOON BEGUM ETC. ETC\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nMarch 9, 1981\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J\n\nConstitution af India, I950, Article 22(5) -Whether delay in considering the representation made by a detenu vitiates the detention under the National Security Act.\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court HELD : 1 : 1. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution en3oms a duty on the authority making the order of detention to afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. The right and obligation to make and to consider the representation at the earliest opportunity is a constitutional imperative which cannot be curtailed or abridged. [140 E]\n\nI : 2. If the Parliament or the State Legislature making the law providing for preventive detention devises a circumlocutory procedure for considering the representation or if the inter-departmental consultative procedures are such D that delay becomes inevitable, the law and the procedures will contravene the constitutional mandate.\n\n[140 F]\n\nI : 3. It is essential that any law providing for preventive detention and any authority obliged to make order for preventive detention should adopt procedures calculated towards expeditious consideration of representations made by detenus. It will be no answer to a demand for liberty to say that administrative red tape makes delay inevitable. The constitutional mandate brooks no unreasonable delay in the consideration of a representation. [140 G, 141A]\n\nI : 4. The right of detenu to have his representation considered \"at the earliest opportunity\" and the obligation of the detaining aLithority to consider the representation \"at the earliest opportunity\" are not a right and an obligation flowing from either the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities, 1974 or the National Security Act or, for that matter any other Parliamentary or State law providing for preventive detention. They are a right and an obligation created by the very Constitution which breathes life into the Parliamentary or State law.\n\n[140 DJ\n\nJayanarayan Sukut v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 225; Narendra Purshotam Umrao etc. v. B.B. Gujral and Ors., [1979] 2 SCR 315; V.J. Jain v.\n\nPradhan, AIR 1979 SC 1501; Smt. Ichhu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and Ors.; AIR 1980 SC 1983; Ramachandra A. Kamat v. Union of India and Ors. [1980] 2 SCR 1072; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W. C. Khambra and Ors .. [1980] 2 SCR\n\nI 09 5, referred to. ·\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 293, 391 and 392 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and Shakeel Ahmed for the Petitioners.\n\nR.K. Bhatt, D. Goburdhan and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of.the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. These three Writ Petitions may be disposed of by a single judgment since the principal question argued in\n\nall the three cases is one. The question is whether delay in considering the representation made by a detenu under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution vitiates a detention under the National Security Act and entitles the detenu to be released on that ground alone.\n\nAs a result of a series of decisions of this Court, (1) it is now well settled that the representation made by a detenu under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution against his detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, must be considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition and that any unexplained delay in considering the representation will be fatal to the detention. The learned counsel for the State .of Uttar Pradesh urged that the rule requiring expeditious consideration of a detenu's representation is a judge-made rule based on provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of the Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, and that the extension of the application of the rule to cases of detention under the National Security Act was unwarranted.\n\nThe learned counsel contrasted the provisions of the National Security Act and the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, and urged that in the case of detention under the National Security Act, a certain amount of delay was inevitable having due regard to the procedure prescribed by the Act and,\n\n(1)\n\n(a) Jayanarayan Sukut v. State of West Bengal\n\n[1970] 3 SCR 225\n\n(b) Narendra Purshotam Umrao etc. v. B.B. Gujral & Ors.\n\n[1979] 2 SCR 315:\n\n(c) Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India and Ors.,\n\n(1980] 2 SCR 1072\n\n(d) Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra and Ors.\n\n(1980] 2 SCR 1095;\n\n(e) V.J. Jain v. Pradhan\n\nAIR 1979 SC 1501 H\n\n(f) Smt. Jchhu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and Ors.\n\nAIR 1980 SC 1983.\n\nJ /\n\n._.,.\n\nSMT. KHATOON BEGUM v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 139\n\ntherefore, delay in consideration of the representation should not be allowed to prejudice the detention.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel.\n\nWe will presently give our reasons for our inability to accept the learned counsel's submissions but we will first like to refer to a few facts.\n\nIn Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 293 of 1981 the order and the grounds of detention were served on the detenu on October 30,\n\n1980 and November l, 1980 respectively. The detenu made a representation on November 12, 1980.\n\nThough according to the detenu he has received no communication from the Government about his representation, the Additional District Magistrate has stated in his counter-affidavit that the representation was rejected on December 9, 1980 and that it was communicated to the detenu through the Superintendent of the Central Jail. The counter-affidavit mentions not a word to explain the delay in considering the representation. The only reference to the representation in the counter-affidavit is in these two sentences: \"It is admitted that the detenu made a representation to the Home Secretary on November 12, 1980, and the same was rejected on December 9, 1980. The rejection of the representation was communicated to the detenu through Superintendent, Central Jail by the Government\".\n\nSimilarly in Writ Petition (Criminal No. 391 of 1981, the order and the grounds of detention were served on the detenu on November 12, 1980.\n\nThe representation was rejected on December 10, 1980.\n\nIn the counter affidavit filed by the Section Officer, Confidential Department, of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, it is stated that on receipt of the representation, the Secretary, Home Department, forwarded it to the District Magistrate for his comments. In order to meet the allegations in the representation, the District Magistrate had to gather information from many sources and the representation alongwith his comments was returned to the Home Secretary by the District Magistrate on November 25, 1980.\n\nThereafter Law Department was consulted and the file could reach the Home Minister on December 5, 1980 only.\n\nThe representation was rejected by the Home Minister on December 8, 1980 and then commun, cated to the detenu through the Superintendent, Central Jail.\n\nIn Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 392 of 1981 the order\n\nand the grounds of detention were served on the detenu on H October 16, 1980.\n\nThe detenu made a representation on October 24, 1980. It was rejected on November 25, 1980. The counter-\n\nA affidavit filed by the Additional District Magistrate does not offer any explanation for the delay in the consideration of the representation.\n\nHe has satisfied himself with the statement \"as regards the representation of the detenu . to the Home Secretary this fact is admitted\".\n\nThe question for consideration is whether a person preventively detained under the provisions of the National Security Act is entitled to be released if there is delay in the consideration of the representation made by him to the detaining authority. It is true that the series of cases where delay in the consideration of the representation made by a detenu was held to be fatal to detention were cases which arose under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974.\n\nWe are however, unable to see how that would make any difference.\n\nThe right of detenu to have his representation considered \"at the earlier opportunity\" and the obligation of the detaining authority to consider the representation \"at the earliest opportunity\" are not a right and an obligation flowing from either the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Pr\"evention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974, or the National Security Act or, for that matter any other Parliamentary of State law providing for preventive detention. They are a right and an obligation created by the very Constitution which breathes life into the Parliamentary or State law. Art. 22(5) enjoins a duty on the authority making the order of detention to afford the detenu \"the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order\". The right and obligation to make and to consider the representation at the earliest opportunity is a Constitutional imperative which cannot be curtailed or abridged. If the Parliament or the State legislature making the law providing for preventive detention devises a circumlocutary procedure for considering the representation or if the inter-departmental consultative procedures are such that delay becomes inevitable, the law and the procedures will contravene the constitutional mandate. It is essential that any Jaw providing for preventive detention and any authority obliged to make orders for preventive detention should adopt procedures calculated towards expeditious consideration of representations made by detenus.\n\nIt will be no answer to a demand for liberty to say that administrative red tape makes delay inevitable. The learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh pointed out certain differences between the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention. of Smuggling Activities Act and the National Security Act which according to him make delay inevitable in\n\nl /\n\nSMT. KHATOON BEGUM v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 141\n\nthe consideration of representations in cases of detention under the National Security Act.\n\nWe think that the differences pointed out are irrelevant. The constitutional mandate brooks no unreasonable delay in the consideration of a representation. In the cases before us, in Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 293 of 1981 and 392 of 1981. no explanation was offered by the detaining authority for the delay in the consideration of representations and in Criminal Writ Petition No. 391 of 1981, administrative red tape was the only explanation offered.\n\nWe are satisfied that in all the three cases there was unreasonable delay in the consideration of the representations and the detenus are, therefore, entiled to be released. They will be released forthwith. The Writ Petitions are allowed.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nPetition allowed", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "SMT. KHATOON BEGUM", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SMT."}}, {"text": "ETC\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 9, 1981\n\n(0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 266, "end_char": 287, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336, "end_char": 346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether delay in considering the representation made by a detenu vitiates the detention under the National Security Act", "statute": "Whether delay in considering the representation made by a detenu vitiates the detention under the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 713, "end_char": 723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Parliament or the State Legislature making the law providing for preventive detention devises a circumlocutory procedure for considering the representation or if the inter-departmental consultative procedures are such D that delay becomes inevitable, the law and the procedures will contravene the constitutional mandate."}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1850, "end_char": 1871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2143, "end_char": 2159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 SCR 315", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2216, "end_char": 2232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1979 SC 1501", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2257, "end_char": 2273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 1983", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2328, "end_char": 2344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SCR 1072", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2394, "end_char": 2411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2579, "end_char": 2589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2612, "end_char": 2629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and Shakeel Ahmed for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Shakeel Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2634, "end_char": 2647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and Shakeel Ahmed for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "R.K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Bhatt, D. Goburdhan and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2682, "end_char": 2694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Bhatt, D. Goburdhan and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Bhatt, D. Goburdhan and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3026, "end_char": 3036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3088, "end_char": 3109, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3361, "end_char": 3442, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State .of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the State .of Uttar Pradesh urged that the rule requiring expeditious consideration of a detenu's representation is a judge-made rule based on provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of the Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, and that the extension of the application of the rule to cases of detention under the National Security Act was unwarranted."}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of the Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3799, "end_char": 3884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3972, "end_char": 3993, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4086, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4148, "end_char": 4192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4244, "end_char": 4265, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4423, "end_char": 4439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 SCR 315", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4498, "end_char": 4514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1980] 2 SCR 1072", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4570, "end_char": 4587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1980] 2 SCR 1095", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4642, "end_char": 4659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1979 SC 1501", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4688, "end_char": 4704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 1983", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though according to the detenu he has received no communication from the Government about his representation, the Additional District Magistrate has stated in his counter-affidavit that the representation was rejected on December 9, 1980 and that it was communicated to the detenu through the Superintendent of the Central Jail."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5992, "end_char": 6009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only reference to the representation in the counter-affidavit is in these two sentences: \"It is admitted that the detenu made a representation to the Home Secretary on November 12, 1980, and the same was rejected on December 9, 1980."}}, {"text": "December 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was rejected on December 10, 1980."}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6467, "end_char": 6494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter affidavit filed by the Section Officer, Confidential Department, of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, it is stated that on receipt of the representation, the Secretary, Home Department, forwarded it to the District Magistrate for his comments."}}, {"text": "November 25, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6873, "end_char": 6890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to meet the allegations in the representation, the District Magistrate had to gather information from many sources and the representation alongwith his comments was returned to the Home Secretary by the District Magistrate on November 25, 1980."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6979, "end_char": 6995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Law Department was consulted and the file could reach the Home Minister on December 5, 1980 only."}}, {"text": "October 24, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7326, "end_char": 7342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu made a representation on October 24, 1980."}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7781, "end_char": 7802, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8106, "end_char": 8187, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8561, "end_char": 8590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8599, "end_char": 8620, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8839, "end_char": 8849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "statute": "Smuggling Activities Act 1974"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9868, "end_char": 9890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh pointed out certain differences between the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention."}}, {"text": "Smuggling Activities Act and the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9987, "end_char": 10041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10220, "end_char": 10241, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_142_144_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "AEL TEMESH REIN\n\nCHANDULAL CHANDRAKAR & OTHERS\n\nMarch 10, 1981\n\n(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD C.J., AND A.P., SEN, J.)\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951-Sections 86 and 117 whether ultravires of Article 329(b) of the Constitution.\n\nThe appellant was a candidate for Election to the Lok Sabha in the General Elections. Respondent 1 was declared the successful candidate. The appellant filed Election Petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951. The appellant expressly stated in his Election Petition that security amount of Rs. 2,000/- was being deposited along with the petition as required by section 117 of the Act but, in fact, no such deposit was made. The High Court dismissed the petition for non-compliance with the provisions of section 117.\n\nOn Appeal to this Court, the appellant argued that sections 86 and 117 of the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951 are ultra vires Article 329(b) of the Constitution and, therefore, the High Court was in error in dismissing the election petition for non-compliance of section 117.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : (I) The Constitution by Article 329(b), has conferred authority on the appropriate legislature to pass a law providing for the authority to which the election petition may be presented and the manner of providing it. The provision of law which prescribes that an election petition shall be accompanied by the payment of security amount pertains to the area covered by the manner of the making of the election petition and is, therefore, within the authority of the Parliament. [143 G-H]\n\n(2) The question as to what is the consequence of non-compliance with section 117 of the Act has been settled by the decision of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Nand Kishore Bhatt and Others [1974] 1 S.C.R. 294. [144 A]\n\n(3) The High Court was right in dismissing the election petition summarily in view of section 86(1) of the Act. [144 CJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1980.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25.3.1980 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 3/80.\n\nAeltemesh Rein Appellant in person.\n\nAELTEMESH REIN v. CHANDULAL (Chandrachud, CJ.) 143\n\nG.N. Rao and C.L. Sahu for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nThe appellant, Aeltemesh Rein, was a candidate for election to the Lok Sabha from the Durg Parliamentary Constituency in the General Elections held in January 1980. Respondent 1 having been declared as a successful candidate in the aforesaid election, the petitioner filed an election petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under s. 81 of the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951 ('The Act'). The appellant stated expressly in his election petition that the security amount of Rs. 2,000/- was being deposited along with the petition as required by s. 117 of the Act but, in fact, no such deposit was made.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the petition for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 117 and hence this appeal.\n\nIt is urged by the appellant who appeared in person before us that sections 86 and 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are ultra vires Article 329(b) of the Constitution and, therefore, the High Court was in error in dismissing the election petition for the reason that the provisions of s.117 were not complied with. We see no substance in this contention. Article 329(b) of the Constitution provid- . es, in so far as material, that no election to either House of Parliament\n\nshall be called in question except by an election petition \"presented\n\nto such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature\". It is in pursuance of this provision that the Parliament provided by s. 117 of the Act that at the time of presenting an election petition, the petitioner shall deposit in the High Court, in accordance with the rules of the High Court, a sum of Rs. 2,000/- .as security for the costs of the resp:mdent.\n\nWe are unable to accept the petitioner's argument that the words \"in such manner\" which occur in Article 329(b) are limited in their operation to procedural and not substantive requirements. The Constitution, by the aforesaid clause, has conferred author.ity on the appropriate legislature to pass a law providing for the authority to which the election petition may be presented and the manner of providing it.\n\nThe provision of law which prescribes that an election petition shall be accompanied by the payment of security amount pertains to the area covered by the manner of the making of the election petition and is, therefore, within the authority of the Parliament.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 S.C.k\n\nThe only question which survives is as to what is the consequence (of non-compliance with s. 117 of the Act. That question has been settled by the decision of this court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Nand Kishore Bhatt and Ors.(1) wherein it was held that the High Court has no option but to reject an election petition which is not accompanied by the payment of security amount as provided in s. 117 of the Act.\n\nSection 86(1) of the Act provides that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117. In that view of the . matter, the High Court was right in dismissing the election petition summarily. ·\n\nThe appellant contended that he could not pay the deposit because he was burgled on way to the Court. - This plea is as irrelevant as it seems untrue.\n\nAccordingly, we uphold the Judgment of the High Court and dismiss this appeal. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "AEL TEMESH REIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AEL TEMESH REIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDULAL CHANDRAKAR & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDULAL CHANDRAKAR & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 10, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AEL TEMESH REIN\n\nCHANDULAL CHANDRAKAR & OTHERS\n\nMarch 10, 1981\n\n(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD C.J., AND A.P., SEN, J.)\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951-Sections 86 and 117 whether ultravires of Article 329(b) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEN, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 86 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 409, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 427, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 619, "end_char": 630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951"}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 762, "end_char": 773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951"}}, {"text": "sections 86 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 827, "end_char": 846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951"}}, {"text": "Respresentation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 854, "end_char": 893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 910, "end_char": 924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provision of law which prescribes that an election petition shall be accompanied by the payment of security amount pertains to the area covered by the manner of the making of the election petition and is, therefore, within the authority of the Parliament. ["}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1660, "end_char": 1671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Respresentation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "[1974] 1 S.C.R. 294", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1782, "end_char": 1801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1898, "end_char": 1911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aeltemesh Rein", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2103, "end_char": 2117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aeltemesh Rein Appellant in person.", "canonical_name": "AEL TEMESH REIN"}}, {"text": "G.N. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2192, "end_char": 2200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "143\n\nG.N. Rao and C.L. Sahu for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "C.L. Sahu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2205, "end_char": 2214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "143\n\nG.N. Rao and C.L. Sahu for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2281, "end_char": 2292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nThe appellant, Aeltemesh Rein, was a candidate for election to the Lok Sabha from the Durg Parliamentary Constituency in the General Elections held in January 1980."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2602, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 1 having been declared as a successful candidate in the aforesaid election, the petitioner filed an election petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under s. 81 of the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951 ('The Act')."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2637, "end_char": 2642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2673, "end_char": 2689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "sections 86 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3095, "end_char": 3114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3122, "end_char": 3160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3177, "end_char": 3191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s.117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3400, "end_char": 3414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3778, "end_char": 3784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4110, "end_char": 4124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 S.C.k", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4687, "end_char": 4723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 S.C.k\n\nThe only question which survives is as to what is the consequence (of non-compliance with s. 117 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5111, "end_char": 5117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5131, "end_char": 5144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 81, 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5265, "end_char": 5280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_145_164_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "KHATRI & ORS. ETC. v.\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS.\n\n'March 10, 1981\n\n[P.N. BHAGWATI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Article 32-Production by the State of certain documents called for by the Supreme Court, whether barred by sections 162 to 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, when the State does not claim privilege in regard to them under section 123 or section 124 of the Indian Evidence Act-Scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution-Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, object and scope, explained-Whether investigation ordered by the State Government under section 3 of the Indian Police Act, 186! is an investigation under Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the reports submitted pursuant thereto, form part of \"case diary\" within the meaning of section 172 of Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe petitioners are certain undertrials in the State of Bihar. In the Writ Petitions filed by them under Article 32 of the Constitution they complained that after their arrest, whilst under police custody they were blinded by the members of the police force, acting not in their private capacity but as police officials and their fundamental right to life guarnteed under Article 21 was therefore, violated and for this violation the State is liable to pay compensation to them. On an application made by the petitioners, several documents including C.I.D. Reports submitted by Shri L.V. Singh, D.I.G., C.l.D, (Anti Dacoity) on December 9, 1980\n\nand other dates were called for by the Court. The State raised an objection to the production of these documents on the ground that they are protected from disclosure under sections 162 to 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and that the petitioners are not entitled to see them or to make any use of them in the present proceedings.\n\nOverruling the State objection and directing the Registry to supply copies of these documents produced before the Court, to the petitioner's advocate and the advocate appearing as amicus curiae, the Court\n\nHELD : 1 :I. The reports submitted by Shri L.V. Singh setting forth the results of his investigation cannot be shut out from being produced and considered in evidence either under section 162 or 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code, even if they refer to any statements made before him and his associates during investigation, provided they are otherwise relevant under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. In a writ petition against the State Government where the complaint is that the police officials of the State Government blinded the petitioners at the time of arrest or whilst in custody, the State Government cannot resist production of a report in regard to the truth or otherwise of the complaint, made by a highly placed officer pursuant to the direction issued by the State Government.\n\n(163 B-D]\n\nI :2. All the other reports covered by Items 2 to 5 of the Court's order dated 16th February, 1981 are equally relevant and must, therefore, be produced and taken on record in the writ petition. (164 B-C]\n\n2:1. The procedure to be followed in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, and sub-rule (9) of Rule 10 lays down that at the hearing of the rule nisi if the court is of the opinion that an opportunity be given to the parties to establish their respective cases by leading further evidence, the court may take such evidence or cause such evidence to be taken in such manner as it may deem fit and proper and obviously the reception of such evidence will be governed by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. It is obvious, therefore, that even a statement made before a police officer during investigation can be produced and used in evidence in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution provided it is relevant under the Indian Evidence Act and neither section 162 nor section 172 can be urged as a bar against its production or use.\n\n[ 153 C-E]\n\n3:1. When the Court trying the writ petition proceeds to inquire into the issue whether the petitioners were blinded by police officials at the time of arrest or whilst in police custody, it does so, not for the purpose of adjudicating upon the guilt of any particular officer with a view to punishing him but for the purpose of deciding whether the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 21 has been violated and the State is liable to pay compensation to them for such violation. The nature and object of the inquiry is altogether different from that in a criminal case and any decision arrived at in the writ petition on this issue cannot have any relevance much less any binding effect, in criminal proceeding which may be taken against a particular police officer. [160 G-H, 161 A-Bl\n\n4. The pendency of a criminal proceeding cannot be urged as a bar against the Court trying a ci vii proceeding or a: writ petition where a similar issue is involved. The two are entirely distinct and separate proceedings and neither is a bar against the other. It may be that in a given case, if the investigation is still proceeding, the Court may defer the. inquiry before it until the investigation is completed or if the Court considers it necessary in the interests of Justice, it may postpone its inquiry even after the prosecution following upon the investigation is terminated, but that is a matter entirely for the exercise of the discretion of the Court and there is no bar precluding the Court from proceeding with the inquiry before it merely because the investigation or prosecution is pending.\n\n[161 D-E]\n\n5. The fact in issue in the inquiry before the Court in the present writ petition is whether the petitioners were blinded by the members of the police force at the time of the arrest or whilst in police custody. The several reports called for by the Court deary relate to the issue as to how, in what manner and by whom the twenty-four undertrial prisoners were blinded, for that is the matter which Shri L.V. Singh was directed by the State Government to investigate. If that be so, the State cannot resist the production of these reports and their use as evidence in the present proceeding. These reports are clearly relevant under section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act since they relate to a fact in issue and are made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty. [161F,162 A-D]\n\nP.C.P. Reddiar v. S. Perumal, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 646; Kanwar Lal Gupta v.\n\nAmar Nath Chawla, [1975] 3 S.C.C. 646; followed.\n\nJagdat v. Sheopal, A.LR. 1927 Oudh 323; Chandulal v.'Pushkar Rai, A.l.R. 1952 Nagpur 271 ; Lionel/ Edwards Limited v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R, J 967 Cal. 191, quoted with approval.\n\n6. Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 makes it clear that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are applicable where an offence under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law is being investigated, inquired into tried or otherwise dealt with. [151 B-C]\n\n7. Section 162 bars the use of any statement made before a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XII, whether recorded in a police diary or otherwise, but, by the express terms of the Section, this bar is applicable only where such statement is sought to be used \"at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made\". If the statement made before the police officer in the course of an investigation under chapter XII is sought to be used in any proceeding other than an inquiry or trial or even at an inquiry or trial but in respect of an offence other than that which was under investigation at the time when such statement was made, the bar of section 162 would not be attracted. [152 A-Cl\n\n7:2. Section 162 has been enacted for benefit of the accused and to protect him against overzealous police officers and untruthful witnesses. But, this protection is unnecessary in any proceeding other than an inquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation and hence the bar created by the section is a limited bar. It has no application in a civil proceeding or in a proceeding under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution and a statement made before a police officer in the course of investigation can be used as evidence in such proceeding, provided it is otherwise relevant unde~ the Indian Evinence Act. [152 D, H, 153 A-BJ\n\nTehsildar Singh and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 875 at 890, applied.\n\nEmperor v. Aftab Mohd. Khan, A.LR. 1940 All. 291 ; Baliram Tikaram Maratha v. Emperor, A.LR. 1945 Nagpur I ; Malakalaya Surya Rao v.\n\nJanakamma, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 198; approved.\n\n8:1. Sub-section (2) of section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the criminal court holding an inquiry or trial of a case to send for the police diary of the case and the criminal court can use such diary, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. But, by reason of sub-section\n\n(3) of section 172, merely because the case diary is referred to by the criminal court, neither the accused nor his agents are entitled to call for such diary nor are they entitled to see it. If however the case diary is used by the police officer who bas made it to refresh his memory or if the criminal court uses it for the purpose of contradicting such police officer tn the inquiry or trial, the provisions of section 161 or section 145, as the case may be of the Indian Evidence Act would apply and the accused would be entitled to see the particular entry in the case diary which has been referred to for either of these purposes and so much of the diary as in the opinion of the Court is necessary to a full understanding of the particular entry so used. [156 C-D]\n\nQueen-Empress v. Mannu, [1897] 19 All. 390, quoted with approval.\n\n\n8:2. The bar against production and use of case diary enacted in section . 172 is intended to operate only in an inquiry or trial for an offence and eve'n this\n\nbar is a limited bar, because in an inquiry or trial, the bar does not operate if the case diary is used by the police officer for refreshing his memory or the criminal court uses it for the purpose of contradicting such police officer.\n\nThis bar can obviously have no application where a case diary is sought to be produced and used in evidence in a civil proceeding or in a proceeding under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution and particularly when the party calling for the case diary is neither an accused nor his agent in respect of the offence to which the case diary relates. The present writ petition which has been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 is neither an \"inquiry\" nor a \"trial\" for an offence nor is this court hearing the writ petition a criminal court nor are the petitioners, accused or their agents so far as the offences arising out of their blinding are concerned. Therefore, even if the reports submitted by Shrl L.V. Singh as a result of his investigation could be said to form part of \"case diary\" their production and use in the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be said to be barred under section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [156 DG, 157 A-BJ\n\n9:1. It would not be right to extend the prohibition of section 172 to cases n.ot falling strictly within the terms of the section, by appealing to what may be regarded as the principle OJ spirit of the section. In fact to do so would be inconsistent with the constitutional commitment of the Supreme Court to the rule of law. Either p1 eduction and use of case diary in a proceeding is barred under the terms of section 172 or it is not, it cannot be said to be barred on an extended or analogical application of the principle supposed to be underlying that section, if it is not covered by its express terms. In order that truth may emerge from the clash between contesting parties under the adversary system, it is necessary that all facts relevant to the inquiry must be brought before the Court and no relevant fact must b~ snut-out, for otherwise the Court may get a distorted or incomplete picture of the facts and that might result in mis-carriage of justice.\n\nIt is imperative to the proper functioning of the judicial process and satisfactory and certain ascertainment of truth that all relevant facts must be made available to the Court. But the law may, in exceptional cases, in order to protect more weighty and compelling competing interests, provide that a particular piece of evidence, though relevant, shall not be liable to be produced or called in evidence. Such exceptions are to be found, inter alia, in sections 122, 123 124, 126 and 129 of the Indian Evidence Act and sections 162 and 172 of the Criminal Proceedure Code But being exceptions to the legitimate demand for reception of all relevant evidence in the interest of justice, they must be strictly interpreted and not expansively construed, \"for they are in derogation of the search for truth\".\n\n[157 E-H, 158 A-CJ\n\nUnited Stales v. Nixon, 418 US 683: 41 Lawyers Edition (2nd series) 1039, quoted with app1oval.\n\nJO.\n\nThe Court did not express any opinion regarding the two interesting questions, (i) whether an investigation carried out by a superior officer by virtue of a direction given to him by the State G Jvernrmnt under se: tion 3 of the Indian p9Jice Act, 1861 is an investigation under Chapter XII so as to attract the applicability of section 172 to a diary nnintained by him in the curse of such investigation and (ii) whether the report made by such officer as a result of the investigation carried out by him forms part of case diary within the meaning of section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [155 D-G]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 5670 and 6216 A of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the C_onstitution)\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani, Mr. Hingorani, Mukul Mudgal and Dainodar .Prakash for the Petitioners.\n\nK.G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Respondent.\n\nMiss A. Subhashini for the Union of India.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by,\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThe question which arises before us for consideration is whether certain documents called for by the Court by its Order dated 16th February, 1981 are liable to be produced by the State or their production is barred under some provision of law.\n\nThe documents called for are set out in the Order dated 16th February, 1981 and they are as follows :\n\n1. the CID report submitted by L.V. Singh, DIG, CID Anti-Dacoity) on December 9, 1980;\n\n2. the CID reports on all the 24 cases submitted by L.V.\n\nSingh and his associates between January 10 and January E 20, 1981 ;\n\n3. the letters number 4/R dated 3rd January, 1981 and number 20/R dated 7th January, 1981 from L.V. Singh to the IG, Police ;\n\nthe files containing all correspondence and notings exchanged between L.V. Singh, DIG and M.K. Jha, Additional IG, regarding the CID inquiry into the blindings, and\n\nthe file (presently in the office of the IG, S.K. Chatterjee containing the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub- Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July or thereabouts and his Jetter to K.D. Singh, SP, CID, Patna which has the hand written observations of M.K. Jha.\n\nThe State has objected to the production of these documents on the ground that they are protected from disclosure under Sections 162 and 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and the petitioners are not entitled to see them or to make any use of them in the present\n\nproceeding. This contention raises a question of some importance and it has been debated with great fervour on both sides but we do not think it presents any serious difficulty in its resolution, if we have regard to the terms of Sections 162 and 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the State.\n\nWe will first consider the question in regard to the reports submitted by Sh. L.V. Singh, Deputy Inspector General CID (Anti- Dacoity) on 9th December, 1980 and the reports submitted by him and his associates Sh. R.R. Prasad, S.P. (Anti-Dacoity) and Smt.\n\nManjuri Jaurahar, S.P. (Anti-Dacoity) between 10th and 20th January, 1981. These reports have been handed over to us for our perusal by Mr. K.G. Bhagat learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State and it is clear from these reports, and that has also been stated before us on behalf of the State, that by an Order dated 28-29th ~November, 1980 made by the State Government under Section 3 of the Indian Police Act 1861, Sh. L.V. Singh was directed by the State Government to investigate into 24 cases of blinding of undertrial prisoners and it was in discharge of this official duty entrusted to him that he with the assistance of his associates Sh. R.R.\n\nPrasad and Smt. Manjuri Jaurahar investigated these cases and made these; reports. These reports set out the conclusions reached by him as a result of his investigation into these cases. The question is whether the production of these reports is hit by Sections 162 and 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It may be pointed out that these are the only provisions of law under which the State resists production of these reports. The State has not claimed privilege in regard to these reports under Section 123 or Section 124 of the Indian Evidence Act. AU that is necessary therefore is to examine the applicability of Sections 162 and 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the present case.\n\nBefore we refer to the provisions of Sections 162 and 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it would be convenient to set out briefly a few relevant provisions of that Code. Section 2 is the definition Section and clause (g) of that Section defines 'Inquiry' to mean \"every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magisitrate or Court\". Clause (h) of Section 2 gives the definition of 'investigation' and it says tbat investigation includes \"all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf\". Section ( 4) provides:\n\nJ /\n\n\"4 (1} All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.\n\n(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.\n\nIt is apparent from this Section that the prov1s10ns of the Criminal Procedure Code are applicable where an offence under the Indian Penal Code or under a1y other law is being investigated, inquired into tried or otherwise dealt with. Then we come straight to Section 162 which occurs in chapter XII dealing with the powers of the Police to investigate into offences. That Section, so far as meterial, reads as under :\n\n\"162 (1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made :\n\nProvided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose ,•statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness , in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness. but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his crossexamination.\n\n(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of claues(l)\n\nof section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act.\"\n\nIt bars the use of any statement made before a police officer in the course of an investigation under chapter XII, whether recorded in a police diary or otherwise, but by the express terms of .the Section this bar is applicable only where such statement is sought, to be used 'at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made'. If the statement made before a police officer in the course of an investigation under chapter XII is sought to be used in any proceeding other than an inquiry or trial or even at an inquiry or trial but in respect of an offence other than that which was under investigation at the time when such statement was made, the bar of Section 162 would not be attracted.\n\nThis section has been enacted for the benefit of the accused, as pointed out by this Court in T'ehsiidar Singh and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(1) it is intended \"to protect the accused against the user of statements of witnesses made before the police during investigation, at the trial presumably on the assumption that the said statements were not made under circumstances inspiring confidence.\" This Court, in Tehsildar Singh's case approved the following observations of Braund, J. in Emperor v. Aftab Mohd. Khan(')\n\n\"As it seems to us it is to protect accused persons from being prejudiced by statements made to police officers who by reason of the fact that an investigation is known to be on foot at the time the statement is made, may be in. a position to influence the maker of it, and, on the other hand, to protect accused persons from the prejudice at the hands of persons who in the knowledge that an investigation has already started, are prepared to tell untruths.\"\n\nand expressed its agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Baliram Tikaram Marathe\n\nv. Emperor(3) that \"the object of the section is to protect the accused both against overzealous police officers and untruthful witnesses.\" Protection against the use of statement made before police during investigation is, therefore, granted to the accused by providing that such statement shall not be allowed to be used except for the limited purpose set out in the proviso to the section, at any inquiry or trial in respect of the offence which was under in-\n\n(1} [1959] Supp 2. S.C.R. 375@ 890\n\n(2) Alll 1940 All. 291\n\n(3) AIR 1945 Nagpur I\n\nI )\n\n..,\n\nvestigation at the time when such statement was made. But this protection is unnecessary in any proceeding other than an inquiry or trial in 'respect of the offence under investigation and hence the bar creaied by the section is a limited bar. It has no application, for example in a civil proceeding or in a proceeding under Article 32 or 226 of the Constituion and a statement made before a police officer in the course of investigation can be used as evidence in such proceeding, provided it is otherwise relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nThere are a number of decisions of various High Courts which have taken this view and amongst them may be mentioned the decision of Jaganmohan Reddy J. in Ma/aka/aya Surya Rao v. Janakamma(1) The present proceeding before tis is a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution filed by the petitioners for enforcing their Fundamental Rights under Article 21 and it is neither an \"inquiry\" nor a \"trial\" in respect of any offence and hence it is difficult to see how section 162 can be invoked by the State in the present case. The procedure to be followed in a writ petition under Article 32 (of the Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, and sub-rule (9) of Rule 10 lays down that at the hearing of the rule-nisi, if the court is of the opinion that an opportunity' be given to the parties to establish their respective cases by leading further evidence the court may take such evidence or cause such evidence to be taken in such mariner as it may deem fit arid proper and obviously the reception of such evidence will be governed. by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. It is obvious, therefore, that even a statement made before a police officer during investigation can be produced and used in evidence in a writ petition under Article 32 provided it is relevant under the indian Evidence Act and section 162 cannot be urged as a bar against its production or se.'Thereports submitted by Shri L. V. Singh setting forth the result of his investigation cannot, in the circumstances, be shut out from being produced and considered in evidence under section 162, even if they refer to all)'. S!atemerits made before him and his associates during investig3.-. tion, provided they are otherwise relevant under some provision of the Indian Evidence Act. . r'\n\nWe now turn to section 172 which is the other section relied upon by the State. That section, reads as follows :-\n\n\" 172. Diary of proceedings in investigation--\n\n( I) Every .police officer making an investigation under this Chapter shall, day by day enter his proceedings in the investi-\n\n(I) AIR 1964 A, P. 1211\n\ngation ih a diary, setting forth the time at which the information reached him, t_he time at which he began and closed his investigation, the place or places visited by him, and a statement of the circumstances ascertained through his investigation.\n\n(2) Any Criminal Court may send for the police diaries of a case under inquiry or trial in such Court, and may use such diaries, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial.\n\n(3) Neither the accused nor his agents shall be entitled to call for such diaries. nor shall he or they be entitled to see them merely because they are referred to by the court; but, if they . are used by the police officer who made them to refresh his memory, or if the court uses them for the purpose of contradicting such police officer, the provisions of section 161 or section ·\n\n.145, as the case may be, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of\n\n1872) shall apply.\n\nThe first question which arises for consideration under this section is whether the reports made by Shri L.V. Singh as a result of the investigation carried out by him and his associates could be said to form part of case diary within the meaning of this section. The argument of Mrs. Hingorani and Dr. Chitale was that these reports did not form part of case diary as contemplated in this section, since the investigation which was carried. out by Shri L.V. Singh was pursuant to a direction given to him by the State Government under section 3 of the Indian Police Act 1861, and it was not an investigation under Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code which alone would attract the applicability of section 172.\n\nMrs. Hingorani sought to support this proposition by relying upon the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldhana(1) Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State however, submitted that even though Shri L.V. Singh carried out the investi\" gation under the direction given by the State Government in exercise of the power conferred under section 3 of the Indian Police Act,\n\n1-861, the investigation carried out by him was one under Chapter XII and section 172 was therefore applicable in respect of the reports made by him setting out the result of the investigation. He conceded that it was undoubtedly laid down by this Court in State of Bihar\n\nv. J.A.C. Saldhana (supra) that the State Government has power to direct investigation or further investiation under section 3 of the\n\n(I) (1910] 2 S.C.R. I'\n\n---J __\n\n.-1._\n\n~ I\n\nIndian Police Act 1861, but contended that it was equally clear from the decision in that case that \"power to direct investigation or further investigation is entirely different from the , method and procedure of investigation and the competence of the person who investigates.\" He urged that section 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that police officers superior in rank to an officer in-charge of a police station may exercise the same powers throughout the local area to which they are appointed as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station and Shri L.V. Singh being the Deputy Inspector General of Police, was superior in rank to an officer incharge of a police station and was, therefore, competent to investigate the offences arising from the blinding of the under-trial prisoners and the State Government acted within its powers under section 3 of the Indian Police Act 1861 in directing Shri L.V. Singh to investigate into these offences. But, \"the method and procedure of investigation\" was to be the same as that prescribed for investigation by an officer in charge of a police statioµ under Chapter XII and therefore the investigation made by Shri L.V. Singh was an investigation under that Chapter so as to bring in the applicability of section 172. These rival contentions raise two interesting questions, first, whether an investigation carried out by. a superior officer by virtue of a direction given to him by the State Government under section 3 of the Indian Police Act, 1861 is an investigation under Chapter XII so as to attract the applicability of section 172 to a diary maintained by him in the course of such investigation and secondly, whether the report made by such officer as a result of the investigation carried out by him forms part of case diary within the meaning of section 172. We do not, however think it necessary to enter upon a consideration of these two questions and we shall assume for the purpose of our discussion that Mr. K.G.\n\nBhagat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, is right in his submission in regard to both these questions and that the reports made by Shri L.V. Singh setting out the result of his investigation form part of case diary so as to invite the applicability of section\n\n172. But, even if that be so, the question is whether these reports are protected from disclosure under section 172 and that depends upon a consideration of the terms of this section.\n\nThe object of section 172 in providing for the maintenance of a diary of his proceedings by the police officer making an investigation under Chapter XII has been admirably stated by Edge, C.J. in Queen-Empress v. Mannu(1) in the following words : H\n\n(!) [1897] 19 All. 390\n\n\"The early stages of the investigation which follows on the commisson of a crime must necessarily in the vast majority of cases be left to the police, and until the honesty, the capacity, the discretion and the judgment of the police can be thoroughly trusted, it is necessary, for the protection of the public against criminals, for the vindication of the law and for the protection of those who are charged with having committed a criminal offence that the Magistrate or Judge before whom the case is for investigation or for trial should have the means of ascertaining what was the information, true, false, or misleading which was obtained from day to day by the jpolice officer who was investigating the case and what such police officer acted.\"\n\nThe criminal court holding an inquiry or trial off a case is therefore empowered by sub-section (2) of section 172 to send for the police diary of the case and the criminal court can use such dairy, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. But, by reason of sub-section (3) of section 172, merely because the case, diary is referred to by cri1inal court, neither the accused nor his agents a1e entitled to call for such diary nor are they entitled to see it. If however the case diary is used by the police officer who has made it to refresh his memory or if the criminal court uses it for the purpose of contradicting such police officer in the inquiry or trial, the provisions of section 161 or section 145, as the case may be, of the Indian Evidence Act would apply and the accused would be entitled to see the particular entry in the case diary which has been referred to so far. either of these purposes and so much of the diary as in the opinion of the Court is necessary to a full understanding of the particular entry so used. It will thus be seen that the bar against production and use of case diary enacted in section 172 is intended to operate only in an inquiry or trial, for an offence and even this bar is a limited bar, because in an inquiry or trial, the bar does not operate if the case dairy is used by the police officer for refreshing his memory or the criminal court uses it for the purpose of contradicting such police officer. This bar can obviously have no application where a case diary is sought to be produced and used in evidence in a civil proceeding or in a proceeding under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution and particularly when the party calling for the case diary is neither an accussed nor his agent in respect of the offence to which the case diary relates. Now plainly and unquestionably the present writ petition which has been filed under Article 32 of_the Constitution to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 is neither an 'inquiry' nor a 'trial' for an offence\n\n·~\n\nnor is this Court hearing the writ petition a criminal court nor are the peitioners, accused or their agents so far as the offences arising out of their blinding are concerned. Therefore, even if the reports submitted by Shri L. V. Singh as a result of his investigation could be said to form part of 'case diary', it is difficult to see how their production and use in the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution could be said to be barred under section 172.\n\nRealising this difficulty created in his way by the specific language of section 172, Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State, made a valiant attempt to invoke the principle behind section 172 for the purpose of excluding the reports of investigation submitted by Sh. L.V. Singh. He contended that if, under the terms of section 172, the accused in an inquiry or trial is not entitled to call for the case diary or to look at it, save for a limited purpose, it is difficult to believe that the Legislature could have ever intended that the complainant or a third party should be entitled to call for or look at the case diary in 1'.some other proceeding, for that would jeopardise the secrecy of investigation and defeat the object and purpose of section 172 and therefore, applying the principle of that section, we should hold that the case diary is totally protected from disclosure and even the complainant or a third party cannot call for it or look £at in a civil proceeding.\n\nThis contention is in our opinion wholly unfounded.\n\nIt is based on what may be called an appeal to the spirit of section 172 which is totally impermissible under any recognised canon of construction.\n\nEither production and use of case diary in a proceeding is barred under the terms of section 172 or it is not it is difficult to see how it can be said to be barred on an extended or analogical application of the principle supposed to be underlying that section, if it is not covered by its express terms. It must be remembered that we have adopted the adversary system of justice and in order that truth may emerge from the clash between contesting parties under this system, it)s necessary that all facts relevant to the inquiry must be brought before the Court and no relevant fact must be shut-out, for otherwise the Court may get a distorted or incomplete picture of the facts and that might result in miscarriage of justice. To quote the words of the Supreme Court of United States in United States\n\nv. Nixon(1) \"The need to develop all relevant fact in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of ... justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity\n\n(I) 418 U.S. 683 : 41 Lawyers Edition (2nd Series 1039)\n\nof the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts within the frame work of the rules of evidence.\", it is imperative to the proper functioning of the judicial process and satisfactory and certain ascertainmet of truth that all relevant facts must be made available to the Court. But the law may, in exceptional cases, in order to protect more weighty, compelling and competing interests, provide that a particular piece of evidence, though relevant, shall not be liable to be prduced or called in evidence. Such exceptions are to be found, inter alia, in sections 122, 123, 124, 126 and 129 of the Indian Evidence Act and sections 162 and 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nBut being exceptions to the legitimate demand for reception of all relevant evidence in the interest of justice, they must be strictly interpreted and not expansively construed, \"for they are in derogation of the search for truth\".\n\nIt would not, therefore, be right to extend the prohibition of section 172 to cases not falling strictly within the terms of the section, by appealing to what may be regarded as the principle or spirit of the section. That is a feeble reed which cannot sustain the argument of the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State. It would in fact be inconsistent with the Constitutional commitment of this Court to the rule of law.\n\nThat takes us to the question whether the reports made by Sb.\n\nL.V. Singh as a result of the investigation carried by him and his associates are relevant under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act so as to be liable to be produced and received in evidence. It is necessary, in order to answer this question, to consider what is the nature of the proceeding before us and what are the issues which arise in it. The proceeding is a writ petition under Article 32 for enforcing the fundamental right of the petitioners enshrined in Article 21.\n\nThe petitioners complain that after arrest, whilst under police custody, they were blinded by the members of the police force, acting not in their private capacity, but as police officials and their fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 was therefore violated and for this violation, the State is liable to pay compensation to them.\n\nThe learned Attorney General who at one stage appeared on behalf of the State at the hearing of the writ petition contended that the _inquiry upon which the Court was embarking in order to find out whether or not the petitioners were blinded by the police officials whilst in police custody was irrelevant, since, in his submission, even if the petitioners were so blinded, the State was not liable to pay compensation to the petitioners first, because the state was not constitutionally or legally responsible for the acts of the police officers outside the scope of\n\ntheir power or authority and the blindings of the under-trial prisoners effected by the police could not therefore be said to constitute violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 by the State and secondly, even if there was violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 21 by reason of the blindings effected by the police officials, there was, on a true construction of that Article, no liability on the State to pay compensation to the petitioners. The attempt of the learned Attorney General in advancing this contention was obviously to preempt the inquiry which was being made by this Court, so that the Court may not proceed to probe further in the matter.\n\nBut we do 'not think we can accede to this co;-:tention of the learned Attorney General.\n\nThe two questions raised by the learned Attorney General are undoubtedly important but the arguments urged by him in regard to these two questions are not prima facie so strong and appealing as to persuade us to decide them as preliminary objections without first inquiring into the facts. Some serious doubts arise when we consider the argument of the learned Attorney General. If an officer of the State acting in his official capacity threatens to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty without the authority of law, can such person not approach the Court for injuncting the State from such officer in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 ? Can the State\n\nurge in defence in such a case that it is not infringing the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21, because the officer who is threatening to do so is acting outside the law and therefore beyond the scope of his authority and hence the State is not responsible for his action? Would this not make a mockery of Article 21 and reduce it to nullity, a mere rope of sand, for, on this view, if the officer is acting according to law there would ex concessionis be no breach of Article 21 and if he is acting without the authority of law, the State would be able to contend that it is not responsible for his action and therefore there is no violation of Article 21.\n\nSo also if there is any threatened invasion by the State of the Fundamental Right guarnteed under Article 21, the petitioner who is aggrieved can move the Court (under Article 32 for a writ injuncting such threatened invasion and if there is any continuing action of the State which is violative of the Fundamental Right under Article 21, the petitioner can approach the court under Article 32 and ask for a writ striking down the continuance of such action, but where the action taken by the State has already resulted in breach of the Fundamental Right under Article 21 by deprivation of i; ome limb of the petitioner, would the petioner have no remedy under Article 32 for breach of the Fundamental Right guaranteed to him ?\n\nWould the court permit itself to become helpless spectator of the violation of the Fundamental Right of the petitioner by the State and tell the petitioner that though the Constitution has guaranteed the Fundamental Right to him and has also given him the Fundamental Right of moving the court for enforcement of his Fundamental Right, the court cannot give him any relief.\n\nThese are some of the doubts which arise in our mind even in a prima facie consideration of the contention of the learned Attorney General and we do not, therefore, think it would be right to entertain this contention as a preliminary objection without inquiring into the facts of the case.\n\nIf we look at the averments made in the writ petition, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot succeed in claiming relief under Article 32 unless they establish that their Fundamental Right under Article 21 was violated and in order to establish such violation, they must show that they were blinded by the police officials at the time of arrest or whilst in police custody. This is the foundational fact which must be established before the petitioners can claim relief under Article 32 and logically therefore the first issue to which we must address ourselves is whether this foundational fact is shown to exist by the petitioners. It is only if the petitioners can establish that they were blinded by the members of the police force at the time of arrest or whilst in police custody that the other questions raised by the learned Attorney General would arise for consideration and it would be wholly academic to consider them if the petitioners fail to establish this foundational fact.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view, as at present advised, that we should first inquire whether the petitioners were blinded by the police officials at the time of arrest or after arrest, whilst in police custody, and it is in the context of this inquiry that we , must consider whether the reports made by Sh. L.V. Singh are relevant under the Indian Evidence Act so as to be receivable in evidence.\n\nWe may at this stage refer to one other contention raised by Mr. K.G. Bhagat on behalf of the State that if the Court proceeds to hold an inquiry and comes to the conclusion that the petitioners were blinded by the members of the police force at the time of arrest or whilst in police custody, it would be tantamount to adjudicating upon the guilt of the police officers without their being parties to the present writ petition and that would be grossly unfair and hence this inquiry should not be held by the Court until the investigation is completed and the guilt or innocence of the police officers is established. We cannot accept this contention of Mr.\n\nK.G. Bhagat. When the Court trying the writ petition proceeds to inquire into the issue whether the petitioners were blinded by police officials at the time of arrest or whilst in police custody, it does so,\n\nKHATRI v. BIHAR (Bhagwali, J.) 161\n\nnot for the purpose of adjudicating upon the guilt of any particular officer with a view to punishing him but for the purpose of deciding whether the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 21 has been violated and the State is liable to pay compensation to them for such violation. The nature and object of the inquiry is altogether different from that in a criminal case and any decision arrived at in the writ petition on this issue cannot have any relevance much less any binding effect, in any criminal proceeding which may be taken against a particular police officer.\n\nA situation of this kind sometimes arises when a claim for compensation for accident caused by negligent driving of a motor vehicle is made in a civil Court or Tribunal and in such a proceeding, it has to be determined by the Court, for the purpose of awarding compensation to the claimant, whether the driver of the motor vehicle was negligent in driving, even though a criminal case for rash and negligent driving may be pending against the driver. The pendency of a criminal proceeding cannot be urged as a bar against the Court trying a civil proceeding or a writ petition where a similar issue is involved. The two are entirely distinct and separate proceedings and neither is a bar against the other. It may be that in a given case, if the investigation is still proceeding, the Court may defer the inquiry before it until the investigation is completed or if the Court considers it necessary in the interests of Justice, it may postpone its inquiry even until after the prosecution following upon the investigation is terminated, but that is a matter entirely for the exercise of the discretion of the Court and there is no bar precluding the Court from proceeding with the inquiry before it merely because the investigation or prosecution is pending.\n\nIt is clear from the aforesaid discussion that the fact in issue in the inquiry before the Court in the present writ petition is whether the petitioners were blinded by the members of the police force at the time of the arrest or whilst inpolice custody. Now in order to determine whether the reports made by Shah L.V. Singh as a result of the investigation carried out by him and his associates are relevant, it is necessary to consider whether they have any bearing on the fact in issue required to be decided by the Court. It is common ground that Sh. L.V. Singh was directed by the State Government under Section 3 of the Indian Police Act, 1861 to investigate into twenty four cases of blinding of under-trial prisoners where allegations were made by the undertrial prisoners and First Information Reports wer~ lodged that they were blinded by the police officers whilst in police custody. Sh. L.V. Singh through his associates carried out this investigation and submitted his reports in the discharge of the official duty entrusted to him by the State Government. These reports clearly relate to the issue as to how, in what manner and by whom the twenty-four undertrial prisoners were blinded, for that is the matter which Shri L.V. Singh was directed, by the State Government to investigate. If that be so, it is difficult to see how the State can resist the production of these reports and their use as evidence in the present proceeding. These reports are clearly relevant under section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act which reads as follows :\n\n\"35. An entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or record is kept; is itself a relevant fact.\"\n\nThese reports are part of official record and they relate to the fact in issue as to how, and by whom the twenty-four under-trial prisoners were blinded and they are admittedly made by Sh. L.V. Singh, a public servant, in the discharge of his official duty and hence they are plainly and indubitably covered by Section 35.\n\nThe language of section 35 is so clear that it is not necessary to refer to any decided cases on the interpretation of that section, but we may cite two decisions .to illustrate the applicability of this section in the present case. The first is the decision of this Court in Kanwar Lal Gupta\n\nv. Amar Nath Chawla(1).\n\nThere the question was whether reports made by officers of the CID (Special Branch) relating to public meetings covered by them at the time of the election were relevant under section 35 and this Court held that they were, on the ground that they were \"made by public servants in discharge of their, official duty and they were relevant under the first part of section 35 of the Evidence Act, since they contained statement showing what were the public meetings held by the first respondent.\" This Court in fact followed an earlier decision of the Court in P.C.P. Reddiar\n\nv. S. Peruma/(2) also in Jagdat v. Sheopa/(3) Wazirhasan J. held that the result of an inquiry by a Kanungo under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 embodied in the report is an entry in a public record stating a fact in issue and, made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties and the report is therefore admis-\n\n(I) [ 1975] 3 s.c.c. 646\n\n\n(3) AIR 1927 Oudh. J23\n\n.>--.\n\nKHATRI v. EfHAR (Bhagwati, J.) 163\n\nsible in evidence under section 35.\n\nWe find that a similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Chandu!al\n\nv. Pushkar Rai(1) where the learned Judges held that repots made by Revenue Officers, though not regarded as iiaving judicial authority where they express opinions on the private rights of the parties are relevant under section 35 as reports made by public officers in the discharge of their official duties, in so far as they supply information of official proceedings and historical facts. The Calcutta High Court also held in Lionel/ Edwerds Limited v. Siate of West Benga/(1) that official correspondence from the Forest Officer to his superior, the conservator of Forests, carried on by the Forest Officer in the discharge of his official duty would be admissible in evidence under section 35.\n\nThere is therefore no doubt in our mind that the reports made by Sh. L.V. Singh setting forth the result of the investigation carried on by him and his associates are clearly relevant under section 35 since they relate to a fact in issue and are made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty. It is indeed difficult to see how in a writ petition against the State Government where the complaint is that the police officials of the State Government blinded the petitioners at the time of arrest or whilst in police custody, the State Government can resist production of a report in regard to the truth or otherwise of the complaint, made by a highly placed officer persuant to the direction issued by the State Government. We are clearly of the view that the reports made by Shri L.V. Singh as a result of the investigation carried out by him and his associates are relevant under section 35 and they are liable to be produced by the State Government and used in evidence in the present writ petition. Of course, what evidentiary value must attach to the statements contained in these reports is a matter which. would have to be decided by the Court after considering these reports.\n\nIt may ultimately be found that these reports )Jave not much evidentiary value and even if they contain any statements adverse to the State Government it may possible for the State Government to dispute their correctness or to explain them away, but it cannot be said that these reports are not relevant.\n\nThese reports must therefore be produced by the State and taken on record of the present writ petition. We may point out that though in our order dated 16th February 1981, we have referred to these reports as having been made by Shri L.V. Singh and his associates between January IO and January 20, 1981. it seems that there has been some error on our part in mentioning the outer date as January 20, 1981,\n\n(I) AIR 1932 Nagpur 271\n\n(2) AIR 1967 Cal. 191\n\nfor we find that some of these reports were submitted by Shri L.V.\n\nSingh even after January 20, 1981 and the last of them was submitted on 27th January 1981.\n\nAH these reports including the report submitted on 9th December, 1980 must therefore be filed by the State and taken as forming part of the record to be considered by the Court in deciding the question at issue between the parties.\n\nWhat we have said above must apply equally in regard to the correspondence and notings referred to as items three and four in the Order dated 16th February 1981 made by us.\n\nThese notings and correspondence would throw light on the extent of involvement, whether by acts of commission or acts of omission, of the State in the blinding episode and having been made by Shri L.V. Singh and Shri M.K. Jha in discharge of their officials duties, they are clearly relevant under section 35 and they must therefore be produced and taken on record in the writ petition, so also the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub-Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July and his letter to Shri K.D. Singh, Superintendent of Police, CID, Patna containing hand-written endorsement of Shri M.K. Jha must for the same reasons be held to be relevant under section 35 and must be produced by the State and .1 be taken as forming part of the record of the writ petition.\n\nSince all these documents are required by the Central Bureau of Investigation for the purpse of carrying out the investigation which has been commenced by them pursuant to the approval given by the State Government under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, we would direct that five sets of photostat copies of these documents may be prepared by the office, one for Mrs. Hingorani, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, one for Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State one for Dr. Chitale who is appearing amcius curiae at our request and two for the Court, and after taking such photostat copies, these documents along with the other documents which have been handed over to the Court by the State shall be returned immediately to Mr. K.G: Bhagat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State, for being immediately made available to the Central Bureau of Investigation for carrying out its investigation so that the investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation may not be impeded or delayed. We hope and trust that the Central Bureau of Investigation will complete its investigation expeditiously without any avoidable delay.\n\nS.R.\n\nApplication allowed.\n\n--L", "total_entities": 229, "entities": [{"text": "KHATRI & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHATRI & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 10, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'March 10, 1981\n\n[P.N. BHAGWATI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 162 to 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239, "end_char": 258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 266, "end_char": 295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361, "end_char": 372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 395, "end_char": 414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 479, "end_char": 490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 635, "end_char": 645, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 678, "end_char": 726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 819, "end_char": 830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 834, "end_char": 857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 916, "end_char": 921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are certain undertrials in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 965, "end_char": 975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1232, "end_char": 1242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "L.V. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1443, "end_char": 1453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by the petitioners, several documents including C.I.D. Reports submitted by Shri L.V. Singh, D.I.G., C.l.", "canonical_name": "L.V.\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "December 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1488, "end_char": 1504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D, (Anti Dacoity) on December 9, 1980\n\nand other dates were called for by the Court."}}, {"text": "sections 162 to 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1679, "end_char": 1698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2235, "end_char": 2246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2445, "end_char": 2464, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "16th February, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2948, "end_char": 2967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the other reports covered by Items 2 to 5 of the Court's order dated 16th February, 1981 are equally relevant and must, therefore, be produced and taken on record in the writ petition. ("}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3134, "end_char": 3144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3645, "end_char": 3664, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3826, "end_char": 3836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "statute": "the Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3891, "end_char": 3910, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3923, "end_char": 3934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "statute": "the Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3939, "end_char": 3950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "statute": "the Constitution is prescribed under order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 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"statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7753, "end_char": 7764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Cl\n\n7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7796, "end_char": 7801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7805, "end_char": 7816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8201, "end_char": 8211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8750, "end_char": 8761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9458, "end_char": 9469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9473, "end_char": 9484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9512, "end_char": 9531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10439, "end_char": 10449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10684, "end_char": 10694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10765, "end_char": 10775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shrl L.V. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11051, "end_char": 11066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, even if the reports submitted by Shrl L.V. Singh as a result of his investigation could be said to form part of \"case diary\" their production and use in the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be said to be barred under section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [", "canonical_name": "Shrl L.V. Singh"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11203, "end_char": 11213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11387, "end_char": 11398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11624, "end_char": 11637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact to do so would be inconsistent with the constitutional commitment of the Supreme Court to the rule of law."}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11744, "end_char": 11755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 122, 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12756, "end_char": 12773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12798, "end_char": 12817, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12822, "end_char": 12842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jice Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13559, "end_char": 13570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jice Act, 1861", "statute": "Jice Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jice Act, 1861", "statute": "Jice Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13914, "end_char": 13924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jice Act, 1861", "statute": "Jice Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13953, "end_char": 13965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the C_onstitution)\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani, Mr. Hingorani, Mukul Mudgal and Dainodar .Prakash for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "K. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13982, "end_char": 13994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the C_onstitution)\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani, Mr. Hingorani, Mukul Mudgal and Dainodar .Prakash for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Dainodar .Prakash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13999, "end_char": 14016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the C_onstitution)\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani, Mr. Hingorani, Mukul Mudgal and Dainodar .Prakash for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14039, "end_char": 14050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "K.G.\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14055, "end_char": 14067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14094, "end_char": 14107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A. Subhashini for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14175, "end_char": 14183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by,\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThe question which arises before us for consideration is whether certain documents called for by the Court by its Order dated 16th February, 1981 are liable to be produced by the State or their production is barred under some provision of law."}}, {"text": "L.V.\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14677, "end_char": 14688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the CID reports on all the 24 cases submitted by L.V.\n\nSingh and his associates between January 10 and January E 20, 1981 ;\n\n3.", "canonical_name": "L.V.\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "M.K. Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14970, "end_char": 14978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the letters number 4/R dated 3rd January, 1981 and number 20/R dated 7th January, 1981 from L.V. Singh to the IG, Police ;\n\nthe files containing all correspondence and notings exchanged between L.V. Singh, DIG and M.K. Jha, Additional IG, regarding the CID inquiry into the blindings, and\n\nthe file (presently in the office of the IG, S.K. Chatterjee containing the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub- Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July or thereabouts and his Jetter to K.D. Singh, SP, CID, Patna which has the hand written observations of M.K. Jha."}}, {"text": "S.K. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15091, "end_char": 15106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the letters number 4/R dated 3rd January, 1981 and number 20/R dated 7th January, 1981 from L.V. Singh to the IG, Police ;\n\nthe files containing all correspondence and notings exchanged between L.V. Singh, DIG and M.K. Jha, Additional IG, regarding the CID inquiry into the blindings, and\n\nthe file (presently in the office of the IG, S.K. Chatterjee containing the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub- Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July or thereabouts and his Jetter to K.D. Singh, SP, CID, Patna which has the hand written observations of M.K. Jha."}}, {"text": "Gajendra Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15182, "end_char": 15197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the letters number 4/R dated 3rd January, 1981 and number 20/R dated 7th January, 1981 from L.V. Singh to the IG, Police ;\n\nthe files containing all correspondence and notings exchanged between L.V. Singh, DIG and M.K. Jha, Additional IG, regarding the CID inquiry into the blindings, and\n\nthe file (presently in the office of the IG, S.K. Chatterjee containing the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub- Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July or thereabouts and his Jetter to K.D. Singh, SP, CID, Patna which has the hand written observations of M.K. Jha."}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15204, "end_char": 15213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the letters number 4/R dated 3rd January, 1981 and number 20/R dated 7th January, 1981 from L.V. Singh to the IG, Police ;\n\nthe files containing all correspondence and notings exchanged between L.V. Singh, DIG and M.K. Jha, Additional IG, regarding the CID inquiry into the blindings, and\n\nthe file (presently in the office of the IG, S.K. Chatterjee containing the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub- Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July or thereabouts and his Jetter to K.D. Singh, SP, CID, Patna which has the hand written observations of M.K. Jha."}}, {"text": "K.D. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15260, "end_char": 15270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the letters number 4/R dated 3rd January, 1981 and number 20/R dated 7th January, 1981 from L.V. Singh to the IG, Police ;\n\nthe files containing all correspondence and notings exchanged between L.V. Singh, DIG and M.K. Jha, Additional IG, regarding the CID inquiry into the blindings, and\n\nthe file (presently in the office of the IG, S.K. Chatterjee containing the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub- Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July or thereabouts and his Jetter to K.D. Singh, SP, CID, Patna which has the hand written observations of M.K. Jha."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15281, "end_char": 15286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the letters number 4/R dated 3rd January, 1981 and number 20/R dated 7th January, 1981 from L.V. Singh to the IG, Police ;\n\nthe files containing all correspondence and notings exchanged between L.V. Singh, DIG and M.K. Jha, Additional IG, regarding the CID inquiry into the blindings, and\n\nthe file (presently in the office of the IG, S.K. Chatterjee containing the reports submitted by Inspector and Sub- Inspector of CID to Gajendra Narain, DIG, Bhagalpur on 18th July or thereabouts and his Jetter to K.D. Singh, SP, CID, Patna which has the hand written observations of M.K. Jha."}}, {"text": "Sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15461, "end_char": 15481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15489, "end_char": 15520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15843, "end_char": 15863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "R.R. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16167, "end_char": 16178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.R. Prasad, S.P. (Anti-Dacoity) and Smt.", "canonical_name": "R.R.\n\nPrasad"}}, {"text": "Manjuri Jaurahar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16210, "end_char": 16226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manjuri Jaurahar, S.P. (Anti-Dacoity) between 10th and 20th January, 1981."}}, {"text": "10th and 20th January, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16256, "end_char": 16283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manjuri Jaurahar, S.P. (Anti-Dacoity) between 10th and 20th January, 1981."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16350, "end_char": 16361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These reports have been handed over to us for our perusal by Mr. K.G. Bhagat learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State and it is clear from these reports, and that has also been stated before us on behalf of the State, that by an Order dated 28-29th ~November, 1980 made by the State Government under Section 3 of the Indian Police Act 1861, Sh.", "canonical_name": "K.G.\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "28-29th ~November, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16535, "end_char": 16558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These reports have been handed over to us for our perusal by Mr. K.G. Bhagat learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State and it is clear from these reports, and that has also been stated before us on behalf of the State, that by an Order dated 28-29th ~November, 1980 made by the State Government under Section 3 of the Indian Police Act 1861, Sh."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16594, "end_char": 16603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Police Act 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16611, "end_char": 16633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "R.R.\n\nPrasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16865, "end_char": 16877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.R.\n\nPrasad and Smt.", "canonical_name": "R.R.\n\nPrasad"}}, {"text": "Sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17124, "end_char": 17144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17369, "end_char": 17380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17384, "end_char": 17395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17403, "end_char": 17422, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17490, "end_char": 17510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "Sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17601, "end_char": 17621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17736, "end_char": 17745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17931, "end_char": 17940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All offences under the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18249, "end_char": 18289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18849, "end_char": 18866, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18983, "end_char": 18994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All offences under the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "All offences under the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19956, "end_char": 19967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19975, "end_char": 20000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20328, "end_char": 20338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20346, "end_char": 20371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20404, "end_char": 20414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21147, "end_char": 21158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "T'ehsiidar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21278, "end_char": 21294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section has been enacted for the benefit of the accused, as pointed out by this Court in T'ehsiidar Singh and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(1) it is intended \"to protect the accused against the user of statements of witnesses made before the police during investigation, at the trial presumably on the assumption that the said statements were not made under circumstances inspiring confidence.\""}}, {"text": "Tehsildar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21607, "end_char": 21622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, in Tehsildar Singh's case approved the following observations of Braund, J. in Emperor v. Aftab Mohd."}}, {"text": "Braund", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21669, "end_char": 21675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, in Tehsildar Singh's case approved the following observations of Braund, J. in Emperor v. Aftab Mohd."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22253, "end_char": 22270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and expressed its agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Baliram Tikaram Marathe\n\nv. Emperor(3) that \"the object of the section is to protect the accused both against overzealous police officers and untruthful witnesses.\""}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23182, "end_char": 23192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23383, "end_char": 23402, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23537, "end_char": 23553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are a number of decisions of various High Courts which have taken this view and amongst them may be mentioned the decision of Jaganmohan Reddy J. in Ma/aka/aya Surya Rao v. Janakamma(1) The present proceeding before tis is a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution filed by the petitioners for enforcing their Fundamental Rights under Article 21 and it is neither an \"inquiry\" nor a \"trial\" in respect of any offence and hence it is difficult to see how section 162 can be invoked by the State in the present case."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23656, "end_char": 23666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23757, "end_char": 23767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23876, "end_char": 23887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23991, "end_char": 24001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24010, "end_char": 24083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24504, "end_char": 24523, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24685, "end_char": 24695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "statute": "the Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966"}}, {"text": "indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24730, "end_char": 24749, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24754, "end_char": 24765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "statute": "the Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966"}}, {"text": "L. V. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24850, "end_char": 24861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Thereports submitted by Shri L. V. Singh setting forth the result of his investigation cannot, in the circumstances, be shut out from being produced and considered in evidence under section 162, even if they refer to all)'.", "canonical_name": "L.V.\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25003, "end_char": 25014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "statute": "the Constitution is proscribod fo Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25183, "end_char": 25202, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25225, "end_char": 25236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26334, "end_char": 26345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26393, "end_char": 26418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26731, "end_char": 26740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument of Mrs. Hingorani and Dr. Chitale was that these reports did not form part of case diary as contemplated in this section, since the investigation which was carried.", "canonical_name": "K. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26749, "end_char": 26756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument of Mrs. Hingorani and Dr. Chitale was that these reports did not form part of case diary as contemplated in this section, since the investigation which was carried."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26982, "end_char": 26991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Indian Police Act 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26999, "end_char": 27021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27061, "end_char": 27103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27151, "end_char": 27162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27539, "end_char": 27548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27563, "end_char": 27573, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27650, "end_char": 27661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27966, "end_char": 27975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Police Act 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28029, "end_char": 28051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28322, "end_char": 28332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28905, "end_char": 28914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "Indian Police Act 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28922, "end_char": 28944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29312, "end_char": 29323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29517, "end_char": 29526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act 1861"}}, {"text": "Indian Police Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29534, "end_char": 29557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29634, "end_char": 29645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29864, "end_char": 29875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "K.G.\n\nBhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30031, "end_char": 30043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not, however think it necessary to enter upon a consideration of these two questions and we shall assume for the purpose of our discussion that Mr. K.G.\n\nBhagat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, is right in his submission in regard to both these questions and that the reports made by Shri L.V. Singh setting out the result of his investigation form part of case diary so as to invite the applicability of section\n\n172.", "canonical_name": "K.G.\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "section\n\n172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30306, "end_char": 30318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30419, "end_char": 30430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30514, "end_char": 30525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Edge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30682, "end_char": 30686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of section 172 in providing for the maintenance of a diary of his proceedings by the police officer making an investigation under Chapter XII has been admirably stated by Edge, C.J. in Queen-Empress v. Mannu(1) in the following words : H\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31629, "end_char": 31640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31831, "end_char": 31842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32236, "end_char": 32247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32251, "end_char": 32262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32291, "end_char": 32310, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32675, "end_char": 32686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33160, "end_char": 33170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33437, "end_char": 33447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33518, "end_char": 33528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33989, "end_char": 33999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34053, "end_char": 34064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34140, "end_char": 34151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34275, "end_char": 34286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34415, "end_char": 34426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34841, "end_char": 34852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35191, "end_char": 35202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35364, "end_char": 35375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36036, "end_char": 36066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To quote the words of the Supreme Court of United States in United States\n\nv. Nixon(1) \"The need to develop all relevant fact in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive."}}, {"text": "S. 683", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36358, "end_char": 36364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 122, 123, 124, 126 and 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37012, "end_char": 37047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37055, "end_char": 37074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37079, "end_char": 37099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37429, "end_char": 37440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37982, "end_char": 38001, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38255, "end_char": 38265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Singh as a result of the investigation carried by him and his associates are relevant under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Singh as a result of the investigation carried by him and his associates are relevant under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38334, "end_char": 38344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Singh as a result of the investigation carried by him and his associates are relevant under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Singh as a result of the investigation carried by him and his associates are relevant under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38589, "end_char": 38599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Singh as a result of the investigation carried by him and his associates are relevant under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Singh as a result of the investigation carried by him and his associates are relevant under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39446, "end_char": 39456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39562, "end_char": 39572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40710, "end_char": 40720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40841, "end_char": 40851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41063, "end_char": 41073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41226, "end_char": 41236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41403, "end_char": 41413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41514, "end_char": 41524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41584, "end_char": 41594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41743, "end_char": 41753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41799, "end_char": 41809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41977, "end_char": 41987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42077, "end_char": 42087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42942, "end_char": 42952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43010, "end_char": 43020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43291, "end_char": 43301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Singh are relevant under the Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44118, "end_char": 44166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45302, "end_char": 45312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shah L.V. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47265, "end_char": 47280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now in order to determine whether the reports made by Shah L.V. Singh as a result of the investigation carried out by him and his associates are relevant, it is necessary to consider whether they have any bearing on the fact in issue required to be decided by the Court.", "canonical_name": "Shrl L.V. Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47565, "end_char": 47574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Police Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47582, "end_char": 47605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48445, "end_char": 48455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48463, "end_char": 48482, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49172, "end_char": 49182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49201, "end_char": 49211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49680, "end_char": 49690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49865, "end_char": 49875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wazirhasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50123, "end_char": 50133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in fact followed an earlier decision of the Court in P.C.P. Reddiar\n\nv. S. Peruma/(2) also in Jagdat v. Sheopa/(3) Wazirhasan J. held that the result of an inquiry by a Kanungo under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 embodied in the report is an entry in a public record stating a fact in issue and, made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties and the report is therefore admis-\n\n(I) [ 1975] 3 s.c.c."}}, {"text": "section 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50191, "end_char": 50202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50210, "end_char": 50241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50544, "end_char": 50554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898"}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50874, "end_char": 50884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51050, "end_char": 51069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court also held in Lionel/ Edwerds Limited v. Siate of West Benga/(1) that official correspondence from the Forest Officer to his superior, the conservator of Forests, carried on by the Forest Officer in the discharge of his official duty would be admissible in evidence under section 35."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51341, "end_char": 51351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51544, "end_char": 51554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52251, "end_char": 52261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16th February 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53012, "end_char": 53030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that though in our order dated 16th February 1981, we have referred to these reports as having been made by Shri L.V. Singh and his associates between January IO and January 20, 1981."}}, {"text": "January 20, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53147, "end_char": 53163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that though in our order dated 16th February 1981, we have referred to these reports as having been made by Shri L.V. Singh and his associates between January IO and January 20, 1981."}}, {"text": "9th December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53527, "end_char": 53545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AH these reports including the report submitted on 9th December, 1980 must therefore be filed by the State and taken as forming part of the record to be considered by the Court in deciding the question at issue between the parties."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54182, "end_char": 54192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54567, "end_char": 54577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Bureau of Investigation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54727, "end_char": 54758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since all these documents are required by the Central Bureau of Investigation for the purpse of carrying out the investigation which has been commenced by them pursuant to the approval given by the State Government under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, we would direct that five sets of photostat copies of these documents may be prepared by the office, one for Mrs. Hingorani, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, one for Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State one for Dr. Chitale who is appearing amcius curiae at our request and two for the Court, and after taking such photostat copies, these documents along with the other documents which have been handed over to the Court by the State shall be returned immediately to Mr. K.G: Bhagat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State, for being immediately made available to the Central Bureau of Investigation for carrying out its investigation so that the investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation may not be impeded or delayed."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54902, "end_char": 54911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Establishment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54919, "end_char": 54957, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K.G: Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 55483, "end_char": 55494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since all these documents are required by the Central Bureau of Investigation for the purpse of carrying out the investigation which has been commenced by them pursuant to the approval given by the State Government under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, we would direct that five sets of photostat copies of these documents may be prepared by the office, one for Mrs. Hingorani, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, one for Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State one for Dr. Chitale who is appearing amcius curiae at our request and two for the Court, and after taking such photostat copies, these documents along with the other documents which have been handed over to the Court by the State shall be returned immediately to Mr. K.G: Bhagat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State, for being immediately made available to the Central Bureau of Investigation for carrying out its investigation so that the investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation may not be impeded or delayed.", "canonical_name": "K.G.\n\nBhagat"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_165_173_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "COMMODORE COMMANDING, SOUTHERN\n\nNAVAL AREA, COCHIN\n\nV. K. RAJAN\n\nMarch 10, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND A.N. SEN}\n\nService matter-Article 16-Service of a temporary government servant termi nated by a termination order simpliciter-Article 16, if attracted.\n\nThe respondent, in the first instance, was appointed as a casual labourer for a month but was continued against an existing vacancy. He was later appointed as a labourer in a regular cadre in an existing vacancy. Sometime later he was promoted and appointed as Ammunition Repair Labourer, Grade II. Three years thereafter his services were terminated.\n\nIn a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the respondent impugned\n\nthe order of termination of his services on the ground that he was appointed D permanently to the post of Ammunition Repair Labourer Grade II and that the termination of his services, when juniors were retained in service, was discriminatory and was in contravention of Article 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appellant contended before the High Court that the term \"regular cadre\" did not imply as in other instances in the employment of government a substantive post, but that the post in the regular cadre is a purely temporary E one.\n\nA single Judge of the High Court rejected the respondent's claim that he was appointed permanently to the post but held that since persons junior to him had been retained in service, termination of his services without assigning any reason was discriminatory and, therefore, the order was bad in law.\n\nAgreeing with the view of the single Judge a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal.\n\nAllowing the appeal\n\nHELD : A perusal of the file relating to the termination of the services of the respondent shows that the decision to terminate his services had been taken at the highest level on the ground of his unsuitability in relation to the post held by him and that it was not by way of any punishment and no stigma was attached to the respondent by reason of the termination of his services. (172 G-H)\n\nThe well settled position in law in this regard is that (i) if the services of a temporary government servant are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory or for a like reason which marks him off in a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16; (ii) where the services of a temporary government servant or a probationer government servant are terminated by an order which does not ex-!acie disclose any stigma or penal consequences against the government servant and is merely a termination order simpliciter there is no case ordinarily for assuming that it is anything but what it pmports to be; (iii) before Article 16 is held to have been violated by some action there must be a clear demonstration of discrimination between one government servant and another similarly placed, which cannot be reasonably explained except on an assumption or demonstration of \"malice in Jaw\" or \"malice in fact\". Acting on legally extraneous or obviously misconceived grounds of action would be a case of \"malice in law\"; (iv) it is open to the employer to terminate the services of a temporary employee on probation at any time before he was confirmed if the employer was satisfied that he was not suitable for being retained in service. [E 169 D; 170 C; 171 C; 172 BJ\n\nJn the instant case the respondent was a temporary government servant.\n\nNo stigma is attached to the termination of his services. His services had been terminated for unsuitability in relation to the post held by him. (171 F-G]\n\nD C1vrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1154 of\n\n1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Or.der dated\n\n18.7.1969 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. 620/69.\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader, K.S. Gurumurthy and R.N. Podar for the Appellant.\n\nT.C. Raghavan and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. 620 of 1969, which had been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of that High Court, allowing 0. P. No. 672 of 1969.\n\nO.P. No. 672 of 1969 was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the termination of the service of the respondent by the appellant by the order dated 17-1-67. That order is to the effect that in accordance with the terms and cnditions of his service the respondent stated to be a temporary Ammunition Repair Labourer Grade II, Naval Armaments Depot, Alwaye, is informed that his service is thereby terminated with effect from the date of service of that order on him.\n\nThat order further states that respondent will be paid a sum equivalent to the\n\n\\_ -\n\namount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice, due to him, that is, for one month in accordance with the pr0visions of the Navy Instruction 22/53, as ame.1ded and that the payment of allowances will, however be subject to conditions under which such allowances are admissible.\n\nThe respondent having been recommended by the Employment Exchange, was appointed by the appellant by Ex. P-1 as labourer on casual basis in lieu of Sailor in the Installation Team (I.N.S. Venduruthy) on pay of Rs. 70/- p.m. plus allowances as admissible from time to time for the period of one month in the first instance with effect from the forenoon of 18.12.61.\n\nThe appellant continued the respondent's employment as labourer in lieu of Sailor in B.R.0. (Installation) Dpar<me, lt,- C)chi; i against S):U) existing vacancy with effect from the forenoon of 18.1.62 by Ex. P-2.\n\nWhen he was casual labourer in the B.R.O. (Installation) Department he was transferred by the appellant to the Naval Armament Depot, Alwaye and appointed as labourer in the regular cadre in the scale mentioned therein plus allowances as admissible from time to time in an existing vacancy with effect from 15. 11.62. Subsequently, when the respondent was working as a labourer in the Naval Armament Depot at Alwaye the appellant promoted him and appointed him as A.R.L. Grade II in the Naval Armaments Depot, Alwaye in the scale mentioned therein plus allowances as admissible from time to time in an existing vacancy with effect ff0m the forenoon of 2.3.64. Thereafter, his services were terminated by Order dated 17-1-67 (Ex. P-8) as mentioned above.\n\nIn the the Writ Petition the respondent attacked the order- Ex. P-8 on two grounds, namely, (I) that he was appointed permanently to the post of A.R.L. Grade II by the Order (Ex. P-4) and\n\n(2) that persons junior to the respondent have been retained in service and, therefore, the termination of the services of the respondent without any reason whatsoever, is discriminatory and contravenes Article 16 of the Constitution.\n\nTn the counter-affidavit filed in the Writ Petition the appellant contended that the phraseology \"regular cadre\" does not imply as it may in some other instances in the employment of government, a substantive post, that the post in the \"regular cadre\" is also a purely temporary one and that the post of Ammunition Repair Labourer Grade II to which the respondent was promoted and appointed, was also on a temporary basis.\n\nThe appellant denied that there was any discrimination in the termination of the services of the respondent. The learned\n\nSingle Juage repelled the contention that the respondent had been permanently appointed to the post of ARL Grade II by the Order Ex. P-4 on the ground that there is nothing in the order to show that the respondent had been appointed permanently to the post. Regarding the second ground urged by the respondent the learned Single Judge held, relying upon this Court's decision in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India(1) and two other decisions of the Mysore and Andhra Pradesh .\n\nHigh Court in Diddaiah\n\nv. State(2) and Jankiraman v. State of Andhra Pradesh(3) respectively that Article 16 of the Constitution applies even to temporary government servants. The learned Judge observed that there is no denial of the fact that persons junior to the respondent have been retained in service and that there is nothing in the order, Ex. P-8 or in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent in the Writ Appeal to show that the respondent was guilty of any misconduct or was otherwise unfit to hold the post.\n\nThe learned Judge further observed that in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit it has only been stated that the fact other persons who are junior to the respondent are retained in service, would not confer any right on the respondent to continue in service. In this view the learned Judge held that the termination of the respondent's services under Ex. P-8 without assigning any reason was discriminatory and he accordingly allowed the Writ Petition without costs.\n\nIn the Writ Appeal filed under s. 5 of the Kerala High Court Act the Division Bench followed the aforesaid decision of this Court in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India (supra) and agreed with the learned Single Judge that the appellant's action in terminating respondent's services under Ex. P-8 is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. The learned Judges observed in their judgment that no reason at all was either alleged or proved as to why appellant chose to terminate the respondent's services under rule 5 of the Central Services (Temporary Services) Rules 1965 such as that it was administratively convenient to do so or that the respondent's work or conduct was unsatisfactory or that it was a case of retrenchment and the respondent was chosen as the junior-most person.\n\nThe learned Judges accordingly dismissed the Writ Appeal.\n\nThe principle that even temporary government servants are entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) in the same manner as\n\n(!) A.I.R. 1964 SC 1854. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 119.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1967 Mysore 223.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 185.\n\nCOMMODORE COMMANDiNG v. V.K. RAJAN (Vardarajan, J.) 169\n\npermanent government servants if the government takes action against them by meting out one of the three punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, is well settled. This court has held in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India(1) that temporary servants are also entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) in the same manner as permanent government servants if the government takes action against them by me'ing out one of the three above punishments following the decision in Purshotam Lal Dhingra v.\n\nUnion of Indic.(2) and tl:at this protecction is only available where the discharge, removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. The same view has been reiterated by this Court in Manager, Govt. Branch Press and Anr.\n\nv. D.B. Beliappa,(3) where it has been observed thus :\n\n\"The principle that can be deduced from the above analysis is that if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated in accordance with. the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory, or for a like reason which marks him off in a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16.\n\nConversely, if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated, arbitrarily, and not on the ground of his unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in the same service, a question of unfair discrimination may arise, notwithstanding the fact that in terminating his service, the appointing authority was purporting to act in accordance with the terms of the eniployment. Where a charge of unfair discrimination is levelled with specificity, or improper motives are imputed to the authority making the impugned order of termination of the service, it is the duty of the authority to di spell that charge by disclosing to the Court the reason or motives which impelled it to take the impugned action. Excepting, perhaps, in cases analogous to those covered by Article 311(2), Proviso (c), the authority cannot withhold such information from the Court o the lame excuse, that impugned order is purely administrative and not judicial, having been passed in exercise of its adminis-\n\n(1) [1964] 5 S.C.R- 119 at 203. (2)\n\n[1958] S.C.R. 828.\n\n\ntrative discretion under the rules governing the conditions of the service.\"\n\nJn the latest decision in State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji and Anr.(1) a similar observation has been made by Pathak, J. at page 567 :\n\n\"The law, it seems to me, is that where the services of a temporary Government servant or a probationer Government servant are terminated by an order which does not ex jacie disclose any stigma or penal consequences against the Government servant and is merely a termination order simpliciter, there is no case ordinarily for assuming that it is anything but what it purports to be.\n\nWhere, however, the order discloses on the face of it that a stigma is cast on the Government servant or that it visits him with p<!nal consequences, then plainly the case is one of punishment. There may still be another kind of case where although the termination of service is intended by way of punishment, the order is framed as a termination simpliciter.\n\nIn such a case, if the Government servant is able to establish by material on the record that the order is in fact passed by way of punishment, the innocence of the language in which the order is framed will not protect it if the procedural safeguards contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution have not been satisfied. In a given case, the Government servant may succeed in making out prima jacie case that the order was by way of punishment but an attempt to rebut the case by the authorities may necessitate sending for the official records for the purpose of determing the truth.\n\nIt is in such a case generally that the official records may be called for by the Court. It is not open to the Court to send for the official records on a mere allegation by the Government servant that the order is by way of punishment.\n\nFor unless there is material on the record before the Court in support of that allegation, an attempt by the Court to find out from the record whether the termination of service is based on the unsuitability of the Government servant in relation to the post held by him or is in reality an order by way of punishment will in effect be an unwarranted attempt to delve into the official records for the purpose of determining the nature of the order on the basis of a mere allegation of the Government\n\n\nservant. On a sufficient case being made out on the merits before tbe Court by the Government servant it is open to the Court to resort to scrutiny of the official records for the purpose verifying the truth\".\n\n/ This Court has observed in Regional Manager and Am. v.\n\nPawan Kumar Dubey (1) thus :\n\n''We do not think that Sughar Singh' s case, in any way, conflicts with what has been laid down by this Court previously on Article 311(2) of the Constitution or Article 16 of the Constitution. We would, however, like to emphasize that, before Article 16 is held to have been violated by some action there must be a clear demonstration of discrimination between one Government servant and another, similarly placed, which cannot be reasonably explained except on an assumption or demonstration of \"malice in law\" or \"malice in fact\".\n\nAs we have explained, acting on a legally extraneous or obviously misconceived ground of action would be a case of \"malice in law\". Orders of reversion passed as a result of administrative exigencies, without any suggestion of malice in law or in fact, are unaffected by Sughar Singh's case (supra). They are not vitiated merely because some other Government servants juniors in the substantive rank, have not been reverted.\"\n\nAfter examining the recorc! in Suglwr Singh's case (supra), the learned Judges have observed :\n\n\"What weighed with this Court was not only that there was a sufficient \"element of punishment\" in reverting Sughar Singh for a supposed wrong done, from which the order of reversion could not be divorced, so that Article J 11 (2) had to be complied with, but, there was also enough of an impropriety and unreasonableness in the action taken against Sughar Singh, solely for a very stale reason, which had become logically quite disconnected to make out a case of \"malice in law\" even if it was not a case of \"malice in fact\"\n\nThe matter is also covered by a recent decision of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Ors. v. Dr. Mohd. S.\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n\nA lskender Ali(1) where one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) speaking for the Court observed as follows :\n\n\"As the respondent was a temporary employee on probation, it was open to the employer to terminate his services at any time before he was confirmed, if the employer was satisfied that he was not suitable for being retained in service.\"\n\n\"The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the remarks made in the assessment roll went to show that the intention of the appointing authority was to proceed against the respondent by way of punishment.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this submission. It is obvious that a temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his canduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained.\n\nThe remarks, in the assessment roll, merely indicate the nature of the performance put in by the officer for the limited purpose of determing whether or not his probation should be extended. These remarks were not intended to cast any stigma.\"\n\n'Jn these circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that as the respondent was merely a probationer, the appointing authority did not consider it necessary to continue the enquiry but decided to terminate tJ, e services of the respondent as he was not found suitable for the job. It is well settled by a fong course of decisions of this Court that in the case of a probationer or a temporary employee, who has no right to the post, such a termination of his service is valid and does not attract the provisons of Article 311 of the Constitution.\"\n\nWe agree with the learned Judges who constituted the Division Bench of the K erala High Court that the respondent was only a temporary government servent and that even as a temporary government servant he is entitled to the protection of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution where termination involves a stigma or amounts to punishment. We looked into the file relating to the respondent ending with order of termination of his service (Ex-P-8). We are satisfied that the decision to terminate the services of the respondent had been taken at the highest level on the ground of unsuitability of the respondent in relation to the post held by him and it is not by way of any punishment and no stigma is attached to the respondent\n\n\nby reason of the termination of his service. In these circumstances A we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and confirm the appellant's order, Ex. P.B. terminating respondent's ·\n\nservices. The appellant shall bear his own costs and pay respondent's costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed. ,", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "COMMODORE COMMANDING, SOUTHERN\n\nNAVAL AREA, COCHIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMODORE COMMANDING, SOUTHERN NAVAL AREA, COCHIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. K. RAJAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. K. RAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 10, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMODORE COMMANDING, SOUTHERN\n\nNAVAL AREA, COCHIN\n\nV. K. RAJAN\n\nMarch 10, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND A.N. SEN}\n\nService matter-Article 16-Service of a temporary government servant termi nated by a termination order simpliciter-Article 16, if attracted."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.N. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 249, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 649, "end_char": 660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 976, "end_char": 986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2529, "end_char": 2539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2906, "end_char": 2916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader, K.S. Gurumurthy and R.N. Podar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K.S. Gurumurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3989, "end_char": 4004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader, K.S. Gurumurthy and R.N. Podar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R.N. Podar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4009, "end_char": 4019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader, K.S. Gurumurthy and R.N. Podar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T.C. Raghavan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4040, "end_char": 4053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.C. Raghavan and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "N. Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4058, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.C. Raghavan and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4470, "end_char": 4481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alwaye", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4799, "end_char": 4805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That order is to the effect that in accordance with the terms and cnditions of his service the respondent stated to be a temporary Ammunition Repair Labourer Grade II, Naval Armaments Depot, Alwaye, is informed that his service is thereby terminated with effect from the date of service of that order on him."}}, {"text": "I.N.S. Venduruthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5476, "end_char": 5493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-1 as labourer on casual basis in lieu of Sailor in the Installation Team (I.N.S. Venduruthy) on pay of Rs."}}, {"text": "15. 11.62.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6182, "end_char": 6192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When he was casual labourer in the B.R.O. (Installation) Department he was transferred by the appellant to the Naval Armament Depot, Alwaye and appointed as labourer in the regular cadre in the scale mentioned therein plus allowances as admissible from time to time in an existing vacancy with effect from 15."}}, {"text": "Naval Armaments Depot, Alwaye", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6362, "end_char": 6391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, when the respondent was working as a labourer in the Naval Armament Depot at Alwaye the appellant promoted him and appointed him as A.R.L. Grade II in the Naval Armaments Depot, Alwaye in the scale mentioned therein plus allowances as admissible from time to time in an existing vacancy with effect ff0m the forenoon of 2.3.64."}}, {"text": "2.3.64", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6527, "end_char": 6533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, when the respondent was working as a labourer in the Naval Armament Depot at Alwaye the appellant promoted him and appointed him as A.R.L. Grade II in the Naval Armaments Depot, Alwaye in the scale mentioned therein plus allowances as admissible from time to time in an existing vacancy with effect ff0m the forenoon of 2.3.64."}}, {"text": "17-1-67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6591, "end_char": 6598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, his services were terminated by Order dated 17-1-67 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7022, "end_char": 7032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8062, "end_char": 8068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regarding the second ground urged by the respondent the learned Single Judge held, relying upon this Court's decision in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India(1) and two other decisions of the Mysore and Andhra Pradesh ."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8190, "end_char": 8200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9116, "end_char": 9120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9410, "end_char": 9420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10033, "end_char": 10044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 5 S.C.R. 119", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10097, "end_char": 10116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10547, "end_char": 10561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11549, "end_char": 11559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12395, "end_char": 12409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12872, "end_char": 12878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the latest decision in State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji and Anr.(1) a similar observation has been made by Pathak, J. at page 567 :\n\n\"The law, it seems to me, is that where the services of a temporary Government servant or a probationer Government servant are terminated by an order which does not ex jacie disclose any stigma or penal consequences against the Government servant and is merely a termination order simpliciter, there is no case ordinarily for assuming that it is anything but what it purports to be."}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13911, "end_char": 13925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sughar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15298, "end_char": 15310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nPawan Kumar Dubey (1) thus :\n\n''We do not think that Sughar Singh' s case, in any way, conflicts with what has been laid down by this Court previously on Article 311(2) of the Constitution or Article 16 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Sughar Singh"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15399, "end_char": 15413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15437, "end_char": 15447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15519, "end_char": 15529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Suglwr Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16268, "end_char": 16280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Suglwr Singh's case (supra), the learned Judges have observed :\n\n\"What weighed with this Court was not only that there was a sufficient \"element of punishment\" in reverting Sughar Singh for a supposed wrong done, from which the order of reversion could not be divorced, so that Article J 11 (2) had to be complied with, but, there was also enough of an impropriety and unreasonableness in the action taken against Sughar Singh, solely for a very stale reason, which had become logically quite disconnected to make out a case of \"malice in law\" even if it was not a case of \"malice in fact\"\n\nThe matter is also covered by a recent decision of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Ors.", "canonical_name": "Sughar Singh"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17040, "end_char": 17049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\nA lskender Ali(1) where one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) speaking for the Court observed as follows :\n\n\"As the respondent was a temporary employee on probation, it was open to the employer to terminate his services at any time before he was confirmed, if the employer was satisfied that he was not suitable for being retained in service.\""}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18551, "end_char": 18562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K erala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18661, "end_char": 18679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the learned Judges who constituted the Division Bench of the K erala High Court that the respondent was only a temporary government servent and that even as a temporary government servant he is entitled to the protection of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18824, "end_char": 18832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_174_194_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "174 \\\n\nDEV RAJ DOGRA AND ORS.\n\nGYAN CHAND JAIN AND ORS.\n\nMarch JO 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND A.N. SEN, JJ.]\n\n\"Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Order XX/ Rules 95 and 96 and Transfer of Property -Act 1882, Ss 52, 58 and 6JALJ.fortgage-Consent decree passed in suit for money due-property let out by owner to tenants-property sold in court auction -Auction purchaser -applying to court for delivery of possession of propeny- Whether entitled to actual physical possession or symbolic possession.\n\nOrder XXI Rules 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure enable a purchaser of immovable property in a Court sale, to apply for delivery of possession.\n\nRule 95 provides for actual physical possession and rule 96 provides for symbolic possession. A purchaser wi11 be entitled to physical possession of the property purchased if the property sold is in the occupation of the judgment-debtor, of some person on behalf of the judgment debtor or some person claiming under a title-created by the judgment-debtor subsequent to the attachment of the property.\n\nIf the property sold is in the possession of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same, symbolic possession is to be made over to the purchaser under Rule 96.\n\nThe first respondent was an auction purchaser of property, of which the three appellants were _tenants occupying different portions. The property was mortgaged by its owner with a Bank. As the amount due was not paid, the Bank instituted a Suit , for its recovery. A decree was passed by Consent of the parties which provided that if the amount was not paid within two years, the Bank could enforce the decree by sale of the property. After the compromise decree was passed, the owner leased out different portions of the property to the appellants.\n\nAs the owner failed to make payment of the decreetal dues, the property was sold by Court auction and the first resrondc:nt, whose bid was the highest, was <iec!-a!'ed to be the purchaser of the premises, and the sale in his favour was -- confirmed.\n\nThe first respondent/auction-purchaser filed an application und'!r Order XXI, Rules 95 and 96 read with Section 151 of the Code_ o_f Civil Procedure in the High Court, for delivery of vacant physical possessioµ of the entire property and prayed that if it was not possible to grant vacant physical possession of any part of the , property, symbolic possession of that part may be granted. This application was\n\ncontes_ted by the three appellants/tenants. ·\n\n._ A Single Judge of the High Curt holding that the tenancies in favour of the ---: appellants having been created after the institution of the suit by the Bank and after the passing of the compromise decree in the said suit, and the said tenancies would have no effect on the rights acquired by the auction-purchaser in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and relying on the Division Bench Judgments of the Bombay High Court in Ramdas Popat Patil v. Fakira Patil and\n\nOrs. AJR 1959 Bom 19 and of the Gujarat High Court in Jagjiwondas a Firm v.\n\nLakhiram Haridasmal and Ors. AIR 1968 Guj 193 passed an order for delivery of A physical possession of the portions in the respective occupation of the appellants.\n\nIn appeal it was contended that the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Anaji Thamaji Patil v. Ragho Bhivraj Patil and Anr. AIR JQ73 Born 75, over-ruled the Bombay Division Bench decision and doubted the correctness of the Gujarat decision, but the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal accepting the contention put forward on behalf of the respondent-purchaser thai the decision of this Court in M/s Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Mahara; a Sir Brijnath [1976] J SCR 237 concluded the controversy.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court, it was contend on behalf of the appellants that:\n\n(I) Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case as the conditions laid down therein for its applicability are not satisfied.\n\n(ii) The right that the mortgagee had was only to put the property to sale in the event of the mortgagor failing to pay the decreetal amount in terms of the provisions of the compromise decree, and this right cannot be said to be a right\n\nto immoveable property directly and specifically in question in the suit.\n\n(iii) Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act should be read alongwith Section 52 and both these sections have been incorporated with the object of preserving the interest of the mortgagee by making suitable provisions so that the security of the mortgagee might not in any way be affected by any act done by the mortgagor after the creation of the mortgage and also after the institution of any suit for enforcement of the mortgage.\n\n(iv) Section 52 makes provisions for the parties to the suit or proceeding and can have no application to any auction purchaser who is not a party to the suit or proceeding and who only acquires his right after the sale in execution of the decree has been confirmed.\n\n(v) The right of the third party auction-purchaser to get physical possession of the property purchased at the auction sale was not considered by the Supreme Court in M/s Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Ors. and Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayya Swami and Ors. AIR 1973 SCR 569.\n\n(vi) Order XXI, Rule 95 and Rule 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the rights of an auction-purchaser are governed by the provisions contained therein and that the auction purchaser cannot claim physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants even though they might have been inducted as tenants after the compromise decree in the suit had been passed.\n\nOn behalf of the first respondent auction-purchaser it was submitted that (!) as the tenants were inducted not only after the institution of the suit for enforcement of the mortgage but also after the compromise decree that has been passed therein, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act must be held to be applicable\n\nand it must be held that the tenancies were illegal and were created in breach of these provisions. S.(2) 65A the Transfer of Property Act does not in any way control section 52. S 65A makes provisions with regard to the powers of the mortgagor to grant leases of the mortgaged property after the creation of the mortgage but before the institution of suit, while S. 32 makes provisions for cases of transfer or otherwise dealing with any property after the institution of a suit or proceeding and S. 52 imposes a complete ban on the transfer of any kind or dealing with immovable property except with the authority of the Court during the pendency of the suit or proceeding so that the rights of any part may not be affected when any decree or order is passed.\n\n3. Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan. In a suit for the enforcement of a mortgage, the right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question and after the 1; deeree for sale is passed, the mortgagor loses even his right to redeem the property. The tenancies in the instant case having been created long after the compromise decree, are illegal and void and in contravention of S. 52 of the Act.\n\n4. The decisions of this Court in .Ml s Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. Manager Mahto and Ors. and Jayaram Mudaliar conclude the question involved in the appeal.\n\nOn the question whether the !st Respondent as auction purchaser in an application under Or. XXI, rules 95 and 96, of the Code of Civil Procedure is entitled to recover actual physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants as lessees, the lease in respect of which were created after the decree in the mortgage suit by consent between the parties had been passed.\n\nAllowing the appeal\n\nHELD I. The Judgment and Order passed by the High Court directing physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants to be made over to the auction-purchaser Respondent No. 1 is set aside. Symbolic possession of the portions in occupation of the appellants to be made over to the auction-purchaser respondent.\n\n[194 DJ\n\n2. In the case of M/s Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., the validity of the lease had been questioned by the mortgagee decree holder in a suit for declaration. The claim was not for possession by a third party auction-purchaser in a proceeding, under rules 95 and 96 uf Order XX! of the Code of Civil Procedure and the merits of such an application and the scope and effect of the said provisions of the Code did not come up for consideration. In Mangru Matha and Ors.\n\nv. Shri Thakur Taraknath Tarakeshwar Math and Ors. a suit was instituted by the mortgagee auction-purchaser for recovery of possession of mortgaged property sold in execution of the mortgage decree and purchased by the mortgagee himself and the decision rested mainly on the basis that the lease was not granted by the mortgagor in the usual course of business. This case was also not concerned with an application by an outsider-auction purchaser for physical possession of the property purchased by him in an application made under Order XXI Rules 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These two decisions do not therefore conclude the question involved in the present appeal. [190 A-B, 191 H-192 CJ\n\n' 1.\n\n3. The auction-purchaser derives his right to obtain possession only after the sale in his favour has become absolute and sale certificate has been obtained by him. The mode and manner of obtaining such possession are regulated by Rules 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [ 193 F]\n\nIn the instant case a third party auction-purchaser is seeking recovery of the physical possession of the property purchased by him at the auction from the appellants who are in possession of different portions of the said premises as tenants of the said portions. The auction-purchaser was not the mmtgagee and he was no pariy to the suit in which the compromise decree was passed. The auctionpurchaser in view of the provisions contained in Rule 95 which regulate the rights of the auction-purchaser to obtain physical possession of the property, is not entitled to recover the physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants as tenants. The appellants are not the judgment-debtors. They are not in occupation of the property on behalf of the judgment-debt or. They are also not claiming to be in occupation under a title created by the judgmentdebtors subsequent to any attachment of the property. There is no question of any attachment in the case. The appellants are in the occupation of their respective portions as tenants and they claim to occupy the same as such. The auctionpurchaser must therefore be held to be entitled to only symbolic possession in terms of the provisions contained in Or XXI rule 96 in respect of the portions in occupation of the appellants. [192 H-193 A, 193 H-194 A, CJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1653 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23.5.1979 of the Delhi High Court in E.F.A. No. 8/76.\n\nMadan Bhatia and Sushi! Kumar for the Appellant.\n\nSN. Kacker, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri, E.M.S. Anam and M.K.\n\nDua for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nA.N. SEN J.\n\nThe principal question which falls for determination in this appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court, is whether Gyan Chand Jain, the Respondent No. 1 in this appeal, who purchased a two and half storeyed Bungalow at No. 5-C/96, W.E.A. I<arol Bagh, New Delhi, at an auction sale held pursuant to the terms of the compromise decree between the morgagor and the morgagee, is entitled to recover actual physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants as lessees, the leases in respect of which were created after the decree in the mortgage suit by consent between the parties had been passed, in an application made by the auction purchaser Gyan Chand Jain under O. XXI, rules 9 5 & 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThere is no serious dispute with regard to the facts material for the purpose of appeal. Des Raj Agarwal, the sole proprietor of M/s.\n\nRaj Kumar & Co., mortgated the 2! storeyed bungalow No. 5-C/96, WEA. Karol Bagh, New Delhi (herein-after referred to as the premises) along with various other properties with Oriental Bank of Commerce (hereinafter referred as the Bank) on 28.6.1960 by deposit of title deeds. The Bank filed a suit to recover its dues on the mortgage on 6.11.1962. On 3.9.1963, a decree was passed by consent of the parties in favour of the plaintiff-mortgagee for the sum of Rs. 479177 .49 with costs and future interest at 6% till realisation of the decretal amount. The other relevant terms of the consent decree which are contained in clauses 8 and 9 of the compromise are to the following effects :\n\n\"8. If the judgment debtor pay Rs. 479177.49 less costs and interest as after March, 1961 within two years of the decree, then whole of the decree shall stand satisfied.\n\n9. If full amount of the decree with costs and interest is not paid as agreed above, within two years of the decree, then the decree-holder shall be free to enforce the decree against the property mortgaged which shall be sold in execution of the same and the decree holder shall be entitled to proceed against other property and person of the judgment-debtor in the case of the proceeds of the property not being sufficient to satisfy the decree\".\n\nAfter the decree had been passed on 3.9.1963, it appears that the judgement-debtor leased out different portions of the premises to Dev Raj Dogra, Ish Kumar Khosla and Balwant Singh, the appellants herein, 1966, 1967 and 1970 respectively. The judgmentdebtor failed to make payment of the decreetal dues in terms of the provisions contained in the consent decree and the premises in question resold by public auction on 28.10.1971. Gyan Chand Jain whose bid was the highest, was declared to be the purchaser of the premises and the sale in his favour was confirmed on 6.8.1973. On\n\n25.10.76 an application was made on behalf on Gyan Chand Jain, the auction purchaser, in the Delhi High Court under 0. XXI rules 95 and 96 and also S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the following reliefs:-\n\n(i) Warrants of possession with the direction that vacant physical possession of the entire property be delivered to the applicant, be issued and vacant physical possession of the entire property be got delivered to the applicant ;\n\n(ii) in case the Hon' ble Court comes to a c_onclusion that the applicant is not entitled to vacate physical possession of any part of the property symbolic possession of that part of the property be granted to him ;\n\n(iii) notices be issued to the persons mentioned in para 9 above to show cause why vacant physical possession of the B portion of the property in their occupation be not delivered to the applicant.\n\nThe three tenant who were in possession of the respective portions leased out to them and on whom notices had been served, contested the said application. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court passed an order of physical possession of the said portions in the respective occupation of the tenants, the appellants before us, to be made over to the auction purchaser Gyan Chand Jain. The Learned Judge held that the tenancies in favour of the tenants had been created after institution of the suit by the Bank and after the passing of the compromise decree in the said suit ; and, the said tenancies would have no effect on the rights acquired by the auction purchaser, in view of the provisions contained in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Learned Judge had relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramdas Popat Patil v. Fakira Pandu Patil and Ors.(1) and also on decision of Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in case Jagjiwandas a Firm v. Lakhiram Haridasmal and Ors.(2) The tenants preferred an appeal against the said order of the learned Judge.\n\nBefore the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, it was urged on behalf of the tenants that the decision of the Division Bench relied on by the learned Single Judge had been subsequently over-ruled by a decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in case of Anaji Thamaji Patil v. Ragho Bhivraj Patil and Anr.(3) and the correctness of the decision of the Gujarat High Court had also been questioned in this Full Bench judgment.\n\nVarious other arguments were also advanced before the Division Bench on behalf of the tenants and the said arguments have been noted in the judgment of the Division Bench.\n\nThe Division Bench however, dismissed the appeal, accepting the contention put forward on behalf of the respondent auction-purchaser that the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji\n\n(I) A.1.R. 1959 Bom.'J9. (2:) A.I.R. 1968 Guj. 193.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1973 Born. 75.\n\nA Deo of Maihar and Ors.,(1) concludes the controversy.\n\nThe' Division Bench also referred to the decision of this Court in case Jayaram Mudaliar v. Avva Swami and Ors.(2) Against the judgment and decision of the Delhi High Court the tenants have preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nMr. Bhatia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants the appellants before us, has urged that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case, as the conditions laid down in the said Section for the applicability of the said section are 'not satisfied.\n\nIt is the argument of Mr.\n\nBhatia that the requirements of the said Section are--(1) there must be a suit or proceeding which is not a collusive one and any right to immovable property must be directly and specifically in question in the said suit or proceeding and (2) transfer or otherwise dealing with the property by any party to the suit or proceeding must affect the right of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be passed therein.\n\nMr. Bhatia has contended that in the instant case the right that the mortgagee had was only to put the property to sale in the event of the mortgagor failing to pay the decreetal amount in terms of the provisions of the compromise decree.\n\nIt is his contention that the right to put the property to sale cannot be said to be a right to immovable property directly and specifically in question in the suit. He also referred to S. 65A of the Transfer of Property Act which empowers the mortgagor while lawfully in possession of the mortgaged property to grant lease in terms of the provisions contained in the said Section.\n\nHe has submitted that S .. 65A should be read along with S. 52 and both these sections have been incorporated with the object of preserving the interest of the mortgagee by making suitable provisions so that the security of the mortgagee might not in any way be affected by any act done by the mortgagor after the creation of the mortgage and also after the institution of any suit for enforcement of the mortgage. It is his submission that in S. 65A of the Transfer of Property Act the Legislature has made it manifestly clear that the mortgagor will be entitled to grant a lease of the property in conformity with the provisions of the said Section and he submits that when a mortgagor grants a lease of the mortgaged property in terms of the provisions of Section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be said that the granting of any such lease affects the right of the mortgagee. Mr. Bhatia has next contended that in any event S.52 makes provisions for the\n\n(I) [1976] 1 S.C.R. 237.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1973 S.C. 569, [1973] I S.C.R. 139.\n\nparties to the suit or proceeding and can have no application to any outside auction purchaser who is not a party to the suit or proceeding and who only acquires his right after the sale in execution o(the decree has been confirmed. Mr. Bhatia argues that the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court must be held to be wrong, as the learned Single Judge came to his decision relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kamdas Popat Patil v. Fakira Pandu Patil and Ors. (supra) and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Jagjiwandas a Firm v. Lakhiram Haridasmal and Ors. (supra) and the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramdas Popat Patil's case has been over ruled by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Anaji Thamaji Patil v. Ragho Bhivraj Patil and Anr.(supra) in which the correctness of the decision of the Gujarat High Court has also been questioned. Mr. Bhatia has commented that the decisions of this Court in the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Ors. (supra) and in the case of Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayya Swami and Ors. (supra) do not conclude the question involved in the instant case. He has submitted that the rights of a third party auction-purchaser to get physical possession of the property purchased at the auction sale was not considered by the Supreme Court in any of these two decisions; and he has further submitted that in these two cases the Supreme Court had indeed proceeded on the assumption that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable without considering whether the requirements of the said Section had been complied with or not, as these aspects were not argued before the Supreme Court in these two cases. Mr. Bhatia has drawn our attention to O.XXI, rule 95 and also to rule 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and has submitted that the rights of an auction purchaser are governed by the provisions contained therein. It is the argument of Mr. Bhatia that in view of the provisions contained therein, the auction purchaser cannot claim physical .possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants, even though the appellants might have been inducted as tenants after the compromise decree in the suit had been passed.\n\nMr. Kakkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the auction purchaser; has submitted that as the tenants in the instant case were inducted not only after te institution of the suit for enforcement of the mortgage but also after the compromise decree had been passed, therein S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act must be held to be applicable and it must be held that the tenancies were illegal and were created in breach of the provisions contained in S. 52 of the\n\nTransfer of Property Act. Mr. Kakkar has argued that S. 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act does not, in any way, control S. 52 of the said Act. It is his argument that S. 65-A makes provisions with regard to the powers of the mortgagor to grant leases of the mortgaged property after the creation of the mortgage but before the institution of suit, while, on the other hand S. 52 makes provisions for cases of transfer or otherwise dealing with any property after the institution of a suitor proceeding and S. 52 imposes a complete ban on the transfer of any kind or dealing with immovable property except with the authority of the Court during the pendency of the suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is directly or specifically in question so that the rights of any party may not be affected when any decree or order is passed in the suit or in the proceeding. Mr. Kakkar has referred to S.58 of the Transfer of Property Act in support of his contention that in case of a mortgage, there is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing of the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan. He has argued that in a suit for the enforcement of mortgage it musi, therefore, be held that the right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question; and he has further argued that after the decree for sale is passed in a mortgage suit the mortgagor loses even his right to redeem the property. He has submitted that in the instant case tenancies have been created long after the compromise decree in which provision for sale of the mortgaged property had been made and the right of the mortgagee decree-holde(to put up the mortgaged property to sale had also arisen for failure on the part of the mortgagorjudgment-debtor to pay the decretal dues in terms of the compromise decree and the tenancies created by the mortgagor must be held to be illegal and void as they are clearly in contravention of the provisions contained in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. He submits that there cannot be any manner of doubt, that the creation of 11. tenancy affects the value of the property and to that extent affects the security, even though it may be said that the Legislature in iti wisdom has thought it fit to permit the mortgagor to grant leases of the mortgaged property in terms of the provisions contained in S. 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nIt is his argument that the Legislature has thought it fit not to impose any kind of absolute prohibition in respect of the dealing with any property by the mortgagor after the creation of a mortgage and has imposed only such restrictioni which the Legislature thought would not prejudicially affect the security of the mortgagee; but the Legislature, however, ia S.52 of the Act has thought fit to impose_complete ban on the transfer\n\nof or otherwise dealing with any property after the institution of a suit or proceeding in which the right to property is directly or specifically in question, so that the rights of any party thereto may not be affected under a decree or order which may be made in the suit or proceeding. Mr. Kakkar has next submitted that the auctionpurchaser at the Court sale acquires all the right, title and interest of the mortgagor and also of the mortagee as a result of the purchase and the auction-purchaser, therefore, steps into the shoes ofthe mortgagee and becomes entitled to obtain physical possession of the property purchased in the same manner as the mortgagee himself would have been able to do. Mr. Kakkar in this connection has referred to the decision of this Court in the case Mangru Mahto and Ors. v. Shri Thakur Taraknath Tarakeshwar Math and Ors.(1 ); and also to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Ors. (supra) It is the submission of Mr. Kakkar that the decisions of this Court in the case of M/ s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (supra) and also in the case of Jayaram Mudaliar (supra) conclude the question involved in the present appeal and the Division Bench rightly dismissed the appeal relying on the said decisions.\n\nBefore we proceed to deal with the respective contentions of the parties, it will be convenient to consider the material provisions of the relevant statutes to which we were referred in the course of submissions made from the bar. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as follows :-\n\n\"During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.\n\n{Explanation-For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence\n\nfrom the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institu- H\n\n\ntion of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order, and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.]\"\n\nMaterial provisions of S. 58 (a) and (b) of the said Act are in the following terms :-\n\n\"(a) A Mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific im\" moveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability.\n\nThe transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being are called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any) by which the transfer is effected is called a mortgage-deed.\n\n(b) Where, without delivering possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds himself personally to pay the mortgage-money, and agrees, expreesly or impliedly, that, in the event of his failing to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee shall have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied so far as may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called a simple mortgage and the mortgagee a simple mortgagee.\"\n\nS. 65A which was subsequently introduced into the Act by S. 30 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929 provides :-\n\n\"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section.(2), a mortgagor, while lawfully in possession of the mortgaged property, shall have power to make leases thereof which shall be binding on the mortgagee.\n\n(2) (a) Every such lease shall be such as would be made in the ordinary course of management of the property concerned, and in accordance with any local law, custom or usage.\n\n(b) Every such lease shall reserve the best rent that can reasonably be obtained, and no premium shall be paid or promised and no rent shall be payable in advance.\n\n(c) No such lease shall contain a covenant for renewal.\n\n( d) Every such lease shall take effect from a date not later than six months from the date on which it is made.\n\n(e) In the case of a lease of buildings, whether leased with or without the land on which they stand, the duration of the lease shall in no case exceed three years, and the lease shall contain a covenant for payment of the rent and a condition of re-entry on the rent not being paid within a time therein specified.\n\n(3) The provisions of sub-section ( l) apply only if and as\n\nfar as a contrary intention is not expressed in the mortgage- D deed; and the provision of sub-section (2) may be varied or extended by the mortgage-deed and, as so varried and extended shall, as far as may be, operate in like manner and with all like incidents, effects and consequences, as if such variations or extensions were contained in that sub-section.\n\nRules 95 and 96 of O.XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure under which the auction-purchaser in th(instant case had made the application for possession are in the following effect :-\n\n\"95. Where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under rnle 94, the Court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by putting such purchaser or any person whom he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf in possession of the property, and, if need be, by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same.\n\n96. Where the property sold is in the occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under rule 94, the Court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by affixing a copy of the certificate of sale in\n\nsome conspicuous place on the property and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other \"customary mode, at some convenient place, that the interest of the judgment-debtor has been transferred to the purchaser.\n\nAn analysis of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act indicates that for application of the said section the following conditions have to be satisfied :-\n\n1. A suit or a proceeding in which any right to immovable property must be directly and specifically in question, must be pending;\n\nThe suit or the proceeding shall not be a collusive one;\n\nSuch property during the pendency of such a suit or proceeding cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the right of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be passed therein except under the authority of Court. In other words, any transfer of such property or any dealing with such property during the pendency of the suit is prohibited except under the authority of Court, if such transfer or otherwise dealing with the property by any party to the suit or proceeding affects the right of any other party to the suit or proceeding under any order or decree which may be passed in the said suit or proceeding.\n\nIt has to be noted that this section imposes a prohibition on transfer or otherwise dealing with any property during the pendency of a suit provided the conditions laid down in the section are satisfied.\n\nS. 58 makes it clear that in case of a mortgage there is a transfer of an interest in the specific immovable property mortgaged for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of a loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may gives rise to pecuniary liability. It further confers, in case of a simple mortgage where, without delivering the possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds himself personally to pay the mortgage-money, a right on the mortgagee to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied, so far as may be necessary in payment of the mortgage-debt.\n\n·~\n\n--~---\n\nS. 65A which as we noticed earlier, was introduced by the Amending Act, 1929 in recognition of the mortgagor's powers exercised bona fide to grant lease of the mortgage-property in the usual course of management, makes provision with regard to the exercise of such powers by the mortgagor, while the mortgage subsists and the mortgagor is in lawful possession of the mortgaged-property.\n\nThis section further makes it clear that any lease granted by the mortgagor in accordance with the provisions of this section would be binding on the mortgagee.\n\nRules 95 and 96 of O.XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure makes provisions for enabling a purchaser of immovable property in a Court sale after obtaining the necessary certificate from the Court in terms of the provisions contained in rule 94 of the Code to apply for delivery of possession of the immovable property purchased by him at the Court sale.\n\nRule 95 provides for actual physical possession and rule 96 provides for symbolic possession. A plain reading of rule 95 which we have earlier set out, clearly establishes, that the purchaser will be entitled to physical possession of property purchased and the Court will direct delivery of actual possession of the property sold to him by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same, if need be, if the following conditions are satisfied:-\n\nThe property sold must be in the occupation of the judgment E debtor;\n\nThe property sold must be in the occupancy of some person on behalf of the judgment-debtor;\n\nThe property sold must be in the occupation of some person clainung under a title created by the judgmentdebtor subsequently to the attachment of the property.\n\nRule 96 on the other hand makes it clear that where the property sold is in the occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same, symbolic possession of the property in the manner provided in the said rule is to be made over to the purchaser after the purchaser has obtanied the necessary certificate under rule 94 of the Code.\n\nWe shall now proceed to consider the decision of this Court\n\nin the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nv. His Highness M'lharaja Sir Brijnath Singh Deo of Maihar and Ors. (supra) H and also the decision of this Court in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayya Swami and Ors (supra). In the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd., the plaintiff-respondent who were the mortgagee of a cinema theatre of which the appellant Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nclaimed to be a lessee in occupation, had filed a suit against the mortgagor and a decree by compromise had been passed in the said suit on 7th May, 1960. By the said compromise decree it was agreed that the amounts due to the mortgagee deGree-holder would be realised by the sale of the theatre. The Central Bank of India, another creditor of the mortgagor, assigned its rights under the decree to the plaintiff decree holder. The theatre was attached in the course of execution of the decree.\n\nThe original lease of 1940 on the basis of which the appellant, the Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. had entered into possession, expired in 1946 but thereafter the Company had continued in possession as a tenant holding over until the impugned lease-deed of 1946 in favour of the company was executed. The company filed a suit in 1954 for specific performance of the agreement to lease and the lease deed of 1956 was executed in compliance with the terms of the compromise decree passed in the said suit filed by the appellant company.\n\nIn the said suit for specific performance by the appellant company, the plaintiff mortgagee was not impleded as a party.\n\nThe plaintiff mortgagee thereafter filed a suit claiming that the lease of 1956 was void as the same came within the mischief of Ss. 52 and 65A of the Transfer of Property Act and also S. 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant company contested the said suit contending inter alia that the suit of this nature filed by the plaintiff mortgagee did not lie as it fell outside the purview of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act.\n\nThe trial Court decreed the said suit of the plaintiff mortgagee and granted the declaration asked for. The appellant-company preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial Court to the High Court which dismissed the said appeal. Thereafter the appellant company filed a further appeal to this Court by special leave granted by this Court. This Court for reasons recorded in the judgment held that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration asked for on proper construction of S. 42 of, the Specific Relief Act.\n\nOne of the contentions which was raised on behalf of the appellant in this Court was that S. 52 of the Transfer of\n\nProperty Act was not attracted to the lease in question.\n\nDealing with contention this Court observed at pp. 243-244 as follows:-:-\n\n\"The contention that the case fell outside the purview of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as the lease was executed in purported satisfaction of an antecedent claim rests upon the terms of an agreement of 1948, embodied in a letter, on the strenght of which the defendant-appellant had\n\n-l--\n\nfiled his suit for specific performance. We find that the terms of the compromise decree in that suit and lease-deed of 1956 purported to confer upon the defendant-appellant new rights.\n\nIndeed, there are good grounds for suspecting that the compromise in the suit for specific performamance was adopted as a device to get round legal difficulties in the execution of the lease of 1956 in favour of the defendant-company. We are unable to accept the argument, sought to be supported by the citation of Bishan Singh and Ors. v. Khazan Singh and Anr. (AIR 1951 Assam 101) that the lease was merely an enforcement of an antecedent or pre-existing right.\n\nWe think that it purported to create entirely new rights pendente lite. It was, therefore struck by the doctrine of !is p211dens, as explained by this Court in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami and Ors. [1973\n\nSCR. 139] embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nAn alternative argument of the appellant was that a case falling within S. 65A (2) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, confining the duration of a lease by a mortgagor to three years, being a special provision, displaces the provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThis argument overlooks the special object of the doctrine of /is pendens which applies to a case in which litigation relating to property in which rights are sought to be created p211de11te lite by acts of parties, is pening.\n\nMoreover, for the purposes of this argument, the defendant-appellant assumes that the provisions of Section 65A(2)\n\n(e) Transfer of Property Act are applicable. If that was so, it would make no substantial difference to the rights of the defen- dant-appellimt, which would vanish before the suit was filed if Section 65A applies'. We, however, think that, as the special doctrine of tis p!ndens, is applicable here, the purported lease of 1956 was invalid from the outset. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the applicability of Section 65A\n\n(2) (e), which the defendant-appellant denies, to the facts of this case.\"\n\nThis Court further held agreeing with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that the lease of J 956 was also struck\n\nby the provisioris of S. 64 of the Civil Procedure Code, as the property continued to remain under attachment at the time of the H grant of the lease in 1956.\n\nIt may be noted that in the case the validity of the lease had been questioned by the mortgagee decree-holder in a suit for appropriate declaration.\n\nThe claim was not for possession by a third party auction-purchaser in a proceeding under rr. 95 and 96 of O.XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure and the merits of an application under the said provisions of the Code and the scope and effect thereof did not come up for consideration,\n\nIn the case of Mangru Mahto and Ors. v. Shri Thakur Taraknath Tarakeshwar Math and Ors. (supra), the mortgagor had granted lease of the mortgaged-property to certain persons. In execution of the mortgage-decree, the mortgagee himself purchased the property at the auction. The lessees of the mortgaged-property had allowed the property to be sold and had not applied for being added as a party. The mortgagee had also obtained the money decree against one of the lessees and in execution of the decree had attached the mortgaged land. _The lessees filed claim petitions objecting to the attachment under O.XXI, rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe claim petitions filed by the lessees were allowed and the executing court held that the leases were genuine. The mortgagee auction-purchaser did not file any suit under Order XXI,'.rule 63 but Jatter filed a suit against the mortgagor and the lessees for recovery of possession of the lands, alleging that the leases were co!lesive transactions and were otherwi.se not binding on him.\n\nThe Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the leases were genuine; but the High Court decreed the suit holding that the leases . were sham transactions .and were made in contravention of S. 65A of the Transfer of Property Act. The lessees thereafter preferred an appeal to this Court under certificate granted by the High Court. One of the contentions raised before this Court was that as the mortgagee did not file a suit under 0. XXI, rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure after the claim petitions of the lessees under O.XXI rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been allowed and the mortgagee was not entitled to maintain th<suit for recovery of possession of the mortgaged land and for mesne profits on the allegation that the leases were collusive transactions and were otherwise not binding on him. This contention was negatived by this Court for reasons recorded in the judgment.\n\nThis Court further held that the validity of the leases granted by the mortgagor was not affected by S. 65A of the Transfer of Property Act\n\nas the leases were granted before the enactment of S. 65-A. lAs these aspects do not have any material bearing on the question involved in the present appeal, it does not become necessary for us to pursue these two aspects any further.\n\nThis Court, however, held that the leases in question were not granted by the mortgagor in the ordinary\n\ncourse of managment as the agent or bailiff of the mortgagee and were not binding on the mortgagee and in that view of the matter this Court dismissed the appeal.\n\nThis Court observed at p. 132 as follows : -\n\n\"A lease granted by the mortgagor, out of the ordinary course of management, though not binding on the mortgagee is binding as between the mortgagor and the lessee.\n\nSuch a lessee acquires an interest in the right of redemption and is entitled to redeem. If such a lease is created before the institution of a suit relating to the mortgage, the lessee must be joined as a party to the suit under 0. 34, r. 1, C.P.C.; otherwise he will not be bound by the decree passed in the suit and will continue to retain his right of redemption. But in view of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the mortgagor grants such a lease during the pendency of a suit for sale by the mortgagee, the lessee is bound by the result of {the litigation. If the property is sold in execution of the decree passed in the suit, the lessee cannot resist a claim for posession by the auctionpurchaser. The lessee could apply for being joined as a party to the suit and ask for an opportunity to redeem the property.\n\nBut if he allows the property to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree and they have now lost the present case, the lessees allowed the suit lands to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree and they have now lost the right of redemption.\n\nThey cannot resist the claim of the auction-purchaser of recovery of possession of the lands.\"\n\nIt may be noted that the Court immediately after the aforesaid observations has further observed as follows:--\n\n\"If a mortgagor in possession of the mortgaged property executes a lease of the property in the ordinary course of management as the agent or bailiff of the mortgagee during the pendency of a suit by the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage, a question may arise whether such a lease is in the eye of the law a lease granted by the mortgagee through his agent and therefore binding on him. But in the present case, that question does not arise as the leases were not granted by the mortgagor in the ordinary course of management as the bailiff or agent of the mortgagor.\"\n\nIt is to be noticed that this decision arose out of the suit instituted by the mortgagee auction-purchaser for recovery of possession of\n\nmortgaged-property sold in execution of the mortgage decree and purchased by the mortgagee himself and the decision in the case rested mainly on the basis that the lease was not granted by the mortgagor in the usual course of business. This case was also not concerned with an application by an outside-auction purchaser for physical possession of the property purchased by him in an application made under O.XXI, rr. 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Proceedure, and the Court did not have to consider this scope and effect of a proceeding under O.XXI, rr. 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nIn our opm10n, it cannot, therefore, be said that these two decisions of this Court conclude the question involved in the present appeal before us.\n\nIt may be true that S. 52 and S. 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act operate in different spheres.\n\nS.65-A, as we have earliar noticed deals with the powers of the mortgagor to grant a lease of the mortgaged property,, while the mortgagor remains in lawful possession of the same.\n\nS. 52 deals with cases of transfer of or otherwise dealing with any immovable property after any suit or proceeding in which any right to the said immovable property is directly and specifically in question, has been filed.\n\nIt is also to be noted that S. 65-A which came to be inserted by the Amending Act 1929, is neither made 'subject to' nor 'not withstanding the provisions' contained in S. 52 of the Act. S. 52 will, however, be only applicable, if the requirements of the said section are satisfied.\n\nWe have earlier noticed what the requirements of the said section are.\n\nIn the instant case, it does not become necessary for us to consider whether the grant of any lease by a mortgagor in conformity with the provisions of S. 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act during the pendency of a suit by the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage will attract the provisions of S. 52 of the Act or will be outside the mischief of the provisions of the said section on the ground that the creation of such a lease may not affect the rights of the mortgagee under any decree or order which may be passed in the suit.\n\nWe ha, e earlier quoted the observations of this Court in the case of Mangru Mahto (supra) and it will be noticed that the Supreme Court in the said case did not decide this question and left this question open.\n\nIn the instant case an outside auction-purchaser is seeking recovery of the physical possession of the property purchased by him at the auction from the appellants who are in possession of different portions of the said premises as tenants of the said por-\n\n) /\n\nI •\n\ntions.\n\nThe auction-purchaser in the instant case was not the mortgagee and he was no party to the suit in which the compromise decree was passed.\n\nS. 52 in clear terms speaks of the rights of the parties to the suit or proceeding. In this connection it may be noted that this Court in the case of Jayaram Mudaliar (supra) held at p. 153 as follows:-\n\n\"It is evident that the doctrine, as stated in section 52, applies not merely to actual transfers of rights which are subject-matter of litigation but to other dealings with it by any party to the suit or proceeding, so as to affect the right of any other party thereto.\n\nHence it could be urged that Where it is not a party to the litigation but an outside agency such as the tax collecting authorities of the Government, which proceeds against the subject-matter of litigation, without anything done by a litigating party, the resulting transaction will not be hit by section 52.\n\nAgain, where all the parties which could be affected by a pending litigation are themselves parties to a transfer or dealings with property in such a way that they cannot resile from or disown the transaction impugned before the Court dealing with the litigation the Court may bind them to their own acts. All these are matters which the Court could have properly considered.\n\nThe purpose of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to defeat any just and equitable claim but only to subject them to the authority of the Court which is dealing with the property to which claims are put forward.\"\n\nThe auction -purchaser derives his right to obtain possession only after the sale in his favour has become absolute and sale certificate has been obtained by him. The mode and manner of obtaining such possession are regulated by rr. 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nIt is of interest to note that in the instant case, the auction purchaser had applied for obtaining possession under r. 95 which provides for actual possession and also under r. 96 which provides for symbolic possession. We have earlier set out the provisions of these two rules.\n\nIn the facts and circumstances of this case, the auction purchaser, in view of the provisions contained in rule 95 which regulates the rights of the auction purchaser to obtain physical possession of the property purchased, is not entitled to recover the physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants as tenants. The appellants are not the judgment-debtors.\n\nThey are not in occupation of the property on behalf of the judgmenHlebtor. They are aleo not <1laimln: to be in occupation under\n\na title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to any attachment of the property. There has been no question of any attachment in the instant case. The appellants are in the occupation of the respective portions as tenants and they claim to occupy the same as such.\n\nThe question of validity or otherwise of the tenancy may have to be considered and determined in an appropriate proceeding. In the present proceeding, the auction-purchaser who is an outsider and was not a party to the suit resulting in the compromise decree in execution of which the property was put up for sale, is not entitled to recover physical possession from the appellants in view of the provisions contained in 0. XXI, rule 95, and the au<'tion-purchaser must be held to be entitled to symbolic possession in terms of the provisions contained in O.XXI, rule 96 in respect of the portions in occupation of the appellants.\n\nWe, accordingly, allow this appeal.\n\nWe set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court directing physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants to be made over to D the auction-purchaser Gian Chand Jain, We direct that symbolic possession of the portions in occupation of the appellants is to be made over to the auction-purchaser Gian Chand Jain. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 178, "entities": [{"text": "DEV RAJ DOGRA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEV RAJ DOGRA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GYAN CHAND JAIN AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GYAN CHAND JAIN AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.N. 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I<arol Bagh, New Delhi, at an auction sale held pursuant to the terms of the compromise decree between the morgagor and the morgagee, is entitled to recover actual physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants as lessees, the leases in respect of which were created after the decree in the mortgage suit by consent between the parties had been passed, in an application made by the auction purchaser Gyan Chand Jain under O. 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{"text": "25.10.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14337, "end_char": 14345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\n25.10.76 an application was made on behalf on Gyan Chand Jain, the auction purchaser, in the Delhi High Court under 0."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14430, "end_char": 14446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\n25.10.76 an application was made on behalf on Gyan Chand Jain, the auction purchaser, in the Delhi High Court under 0."}}, {"text": "S. 151", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14485, "end_char": 14491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14495, "end_char": 14522, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15387, "end_char": 15392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High 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"metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36638, "end_char": 36673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall now proceed to consider the decision of this Court\n\nin the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nv. His Highness M'lharaja Sir Brijnath Singh Deo of Maihar and Ors. (", "canonical_name": "Supreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd."}}, {"text": "Supreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36860, "end_char": 36896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd., the plaintiff-respondent who were the mortgagee of a cinema theatre of which the appellant Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nclaimed to be a lessee in occupation, had filed a suit against the mortgagor and a decree by compromise had been passed in the said suit on 7th May, 1960.", "canonical_name": "Supreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd."}}, {"text": "7th May, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37166, "end_char": 37179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd., the plaintiff-respondent who were the mortgagee of a cinema theatre of which the appellant Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nclaimed to be a lessee in occupation, had filed a suit against the mortgagor and a decree by compromise had been passed in the said suit on 7th May, 1960."}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37327, "end_char": 37348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Bank of India, another creditor of the mortgagor, assigned its rights under the decree to the plaintiff decree holder."}}, {"text": "Ss. 52 and 65A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38314, "end_char": 38328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38336, "end_char": 38360, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38370, "end_char": 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"end_char": 48156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48334, "end_char": 48339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48587, "end_char": 48592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amending Act 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48628, "end_char": 48645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48727, "end_char": 48732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act 1929", "statute": "the Amending Act 1929"}}, {"text": "S. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48745, "end_char": 48750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act 1929", "statute": "the Amending Act 1929"}}, {"text": "S. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49066, "end_char": 49071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act 1929", "statute": "the Amending Act 1929"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49081, "end_char": 49105, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49208, "end_char": 49213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act 1929", "statute": "the Amending Act 1929"}}, {"text": "Mangru Mahto", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49516, "end_char": 49528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We ha, e earlier quoted the observations of this Court in the case of Mangru Mahto (supra) and it will be noticed that the Supreme Court in the said case did not decide this question and left this question open."}}, {"text": "S. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50075, "end_char": 50080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50326, "end_char": 50336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50849, "end_char": 50859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51254, "end_char": 51264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51272, "end_char": 51296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51714, "end_char": 51741, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gian Chand Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53668, "end_char": 53683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court directing physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants to be made over to D the auction-purchaser Gian Chand Jain, We direct that symbolic possession of the portions in occupation of the appellants is to be made over to the auction-purchaser Gian Chand Jain.", "canonical_name": "GYAN CHAND JAIN AND ORS"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53905, "end_char": 53911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_195_199_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RAM MANORATH\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch JO. 1981\n\n[ Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.P. SEN, J.]\n\nIndian Penal Code 1860, Ss. 302 and 149-Murders committed by members of an unlawful assembly-Acquittal of some-Effect on prosecution of remaining- Death sentence for two and life sentence for others-Propriety of.\n\nOut of twelve persons, charged with the offences under section ~302 read with section 149 I.P.C. and various other charges, eight were convicted. Two of them, C and R were sentenced to death while the others were sentenced to imprisonment for life. The High Court upheld the death sentence of two accused, acquitted one and confirmed the conviction of others.\n\nThe case of the prosecution was that on the day of the occurrence at about sun-set C shot dead two of the deceased while two others were shot by D R. The prosecution relied on the dying declaration of one of the deceased and examined four eye witnesses.\n\nJn appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the fact that the trial court did not find it safe to accept the prosecution evidence and acquitted five out of twelve persons mentioned in the F.I.R. at one stage or the other should be sufficient to discard the prosecution case in respect of the other accused as well.\n\nAllowing the appeals in part,\n\nHELD : l(i). It is difficult to hold that the witnesses had made out an entirely false or concocted story against the appellants. The circumstance that three of the four prosecution witnesses had been injured during the course of the incident affords a strong guarantee of their presence at the scene of the occurrence.\n\nThere is also no reason why the four eye witnesses should falsely implicate persons against whom they had no grouse.\n\n[197 F-G]\n\n(ii). The reason why the trial court and the High Court acquitted some of the accused was that in the case of some of them there was a possibility of mistaken identity while, in regard to some others, the evidence was not of such a nature or character as to justify the acceptance of their complexity beyond a reasonable doubt. [197 HJ ·\n\n2. One of the accused J must be acquitted for the reason that though his name was mentioned alongwith the names of eleven others at the outset of the First Information Report, the text of that report does not attribute any part to H him at all. His name had been included in an omnibus manner, by sayini:\n\nthat he along with others wielded his latbi. [198 C-D]\n\n3. It is unsafe to sentence C and R to death. One of the deceased implicated R in his dying declaration as the person, who shot at him but as pointed out by the Trial Court itself, the dying declaration suffers from several infirmities and, it cannot therefore, be relied upon for the purposes of holding that it was this accused, who shot the deceased. Secondly, the occurrence took place an hour after sun-set and it is hardly likely that if a large group of ten or twelve persons had formed an unlawful assembly, the witnesses would be in a position to identify minute details of the incident. The prosecution version in regard to specific overt acts that C and R fired shots resulting in the fatal injuries to the two deceased seems exaggerated. No distinction can be made in the case of the other accused, who have been sentenced to life . imprisonment and the case of these two accused. The sentence of death imposed on them is, therefore, set aside. They are sentenced to imprisonment for life. [198 E-G, 199 B-D]\n\n4. The conviction and sentence of the remaining appellants are confirmed. [199 E]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 345 & 346 of 1978.\n\nCriminal Appeal Nos.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14.1.1978 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Criminal Appeals Nos. 496, 508 and 542 of 1977.\n\nFrank Anthony and Sushi! Kumar for the Appellant.\n\nH.R. Bhardwaj, G. S. Narayanan and R. K. Bhatt for the, E Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nTwelve persons were put up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bahraich on various charges, the principal charge being under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code. The learned Judge acquitted four persons and convicted the remaining eight of the offences of which they were charged. Two out of those eight persons namely, Chhotey and Ram Manorath were sentenced to death while the remaining aix were sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe sentences awarded for the other offences were directed to run concurrently with that sentence.\n\nThe High Court of Allahabad acquitted one more person and convicted the remaining seven. The High Court also uphel(! the death 11entence awarded to Chhotey and Ram Manorath. Froiu out of the ieven persons convicted by the High Court, only six are\n\nbefore us iince one of them,. Baijnath, who was awarded Uf~ impriionmenf has not appealed from the judgment of the Iileh\n\nCourt.\n\nThe incident out of which these proceedings arise took place at about sunset time on December 5, 1973 in a village called Bhawanipur. Four persons died during the course of that incident, namely, Guley, Abbas, Wali Mohammad and Nankau. Guley and Abbas are alleged to have been shot dead by Chhotey while the other two are alleged to have been shot by Ram Manorath. Guley and Abbas died instantaneously, Nankau a little later and Wali Mohammad about a week later.\n\nIn support of its case the prosecution examined four eye witnesses : Noor Mohammad, P. W. 1, Shaukat Ali, P. W. 2, Nafees, P. W. 4 and Naeem, P. W. 5. The prosecution also relied on the dying declaration of Wali Mohammad which was recorded by a Magistrate. The evidence of these four witnesses as also the dying declaration have been accepted by both the Courts.\n\nShri Frank Anthony, who appears on behalf of five out of the six appellants before us, has drawn our attention to various circumstances which according to him render the entire prosecution case suspect and unacceptable. It is urged by the learned counsel that a large number of persons were roped in on mere suspicion which is shown by the very fact that five out of the 12 persons who were mentioned in the First Information Report were acquitted at one stage or _the other for the reason that it would not be safe to accept the evidence led by the prosecution against those persons.\n\nThe same test, according to the learned counsel, must apply to ths cases of the remaining accused also.\n\nHaving considered this submission and the other submissions made by the learned counsel, we find it difficult to hold that the witnesses have made out an entirely false or concocted case against all the appellants. Out of the four eye witnesses examined by the prosecution, Noor Mohammad, Shaukat Ali and Nafees were indisputably injured during the course of the incident in question and that circumstance affords a strong guarantee of their presence at the scene of offence. Counsel himself urged that there was no motive for the offence. If that be so, we are unable to understand why the four eye witnesses should falsely implicate persons against whom they have no grouse. The reason for the acquittal of some of the accused by the Trial Court and the High Court is that there was, in the case of some of them, a possibility of mistaken identity while, in regard to some others, the evidence was not of such a nature or character as to justify the acceptance of their complicity beyond a reasonable doubt. The injuries received by Shaukat Ali, P. W. 2 are quite serious. P. w. 4,\n\nNafees was not concerned with the incident in any other manner because he was engaged as a mere labourer by the deceased, Wali Mohammad. In so far as the remaining two witnesses nameiy, P.W.l and 5 are concerned, their presence was virtually admitted on behalf of the principal accused Baijnath who has not chosen to file any appeal before us.\n\nThough this is the true position, we do not consider it proper to accept wholly the evidence led by the prosecution without examining the case of each one of the accused.\n\nIn that process we find that the appellant Jaisee ought to be acquitted. It is undoubtedly true as contended by Shri Bhardwaj, who appears on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, that Jaisee's name is mentioned in the F.I.R. and that he has been implicated by all the four prosecution witnesses.\n\nBut the difficulty which we find in accepting the case of the prosecuti0n against this accused is that though his name is mentioned along with the names of eleven other persons at the outset of the First Information Report, the text of that report does not attribute any part to him at all.\n\nHis name has been included in the text of the report in an omnibus manner by saying that he, along with others, apart from Chhotey and Ram Manorath who were armed with guns, wielded his lathi.\n\nThere is one more aspect of the matter which merits serious attention, and that is whether the death sentence imposed on Chhotey and Ram Manorath must be confirmed.\n\nHaving given our anxious consideration to this question, especially since four persons were done to death, we find it unsafe to sentence these two accused to the extreme penalty of law.\n\nIn so far as Ram Manorath is concerned, he is alleged to have shot at Wali Mohammad and Nankau.\n\nWali Mohammad has implicated Ram Manorath in his dying declaration as the person who shot at him but, Shri Sushi! Kumar, who appears for Ram Manorath, has very tellingly demonstrated how unsafe it will be to accept the dying declaration.\n\nThe learned Trial Judge has himself pointed out in paragraph I 04 of his judgment the various infirmities from which the dying declaration suffers.\n\nWe are quite clear that the learned counsel is right in cautioning the Court against the acceptance of the dying declaration which suffers from the infirmities pointed out by the Trial Court.\n\nWe cannot, therefore, rely on the dying declaration for the purpose of holding that it was Ram Manorath who shot at Wali Mohammad.\n\nBut then Shri Bhardwaj relies on the evidence of the four witnesses and contends that the part played by Ram Manorath is established on\n\nthat evidence. On that aspect of the matter, we have a serious difficulty in accepting at its face value the evidence of these witnesses in so far as they say that they saw Chhotey and Ram Manorath firing shots at Guley, Abbas, Wali Mohammad and Nankau. It may be recalled that the incident occurred on December 5, 1973 and the almanac shows that the time of the sunset on that day was 5.13 p.m. The incident happened nearly an hour after the sunset and it is hardly likely that if a large group of ten or twelve persons had formed an unlawful assembly, the witnesses would be in a position to identify minute details of the incident. There is not the slightest doubt that the four persons, who died during the course of the incident in question, were done to death by persons who were members of the unlawful assembly, some of whom have been convicted by the trial court and the High Court. But we are unable to accept the prosecution version which, in regard to specific overt acts seems exaggerated, t'J.at Chhotey and Ram Manorath fired the shots which resulted in the fatal injuries.\n\nNo distinction can, therefore, be made in the cases of the other persons who have been sentenced to life imprisonment and the cases of these two persons.\n\nWe must, therefore, set aside the death sentence imposed upon them.\n\nThe result is that the appeals are partly allowed. The appellant Jaisee is acquitted of all the offences of which he was charged and he shall be released so far is the present case is concerned.\n\nThe conviction of appellants Chhotey and Ram Manorath for the various offences is confirmed but the sentence of death imposed upon them is set aside. We sentence them to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe conviction and sentence of the remaining appellants are confirmed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals partly allowed.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "RAM MANORATH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM MANORATH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 302 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381, "end_char": 392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14.1.1978 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Criminal Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3792, "end_char": 3805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and Sushi!", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "Sushi! Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and Sushi!", "canonical_name": "Sushi! Kumar"}}, {"text": "H.R. Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3843, "end_char": 3856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.R. Bhardwaj, G. S. Narayanan and R. K. Bhatt for the, E Respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Narayanan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.R. Bhardwaj, G. S. Narayanan and R. K. Bhatt for the, E Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3878, "end_char": 3889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.R. Bhardwaj, G. S. Narayanan and R. K. Bhatt for the, E Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3958, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nTwelve persons were put up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bahraich on various charges, the principal charge being under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4123, "end_char": 4134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4145, "end_char": 4156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4164, "end_char": 4174, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chhotey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4334, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two out of those eight persons namely, Chhotey and Ram Manorath were sentenced to death while the remaining aix were sentenced to imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey"}}, {"text": "Ram Manorath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4346, "end_char": 4358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two out of those eight persons namely, Chhotey and Ram Manorath were sentenced to death while the remaining aix were sentenced to imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "RAM MANORATH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Allahabad acquitted one more person and convicted the remaining seven."}}, {"text": "Baijnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4827, "end_char": 4835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baijnath, who was awarded Uf~ impriionmenf has not appealed from the judgment of the Iileh\n\nCourt."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5012, "end_char": 5028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident out of which these proceedings arise took place at about sunset time on December 5, 1973 in a village called Bhawanipur."}}, {"text": "Bhawanipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident out of which these proceedings arise took place at about sunset time on December 5, 1973 in a village called Bhawanipur."}}, {"text": "Guley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four persons died during the course of that incident, namely, Guley, Abbas, Wali Mohammad and Nankau."}}, {"text": "Abbas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5130, "end_char": 5135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four persons died during the course of that incident, namely, Guley, Abbas, Wali Mohammad and Nankau."}}, {"text": "Wali Mohammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four persons died during the course of that incident, namely, Guley, Abbas, Wali Mohammad and Nankau."}}, {"text": "Nankau", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5155, "end_char": 5161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four persons died during the course of that incident, namely, Guley, Abbas, Wali Mohammad and Nankau."}}, {"text": "Noor Mohammad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5460, "end_char": 5473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of its case the prosecution examined four eye witnesses : Noor Mohammad, P. W. 1, Shaukat Ali, P. W. 2, Nafees, P. W. 4 and Naeem, P. W. 5."}}, {"text": "Shaukat Ali", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5484, "end_char": 5495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of its case the prosecution examined four eye witnesses : Noor Mohammad, P. W. 1, Shaukat Ali, P. W. 2, Nafees, P. W. 4 and Naeem, P. W. 5."}}, {"text": "Nafees", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5506, "end_char": 5512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of its case the prosecution examined four eye witnesses : Noor Mohammad, P. W. 1, Shaukat Ali, P. W. 2, Nafees, P. W. 4 and Naeem, P. W. 5."}}, {"text": "Naeem", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of its case the prosecution examined four eye witnesses : Noor Mohammad, P. W. 1, Shaukat Ali, P. W. 2, Nafees, P. W. 4 and Naeem, P. W. 5."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5760, "end_char": 5773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Frank Anthony, who appears on behalf of five out of the six appellants before us, has drawn our attention to various circumstances which according to him render the entire prosecution case suspect and unacceptable.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "Shaukat Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6735, "end_char": 6746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the four eye witnesses examined by the prosecution, Noor Mohammad, Shaukat Ali and Nafees were indisputably injured during the course of the incident in question and that circumstance affords a strong guarantee of their presence at the scene of offence."}}, {"text": "Nafees", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the four eye witnesses examined by the prosecution, Noor Mohammad, Shaukat Ali and Nafees were indisputably injured during the course of the incident in question and that circumstance affords a strong guarantee of their presence at the scene of offence."}}, {"text": "Jaisee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that process we find that the appellant Jaisee ought to be acquitted.", "canonical_name": "Jaisee"}}, {"text": "Bhardwaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8165, "end_char": 8173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undoubtedly true as contended by Shri Bhardwaj, who appears on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, that Jaisee's name is mentioned in the F.I.R. and that he has been implicated by all the four prosecution witnesses."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8204, "end_char": 8226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undoubtedly true as contended by Shri Bhardwaj, who appears on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, that Jaisee's name is mentioned in the F.I.R. and that he has been implicated by all the four prosecution witnesses."}}, {"text": "Jaisee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8233, "end_char": 8239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undoubtedly true as contended by Shri Bhardwaj, who appears on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, that Jaisee's name is mentioned in the F.I.R. and that he has been implicated by all the four prosecution witnesses.", "canonical_name": "Jaisee"}}, {"text": "Sushi! Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9389, "end_char": 9401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wali Mohammad has implicated Ram Manorath in his dying declaration as the person who shot at him but, Shri Sushi!", "canonical_name": "Sushi! Kumar"}}, {"text": "t'J.at Chhotey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11135, "end_char": 11149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But we are unable to accept the prosecution version which, in regard to specific overt acts seems exaggerated, t'J.at Chhotey and Ram Manorath fired the shots which resulted in the fatal injuries."}}, {"text": "Chhotey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11671, "end_char": 11678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conviction of appellants Chhotey and Ram Manorath for the various offences is confirmed but the sentence of death imposed upon them is set aside.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_1_11_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "'i ·.\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nSHER SINGH & ORS.\n\nFebruary 24, 1981\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nCode af Criminal Procedure 1973, S. 154, Indian Penal Code 1860, S. 302 and Indian Evidence Act 1872, S. 103-Trial for murder-Accused convicted for murder by Sessions Court-Acquittal by High Court-Interference by Supreme Court-Whether F.I.R. to contain details of the occurrence-Prosecution whether bound to prove motive-Burden of proof of alibi whether on the accused.\n\nThe two deceased were the two younger half brothers of the first respondent.\n\nA day before the day of the murder of the two deceased, the brothers had divided the family properties and started living separately. P. W. 3, the wife of one of the deceased, in the F.I.R. given to the police, stated that on the day of the occur rence when the two deceased and she went to the bagichi for milking the cattle, the first respondent and his sons surrounded the two deceased in the court-yard, the first respondent dealt a blow on the head of her husband with a gandasi while the others gave lathi blow on the second deceased. Both of them succumbed to the injuries. It was also. stated in the F.I.R. that P.W. 4, the sister of the deceased, was with her at the time of the occurrence and that when they screamed, the assailants asked them to keep quiet on pain of death to them. The assailants, it was alleged, thereafter dragged the two dead bodies and burnt them in the nearby heap of cowdung cakes after pouring kerosene on the heap. The defence of the two accused was alibi.\n\nAll the accused, who were charged of offences under section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code were sentenced ; the first respondent to death and the others to imprisonment for life.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentences and acquitted all of them.\n\nAllowing the State's appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. When an accused pleads alibi, the burden of proof under section 103 of the Evidence Act is on the accused. The plea of all the accused that they were elsewhere at the time of the offence is not true. [ 4-G, 5C]\n\n2. The guilt of the two respondents had been established beyond all reasonable doubt. The High Court rejected the evidence of P.W. 10 on the ground that he had not stated in the statement before the police that in the partition of the family properties among the brothers, there was a hitch. The prosecution is not bound to prove motive of any offence in a criminal case, for motive is known only to the perpetrators of the crime and may not be known to others. If the motive is proved by the prosecution, the Court has to consider it and see whether it is adequate. [1 JE, 6 B-C]\n\nA In the instant case the motive proved is apparently inadequate, although it\n\nmight be possible. [6 C]\n\n3. The High Court had taken a wrong view in rejecting the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 on the gro1md that they' were close relations of the deceased ; that it was highly improbable that P.W. 3 who was in advance stage of pregnancy would go to the place of occurrence. [SF; 9F-G]\n\n4. Although both the witnesses P.Ws. 3 and 4 were close relations of the deceased, their evidence could not be rejected solely on that ground. They were also related to the m; pondents and there is nothing on record to show that they were inimically disposed towards the respondents to falsely implicate them in the murder. Secondly, it was a pure conjecture of the High Court when it said that panchas and sarpanchas and other respectables of the village took an opportunity to implicate the respondents. It was also a conjecture on the part of the High Court to say that the deceased were murdered by unknown culprits and that the respondents were falsely implicated by the village respectables. The High Court found as a fact that the respondents and the deceased slept in the bagichi during nights to keep watch over the cattle. Had the murder been perpetrated by unknown persons, the respondents would have intervened and informed the neighbours. [8F-9B]\n\n5. The fact that P.W. 3 did not mention in the F.I.R. that she had informed some persons of the village before the lodging of the F.I.R. and that for this reason her statement could not be relied on is not correct. The F.I.R. need not contain aJI details of the' occurrence nor does the omission to mention the name of pe1sons whom she informed in the village detract from the credibility of the report. The omission is a mere omission of details and not a contradiction. [9 CJ\n\n6. The High Court was not right in disbelieving the evidence of P.W. 4 on the ground that had she been present at the scene of occurrence, she would have out of love for her real brothers, intervened and tried to save them. There is nothing unnatural if she had out of a sense of self preservation at the threat of the assailant refrained from attempting to save the two deceased from the murder. P.W. 3 must have been dazed at the brutal murder of her husband and brother-in-law. In such a situation she could not be expected to mention all the details, in the F.I.R. and therefore, the High Court was not right in rejecting the evidence of P.W. JO solely on the ground that no mention of the extra-judicial confession of, Respondent No. l had been made in the F.I.R. [9H-10B; lOD-E]\n\n7. In view of the fact that the conviction and sentence were passed by the Session Judge in July, 1974 and the High Court passed the order of acquittal in 1975, the extreme penalty of death given to :the first respondent is not called for now ; ends of justice will be met if aJI the respondents are sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\n[11 G]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 320/75.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2.4.1975 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1044/74 and Murder Reference No. 50/74.\n\n~.\n\nf<..G. Bhagat and R.N. Poddar for the Appellant.\n\nMrs. Urmila Sirur for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J. This appeal by special leave by the State of Haryana is directed against the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court setting aside the conviction and and sentence passed . by the Session Judge, Karna!. Respondents Balkar Singh and Daiei Singh are the sons of respondent Sher Singh.\n\nThe Session Judge convicted all the three under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, and sentenced Sher Singh to death and the other two to imprisonment for life.~ On a reference by the Sessio.ns Judge for the confirmation of the sentence of death inflicted on Sher Singh and appeal filed by the respondents the High Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquitted the respondents.\n\n2. The material facts may be stated thus : On 17th of October, 1973 at about 12 A.M. Mst. Narman, widow of Danna\n\n(deceased) submitted the first information report to A.S.I. Ram Sarup (P.W. 12) at village Pai.\n\nHer material allegations in the first information report were. that the previous day, respondent Sher Singh and his two younger half brothers, namely, Danna, her husband, and Hukmi, had effected a family partition amongst themselves and they started living separately. That day, namely 17th of October, at about 6.00 A.M. her husband, Danna, along with his brothers Hukmi and respondents Sher Singh came to their bagichi nearby from the house in order to milk cattle. She followed them in order to fetch milk. Respondent Sher Singh, then along with his sons Daiei, Balkar, Keni, Prem and Parwana surrounded her husband and her husband's younger brother, Hukmi, in the courtyard. Sher Singh had a Gandasi in his hand, Daiei a lathi shoded with iron blade, the other three had lathis in their hands. Sher Singh dealt a Gandasa blow on the head of her husband Danna, who immediately fell down on the ground. Daiei then dealt a blow with iron shoded lathi on the head of Hukmi who also fell down on the ground. The other accused then inflicted blows with lathis on the persons after they had already fallen down.\n\nRespondent Sher Singh dealt another Gandasi blow on her husband. She has further stated in the first information report that Mst. Danni, sister of repondent Sher Singh, was also with her and witnessed the occurrence. They screamed seeing the assaults, whereupon they were directed on pain of death to sit in the corner of the court-yard.\n\nA Out of fear they obliged. Thereafter, it has further been aileged, the accused persons dragged the dead bodies to their nearby . heap of cow-dung cakes. Sher Singh spread kerosene on the heap of the cakes and Daiei set fire to it lighting a match stick.\n\nAs a result, the two bodies were charred.\n\nP.W. 12 sent. the F.I.R. to the police station where the case was registered, Police, after investigation, submitted charge-sheet and arrested the accused persons. Eventually, the accused persons were charged under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, and tried in the court of Sessions. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges. According to them the three brothers were. joint In residence, mess and cultivation till the date of the occurrence. The defence of respondent, Sher Singh, was that his two sons, Daiei and Balkar, and the deceased brothers Danna and Hukmi, used to sleep in the Bagichi during the night to keep watch over their cattle tetherred there. On October 16, 1973 he and his two deceased brothers were in their fields during the day and in the evening he went to their field where cotton was ripe and he remained there to keep watch over the cotton till next morning. That field was at a distance of about Ii miles from their Bagich1.\n\nAbout H hours after sun rise on October I 7, I 973, he returned to the Bagi chi where he found the heap of cow-dung cakes in the enclosure of Bagichi burning. Police then arrested him. The defence of respondent Daiei was that two days before the date of occurrence he went to his maternal uncle, Lalji, at Narwara to borrow a tractor. He returned home on the I 7th of October, 1973 at about sun-set. He found the heap of cow-dung burning and police inside the Bagichi where he was arrested by the police. The defence of respondent Balkar was that he was a student of 9th class and on 16th of October, 1973 he had been to school to witness some sports. He passed the follow ing night in village, Diwali, where his sister was married. He return ed home on October 17, 1973 and when he reached the Bagichi he found the heap of cow-dung burning and, he was arrested by the police there. Thus the defence of all the respondents was alibi.\n\n4. When an accused pleads alibi, the burden is on him to prove it under Section 103 of the Evidence Act which provides :\n\n\"l 03. The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.\n\n,_ y\n\nIllustrations : (a) A prosecutes B for theft, and wishes the d A court to believe that B admitted the theft to C.\n\nA must prove the admission.\n\nB wishes the court to believe that, at the time in question, he was elsewhere. He must prove it.\"\n\nIn this case defence did not adduce any evidence tci prove the alibi.\n\nOn the contrary the evidence of P.W. 11, Lila, is that on 21st -October, 1973, all the accused were produced by Lalji, the brother of he wife of respondent, Sher Singh in village Nand Karan Majra around 8 a.m., when they were arrested. This was in presence of of P.W. 11 and several others. Police had been thert the witness says, from October 17 to 20, 1973.\n\nThis evidence of P.W. 11 remains unrebutted. The plea of the respondents that they had been elsewhere at the time of the occurrence and returned]to the place of occurrence by themselves on October 17, when they were arrested by police, is untrue.\n\nLet us now turn to and examine the prosecution case and see whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable dobt.\n\n6. The death of Danna and Hukmi is not in dispute.\n\nThat the dead bodies were burnt on the cow dung heap by the side of the Bagichi is also not in dispute. ·\n\nThe only question for decision is whether Danna and Hukmi were murdered and their dead bodies were burnt by the respondents as alleged by the prosecution. The prosecution relies on the following piece of evidence :\n\n(i) Motive of the murder;\n\n(ii) Direct evidence of the alleged eye witnesses, P.W. 3 and 4;\n\n(iii) Extra .Judicial Confession alleged to have been made by respondent Sher Singh before P.W. 10; and\n\n(iv) Recoveries of incriminating articles on disclosure statements alleged to have been made by the respondents.\n\n(i) Motive :~P.W. 3 Mst. Narman has deposed that two days before the day of occurrence, deceased Danna, Hukmi and respondent Sher Singh made an amicable partition of their property. They divided their land (except Shamlat land), house, cattle, utensils and H grains. Respondent Sher Singh, however, refused to part with joint\n\nA cash and jewellery. Danna refused to part with any share of the Shamlat land unless the cash and jewellery were divided. P.W. 4 Mst. Danni and Jhanda (P, W. 10) support, P.W. 3, It therefore, appears. that there was some sort of hitch between respondent Sher Singh on the one hand and his half brothers Danna, and Hukmi on the other. The Hig; h Court declined to accept the evidence of P.W.\n\nB 10 in as much as he had not mentioned the fact of partition in his statement before the police.\n\nThe prosecution is not bound to prove motive of any offence in a criminal case, in as much as motive is known only to the perpetrator of the crime and may not be known to o, t11ers. If the motive is proved by prosecution, the Court has to consider it and see whether it is adequate. In the instant case the motive proved was apparently inadequate, although it might be possible.\n\n(ii) Direct Evidence :-P.W. 3 Mst. Narman has deposed that 15 days before: the date of occurence, P.W. 4 Danni who was at her husband's house to help her as she was expecting a child one of these days.\n\nIn fact she delivered a child 12 days after the occurrence. She has supported the prosecution case in its entirety.\n\nShe says that in the moning about the time of sun-rise on the date of occurrence, deceased Danna and Hukmi went to the Panchayat land where their cattle had been tethered in order to milk them. She followed them to bring milk home.\n\nDanna also accompanied her to make cow dung cakes. At that time she found that the respondents had been standing in the Panchayat land armed with dangerous weapons. Respondent Sher Singh gave Gandasi blow on the head of Danna who immediately fell down on the ground. Daiei also gave a blow on the head Hukmi who also fell down.\n\nAll of them thereafter indiscriminately assaulted the two injured persons.\n\nBoth of them died as a result. She and Danna began to scream whereupon the culprits asked her and Danna to keep quiet on pain of death and they asked them to sit on one side of the place. Both of them out of fear did as directed.\n\nShe has further deposed that the respondents including the other miscreants dragged the two dead bodies to the nearby heap of cow dung cakes and placed the dead bodies on it.\n\nRespondent Sher Singh then brought a tin of kerosene oil and sprinkled it on the heap of the cow dung cakes.\n\nRespondent Daiei put fire to the cow dung cakes. When the heap of the cow dung cakes was burning they set weeping there while the respondents were scrapping the blood stains on the earth and throwing them to the burning cow dung cakes. After some time P.W. 10 Jhanda and\n\n.1 J\n\none Bhagtu came to. the place of occurrence after the dead bodies were put to fire. They inquired of Sher Singh as to why they were burning the cow dung cakes. Sher Singh replied that he had murdered his two brothers and was burning their dead bodies. He, however threatened them to mind their own business and said that if they raised any alarm, they would be similarly murdered and put to fire. P.W. 10 Jhandu and Bhagtu then left the the place. The process of burning took about three hours. All this time the culprits were at the place of occurrence scraping the blood stained spots.\n\nThey then changed their blood stained clothes, threw them to the fire and put on new clothes and left the place with weapons in hands towards village Bhana. After the departure of the culprits the witness along with P.W. 4 left for the nearby village. They narrated the occurrence to the villagers and told them as to how her husband and brother-in-law had been murdered and their dead bodies burnt.\n\nBut they remarked that that was a dispute between brothers and they could not do anything. The witness then left the village for police station at Pundri to lodge an offence report. On the way falls village Pai, at the distance of about 4-5 miles from the place of occurrence, she met at village Pai a police officer and two constables to whom she narrated the occurrence. Her statement was recorded by P.W. 12, Ram Sarup, an Assistant Sub-inspector of Pundri PoHce Station, who was at Pai. She was then accompanied home by two constables.\n\nWhile P.W. 12 sent the F.I.R. to the police station for registering a case. They reached the place of occurrence, after some time.\n\nA short while after the arrival of the witness and the two constables at the place of occurrence, a senior police officer arrived at the place of occurrence. They with the help of some other persons who had gathered there in the mean time started to extinguish the fire by putting buckets of water on it.\n\nP.W. 4 Danni corroborates P.W. 3 on the commission of murder of the two deceased by the respondents and a few others. P.W. 10 who came to the place of occurrence on seeing smoke from the lheap of cow-dung cakes, inquired of Sher Singh as to what was happening. He has deposed that he was told by Sher Singh that he had killed his two brothers and was burning their dead bodies and that he was asked on pain of murder to mind his own business, and not to raise alarm. He and Bhagtu then left the place.\n\nP.Ws. 3 and 4 were cross-examined at great length by the defence counsel but nothing significant could be brought out in order to H demolish their basic aud substantial evidence given in examinationincchief; Only some minor discrepancies with regard to omissions of details in their statements to the police were brought out. These omissions in our opinion were not contradictions and insignificant.\n\nThe High Court has rejected the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 on\n\nthe~ ground (a) that they were close relations of the two deceased ;\n\n(b) that P.W. 3 had omtted to mention in the F.I.R. that she had informed any person of the village before leaving for the police station ; (c) that it was 'highly improbable and unnatural' that P.W. 3 would go to the place of occurrence from her home when she was in advance pregnancy ; (d) that she was not accompanied to the police station by anybody ; (e) that none of the villagers came to the place of occurrence; and (f) that she and P.W. 4 did not physically attempt to save the two deceased who were respectively their husband and brother. Ultimately the High Court found that \"most probably both Smt. Narman and Danni were not present on the spot and had not witnessed the occurrence.\"\n\nIn our opinion the conclusion arrived at., by the learned High Court is untenable. The learned High Court has taken a very unrealistic view of the situation and of the facts and circums; anes of the case. There .is no evidence that P. W s 3 and 4 could or did raise any alarm. When they were about. to scream they were threatened on pain ofmurde_r, to keep quiet and sit. There is evidence that both the deceased as well as P.Ws 3and 4 were unarmed, whereas the respondents were armed with dangerous weapons.\n\nIn such a situation it will be too much to expect of P.Ws 3 and 4 to try to physically intervene and save the two deceased. Although it is. true that P.Ws 3 and 4 were close relations of the two deceased, their evidence could not be rejected on that ground. They were also related to the respondents and there is nothing on record to show that they were inimically disposed to the respondents to falsely implicate the respondent in a murder case like this. They were the most natural witnesses. Although it was not the case of defence that some of the people of the Panchayat conspired with P.Ws 3 and 4 to implicate the respondents in this murder case the High Court made out its own theory to that effect. There is no evidence or circumstances from which that inference could be dravm. It was a pure conjecture that \"it was best opportunity for the Panchas and Sarpanch and other rspectables of the village to take special interest in bringing the .culprits to book by contacting the police at the earliest if the culprits were not other persons than the appellants.\" The High Court has also based its finding on conjecture that the two deceased were murdered by unknown culprits and they were falsely implicated by the village\n\n-4.\n\n• 'r\n\nHARYANA l'. SHER SIHGH (Islam, J.) 9\n\nrespectables\" on. suspicion. This .hypothesis do.es not stand any scrutiny:Respondent Sher Singh in his statement says 'It was routine for me and my two elder sons and two .step brothers to sleep in the Bagichi dl;!ring night where we used to tie our cattle!' Even the High Gourt has. found. ·~:,.that they deceased) , like Sher Singh or Sher Singh's sons used to sleep in tlie Bagichi in the. night to keep Watch, over.them (cattle).\" If that be so, had the murder. been. perpetrated\n\nby. unknown culprits, there Wl\\S no reason as to why-the. the respon~: dents did not intervene and .inform any of.the neighbours. The. learned High Court, as stated above, has rejected the evidence of P.W. 3 on the 'ground that e-did not mention in the F.l.R. that he had informed any periwn of the 'village bfore she lodged th'& F.LR; ; The: F.l.R. need rtot contain the details of the occurrence. 'The omission referred. to by the ; High Court is an omission• of details and . not\n\nreally a contradiction. The High Court also was not right in 'obset~ ving that it was surprising \"that.as s'tated by Mst. NarID.an nobody in . the' village lisretied to her story nor did anybody go to herhelp when shewent fo'Abad1 Iaridof the village after the departure of the appellants, frem the place of occurrence.\" In fact P.W: IO had come\n\nto the place of. occurrence before. P.Ws 3 and 4 '1e'ft'the place of occurrenee for the viilage:. The way P.W. 10 wastreat'ed' by' •respondent, Sher Singh, was suffici'ent to deter any other viliager to 'C'ome to the: place of -0ccurrenbe. The High : Court has' also found it a'\n\n'mystery' that none .of the villagers carrie to the place of occlitrence and intervened in the matter. There is no evidence on record to show that when the assaults on the deceased were in progress or the dead bodies were'being burnt, any of the villagersin fact khew libouf the occurrence. Irt fact P.W. 10 and 'Bhagtu had.; seen the' sri1okd 'rroni the cow dung cakes, and came' to the place of occurrence:. :;·;, \\\n\n• : ,: t • : •. .\", .• '. '.. . , •• • . t The High Court.has also observed thatit was unlikely that P.W. 3 would go to. the Bagichi- .in.such an advance stage. of pregnancy in order to bring milk from, there at sun rise in as much as P.W. 4 had already. come there to help her in domestic work. It is commop ex~ , perience that in villages women who regularly' attend to their <lomestic\n\nchoreand work in the field, work some time till the very moment of actual child birth, P.W. 4 was brought to help her as in her advance stage of pvegnancy she could not work as briskly as before. The .learned High Court.has also observed that presence of P .. W. 4 Danni\n\n:it the place of occurrence was \"not natural because had she been pi'esent there she would have out of love.' for her real brothers physically i!ltervened and tried to save them from the clutches of\n\nassaults~\" -It has been obser.ved before that they were asked to keep\n\nJO :mPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nquiet and sit on pain of murder. It cannot be forgotten that Danni was also an unarmr.:d village women and the first instinct of a being is the instinct of self-preservation.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, it was not, \"unnatural\" that she would not, as she could not, attempt to save the two deceased from murder. The High Court has also observed that in any case P.W. 4 would have raised hue and cry. She could not raise an outcry as she was told by Sher Singh that she would be murdered and burnt, if she did so.\n\nIt was therefore but natural thE.t she did not raise any hue and cry.\n\n(iii) Extra Judicial Confession :-The evidence of P.W. 10 has also been referred to above. He has depJsed that wi1en seeing the smoke he went to the place of occurrence and inquired of Sher Singh as to why they wer•~ burning the heap of cow dung cakes, he replied that he had murdered. his two brothers and was burning their dead bodies. This is an extrajudicial confession so far as Sher Singh is concerned. The High Court has not accepted the evidence of P.W.\n\n10 on the ground that this was not mentioned by P.W. 3 in the first information report. This was an omission. That apart, it must be remembered that P.W. 4 who saw with her own eyes such a brutal murder of her husband and brother-in-law must have been dazed and at her wits end. In such a situation, it could not be expected of her to give al) the details in the first information repJrt. And on account of the omission, P. W. 10 could not be disbelieved.\n\n(iv) Recoveries of incrim<nating articles :-The last piece of evidence on which reliance has been taken by the prosecution is the recoveries of incriminating weapons. The evidence of P.W. 13, the Investigating Officer, is that respondent Sher Singh on 23rd of October, 1973 made a disclosure statement which is Exhibit PL. The disclosure was that Sher Singh had kept concealed a Gandasi in the bundle of sugar canr.: in his field and he could get the same recovered.\n\nIn pursuance of his disclosure the Gandasi Bx. P. 26 was recovered\n\nfromthat place. The Gandasi was stained with blood and was seized under seizure memo Ex. PL/ l. On the same day respondent Daiei Singh made a disclosure statement Bx. PM and disclosed that he had kept concealed a lathi to which an iron piece was attached in his Gowar field and he could get the same recovered. In pursuance of his disclosure, /athi Ex. P. 27 which was stained with blood was recovered. It was seized under seizure memo Ex. PM/l. On the same day respondent, Balkar Singh made a disclosure statement, Ex.\n\nPN that he had kept concealed a lathi in his kikar branches fence and he could get th1~ same recovered. In pursuance of his disclosure\n\nHARYANA v. SHER SINGH (ls/am J.) II\n\nstatement, Jathi Ex. P. 28 which was stained with blood was recovered. It was seized under seizure memo Ex. PN/l. These discoveries were made in presence of P.W. 11 Lila, who was Sarpanch of the\n\nlocal panchayat. The High Court declined to put any importance to the recoveries as the respondents were not interrogated by Police from October 20 to 24. In our opinion that cannot be a sufficient justification to hold that tthe recoveries were 'fake'. The weapons were recovered at the pointing of the respondents.\n\nIn addition the Investigating Officer seized an empty kerosene tin lying at the place of occurrence, The tin was emitting smell of kerosene oil and it was seized under seizure memo Ex. PI which was attested by P. W. 11. In addition another circumstance tends to support the complicity of the respondents in the offence ... It. is th~ conduct of the. respondents. Th.e two deceased who had been murdered, by whomsoever it might be, were near blood relations of the respondents. If the murder had been committed by some others, as supposed by the 'High Court, they would not have kept quiet. Of course, they have stated in their defence 'that they were away from home in some other places and returned to the place of occurrence on 17th October, 1973 which has been found by us to be untrue.\n\nThis conduct of the respondent~ is incriminating.\n\n7. As a result of lie above discussions \\Ve, hold agreeing witll the learned .Sessions Judge, that the guilt of the respondents has been established by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt. In the result we allow, the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of acquittal of the High Court and convict the respondents under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code.\n\n8. Now comes the question of sentence. The murdor is ghastly and brutal. Respondent Sher Singh deserved the extreme penalty provided by Jaw, The learned Sessions Judge was right in imposing death sentence on him.\n\nBut in view of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge passed the order of conviction and sentence as early as 27th July, 1974 and the High Court passed the order of acquittal\n\nas early as 2nd of April, 1975, we refrain frorri visiting respondent Sher Singh with the extreme penalty provided by Jaw for murder.\n\nWe sentence all the respondents to imprisonment for life. We are told that respondents Balkar Singh and Daiei Singh are on bail.\n\nTheir bail bonds are cancelled. They shall surrender fothwith to serve out their sentences.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. ' c", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHER SINGH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHER SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 24, 1981\n\n(0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act 1872", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act 1872"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1626, "end_char": 1636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1644, "end_char": 1654, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~.\n\nf<..G. Bhagat and R.N. Poddar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~.\n\nf<..G. Bhagat and R.N. Poddar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Urmila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5913, "end_char": 5925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6046, "end_char": 6062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J. This appeal by special leave by the State of Haryana is directed against the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court setting aside the conviction and and sentence passed ."}}, {"text": "Balkar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6240, "end_char": 6252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents Balkar Singh and Daiei Singh are the sons of respondent Sher Singh.", "canonical_name": "Balkar Singh"}}, {"text": "Daiei Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6257, "end_char": 6268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents Balkar Singh and Daiei Singh are the sons of respondent Sher Singh.", "canonical_name": "Daiei Singh"}}, {"text": "Sher Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6296, "end_char": 6306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents Balkar Singh and Daiei Singh are the sons of respondent Sher Singh.", "canonical_name": "SHER SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6357, "end_char": 6368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6379, "end_char": 6389, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sher Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6405, "end_char": 6415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Session Judge convicted all the three under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, and sentenced Sher Singh to death and the other two to imprisonment for life.~ On a reference by the Sessio.ns Judge for the confirmation of the sentence of death inflicted on Sher Singh and appeal filed by the respondents the High Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquitted the respondents.", "canonical_name": "SHER SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "17th of October, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6754, "end_char": 6775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts may be stated thus : On 17th of October, 1973 at about 12 A.M. Mst."}}, {"text": "Narman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narman, widow of Danna\n\n(deceased) submitted the first information report to A.S.I. Ram Sarup (P.W. 12) at village Pai."}}, {"text": "Danna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6815, "end_char": 6820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narman, widow of Danna\n\n(deceased) submitted the first information report to A.S.I. Ram Sarup (P.W. 12) at village Pai.", "canonical_name": "Danna"}}, {"text": "A.S.I. Ram Sarup", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6875, "end_char": 6891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narman, widow of Danna\n\n(deceased) submitted the first information report to A.S.I. Ram Sarup (P.W. 12) at village Pai."}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6913, "end_char": 6916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narman, widow of Danna\n\n(deceased) submitted the first information report to A.S.I. Ram Sarup (P.W. 12) at village Pai."}}, {"text": "Hukmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the previous day, respondent Sher Singh and his two younger half brothers, namely, Danna, her husband, and Hukmi, had effected a family partition amongst themselves and they started living separately."}}, {"text": "17th of October", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7205, "end_char": 7220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That day, namely 17th of October, at about 6.00 A.M. her husband, Danna, along with his brothers Hukmi and respondents Sher Singh came to their bagichi nearby from the house in order to milk cattle."}}, {"text": "Daiei", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7477, "end_char": 7482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Sher Singh, then along with his sons Daiei, Balkar, Keni, Prem and Parwana surrounded her husband and her husband's younger brother, Hukmi, in the courtyard.", "canonical_name": "Daiei"}}, {"text": "Balkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7484, "end_char": 7490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Sher Singh, then along with his sons Daiei, Balkar, Keni, Prem and Parwana surrounded her husband and her husband's younger brother, Hukmi, in the courtyard.", "canonical_name": "Balkar Singh"}}, {"text": "Keni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7492, "end_char": 7496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Sher Singh, then along with his sons Daiei, Balkar, Keni, Prem and Parwana surrounded her husband and her husband's younger brother, Hukmi, in the courtyard."}}, {"text": "Prem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7498, "end_char": 7502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Sher Singh, then along with his sons Daiei, Balkar, Keni, Prem and Parwana surrounded her husband and her husband's younger brother, Hukmi, in the courtyard."}}, {"text": "Parwana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Sher Singh, then along with his sons Daiei, Balkar, Keni, Prem and Parwana surrounded her husband and her husband's younger brother, Hukmi, in the courtyard."}}, {"text": "Danni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8159, "end_char": 8164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danni, sister of repondent Sher Singh, was also with her and witnessed the occurrence.", "canonical_name": "Danna"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8883, "end_char": 8894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8905, "end_char": 8915, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bagichi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9269, "end_char": 9276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of respondent, Sher Singh, was that his two sons, Daiei and Balkar, and the deceased brothers Danna and Hukmi, used to sleep in the Bagichi during the night to keep watch over their cattle tetherred there."}}, {"text": "October 16, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9346, "end_char": 9362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 16, 1973 he and his two deceased brothers were in their fields during the day and in the evening he went to their field where cotton was ripe and he remained there to keep watch over the cotton till next morning."}}, {"text": "Bagichi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9777, "end_char": 9784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About H hours after sun rise on October I 7, I 973, he returned to the Bagi chi where he found the heap of cow-dung cakes in the enclosure of Bagichi burning."}}, {"text": "Daiei", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of respondent Daiei was that two days before the date of occurrence he went to his maternal uncle, Lalji, at Narwara to borrow a tractor.", "canonical_name": "Daiei"}}, {"text": "Lalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9931, "end_char": 9936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of respondent Daiei was that two days before the date of occurrence he went to his maternal uncle, Lalji, at Narwara to borrow a tractor."}}, {"text": "Narwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9941, "end_char": 9948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of respondent Daiei was that two days before the date of occurrence he went to his maternal uncle, Lalji, at Narwara to borrow a tractor."}}, {"text": "7th of October, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9996, "end_char": 10016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He returned home on the I 7th of October, 1973 at about sun-set."}}, {"text": "Balkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10166, "end_char": 10172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of respondent Balkar was that he was a student of 9th class and on 16th of October, 1973 he had been to school to witness some sports.", "canonical_name": "Balkar Singh"}}, {"text": "16th of October, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10219, "end_char": 10240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of respondent Balkar was that he was a student of 9th class and on 16th of October, 1973 he had been to school to witness some sports."}}, {"text": "Diwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10330, "end_char": 10336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He passed the follow ing night in village, Diwali, where his sister was married."}}, {"text": "October 17, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He return ed home on October 17, 1973 and when he reached the Bagichi he found the heap of cow-dung burning and, he was arrested by the police there."}}, {"text": "Section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10642, "end_char": 10653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lila", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11274, "end_char": 11278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary the evidence of P.W. 11, Lila, is that on 21st -October, 1973, all the accused were produced by Lalji, the brother of he wife of respondent, Sher Singh in village Nand Karan Majra around 8 a.m., when they were arrested."}}, {"text": "21st -October, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11291, "end_char": 11310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary the evidence of P.W. 11, Lila, is that on 21st -October, 1973, all the accused were produced by Lalji, the brother of he wife of respondent, Sher Singh in village Nand Karan Majra around 8 a.m., when they were arrested."}}, {"text": "Nand Karan Majra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11412, "end_char": 11428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary the evidence of P.W. 11, Lila, is that on 21st -October, 1973, all the accused were produced by Lalji, the brother of he wife of respondent, Sher Singh in village Nand Karan Majra around 8 a.m., when they were arrested."}}, {"text": "October 17 to 20, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11569, "end_char": 11591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Police had been thert the witness says, from October 17 to 20, 1973."}}, {"text": "Narman", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12699, "end_char": 12705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narman has deposed that two days before the day of occurrence, deceased Danna, Hukmi and respondent Sher Singh made an amicable partition of their property."}}, {"text": "Danna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13023, "end_char": 13028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danna refused to part with any share of the Shamlat land unless the cash and jewellery were divided."}}, {"text": "Danni", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13136, "end_char": 13141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danni and Jhanda (P, W. 10) support, P.W. 3, It therefore, appears."}}, {"text": "Jhanda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13146, "end_char": 13152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danni and Jhanda (P, W. 10) support, P.W. 3, It therefore, appears."}}, {"text": "Gandasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14619, "end_char": 14626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Sher Singh gave Gandasi blow on the head of Danna who immediately fell down on the ground."}}, {"text": "J\n\none Bhagtu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15624, "end_char": 15637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some time P.W. 10 Jhanda and\n\n.1 J\n\none Bhagtu came to."}}, {"text": "Jhandu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 10 Jhandu and Bhagtu then left the the place."}}, {"text": "Bhagtu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16043, "end_char": 16049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 10 Jhandu and Bhagtu then left the the place."}}, {"text": "Bhana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16366, "end_char": 16371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They then changed their blood stained clothes, threw them to the fire and put on new clothes and left the place with weapons in hands towards village Bhana."}}, {"text": "Pundri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16764, "end_char": 16770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness then left the village for police station at Pundri to lodge an offence report."}}, {"text": "Ram Sarup", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17029, "end_char": 17038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her statement was recorded by P.W. 12, Ram Sarup, an Assistant Sub-inspector of Pundri PoHce Station, who was at Pai."}}, {"text": "Pundri PoHce Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17070, "end_char": 17090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her statement was recorded by P.W. 12, Ram Sarup, an Assistant Sub-inspector of Pundri PoHce Station, who was at Pai."}}, {"text": "Bhagtu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18070, "end_char": 18076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He and Bhagtu then left the place."}}, {"text": "s 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19566, "end_char": 19575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HARYANA l'. SHER SIHGH (Islam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21081, "end_char": 21110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• 'r\n\nHARYANA l'."}}, {"text": "23rd of October, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25866, "end_char": 25887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of P.W. 13, the Investigating Officer, is that respondent Sher Singh on 23rd of October, 1973 made a disclosure statement which is Exhibit PL."}}, {"text": "Daiei Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26273, "end_char": 26284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PL/ l. On the same day respondent Daiei Singh made a disclosure statement Bx.", "canonical_name": "Daiei Singh"}}, {"text": "Balkar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26624, "end_char": 26636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PM/l. On the same day respondent, Balkar Singh made a disclosure statement, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Balkar Singh"}}, {"text": "17th October, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28088, "end_char": 28106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, they have stated in their defence 'that they were away from home in some other places and returned to the place of occurrence on 17th October, 1973 which has been found by us to be untrue."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28531, "end_char": 28542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28553, "end_char": 28563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "27th July, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28892, "end_char": 28907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in view of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge passed the order of conviction and sentence as early as 27th July, 1974 and the High Court passed the order of acquittal\n\nas early as 2nd of April, 1975, we refrain frorri visiting respondent Sher Singh with the extreme penalty provided by Jaw for murder."}}, {"text": "Jaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29076, "end_char": 29079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in view of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge passed the order of conviction and sentence as early as 27th July, 1974 and the High Court passed the order of acquittal\n\nas early as 2nd of April, 1975, we refrain frorri visiting respondent Sher Singh with the extreme penalty provided by Jaw for murder."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_200_204_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nv '\n\nPRATAP CHAND & ORS.\n\nMarch 11, 1981\n\n( 0. CHINNAPPA R EDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ. )\n\nDmgs and Cosmetics Act 194G-Section 18A-Scope of-Information furnished under section 18A alleged to be fictitious-Report of Inspector not provedln.rpector not examined-Validity of report.\n\nSection 34-\"person incharge\"-Meaning of-Tests to he applied.\n\nAll the three respondents (respondents nos. 1 and 2 partners and respondent No. 3, the firm) were prosecuted for the alleged contravention of section I SA, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 in that when asked by the Drugs Inspector to disclose the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom a certain drug was acquired by them, they gave a fictitious address and that, therefore, they were liable to be convicted under section J8(a) (ii) read with section\n\n18(c) of the Act\n\nThe Metropolitan Magistrate convicted respondent no. l (the partner incharge of the business of the firm) and respondent no. 3 (the firm) but acquitted respondent no. 2 on the ground that it was respondent no. 1 who was incharge of the firm and sentenced them variously.\n\nE The High Court summarily dismissed the State's appeal against the acqittaJ\n\nof respondent no. 2 and of all the respondents under section 18A.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : Violation of the provisions of section J8A remained unestablished and the defence version remained unrebutted. [202E]\n\nThe Assistant Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration ombay , North Circle, deposed that the particulars given by the respondents as to the person (rom whom the drugs were purported to have been acquired were verified by an Inspector, who in his report stated that the name and address given by the respondents were fictitious; but the Inspector has not been examined nor was his report proved. The defence version, therefore, remained unrebutted. (202 D-E)\n\nThe second respondent was not liable to be convicted merely because he had the ri'ght to participate in the business of the firm under the terms of the partnership deed. The term \"person incharge\" refetred to in section 34 must mean that the person should be in overall control of the day to day business of the firm.\n\nA person may be a party to the policy being followed by a firm and yet not be incbarge of its business or a person may be incharge of a business but not in overall charge or may be incharge or only some part of the business. In short, a partner of a firm is liable to be convicted for an offence if he was in\n\nICARNATAKA V. PRATAP CHAND (Baharulls/arn, J.) 201\n\nf and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of its b t' cha!lle\n\n0ed that the offence was committed with the consent or co~\n\n1.ness or irf it is prov 1 t 1 f nJVance o or\n\n1185 attributable to any neg cc on t 1e part o the partner concerned. [204A-.B]\n\nG.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta (1971] 3 S.C.R. 748 applied.\n\nIn the instant case respor.dent no. 2 was not in overall control of the business. It was respondent no. 1, who was in that position. [204 C) B\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.1975 of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 364 or 1975.\n\nN. Nettar for the Appellant.\n\nA.K. Sen, S.K. Bisaria and V.P. Gupta for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL IsLAM, J. This appeal by special leave has been preferred by the State of Karnataka.\n\n2. The three respondents being the partners of the firm, M/s. l>fafatlal and Co., and the firm itself were charged for offences under\n\n~ Sections l 8(c), 18(a) (ii) and 18A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940 read with Section 27(a) (ii), 27(a) (i) and Section 28 of the\n\nDrugs Control Act, (hereinafter, the Act). The defence was a plea of \"Not Guilty\". The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate found respondents\n\n1. and 3, that is, one of the partners and the firm, guilty under Sec-\n\n1100 18(a) (ii) and Section 18(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and\n\n5entenced respondent No. I to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one\n\near under 'ection 18(a) (jj) and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. m default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month, and ltlltenctd spondents 1 and 3 to pay a nne of Rs. l, OOO tach, Under section 18(c) in default to sutTer simple imprisonment r ' . . d f th or three months. The respondent No. 2 was acquttte 0\n\ntwo offences as the Magistrate found that it was respondent\n\n:~ 6 1r and not respondent no. 2 who was in char go of the business of , , . m. All the respondnts were acquitted of the offence under\n\nectJon U!A.\n\nltil.rtJ;~he appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court of a from the order of acquittal of respondent No. 2 of the\n\n.I •j l '\n\n~ 1\n\nj ' l j\n\nSU1'R£ME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\noffence under Section 18(a) (ii) and J8(c) and of all the respondents\n\nunder section 1 SA of the Act. The High Coun summarily dismissed the appeal.\n\n4. Section 18A of the Act requires that every person who bas acquired drug or cosmetic, if required, shall disclose to the inspector the name, address and other particulars of the persons from whom the drug or cosmetic was acquired.\n\nThe respondents pleaded that they did disclose to the Drugs Inspector, the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom the drugs were acquired, by section 18A of the Act and in support of their defence they rely on Exhibit P. 20, a letter dated 17.7.1971 addressed to the Drugs Controller. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has found that Exhibit P.20 contained the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom the drugs were claimed to have been acquired as M/s. Mangilal Jayantilal & Company, 65 Princess Street, Second Floor, Bombay, which name and address, according to the prosecution, were fictitious. P. W.3, the\n\nAssistant Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, Bombay North Circle, has deposed that he got it verified by his Inspector who submitted a report that the above name and address were fictitious.\n\nBut the Jnspetor bas not been examined, nor his report proved.\n\nObviously, therefore, the defence version remained unrebutted and violation of section 18A remained unestablished.\n\nRegarding the acquittal of the 2nd resondent of the offence under section 18 (a) {ii) and section J 8{c), the learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that under section 34 of the Dmgs and Cosmetics Act the firm, as well as its partners were liable to be convicted. Section 34 may be extracted here :-\n\n .. s. 34. {1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible\n\nto the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :\n\nProvided that nothing contained in the subsction shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves tllat the offence was committed without\n\n')\n\nKARNATAKA v. PRATAP CHAND (Baharu/ls/am1 J.) 203\n\nhis knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent A the commission of such offence.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence bas been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.\n\nBxplanation.-For the purpose of this section-\n\n(a) \"company\" means a body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals ; and\n\n(b) \"director\" in relation to a firm means a partner in the D firm.\"\n\nlt is seen that the partner of a firm is alo; o liable to be convicted for an offence committed by the firm if he was in charge of, and was responsible to, the firm for tbe conduct of the business of the finn or if it is proved that the offence was committed with. the\n\nconsent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect on the part of the partner concerned. In the present case the second respondent was sought to be made liable on the ground that he aJongwith the first respondent was in charge of the conduct of the business of the firm.\n\nSection 23-C of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 which was identically the same as section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act came up for interpretation in G. L. Gupta\n\nv. D. N. Mehta(l) it was observed as follows :\n\n\"What then does the expression \" a person in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of a company mean\"?\n\nIt will be noticed that the word 'company includes a firm or other association and the same test must apply to a director in-charge and a partner of a firm incharge of a business. It seems to us that in tbe context a person 'in-charge' must mean\n\nthat the person should be in over all control of the day to day\n\n(1) (197JJ 3 S.C, R. 748.\n\n204 sun.EME COURT RE'PORT\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA business of the company or firm. This inference follows from the wording of S. 23C(2). It mentions director, who may be a party to the policy being followed by a company and yet\n\nnot be in-charge of the business of the company. Further it mentions manager, who usually is in charge of the business\n\nbut not in over-all-charge. Similarly the other officers may B be in charge of only some part of business.\"\n\nThe evidence in the present case shows that it was respondent No. 1 and not respondent No. 2 who was in over all control of the day to day business of the firm.\n\nThe second respondent is not liable to be convicted merely because he bad the right to participate in the business of the finn under the terms of the Partnership Deed.\n\nThis appeal has no merit and is dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n' .", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRATAP CHAND & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRATAP CHAND & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 11, 1981\n\n( 0."}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Dmgs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dmgs and Cosmetics Act", "statute": "Dmgs and Cosmetics Act"}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dmgs and Cosmetics Act", "statute": "Dmgs and Cosmetics Act"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299, "end_char": 309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dmgs and Cosmetics Act", "statute": "Dmgs and Cosmetics Act"}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section\n\n18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 822, "end_char": 836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 853, "end_char": 876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, the firm) were prosecuted for the alleged contravention of section I SA, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 in that when asked by the Drugs Inspector to disclose the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom a certain drug was acquired by them, they gave a fictitious address and that, therefore, they were liable to be convicted under section J8(a) (ii) read with section\n\n18(c) of the Act\n\nThe Metropolitan Magistrate convicted respondent no."}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1252, "end_char": 1263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1971] 3 S.C.R. 748", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2843, "end_char": 2862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3216, "end_char": 3225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Nettar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3246, "end_char": 3254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, S.K. Bisaria and V.P. Gupta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.K. Bisaria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3256, "end_char": 3268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, S.K. Bisaria and V.P. Gupta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "V.P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3273, "end_char": 3283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, S.K. Bisaria and V.P. Gupta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "BAHARUL IsLAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL IsLAM, J. This appeal by special leave has been preferred by the State of Karnataka.", "canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ."}}, {"text": "State of Karnataka", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3423, "end_char": 3441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL IsLAM, J. This appeal by special leave has been preferred by the State of Karnataka."}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3624, "end_char": 3647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 27(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3665, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3699, "end_char": 3709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "Section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3990, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4251, "end_char": 4264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "Section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4791, "end_char": 4804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4854, "end_char": 4863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4929, "end_char": 4940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17.7.1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents pleaded that they did disclose to the Drugs Inspector, the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom the drugs were acquired, by section 18A of the Act and in support of their defence they rely on Exhibit P. 20, a letter dated 17.7.1971 addressed to the Drugs Controller."}}, {"text": "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has found that Exhibit P.20 contained the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom the drugs were claimed to have been acquired as M/s. Mangilal Jayantilal & Company, 65 Princess Street, Second Floor, Bombay, which name and address, according to the prosecution, were fictitious."}}, {"text": "Mangilal Jayantilal & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has found that Exhibit P.20 contained the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom the drugs were claimed to have been acquired as M/s. Mangilal Jayantilal & Company, 65 Princess Street, Second Floor, Bombay, which name and address, according to the prosecution, were fictitious."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5728, "end_char": 5734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has found that Exhibit P.20 contained the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom the drugs were claimed to have been acquired as M/s. Mangilal Jayantilal & Company, 65 Princess Street, Second Floor, Bombay, which name and address, according to the prosecution, were fictitious."}}, {"text": "section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6267, "end_char": 6277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6335, "end_char": 6353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regarding the acquittal of the 2nd resondent of the offence under section 18 (a) {ii) and section J 8{c), the learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that under section 34 of the Dmgs and Cosmetics Act the firm, as well as its partners were liable to be convicted."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6375, "end_char": 6385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6479, "end_char": 6489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8491, "end_char": 8501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8511, "end_char": 8547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8582, "end_char": 8592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8600, "end_char": 8623, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 23C(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9296, "end_char": 9305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_205_208_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SURJEET SINGH & ANR.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nMarch 12, 1981\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nWhet her service 011 the detenu, whose mother tongue is Hindi of the grounds of detention in English, a language not understood by him, vitiates the detention-Grounds of detention explained to the detenu in Hindi by the Serving Officer-Not enough-Grounds must be supplied in Hindi.\n\nAllowing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : The supply to the detenus of the grounds of detention in the English language with which they were not conversant could not be considered to be effective communication to them so as to afford to them a real opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Their detention is repugnant to the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The complicated nature or the length of the document, is not a sine qua non for the fulfilment of the requirement that the grounds must be supplied to the detenu in a language. which he understood before the service on him of sueh grounds could be considered a communication thereof to him. [20SC-D, 208E-G]\n\nHarikisan v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 918; Habibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack and Anr, [1969] l SCR 227;\n\nNainmal Pratap Mal Shah v. Union of India and Ors. [1980] 4 S.C.C. 427, E followed.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 5931 and 5932 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)\n\nN. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande for the Petitioners.\n\nM. K. Banerjee Addi. Sol. Genl., R. N. Poddar and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nBy this order we shall dispose of Criminal Writ Petitions Nos. 5931 and 5932 of 1980 in each of which the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is the same.\n\nIn Criminal Writ Petition No. 5931 of 1980, the petitioner H is one Surjeet Singh while the other petition has been filed by a person named Kulwant Singh.\n\nEach of the petitioners was detained on the 13th October, 1980 under the provisions of the National Security Ordinance which now stands replaced by the National Security Act. They were arrested on that date and pn each of them a police officer served an order of detention along with the grounds on which it was based, both the documents being in English.\n\nIt is the case of the State and the same has not been controverted before us, that the police officer effecting the service of the two documents explained to the concerned detenu in Hindi what their contents were.\n\nDr. N. M. Ghatate, learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the detention of the two petitioners with th~ conten• tion that English was not a language which either of them understood, that this factor rendered it necessary for the grounds of detention to be served on them in Hindi which was their mothertongue and that the same having not been done, there was in law no communication of such grounds to either of them.\n\nD 5.\n\nAfter hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have no\n\nhesitation in holding that the challenge to the detention is wellfounded in view of the dicta of this Court in Harikisan v. The State of Maharashtra & Others,(1) Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack & Anr.,(') and Nainmal Partap Mal Shah v. Union of India and Otlzers,(3)\n\nIn the first of these cases an order under the Preventive Detention Act (Central Act IV of 1950) was under challenge. The grounds of detention had been provided to the detenu in English and a request by him for a translation of the same was turned down.\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that so long as English continued to be the official language of the State, the communication of the grounds of detention in that language was enough compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. This opinion did not find favour with Sinha, C.J., who delivered the judgment of this Court and observed :\n\n'If the detained person is conversant with the English language, he will naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of the charge against him and the facts and circumstances on which the order of detention is based.\n\nBut to a\n\n(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 918.\n\n(2) [1969] l S.C.R. 227.\n\n(3) [ 1980] 4 s.c.c. 427.\n\nSURJEET SINGH v. UNION (Koshal, J.) 207\n\nperson who is not so conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, the detenu must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand, and in a script which he can read, if he is a literate person.\n\nThe Constitution has guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. It has also, by way of limitations upon the freedcm of personal liberty, recognised the right of the State to legislate for preventive detention, subject to certai_i:i safeguards in favour of the detained person, as laid down in clauses (4) and (5) of article 22.\n\nOne of those safeguards is that the detajned person has the right to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made against him, in order that he may be able to make the representation against the order of detention. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, it has not been shown that the appellant had the opportunity, which the law contemplates in his favour, of making an effective representation against his detention.\n\nOn this ground alone we declare his detention illegal, and set aside the order of the High Court and the Order of Detention passed against him.\"\n\nIn Hadibandhu's case (supra) also an order under the Preventive Detention Act was impunged with the contention that the grounds of detention had not been supplied to the detenu in the language and script which he understood. The order was struck down by this Court for the reasons appearing in the following passage:\n\n\"The grounds in support of the order served on the appellant ran into fourteen typed pages and referred to his activities over a period of thirteen years, beside referring to a large number of court proceedings concerning him and other persons who were alleged to be his associates.\n\nMere oral explanation of a complicated order of the nature made against the appellant without supplying him the translation in script and language which he understood would, in our judgment amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making a representation against the order.\"\n\nIn Nainmal's case, Fazal Ali, J., who followed Hadibandhu's case, held that the communication of the grounds of detention in a language understood by the detenu was an essential requirement for ·the validity of a detention order which,· in the . absence of such requirement being fulfilled, would be repugnant to. the provisions of . article 22(5) of the Constitution and would thus stand vitiated. And that i~ a view ;, hich has been consistently held by this Court.\n\n6. The facts with which we are here concerned, in so far as they are relevantto the decision of the point canvassed before us, are\n\non all fours with those of the . three cases cited above. As already pointed out, the grounds of detention were supplied to the two petitioners in the English language-a language with which they were not conversant. The service of the grounds on them in that manner could not be considered under the circumstances to be effective communication to them thereof so as to afford to them a real opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention.\n\n7. It is true, as pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General, that in Hadibandhu's case (supra) the grounds of detention covered numerous pages and related to a long period of time and, according to this Court, contained \"a complicated order 0 • The complicated nature er the length of the document, however, was only mentioned incidentally by this Court and was not meant to be a sine qua non for the fulfilment of the requirement that the groui1ds must be supplied to the detenu in a language which he understood before the service on him of such grounds could be considered a communication thereof_to him for the purposes of the Preventive Detention Act.\n\nIn the result both the petitions succeed and are accepted.\n\nThe detention of each of the petitioners is held to be repugnant to the provisions of article 22(5) of the Constitution and is struck down on that account. Both of them are directed to be set at liberty_ forthwith, in so far as these petitions are concerned.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nPetitions allowed. ·", "total_entities": 27, "entities": [{"text": "SURJEET SINGH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURJEET SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 12, 1981\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 752, "end_char": 762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1400, "end_char": 1410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. V. Deshpande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1452, "end_char": 1467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "M. K. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1490, "end_char": 1504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Banerjee Addi."}}, {"text": "R. N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1523, "end_char": 1535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Poddar and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nSubhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1545, "end_char": 1559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Poddar and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1626, "end_char": 1632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nBy this order we shall dispose of Criminal Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Surjeet Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5931 of 1980, the petitioner H is one Surjeet Singh while the other petition has been filed by a person named Kulwant Singh.", "canonical_name": "SURJEET SINGH & ANR"}}, {"text": "Kulwant Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1959, "end_char": 1972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5931 of 1980, the petitioner H is one Surjeet Singh while the other petition has been filed by a person named Kulwant Singh."}}, {"text": "13th October, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2019, "end_char": 2037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Each of the petitioners was detained on the 13th October, 1980 under the provisions of the National Security Ordinance which now stands replaced by the National Security Act."}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2127, "end_char": 2148, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N. M. Ghatate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N. M. Ghatate, learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the detention of the two petitioners with th~ conten• tion that English was not a language which either of them understood, that this factor rendered it necessary for the grounds of detention to be served on them in Hindi which was their mothertongue and that the same having not been done, there was in law no communication of such grounds to either of them."}}, {"text": "Central Act IV of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3399, "end_char": 3421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3857, "end_char": 3862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This opinion did not find favour with Sinha, C.J., who delivered the judgment of this Court and observed :\n\n'If the detained person is conversant with the English language, he will naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of the charge against him and the facts and circumstances on which the order of detention is based."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4628, "end_char": 4633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution has guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4947, "end_char": 4957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hadibandhu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5570, "end_char": 5580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hadibandhu's case (supra) also an order under the Preventive Detention Act was impunged with the contention that the grounds of detention had not been supplied to the detenu in the language and script which he understood."}}, {"text": "Nainmal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nainmal's case, Fazal Ali, J., who followed Hadibandhu's case, held that the communication of the grounds of detention in a language understood by the detenu was an essential requirement for ·the validity of a detention order which,· in the ."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6528, "end_char": 6537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nainmal's case, Fazal Ali, J., who followed Hadibandhu's case, held that the communication of the grounds of detention in a language understood by the detenu was an essential requirement for ·the validity of a detention order which,· in the ."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8391, "end_char": 8404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nPetitions allowed. ·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_209_212_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "~---\n\n_ _).\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nSMT. MANBHAR ETC.\n\nMarch 12, 1981\n\n[A.D. KoSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, Section 378 (i}-Deputy Govt. Advocate whether means Public Prosecutor-Section 24 read with clause (u) of section 2-Authority of the Advocate General.\n\nThe Advocate General of the Appellant State issued notification under section 94 read with clause (u) of section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure published on 25th of September, 1974, directing that three categories of various law officers of the Government including the Deputy Govt. Advocate shall have the authority to act and, plead and argue in all matters covered by the Code.\n\nThe High Court held that the Deputy Govt. Advocate had no locus standi D under the Code of Criminal Procedure to prefer an application under section 378 thereof for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by a lower Court in a murder ease. The respondent contended that an application under Section 378 would be incompetent unless its contents disclosed that it was being presented by a Public Prosecutor.\n\nAccepting the appeals E\n\nHELD : (I) The High Court was not justified in throwing out the application presented to it as one having been filed by a person incompetent to do so.\n\nFor the application to be treated as incompetent, the High Court was bound to enquire into the status of the person presenting it and could throw it out only if it was found as a fact that he did not enjoy the status of a Public Prosecutor. Such a status is for all practical purposes settled by the notification dated 25th September, 1974, of which after its publication in the Government Gazette, the High Court could take judicial notice.\n\n[211 G, 212 B-C]\n\n2(i) The Advocate General being admittedly a Public Prosecutor for the State High Court, he had the authority by virtue of the provisions of clause (u) of section 2 of the Code to issue directions authorising other persons to act; and once a person was so authorised, he would be Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code. [21JE-F]\n\n(ii) A Deputy Government Advocate beinga person so authorised under the notification dated 25th September, 1974, is thus a Public Prosecutor having full competence to present an application under section 378 of the Code. [211F-G]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 285 of 1977.\n\n210 SUPil.EME COURT REPORT\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.1974 of the Rajasthan High Conrt in D. B. Cr. Leave to Appeal No. 839/74.\n\nAND\n\nCriminal Appeal Nos. I 0 & I 1 of 1976.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.1974 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Misc.\n\nLeave to Appeal No. 857/74 and D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 350/74.\n\nBadri Dass Sharma for the AppelJant in all the Appeals.\n\nS. Balakrishnan for RR in Criminal Appeal No. 10/76.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nBy this Judgment we shall dispose of three appeals, viz., Criminal Appeals Nos. 10 and 11 of 1976 and Criminal Appeal 285 of 1977 in each of one of which the question arising for determination by us is the same.\n\nThe first of them is by Special leave granted by this Court and the other two are by certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan against its three orders dated 29th July, 1974, all holding that the Deputy Government Advocate of Rajasthan had no locus standi under the Code of Criminal Procedure thereinafter referred to as the Code) to prefer an application' under section 378 thereof for leave to appeal on behalf of the State against an order of acquittal recorded by a lower court in a murder case.\n\nThe releunt provisions of the Code are sub-section (I) of section 378, sub-section (1) of section 24 and clause (u) of section 2.\n\nThe same are reproduced below in that order:-\n\n\"378(1) : Save as otherwise proTided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acqtiittal passed by any Court other than a High Court or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.\n\n24. (J) : For every High Court, the Central Government or the State Govefllment shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint\n\nRAJ AS THAN v. SMT. MA NB HAR ETC. (Kasha!, J.) 211\n\none or more additional Public Prosecutors, for conducting in A such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding an behalf of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be.\n\n2(u) : \"Public Prosecutor\" means any person appointed under section 24, and includes any person actin~ under the B directions of a Public Prosecutor.\"\n\nIt will be seen that under sub-section (I) of section 378, only a Public Prosecutor can present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court subordinate to the1High Court, if so directed by the State Government. Again, for a person to be a Public Prosecutor, it is necessary that he is either appointed as suc11 under section 24 or acts under the directions of a Public Prosecutor so appointed.\n\n3 Learned counsel for the State has referred to Notification No. F. 32(1) Judl/74 dated 30.3.1974 issued by the State Government of Rajasthan appointing the Advocate General of the State to be a Public Prosecutor under section 24 of the Code. Another notification on which he relies is Notification No. P-36/AG/D dated l.4.74 published on 25th September, 1974 issued by the then Advocate General of Rajasthan under section 24 read with clause (u) of section 2 of the Code and directing that three categories of various Law Officers of the Government including the Deputy Government Advocate shall have the authority to act, plead and argue in all matters covered by the Code. These two notifications read together in our opinion, clinch the issue in favour of the State. The Advocate General being admittedly a Public Prosecutor for the State High Court he had the authority by virtue of the provisions of clause (u) of section 2 of the Code to issue directions authorising other persons to act; and once a person was so authorised, he would be a Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code. A Deputy Government Advocate being a person so authorised under the notification dated 25th September, 1974 above mentioned is thus a Public Prosecutor having full competence to present an application under section 378 of the Code. In this view of the matter, the High Court was not justified in throwing out the application presented to it as one having been filed by a person incompetent to do so.\n\nMr. Balkrishnan, learned Counsel for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. IO of 1976 has contended that as the Deputy Government Advocate did not specify his status as Public Prosecutor\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA in the application rejected by the High Court, that application could not be regarded as having been filed by a competent person.\n\nAccording to learned counsel, an application under section 378 would be incompetent unless from its contents disclosed that it was being presented by a Puplic Prosecutor. We do not agree with this contention and that for two reasons.\n\nFirstly, no principle of law B has been brought to our notice that if the proper designation of a person does not appear on a document authenticated by him, that document would lose its authenticity, even though that person factually holds such designation. For the application to be treated as incompetent, the High Court was bound to enquire into the status of the person presenting it and to throw it out only if it was found as a fact that he did not enjoy the status of a Public Prose- _J C cutor. Secondly, such status is for all practical purposes settled by\n\nthe notification dated 25th September, 1974 of which, after its publication in the Governmeut Gazette, the High Court could take judicial notice.\n\nHad that been done, the problem would hot have arisen as the Deputy Government Advocate would have been found to be holding the status of a Public Prosecutor.\n\nFor the reasons stated, we accept all the three appeals and set aside the impugned or'ders with a direction that the applications made under section 378 of the Code shall be heard and decided by the High Court on merits,\n\nE N.K.A.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MANBHAR ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANBHAR ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 12, 1981\n\n[A.D. KoSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, Section 378 (i}-Deputy Govt."}}, {"text": "A.D. KoSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236, "end_char": 245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387, "end_char": 396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 404, "end_char": 430, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Advocate had no locus standi D under the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 711, "end_char": 756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 810, "end_char": 821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocate had no locus standi D under the Code", "statute": "Advocate had no locus standi D under the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 975, "end_char": 986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocate had no locus standi D under the Code", "statute": "Advocate had no locus standi D under the Code"}}, {"text": "25th September, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1587, "end_char": 1607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a status is for all practical purposes settled by the notification dated 25th September, 1974, of which after its publication in the Government Gazette, the High Court could take judicial notice."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1884, "end_char": 1893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2009, "end_char": 2054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2262, "end_char": 2273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code", "statute": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code"}}, {"text": "Badri Dass Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2756, "end_char": 2773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Dass Sharma for the AppelJant in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2813, "end_char": 2828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Balakrishnan for RR in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2911, "end_char": 2917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nBy this Judgment we shall dispose of three appeals, viz.,"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3248, "end_char": 3271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of them is by Special leave granted by this Court and the other two are by certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan against its three orders dated 29th July, 1974, all holding that the Deputy Government Advocate of Rajasthan had no locus standi under the Code of Criminal Procedure thereinafter referred to as the Code) to prefer an application' under section 378 thereof for leave to appeal on behalf of the State against an order of acquittal recorded by a lower court in a murder case."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3411, "end_char": 3437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3508, "end_char": 3519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3736, "end_char": 3746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J) : For every High Court, the Central Government or the State Govefllment shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint\n\nRAJ AS THAN v. SMT."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4697, "end_char": 4707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4835, "end_char": 4846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5159, "end_char": 5169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5652, "end_char": 5662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5687, "end_char": 5696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6157, "end_char": 6166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6538, "end_char": 6549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code", "statute": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code"}}, {"text": "Balkrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6736, "end_char": 6747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Balkrishnan, learned Counsel for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7144, "end_char": 7155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code", "statute": "Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_213_222_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "AHMEDABAD MANUFACTURING & CALICO\n\nPRINTING CO. LTD.\n\nWORKMEN & ANR.\n\nMarch 12, 1981\n\n[ A.D. KOSHAL AND R.B. MISRA, JJ. ]\n\nSpecial leave petition allowed to be withdrawn unconditionally-Whether amounts to a dismissal and,..therefore, a bar to entertain a fresh petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the same/acts and grounds taken in the special leave petition.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, on a dispute referred to it under section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 took up for consideration four demands for basic wages and adjustment, dearness allowance, gratuity and retros: pectivity of the demands of the workmen. The Tribunal gave its award on 30th of November 1971 which was published on 20th January, 1972 in the Maharashtra Government Gazette.\n\nThe appellant company, feeling aggrieved by the award, filed in the Supreme Court a petition for spedal leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. Pursuant to a notice, the respondent workmen put in appearance and filed a counter affidavit. After some arguments the appellant Company at its request was permitted to withdraw the leave petition as per the order of the Court dated 21st of August, 1972 which reads : \"Upon hearing counsel the Court allowed the special leave petition to be withdrawn\". Four days thereafter the company filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court challenging the award. The petition was virtually based on the same facts and grounds as were taken in the special leave petition before the Supreme Court. The learned single Judge who heard the petition determined the circumstances on the basis of the respective affidavits filed by the parties in which the comoany unconditionally withdrew its special leave petition and in view of those circumtsances equated the withdrawal of the leave petition with the dismissal of the same. Relying on Vasant Vithal Palse and Ors. v. The Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. and Anr. [1970] 2 LLJ 328, a decision .of that court, the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition in fimine.\n\nA Letters Patent Appeal against the said order of dismissal also met the same fate. However, a petition under Article 133 of the Constitution for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court was accepted by the said Division Bench and a certificate was granted and hence the appeal.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : I. Permission to withdraw a special leave petition cannot be equated with an order of dismissal. If a non-speaking order of dismissal cannot operate as res judicata for entertaining a fresh writ petition on the same facts and grounds taken in the special leave petition, an order permitting the withdrawal of the writ petition for the same reason cannot so operate. [219B,222C-D)\n\nA Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of Cochin Port Trust and Anr., [1978]13 SCR 971, followed.\n\nPunjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand and Anr., [1978] 3 SCR 370; \"f Hoshnak Singh v. Union of India and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 399; Daryao and Ors. v.\n\nThe State of U.P. and Ors., [1962] I SCR 574, discussed.\n\nB Vasant Vithal Palse and Ors, v The Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. and Anr.,\n\n[1970] 2 LLJ 328; Management of Western India Match Co. Ltd., Madras v.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunul, Madras and Anr. A.LR. 1958 Mad. 398, distinguished.\n\n2. The order of a court has to be read as it is. If the Supreme Court intended to dismiss the petition at the threshold. it could liave said so explicitly.\n\nIn the absence of any indication in the order itself, it will not be proper to enter into the arena of conjecture and to come to a conclusion on the basis of extraneous evidence that the Supreme Court intended to reject the leave petition. If the Order of the Supreme Court is read as it is there is not the slightest doubt that the Supreme Court had. allowed the company to withdraw the leave petition, in the instant case. The approach of the High Court in having perused the affidavits filed by the parties to know the circumstances under which the leave petition was withdrawn is not correct. [217 C-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1678 of 1973.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 4.7.1973 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 142/72.\n\nF. S. Noriman, Y. S. Chitde, 0. C. Mathur, K. J. John, Sri Narain, Narayan B. Shetya and M. Mudgal for the Appellant.\n\nP. D. Damania, B. R. Aganvala and P. G. Gokhale for Respondents 1-2.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthy and Jatinder Sharma for Respondent 3.\n\nJanardhan Sharma for the Interveners.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J.\n\nThe present appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment dated 4th of July, , 1973 of the High Court of Bombay in a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe facts leading up to this appeal lie in a narrow compass.\n\nH The appellant-the Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. (hereinafter. called the Company)-is predominantly a textile manufacturer but has also factories in Bombay manufacturing\n\nCALICO PRINTING v. WORKMEM (Misra, J.) 215\n\nheavy chemicals and engages about 750 workmen in three such factories.\n\nA dispute arose between the Company and the said workmen in respect of seventeen demands raised by them through their union. The disoute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\n\nOut of the demands of the workmen the Tribunal took up for consideration only four demands, that is, demands Nos. l, 2, 15 and 16 respectively for basic wages and adjustment, dearness allowance, gratuity and retrospective effect of the demands. The Tribunal gave its award on 30th of November 1971 and sent a copy thereof to the parties.\n\nThe award was published on 20th of January, 1972 in the Maharashtra Government Gazette.\n\nUnder the rules it was to be effective after one month of its publication in the Gazette.\n\nThe Company, feeling aggrieved by the award, filed with this Court a petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution (the leave petition, for short).\n\nPursuant to a notice, the respondent union put in appearance and filed a counter affidavit.\n\nIt appears that after some arguments the appellant chose to withdraw the leave petition.\n\nAs much turns upon the order .of this Court dated 21st of August, 1972 permitting withdrawal, it would be appropriate to quote the same :\n\n\"Upon hearing counsel the Court allowed the special\n\nleave petition to be withdrawn.\" E\n\nFour days thereafter the Company filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court challenging the award. That petition was virtually based on the same facts and\n\nl grounds as were taken in the leave petition before this Court.\n\nThe respondent union appeared and filed a counter affidavit urging that the petition be dismissed in limine.\n\nA rejoinder affidavit was filed on behalf of the Company.\n\nOn the date of hearing three preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the union respondent. In the present appeal we are, however, concerned only with one of them, namely, that the High Court should not exercise discretion in granting relief to the Company under Article 226 of the Constitution, after the withdrawal of the leave position unconditionally.\n\nThis objection prevailed with the High Court. The learned H Single Judge determined the circumstances on the basis of the respective affidavits filed by the parties, in which the Company\n\nunconditionally withdrew its leave petition and in view of those circumstances he equated the withdrawal of the leave petition with the dismissal of the same. Relying on Vasant Vithal Palse and Ors. v.\n\nThe Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. and Anr.(1) he held that it was not a fit case for exercise of the Court's discretionary power to admit the writ petition and accordingly dismissed the same in limine.\n\nThe Company filed a Letters Patent Appeal but the Division Bench dismissed the same and confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge. The preliminary objection which weighed with the High Court was repeated on behalf of the union respondent before the Division Bench in appeal with two contentions : (!) the unconditional withdrawal by the Company of its leave petition in the circumstances found by the learned Single Judge is a bar to the competence of the Court to entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In other words, the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant rule nisi under Article 226 in view of the withdrawal of the petition under Article 136 of the Constitution; (2) The learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the petition in limine under Article 226 of the Constitution in the exercise of his discretion on the ground that the leave petition based on the same contention was unconditionally withdrawn.\n\nAlthough the Division Bench discussed the first contention but refused to decide it as it was taken for the first time before it in appeal. The second contention was, however, accepted by the Division Bench. The High Court did not consider the other cases cited on behalf of the Company as it thought that the point in question was concluded by a Division Bench of that Court in Vasant Vithal Palse's case (supra). The Company thereafter moved a petition under Article 133 of the Constitution for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court which was granted by the High Court and this is how the present appeal comes before us.\n\nTwo questions arise for consideration in this appeal :(I) Whether unconditional withdrawal of the leave petition would amount to its dismissal ? (2) If so, what would be its impact on the petition under article 226 of the Constituti0n ?\n\nIt was contended for the appellant that the order of this Court permitting the appellant to withdraw the leave petition H should be read as it is and that so read the order only means that\n\n(I) [1970] 2 L.L.J. 328.\n\nthe Company had withdrawn the leave petition. It was urged that A the mere fact that the appellant chose to withdraw the leave petition after some arguments will not alter the nature of the order and that by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the leave petition had been dismissed by this Court. It may be, it was argued that the Company chose to withdraw the leave petition on the ground that this Court was not favourably inclined to grant it or Bthat the Company chose to avail of a better remedy before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, which had a wider scope.\n\nThe High Court perused the affidavits filed by the parties to know the circumstances under which the leave petition was withdrawn, but in our opinion that is not a correct approach. The order of a Court has to be read as it is. If this Court intended to dismiss the petition at the threshold, it could have said so explicitly.\n\nIn the absence of any indication in the order itself, it will not be proper to enter into the arena of conjecture and to come to a conclusion on the basis of extraneous evidence that this Court intended to rejeet the leave petition. If the Order of this Court is read as it is there is not the slightest doubt that this Court had allowed the Company to withdraw the leave petition, and if that be so, it would be idle to argue that the leave petition had been dismissed at the threshold.\n\nReliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust & Anr.(1) In that case a special leave petition had been dismissed in limine with a non-speaking order. This Court dealing with the impact of that order observed as follows :\n\n\"If by any judgment or order any matter in issue has been directly and explicitly decided the decision operates as res judicata and bars the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. The principle of res judicata also comes into play when by the judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implication; then also the principle of res }udicata on that issue is directly applicable.\"\n\n(!) (1978] 3 S.C.R. 971.\n\nA Then the Court proceeded to consider whether the .matter in issue has been either explicitly or implicitly decided. Dealing with that aspect of the matter the Court further observed :\n\n\"Indisputably nothing was expressly decided. The effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must by necessary implication, be taken to have decided that it was not a fit case where special leave should be granted. It may be due to several reasons.\n\nIt may be one or more. It may also be that the merits of the award were taken into consideration and this Court felt that it did not require any interference.\n\nBut since the order is not a speaking order, one finds it difficult to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants that it must be deemed to have necessarily decided implicitly all the questions in . relation to the merits of the award. A writ proceeding is a different proceeding.\n\nWhatever can be held to have been decided expressly, implicitly or even constructively while dismissing the special leave petition cannot be re-opened.\n\nBut the technical rule of res judicata, although a wholesome rule based. on public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. It is not safe to extend the principle of res judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guesswork .... If the writ petition is dismissed by a speaking order either at the threshold or after contest, say, only on the ground of !aches or the availability of an alternative remedy, then another remedy open in law either by way of suit or any other proceeding obviously will not be barred on the principle of res judicata. Of course, a second writ petition on the same cause of action either filed in the same High Court or in another will not be maintainable because the dismissal of one petition will operate as a bar in the entertainment of another writ petition. Similarly even if one writ petition is dismissed in limine by a non-speaking order 'dismissed', another writ petition would not be maintainable because even the one-word order, as we have indicated above, must necessarily be taken to have decided impliedly that the case is not a fit one for exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Another writ petition from the same order or decision. will not lie.\n\nBut the position is substantially different when a writ petition is dismissed either at the threshold or\n\nafter contest without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter; then no merit can be deemed to have been necess arily and impliedly decided and any other remedy of suit or other proceeding will not be barred on the principle of res judicata.\"\n\nIf a non-speaking order of dismissal cannot operate as res judicata, B an order permitting the withdrawal of the leave petition for the same reason cannot so operate. The case in hand stands on a still better footing than the case of Workmen of Cochin Port Trust (supra).\n\nNext reliance was placed on Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v.\n\nSuresh Chand & Anr.(1) In that case one of the contentions raised was that no application for approval was made by the appellant to the Industrial Tribunal and that there was thus contravention of section 3J (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. An application for approval was in fact made under section 33 (2) (b), but that was withdrawn and the argument advanced was that the withdrawal was tantamount to refusal of approval, that the ban imposed by section 33 (2) (b), therefore, continued to operate and that the order of dismissal passed by the appellant was void and inoperative.\n\nThe contention was, however, repelled and this Court observed :\n\nI \"Where, however, the application for approval under section 33 (2) (b) is withdrawn by the employer and there is no decision on it on rrierits, it is difficult to see how it can be said that the approval has been refused by the Tribunal. The Tribunal having had no occasion to consider the application on merits there can be no question of the Tribunal refusing approval to the employer. It cannot be said that where the application for approval is withdrawn, there is a decision by the Tribunal to refuse to lift the ban. The withdrawal of the application for approval stands on the same footing as if no application under section 33 (2) (b) has been made at all.\"\n\nIn Hoshnak Singh v. Union of India & Ors.(2j an earlier petition was dismissed by a non-speaking one word order dismissed'. A second petition after pursuing the alternative remedy was filed.\n\nA question arose whether the same would be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata.\n\nThis Court held that the second petition would not be so barred because the cause of action was entirely\n\n(I) [1978] 3 S C.R. 370.\n\n(2) [1979] 3 S.C.R. 399.\n\nA different and the dismissal could not stand in the way of the petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nReliance was next placed on Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors.(1) In that case the previous petition for a writ filed by the petitioner before the High Court was withdrawn. The High Court, therefore, dismissed the said petition with the expres observation that the merits had not been considered by the High Court in dismissing it and that, therefore, no order as to costs was passed.\n\nIt was held by this Court that the order dismissing the writ petition as withdrawn could not constitute a bar of res judicata.\n\nCounsel for the respondent union has contended that the order of rejection may be either explicit or implicit and that it can be shown from the circumstances of the present case that the leave petition was withdrawn only after full arguments when the appellant found that this Court was not favourably inclined to grant it, In these circumstances it is argued that the order of withdrawal would amount to the dismissal of the leave petition and that in this view of the matter the High Court in the sound exercise of its discretion was justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine.\n\nIn support of this contention the learned counsel relied upon Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat .(2) In that case the respondent first filed a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revision was, however, dismissed. Thereupon the respondent moved a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Consti-· tution challenging the same order of the appellate court.\n\nThe High Court held that in spite of the dismissal of the revision petition, it could interfere under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution on a proper case being made out. This Court, however, reversed the order of the High Court holding that even on the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order of the\n\nSingle Judge who had disposed of the revision petition, a writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the High Court when the respondent had already chosen the remedy under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that if there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of\n\n(1) [1962] l S.C.R. 574.\n\n\n.-A.\n\nthe same order of the subordinate court. The facts of that case are A materially different from those of the case in hand and that case is not of much assistance in solving the problem before us.\n\nJn Vasant Vithal Palse's case (supra} the trade union filed an application for special leave to appeal to this Court and the same was rejected. Thereafter the individual workmen filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the award without disclosing the fact that application for special leave made to the Supreme Court by the trade union had been rejected.\n\nThe writ petition was dismissed on the grounds : (I) that the material facts had been concealed, and (2) that the leave petition filed by the trade union had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. That case is also distinguishable on facts, firstly because there is no concealment of facts in the present case, and, secondly, the Supreme Court in that case had dismissed the application for special leave. In the cas.e in hand the petition has only been permitted to be withdrawn. It is on the basis of that decision that the High Court had dismissed the petition in limi11e.\n\nNext, reliance was placed on A. M. Allison v. B. L. Sen.(') This Court dealing with the writ of certiorari observed as follows :\n\n\"A writ of certiorari cannot be issued as a matter of course. The High Court is entitled to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice. The Supreme Court declines to interfere, in appeal, with the discretion of the High Court unless it is satisfied that the justice of the case requires such interference.\"\n\nThere is no quarrel with the proposition that a writ of certiorari is not issued as a matter of course and that the petitioner has to satisfy the Court that his rights have been infringed so that there has been failure of justice. In the instant case the appellant chose to file a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court but eventually withdrew the petition and thereafter invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court in its discretion chose to dismiss the writ petition in !imine only on the ground that the petitioner had moved an application for special leave before the Supreme Court and withdrew the same unconditionally.\n\nIn view of the law laid down by this Court in a recent decision in the case of Workmen of Cochin Port Trust (supra) the decision in Aflison's case has lost its efficacy.\n\n(I) [1957] S.C.R. 359.\n\nIn the Management of Western India Match Co. Ltd., Madras\n\nv. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Am.,(1) the Supreme Court had declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner by grantiug leave unc'.er Article 136 of the Constitution against an award of the Industrial Tribunal without giving any reasons. The Madras High Court held that in the circumstances of the case it would not be a proper exercise of its discretion in admitting the writ petition despite the evidence that the Industrial Tribunal failed to give opportunity to the petitioner to produce evidence and thus violated a principle of natural justice, when the Supreme Court had dismissed the leave petition against the award. In that case the Supreme Court had dismissed the leave petition. The facts were thus materially different from the facts of the present appeal.\n\nBesides, this Court has taken a different view in the recent case of Workmen of Cochin Port Trust (supra),\n\nAfter having analysed the various cases cited, we are of the view that permission to withdraw a leave petition cannot be D equated with an order of its dismissal.\n\nWe , also come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case the High Court has not exercised a proper and sound discretion in dismissing the writ petition in limine on the sole ground that the application for special leave on the same facts and grounds had been withdrawn unconditionally.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impuged order and the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9th November, 1972 in writ petition No. 583 of 1972 and send the case back to him for considering the writ petition on merits. There is, however, no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(1) A.LR. 1958 Mad. 398.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "AHMEDABAD MANUFACTURING & CALICO\n\nPRINTING CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WORKMEN & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 12, 1981\n\n[ A.D. KOSHAL AND R.B. MISRA, JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 378, "end_char": 408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, on a dispute referred to it under section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 took up for consideration four demands for basic wages and adjustment, dearness allowance, gratuity and retros: pectivity of the demands of the workmen."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 465, "end_char": 494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "30th of November 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 679, "end_char": 700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal gave its award on 30th of November 1971 which was published on 20th January, 1972 in the Maharashtra Government Gazette."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 724, "end_char": 742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal gave its award on 30th of November 1971 which was published on 20th January, 1972 in the Maharashtra Government Gazette."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 851, "end_char": 864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company, feeling aggrieved by the award, filed in the Supreme Court a petition for spedal leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 909, "end_char": 920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "of August, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1180, "end_char": 1195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some arguments the appellant Company at its request was permitted to withdraw the leave petition as per the order of the Court dated 21st of August, 1972 which reads : \"Upon hearing counsel the Court allowed the special leave petition to be withdrawn\"."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1351, "end_char": 1362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2181, "end_char": 2192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 SCR 370", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 SCR 399", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4100, "end_char": 4128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "217 C-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 4.7.1973 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "F. S. Noriman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Noriman, Y. S. Chitde, 0."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4269, "end_char": 4281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Noriman, Y. S. Chitde, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4284, "end_char": 4295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Noriman, Y. S. Chitde, 0."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, K. J. John, Sri Narain, Narayan B. Shetya and M. Mudgal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Narain,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4313, "end_char": 4320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, K. J. John, Sri Narain, Narayan B. Shetya and M. Mudgal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Narayan B. Shetya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4321, "end_char": 4338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, K. J. John, Sri Narain, Narayan B. Shetya and M. Mudgal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4343, "end_char": 4352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, K. J. John, Sri Narain, Narayan B. Shetya and M. Mudgal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. D. Damania", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4373, "end_char": 4386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. D. Damania, B. R. Aganvala and P. G. Gokhale for Respondents 1-2."}}, {"text": "B. R. Aganvala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4388, "end_char": 4402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. D. Damania, B. R. Aganvala and P. G. Gokhale for Respondents 1-2."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4407, "end_char": 4420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. D. Damania, B. R. Aganvala and P. G. Gokhale for Respondents 1-2."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthy and Jatinder Sharma for Respondent 3."}}, {"text": "Jatinder Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4464, "end_char": 4479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthy and Jatinder Sharma for Respondent 3."}}, {"text": "Janardhan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4499, "end_char": 4515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardhan Sharma for the Interveners."}}, {"text": "MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4582, "end_char": 4587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J.\n\nThe present appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment dated 4th of July, , 1973 of the High Court of Bombay in a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4773, "end_char": 4784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The appellant-the Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. (hereinafter.", "canonical_name": "Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "called the Company)-is predominantly a textile manufacturer but has also factories in Bombay manufacturing\n\nCALICO PRINTING v. WORKMEM (Misra, J.) 215\n\nheavy chemicals and engages about 750 workmen in three such factories."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5363, "end_char": 5376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5384, "end_char": 5413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "20th of January, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The award was published on 20th of January, 1972 in the Maharashtra Government Gazette."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6047, "end_char": 6058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "21st of August, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As much turns upon the order .of this Court dated 21st of August, 1972 permitting withdrawal, it would be appropriate to quote the same :\n\n\"Upon hearing counsel the Court allowed the special\n\nleave petition to be withdrawn.\""}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6580, "end_char": 6591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8403, "end_char": 8414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8512, "end_char": 8523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8572, "end_char": 8583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8685, "end_char": 8696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vasant Vithal Palse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9229, "end_char": 9248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court did not consider the other cases cited on behalf of the Company as it thought that the point in question was concluded by a Division Bench of that Court in Vasant Vithal Palse's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9695, "end_char": 9706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10485, "end_char": 10496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1978] 3 S.C.R. 971", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12178, "end_char": 12197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Workmen of Cochin Port Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15261, "end_char": 15289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case in hand stands on a still better footing than the case of Workmen of Cochin Port Trust (supra)."}}, {"text": "section 3J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15556, "end_char": 15566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15582, "end_char": 15611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15664, "end_char": 15674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15820, "end_char": 15830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16074, "end_char": 16084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16646, "end_char": 16656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 S C.R. 370", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17087, "end_char": 17106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 S.C.R. 399", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17113, "end_char": 17132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17260, "end_char": 17271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18588, "end_char": 18599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18603, "end_char": 18630, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18718, "end_char": 18738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18916, "end_char": 18936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19339, "end_char": 19350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19354, "end_char": 19381, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jn Vasant Vithal Palse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19863, "end_char": 19885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Vasant Vithal Palse's case (supra} the trade union filed an application for special leave to appeal to this Court and the same was rejected."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20064, "end_char": 20075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21720, "end_char": 21731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aflison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22113, "end_char": 22120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the law laid down by this Court in a recent decision in the case of Workmen of Cochin Port Trust (supra) the decision in Aflison's case has lost its efficacy."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22242, "end_char": 22269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Management of Western India Match Co. Ltd., Madras\n\nv. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Am."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22392, "end_char": 22403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22500, "end_char": 22517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court held that in the circumstances of the case it would not be a proper exercise of its discretion in admitting the writ petition despite the evidence that the Industrial Tribunal failed to give opportunity to the petitioner to produce evidence and thus violated a principle of natural justice, when the Supreme Court had dismissed the leave petition against the award."}}, {"text": "9th November, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23714, "end_char": 23732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impuged order and the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9th November, 1972 in writ petition No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_223_233_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "GUDA VIJAYALAKSHMI\n\nGUDA RAMCHANDRA SEKHARA SASTRY\n\nMarch 13, 1981\n\n[ V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND AMRENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.]\n\nTransfer of proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act-Power of the Supreme Court to transfer under section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code-Whether section 25 C.P.C. gets excluded by reason 0{ provisions of sections 21 and 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.\n\nThe petitioner (wife) filed a suit (O.P. 72/79) in forma pauperis seeking maintenance from the respondent (husband) in the court of subordinate Judge, Elum (Andhra Pradesh). On the receipt of the notice of the suit, the respondent filed a divorce suit (Petition Case No. 28/1980) against the wife under section 13 , of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the court of the District Judge, Udaipur (Rajasthan). By the instant transfer petition filed under section 25 C.P.C.,\n\n1908, the wife sought to get the suit at Udaipur transferred to Eluru.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised to the effect that section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code, which gets excluded by reason of the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is not applicable to proceedings under the said Act and as such the Supreme Court has no power to transfer the husband's suit from Udaipur District Court, Udaipur (Rajasthan) to Eluru District Court, Eluru (A.P.).\n\nRejecting the preliminary objection, the Court\n\nHELD : Per curiam\n\nOn merits, it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit pending in the District Court Udaipur (Rajasthan) to the District Court at Eluru (Audhra Pradesh), where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose, the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.). [226 A-Bl\n\nPer Tulzapurkar J.\n\n1. It will invariably be expedient to have a joint or consolidated hearing or trial by one and the same Court of a husband's petition for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground that the wife has withdrawn from his society withont reasonable excuse under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the wife's petition for judicial separation against her husband on ground of cruelty under section 10 of the said Act in order to avoid conflicting decisions being rendered\n\nby twG> different Courts. In such a situation rnsort will have to be had to tltc!\n\nA powers under sections 23 to 25 of the Civil Procedure Code for directing transfer of the petitions for a consolidated hearing. [228 G-H, 227 A]\n\n2:1. On a proper construction of the relevant provisions, it cannot be said that the substantive provision contained in section 25 Civil Procedure Code is excluded by reason of section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955. [226 FJ\n\n2 ;.2. In terms, section 21 C.P.C. does not make any distinction between procedural and substantive provisions of C.P.C. and all that it provides is that the Code, as far as may be, shall apply to all proceedings under the Act and the phrase \"as far as may be\" means and is intended to exclude only such provisions of the Code as are or may be inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Code. It is impossible to say that such provisions of the Code as partake of the character of substantive law are excluded by implication as no such implication can be read into section 21 of the Act and a particular provisio.n of the Code irrespective of whether it is procedural or substantive will not apply only if it is inconsistent with any provisions of the Act. [226 G-H, 227 A-BJ\n\n3. Section 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not exclude the power of transfer conferred upon the Supreme Court by the present section 25 C.P.C., in relation to proceedings under that Act. The marginal note of section 21 A itself makes it clear that it deals with power to transfer petitions and direct their joint or consolidated \"trial in certain cases\" and is not exhaustive.\n\nSection 21A does not deal with the present section 25 C.P.C. which has been substituted by an amendment which has come into force with effect from February 1, 1977 (section 11 of the Amending Act 104, 1976). By the amendment very wide and plenary power has been conferred on the Sllpreme Court for the first time to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings from one High Court to another High Court or from one Civil Court in one State to another Civil Court in any other State throughout the country. Conferal of such wide and plenary power on the Supreme Court could not have been in contemplation of Parliament at the time of enactment of section 21 A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. [227 C-D, F-H, 228 A-BJ\n\nSmt. Rama Kanta v. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 373 and F P,.iyavari Mehta v. Priyanath Mehta, AlR 1980 Bombay 337, overruled.\n\nPer Amre11dra Nath Sen, J.'\n\n...\n\nI. A plain reading of section 25 C.P.C. clearly indicates that very wide jurisdiction and powers have been conferred on the Supreme Court to transfer any suit, appeal or any other proceedings from a High Court or other Civil Court in any State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any other State for the ends of justice. Supreme Court enjoys the power and jurisdiction to entertain the transfer application under section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [230 F, 233 DJ\n\n2: t. Sections 21 and 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act do not in Ut?Y H way, exclude, effect or curtail the power conferred on the Supreme Court under section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the jurisdiction clearly :onfer.red\n\nG. VIJAYALAKSHMI v. G. RAMACHANDRA (Tulz:ipurkar, J.) 225\n\nen any court has to be ouited, the exclusion of such jurisdiction must be made in clear and unequivocal terms. [232E, 2330]\n\n2 : 2.\n\nSection 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act only provides that \"all proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code. of Civil Procedure, 1908\". Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not deal with the question of jurisdiction of any court and it cannot be construed to exclude the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under section 25 C.P.C. [232 E-G]\n\n2: 3.\n\nSection 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act has, indeed, no bearing on the question of jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under section 25 C.P.C. Section 21 A has no application to the case of transfer of any suit or proceeding from one State to another. [233 B-C]\n\n2 : 4. The Supreme Court must necessarily enjoy the power and jurisdiction under the provisions of section 25 C.P.C. of transferring such a suit er proceeding for the ends of justice unless the pO\\yer and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are specifically taken away by any statute. [2320-E]\n\n3. Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure came into force after D section 21 and 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act have been incorporated in1the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955 and as such section 25 of the Code overrides sections 21 and 21 A of the Hindu Marriage Act. [233 A-El\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transfer Petition No. 36 of 1980.\n\nPetition under section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure for transfer of case No. 28 of 1980 Misc. (36) pending in the Court of the Distt. Judge, Udaipur (Rajasthan) to the Court of Subordinate Judge, Eluru (Andhra Pradesh) to be tried a\\ongwith 0 P. No. 72 ot i 979 pending in that court.\n\nG. S. Rama Rao for the Petitioner.\n\nB. D. Sharma for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. On September 26, 1979, the petitioner (wife) filed a suit in Jonna pauperis seeking maintenance from the respondent (her husband) in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Eluru (Andhra Pradesh) being 0. P. No. 72 of 1979.\n\nOn the receipt of the notice of the suit, the respondent filed a divorce suit (Petition Case No. 28 of l 980) against the wife under s. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the Court of the District Judge, Udaipur (Rajasthan).\n\nBy the instant transfer petition filed under s. 25 C.P.C.\n\nA 1908 the wife is seeking to get the husband's suit transferred to Eluru. On merits we are satisfied that it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.) where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District High Court at Eluru (A.P.) B\n\nHowever, counsel for the respondent (husband) has raised before us a preliminary objection that s. 25 of the C.P.C. under which the transfer petition has been made is not applicable to proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and as such this Court has no power to transfer the husband's suit from Udaipur District Court to the District Court at Eluru. He urged that s. 25 of C.P.C. gets excluded by reason of the provisions of s. 21 and 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. According to him s. 25 C.P.C. deals with the substantive law and not procedural law and since s. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act makes applicable to all the proceedings under the Act only such provisions of C.P.C. as relate to the regulation of proceedings i.e. such provisions which deal with procedural matters only, s. 25 C.P.C. is not applicable.\n\nHe also urged that s. 21 A (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act also makes the above position clear beyond doubt by specifically excluding ss. 24 and 25 C.P.C. from being applied to the proceedfogs under the Hindu Marriage Act.\n\nA large number of authorities were referred to by counsel to substantiate his contention and general principles but in particular one decision of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Priyavari Mehta v. Priyanath Mehta(1) was pressed into service as having a direct bearing on the point.\n\nIn our view, on proper construction of the relevant provisions it is not possible to uphold the preliminary objection. In the first place it is difficult to accept the contention that the substantive provision contained in s. 25 C.P.C. is excluded by reason of s. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act merely provides : \"Subject to other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in that behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908\". In terms s. 21 doe& not make any distinction between procedural and substantive pro. visions of C.P.C. and all that it provides is that the Code as far as may be shall apply to all proceedings under the Act and the phraSI!:\n\n(il A.I.R. 19'3Q Boru. 337.\n\n... '\n\n. G. AIJAYALAKSHMI v. G. RAMACHA]'jDRA (Tulzapurkar J.) 227\n\n\"as far as may be\" means and is intended to exclude only such provisions of the Code as are or may be inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. It is impossible to say that such provisions of the Code as partake of the character of substantive law are excluded by implication as no such implication can be read into s. 21 and a particular provision of the Code irrespective of whether it is procedural or substantive will not apply only if it is inconsistent with any provision of the Act.\n\nFor instance, it is difficult to countenance the suggestion that the doctrine of res judicata contained in s. 11 of the Code which partakes of the character of substantive law is not applicable to proceedings under the Act. Resjudicata, after all, is a branch or specie of the Rule of Estoppel called Estoppel by Record and though Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, the whole concept is more correctly viewed as a substantive rule of law (See : Canada and Dominion Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships Ltd.(1)\n\nSo far ass. 2!A of the Hindu Marriage Act Is concerned the marginal note of that section itself makes it clear that it deals with power to transfer petitions and direct their joint or consolidated trial \"in certain cases\" and is not exhaustive.\n\nFurther sub-s. (3) of s. 21A on which strong reliance was placed runs thus:\n\n\"21A (3). In a case where clause (b) of sub-section (2) applies, the Court or the Government, as the case may be, competent under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to transfer any suit for proceeding from the district court in which the later petition has been presented to the district court in which the earlier petition is pending, shall exercise its powers to transfer such later petition as if it had been empowered so to do under the said Code.\"\n\nThis provision in terms deals with the power of the Government or the Court on whom powers of transfer have been conferred by the C.P.C. as it then stood, that is to say, .olds. 24 and 25 of C.P.C.\n\nIt does not deal with the present s. 25 C.P.C. which has been substituted by an amendment which has come into force with effect from February 1, 1977 (s. 11 of the Amending Act 104 of 1976). By the amendment very wide and plenary power has been conferred on this Court for the first time to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings from one High Court to another High• Court or from one Civil\n\n(I) (1947] A.C. 46, P.C., at p. 56.\n\nCourt in one State to another Civil Court in any other State throughout the country. Conferal of such wide and plenary power on this Court could not have been in the contemplation of Parliament at the time of enactment of s. 21 A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.\n\nIt is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that s, 21A of Hindu Marriage Act excludes the power of transfer conferred upon this Court by the present s. 25 of C.P.C. in relation to proceedings under that Act.\n\nComing to the decision rendered by the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in Priyavari Mehta's case (supra) it needs to be pointed out that the aforesaid aspects of s. 21 A of the Hindu Marriage Act and the presents. 25 of the C.P.C. were not considered by the Nagpur Bench at all. Moreover, the Nagpur Bench, following the decision of the Punjab and HaryanaJiigh Court in Smt. Rc, ma Kanta v. Asl10k Kumar(1) has also taken the view that s. 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act permits transfer and consolidation of only two types of petition under the Act, namely, cross petitions filed by the two spouses against each other under s. I 0 or s. 13 of the Act and that consolidation or joint hearing of other types of petitions is excluded by necessary intendment. The Bench has observed\n\n\"The effect of s. 21A, therefore, in my op11110n, is that joint or consolidated hearing or trials of petitions other than those mentioned in that section not being permissible, the powers under s. 23 to 25 of the Code cannot be exercised for transfer of petitions for a consolidated hearing of the petitions no! contemplated by that section.\"\n\nSuch a view, in our opinion, is not correct.\n\nAs stated earlier, in the matter of transfer of petitions for a consolidated hearing thereof s. 21 A cannot be regarded as exhaustive for the marginal note clearly suggests that the section deals with power to transfer petitions and direct their joint and consolidated trial \"in certain cases.\" Moreover, it will invariably be expedient to have a joint or con-\n\nG_J solidated hearing or trial by one and the same Court of a husband's petition for restitution of conjugal rights on ground that the wife has withdrawn from his society without reasonable excuse under s. 9 of the Act and the wife's petition for judicial separation against her husband on grom1'tl of cruelty under s. I 0 of the Act in H order to avoid onflicting decisions being rendered by two different\n\n(1) AIR 1977 Punj. & Har. 373.\n\nG. VIJAYALAKSHMI v. G. RAMACHANDRA (A.N. Sen, J.) 229\n\nCourts. In such a situation resort will have to be had to the powers\n\n A under ss. 23 to 25 of the Civil Procedure Code for directing transfer of the petitions for a consolidated hearing.\n\nReading s. 21A in the manner done by the Nagpur Bench which leads to anamolous results has to be avoided.\n\nIn this view of the matter, the preliminary objection is over- B ruled. Divorce case No. 28 of 1980 pending in the District Court Udaipur (Rajasthan) is transfered to the District Court Eluru (A.P.),\n\nto which Court the wife's petition for maintenance shall also stand transferred. No order as to costs.\n\nAMRENDRA NATH SEN, J.\n\nI agree with the order proposed by my learned brother. I, however, propose to make certain observations with regard to the preliminary objection raised as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this application.\n\nThe preliminary objection raised is that the jurisdiction and power conferred on this Court under S. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure are excluded by the provisions contained in S. 21 and S. 21 A of the Hindu Marriage Act; and as S. 25 of the Civil Procedure Code is .not attracted, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this application for transfer.\n\nS. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as fQllOWS :-\n\n\"(I) On the application of a party, and after notice to the parties, and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, the Supreme Court may, at any stage, if satisfied that an order under this section is expedient for the ends of justice, direct that any suit, appeal or other proceeding be transferred from a High Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any other State.\n\n(2) Every application under this section shall be mad~ by a\n\nmotion which shall be supported by an affidavit.\n\n(3) The Court to which such suit, appeal or other proceeding is transferred shall, subject to any special directions in the order of transfer, either re-try it or proceed from the stage at which it was transferred to it.\n\n(4) In dismissing any application under this section, thr.i Supreme Court may, if it is of opinion that the application H was frivolous or vexatious, order the applicant to pay by way of compensation to any person who has oppo1ed th!l\n\nSUPREME COURTS REPORTS\n\n( 1981 J S.C.R. 3\n\napplication such sum, not exceeding two thousand rupees, as it considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.\n\n(5) The law applicable to any suit, appeal or other proceeding \"\"'f' transferred under the section shall be the law which the court in which the suit, appeal or other proceeding was originally instituted ought to have applied to such suit, appeal or proceeding.\"\n\nIt may be noticed that the present section 25 was substituted for the former section 25 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,\n\n1976. In this connection it may be relevant to set out S. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood before its amendment by the substitution of the present section.\n\nThe earlier section 25 was in the following terms :-\n\n\"(I) Where any part to a suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in a High Court presided over by a single Judge objects to its being heard by him and the Judge is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, he shall make a report to the State Government, which may, by notification in the \"Official Gazette, transfer such suit, appeal or proceeding in any other High Court :\n\nProvided that no suit, appeal or proceeding shall be transferred to a High Court without the consent of the State Government of the State that High Court has its principal seat.\n\n(2) The law applicable to any suit, appeal or proceeding so transferred shall be the law which the Court in which the suit, appeal or proceeding was originally instituted ought to have applied to such case.\"\n\nA plain reading of S. 25 of the Code clearly indicates that very wide jurisdiction and powers have been conferred on this Court to transfer any suit, appeal or any other proceeding from a High Court or other Civil Court in any State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any other State for the ends of justice. I shall now set out the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act.\n\nS. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act is in the following terms :-\n\n\"Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all\n\nG. VIJAYALAKSHMI v. G. RAMACHANDRA (A.N. Sen, J.) 231\n\nproceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be A by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\"\n\nSection 21A which was introduced in the Act by the Amending Act, (68 of 1976) provided as follows\n\n\"(1) where-\n\n(a) a petition under this Act has been presented to a district court having jurisdiction by a party to a marriage praying for a decree for judicial separation under s. 10 or for a decree of divorce under section 13, and\n\n(b) another petition under this Act has been presented thereafter by the other party to the marriage praying for a decree for judicial separation under section 10 or for a decree of divorce under section 13 on any ground, whether in the same district court or in a different district court, in the same State or in a different State;\n\nthe petition shall be dealt with as specified in sub-section (2)\n\n(2) in a case where sub-section (I) applies;\n\n(a) if the petitions are presented to the same district E court, both the petitions shall be tried and heard together by that Court :\n\n(b) if the petitions are presented to differeut district courts, the petition presented later shall be transferred to the district court in which the; earlier petition was presented and both the petitions shall be heard and disposed of together by the district court in which the earlier petition was presented.\n\n(3) In a case where clause (b) of sub-section (2) applies, the G court or the Government as the case may .be, competent under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to transfer any suit or proceeding from the district court in which the later petition has been presented to the district court in which the earlier petition is pending, shall exercise its H powers to transfer such later petition as if it._had been empowered so to do under te said Code.\"\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent argues that in view of the provisions contained in S. 21, only the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to procedure which will regulate the proceedings instituted under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ill apply; and as S. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not appertaill to the domain of procedure and confers substantive right, the said section is not applicable and cannot be attracted. It is argued that this position is further made clear by the provisions contained in S. 2IA.\n\nIn my opinion, this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent husband is without any substance. I have earlier set out section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure and I have pointed out that an analysis of the section makes it abundantly clear that for the ends of justice, wide power and jurisdiction have been conferred on this Court in the matter of transfer of any suit, appeal or proceeding from any High Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any other State. A suit or a proceeding for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act in a Civil Court is necessarily a suit or proceeding and must on a plain reading of S. 25(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure be held to come under S. 25(1) of the Code, as the said section speaks of any suit, appeal or other proceeding. This Court must necessarily enjoy the power and jurisdiction under the said provisions of transferring such a suit or proceeding for the ends of justice, unless the power and jurisdiction of this Court are specifically taken away by any statute. If the jurisdiction clearly conferred on any Court has to be ousted, the exclusion of such jurisdiction must be made in clear and unequivocal terms. S. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not deal with the question of jurisdiction of any Court. As no procedure with regard to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act has been laid down in the said Act, S. 21 of the Act only provides that 'all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure.' S. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be construed to exclude the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under S. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It does not become necessary in the instant case to decide whether the provision in relation to jurisdiction of this Court contained in S. 25 of the\n\nCode of Civil Procedure is one of substantive law or it belongs to the domain of Procedure.\n\nEven if I accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that S. 25 does not form any . part of the procedural law and is a part of the substantive law, I am of the opinion that jurisdiction conferred on this Court by S. ZS of.\n\nG. VIJA YALAKSHMI V. G. RAMACHANDRA (A.N. Serl, J.) 233\n\nthe Code of Civil Procedure, is not in any way, affected by S. 21 of of the Hindu Marriage Act which, as I have already noted, only . provides that 'all proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.'\n\nS. 21 A of the Hindu Marriage Act, in my opinion, has indeed\n\nno bearing on the question of jurisdiction conferred on this Court B , under S. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nS. 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act makes provisions for transfer of petitions specified in the said section and for hearing and disposal of such petitions together by the District Court in which the earlier petition has been presented.\n\nSuch power bas been conferred on the Court or tbe Government.\n\nS. 21 A has no application to the case of transfer of any suit or proceeding from one State to another.\n\nAs I have earlier noted, very wide power and jurisdiction have been conferred on this Court in the interest of justice for transferring any appeal, suit or proceeding from one State to another under S. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, tbe petitioner bas applied for transfer of the suit pending in the District at Udaipur in tbe State of Rajastban to the appropriate Court at Eluru in the State of Andhra Pradesh. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this Court enjoys the power and jurisdiction to entertain this application under S. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S. 21 and S. 21 A of the\n\nHindu Marriage Act do not, in any way, exclude, affect or curtail the power conferred on this Court under S. 25 of the Code of Civil E Procedure. I may incidentally add that the present section 25 in , the Code of Civil Procedure came into force after S. 21 and 21A have been incorporated in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nPreliminary objection rejected.", "total_entities": 234, "entities": [{"text": "GUDA VIJAYALAKSHMI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GUDA VIJAYALAKSHMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUDA RAMCHANDRA SEKHARA SASTRY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GUDA RAMCHANDRA SEKHARA SASTRY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 13, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUDA VIJAYALAKSHMI\n\nGUDA RAMCHANDRA SEKHARA SASTRY\n\nMarch 13, 1981\n\n[ V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND AMRENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMRENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Transfer of proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214, "end_char": 224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act", "statute": "Transfer of proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 261, "end_char": 271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act", "statute": "Transfer of proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 272, "end_char": 277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 21 and 21A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 320, "end_char": 339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 677, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 697, "end_char": 721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "District Judge, Udaipur (Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28/1980) against the wife under section 13 , of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the court of the District Judge, Udaipur (Rajasthan)."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 824, "end_char": 834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 835, "end_char": 840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 885, "end_char": 892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the instant transfer petition filed under section 25 C.P.C.,\n\n1908, the wife sought to get the suit at Udaipur transferred to Eluru."}}, {"text": "Eluru", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 908, "end_char": 913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the instant transfer petition filed under section 25 C.P.C.,\n\n1908, the wife sought to get the suit at Udaipur transferred to Eluru."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 970, "end_char": 980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "sections 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1087, "end_char": 1111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1181, "end_char": 1194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A preliminary objection was raised to the effect that section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code, which gets excluded by reason of the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is not applicable to proceedings under the said Act and as such the Supreme Court has no power to transfer the husband's suit from Udaipur District Court, Udaipur (Rajasthan) to Eluru District Court, Eluru (A.P.)."}}, {"text": "District Court Udaipur (Rajasthan)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1492, "end_char": 1526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the preliminary objection, the Court\n\nHELD : Per curiam\n\nOn merits, it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit pending in the District Court Udaipur (Rajasthan) to the District Court at Eluru (Audhra Pradesh), where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose, the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.). ["}}, {"text": "District Court at Eluru (Audhra Pradesh)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the preliminary objection, the Court\n\nHELD : Per curiam\n\nOn merits, it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit pending in the District Court Udaipur (Rajasthan) to the District Court at Eluru (Audhra Pradesh), where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose, the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.). ["}}, {"text": "District Court at Eluru", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1719, "end_char": 1742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the preliminary objection, the Court\n\nHELD : Per curiam\n\nOn merits, it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit pending in the District Court Udaipur (Rajasthan) to the District Court at Eluru (Audhra Pradesh), where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose, the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.). ["}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1766, "end_char": 1777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 A-Bl\n\nPer Tulzapurkar J.\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2042, "end_char": 2051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2059, "end_char": 2077, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2173, "end_char": 2183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 23 to 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2354, "end_char": 2371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2606, "end_char": 2616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2617, "end_char": 2637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2663, "end_char": 2673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2681, "end_char": 2699, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2733, "end_char": 2743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2744, "end_char": 2749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2830, "end_char": 2835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3285, "end_char": 3295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 21A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3500, "end_char": 3511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3519, "end_char": 3543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3714, "end_char": 3724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 21A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3884, "end_char": 3895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3927, "end_char": 3937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3938, "end_char": 3943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "February 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 21A does not deal with the present section 25 C.P.C. which has been substituted by an amendment which has come into force with effect from February 1, 1977 (section 11 of the Amending Act 104, 1976)."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4049, "end_char": 4059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conferal of such wide and plenary power on the Supreme Court could not have been in contemplation of Parliament at the time of enactment of section 21 A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. ["}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4552, "end_char": 4576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amre11dra Nath Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4745, "end_char": 4763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Amre11dra Nath Sen, J.'\n\n...\n\nI. A plain reading of section 25 C.P.C. clearly indicates that very wide jurisdiction and powers have been conferred on the Supreme Court to transfer any suit, appeal or any other proceedings from a High Court or other Civil Court in any State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any other State for the ends of justice."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4797, "end_char": 4807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4808, "end_char": 4813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5206, "end_char": 5233, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 21 and 21A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5284, "end_char": 5302, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5399, "end_char": 5409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5440, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5674, "end_char": 5684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil 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"start_char": 6785, "end_char": 6809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6822, "end_char": 6832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "sections 21 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6855, "end_char": 6873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6883, "end_char": 6901, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 6998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7002, "end_char": 7029, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court of the Distt. Judge, Udaipur (Rajasthan)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36) pending in the Court of the Distt."}}, {"text": "G. S. Rama Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7264, "end_char": 7278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Rama Rao for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7300, "end_char": 7312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7376, "end_char": 7387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. On September 26, 1979, the petitioner (wife) filed a suit in Jonna pauperis seeking maintenance from the respondent (her husband) in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Eluru (Andhra Pradesh) being 0.", "canonical_name": "Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "Court of Subordinate Judge, Eluru (Andhra Pradesh)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7529, "end_char": 7579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. On September 26, 1979, the petitioner (wife) filed a suit in Jonna pauperis seeking maintenance from the respondent (her husband) in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Eluru (Andhra Pradesh) being 0."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7742, "end_char": 7747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the\n\nHindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7755, "end_char": 7779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7889, "end_char": 7894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "District Court at Eluru (A.P.)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8082, "end_char": 8112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On merits we are satisfied that it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.) where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District High Court at Eluru (A.P.) B\n\nHowever, counsel for the respondent (husband) has raised before us a preliminary objection that s. 25 of the C.P.C. under which the transfer petition has been made is not applicable to proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and as such this Court has no power to transfer the husband's suit from Udaipur District Court to the District Court at Eluru."}}, {"text": "District High Court at Eluru", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8255, "end_char": 8283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On merits we are satisfied that it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.) where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District High Court at Eluru (A.P.) B\n\nHowever, counsel for the respondent (husband) has raised before us a preliminary objection that s. 25 of the C.P.C. under which the transfer petition has been made is not applicable to proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and as such this Court has no power to transfer the husband's suit from Udaipur District Court to the District Court at Eluru."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8390, "end_char": 8395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8403, "end_char": 8408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8501, "end_char": 8525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Udaipur District Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On merits we are satisfied that it is expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the husband's suit to the District Court at Eluru (A.P.) where both the proceedings could be tried together and for that purpose the wife is agreeable to have her maintenance suit transferred to the District High Court at Eluru (A.P.) B\n\nHowever, counsel for the respondent (husband) has raised before us a preliminary objection that s. 25 of the C.P.C. under which the transfer petition has been made is not applicable to proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and as such this Court has no power to transfer the husband's suit from Udaipur District Court to the District Court at Eluru."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8667, "end_char": 8672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8676, "end_char": 8681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21 and 21A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8728, "end_char": 8741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8749, "end_char": 8772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8791, "end_char": 8796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act 1955"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8797, "end_char": 8802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8868, "end_char": 8873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8899, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9090, "end_char": 9095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9096, "end_char": 9101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9142, "end_char": 9147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9161, "end_char": 9179, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 24 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9255, "end_char": 9268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9269, "end_char": 9274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9324, "end_char": 9342, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9495, "end_char": 9501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A large number of authorities were referred to by counsel to substantiate his contention and general principles but in particular one decision of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Priyavari Mehta v. Priyanath Mehta(1) was pressed into service as having a direct bearing on the point."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9515, "end_char": 9532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A large number of authorities were referred to by counsel to substantiate his contention and general principles but in particular one decision of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Priyavari Mehta v. Priyanath Mehta(1) was pressed into service as having a direct bearing on the point."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9876, "end_char": 9881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9882, "end_char": 9887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9914, "end_char": 9919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9927, "end_char": 9951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9953, "end_char": 9963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9971, "end_char": 9989, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10196, "end_char": 10225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10237, "end_char": 10242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10324, "end_char": 10329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10876, "end_char": 10881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11158, "end_char": 11163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11625, "end_char": 11643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11870, "end_char": 11876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12059, "end_char": 12088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12520, "end_char": 12525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12581, "end_char": 12586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12623, "end_char": 12628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": 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VIJA YALAKSHMI V. G. RAMACHANDRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24516, "end_char": 24551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. VIJA YALAKSHMI V. G. RAMACHANDRA (A.N. Serl, J.) 233\n\nthe Code of Civil Procedure, is not in any way, affected by S. 21 of of the Hindu Marriage Act which, as I have already noted, only ."}}, {"text": "A.N. Serl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24553, "end_char": 24562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. VIJA YALAKSHMI V. G. RAMACHANDRA (A.N. 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{"document_id": "1981_3_22_28_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR\n\nCIVIL LINES, NAGPUR & ANR. v.\n\nRAMCHANDRA S/O GURUNATH MODAK & ORS.\n\nFebruary 26, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nV.B. ERADI, JJ.]\n\nCity of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948-Section 59{3)(b)-Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority to suspend municipal officers and servants, pending a .departmental inqulry-Words and phrases \"control\" and \"vests'.',\n\nexplained'-Criminal cases to be disposed off to protect. the accused from harassment.:_Departmental inquiry, whether. can be continued after acquittai In 'a criminal case.\n\nDuring the construction of a stadium called the Yeshwant Stadium, which was being looked ; ifter by the respondents, two accidents occurred resulting in the death of seven persons and i11jur1ies. to eight persons. Pending a departmental inquiry!fn the said connection, an order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on the 23rd of September, 1974 which was confirllied by. the eorporation by its order of the same date. According to the respondents the later orde.r was not communicated to them. Pursuant.to a criminal complaint filed before)t, the police filed a charge-sheet under section 304-A Penal Code against the respondents on the 25th of September, 1976. In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13-1-1917 with effect from 8-10-76~ The respondents filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the 20th of July, 1977. Thereafter the respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court which allowed the petition taking the view that under the rules and byelaws of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, as amended upto date, the competent authority to pass orders of suspension against the respondents was the Corporation itself and not the Chief Executive Officer.\n\nThe High Court quashed the orders of suspension and directed the reinstatement of the respondents and payment of their full salary to them. Hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1:1. Clause (b) of Section 59(3) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 194$ in express terms authorises and clothes the Municipal Conunisioner with the power to exercise supervision and control over the acts of Municipal Officers and servants and hence he is fully competent to suspend the Municipal Officers and servants, pending a departmental inquiry. [24 H-25A; 26 Fl\n\n1 : 2. The term \"control\" is of a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned.\n\nClause (b) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act is preceded by the Words \"vests in the commissioner\".\n\nWhen the words \"control\" and \"vests\" are read together they are strong terms\n\nfy_\n\n--f-\n\n' ----..\n\nwhich convey an absolute control in the authority in order to effectuate the A policy underlying the rules and makes the authority concerned the sole custodian of the servants and officers of the Municipal Corporation. (28 E, 25 A-B]\n\nState of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, (1966] 1 SCR 771 ; High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. V. V.S. Krishnamurthy and Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 26, followed.\n\n2. Whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against its servants, if he is acquitted in the criminal case, would have to continue is a matter to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered. However, whether it is really worthwhile to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal after the ;_lapse of number of years since the departmental inquiry has started is a relevant factor to be considered.\n\n(27 C-E]\n\nObservation : Criminal cases should be disposed off as quickly as possible so as to protect the accused from unnecessary harassment. (27 A] D\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 396 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3.10. 1979 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civil Application No. 1501 of 1977 ..\n\nG.S. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashri Wad and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellants.\n\nP.V. Holay, T.G. Narayanan Nair, M.S. Gupta and G.S. Sathe for Respondent No. 1 & 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay of 2/3rd October, 1979 by which an order passed suspending the two respondents was quashed on the ground that the order of supension pending a departmental inquiry was passed by the Municipal Commissioner who was not competent to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry.\n\nThe High Court was of the view that under the Rules and Bye-laws of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948(her einafter referred to as the 'Act') as amended upto-date, the competent authority to pass orders of suspension against the respondents was the corpora tion itself and not the Chief Executive Officer. It appears that originally the order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on the 23rd September, 1974 which was confirmed by the Corporation by its order dated 23rd September, 1974. It is alleged by the respondents that latter order was not communicated to them. The suspension was ordered in connection with a departmental inquiry relating to two accidents which occurred during the construction of a stadium called the Yeshwant Stadium, which was being looked after by the respondents and which resulted in the death of seven persons and injuries to eight others. A complaint was also filed before the police as a result of which a charge-sheet under s. 304~A l.P.C. was filed against the respondents, on the 25th September, 1976. In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13,1.77 with effect from 8.10.76. The respondents filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the 20th July, 1977. Thereafter, the respondents filed a writJfpetitlon in the High Court which allowed the petition and quashed the order of suspension and directed the respendents to be paid theirj_full salary and further directed the re-instatement of the respondents. Hence this appeal.\n\nThe short poirit taken by Mr. Sanghi was that under s. 59 (3) of the Act, the Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry. On a perusal of s. 59 (3) we are of the opinion that the contention is wellfounded and must prevail. Section 59 (3) may be extracted thus :\n\n\"Section 59 (3). : Subject, whenever it is in this Act expressly so directed to the approval or sanction of the Corporation or of the Standing Committee, and subject also to all other restrictions, limitations and conditions imposed by this Act, the entire executive power for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act vests in the Commissioner who shall also-\n\n(a) ......\n\n(b) exercise supervision and control over the acts and proc, eedings of all municipal officers and servants and subject to the rules or bye-laws for the time being in force, dispose of all questions relating to the services of tne said officers and servants and their pay, privileges and allowances. \"(Emphasis\n\nours)'' H Thus clause (b)'. of s. 59(3) in express terms authorises and clothes the Municipal Commissioner with the power to exercise supervision\n\nI' '\n\n' --., ,\n\nand control over the acts of Municipal officers and servants. It may be noticed that the said clause (b) is preceded by the words 'vest in the Commissioner'. When the wotds 'control' and 'vests' are read together they are strong tenns which convey an absolute control in the authority in order to effectuate the policy underlying the rules and makes the authority concerned the sole custodian of the control of the servants and officers of the Municipal Corporation. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi(1) while\n\ninterpeting a similar language employed in Art. 235 of the Constitution of India which confers con.trol by the High Court over District\n\ncourts, this Coµrt heid that the word 'control' \\VOUld include the power to takedisciplinary action and all other incidental 'or consequential steps . to effectuate this end and made the following observations : ···\n\n, .·- ''The word \"control;', as we have seen, was used for the first time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the word\n\n''vest\" which is a stroi\\g wore!. It shows that the High Court is made the sole cusfodian: <;>f the control overtheju\\ficiary.\n\nControl, therefore, is not merely .. the p()Wer to arrange the day to day working of the court' but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over th.e presiding Judge,\"\n\n\"In our Judgment, the control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject onlyto the power of the Governor in the matter of appoiniment (illcltiding dismissal and removal) and ' posting and promotion of District Jdges.\n\nWithin the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal.\"\n\nThis view was reiterated in High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v.\n\nV. V.S. Krishnamurhty & Ors.(') where this Court Clearly held that. 'control' included the passing of an order of suspension and that the power of control was comprehensive and effective in opb'ration~ lit this connection, Sarkaria, J. speaking for th~ Couit,1, observed as follows:,- ., ' ' ' .1 '' \" \"The interpretation and scope of , Artic1<1i23~ , J1as been the subject of several decisions of this Court. .. The position\n\n(l) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 771. . , (2) [1979] lS.C.R. 26.\n\n: --.·\n\ncrystallised by these decisions is that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court under Article 235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation.\n\nIt comprehends a wide variety of matters.\n\nAmong others, it includes:\n\n(a) (i) Disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank of District Judges, and intitial posting and promotion to the cadre of District Judges. In the exercise of this control, the High Court can hold inquiries against a member of the subordinate judiciary, impose punishment other than dismissal or removal.. ....\n\n(ii) In Article 235,. the word 'control' is accompanied by the word \"vest\" which shows that the High Court alone is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. The control vested in the High Court, being exclusive, and not dual, an inquiry into the conduct of a member of judiciary can be held by the High Court alone and no other authority ..... .\n\n(iii) Suspension from service of a member of the Judiciary, with a view to hold a disciplinary inquiry.\"\n\nIt is thus now settled by this Court that the term 'control' is of a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve the powers 'vested\"in the authority concerned. In the aforesaid case, suspension from service pending a disciplinary inquiry has clearly been held to fall within the ambit of the word 'control'. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, the plain language of clause (b) of s. 39 (3), as extracted above, irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the Municipal Commissioner was fully competent to suspend the respondents pen ding a departmental inquiry and hence the order of suspension passed against the respondents by the Municipal Commissioner did not suffer from any legal infirmity. The High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the order of suspension passed by the Municipal Commissioner was without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter the order of the High Court cannot be maintained and has to be quashed.\n\nH We might, however, mention that although in the criminal case charge-sheet wa'.l submitted as far back as September, 1976 we\n\n' I\n\n• '\"('\n\n-.(\n\n' --.... ;\n\n<; ORPORATION OF NAGPUR v. RAMCHANDRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 27\n\nunderstand that no charges have been framed so far.\n\nCriminal cases should be disposed of as quickly as possible so as to protect the accused from unnecessary harassment. We therefore direct the Judicial Magistrage First Class of Nagpur to dispose of the Criminal Case No. 1902 of 1976 pending in his file with the utmost expedition and if possible withi~ six months from today. Mr. Sanghi\n\non behalf of the Municipality, states that he will fully cooperate. with the prosecution in producing all the available evidence before the court and bringing the case to a final conclusion within the period mentioned above.\n\nThe other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court.\n\nNormally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the clepartmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered.\n\nHowever, as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started the authority concerned will taken into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worth while to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. If, h0wever, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted. we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry.\n\nMr. Sanghi states that if it is decided to continue the inquiry, as only arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed, he will see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the date of the decision of the criminal court. If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequenses under the rules will automatically follow.\n\nWe might mention that at the time when special leave was granted by this Court, it was ordered that the respondents should\n\nbe paid a lump-sum of Rs. 10,000/- each apart from the 75% allowance. We think that in the interest of justice the department H may not insist on the refund of the amout of Rs. 10,000/- until the\n\nresult of .the departmental inquiry and if the departmental inquiry concludes in their favour, the amount will be either refunded or adjusted against their dues.\n\nWith these observations, the. appeal is accepted and thejudg ment of the High Court is quashed'. Parties will bear their own B costs throughout.\n\n'•\"\\_\n\n' .\n\nS.R.\n\n--· ,, ,-, i.:\n\n. ...\n\n. ~. • . , l ..\n\n. , .\n\nAppeal allowed,\n\n. '': .\n\n. •, ''", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR\n\nCIVIL LINES, NAGPUR & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR CIVIL LINES, NAGPUR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRA S/O GURUNATH MODAK & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA S/O GURUNATH MODAK & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 26, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 26, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nV.B. ERADI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.B. ERADI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "23rd of September, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending a departmental inquiry!fn the said connection, an order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on the 23rd of September, 1974 which was confirllied by."}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1181, "end_char": 1192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1195, "end_char": 1205, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "25th of September, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1237, "end_char": 1260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant.to a criminal complaint filed before)t, the police filed a charge-sheet under section 304-A Penal Code against the respondents on the 25th of September, 1976."}}, {"text": "13-1-1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1385, "end_char": 1394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13-1-1917 with effect from 8-10-76~ The respondents filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the 20th of July, 1977."}}, {"text": "8-10-76~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1412, "end_char": 1420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13-1-1917 with effect from 8-10-76~ The respondents filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the 20th of July, 1977."}}, {"text": "20th of July, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1516, "end_char": 1534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13-1-1917 with effect from 8-10-76~ The respondents filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the 20th of July, 1977."}}, {"text": "Section 59(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2122, "end_char": 2135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1966] 1 SCR 771", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3167, "end_char": 3183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1979] 1 SCR 26", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3259, "end_char": 3274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jayashri Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1501 of 1977 ..\n\nG.S. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashri Wad and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Urmila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1501 of 1977 ..\n\nG.S. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashri Wad and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P.V. Holay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.V. Holay, T.G. Narayanan Nair, M.S. Gupta and G.S. Sathe for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "T.G. Narayanan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4633, "end_char": 4652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.V. Holay, T.G. Narayanan Nair, M.S. Gupta and G.S. Sathe for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M.S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.V. Holay, T.G. Narayanan Nair, M.S. Gupta and G.S. Sathe for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "G.S. Sathe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4669, "end_char": 4679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.V. Holay, T.G. Narayanan Nair, M.S. Gupta and G.S. Sathe for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4751, "end_char": 4759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay of 2/3rd October, 1979 by which an order passed suspending the two respondents was quashed on the ground that the order of supension pending a departmental inquiry was passed by the Municipal Commissioner who was not competent to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "23rd September, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that originally the order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on the 23rd September, 1974 which was confirmed by the Corporation by its order dated 23rd September, 1974."}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court was of the view that under the Rules and Bye-laws of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948", "statute": "The High Court was of the view that under the Rules and Bye-laws of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "25th September, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6178, "end_char": 6198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A complaint was also filed before the police as a result of which a charge-sheet under s. 304~A l.P.C. was filed against the respondents, on the 25th September, 1976."}}, {"text": "13,1.77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6323, "end_char": 6330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13,1.77 with effect from 8.10.76."}}, {"text": "8.10.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6348, "end_char": 6355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13,1.77 with effect from 8.10.76."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6452, "end_char": 6467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the 20th July, 1977."}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6770, "end_char": 6776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short poirit taken by Mr. Sanghi was that under s. 59 (3) of the Act, the Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry."}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6792, "end_char": 6797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7069, "end_char": 7079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7798, "end_char": 7806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8511, "end_char": 8519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8527, "end_char": 8548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v.\n\nV. V.S. Krishnamurhty & Ors", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9665, "end_char": 9732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view was reiterated in High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Ors."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "control' included the passing of an order of suspension and that the power of control was comprehensive and effective in opb'ration~ lit this connection, Sarkaria, J. speaking for th~ Couit,1, observed as follows:,- ., ' ' '"}}, {"text": "[1966] 1 S.C.R. 771", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10136, "end_char": 10155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10307, "end_char": 10318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10902, "end_char": 10913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11826, "end_char": 11831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12581, "end_char": 12590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' --.... ;\n\n<; ORPORATION OF NAGPUR v. RAMCHANDRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 27\n\nunderstand that no charges have been framed so far.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_234_238_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "VISHUNDAS HUNDUMAL, ETC.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.\n\nMarch 13, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI, A.D. KOSHAL AND A.P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nMotor Vehicles Act, 1939~Scheme No. 50-M reserving notified routes for exclusive operation by the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation-Certain. operators'permits only were curtailed and they were prohibited fro•n operating their stage carriages on a portion of their routes which were overlapping with the notified route leaving 19 others untouched, through oversight-Whether such an action amounts to hostile discrimination.\n\nAllowing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : (I) Undoubtedly, the error or omission was on the part of the Regional Transport Authority in the instant case, in not supplying full information to the Special Secretary a bout all the valid permits in force at the relevant time and which were either to be curtailed or cancelled consequent upon the approval of the scheme. This error or omission on the part of the Regional Transport Authority has resulted in gross discrimination between the transport operators in the same class in that some have their permits remaining intact with right to ply their vehicles on the notified route and some others whose permits are curtailed. When discrimination is glaring the State cannot take recourse to inadvertance in its action resulting .in discrimination.\n\n[237 D-E &\n\n238 B-C]\n\n(2) Conceding that this was discrimination unconsciously indulged into by inadvertence or oversight on the part of a governmental agency, the error should be rectified. To. reject the whole scheme would be .destructive of a wholesome effort towards nationalisation of bus transport which is generally undertaken in public interest. In this case denial of equal protection, complained off flows from State action and has a direct impact on the fundamental rights of the petitioners: A constructive approach by removing the discrimination by putting the present petitioners in the same class as those who have enjoyed favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the Regional Transport Authority will meet the ends of justice. The benefit of this order would be available, if and only if, the petitioners have valid permits for operating stage carriage and if such permits are there, they would be without restriction for operating on that part of the route of each of the petitioners which overlaps with the notified route but it would be open to the Regional Transport Authority to impose corridor restrictions; so, however, that such restriction does not suffer from the defect of discrimination which is found to be constitutional. [238A-B-D, E-G]\n\nRamnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan; [1963] 2 S.C.R. 152, distinguished.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDJGTIQN Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos. 6150 & 7$39/79.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 15-1-79 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in C.W.C. No. I 5/79 and\n\nM.P. No. 12/79 respectively.\n\nAND\n\nWrit Petitions Nos.435, 763 & 813 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)\n\nG. L. Sanghi, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and M. K. Dua for the Petitioners.\n\nKameshwar Nath for the Respondent.\n\nS. K. Gambhir for the Respondent-(State)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. Petitioners in this group of petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and petitions for special leave to appeal were at the relevant time holders of stage carriage permits granted to them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ('Act' for short), and were operating stage carriages on the routes for which permits were granted. A Scheme No. 50-M was framed and publicised by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ('Corporation' for short), covering certain routes including (i) Rewa-Shahdol; and\n\n(ii) Satna-Ramnagar, which were to be reserved for exclusive operation by the Corporation. After objections were invited and heard, the scheme was finally approved and it came into force on January 20,\n\n1979. On the approved scheme coming into force part of the routes on which petitioners were operating overlapped with the notified routes. Consequently their permits were curtailed prohibiting them from operating their stage carriages on a portion of their routes which were overlapping with the notified route.\n\nThis action was challenged by filing writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Cons titution in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. A Division Bench of the High Court rejected all the petitions except one.\n\nHence some petitions for special leave and other writ petitions filed by the petitioners who are operators of the stage carriages and who are affected by the curtailment of their permits consequent upon the approved scheme coming into force.\n\nNumber of contentions were raised before the High Court, about the validity of the scheme, the procedure adopted while\n\nA approving the scheme, the opportunity to raise objections and the consideration of the objections.\n\nNone of them found favour with the High Court and the reasons which appealed to the High Court rejecting those contentions are so convincing that we adopt them and reject all those contentions.\n\nThe only contention that survives for our consideration is that while cancelling and/or curtailing certain permits for routes parts of which overlapped with the notified routes there were other permit holders in the same class having stage carriage permits for certain routes parts of which were overlapping with the notified route and yet in the case of petitioners their permits were curtailed prohibiting them from operating their stage carriages on that portion of the route for which they had permit which was overlapping with the notified route while others in all 19 who, though similarly situated, were favourably treated by neither curtailing nor cancelling their permits and were permitted to ply their stage carriages on the routes for which they had permits passing _ over a portion of the notified route without any let or hindrance.\n\nThe contention is that this is hostile discrimination by executive act without any valid criteria for picking and choosing and that the discrimination is so writ large on its face that the Corporation and the State Government did not try to justify the same before either the Special Secretary who heard the objections or the High Court and took convenient refuge under the plea of. unconscious and unintentional discrimination through oversight relying upon _Ramnath Verma v. State of R(, jasthan.(1) Those 19 operators who received a favourable ye:t unjustified treatment are listed at page 45 in Special Leave Petition\n\nNo. 6150/79.\n\nNeither the learned counsel for the Corporation nor Mr. Gambhir for the State of Madhya Pradesh attempted to justify classification amongst operators holding stage carriage permits and plying vehicles on routes part of which was overlapping with the notified route.\n\nBefore we examine what has been laid down by this Court in\n\nRamnth Verma's case (supra) it would be advantageous to recall how the Special Secretary appointed to hear objections and approve the scheme dealt with this contention of the petitioners. In paragraph 13 of his order he has observed as under :-\n\n\"It is clear from the evidence that certain permits which were valid on the date of the publication of the scheme were left out and have not been included in the scheme'\n\n\nwhich was published under section 68-C. The question to be considered is whether the permits have been left out by the Corporation consciously and whether this is an act of conscious discrimination. And also if it is conscious discrimination, what will be its effect. The law relating to left out permits has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan\".\n\nAfter referring to the facts in Ramnuth Verma' s case (supra), he held that error or omission was on the part of the Regional Transport Authority in not supplying particulars of all those permits which were valid, and which were either to be curtailed or cancelled consequent upon the approved scheme coming into force and on this account the Corporation cannot suffer and the whole scheme cannot be struck down.\n\nFor almost identical reasons the High Court has negatived this contention.\n\nUndoubtedly, the error or omission was on the part of the Regional Transport Authority in not supplying full information to the Special Secretary about all the valid permits in force at the relevant time and which were either to be curtailed or cancelled consequent upon the approval of scheme.\n\nThis error or omisson on the part of the Regional Transport Authority has resulted in gross discrimination between the transport operators in the same class in that some have their permits remaining intact with right to ply their vehicles on the notified route and some others whose permits are curtailed.\n\nThat this is discrimination between persons in the same class does not call for any discussion. Maybe, the discrimination may arise out of error or omission on the part of a governmental agency but the question is : Can it be overlooked on that account? Ramnath\n\nVerma' s case (supra) cannot help the respondents in this behelf because a Constitution Bench of this Court held in that case that d\\scrimination under Art. 14 is conscious discrimination and not accidental discrimination that arises from oversight which the State is ready to rectify.\n\nWe did not find any willingness on the part of the State authorities to rectify the error either in the High Court or before this Court. There was some vague suggestion of another scheme which was under examination which may ultimately result in rectification of this discrimination.\n\nNo concrete or adequate information was laid before the Court as to whether that scheme is pending and how Jong would it take to reach its final destination. And further, there is no guarantee that it will be approved We, however, take note of a submission by Mr. Gambhir, learned\n\nA counsel for the State Government that the said scheme would be finalised wihin a period of six months.\n\nConceding that this was discrimination unconsciously indulged into by inadvertence or oversight on the part of a governmental agency, by this order we only propose to rectify the same and not reject the whole scheme.\n\nSuch an approach would be destructive of a wholesome effort towards nationalisation of bus transport which is generally undertaken in puclic interest.\n\nWhen discrimination is glaring the State cannot take recourse to inadvertence in its action resulting in discrimination.\n\nThe approach is, what is the impact of State action on the fundamental rights of citizen.\n\nIn this case denial of equal protection is com plained of.\n\nAnd this denial of equal protection flows from State action and has a direct impact on the fundamental rights of the petitioners.\n\nWe, therefore, propose to take a constructive approach by remov; ng the discrimination by putting the present petitioners in the same class as those who have enjoyed favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the Regional Transport Authority.\n\nAccordingly we hereby direct that order/conditions in permits curtailing the permits of the petitioners prohibiting them from passing over the overlapping portion of their route with the notified route be quashed and declared to be of no consequence till all the operators including those excluded similarly situated are similarly treated.\n\nBefore concluding it may be noticed that we were told that the petitioners' permits have expired.\n\nThis order is not to be interpreted. or used for even remotely or indirectly suggesting that under the effect of this order or as a result of this order petitioners are entitled to renewal of their permits. The benefit of the order hereinabove made would be available, if and only if, the petitioners have valid permits for operating stage carriages and if such permits are there, they would be without restriction for operating on that part of the route of each of the petitioners which overlaps with the notified route but it would be open to the Regional Transport Authority to impose corridor restrictions.\n\nSP, however, that such restriction does not suffer from tJ-.e defect of discrimination which we have held by this judgment to be unconstitutional.\n\nOrder accordingly.\n\nWe allow the special leave petitions and the writ petitions to the extent hereinabove indicated with no crder H as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions cllowed", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "VISHUNDAS HUNDUMAL, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHUNDAS HUNDUMAL, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 13, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 13, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI, A.D. KOSHAL AND A.P. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1963] 2 S.C.R. 152", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2665, "end_char": 2684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 2999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and M. K. Dua for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3037, "end_char": 3048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and M. K. Dua for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "P. N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3050, "end_char": 3060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and M. K. Dua for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "M. K. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and M. K. Dua for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Kameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3097, "end_char": 3111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kameshwar Nath for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir for the Respondent-(State)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. Petitioners in this group of petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and petitions for special leave to appeal were at the relevant time holders of stage carriage permits granted to them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ('Act' for short), and were operating stage carriages on the routes for which permits were granted."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3219, "end_char": 3224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir for the Respondent-(State)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. Petitioners in this group of petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and petitions for special leave to appeal were at the relevant time holders of stage carriage permits granted to them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ('Act' for short), and were operating stage carriages on the routes for which permits were granted."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3274, "end_char": 3284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3433, "end_char": 3451, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3609, "end_char": 3656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50-M was framed and publicised by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ('Corporation' for short), covering certain routes including (i) Rewa-Shahdol; and\n\n(ii) Satna-Ramnagar, which were to be reserved for exclusive operation by the Corporation."}}, {"text": "Rewa-Shahdol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50-M was framed and publicised by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ('Corporation' for short), covering certain routes including (i) Rewa-Shahdol; and\n\n(ii) Satna-Ramnagar, which were to be reserved for exclusive operation by the Corporation."}}, {"text": "Satna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50-M was framed and publicised by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ('Corporation' for short), covering certain routes including (i) Rewa-Shahdol; and\n\n(ii) Satna-Ramnagar, which were to be reserved for exclusive operation by the Corporation."}}, {"text": "Ramnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3752, "end_char": 3760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50-M was framed and publicised by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ('Corporation' for short), covering certain routes including (i) Rewa-Shahdol; and\n\n(ii) Satna-Ramnagar, which were to be reserved for exclusive operation by the Corporation."}}, {"text": "January 20,\n\n1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3931, "end_char": 3948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After objections were invited and heard, the scheme was finally approved and it came into force on January 20,\n\n1979."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Cons titution in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur."}}, {"text": "Gambhir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6670, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither the learned counsel for the Corporation nor Mr. Gambhir for the State of Madhya Pradesh attempted to justify classification amongst operators holding stage carriage permits and plying vehicles on routes part of which was overlapping with the notified route."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6686, "end_char": 6709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither the learned counsel for the Corporation nor Mr. Gambhir for the State of Madhya Pradesh attempted to justify classification amongst operators holding stage carriage permits and plying vehicles on routes part of which was overlapping with the notified route."}}, {"text": "Ramnth Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we examine what has been laid down by this Court in\n\nRamnth Verma's case (supra) it would be advantageous to recall how the Special Secretary appointed to hear objections and approve the scheme dealt with this contention of the petitioners.", "canonical_name": "Ramnuth Verma"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7385, "end_char": 7395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law relating to left out permits has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan\"."}}, {"text": "Ramnuth Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7778, "end_char": 7791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to the facts in Ramnuth Verma' s case (supra), he held that error or omission was on the part of the Regional Transport Authority in not supplying particulars of all those permits which were valid, and which were either to be curtailed or cancelled consequent upon the approved scheme coming into force and on this account the Corporation cannot suffer and the whole scheme cannot be struck down.", "canonical_name": "Ramnuth Verma"}}, {"text": "Ramnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9093, "end_char": 9100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramnath\n\nVerma' s case (supra) cannot help the respondents in this behelf because a Constitution Bench of this Court held in that case that d\\scrimination under Art."}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9102, "end_char": 9107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramnath\n\nVerma' s case (supra) cannot help the respondents in this behelf because a Constitution Bench of this Court held in that case that d\\scrimination under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9254, "end_char": 9261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_239_258_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "KU. SONIA BHATIA\n\nSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.\n\nMarch 17, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nV. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960-Section 5(6)-Scope of-Gift of property for love and affection--!! could be said to be a transfer for consideration.\n\nWords and phrases-\"Consideration.''-'Adequate''-\"Gift\"-\"Transfer\"- Meaning of.\n\nInterpretation-Words of everyday use-How interpreted.\n\nSub-section 6 of section 5 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D ings Act, 1960 as it stood at the relevant time provided that in determining the ceiling area any transfer of land made after January, 24, 1971 should be ignored and not taken into account. Clause (b) of the proviso to sub:section 6 which carves out an exception states that . the sub-section shall not apply to a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration under an irrevocable instrument. Explanation II to this proviso places the burden of proof that a case fell within clause {b) of the E proviso is on the party claming its benefit.\n\nOn January 28, 1972 the donor gifted away certain lands in favour of his grand-daughter, the appellant, daughter of a pre-deceased son.\n\nThe gift having been made after the prescribed date, the Prescribed Authority ignored the gift for purposes of section 5 {6) of the Act.\n\nF. ·\n\nOn appeal, the District Judge gave a finding in favour of the appellant holding t.hat the gift was bona fide having regard to the circumstances in which it was made and that it could not b~ held invalid merely because it was.executed after the due date of January 24, 197 J.\n\nPurporting to follow one of its earlier decisions, the High Court held that a gift not being a transfer for consideration, had to be ignored under the provisi.ons of the Act and that a gift being a gratuitous transfer made out of love and affection fell outside the purview of clause (b) of the proviso.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it was contended that a gift could not be said to be a transfer witbaut consideration because even love and affection may\n\nA provide sufficient consideration and hence the condition regarding adequate consideration would not apply to a gift.\n\nDismissing the appeal\n\nHELD : It is a well settled rule of construction of statutes that where the definition of a word has not been given in an enactment it must be construed in its popular sense if it is a word of every day use, that is, the sense in which people conversant with the subject-matter wiih which it deals would attribute to it.\n\nSimilarly if the language used is clear and explicit, the provision cannot be reduced tg a nullity by reading into it a meaning which it does not carry.\n\n[246B]\n\nIn the instant case therefore, the word \"transfer\" being a term of wellknown legal significance with well ascertained incidents the legislature did not consider it necessary to define it separately. It is used in the sense in which it is used in the Transfer of Property Act. [245 G]\n\nC.I.T., Andhra Pra.iesh v. M(s. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderahad [1972) t.\n\nS.C.R. 168 and Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth and Anr. [19fs] 1\n\nS.C.R. 423 applied.\n\nD Keats v. Lewis [1911) A.C. 641 referred to.\n\nA conspectus of the meaning of the term \"gift\" is that it is a transfer which does not contain an element of consideration in any shape or form.\n\nWhere in respect of a gift there is a benefit measurable in terms of money the transaction ceases to be a gift and assumes a different colour. Yet another salient feature of a gift is that love, affection and many other . factors may E constitute the motive for the gift and may enter into the intention of the donor making a gift, but none of these can be held to be legal consideration, as undestood by law. [251 G-H; 252F]\n\n\"Consideration\" means a reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit passed on by the promisor to the promi8ee or by the transferor to the transferee.\n\nWhen the term consideration is qualified by the word \"adequate\" it makes it F sufficient and valuable having regard to the facts, circumstances and necessities of the case. [251 Fl\n\nThe word \"transfer for adequate consideration\" used in clause (b) of the proviso excludes a transaction, which is in the nature of a gift and which is without consideration. [252 E]\n\nThe argument that if the legislature intended to exclude gifts clause (b) of the pr.oviso would have expressly said so and by not excluding it must be deemed to have included a gift is without force particularly .in the face of the clear and unambiguous language of the proviso. Every legislature has its own technical device to express its inlendment. Express exclusion is not the only method of conveying the legislative intent there may be other methods or devices by which a legislature expresses its intent; namely, by using expressions, which would exclude a particular transaction by necessary intendment. This is what is done in enacting clause (b) of the proviso. [252 G-H]\n\nThe legislature has made its intention clear that a gift is excluded by A qualifying the word \"consideration\" with the adjective \"adequate\". [252 H]\n\nBy using the word \"adequate\" to qualify the word 'consideration\" the legislature has ruled out gifts from the ambit of clause (b) of the pro viso.\n\n[253 CJ\n\nThe words \"adequate consideration\" Clearly postulate that consideration must be capable of being measured in terms of money, having regard to the market price of the property, the value that it may fetch if sold, the value of similar lands situate in the vicinity and so on. [253 BJ\n\nThe argument that since in the case of a gift there is no question of consideration, the words for \"adequate consideration\" in the 3rd part of clause (b) of the proviso are inapplicable and should, therefore, be ignored is opposed to the C well known rule of interpretation that Courts, while interpreting statutes, must not legislate. A legislature does not use words without any intention and every word used by the legislature must be given its due import.\n\nThe intention of the legislature in using the words \"adequate consideration\" is to exclude any transaction which is not for adequate onsideration. Even if a sale is bona fide if to but consideration is inadequate, the transaction would fall beyond the protection of clause (b) of the proviso. [253 E-F]\n\n~ D\n\nDebi Saran Koiri and Anr. v. Nandlal Chaubey and Ors. A.I.R. 1929 Patna 591 and Kulasekaraperumal v. Pathakutty Thalevanar and Ors.\n\nA.LR. 1961 Madras 405 approved,\n\nThe words \"adequate consideration\" carry a well-known legal significance and, therefore, convey the same meaning and import in whichever statute they are used unless a contrary intent ion appears from the language .employed by the legislature in a particular Act. [256 E-F]\n\nTulsidas Ki/achand v. The Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City I, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 351, referred to\n\nFateh Mohammed v. District Judge [Civil Writ Petition No. 915 of 1975, F decided on 10-7-78] overruled.\n\nAn explanation merely widens the scopo of the main section and is not meant to carve out a particular exception to the main section. The words admission, acknowledgment, relinquishment or declaration used in Explanation I, do not absolve the party concerned from proving that the transfer should be executed in good faith and for adequate consideration. [256 E-F] G\n\nHowever laudable the object of the donor in gifting the property to his grand-daughter (partictllarly in the circumstances of this case) may be and whatever hardship might ensue to the donee by applying the provision, the gift fails if it does not fulfil the other essential requirements of the section. The act was enacted to implement one of the Directives contained in Part IV of the Constitu- H tion and if in this process a few individuals suffer that cannot be helped, for, individual interests must yield to the larger interests of the community. [258 D-F]\n\nA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 775 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.78 of the High Court of Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 12602/77.\n\nS. N. Kacker and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.\n\n0. P. Rana and S. Dikshit for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated December 21, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the State of U.P. before the Court.\n\nThe case arose out of an order Pf!SSed by the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), as amended uptodate, by which the said Authority rejected the claim of the petitioners on D ,. the basis of a gift which had been executed by her grandfather by a registered document dated January 28, 1972. The Act was passed as far back as 1960 but by virtue of an amendment, being U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973, section 5 was introduced which placed a ceiling on any tenure holder to hold land in excess of the ceiling a:rea fixed under the Act. Section 5 contained various sub-sections but in the E instant case we are concerned only with sub-section (6) as also clause\n\n(b) of the proviso to the said sub-section. By another amendment, being U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975, which was given retrospeetive operation with effect from 8.6.1973 Explanation I, alongwith its sub clauses, was added to sub-section (6) of section 5.\n\nF The decision in the present case turns upon the interpretation of sub-section (6) of s. 5 and the proviso therein in order to determine the validity of the deed of gift said to have been executed by Chunni Lal Bhatiya, the grandfather of the petitioner Sonia and respondent No. 4 before the District Judge.\n\nG To begin with, we might like to state here that the facts of the case undoubtedly reveal that if the provisions of the said sub-section\n\n(6) were to apply it would work serious hardship to the petitioner but as we are concerned with interpretation of an important statute the mere fact that a correct interpretation may lead to hardship H would not be a valid consideration for distorting the language of the statutory provisions.\n\n'''T\n\nBefore we proceed to examine the relevant provisions, it may be necessary to give a resume of the facts of the case.\n\nChunni Lal Bhatiya had two sons, Sudesh and Mahesh and a daughter Smt.\n\nSarla, On 14.9.1%9 Chunni Lal executed a registered deed of gift in respect of 110 bighas in favour of his son, Sudesh. A month later, another deed of gift was executed in favour of his son, Sudhir. So . far as these two gifts are concerned, as they were made before the amendment of the Ceiling Act, their validity was beyond question and they are not the subject-matter of any dispute in the present case. On January 28, 1972 Chunni Lal executed a gift in respeet of 80\n\nbighas in favour of his grand-daughter, Sonia (daughter of Mahesh.) It appears that a serious misfortune had befallen Chunni Lal in that he lost his two sons, Sudesh and Mahesh, who were serving in the Air Force and died in two different air crashes. As Chunni Lal wanted to make sufficient provision for his grandsons and granddaughter, he executed the three gifts.\n\nThe gif, executed in favour .of Sonia is the subject-matter of the dispute in the instant case.\n\nThe Prescribed Authority held that as the gift was made after the due date, i.e. 24.1.1971, as prescribed by sub-section (6) of s. 5, the transfer would have to be ignored.\n\nAgainst the decision of the Prescribed Authority, the appellant filed an appeal before the District Judge being the Appellate Authority, and assailed the finding of the Prescribed Authority. The District Judge, after hearing the parties, came to a clear finding that the gift was a bona fide one having regard to the circumstances in which the transfer was made and merely because it was executed after the due date (24.1.1971) it could not be held to be invalid. Thereafter, the State of U.P. filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed following a Division Bench decision of its Court in Fat eh Mohammad v. District Judge(1) which had held that a deed of gift not being a transfer for consideration had to be ignored under the provisions of the Act. Hence, this appeal before us.\n\nThe finding of the District Judge that the gift was a bona fide one has not been challenged by Mr. Rana, appearing for the respondent, who however argued that the said gift itself was not covered by the Explanations laid down in the proviso to the said sub-section\n\n(6) of s. 5 of the Act.\n\nThus the only question for determination in the instant case is the legal effect of the prohibition contained in sub-section (6) and clause (b) of its proviso. In order to\n\n(I) Civil Writ Petition No. 915of1975 (deeided on 10.7.78)\n\nA understand the scope and ambit of sub-section (6) and its proviso, it may be necessary to extract the relevant portions of sub-section (6} and Explanations concerned :-\n\n\"6. In determining tne ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty- B fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer\n\nwould have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account :\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to:- C ~\n\n\"(b} a transfer approved to the satisfaction of the .,_\n\nprescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family.\n\nExplanation I-For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression transfer of land made after the twenty fourth day of January, 1971, includes:-\n\n(a) a declaration of a person as a co-tenure made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971 in a suit or proceeding irrespective of whether such suit or proceeding was pending on or was instituted after the twentyfourth day of January, 1971;\n\n(b) any admission, acknowledgement, relinquishment or declaration in favour of a person to the like effect, made in any other deed or instrument or in any other\n\nn1anner.\"\n\n\"Explanation II-The burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.\"\n\nThe substantive provision which is contained in sub-section\n\n(6) clearly provides that any transfer after the 24th of January 1971 would have to be ignored and not taken into account in determining H the surplus area.\n\nClause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (6} (hereinafter referred to as 'clause (b) of the proviso') however, carves out an exception to the general rule contained in sub-section (6) and\n\n--of-\n\nExplanation II places the burden of proving the fact, that the case falls within the protection of clause (b) of the proviso, on the party relying on the transfer and claiming its benefit.\n\nA careful analysis of clause (b) of the proviso would reveal that it requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a transfer can seek its protection:\n\n(I) that the transfer must be in good faith,\n\n(2) that it must be proved to be in good faith to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Auth9rity,\n\n(3) that it should be for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument, and\n\n(4) that it should not be in the nature of a benami transaction for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder or other members of his family.\n\nIt is manifest that if these conditions are satisfied and proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority then the burden which lies on the claimant under Explanation II would have been discharged and the transfer would not be ignored but would fall under the protective umbrella contained in clause (b) of the proviso. It may be noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has neither defined the word 'transfer' in any of the definitions of the Act nor has clarified it. The primary object of the Act is to prevent the tenure holders from evading the Law of Ceiling by making fictitious transfers even by registered documents either before or after the due date so as to evade the provisions of the Act and thus frustrate the very object and the sccial purpose for which the Act had been passed. In these circumstances, therefore, the word 'transfer' has obviously been used by the legislature in the general sense of the term as defined in the Transfer of Property Act, which is the statute that governs all transfers of movable or immovable properties.\n\nIn other words, the word 'transfer' being a term of well-known legal significance having well ascertained incidents, the legislature did not think it necessary to define the term 'transfer' separately.\n\nSimilarly, the word 'consideration' also being a term commonly used to denote contracts, sales and transactions, has been used in the same sense, that is to say, as defined by s. 2( d)\" of the Contract Act. .\n\nIt is well settled that whenever the the legislature uses certain H terms or expressions of well-known legal significance or connotation the courts must interpret them as used or understood in the popular\n\nA sense. In the case of C.I T. Andhra Pradesh v. M/s. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secundrabad(1) this Court while laying down guidelines for holding how a particular expression has been. defined, observed as follows:-\n\n\"Now it is well settled that where the definition of a B word has not been given, it must be construed in its popular sense if it is a word of every day use. Popular sense means \"that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it\". c\n\nLord Atkinson in Keats v. Lewis(2) observed as follows :\n\n\"Jn the construction of a statute it is, of course, at all times and under all circumstances permissible to have regard to the state of things existing at the time the statute was passed, and to the evils, which as appears from its provisions, it was designed to remedy. If the words are capable of one meaning alone then it must be adopted, but if they are susceptible of wider import, we have to pay regard to what the statute or the particular piece of legislation had in view.\"\n\nThese observations are fully applicable to the present Act which has for its object remedying the evil of evading the ceiling law by the large landholders by executing saledeeds or other instruments so as to escape the consequences of the law.\n\nJn Union of India v. Sanko/ Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr.(3) Chandrachud, J., as he then was, observed as follows :-\n\n\"The normal rule of interpretation is that the words used by the legislature are generally a safe guide to its intention. Lord Reid in Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang (1966 A.C. 182) observed that \"no principle of interpretation of statutes is more firmly settled than the rule that the Court must deduce the intention of Parliament from the words used in the Act.\" Applying such a rule, this Court observed in S. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam (AIR\n\n(2) [1972) I S.C.R. 168 H\n\n(I) [1911) A.C. 641.\n\n(3) [1978) I S.C.R. 423.\n\n1972 SC 2284 at 2290) that \"where the statute's meaning A is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated.\"\n\n\"But, if the provision is clear and explicit, it cannot be reduced to a nullity by reading into it a meaning which it B does not carry.\"\n\nAgainst this background we have now to consider the real intention of the words \"transfer for adequate consideration\" as used in clause (b) of the proviso. The High Court has held that although the deed of gift is a transfer but as it is a transfer without any consideration, therefore such a transfer does not fulfil one of the essential ingredients mentioned in clause (b) of the proviso, namely, that it should be for consideration. The High Court has further held that its view is reinforced by the word 'adequate' which qualifies the word 'consideration' which completely rules out a transfer in the nature of a gift. The High Court was of the view that a transfer of property by way of a gift being a purely gratuitous transfer made out of love and affection _ or for the spiritual benefit of the donor, falls completely beyond the ambit of clause\n\n(b) of the proviso and, therefore, has to be ignored under the provisions of the said sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act.\n\nMr. Kacker, appearing for the appellant, assailed the view taken by the High Court on the ground that the High Court has given a very restricted.meaning to the term 'transfer for adequate consideration' by limiting the import of the word 'consideration'.\n\nHe argued in the first place that a gift cannot be said to be a transfer without consideration because even love and affection, spiritual benetit or other factors of similar nature may provide sufficient consideration for the gift.\n\nSecondly, it was argued that even if a gift was a transfer without consideration and was intended to be excluded by clause (b) of the proviso, then there should have been an express indication of the same in the provisions of clause (b) of the proviso by expressly excluding gifts.\n\nAnother facet of this argument advanced before us by Mr. Kacker was that as gift has not been expressly excluded by clause (b) of the proviso, we should be persuaded to hold that the conditions regarding adequate consideration would . not apply to a gift as a gift, was a transfer without consideration and if other conditions were satisfied a gift would also fall within the purview of clause (b) of the proviso.\n\nWe have given our anxious consideration to the arguments put forward\n\nA by Mr. Kacker and although the arguments are extremely attractive yet we find ourselves unable to agree with the same.\n\nTo begin with, it may be necessary to dwell on the concept of gift as contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act and as defined in.various legal dictionaries and books. To start with, Black's Law B Dic:tionary (Fourth Edition) defines gift thus :-\n\n\"A voluntary transfer of personal property without consideration. A parting by owner with property without pecuniary consideration. A voluntary conveyance of land, or transfer of goods, from one person to another made gratuitously, and not upon any consideration of blood or money.\"\n\nA similar definition has been given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) where the anther defines gift thus:\n\n\"Something that is voluntarily transferred by one person to another without compensation: a voluntary transfer of real or personal property without any consideration or without a valuable consideration-distinguished from sale.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nVolume 18 of Words & Phrases (Permanent Edition) defines gift thus :\n\n\"A 'gift\" is a voluntary transfer of property without compensation or any considera1io11.\n\nA 'gift' means a voluntary transfer of property from one person to another without consideration or compensation.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nIn HalsburY's Laws of England (Third Edition-Volume 18) while detailing the nature and kinds of gift, the following statement is made:\n\n\"A gift inter vivas (a) may be defined shortly as the transfer of any property from one person to another gratuitously.\n\nGifts then, or grants, which are the eighth method of transferring personal property, are thus to be distinguished from each other, that gifts are always gratuit0us, grants are upon some consideration or equivalent.\"\n\nThus, according to Lord Halsbury's statement the essential distinction between a gift and a grant is that whereas a gift is absolutely gratuitous, grant is based on some consideration or equivalent.\n\nSimilarly in Volume 38 of Corpus Juris Secundum, it has been clearly stated that a gift is a transfer without consideration and in this connection while defining the nature and character of a gift the author states as follows :\n\n\"A gift is commonly defined as a voluntary transfer of property by one to another, without any consideration or compensation therefor.\n\nAny piece of property which is voluntarily transferred by one person to another without compensation or consideration.\n\nA gift is a gratuity, and an act of generosity, and not only does not require a consideration but there can be none; if there is a consideration for the transaction it is not a gift.\"\n\nIt is, therefore, clear from the statement made in this book that the concept of gift is diametrically opposed to the presence of any consideration or compensation.\n\nA gift has aptly been described as a gratuity and an act of generosity and stress has been laid on the fact that if there is any consideration then the transaction ceases to be a gift. Before closing this aspect of the matter we might also refer to the definition of consideration given in various books.\n\nBlack's Law Dictionary defines 'consideration' thus :\n\n\"Consideration\" is not to be confounded with motive.\n\nConsideration means something which is of value in the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff, either of benefit to the plaintiff or of detriment to the defendant\".\"\n\nThis is the view expressed in 2 Q.B. 851.\n\nSimilarly, at p.61 in the same volume, the words 'adequate consideration' have been defined thus:-\n\n\"One which is equal, or reasonably proportioned, to the value of that for which it is given.\n\nFair and reasonable under circumstances.\" (Emphasis ours)\n\nWebster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) defines, , consideration' thus:\n\n\"Something that is legally regarded as the equivalent H or return given or suffered by one for the act or. promise of another\"\n\nA And the word 'adequate' has been defined in the same volume at page 25 thus:\n\n\"Legally sufficient: such as is lawfully and reasonably sufficient\"\n\nB Similarly, in words and Phrases (Permanent Edition-volume 2) the word 'adequate' has been defined at p.545 thus:\n\n'Adequate' means fuily equal to requirments or occasions, commensurate, but in its primary and more popular significance nothing can be said to be 'adequate' which is not equal to what is required, suitable to the case or occasion, fully sufficient, proportionate, and satisfactory.\"\n\nAnd when used to qualify consideration, it has been defined thus : in the same volume at p.545:\n\n\"Fair consideration in money or money 's worth\" is consideration which under all circumstances is honest, reasonable, and free from suspicion, whether or not strictly 'adequate' or 'full'.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n'Adequate Consideration' has been further defined as follows in the same volume at p. 553 :-\n\n\"Adequate consideration\" generally is one which is a fair equivalent in value for benefit obtained ...... ,.. '\n\n'Adequate consideration' required in action for specific performance merely means that contract price must be substantially just and fair valuation under all circumstances.''\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nIn Volume 17 of Corpus Juris Secundum (p. 420-421 and 425) the import of 'consideration' has been described thus :-\n\n\"Various definitions of consideration are to be found in the textbooks and judicial opinfons.\n\nA sufficient one, as\n\n...\n\nstated in Corpus Juris and which has been quoted and A cited with approval is, \"a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment to the party to whom the promise is made ..... .\n\nAt common law every contract not under seal requires a consideration to support it, that is, as shown in the deli- B nition above, some benefit to the promisor, or some detriment to the promisee ......\n\nThere is a sufficient consideration for a promise if there is any benefit to the promisor or any detriment to the promisee ...... It may be laid down as a general rule, in accordance with the definition given above, that there is a sufficient consideration for a promise if there is any benefit to the promisor or any loss or detriment to the promisee.\"\n\nTl'e gist of the term 'consideration' and its legal significance has been clearly summed up in s. 2(d) of the Contract Act which defines 'consideration' thus : D\n\n' \"When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstrains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something,.such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.\" E\n\nFrom a conspectus, therefore, of the definitions contained in the dictionaries and the books regarding a gift or an adequate consideration, the inescapable conclusion that follows is that 'consideration' means a reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee.\n\nSimilarly, when the word' 'consideration' is qualified by the word 'adequate', it makes consideration stronger so as to make it sufficient and valuable having regard to the facts, circumstances and necessities of the case. It has also been seen from the discussions of the various authorities mentioned above that a gift is undoubtedly a transfer which does not contain any element of consideration in any shape or form.\n\nIn fact, where there is any equivalent or benefit measured in terms of money in respect of a gift the transaction ceases to be a gift and assumes a different colour. It has been rightly pointed out in one of the books referred to above that we should not try to confuse the motive or the purpose of making a gift with the consideration which is the subject matter of the gift.\n\nLove, affection, spiritual benefit and many other\n\nfactors may enter in the intention of the donor to make a gift but these filial considerations cannot be called or held to be legal considerations as understood by law. It is manifest, therefore, that the passing of monetary consideration is completely foreign to the concept of a gift having regard to the nature, character and the circumstances under which such a transfer takes place. Furthermore, when the legislature has used the word 'transfer' it at once invokes the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nUnder section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, gift is defined thus :\n\n\" 'Gift' is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.\n\nSuch acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving.\n\nIf the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.\"\n\nThus, s. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly postulates that a gift must have two essential characteristics-( l) that it must be made voluntarily, and (2) that it should be without consideration. This is apart from the other ingredients like acceptance, etc.\n\nAgainst the background of these facts and the undisputed position of law, the words, 'transfer for adequate consideration' used in clause (b) of the proviso clearly and expressly exclude a transaction which is in the nature of a gift and which is without consideration.\n\nLove and affection, etc., may be motive for making a gift but is not a consideration in the legal sense of the term. As regards the argument of Mr. Kacker that if the legislature intended to exclude gifts, clause (b) of the proviso should have expressly said so; the answer is very simple.\n\nEvery legislature bas its own technical or legal device to express its intendment. Some legislatures may have chosen to expressly exclude gift as Mr. Kacker says but that is not the only method of conveying the legislative intent. There may be other methods or devices by which the legislative intent can be expressed, namely, by using such expressions which would expressly or by necessary intendment exclude a particular transaction. This me'thod seems to have been adopted by the legislature in enacting clause (b) of the proviso. In fact, the legislature has made its intention clear that gift is excluded by qualifying the word 'consideration' by the adjective 'adequate'. Assuming that love and affection, spiritual benefit or similar other factors may amount. to a consideration for the gift, the word 'adequate' is wholly inapplicable to and inconsistent with the concept of a gift because it is impossible to measure love and affection, the sentiments or feelings of the donor by any standard yardstick or barometer. The words 'adequate consideration' clearly postulate that consideration must be capable of being measured in terms of money value having regard to the market price of the property, the value that it may fetch if sold, the value of similar lands situated in the vicinity, so on and so forth.\n\nIn the instant case, therefore, in our opinion, the legislature by using the word 'adequate' to qualify the word 'consideration' has completely ruled out and excluded gift from the ambit of clause (b) of the proviso. In these circumstances, therefore, the argument of Mr. Kacker that by not expressly excluding gift, clause (b) of the proviso includes gift cannot be accepted particularly in the face of the clear and unambiguous language used by clause (b) of the proviso in describing the nature of the transaction as one for adequate consideration.\n\nWe now deal with the second limb of the argument of Mr.\n\nKacker that as in the case of a gift there is no question of a consideration, we should hold that the 3rd part of clause (b) of the proviso which contains the words 'for adequate consideration' is inapplicable and ignore the same.\n\nThis argument is diametrically opposed to the well-known rule of interpretation that courts in interpreting statutes must not interpolate or legislate. It is well settled that a legislature does not waste words without any intention, and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance. In the instant case, the words !'adequate consideration' have undoubtedly a §weH recognised concept and, as indicated above, the intention was to exclude any transaction which is not for adequate consideration.\n\nNot to speak of a gift but even if a sale is found to be bona fide but the consideration is inadequate, for instance, where the property has been sold for a nominal price or below the market value, the transaction would fall beyond the protection given by clause\n\n(b) of the proviso. Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Kacker to a single Bench decision by Banerji, J, in Fateh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors(1) where the learned Judge had taken the view that the definition of a transfer given in clause (b) of the proviso included a gift because a gift also could not be said to be a transfer without consideration even though\n\n(!) [1977] 3 All. L.R. 690.\n\nconsideration may not be weighed in terms of money. The learned Judge in taking this view had obviously fallen into error of confusing what was the motive or the reason for the gift as being a legal consideration of it. It has already been pointed out that in considering the nature of a gift one should not confuse the motive, which may be love and affection, or spiritual benefit, with valuable consideration which has to be either in the shape of a money compensation or equivalent of the same.\n\nIt is true that in every gift the donor has a particular motive and objective or a reason to part with his property in favour of . the donee, the reason being, in some cases, love and affection where th~ gift is in favour of a relation or friend, or spiritual benefit in other cases but this will be the immediate motive for making the gift and cannot be regarded as a consideration for the gift because the very concept of gift is based on a purely gratuitous consideration. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Conrt in the case referred to above has rightly overruled the view of Banerji, J,, on this count.\n\nIn fact the matter has been considered by other High Courts who have consistently taken the view that a gift is a transfer without consideration, love and affection being only the motive for making the transfer. In Debi Saran Koiri & Anr. v. Nandalal Clnubey and Ors.(1) while elucidating the nature and character of a gift Sahay, J. made the following observations :\n\n\"Now, S. 122, T.P. Act defines \"gift\" as a transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made volnntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to anoiher, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.\"\n\n''To my mind consideration in S .. 122, T.P. Act, means valuable consideration and not consideration in the shape of conferring spiritual benefit to the donor. If valuable consideration be not the consideration referred to in S. 122, I fail to understand how any gift can be made without consideration at all. There must be some sort of consideration in every gift, for instance, a consideration of an expectation of spiritual or moral benefit or consideration of love and affection.\n\nSuch considerations are not considerations contemplated in S. 122.\n\nThe consideration there contrn1plated must be ; GJuable consideration, that is consideration either of money or of money's worth.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n(I) AIR 1929 Patna 591\n\nIn Kulasekaraperumal v. Pathakutty Thalevanar & Ors.(1) A Jagadisan, J. made the classic observations which may be extracted thus:-- ' A gift is essentially a gratuitous transfer.\n\nComplete absence of consideration marks the transfer as a gift and differentiates it from a grant.\"\n\nThe learned Judge has rightly pointed out that complete absence of consideration is the main hallmark which distinguishes a gift from a grant or for that matter other transactions which may\n\nb~ for valuable or adequate consideration.\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by Jagdisan' J. in Kulasekarapirumal's case (supra) and Sahay, J. in Debi Saran's case\n\n(supra) which correctly represent the character and nature of the gift as contemplated by law. Banerji, J. in Fat eh Singh' s case (supra) seems to have relied heavily on Explanation I of sub-section (6) of s. (5) of the Act which refers to a declaration of a tenure holder made in a suit or any admission, acknowledgement, relinquishment, etc., made in any other deed or instrument in order to reinforce his conclusion that clause (b) of the proviso did not exclude a gift. With due respect, here the learned Judge completely failed to appreciate the scope of clause (b) of the provisio and Explanation I.\n\nIt is well settled that an Explanation merely widens the scope of the main section and is not meant to carve out a particular exception to the contents of the main section. Thus, even if the words 'relinquishment, admission or declaration' are used in Explanation I, the use of such words do not absolve the party concerned from proving the essential ingredients laid down in clause (b) of the proviso, namely, -that the transfer should be executed in good faith and should be for adequate consideration.\n\nWhatever be the nature of the declaration, acknowledgement, relinquishment, adequacy of consideration has to be proved in any case.\n\nThus, in our view, the Division Bench was fully justified in overruling the view of Banerji, J. in regard to the interpretation of the Explanation also.\n\nFinally, we would like to mention that the matter is no longer res integra but is fully covered in principle by a decision of this Court in Tulstdas Kilachand v. The Commission-er of Income-tax, Bombay City !,(') where Hidayatullah J, speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It remains to consider whether there was a adequate consideration for the transfer. Reliance has been placed\n\n(I) A.LR. 1961 Madras 405.\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nonly upon love and affection.\n\nThe words \"adequate consideration\" denote consideration other than mere love and affection which, in the case of a wife, may be presumed.\n\nWhen the law insists that there should be \"adequate consideration\" and not \"good consideration\", it excludes mere love and affection.\n\nThey may be good consideration to support a contract, but adequate consideration to avoid tax is quite a different thing. To insist on the other meaning is really to say that consideration must only be looked for, when love and affection cease to exist.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nIt would thus, appear that this Court clearly held that the words 'adequate consideration' completely exclude the concept of love and affection and this decision appears to be on all fours with the facts of the present case.\n\nRealising this predicament Mr. Kacker submitted that the words 'adequate consideration' used in the Income Tax Act denote a different texture.\n\nMr. Kacker argued that it is not permissible to interpret or use an expression in one Act as having the same meaning in another Act which is of a different kind. Of course, there can be no dispute with this proposition but then the Act as also the Income Tax Act have both used the words 'adequate consideration' which, as we have already held, are terms of well-known legal significance having a well recognised popular sense and hence they. would convey the same meaning and import whenever used in other statutes unless a contrary intention appears from the language employed by the legislature in the statute.\n\nMoreover, the object of the Income Tax Act as also the present Act seems to te more or less identical.\n\nWhereas the object of the Income Tax Act in enacting s. 16(3)(b) which is extracted below, is to circumvent and prevent a growing tendency on the part of the assessees to avoid or reduce tax liability by means of settlements :\n\n\"16(3) ..... .\n\n(a)\n\n(b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both.\"\n\n---;·\n\nSONIA BHATIA v. u. P. STATE (Pazal Ali, J.) 257\n\nIn the instant case also the avowed object of sub-seetion ( 6) of section S of the Act is to prevent the large landholders from evading the ceiling Jaw by executing transfers, instruments or gifts so as to reduce their surplus area. Where the two statutes have a common and identical object then the legal terms used in one statute must be given the same meaning in the other. It cannot be said that the words 'adequate consideration' appearing in sub-section (6) of s. S of the Act do not take their colour from the context but are in conformity with the main object of the Act, to prevent evasion of the ceiling Jaw by large tenure holders in anticipation of the passing of the Ceiling Law.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, the argument of Mr. Kacker on this score must be rejected. We, therefore, hold that in view of the interpretation paced by this Court on the words 'adequate consideration' which fully applies to the present case and to the same language employed in sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act, a gift is not only impliedly but expressly excluded by the Act.\n\nIn the Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court D referred to above, after a consideration of a large number of authorities the following observations were made :\n\n\"The Legislature while.enacting the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, was alive to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the transfer of immovable property. The terms 'transfer', sale, 'mortgage' and 'lease' have not been defined in the Act.\n\nTherefore, these terms must have been used only in the sense in which they have been used in Transfer of Property Act. If the Legislature intended to use those terms in a different sense and with a different connotation, it would have defined those terms in the Act.\n\nBut that has not been done ...\n\nThe legislature, however, thought that there may be genuine and bona fide transfers for consideration. To protect such tenure holders and other transfers, proviso (b) to sub-section (6) of section S of the Act was enacted. It saved transfers for adequate consideration.\n\nGift is a gratuitous transfer and there is no consideration which obviously means valuable consideration. If transfer for love and affection is taken to be a transfer for consideration then the purpose of the Act would be\n\nSIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R\n\ncompletely defeated as the tenure holders would transfer their land by gift after 24th January J 971.\"\n\nWe fully endorse the observations made by the Division Bench which lay down the correct law on the subject and we overrule the decision of Banerji, J. in Fateh Singh's case (supra).\n\nLastly, it was urged by Mr: Kacker that this is an extremely hard case where the grand-father of the donee wanted to make a beneficial provision for his grand-daughter after having lost his two sons in the prime of their life due to air crash accidents while serving in the Air Force. It is true that the District Judge has come to a clear finding that the gift in question is bona fide and has been executed in good faith but as the gift does not fulfil the other\n\nI ingredients of the.section, namely, that it is not for adequate consideration, we are afraid, however laudable. the object of the donor may have been, the gift has to fail because the genuine attempt of the donor to benefit his granddaughter seems to have been thwarted by the intervention of sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act. This is undoubtedly a serious hardship hut it cannot be helped.\n\nWe must remember that the Act is a valuable piece of social legislation with the avowed object of ensuring equitable distribution of the land by taking away land from large tenure holders and distributing the same among landless tenants or using the same for public utility schemes which is in the larger interest of the community at large.\n\nThe Act seems to implement one of the most important constitutional directives contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India.\n\nIf in this process a few individuals suffer severe hardship that cannot be helped, for individual interests must yield to the larger interests of the community or the country as indeed every noble cause claims F its martyr.\n\nAs this was the only point raised before us, we find no merit J.f in the same.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we hold that the High Court was G right in allowing the writ petition in respect of the gift in question.\n\nThe appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissqd,", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "KU. SONIA BHATIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KU. SONIA BHATIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 17, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 17, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nV. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960-Section 5(6)-Scope of-Gift of property for love and affection--!!"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 436, "end_char": 445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960"}}, {"text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D ings Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 471, "end_char": 523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January, 24, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 635, "end_char": 652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section 6 of section 5 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D ings Act, 1960 as it stood at the relevant time provided that in determining the ceiling area any transfer of land made after January, 24, 1971 should be ignored and not taken into account."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 732, "end_char": 741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D ings Act, 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D ings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "January 28, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1122, "end_char": 1138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 28, 1972 the donor gifted away certain lands in favour of his grand-daughter, the appellant, daughter of a pre-deceased son."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1367, "end_char": 1376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D ings Act, 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D ings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "January 24, 197 J.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1656, "end_char": 1674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. ·\n\nOn appeal, the District Judge gave a finding in favour of the appellant holding t.hat the gift was bona fide having regard to the circumstances in which it was made and that it could not b~ held invalid merely because it was.executed after the due date of January 24, 197 J.\n\nPurporting to follow one of its earlier decisions, the High Court held that a gift not being a transfer for consideration, had to be ignored under the provisi.ons of the Act and that a gift being a gratuitous transfer made out of love and affection fell outside the purview of clause (b) of the proviso."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3008, "end_char": 3032, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 351", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6911, "end_char": 6930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10-7-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7029, "end_char": 7036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "915 of 1975, F decided on 10-7-78] overruled."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Prem Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8188, "end_char": 8201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8225, "end_char": 8232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and S. Dikshit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8237, "end_char": 8247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and S. Dikshit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8313, "end_char": 8321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated December 21, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the State of U.P. before the Court."}}, {"text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8991, "end_char": 9000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9125, "end_char": 9134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "8.6.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9404, "end_char": 9412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 of 1975, which was given retrospeetive operation with effect from 8.6.1973 Explanation I, alongwith its sub clauses, was added to sub-section (6) of section 5."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9487, "end_char": 9496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9586, "end_char": 9590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "statute": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Chunni Lal Bhatiya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9700, "end_char": 9718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F The decision in the present case turns upon the interpretation of sub-section (6) of s. 5 and the proviso therein in order to determine the validity of the deed of gift said to have been executed by Chunni Lal Bhatiya, the grandfather of the petitioner Sonia and respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Chunni Lal Bhatiya"}}, {"text": "Sonia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9754, "end_char": 9759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F The decision in the present case turns upon the interpretation of sub-section (6) of s. 5 and the proviso therein in order to determine the validity of the deed of gift said to have been executed by Chunni Lal Bhatiya, the grandfather of the petitioner Sonia and respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sudesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunni Lal Bhatiya had two sons, Sudesh and Mahesh and a daughter Smt."}}, {"text": "Mahesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10411, "end_char": 10417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunni Lal Bhatiya had two sons, Sudesh and Mahesh and a daughter Smt."}}, {"text": "Sarla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10439, "end_char": 10444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarla, On 14.9.1%9 Chunni Lal executed a registered deed of gift in respect of 110 bighas in favour of his son, Sudesh."}}, {"text": "14.9.1%9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10449, "end_char": 10457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarla, On 14.9.1%9 Chunni Lal executed a registered deed of gift in respect of 110 bighas in favour of his son, Sudesh."}}, {"text": "Chunni Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarla, On 14.9.1%9 Chunni Lal executed a registered deed of gift in respect of 110 bighas in favour of his son, Sudesh.", "canonical_name": "Chunni Lal Bhatiya"}}, {"text": "Sudhir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10630, "end_char": 10636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A month later, another deed of gift was executed in favour of his son, Sudhir."}}, {"text": "24.1.1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11458, "end_char": 11467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Prescribed Authority held that as the gift was made after the due date, i.e. 24.1.1971, as prescribed by sub-section (6) of s. 5, the transfer would have to be ignored."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12031, "end_char": 12044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the State of U.P. filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed following a Division Bench decision of its Court in Fat eh Mohammad v. District Judge(1) which had held that a deed of gift not being a transfer for consideration had to be ignored under the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12447, "end_char": 12451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The finding of the District Judge that the gift was a bona fide one has not been challenged by Mr. Rana, appearing for the respondent, who however argued that the said gift itself was not covered by the Explanations laid down in the proviso to the said sub-section\n\n(6) of s. 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12621, "end_char": 12625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10.7.78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12862, "end_char": 12869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "915of1975 (deeided on 10.7.78)\n\nA understand the scope and ambit of sub-section (6) and its proviso, it may be necessary to extract the relevant portions of sub-section (6} and Explanations concerned :-\n\n\"6."}}, {"text": "24th of January 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14481, "end_char": 14501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substantive provision which is contained in sub-section\n\n(6) clearly provides that any transfer after the 24th of January 1971 would have to be ignored and not taken into account in determining H the surplus area."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16478, "end_char": 16502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16968, "end_char": 16976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17721, "end_char": 17729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nLord Atkinson in Keats v. Lewis(2) observed as follows :\n\n\"Jn the construction of a statute it is, of course, at all times and under all circumstances permissible to have regard to the state of things existing at the time the statute was passed, and to the evils, which as appears from its provisions, it was designed to remedy."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18561, "end_char": 18572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Union of India v. Sanko/ Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr.(3) Chandrachud, J., as he then was, observed as follows :-\n\n\"The normal rule of interpretation is that the words used by the legislature are generally a safe guide to its intention."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18938, "end_char": 18948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Reid in Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang (1966 A.C. 182) observed that \"no principle of interpretation of statutes is more firmly settled than the rule that the Court must deduce the intention of Parliament from the words used in the Act.\""}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20356, "end_char": 20360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20378, "end_char": 20384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kacker, appearing for the appellant, assailed the view taken by the High Court on the ground that the High Court has given a very restricted.meaning to the term 'transfer for adequate consideration' by limiting the import of the word 'consideration'."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21843, "end_char": 21867, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "HalsburY", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22965, "end_char": 22973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis ours)\n\nIn HalsburY's Laws of England (Third Edition-Volume 18) while detailing the nature and kinds of gift, the following statement is made:\n\n\"A gift inter vivas (a) may be defined shortly as the transfer of any property from one person to another gratuitously.", "canonical_name": "HalsburY"}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23461, "end_char": 23469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, according to Lord Halsbury's statement the essential distinction between a gift and a grant is that whereas a gift is absolutely gratuitous, grant is based on some consideration or equivalent.", "canonical_name": "HalsburY"}}, {"text": "Webster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25354, "end_char": 25361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emphasis ours)\n\nWebster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) defines, , consideration' thus:\n\n\"Something that is legally regarded as the equivalent H or return given or suffered by one for the act or."}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27915, "end_char": 27922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29945, "end_char": 29969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29978, "end_char": 29989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29997, "end_char": 30021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30440, "end_char": 30446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30454, "end_char": 30478, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Banerji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34321, "end_char": 34328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Kacker to a single Bench decision by Banerji, J, in Fateh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors(1) where the learned Judge had taken the view that the definition of a transfer given in clause (b) of the proviso included a gift because a gift also could not be said to be a transfer without consideration even though\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Conrt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35631, "end_char": 35651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Conrt in the case referred to above has rightly overruled the view of Banerji, J,, on this count."}}, {"text": "Sahay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36069, "end_char": 36074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Nandalal Clnubey and Ors.(1) while elucidating the nature and character of a gift Sahay, J. made the following observations :\n\n\"Now, S. 122, T.P. Act defines \"gift\" as a transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made volnntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to anoiher, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.\""}}, {"text": "S. 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36120, "end_char": 36126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36594, "end_char": 36600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36912, "end_char": 36918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A Jagadisan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37154, "end_char": 37165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis supplied)\n\n(I) AIR 1929 Patna 591\n\nIn Kulasekaraperumal v. Pathakutty Thalevanar & Ors.(1) A Jagadisan, J. made the classic observations which may be extracted thus:-- ' A gift is essentially a gratuitous transfer."}}, {"text": "Jagdisan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37685, "end_char": 37693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by Jagdisan' J. in Kulasekarapirumal's case (supra) and Sahay, J. in Debi Saran's case\n\n(supra) which correctly represent the character and nature of the gift as contemplated by law."}}, {"text": "Kulasekarapirumal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37701, "end_char": 37718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by Jagdisan' J. in Kulasekarapirumal's case (supra) and Sahay, J. in Debi Saran's case\n\n(supra) which correctly represent the character and nature of the gift as contemplated by law."}}, {"text": "Debi Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37751, "end_char": 37761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by Jagdisan' J. in Kulasekarapirumal's case (supra) and Sahay, J. in Debi Saran's case\n\n(supra) which correctly represent the character and nature of the gift as contemplated by law."}}, {"text": "Fat eh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37880, "end_char": 37892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banerji, J. in Fat eh Singh' s case (supra) seems to have relied heavily on Explanation I of sub-section (6) of s. (5) of the Act which refers to a declaration of a tenure holder made in a suit or any admission, acknowledgement, relinquishment, etc.,", "canonical_name": "Fat eh Singh"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39390, "end_char": 39402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Hidayatullah J, speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It remains to consider whether there was a adequate consideration for the transfer."}}, {"text": "Whereas the object of the Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41303, "end_char": 41343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41356, "end_char": 41367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whereas the object of the Income Tax Act", "statute": "Whereas the object of the Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42846, "end_char": 42850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42966, "end_char": 42986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court D referred to above, after a consideration of a large number of authorities the following observations were made :\n\n\"The Legislature while.enacting the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, was alive to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the transfer of immovable property."}}, {"text": "Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43144, "end_char": 43186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43223, "end_char": 43247, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43476, "end_char": 43500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44177, "end_char": 44215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If transfer for love and affection is taken to be a transfer for consideration then the purpose of the Act would be\n\nSIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R\n\ncompletely defeated as the tenure holders would transfer their land by gift after 24th January J 971.\""}}, {"text": "24th January J 971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44299, "end_char": 44317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If transfer for love and affection is taken to be a transfer for consideration then the purpose of the Act would be\n\nSIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R\n\ncompletely defeated as the tenure holders would transfer their land by gift after 24th January J 971.\""}}, {"text": "Fateh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44475, "end_char": 44486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We fully endorse the observations made by the Division Bench which lay down the correct law on the subject and we overrule the decision of Banerji, J. in Fateh Singh's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Fat eh Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45284, "end_char": 45288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45815, "end_char": 45836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_259_267_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SURESH\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch 17, 1981\n\n( Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J. AND A.P. SEN, J.)\n\nSentence of death-Whether death sentence is called for has to be examined in each case with dispassionate care-Penal Code, section 302.\n\nEvidence-Trustworthiness of a witness, a child of five years, examined without administering oath by reason of his lack of understanding the sanctity of oath.\n\nConviction rested not on the evidence of sole eye-witness, a child of five years of age but other corroborative evidence.\n\nThe appellant, a starving youth was given shelter by a kindly couple by engaging him as a domestic servant. The reward of that kindness was the murder of the lady cf the house and her three year old son and causing serious injury to her five year old son. The appellant was, therefore, charged and convicted under sections 302 and 307 of the Penal Code and sentenced under section 307 to imprisonment and to death under section 302. The High Court confirmed the death sentence and hence the appeal after obtaining special leave of the Court.\n\nMaintaining the conviction under sections 302 and 307 I.P.C. and the sentence under the latter section, but modifying the death sentence under section 302\n\nto one of life imprisonment, the Court\n\nHELD : 1.\n\nAltering the sentence of the appellant to imprisonment for life for the offence under section 302 of the Penal Code, while maintaining the sentence under section 307 Penal Code-the two sentences to run concurrentlywill meet the ends of justice, in the instant case, under the following circumstances : [267 A-BJ\n\n(a) He was just about 21 years of age on the date of the offence and, very probably, a sudden impulse of sex or theft made him momentarily insensible.\n\n(b) The evidence of Sunil shows that immediately after the crime, he was found sitting in the chowk of the house crying bitterly. (c) Having achieved his purpose, he did not even try to run away, which he could easily have done since his injuries were not of such a nature as to incap8citate him from fleeing from an inevitable arrest. (d) Though he was not insane at the time of the offence in the sense that he did not know the nature and consequences of what he wao doing, still he was somewhat unhinged.\n\nHe was kept in a mental hospital from July 19, 1973 to Februnry 2, 1975 where he had shown aggressive symptoms and once even attacked another patient. (e) The basic evidence in this case is of a child of five who answered many vital questions with a nod of the head, one way\n\nA or the other. The extreme sentence cannot seek its main support from evidence of this kind which, even if true, is not safe enough to act upon for putting out a life. (f) Non-availability of the useful data on the question of sentence which the trial court proposed to pass due to the trial Judge's failure to ask the appellant what he had to say on the question of sentence and (g) '.the appellant has been in jail for ten Jong years and probably would have earned by now the right to be released, after taking into account the remissions admissible to him, were B he sentenced to life imprisonment. [265 E-H, 266A, C-D, G]\n\n2. The Trial Judge had a safe expedient in section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which he needlessly denied to himself on technical consideration that by reason of section 484(2) (a) of the Code section 235 (2) did not apply to trials which were pending on the date when the new Code came into force.\n\nThe Trial Judge ought to have questioned the appellant on the sentence, whether the letter of section 235(2) governed the matter or not. That would have furnished to the court useful data on the question of sentenee which it proposed to pass. In any case, the trial would not have been invalidated if the court were to apply the provisions of section 235 which were introduced into the Code, ex debitofusticiae. [266 D-F]\n\nA witness who, by reason of his immature understanding. was not administered oath and who was privileged, by reason of his years, not to make his answers in an intelligible and coherent manner is unsafe to be trusted wholesale. Children, in the first place, mix up what they see with what they like to imagine to have seen and besides, a little tutoring is inevitable in their case in order to lend coherence and consistency to their disputed thoughts which tend to stray. [266 A-B, CJ\n\nBut, in the instant case, there are unimpeachable and the most eloquent matters on the record which lend an unfailing assurance that Sunil is a witness of truth, not a witness of imagination as most children of that age are. [263H,264A]\n\nAn assessment of the following corroborative evidence, in the instant case, clearly indicate that it was the appellant who commited the murder of Geeta and her son Anil and caused injuries to Sunil : (a) the presence of the appellant proved by quite a large number of injuries dming the incident; (b) his conduct in not raising hue and cry at least after the robbers had made good their escape, if any at the time of the killing of the mistress of the house, but little while later, he quietly walked to a neighbour and trotted out the story that a few Badmashes intruded into the house and killed Geeta and her son; (c) the pattern of the crime, that is, Anil was sleeping alongside his mother receiving an injury and getting killed while the mother was assaulted and Sunil being assaulted in order that he should not be left alive to identify the culprit, whom Sun ii could easily identify as he was a household servant engaged mainly to look after the two hoys: (d) the nature of injuries which were found on the person of the appellant are typically of the kind which a woman in distress would cause while defending herself, and cannot be by a Badmash but would otherwise deal with him if indeed the Badmash wanted to put the appellant out of harm's way; (e) the weapons with which Geeta was defending herself at different stages of her lifesaving fight with the appellant were snatched by the appellant and he hit her with those weapons, that is how similar injuries were found on the perwn of the deceeased and the appellant by the same t.v• .veapoa£. [2M A-H, 265 B-C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPllLLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.\n\n281 of 1978.\n\nY Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4.1 1.77 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 1495 of 1977.\n\nL. N. Gupta for the Appellants.\n\nH. R. Bhardwaj and R. K. Bhatt for the Respondent.\n\n0. P. Rana for the Complainant.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nThis is yet another case in which a young housewife has been done to death by a trusted servant of the family.\n\nHer three-year old son was murdered along with her and her five-year old son was seriously injured.\n\nThe incident occurred on May 6, 1971 at about 2.00 p.m. in House No. F-4/3, Kanoria Colony Quarters, Renukoot, where one Mohan Lal Khetan used to Jive with his wife Geeta and two sons Anil and Sunil aged three and five years respectively. Mohan Lal left for Allahabad for some work on the morning of the 6th.\n\nHis wife and children took their food at about 1.00 p.m. and while they were resting, with a cooler on, they were assaulted as a result of which Geeta and Anil died and Sunil received serious injuries. The only other person who was then present in the house was tl; e appellant, who was working as a household servant for a few years before the incident. His presence in the house at the material time is beyond the pale of controversy and indeed his very defence is that some intruders entered the house and caused injuries to Geeta, her two sons and to he himself.\n\nThe appellant received quite some injuries in the incident which led to the death of Geeta and Anil.\n\nSunil, the five-year old son of Geeta, was examined by the prosecution as the sole eye witness in the case and his evidence has been accepted by the Sessions Court and the High Court. Shri L. N.\n\nGupta, who has argued the case on behalf of the appellant with admirable precision and brevity, contends that no reliance should be placed on Sunil's evidence because he is a young child of immature understanding, that no oath was administered to him by reason of his lack of understanding of the sanctity of oath, that he did not implicate the appellant for two days or so at least and that his\n\nstatement was recorded by the police about 20 days after the incident.\n\nCounsel further argues that in the very nature of things, it would be impossible for a young lad of 13 like the appellant to overpower, gag, assault and slay a well-built woman of 30 that Geeta was.\n\nThe motive of the offence, according the Courts below, was to outrage the modesty of Geeta. It is urged that a boy of 13 could not possibly have entertained any such lewd thoughts.\n\nAccording to medical evidence, the injuries on the person of Geeta and the appellant were partly caused by a blunt weapon and partly by a sharp-edged weapon.\n\nThat means that two different kinds of weapons were used against both of them and, what is more important, the same two weapons.\n\nAccording to counsel, that is more consistent with a stranger or strangers attacking Geeta and the appellant than with the appellant attacking Geeta. The appellant could not have attacked Geeta with two different weapons and even if Geeta were to retaliate, she could not have caused injuries to the appellant with the same two weapons. The final submission is that the prosecution case is rendered suspicious because the evidence of discovery of the iron rod, the knife, two gold bangles and the cash at the instance of the appellant has been disbelieved by the\n\nSessions Court and the High Court.\n\nWe have given our anxious consideration to these weighty considerations but on a close scrutiny of the evidence and the circumstances of the case we find ourselves unable to - differ from the Courts below in regard to the assessment of the evidence in the case.\n\nCounsel is not right in saying that the appellant was only thirteen years of age in May l 971. lt appears that the appellant gave his age as l 3 during the committal proceedings but the age so given cannot be accepted as correct merely because, as counsel contends, the prosecution did not dispute the correctness of the assertion made by the appellant.\n\nThere was no assertion in regard to the appellant's age and indeed it was not put in issue at any stage of the proceedings.\n\nThe pointregarding the appellant's age is being raised for the first time in this Court in the form and context in which it is raised by Shn Gupta. The reference to the \"tender age\" of the appellant was made in the Sessions Court on the question of sentence and not that of guilt, nor indeed in the context that the nature of the offence is such that the appellant could not have committed it, being just a boy of 13 or so. It is not a matter of uncommon experience that the age of an accused is mentioned in the ccmmittal proceedings without proper inquiry or scrutiny si:r.ce, in rncst cases, not l1ing turns on it.\n\nJn fact if the appellant\n\nwas only 13 years of age at the time of the offence, the Sessions Court would not have failed to notice that fact and it would be amazing that the appellant's advocates in the Courts below should not advert to it, though the minutest contentions were raised in arguments and subtle suggestions were made to prosecution witnesses in their cross-examination.\n\nDuring the trial, the appellant was suspected t_o be of a deranged mind and was for that reason sent to the mental hospital at Varanasi. Exhibit K-20, which is the abstract of medical history maintained in that hospital, shows that at the time of the appellant's admission to the hospital on July 19, 1973 he was 23 years of age.\n\nThe occurrence 11aving taken place in May 1971, the appellant would be about 21 years of age at the relevant time.\n\nThat is what the High Court has found while dealing with the question of sentence when it was urged before it that the death sentence should not be confirmed since the appell'lnt was just 14 or 15 years of age on the date of offence.\n\nWe concur in view of the High Court on the question of the appellant's age and agree with it that the age given by the appellant in the committal Court and the Sessions Court was a random statement not based on any reliable data.\n\nWe cannot accept that an able-bodied boy of eighteen or ninetel!n could not have cJmmitted an assault of the present nature for the motive alleged.\n\nBut we might mention that we are not in entire agreement with the S'!ssions Court and the High Court that the motive of the offender was necessarily to outrage the modesty of Geeta It is not possible to record a positive finding that the motive necessarily was to commit theft or robbery, but the nature of injuries on the person of Geeta does not fully bear out the inference that the motive of the outrage was c:.mcerned with sex.\n\nThere was no injury at all on Geeta' s private parts or anywhere nearabout, not even a scratch or an abrasion.\n\nMost of the injuries were caused to her on the. face and head. It seems to us more probable that Geeta woke up while the almirah was being rai1sacked\n\nand she paid the price of her courage.\n\nShe resisted tle robbery and was therefore done to death.\n\nSbri Gupta made a very plausible case against the acceptance of the evidence of Sunil, the child witness.\n\nWe must confess that\n\nif the case were to rest solely on Sunil's uncorroborated testimony, H we might have found it difficult to sustain the appellant's conviction.\n\nBut there are uai•peach11.ble and the most eloqunt matters on the\n\nrecord which lend an unfailing assurance that Sunil is a witness of truth, not a witness of imagination as most children of that age generally are.\n\nAs we have stated earlier, the presence of the appellant is undisputed and is indeed indisputable.\n\nThe appellant himself received quite a large number of injuries during the incident, which proves his presence in the house at the relevant time beyond the shadow of a doubt. If the appellant was present in the house at the time when Geeta was assaulted, it becomes necessary to examine his conduct without shifting the burden of proof on to him. If the mistress of the house was killed by robbers, we should have thought that the appellant would raise a hue and cry at least after the robbers had made good their escape.\n\nHe did nothing of the kind and a little while later, he quitely walked to a neighbour and trotted out the story that a few \"Badmashes\" intruded into the house and killed Geeta and her son.\n\nNot only does the conduct of the appellant corroborate the evidence of Sunil, but the very pattern of the crime corroborates D that it is the appellant who committed it.\n\nAnil was sleeping alongside his mother and he seems to have received an injury while the\n\nmotl:.er was assaulted.\n\nBut Sunil was assaulted obviously in order that he should not be left alive to identify the culprit.\n\nThe culprit whom Sunil could easily identify was the appellant who was a household servant engaged mainly to look after the two boys. Total E strangers, whom even the appellant could not identify except as \"Badmashes'', would have no reason whatever to assault Sunil.\n\nThe most important of the circumstances which corroborates the evidence of Sunil is the nature of injuries which were found on the person of the appellant. Those injuries are typically of the kind which a woman in distress would cause while defending herself.\n\nThere is a trail of scratches and abrasions on the front portion of the appellant's body and it is not without significance, as contended by Shri Bhardwaj who appears on-behalf of the State of U.P., that the injuries on Geeta are also all on the front portion of her body.\n\nA 'Badmash' would not deal with the appellant with his nails, if indeed he wanted to put the appellant out of harm's way.\n\nThere is one more argument which requires to be dealt with, namely, that two different weapons and the same two weapons were used against both Geeta and the appellant.\n\nWe are I not quite sure whether Geeta had received an incised injury because, the injuries which were found on her forehead can give the appearance\n\n. x\n\nof incised injuries, if caused by an iron rod.\n\nThe skin just above a hard surface can break by a severe blow and give the appearance of an incised injury.\n\nBut even assuming that the same two weapons were used on Geeta as also the appellant, it does not militate against the commission of the crime by the appellant himself. It is clear from the evidence of Dr. Guha and Dr. Sharma that all the injuries on the person of both Geeta and the appellant were on the front portions of their respective bodies. It is also clear that the injury which resulted in the death of Geeta as also her son Anil was caused by the iron rod. We are inclined to the view that the weapons with which Geeta was defending herself at different stages of her life-saving fight with. the appellant were snatched by the appellant and he hit her with those weapons.\n\nThat ishow similar injuries were found on the person of both .\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the Sessions Court and the High Court that it is the appellant who committed the murder of Geeta\n\nand her son Anil and caused injuries to Sunil.\n\nCrimes like the one before us cannot be looked upon with equanimity because they tend to destroy one's faith in all that is good in life. A starving youth was given shelter by a kindly couple.\n\nThe reward of that kindness is the murder of the woman and her child.\n\nWe cannot condemn adequately the utterly disgraceful and E dastardly conduct of the appellant. But all the same, the question as to whether the death sentence is called for has to be examined in each case with dispassionate care.\n\nThe appellant was just about 21 years of age on the date of the offence and, very probably, a sudden impulse of sex or theft made him momentarily insensible.\n\nThe evidence of Sunil shows that immediately after the crime, the appellant was found sitting in the chowk of the house crying bitterly.\n\nHaving achieved his purpose. he did not even try to run away, which he could easily have done since, his injuries were not of such a nature as to incapacitate him from fleeing from an inevitable arrest.\n\nIt would also appear that though he was not insane at the time of the offence in , he sense that he did not know the nature and consequences of what he was doing, still he was somewhat unhinged.\n\nHe was suspected to be insane during the trial and was kept in a mental hospital from July 19, 1973 to February 2, 1975.\n\nHe was eventually declared fit to stand his trial but the evidence of Dr. R.\n\nN. Srivastava (P.W. 13), who was in charge of the hospital and the notes (Exhibit Ka-20) of the hospital show that the appellant had\n\nshown aggressive symptoms and once, he had attacked another patient.\n\nCoupled with these considerations is the fact that the basic evidence in the case is of a child of five who answered many vital questions with a nod of the bead, one way or the other.\n\nA witness who, by reason of his immature understanding, was not administered oath and who was privileged, by reason of bis years, not to make his answers in an intelligible and coherent manner is unsafe to be trusted wholesale.\n\nWe cannot also overlook, what Shri L. N. Gupta highlighted, that Sunil's statement was recorded about 20 days later.\n\nThere is valid reason for the delay, namely, his state of mind (he was a witness to the murder of his mother and an infant brother) and the state of hls body (he was gagged as a result of which his clavicle was fractured).\n\nChildren, in the first place, mix up what they see with what they like to imagine to have seen and besides, a little tutoring is inevitable in their case in order to lend coherence and consistency to their disjointed thoughts which tend to stray. The extreme sentence cannot seek its main support from evidence of this kind which, even if true, is not safe enough to act upon for putting out a life.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge did not ask the appellant what he had to say on the question of sentence, holding that section 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not, by reason of its section 484 (2) (a), apply to trials which were pending on the date when the new Code came into force.\n\nWe wish that the Sessions Court had questioned the appellant on the sentence, whether the letter of section 235(2) governed the matter or not. That would have furnished to the Court useful data on the question of sentence which it proposed to pass. In any case, the trial would not have been invalidated if the Court were to apply the provisions of that section which were introduced into the Code ex debito justiciae.\n\nThe learned Judge had before him a safe expedient, the benefit of which he needlessly denied to himself on technical considerations.\n\nFinally, the appellant has been in jail for ten long years.\n\nHe has probably earned by now the right to be released, after taking into account the remissions admissible to him, were he sentenced to life imprisonment.\n\nWe suppose, though we are not confident, that some celebrity or the other must have visjted the jail and large, wholesale remissions from sentence must have been doled out to the prisoners in order to commemorate the great and unusual event.\n\nr -<\n\nIn the result, we confirm the order of conviction but set aside the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant and sentence him to imprisonment for life for the offence under section 302 of the Penal Code.\n\nThe sentence under section 307 will stand but the two sentences will run concurrently .\n\n. S.R.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "SURESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 6, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 17, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 37, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SURESH\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch 17, 1981\n\n( Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J. AND A.P. SEN, J.)\n\nSentence of death-Whether death sentence is called for has to be examined in each case with dispassionate care-Penal Code, section 302."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. 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("}}, {"text": "July 19, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2266, "end_char": 2279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was kept in a mental hospital from July 19, 1973 to Februnry 2, 1975 where he had shown aggressive symptoms and once even attacked another patient. ("}}, {"text": "Februnry 2, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2283, "end_char": 2299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was kept in a mental hospital from July 19, 1973 to Februnry 2, 1975 where he had shown aggressive symptoms and once even attacked another patient. ("}}, {"text": "section 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3175, "end_char": 3189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3197, "end_char": 3229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 484(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3314, "end_char": 3328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3345, "end_char": 3356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Geeta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "263H,264A]\n\nAn assessment of the following corroborative evidence, in the instant case, clearly indicate that it was the appellant who commited the murder of Geeta and her son Anil and caused injuries to Sunil : (a) the presence of the appellant proved by quite a large number of injuries dming the incident; (b) his conduct in not raising hue and cry at least after the robbers had made good their escape, if any at the time of the killing of the mistress of the house, but little while later, he quietly walked to a neighbour and trotted out the story that a few Badmashes intruded into the house and killed Geeta and her son; (c) the pattern of the crime, that is, Anil was sleeping alongside his mother receiving an injury and getting killed while the mother was assaulted and Sunil being assaulted in order that he should not be left alive to identify the culprit, whom Sun ii could easily identify as he was a household servant engaged mainly to look after the two hoys: (d) the nature of injuries which were found on the person of the appellant are typically of the kind which a woman in distress would cause while defending herself, and cannot be by a Badmash but would otherwise deal with him if indeed the Badmash wanted to put the appellant out of harm's way; (e) the weapons with which Geeta was defending herself at different stages of her lifesaving fight with the appellant were snatched by the appellant and he hit her with those weapons, that is how similar injuries were found on the perwn of the deceeased and the appellant by the same t.v• .veapoa£. [2M A-H, 265 B-C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPllLLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Anil", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "263H,264A]\n\nAn assessment of the following corroborative evidence, in the instant case, clearly indicate that it was the appellant who commited the murder of Geeta and her son Anil and caused injuries to Sunil : (a) the presence of the appellant proved by quite a large number of injuries dming the incident; (b) his conduct in not raising hue and cry at least after the robbers had made good their escape, if any at the time of the killing of the mistress of the house, but little while later, he quietly walked to a neighbour and trotted out the story that a few Badmashes intruded into the house and killed Geeta and her son; (c) the pattern of the crime, that is, Anil was sleeping alongside his mother receiving an injury and getting killed while the mother was assaulted and Sunil being assaulted in order that he should not be left alive to identify the culprit, whom Sun ii could easily identify as he was a household servant engaged mainly to look after the two hoys: (d) the nature of injuries which were found on the person of the appellant are typically of the kind which a woman in distress would cause while defending herself, and cannot be by a Badmash but would otherwise deal with him if indeed the Badmash wanted to put the appellant out of harm's way; (e) the weapons with which Geeta was defending herself at different stages of her lifesaving fight with the appellant were snatched by the appellant and he hit her with those weapons, that is how similar injuries were found on the perwn of the deceeased and the appellant by the same t.v• .veapoa£. [2M A-H, 265 B-C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPllLLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Anil"}}, {"text": "Sunil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4792, "end_char": 4797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "263H,264A]\n\nAn assessment of the following corroborative evidence, in the instant case, clearly indicate that it was the appellant who commited the murder of Geeta and her son Anil and caused injuries to Sunil : (a) the presence of the appellant proved by quite a large number of injuries dming the incident; (b) his conduct in not raising hue and cry at least after the robbers had made good their escape, if any at the time of the killing of the mistress of the house, but little while later, he quietly walked to a neighbour and trotted out the story that a few Badmashes intruded into the house and killed Geeta and her son; (c) the pattern of the crime, that is, Anil was sleeping alongside his mother receiving an injury and getting killed while the mother was assaulted and Sunil being assaulted in order that he should not be left alive to identify the culprit, whom Sun ii could easily identify as he was a household servant engaged mainly to look after the two hoys: (d) the nature of injuries which were found on the person of the appellant are typically of the kind which a woman in distress would cause while defending herself, and cannot be by a Badmash but would otherwise deal with him if indeed the Badmash wanted to put the appellant out of harm's way; (e) the weapons with which Geeta was defending herself at different stages of her lifesaving fight with the appellant were snatched by the appellant and he hit her with those weapons, that is how similar injuries were found on the perwn of the deceeased and the appellant by the same t.v• .veapoa£. [2M A-H, 265 B-C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPllLLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Sunil"}}, {"text": "Sun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5463, "end_char": 5466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "263H,264A]\n\nAn assessment of the following corroborative evidence, in the instant case, clearly indicate that it was the appellant who commited the murder of Geeta and her son Anil and caused injuries to Sunil : (a) the presence of the appellant proved by quite a large number of injuries dming the incident; (b) his conduct in not raising hue and cry at least after the robbers had made good their escape, if any at the time of the killing of the mistress of the house, but little while later, he quietly walked to a neighbour and trotted out the story that a few Badmashes intruded into the house and killed Geeta and her son; (c) the pattern of the crime, that is, Anil was sleeping alongside his mother receiving an injury and getting killed while the mother was assaulted and Sunil being assaulted in order that he should not be left alive to identify the culprit, whom Sun ii could easily identify as he was a household servant engaged mainly to look after the two hoys: (d) the nature of injuries which were found on the person of the appellant are typically of the kind which a woman in distress would cause while defending herself, and cannot be by a Badmash but would otherwise deal with him if indeed the Badmash wanted to put the appellant out of harm's way; (e) the weapons with which Geeta was defending herself at different stages of her lifesaving fight with the appellant were snatched by the appellant and he hit her with those weapons, that is how similar injuries were found on the perwn of the deceeased and the appellant by the same t.v• .veapoa£. [2M A-H, 265 B-C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPllLLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Sunil"}}, {"text": "ii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5467, "end_char": 5469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "263H,264A]\n\nAn assessment of the following corroborative evidence, in the instant case, clearly indicate that it was the appellant who commited the murder of Geeta and her son Anil and caused injuries to Sunil : (a) the presence of the appellant proved by quite a large number of injuries dming the incident; (b) his conduct in not raising hue and cry at least after the robbers had made good their escape, if any at the time of the killing of the mistress of the house, but little while later, he quietly walked to a neighbour and trotted out the story that a few Badmashes intruded into the house and killed Geeta and her son; (c) the pattern of the crime, that is, Anil was sleeping alongside his mother receiving an injury and getting killed while the mother was assaulted and Sunil being assaulted in order that he should not be left alive to identify the culprit, whom Sun ii could easily identify as he was a household servant engaged mainly to look after the two hoys: (d) the nature of injuries which were found on the person of the appellant are typically of the kind which a woman in distress would cause while defending herself, and cannot be by a Badmash but would otherwise deal with him if indeed the Badmash wanted to put the appellant out of harm's way; (e) the weapons with which Geeta was defending herself at different stages of her lifesaving fight with the appellant were snatched by the appellant and he hit her with those weapons, that is how similar injuries were found on the perwn of the deceeased and the appellant by the same t.v• .veapoa£. [2M A-H, 265 B-C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPllLLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "L. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Gupta for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "L. N.\n\nGupta"}}, {"text": "H. R. Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Bhardwaj and R. K. Bhatt for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6447, "end_char": 6458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Bhardwaj and R. K. Bhatt for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6483, "end_char": 6490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana for the Complainant."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6557, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nThis is yet another case in which a young housewife has been done to death by a trusted servant of the family."}}, {"text": "May 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6815, "end_char": 6826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident occurred on May 6, 1971 at about 2.00 p.m. in House No."}}, {"text": "Renukoot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6891, "end_char": 6899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F-4/3, Kanoria Colony Quarters, Renukoot, where one Mohan Lal Khetan used to Jive with his wife Geeta and two sons Anil and Sunil aged three and five years respectively."}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6911, "end_char": 6927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F-4/3, Kanoria Colony Quarters, Renukoot, where one Mohan Lal Khetan used to Jive with his wife Geeta and two sons Anil and Sunil aged three and five years respectively.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Lal Khetan"}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7029, "end_char": 7038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Lal left for Allahabad for some work on the morning of the 6th.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Lal Khetan"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Lal left for Allahabad for some work on the morning of the 6th."}}, {"text": "L. N.\n\nGupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7959, "end_char": 7971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri L. N.\n\nGupta, who has argued the case on behalf of the appellant with admirable precision and brevity, contends that no reliance should be placed on Sunil's evidence because he is a young child of immature understanding, that no oath was administered to him by reason of his lack of understanding of the sanctity of oath, that he did not implicate the appellant for two days or so at least and that his\n\nstatement was recorded by the police about 20 days after the incident.", "canonical_name": "L. N.\n\nGupta"}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10590, "end_char": 10595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pointregarding the appellant's age is being raised for the first time in this Court in the form and context in which it is raised by Shn Gupta."}}, {"text": "Varanasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11579, "end_char": 11587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the trial, the appellant was suspected t_o be of a deranged mind and was for that reason sent to the mental hospital at Varanasi."}}, {"text": "Anil", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14783, "end_char": 14787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil was sleeping alongside his mother and he seems to have received an injury while the\n\nmotl:.er was assaulted.", "canonical_name": "Anil"}}, {"text": "Bhardwaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15676, "end_char": 15684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a trail of scratches and abrasions on the front portion of the appellant's body and it is not without significance, as contended by Shri Bhardwaj who appears on-behalf of the State of U.P., that the injuries on Geeta are also all on the front portion of her body."}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15714, "end_char": 15727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a trail of scratches and abrasions on the front portion of the appellant's body and it is not without significance, as contended by Shri Bhardwaj who appears on-behalf of the State of U.P., that the injuries on Geeta are also all on the front portion of her body."}}, {"text": "Guha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from the evidence of Dr. Guha and Dr. Sharma that all the injuries on the person of both Geeta and the appellant were on the front portions of their respective bodies."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16626, "end_char": 16632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from the evidence of Dr. Guha and Dr. Sharma that all the injuries on the person of both Geeta and the appellant were on the front portions of their respective bodies."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18623, "end_char": 18639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was suspected to be insane during the trial and was kept in a mental hospital from July 19, 1973 to February 2, 1975."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nN. Srivastava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18716, "end_char": 18733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was eventually declared fit to stand his trial but the evidence of Dr. R.\n\nN. Srivastava (P.W. 13), who was in charge of the hospital and the notes (Exhibit Ka-20) of the hospital show that the appellant had\n\nshown aggressive symptoms and once, he had attacked another patient."}}, {"text": "L. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19373, "end_char": 19384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We cannot also overlook, what Shri L. N. Gupta highlighted, that Sunil's statement was recorded about 20 days later.", "canonical_name": "L. N.\n\nGupta"}}, {"text": "section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20195, "end_char": 20206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20218, "end_char": 20250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 484", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20277, "end_char": 20288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20481, "end_char": 20495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21579, "end_char": 21590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21598, "end_char": 21608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21630, "end_char": 21641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_268_269_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "GAYASI\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch 17, 1981 J\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.P. SEN, J]\n\nPenal Code-Crime against public servant for reasons arising out of performance of official duty-No reason for commuting death sentence to lesser sentence.\n\nThe deceased Bhagwan Singh who was working as an Amin put the appellant's lands to sale for recove1 ing certain arrears. The appellant and his two companions Moo] Chand and Daya Ram lay in wait for the deceased while he was on his way back home. Daya Ram first fired three shots at the deceased as a result of which he fell down. Immediately thereafter the appellant emerged with a sword and chopped off the head of Bhagwan Singh.\n\nThe appellant was convicted under section 302 read w.ith section 34, I.P.C. and sentenced to death. The second accused was still absconding.\n\nOn the question of sentence\n\nHELD : There is no reason for commuting the sentence of death to the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life. The deceased had to perform his ministerial duties as an amin in putting the land to sale. He bore no personal grudge against the appellant nor had he anything to gain for himself by selling the appellant's lands. Such crimes against public servants for reasons arising out of the performance by them of their public duties must be put down with a firm hand. [269E]\n\nThe fact that the second accused was absconding does not reduce the gravity of the appellant's offence. [269D]\n\nF CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTDN: Criminal Appeal No. 362 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order ~' dated 28.2.79 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Cr!.\n\nAppeal No. 3500/78 and murder reference No. 33/78.\n\nG S. K. Bisaria for the Appellant.\n\nH. R. Bhardw(lj and R. K. Bhatt for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nThe appellant's land was auctioned on H December 26, 1976 in a revenue sale held to recover arrears of land revenue.\n\nOn the same day, the land of one Moo! Chand was also sold for a similar reason.\n\nThe deceased Bhagwan Singh; who was\n\nGAYASI v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud. C.J.) 269\n\nan Amin, acted as an officer of the Court in effecting the aforesaid sales.\n\nAfter the sale proceedings were over, Bhagwan Singh was returning home on a bicycle, with his peon Shripat, who is examined in the case as P. W.4 The appellant, Moo! Chand and the latter's son Daya Ram lay in wait for the deceased and while he was passing along on his bicycle, Daya Ram fired three shots at him; two out of these hit Bhagwan Singh, as a result of which he fell down.\n\nA split second thereafter, the appellant emerged with a sword and chopped off the neck of Bhagwan Singh.\n\nDaya Ram is still absconding but the appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court under section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to death.\n\nHe was also convicted under section 307 of the Penal Code. The sentence of death having been confirmed by the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave. The leave is limited to the question of sentence.\n\nWe see no reason for commuting the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant to the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life.\n\nThe fact that Daya Ram is absconding does not reduce the gravity of the offence committed by the appellant.\n\nBhagwan Singh had but performed his ministerial duty as an Amin in putting the appellant's land to sale. He bore no personal grudge against the appellant nor had he anything to gain for himself by selling the lands of the appellant and of Daya Ram.\n\nSuch cri1ms committed against public , •' I servants for reasons ansmg out of the performance by them of their public duties must be discouraged and put down with a firm hand.\n\nWe, therefore, confirm the sentence of death passed on the appellant and dismiss the appeal.\n\nP.B.R \\ Apral dismissed.", "total_entities": 26, "entities": [{"text": "GAYASI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 6, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAYASI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 17, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 37, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GAYASI\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch 17, 1981 J\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.P. SEN, J]\n\nPenal Code-Crime against public servant for reasons arising out of performance of official duty-No reason for commuting death sentence to lesser sentence."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 93, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 252, "end_char": 265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased Bhagwan Singh who was working as an Amin put the appellant's lands to sale for recove1 ing certain arrears."}}, {"text": "Moo] Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 397, "end_char": 407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and his two companions Moo] Chand and Daya Ram lay in wait for the deceased while he was on his way back home.", "canonical_name": "Moo] Chand"}}, {"text": "Daya Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 412, "end_char": 420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and his two companions Moo] Chand and Daya Ram lay in wait for the deceased while he was on his way back home."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 705, "end_char": 716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 728, "end_char": 738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 740, "end_char": 745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "G S. K. Bisaria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1671, "end_char": 1686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. K. Bisaria for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Bhardw(lj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1707, "end_char": 1722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Bhardw(lj and R. K. Bhatt for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1727, "end_char": 1738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Bhardw(lj and R. K. Bhatt for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1804, "end_char": 1815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nThe appellant's land was auctioned on H December 26, 1976 in a revenue sale held to recover arrears of land revenue."}}, {"text": "Moo! Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1975, "end_char": 1985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day, the land of one Moo!", "canonical_name": "Moo] Chand"}}, {"text": "an Amin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2106, "end_char": 2113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.) 269\n\nan Amin, acted as an officer of the Court in effecting the aforesaid sales."}}, {"text": "Shripat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2282, "end_char": 2289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the sale proceedings were over, Bhagwan Singh was returning home on a bicycle, with his peon Shripat, who is examined in the case as P. W.4 The appellant, Moo!"}}, {"text": "Moo! Chand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2344, "end_char": 2354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the sale proceedings were over, Bhagwan Singh was returning home on a bicycle, with his peon Shripat, who is examined in the case as P. W.4 The appellant, Moo!"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2763, "end_char": 2774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2785, "end_char": 2795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2803, "end_char": 2813, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2871, "end_char": 2882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2890, "end_char": 2900, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P.B.R \\ Apral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3830, "end_char": 3843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.B.R \\ Apral dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_270_275_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "MUNIAPPAN\n\n1'.\n\nSTATE OF TA M)L NADU\n\nMl.rclt 18, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.P. SEN, J.]\n\nCRIMINA L PROCEDURE CODE 1973\n\n(I) S. 235(2)- Hearing accused on sen/ence-Formal que.TI/011 to accused as to what he lras to say-Statutory obligation whetflpr dlsclwrged-Neressity mrd object of section explained.\n\n(2) S. 354(3)- 'Special reasons' /or awarding death sllfenre-Sesstons J11dge clraracterisillg murder 'terrific do11ble murder' and awarding death untence--\n\nWhelher legal and valid.\n\nPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE\n\n(J) Advocates appearing in cast-Condurl o(-Hlr:lt Coull to make only guarded observations.\n\n(2) Police Olficersumdul't of-Criticism by High CourJ- Prior opporltmily to etplain-Necersit.r of.\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by section 354(3) provides that when the conviction is for an offence punihable with death, the judgment shall in the case of sentence of death state 'special reasons' for such sentence.\n\nThe appcllam was charged under section 302 of the Penal Code for having. committed the murder of his maternal uncle and his son.\n\nI The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for murder and being of the opinion thal it was \" a terrific double murder'' sentenced the npplla n t to death,\n\nThe High Court condemned the murders as \"cold blooded\" and confirmed the conviction and sentence.\n\nAllowing the apJ; eal to this Court. limited 10 the question of sentence.\n\nHELD: I. The sentence of death imposed on the appellant tS set aside and he is-sentenced to imprisonment for life. [27.5 J-]\n\n2. The reasons given by the Sessions .tudgc for ampo~•na the death sentence :tre not 'special reasons' .... ithin the meaning of section 354(3) of the Criminal\n\nProcedure Code. lt is not cenajn if he were cogniuot of his high responibility under that provision. that he would have imposed the de:uh sentence. [275 F.)\n\n:t. It is not understood what is meant by \"a terrific murder· as suggested by the Sessions Judge. All murders are terrific and tf the fact of the murder being\n\n-r\n\nMUNJAPPAN 11. TAMIL NADU 271\n\nterrific is an adequate reason for imposing the death sentence then every murdex shall have to be visited with that senten:!.\n\nDath senence will then tbecome the rule, not an exception and section 354(3) wold become a dead letter. [272 F-G]\n\n4(i). On the question of sentence it is not merely the accused but the whole society which has a stake.\n\n(273 .B]\n\n(ii) After the conviction is recorded , the ()ccasion to apply the provisions of section 235(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code arises. The obligation under\n\nthis section to hear the accused on tile question of sentence is not discharged by\n\nputting a formal question to the accused as to what he has to say on the question of sentence. The Judge must make a genuine effort to elicit from the :accused all\n\ninformation which will eventually bear on the question of sentence. All admis sible evidence is before the Judge but that evidence itself often furnishes a clue\n\nto the genesis of the crime and the motivation of the criminal. It is the bounden duty of the Judge to cast aside the formalities of the Court-scene and approach the question of sentence from a broad so'Ciologica'l point of view. Questions which the Judge can put to th..: accused under section 235(2) and the answers which the accused makes arc beyond the narrow constraints of the Evidence Act.\n\nThe Court, while on the question of sentence, is in an altogether different domain\n\nin which facts and factors of an entirely different order operate.\n\n[273 .B; 272 H273 A; 273 C]\n\nIn the instant case, the Sessions Judge complied with tlic form and letter of the obligation which section 235(2) imposes, forgetting the spirit and substance of that obligation. (273 D]\n\n5. lt i~ not PO$sible to appreciate how, after. being shot in the chest and receiving the injuries described in the post-mortem report, the deceased could have survived for a\" couple of hours thereafter. There is also no explanation as to why the F.I.R. was not recorded at the Police Station when P.W. I went there.\n\nIt is therefore unsafe to confirm the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant.\n\n[273 H. 274 F, 275 El\n\n6. It is not the normal function of the High Court to pass judgment on the conduct of lawyers who appear before the lower C()Urts. [275 C)\n\nThe High , Court should have given anoppol'tuni ty to the two police officers to explain their conduct before making criticism on it. (274 GJ\n\nCRIMINAL iAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 221 of 198l.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23.10.1979 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 759179 (Referred Trial No. 9/79).\n\nA.1'. M. Sampath and P.N. RamaUngam for the Appellant.\n\nA. V. Ran gam for the Respondent.\n\n' •:\n\nG -\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nCHANDRACHUD C. J.\n\nThe appellant, Mu_niappan,' was con. victcd by the learned Sessions Judge, Dharmapun under section 302 of the Penal Code and sentenced to death on the charge that h bad committed the murder of his mother's brother also cal!e~ Muniappan and his son Chinnaswamy.\n\nTl~ e conviction for murder and the sentence of death having been confirmed by the High Coun\n\nof Madras by a Judgment dated October 23, 1979, this appeal has been filed by the accused by special leave. The leave is limited to\n\nthe question of sentence.\n\nThe judgments of the High Court and the Se; ions Court, in so far as the sentence is concerned, leave much to be desired. In the first place, the Sessions Court overlooked the provision. contained in section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which provides, in so far as is relevant, that when the conviction is for an of:cnce punishable with death. the judgment shall in the ca; e of sentence of dcat11 state special reasons for such sentence. The learnc:d Sessions Judge, in a very brief paragraph consiting of two sentences, has tbis to say on the question of sentence :\n\n\"When the accused was asked on the question of sentence, he did not say anything. The accused has cotn mitted terrific double murder and o no sympathy can be\n\nshown to him.\"\n\nThe judgment of the Sessions Judge is in Tamil but we understand from the learned counsel, who appear in the case and both of whom understand Tamil well enough, th1t tl:c Tamil word \"Dhayank:lrJnt\" has been rightly translated as '' terrific''.\n\nWe plead our inabilitY to understand what is meant by a \"tcrriik'' murder because all murdrs are terrific _and i~ tl.e fact of tr.e murder being terrilk is an adequate reason !r lmp?smg the death sentence, then every murder shall hav~ to be VJSlted wuh that sentence. In that event, death sentcn.:e Will become the rule, not an exception and tiection 354(3} will blllll~ a dead letter. We ure also not satisfied that the Jcarnd Ssstons Judge made any serious elfort to elicit fwm the accused \"hat be\n\nwan led to s_ay on the quet ion of sentence. All that the karoed Judge sa''$ u th t \" h n of ' a \" en the uccued wa~ asked on the questJil ie.utcnce, he did not say unything\". The obligation t\" hear he\n\na\\:CUed on the qu. t f . . . d b sccuon cs 1011 o sentence wh1ch ts tmposc Y • 23((2) (>f the Criminal Procedure Code is not discharged by putting a ormal question 10 the accused us to what he has !O , saY on the\n\n~1UNIAPPAN l'. TAMIL NADU (Chandrachud, C. J.) 273\n\nquestion of sentence. The Judge must make a genuine effort to A elicit from the accused all information which will eventually bear on\n\nthe question of sentence.\n\nAll admissible evidence is before the Judge but that evidence itself often furnishes a clue to the genesis of the crime and the motivation of the criminal. It is the bounden duty of the Judge to cast aside the formalities of the Court-scene and approach the question of sentence from a broad sociological B point of view. The occasion to apply tbe provisions of section 235\n\n(2) arises only after the conviction is recorded. What then remains . is the question of sentence in which not merely the accused but the whole society has a stake. Questions which the Judge can put to the accused under section 235 (2) and the answers which the accused makes to those questions are beyond the narrow constraints of the C Evidence Act. The Court, while on the question of sentence, is in an altogether different domain in which facts and factors which operate are of an entirely different order than those which come into play on the question of conviction. The Sessions Judge, in the instant case, compHed with the form and letter of the obligation which Section 235(2) imposes, forgetting the spirit and substance of D that obligation.\n\nThe High Court condemned the murders in terms equally strong by calling them \"cold blooded\" and thought that its duty to consider the propriety of the death sentence began and ended' with that assertion. Its failure to see the failings of the Sessions Court in the E matter of sentencing ted to an unexamined confirmation of the death sentence.\n\nComing to the judgement of the High Court itself, there are certajn features of it which need a close reflection. One of the questions before the High Court was as to the time when the double F murder was committed because, upon that circumstance depended the veracity of the eye witnesses. The doctor who performed the post-mortem examination stated in his evidence that the deceased must have taken their food about four or five hours before their death.\n\nThe case of the prosecution was that the murders were committed at about 9.00 p.m. P.W. I, who is the son of the G deceased Muoiappan, stated in his evidence that the deceased had taken their foodat 8.30 p.m.. This was a very important aspect of the case to whjch the High Court should have applied its mind\n\nwith care.\n\nInstead, it took an extempore expedient by saying: \"Both the deceased might have died a couple of hours after they H substained the injuries at 9.00 p.m.\" . It is impossible to appreciate how, after being_ shot in the chest and receiving the kind of injuries\n\nSUPRBMB COURTS REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwhich are described in the post-mortem report, the deceased could have survived for a couple of hours after they were shot.\n\nYet another question which bad an important bearing on the case was as to the delay caused in filing the F.l.R. Tbe case of the prosecution is that P.W. J went to the Police Station promptly but the solitary police constable who was present there directed him to go to the village Munsif to have his complaint recorded. Now, the record of the Police Station shows that a Sub-Inspector of Police was also present at the Police Station which falsifies the evidence that only a police constable was present at the Police Station at the material time and, therefore, the F.I.R. could not be recorded. The High Court has dealt with this aspect of the matter thus :\n\n\"Jo passing, we may mention that this is a grave dereliction of duty on the part of the policeman who was in charge of the police station at that time and is a matter that\n\nought to be enquired into by the higher authorities.\n\nWe hope that suitable directions wHI be issued to subordinate officers in this district to prevent a recurrence of such lapses on the part of policemen when reports of cognizable offences are given. ··\n\nThe High Court added that the Inspector of Police was not on good terms with the Sub-Inspector and, therefore, the former made a false entry that the latter was present at the police station, which, according to the High Court, was a serious matter which required to be probed by the Senior Officers. We are not quite sure whether there is credible evidence on record to show any enmity between the Inspector and the Sub-Inspector and whether the High Court merely\n\nrelied on the statement made by counsel for the State that the relations between the two Police Officers were cordial. Whatever that may be, we do not think that the Higb Court bas explained satisfactorily why the F.T.R. was not recorded at the police station when P.W.l went there. The ex-parte strictures passed by the High Court are likely to involve tbe two Police Officers or at least one of\n\nthem into grave consequences.\n\nThey should have beeo given an opportunity to explain themselves before the High Court persuaded itself to make such scathing criticism on their conduct.\n\nThere is one more aspect of the Judgment of tbe High Court, H which, with great respect, we are unable to appreciate. A question arose before the High Court as to whether a \"mucb.ilikka\" bears the signature of the appellant. The High Court compared the\n\nMUNIAPPAN v. TAMIL NADU (Chandrachud, C. J.) 275\n\nadmitted signatures of the appellant with the disputed signature and came to the conclusion that the disputed sigo1atur<! was of the appellant himself. The High Court castigated the Public Prosecutor who conducted the prosecution in the Sessio:1s Court by saying that he had not followed the cross-examination of P.W.l \"with attention, and not chosen to bring to the notice of P.W. 1 that the accused had signed the muchilikka, exhibit P. I. We do not know how the High Court came to know that the Public Prosecutor was not following the cross-examination of the witness with attention, but we can guess why the High Court made that observation. It added in parenthesis : \"such lapses on the part of this Public Prosecutor have become frequent and have been commented upon by us, and we hope that at least hereafter he will take some interest in the cases which he is conducting.\" It is not the normal function of the High Court to pass judgment on the conduct of lawyers wlJO appear before the lower courts.\n\nOne should understand if the High Court were to make its guarded observation on the conduct of lawyers appearing before it.\n\nBut how the learned Judges of the High Court had, in tl1eir capacity as Judges of the High Court, come to know that \"such lapses on the part of this Public Prosecutor have\n\nbecome frequent ......... ,\" we are unable to understand.\n\nThese various matters make it unsafe to confirm the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant. The reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for imposing the death sentence are not special reasons within the meaning of section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and we are not sure whether, if he were cognisant of his high responsibility under that provision, he would have necessarily imposed the death sentence.\n\nAccordingly, we set aside the sentence of death and sentence the appellant to imprisonment for life.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 36, "entities": [{"text": "MUNIAPPAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNIAPPAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF TA M)L NADU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 317, "end_char": 326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 716, "end_char": 748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 752, "end_char": 766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 968, "end_char": 979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 987, "end_char": 997, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1654, "end_char": 1668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2227, "end_char": 2241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2476, "end_char": 2490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3250, "end_char": 3264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3641, "end_char": 3655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CRIMINAL iAPPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274 GJ\n\nCRIMINAL iAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4666, "end_char": 4676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Sampath and P.N. RamaUngam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P.N. RamaUngam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4681, "end_char": 4695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Sampath and P.N. RamaUngam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. V. Ran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4716, "end_char": 4725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Ran gam for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4830, "end_char": 4841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' •:\n\nG -\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nCHANDRACHUD C. J.\n\nThe appellant, Mu_niappan,' was con.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4940, "end_char": 4951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4959, "end_char": 4969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Muniappan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5075, "end_char": 5084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "victcd by the learned Sessions Judge, Dharmapun under section 302 of the Penal Code and sentenced to death on the charge that h bad committed the murder of his mother's brother also cal!e~ Muniappan and his son Chinnaswamy.", "canonical_name": "MUNIAPPAN"}}, {"text": "Chinnaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "victcd by the learned Sessions Judge, Dharmapun under section 302 of the Penal Code and sentenced to death on the charge that h bad committed the murder of his mother's brother also cal!e~ Muniappan and his son Chinnaswamy."}}, {"text": "High Coun\n\nof Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5194, "end_char": 5214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl~ e conviction for murder and the sentence of death having been confirmed by the High Coun\n\nof Madras by a Judgment dated October 23, 1979, this appeal has been filed by the accused by special leave."}}, {"text": "October 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5235, "end_char": 5251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl~ e conviction for murder and the sentence of death having been confirmed by the High Coun\n\nof Madras by a Judgment dated October 23, 1979, this appeal has been filed by the accused by special leave."}}, {"text": "section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5587, "end_char": 5619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TAMIL NADU (Chandrachud, C. J.) 273\n\nquestion of sentence.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7868, "end_char": 7879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8101, "end_char": 8112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 235(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Muoiappan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9564, "end_char": 9573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution was that the murders were committed at about 9.00 p.m. P.W. I, who is the son of the G deceased Muoiappan, stated in his evidence that the deceased had taken their foodat 8.30 p.m.. This was a very important aspect of the case to whjch the High Court should have applied its mind\n\nwith care.", "canonical_name": "MUNIAPPAN"}}, {"text": "Munsif", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10468, "end_char": 10474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Tbe case of the prosecution is that P.W. J went to the Police Station promptly but the solitary police constable who was present there directed him to go to the village Munsif to have his complaint recorded."}}, {"text": "section 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14223, "end_char": 14237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14525, "end_char": 14531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_276_279_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "HARISH PAHWA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.\n\nMarch 18, 1981\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974-Detenu assailing detention order-Failure of State Government to dispose of representation within reasonable time-Point not taken before High Court-Whether can be raised in Supreme Court-Representations of detenus to be dealt with cominuously and disposed of expeditiously-Duty of State Government.\n\nThe appellant who was detained by an order dated 16th May, 1980, made a representation dated 3rd June, 1980 from jail, which was received by the State Government on 4th June, 1980. Comments were called for from the Customs Authorities on the 6th of June, 1980 and were received on 13th June, 1980.\n\nOn the 17th June, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for opinion which was furnished on the 19th June, 1980. The representation was rejected by an order dated 24th June, 1980, which was communicated to the jail authorities two days later ..\n\nThe appellant's writ petition having been dismissed by the High Court, he came in appeal to this Court raising a new plea that the representation made by him against the detention to the State Government was not decided within a reasonable time and that the delay was fatal to the detention.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. In matters of this kind where all the material necessary for the determination of a new point is available on the record, and having regard to the importance of the matter, this Court can entertain the point even if it had not been raised before the High Court. [277 F-G]\n\n2. The order of detention declared unconstitutional and appellant directed to be set at liberty. [279 Fl\n\n3. On numerous earlier occasions this Court has made it clear that it does not look with equanimity upon delays in considering the representations of detenus. Where the liberty of a person is involved it is the duty of the State to determine his representations with the utmost expedition and deal with it continuously until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu.\n\n[278 G-H]\n\nIn the instant case no explanation had been given by the Government, as to why no action was taken on the representation of the detenu on 4th, 5th and\n\n25th of June 1980 and what consideration was given from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 and why the file had to travel from table to table before reaching the Chief Minister, who was the only authority to decide the representation.\n\n[278 E-F]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 183 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.1981 of the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Misc.\n\nHabeas Corpus Writ No. 6343/80 .\n\nR.K. Garg, Naresh K. Sharma and Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant.\n\nR.K. Bhatt for Respondent No. 1\n\nHardayal Hardy and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This is an appeal by one Harish Pahwa against the judgment dated 30th January, 1981 of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing a petition presented by the appellant to it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that a writ of habeas corpus be issued against the State of Uttar Pradesh and Union of India in as much as the detention of the appellant by them was not in accordance with law.\n\nThe only point that has been raised before us by Mr.\n\nGarg appearing on behalf of the appellant is that the representation made by him against his detention to the State Government was not decided within a reasnoable time and that the delay is fatal to the detention. This point was no doubt not taken before the High Court, but in view of its importance and the fact that all the material necessary for its 'determination is available -0n the record, we have allowed it to be raised before us and have overruled a preliminary objection taken by the State to the effect that it should not be entertained.\n\nIn order to decide the point we may refer to certain\n\nadmitted facts.\n\nThe order of detention is dated 16th May, 1980 and H the representation made by the appellant against it from Varanasi Jail bears date the 3rd of June, 1980. The.State Government received\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe representation on the 4th June, 1980 but for two days no action was taken in connection 'with it. On the 6th of June, 1980 comments were called for from the Customs authorities with regard to the allegations made ·in the representation and such comments were received by the State Government on the 13th June, 1980.\n\nOn the 17th of June, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on the 19th of June, 1980 The rejection of the representation was ordered on the 24th of June, 1980 and it was communicated to the jail authorities two days later.\n\nThe case of the State is that the representation was with the Customs authorities who were formulating their comments from 7th June, 1980 to the 12th of June, 1980 and that the representation was under the consideration of the Government for four days from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980, of its Law Department from 17th June, 1980 to 19th June, 1980 and then again under its own consideration for six days from 19th June, 1980 to 24th June, 1980.\n\nIn our opinion, the manner in which the representation made by the appellant has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affairs in the matter of consideration of representations made by persons detained without trial.\n\nThere is no explanation at all as to why no action was taken in reference to the representation on 4th, 5th and 25th of June, 1980. It is also not clear what consideration was given by the Government to the representation from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 when we find that it culminated only in a reference to the Law Department, n:ir it is apparent why the Law Department had to be consulted at all. Again, we fail to understand why the representation had to travel from table to :table for six days before reaching the Chief Minister wh:> was the only authority to decide the representation. We may make it clear, as we have done on 1 numerous earlier occasions, that this Court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned.\n\nCalling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import.\n\nWe would emphasise that it is the duty of the State to proceed to determine representations of the character above mentioned with the utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for\n\nsome assistance in connection with it ) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. This not having been done in the present case we have no option but to declare the detention unconstitutional. We order accordingly, allow the appeal and direct that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "HARISH PAHWA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARISH PAHWA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 18, 1981\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "6th of June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comments were called for from the Customs Authorities on the 6th of June, 1980 and were received on 13th June, 1980."}}, {"text": "13th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 761, "end_char": 776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comments were called for from the Customs Authorities on the 6th of June, 1980 and were received on 13th June, 1980."}}, {"text": "17th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 786, "end_char": 801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th June, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for opinion which was furnished on the 19th June, 1980."}}, {"text": "19th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 913, "end_char": 928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th June, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for opinion which was furnished on the 19th June, 1980."}}, {"text": "24th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 980, "end_char": 995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was rejected by an order dated 24th June, 1980, which was communicated to the jail authorities two days later ..\n\nThe appellant's writ petition having been dismissed by the High Court, he came in appeal to this Court raising a new plea that the representation made by him against the detention to the State Government was not decided within a reasonable time and that the delay was fatal to the detention."}}, {"text": "4th, 5th and\n\n25th of June 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2300, "end_char": 2331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[278 G-H]\n\nIn the instant case no explanation had been given by the Government, as to why no action was taken on the representation of the detenu on 4th, 5th and\n\n25th of June 1980 and what consideration was given from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 and why the file had to travel from table to table before reaching the Chief Minister, who was the only authority to decide the representation."}}, {"text": "16th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2389, "end_char": 2404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[278 G-H]\n\nIn the instant case no explanation had been given by the Government, as to why no action was taken on the representation of the detenu on 4th, 5th and\n\n25th of June 1980 and what consideration was given from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 and why the file had to travel from table to table before reaching the Chief Minister, who was the only authority to decide the representation."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2778, "end_char": 2787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, Naresh K. Sharma and Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Naresh K. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2789, "end_char": 2805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, Naresh K. Sharma and Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2810, "end_char": 2822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, Naresh K. Sharma and Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R.K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2843, "end_char": 2853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Bhatt for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hardayal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2876, "end_char": 2890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nHardayal Hardy and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2900, "end_char": 2913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nHardayal Hardy and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2980, "end_char": 2986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This is an appeal by one Harish Pahwa against the judgment dated 30th January, 1981 of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing a petition presented by the appellant to it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that a writ of habeas corpus be issued against the State of Uttar Pradesh and Union of India in as much as the detention of the appellant by them was not in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "Harish Pahwa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3016, "end_char": 3028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This is an appeal by one Harish Pahwa against the judgment dated 30th January, 1981 of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing a petition presented by the appellant to it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that a writ of habeas corpus be issued against the State of Uttar Pradesh and Union of India in as much as the detention of the appellant by them was not in accordance with law.", "canonical_name": "HARISH PAHWA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This is an appeal by one Harish Pahwa against the judgment dated 30th January, 1981 of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing a petition presented by the appellant to it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that a writ of habeas corpus be issued against the State of Uttar Pradesh and Union of India in as much as the detention of the appellant by them was not in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3167, "end_char": 3178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3455, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only point that has been raised before us by Mr.\n\nGarg appearing on behalf of the appellant is that the representation made by him against his detention to the State Government was not decided within a reasnoable time and that the delay is fatal to the detention."}}, {"text": "17th of June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4635, "end_char": 4653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th of June, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on the 19th of June, 1980 The rejection of the representation was ordered on the 24th of June, 1980 and it was communicated to the jail authorities two days later."}}, {"text": "19th of June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4769, "end_char": 4787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th of June, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on the 19th of June, 1980 The rejection of the representation was ordered on the 24th of June, 1980 and it was communicated to the jail authorities two days later."}}, {"text": "24th of June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4843, "end_char": 4861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th of June, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on the 19th of June, 1980 The rejection of the representation was ordered on the 24th of June, 1980 and it was communicated to the jail authorities two days later."}}, {"text": "7th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5050, "end_char": 5064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the State is that the representation was with the Customs authorities who were formulating their comments from 7th June, 1980 to the 12th of June, 1980 and that the representation was under the consideration of the Government for four days from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980, of its Law Department from 17th June, 1980 to 19th June, 1980 and then again under its own consideration for six days from 19th June, 1980 to 24th June, 1980."}}, {"text": "12th of June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5072, "end_char": 5090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the State is that the representation was with the Customs authorities who were formulating their comments from 7th June, 1980 to the 12th of June, 1980 and that the representation was under the consideration of the Government for four days from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980, of its Law Department from 17th June, 1980 to 19th June, 1980 and then again under its own consideration for six days from 19th June, 1980 to 24th June, 1980."}}, {"text": "4th, 5th and 25th of June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no explanation at all as to why no action was taken in reference to the representation on 4th, 5th and 25th of June, 1980."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7283, "end_char": 7289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_280_287_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nB. RAGHURAMA SHETTY ETC.\n\nMarch 24, 1981\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, E. S. VENKATARAMJAH AND\n\nA. N. SEN, JJ. ]\n\nKarnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 Section 6(i) Paddy-and rice-Whether distincl commodities-Milling of Paddy-whether involves manufacturing process-Consumption-meaning of.\n\nThe assessees (respondents) are the owners of rice mills and are registered dealers under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, J 957. In the course of their business, they purchase paddy and after milling paddy, sell the resultant rice. During the assessment years, fhe assessees purchased paddy from agriculturists who were not liable to pay sales tax. 1 he assessing authority under the Act levied on the assessee in each of these cases purchase tax on th~ purchase turnover of paddy under section 6(i) of the Act. The appeals filed by the assessees were dismissed by the Appellate Authority except the one, holding that the conversion of paddy into rice. did not involve any manufacturing process and that the purchase turnovers of paddy in those cases were not liable to tax under section 6(i) of the Act. In the case of the other assessee, the Tribunal held that the turn over was liable to be taxed as he had manufactured milled rice out of the paddy purchased by him.\n\nThe appellant filed revision petitions in the High Court and the assessee filed revision petition in the last case.\n\nThe High Court after holding that the turn overs in questiou were not liable to tax under section 6(i) of the Act dismissed the petitions filed by the appellant and allowed the petition of the last assessee. The High Court granted a certificate of fitness to this Court.\n\nThe appellant argued that the sale price of paddy which is a taxable commodity having not been subjected to tax under section 5, the assessees were liable to tax under section 6(i) of the Act as they had consumed it in the manufacture of rice which was a different commodity for sale. The respondent argued that they had not consumed paddy when they produced rice from it by merely carrying out the process of dehusking at their mills.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHELD : 1. {i) Paddy and rice are two distinct commodities.\n\nThe milling of paddy involves a manufacturing process. [284 B]\n\n(ii) The levy in question is not impermissible even though paddy and rice are liable to be taxed at a single point, as in fact there is no double taxation on the same commodity. [286 F-G]\n\nGanesh Trcding Co. Karna/ v. State of Haryana and Anr. 32 S.T.C. 623, Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar and Co. v. The State of Punjab and Anr. 44 S.T.C.\n\nJ 59 affirmed.\n\n2. Consumption in the true economic sense does not mean only use of goods in the production of consumer goods or final utilisation of consumer goods by consumers involving activities like eating of food, drinking of beverages, wearing of clothes or using of an autombile by its owner for domestic purposes. A manufacturer also consumes commodities which are ordinarily called raw materials when he produces semifinished goods which have to undergo further processes of production before they can be transformed into consumer goods. At every such intermediate stage of production, some utility or value is added to goods which are used as raw materials and at every such stage the raw materials are consumed. [284 D-E]\n\n3. At every stage of production there is consumption of goods even though at the end of it there may not be final consumotion of goods but only production of goods with higher utility which may be used in further productive processes.\n\n[285 B-B]\n\nM/s. Anwar Khan Mahboob Co. v. The State of Bombay and Ors. [1961] 2 S.C.R. 709 at pp. 715-716; Economics (Tenth Edition 1976) at page 168 by Professor' Paul A. Samuelson, referred to.\n\nIn the instant case, the assessees had consumed that paddy purchased by them when they converted it into rice which is commercially a different commodity for sale. The case of assessees therefore, squarely falls under section 6(i) the Act.\n\n[286 CJ\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1801-1805 of 1975.\n\nFrom the Judgments and Orders dated the 27th January and 3rd February 1975 of the Karnataka High Court at Bangalore in STRPs Nos. 14, 15, 19, 26 & 32 of 1974.\n\nN. Nettar for the Appellant.\n\nJ. Ramamurthy and Miss R. Vaigai for the Respondent.\n\nEx-parte Respondents in CAs 1801-1803 & 1805/75.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nThe question which arises for consideration in these appeals by certificate is whether the respondents (here-\n\nA inafter referred to as 'the assessees') are liable to pay purchase tax under section 6(i) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the tur.nover consisting of the price paid by them for purchasing paddy for the purpose of converting it into rice for sale, in their respective rice mills.\n\nThe assessees are owners of rice mills in the State of Karnataka and are registered dealers under the Act.\n\nIn the course of their business, they purchase paddy and after milling paddy sell the resultant rice.\n\nDuring the assessment years, the assessees purchased paddy from agriculturists who were not liable to pay sales tax. The assessing authority under the Act levied on the assessee in each of these cases purchase tax on the purchase turnover of paddy under section 6(i) of the Act.\n\nThe appeals filed by the assessees against the said assessments were dismissed by the appellate authority.\n\nThe Karnataka Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals filed by the assessees against the orders of the appellate authority except the one filed by the assessee who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1805 of 1975 holding that the conversion of paddy into rice did not involve any manufacturing process and that the purchase turnovers of paddy in those cases were not liable to tax under section 6(i) of the Act.\n\nIn the case of the assessee who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1805 of 1975, the Tribunal held that the turnover was liable to be taxed as he had manufactured boiled rice out of the paddy purchased by him.\n\nAggrieved by the decisions of the Tribunal, the State Government filed revision petitions before the High Court under section 23( I) of the Act in the first four cases and the-assessee filed a revision petition in the last case.\n\nThe High Court after holding that the turnovers in question were not liable to tax under section 6(i) of the Act dismissed the petitions filed by the State Government and allowed the petition of the assessee who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1805 of 1975.\n\nThereafter the High Court granted by a common order a certificate of fitness in all these cases to prefer appeals before this Court to the State Government. On. the basis of said certificate, these appeals have been filed by the State Government against the orders of the High Court. Since these appeals involve a common question of law, they are disposed of by this common judgment.\n\nThe relevant part of section 6 of te Act reads :\n\n\"6. Levy of purchase tax under certain circumstances. --Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) of\n\nsection 5, every dealer who in the course of his business purchases any taxable goods in circumstances in which no tax under section 5 is leviable on the sale price of such goods and,\n\n(i) either consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise or disposes ofsuch goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the state,\n\n(ii)\n\nshall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of such goods at the same rate at which it would bave been leviable on the sale price of such goods under section 5.\"\n\nThe contention of the State Government before the High Court was and before us is that the sale price of paddy which is a taxable commodity having not been subjected to tax under section 5 the assessees are liable to tax under section 6(i) of the Act as they had consumed it in the manufacture of rice which was a different commodity for sale. The assessees' contention which was accepted by the High Court is that paddy and rice being the same it cannot be said that they had manufactured 'other goods' out of paddy and hence section 6(i) is not attracted.\n\nPaddy and rice have been held to be different commodities by this Court in Ganesh Trading Co., . Karna! v. State of Haryana &\n\nAnr.(1) in which it is observed thus :\n\n\"Now, the question for our decision is whether it could be said that when paddy was dehusked and rice was produced its identity remained.\n\nIt was true that rice was produced out of paddy but it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking. It had changed its identity.\n\nRice is not known as paddy. It is a misnomer to call rice as paddy. They 'are two different things in ordinary parlance.\n\nHence quite clearly when paddy is dehusked and rice produced, there has been a change in the identity of the goods\".\n\n(1) 32 S.T.C. 623\n\nThe above view has been followed by this Court in Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar and Co. v. The State of Punjab 4 Ors.(1)\n\nIt is unfortunate that the High Court as well as the Tribunal have tried to distinguish the decision of this Court in Ganesh Trading Co.' s case (supra) on insubstantial grounds, a detailed reference to which is unnecessary We reiterate the view expressed in the above two cases and hold that paddy and rice are two distinct commodities and that the milling of paddy involves a manufacturing process.\n\nThere is no merit in the submission made on behalf of the assessees that they had not consumed paddy when they produced rice from it by merely carrying out the process of dehusking at their mills.\n\nConsumption in the true economic sense does not mean only use of goods in the production of consumers' goods or final utilisation of consumers' goods by consumers involving activities like eating of food, drinking of beverages, wearing of clothes or . using of an automobile by its owner for domestic purposes.\n\nA manufacturer also consumes commodities which are ordinarily called raw materials when he produces semi-finished goods which have to undergo furthi:.r processes of production before they can be transformed into consumers' goods.\n\nAt every such intermediate stage of production, some utility or value is added to goods which are used as raw materials and at every such stage the raw materials are consumed.\n\nTake the case of bread. It passes through the first stage of production when wheat is grown by the farmer, the second stage of production when wheat is converted into flour by the miller and the third stage of production when flour is utilised by the baker to manufacture bread out of it.\n\nThe miller and the baker have consumed wheat and flour respectively in the course of their business.\n\nWe have to understand the word 'consumes' in section 6(i) of the Act in this economic sense. It may be interesting to note that this is the basis of the levy of 'Value Added Tax', popularly called as VAT, which is levied as an alternative to tax on turnover in some Western countries. The difference between 'Value Added Tax', and tax on the turnover of sales or purchases is explained by Professor Paul A. Samuelson in his book entitled 'Economics' (Tenth Edition, 1976) at page 168 thus :\n\n\"A turnover tax simply taxes every transaction made : wheat, flour, dough, bread, VAT is different because it does not include in the tax on the miller's flour that part of its\n\n(!) 44 S.T.C. 159\n\nvalue which came from the wheat he bought from the farmer. Instead, it taxes him only on the wage and salary, cost of milling, and on the interest, rent, royalty, and profit cost of this milling stage of production. (That is, the raw material costs used from earlier stages are subtracted from the miller':: selling price in calculating his \"value added\" and the VAT tax on value added ......... )\"\n\nAt every stage of production, it is obvious there is consumption of goods even though at the end of it there may not be final consumption of goods but only production of goods with higher utility which may be used in further productive processes.\n\nWhile construing the word 'consumption' which was found in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) as it stood prior to its deletion by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, this Court in M/s. Anwarkhan Mahboob Co. v.\n\nThe State of Bomhay & Ors.(1) observed thus :\n\n\"The Act of consumption with which people are most familiar occurs when they eat, or drink or smoke. Thus, we speak of people consuming bread, or fish or meat or vegetables, when they eat these articles of food; we speak of people consuming tea or coffee or water, when they drink these articles; we speak of people consuming cigars or cigarettes or bidis, when they smoke these. The production . of wealth, as economists put it, consists in the creation of\n\n\"utilities\". Consumption consists in the act of taking such advantage of the commodities and services produced as constitutes the \"utilization\" thereof.\n\nFor each commodity, there is ordinariiy what is generally considered to be the final act of consumption. For some commodities, there may be even more than one kind of final consumption.\n\nThus grapes may be \"finally consumed\" by eating them as fruits; they may also be consumed by drinking the wine prepared from \"grapes\". Again, the final act of consumption may in some cases be spread over a considerable period of time.\n\nBooks, articles of furniture, paintings may be mentioned as examples. It may even happen in such cases, that after one consumer has performed part of the final act of consumption, another portion of the final act\n\n(!) (1961] l.S.C.R. 709 at pp. 715-716\n\nof consumption may be performed by his heir or successorin-interest, a transferee, or even one who has obtained possession by wrongful means.\n\nBut the fact that there is for each commodity what may be considered ordinarily to be the final act of consumption; should not make us forget that in reaching the stage at which this final act of consumption takes place the commodity may pass through different stages of production and for such different stages, there would exist one or more intermediate acts of consumption.\"\n\nApplying the above test, it has to be held that the assessees had consumed the paddy purchased by them when they converted it into rice which is commercially a different commodity.\n\nSince it is not disputed that the sales of paddy, which is a taxable commodity, in favour of the assessees had not suffered tax under section 5 in view of the circumstances in which they had taken place and it is held that the assessees had consumed paddy in the manufacture of rice which was a different commercial commodity for sale, the case of the assessees squarely falls under section 6(i) of the Act.\n\nThe charge under section 6(i) should, therefore, be given due effect.\n\nThis view is in accord with the opinion of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswami etc. etc.(1) and in Ganesh Prasad Dixit v. Commissioner of Sa/es-tax,(2) where provisions corresponding to section 6(i) of the Act arose for consideration.\n\nIt is next contended that since the assessees would be exposed to! double taxation both as buyers of paddy and as sellers of rice we ' , should hold that the levy in question is impermissible because paddy and rice are liable to be [taxed at a single point.\n\nNo provision is shown to us which bars such taxation when the commodities are different. In fact, in this case there is no double taxation on the\n\nsamecommodity. A similar contention was rejected by this Court in the case of Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar (supra) thus :\n\n\"We may at this stage refer to one other subsidiary argument urged on behalf of the appellants. It is argued that because paddy and rice are not different kinds of goods\n\n(1) [1976] ! S.C.R. 38.\n\n(2) [ 1969] 3 S. C.R. 490.\n\nbut one and the same, the inclusion of both paddy and rice in Schedule C to the Act would amount to imposition of double taxation under the Act. There is no merit in this contention also because the assumption that paddy and rice are one and the same is erroneous.\n\nIn Ganesh Trading Co., Karna/ v. State of Haryana (1973) 32 S.T.C. 623 (S.C.), arising under the Act, this Court has held that although rice is produced out of paddy, ,..it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking; that rice and paddy are two different things in ordinary parlance and, therefore, when paddy is dehusked and rice produced, there is a change in the identity of the goods.\"\n\nIn the result these appeals are allowed, the judgments of the High Court against which these appeals are filed are set aside and the turnover in question in each case is held to be taxable under section 6(i) of the Act. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. RAGHURAMA SHETTY ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. RAGHURAMA SHETTY ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 24, 1981\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, E. S. VENKATARAMJAH AND\n\nA. N. SEN, JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 776, "end_char": 788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1069, "end_char": 1081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1467, "end_char": 1479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1817, "end_char": 1829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 709", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3608, "end_char": 3627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Paul A. Samuelson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3701, "end_char": 3718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "715-716; Economics (Tenth Edition 1976) at page 168 by Professor' Paul A. Samuelson, referred to."}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3952, "end_char": 3964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Nettar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4243, "end_char": 4256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Ramamurthy and Miss R. Vaigai for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Vaigai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Ramamurthy and Miss R. Vaigai for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4391, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nThe question which arises for consideration in these appeals by certificate is whether the respondents (here-\n\nA inafter referred to as 'the assessees') are liable to pay purchase tax under section 6(i) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the tur.nover consisting of the price paid by them for purchasing paddy for the purpose of converting it into rice for sale, in their respective rice mills."}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4620, "end_char": 4649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4905, "end_char": 4914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees are owners of rice mills in the State of Karnataka and are registered dealers under the Act."}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5315, "end_char": 5327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Karnataka Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Karnataka Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals filed by the assessees against the orders of the appellate authority except the one filed by the assessee who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5847, "end_char": 5859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6205, "end_char": 6219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 6997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7122, "end_char": 7131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7635, "end_char": 7644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7827, "end_char": 7836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7875, "end_char": 7887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8175, "end_char": 8187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganesh Trading Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8282, "end_char": 8300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paddy and rice have been held to be different commodities by this Court in Ganesh Trading Co., ."}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10803, "end_char": 10815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12173, "end_char": 12190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14494, "end_char": 14503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14743, "end_char": 14755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14786, "end_char": 14798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15044, "end_char": 15056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15578, "end_char": 15600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar contention was rejected by this Court in the case of Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar (supra) thus :\n\n\"We may at this stage refer to one other subsidiary argument urged on behalf of the appellants."}}, {"text": "1969] 3 S. C.R. 490", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15819, "end_char": 15838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule C to the Act would amount to imposition of double taxation under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15903, "end_char": 15984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16723, "end_char": 16735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule C to the Act would amount to imposition of double taxation under the Act", "statute": "Schedule C to the Act would amount to imposition of double taxation under the Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_288_290_EN", "year": 1981, "text": ".DAGADU\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n. ·-··-·-~-··--- March 24, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, BAHARUL ISLAM AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 384 (section 421 of 1898 Code) ;.fl -Powers of the High Court to reject appeal summarily-The lfigh Court should ordinarily pass a 'speaking order'.\n\nAlthough under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I 898 (which is sectiofl 384 of the Code of. Criminal Prccedure, 1973) the High Court has the undoubted power to summarily dismiss a first appeal against conviction of an accused yet in very serious cases like those under section 302 Indian Penal Code, or other cases where death or life irnprisoninent can be awarded, the High Court should consider the appeal on merits instead of dismissing it summarily, unless the evidence is so cle3r and cogent, reliable and creditworthy -that on the face of it no case for the barest consideration is made out. Even if the High Court chooses to dismiss the appeal summarily some brief reasons should be giVen so as to_ enable the Supreme Court to judge whether or not ' the case requires any further examination. If no reasons are given then the ·\n\ntask of the Supreme Court becomes onerous in as much as the Judges have to perform the function of the High Court itself by reappraising the entire\n\ntvc\"<rce J{!ltt:rg in fericus harasrrcnt and expense to the accused.\n\n[289 C, 290 CJ\n\nGovinda Kadtuji Kadam and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, [1970] 1SCC469 and Sita Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P., [1979] 2 SCR 1085, followed •.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 313 of 1974. r G Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-7-1973 .of the Bombay.High Court in Cr!. Appeal No. 759/73.\n\nHarjinder Singh for the Appellant.\n\nH O.P. Rana.and R .. N. Podar for the Respondent.\n\nDAGADU v. MAHARASHTRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 289\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nIn this appeal by special leave the appellant has been convicted under section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nAfter having gone through the judgment of the Sessions Judge and the grounds taken by the appellant in his appeal by , special leave we are satisfied that this case does raise some arguable points which merit serious consideration by the High Court. We would like to point out that although under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which is section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the High Court has the undoubted power to summarily dismiss a first appeal against conviction of an accused yet in very serious cases like those under section 302 Indian Penal Code, or other cases where death or life imprisonment can be awarded, the High Court should consider the appeal on men ts instead of dismissing it summarily, unless the evidence is so clear and cogent, reliable and creditworthy that on the face of it no case for the barest consideration is made out.\n\nThis Court in Govinda Kridtuji Kadom and Ors. v. State of Maharastrc;(') while laying down the guidelines for dismissing an appeal summarily observed as follows :\n\n\"The summar.y decision is accordingly a judicial decision which vitally affects the convicted appellant and in a fit case it is also open to challenge on appeal in this Court. An order summarily dismissing an appeal by the word 'rejected', as is tl'e case before us, though not violative of any statutory provision removes nearly every opportunity for detection of errors in the order.\n\nSuch an order does not speak and is inscrutable giving no indication , of the reasoning underlying it. It may at times embarrass this Court when the order appealed against prima fade gives rise to arguable points which this Court is required to consider without having the benefit of the views of the High Court on those points.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, when an appeal in the High Court raises a serious and substantial point which is prima facie arguable it is improper for that Court to dismiss it summarily without giving some indicat_ion of its view on the points raised.\"\n\nTo the same effect is the later decision of this Court in Sita Ram and Ors. v. State of U.P.(2) where this Court reiterated as follows :\n\n(I) (1971] I S.C.C. 469.\n\n(2) (1979] 2 S.C.R. 1085.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"The order summarily dismissing an appeal by the High Court by the word 'rejected' is not violative of any statutory provision.\n\nWhile holding that a summary rejection of the appeal by the High Court is not violative of any statutory provision, this Court pointed out that it is desirable that reasons are recorded by the High Court when prima facie arguable issues have been raised as that would enable the Supreme Court to appreciate the reasons • for rejection of the appeal by the High Court.\"\n\nWe, therefore, hold that even if the High Court chooses to dismiss the appeal summarily some brief reasons should be given so as to enable this Court to judge whether or not the case requires any further examination. If no reasons are given then the task of this Court becomes onerous inasmuch as \\e have to perform the function of the High Court itself by reappraising the entire evidence resulting in serious harassment and expense to the accused. In these circumstances, we set aside the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal and direct the High Court to re-admit the appeal and hear it according to Jaw within three months from today, as far as practicable. As the case is a very old one the High Court should give top priority to the case.\n\nThe, entire record and the paper books which have been prepared in thls Court should be sent to the High Court which has only to hear the counsel for the parties and decide the case.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "DAGADU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 7, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAGADU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-··-·-~-··--- March 24, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, BAHARUL ISLAM AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 384 (section 421 of 1898 Code) ;.fl -Powers of the High Court to reject appeal summarily-The lfigh Court should ordinarily pass a 'speaking order'."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 378, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 602, "end_char": 613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 614, "end_char": 631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1050, "end_char": 1063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if the High Court chooses to dismiss the appeal summarily some brief reasons should be giVen so as to_ enable the Supreme Court to judge whether or not ' the case requires any further examination."}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 SCR 1085", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1513, "end_char": 1530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1737, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harjinder Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H O.P. Rana.and", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1773, "end_char": 1788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H O.P. Rana.and R .. N. Podar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R .. N. Podar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H O.P. Rana.and R .. N. Podar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAGADU v. MAHARASHTRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 289\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nIn this appeal by special leave the appellant has been convicted under section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAGADU v. MAHARASHTRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 289\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nIn this appeal by special leave the appellant has been convicted under section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 2005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2006, "end_char": 2023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2381, "end_char": 2413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2423, "end_char": 2434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2442, "end_char": 2474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2626, "end_char": 2637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2638, "end_char": 2655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "(1979] 2 S.C.R. 1085", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4253, "end_char": 4273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5753, "end_char": 5759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_291_293_EN", "year": 1981, "text": ".. ¥\"'\n\n....\n\nBHUDEO MANDAL & OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nMarch 24, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI, BAHARUL !SLAM, AND\n\nA. VARADARAJAN, JJ.)\n\nIndian Penal Code 1860-S. 149-Conviction under clear finding regarding common object of assembly-Necessity of.\n\nWhen the appellants wanted to irrigate the land they were prevented from doing so by the deceased as a result of which the !st appellant who is now dead gave a bhala blow to the deceased. The other appellants were supposed to have been armed with lathis but they did not cause any injuries either to the witnesses or to the deceased.\n\nThe Sessions Judge convicted the l st appellant under section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and the other appellants under section 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo 3 years' rigorous imprisonment but affirmed the acquittal of the individual charges under sections 323 and 325 I.P.C. The High Court while convicting the appellant under sections 325/149 of the I.P.C. has given no finding regarding the common object of the unlawful assembly.\n\nAccepting the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : In the instant case, there is neither any evidence nor any finding that any of the ingredients of section 149 have been established by the prosecution. Even on the prosecution case itself the occurrence took place as a result of an inigation dispute and the appellants were merely acting under a bona fide claim or belief that they had the right to irrigate the land. There is no overt act attributed to any of the appellants in regard to the deceased and the mere fact that the appellants were armed with lathis by itself would not prove that they shared the common object with which the deceased was inspired. [292 G-H]\n\n2. Before the High Court upheld the conviction of the appellants under sections 326/149 I.P.C. it should have recorded a clear finding as to what was the object of the unlawful assembly and if so whether the object was to commit murder, grievous hurt or simple hurt. [293 A]\n\n3. Whenever the High Court convicts any person or persons of an H offence with the aid of section 149 a clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly must be given and the evidence discussed must\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nshow not only the nature of the common object but also that the object was unlawful. Before recording a conviction under section 149 of the l.P.C. the essential ingredients of section 141 of the I.P.C. must be established. [293 DJ\n\nI CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1974.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 24.1.1974 of the Patna High Court at Patna in Criminal Appeal No.\n\n306/ I 969.\n\nU. P. Singh for the Appellants.\n\nK. G. Bhaget and U. N. Prasad for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court dated 24.1.1974 and has been preferred by appellants Dayanand Manda!, Bhubneshwar Manda!, Kuldip Manda!, Bhagwat Mandal, Nemo Manda!, and Udin Yadav.\n\nThe occurrence seems to have arisen out of an irrigation dispute. According to the prosecution case the appellants wanted to irrigate the land and when they were prevented from doing so, Mainu Manda! resisted as a result of which Bhudeo Manda! who is now dead gave a bhala blow to the deceased Mainu Manda!.\n\nSo far as the other appellants are concerned, they are supposed to have been armed With laihis but they did not cause any injuries either to the witnesses or to the deceased. The Sessions Judge had convicted the accused Bhudeo Manda! under section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and the other appellants under section 326/I 49 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to 3 years rigorous imprisonment but affirmed the acquittal of the accused of the individual charges under sections 323 and 325 of the Indian l'enal Code by the Sessions Judge.\n\nWe have gone through the judgment of the High Court which while convicting the appellant under section 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code has given no finding regarding the common object of the unlawful assembly.\n\nEven on the prosecution case itself the occurrence took place as a result of an irrigatin dispute and the appellants were merely acting under a bona fide claim or belief that they had the right to irrigate the land.\n\nThere is no overt act attributed to any of the appellants on the deceased and the mere fact that the appellants were armed with Iathis by itself would not prove that they shared the common\n\nBHUDEO MANDAL v. BIHAR (Fazal Ali, J.) 293\n\nobject with which Bhudeo Manda! was inspired. Before the High Court could have upheld the conviction of the appellants under section 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code, it should have recorded a clear finding as to what was the object of the unlawful assembly and if so whether the object was to commit murder, grievous hurt or simple hurt.\n\nIn these circumstances we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of Mr. U.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants that there is no material to support the conviction of the appellants under section 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nMr. Bhagat appearing for the State fairly conceded that in the circumstances of this case it would not be possible for him to support the conviction mainly on the ground that since the main accused was convicted under section 304, Part I the other appellants should also have been convicted under section 304/ l 49 and not under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nWe should like to point out that whenever the High Court convicts any person or persons of an offence with the aid of section 149 a clear finding regarding the comn:ion object of the assembly must be given and the evidence discussed must show not only the nature of the common object but also that the object was unlawful.\n\nBefore recording a conviction under section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, the essential ingredient of section 141 of the Indian Penal Code must be established.\n\nSection 149 creates a specific offence and deals with the punishment of that offence. There is an assembly of five or more persons having a common object and the doing of acts by members is in prosecution of that object. The emphasis is on common object.\n\nIn tbe instant case there is neither any evidence nor any finding that any of the ingredients of section 149 have been established by the prosecution.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed and the conv1ct10n and sentence of the appellants are set aside and the appellants are acquitted of the charge framed against them. The appellants are hereby discharged from their bail bonds and need not surrender.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "BHUDEO MANDAL & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUDEO MANDAL & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. ¥\"'\n\n....\n\nBHUDEO MANDAL & OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nMarch 24, 1981\n\n[S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI, BAHARUL !"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 648, "end_char": 679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 762, "end_char": 773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 785, "end_char": 802, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 323 and 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 923, "end_char": 943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1003, "end_char": 1015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1248, "end_char": 1259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1861, "end_char": 1866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2139, "end_char": 2150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2418, "end_char": 2429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2473, "end_char": 2484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2492, "end_char": 2497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2737, "end_char": 2748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "K. G. Bhaget", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2770, "end_char": 2782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. G. Bhaget and U. N. Prasad for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "U. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. G. Bhaget and U. N. Prasad for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court dated 24.1.1974 and has been preferred by appellants Dayanand Manda!,"}}, {"text": "Dayanand Manda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3017, "end_char": 3031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court dated 24.1.1974 and has been preferred by appellants Dayanand Manda!,"}}, {"text": "Bhubneshwar Manda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhubneshwar Manda!,"}}, {"text": "Kuldip Manda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3054, "end_char": 3066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kuldip Manda!,"}}, {"text": "Bhagwat Mandal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwat Mandal, Nemo Manda!,"}}, {"text": "Nemo Manda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwat Mandal, Nemo Manda!,"}}, {"text": "Udin Yadav", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3102, "end_char": 3112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Udin Yadav."}}, {"text": "Mainu Manda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3302, "end_char": 3313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution case the appellants wanted to irrigate the land and when they were prevented from doing so, Mainu Manda!"}}, {"text": "Bhudeo Manda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3345, "end_char": 3357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "resisted as a result of which Bhudeo Manda!", "canonical_name": "BHUDEO MANDAL & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3664, "end_char": 3675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3676, "end_char": 3707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3814, "end_char": 3831, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 323 and 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3958, "end_char": 3978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4124, "end_char": 4135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Part I of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4147, "end_char": 4164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4840, "end_char": 4857, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "U.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of Mr. U.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants that there is no material to support the conviction of the appellants under section 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5243, "end_char": 5254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5266, "end_char": 5283, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5290, "end_char": 5296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhagat appearing for the State fairly conceded that in the circumstances of this case it would not be possible for him to support the conviction mainly on the ground that since the main accused was convicted under section 304, Part I the other appellants should also have been convicted under section 304/ l 49 and not under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5583, "end_char": 5594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5615, "end_char": 5626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5634, "end_char": 5651, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5772, "end_char": 5783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6014, "end_char": 6025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6033, "end_char": 6050, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6080, "end_char": 6091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6116, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6492, "end_char": 6503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_294_299_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "INDO INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES\n\nCOMMISSfONER OF SALES TAX,\n\nUTTAR PRADESH.\n\nMarch 25, 1981\n\n[ V.D. TULZAPURKAR, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND\n\nAMRENDRA NATH SEN, JJ. ]\n\nUttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948, Entry Nu. 39 of the First Schedule thereto-\" Hypodermic clinical syringes\"-whether a glass ware.\n\nUpto November 30, 1973, there were two competing entries in the First Schedule to the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, so far as the item \"hypodermic. clinical syringes\" is concerned, namely, Entry 39 which ran : \"Glass wares other than hurricane lantern chimneys, optical lenses and bottles\" and Entry 44 which ran: \"Hospital equipment and apparatus\"and for an item faJJing under the former the rate of tax was 1 (, % while uncier the latter the rate of tax was 4 % and for an unclassified item the rate was 3-1/2%. From December l, 1973 onwards Entry 44 was deleted and, therefore, if the clinical syringes did not fall within entry 39 it became an unclassified item under .section 3A(2A) of the U .P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 and the rate of tax was 7%. In view of this position that obtained for the relevant periods during the assessment year 1973-74 the appellant-assessee had claimed before \"the assessing autho1ities that its turnover in respect of syringes for the period up to November 30, 1973 was liable to tax at 3-1 /2% as an unclassified item or in the alternative at 4% as \"hospital equipment\" under Entry 44 and its turnover for the period from December I, 1973 to March 31, 1974 was liable to be taxed at 7% as an unclassifieci item. But, negativing its contentions the entire turnover was held to be taxable at the rate of 10% on the basis that clinical syringes fe]J within the expression \"glass ware\" occurring in Entry 39 and hence the appeal by special leave on the question whether hypodermic clinical syringes could be regarded as glass ware.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : ]. The assessee's turnover up to November :•O, 1973 will fall under Entry 44 dealing with \"hospital <quipmem\" and the same would be taxable at the rate of 4% and its turnover from December 1, 1974 will be taxable at the rate of 7% as an unclassified item. [298 H]\n\n2 : ]. It is well settled that in interpreting items in statutes like the Excise Tax Acts or Sales Tax Acts, whose primary object is to raise revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse products, articles and substances resort should! be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning-attached to them by those dealing in them. If any term or expression has been defined in the enactment tren it must be understcod in the sense in which it is defined\n\nbut in the absence of any definition, being given in the enactment the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted.\n\n[297 C-D]\n\nRamavatar Budhiaprasad etc. v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer,' Ako/a, [1961] 1 SCR 279 and Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. las.want Singh Charan Singh, [1967] 2 SCR 720, followed.\n\n2 : 2. The clinical syringes which the assessee manufactures and sells cannot be considered as\" glass ware\" falling within Entry 39 of the First Schedule of the Act. (a) Jn commercial sense, glass ware would never comprise articles like clinical syringes, thermometers, lactometers, and the like which have specialised significance and utility: (b) in popular or commercial parlance a general merchant dealing in \"glass ware\" does not ordinarily deal in articles like clinical syringes, thermometers etc. which articles though made of glass, are normally available in medical stores or with the manufacturers thereof .like the assessee; (c) it is equally unlikely that consumer would ask for such articles from a glass ware shop.\n\nFurther in popular sense when one talks of glass ware such specialised articles like clinical syringes do not come up to one's mind. [298 E-F]\n\nState of Orissa v. Janta Medical Stores, 37 STC 33, approved.\n\nCommissioner of Sales Tax v. S.S.R. Syringes and Thermometers, 1973 Law Diary 178, overruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 151 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16.8.1969 of the Addi. Judge (Revions) Sales Tax, Saharanpur in Revision Appln. No. 1688/78.\n\nJ. R,1mamurthi and Miss R. Vaigai for the Appellant.\n\nS. C. Manchroida, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the F Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave raises the question whether hypodermic clinical . syringes could be regarded as \"glass ware\"' under Entry No. 39 of the First Schedule to U.P_ G Sales Tax Act, 1948 ?\n\nThe facts giving rise to the question lie in a narrow compass.\n\nThe appellant firm (hereinafter called the assessee) manufactures and sells hypodermic clinical syringes.\n\nFor the assessment year H 1973-74 the assessee filed a return disclosing net U.P. sales of such syringes at Rs. 95,065.\n\nThe disclosed turnover was accepted by the\n\nSales Tax Officer, Sector III Muzaffarnagar, but as regards the rate of tax the assessee contended that the clinical syringes in respect of their turnover of Rs. 91,513 up to November 30, 197 3 should be regarded as an unclassified item and taxed at the rate of 3t% or at 4% as \"hospital equipment and apparatus\" under Entry 44 of the First Schedule to the Act and on the turnover of Rs. 3,552/- for the period from December l, 1973 to March 31, 197 4 at the rate of 7% as an unclassified item.\n\nThe Sales Tax Officer, however, treated the syringes as \"glass ware\" and taxed the entire turnover of Rs. 95,065/- at the rate of 10% under Entry No. 39 of the First Schedule.\n\nThe said assessment was upheld in appeal by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Muzaffarnagar and also in revision by the Additional Judge (Revision), Sales Tax, Saharanpur on August 16, 1979. It is this view taken by the assessing authorities as well as by the Additional Judge in revision that is being challenged by the assessee before us in this appeal.\n\nIt may be stated that up to November 30, 1973 there were two competing entries in the First Schedule to the U.P. Sales Tax Act so far as the item in question is concerned, namely, Entry 39 which ran : \"Glass wares other than hurricane lantern chimneys, optical lenses and bottles\" and Entry 44 which ran : \"Hospital equipment and apparatus\" and for an item falling under the former the rate of tax was 10% while under the latter the rate of tax was 4 % and for an unclassified item the rate was 3 %.\n\nFrom December 1, 1973 onwards Entry 44 was deleted and, therefore, if the clinical syringes did not fall within Entry 39 it became an unclassified item under s. 3A (2A) of the Act and tl; e rate of tax was 7%. In view of this position that obtained for the relevant periods during the assessment year 1973-74 the a'sessee had claimed before the assessing authorities that its turnover in respect of syringes for the period up to November 30, 1973 was liable to tax at 3; % as an unclassified item or in tbe alternative at 4% as \"hospital equipment\" under Entry 44 and its turnover for the period from December I, 1973 to March 31, 1974 was liable to be taxed at 7% as an unclassified item.\n\nBut, negativing its contentions the entire turnover was held to be taxable at the rate of 10% on the basis that clinical syringes fell within the expression \"glass ware\" occurring in Entry 39.\n\nCounsel for the assessee contended before us that in the absence of any definition of \"glass ware\" in the Act that expression must be understood in the ordinary commercial parlance and not in any scientific and technical sense and if such test were applied to the instant case then clinical syringes manufactured and sold by the\n\n.__,\n\n~ .\n\nassessee could never be regarded as \"glass ware\".\n\nCounsel pointed out that the Revising Authority negatived the contention of the assessee in view of a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. S. S. R. Syringes and Thermometers(1) but urged that the contrary view taken by the Orisa High Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Jania Medical Stores(') that thermometers, lactometers, syringes, eye-glasses, etc. do not come within the meaning of the expression \"glass ware\" in Entry No. 38 in the Schedule to the relevant Notification issued under the first proviso to s. 5(1) of .the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 was correct.\n\nIn our view counsel's contention has considerable force and deserves acceptance.\n\nc It is well settled that in interpretting items in statutes like the \\/\" Excise Tax Acts or Sales Tax Acts, whose primary object is to raise revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse products, articles and substances resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those D dealing in them. If any term or expression has been defined in the enactment then it must be understood in the sense in which it is defined but in the absence of any definition being given in the enactment the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted. In_ Ramavatar Budhiaprasad, etc.\n\nv. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola(3) the question was whether E 'betel leaves' fell within item 'vegetable' so as to earn exemption from sales tax and this Court held that word 'vegetable' had not been defined in the Act, and that the same must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance and so construed it denoted those classes of vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen garden and F are used for the table and did not comprise betel leaves within it and, therefore, betel leaves were not exempt from taxation: In Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh(4) the question was whether the item 'coal' under Entry I of Part III of Second Schedule to Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 included charcoal or not and this Court observed thus : G\n\n\"Now, there can be no dispute that while coal is tecbni-. cally understood as a mineral product, charcoal is manu-\n\n(!) 1973 Law Diary 178.\n\n(2) 37 S.T.C. 33.\n\n(3) (1961] 1 S.C.R. 279.\n\n(4) (1967) 2 S.C.R. 720.\n\nfactured by human agency from products like wood and other things.\n\nBut it is now well-settled that w bile interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense.\"\n\nViewing the question from the above angle this Court further observed that both a merchant dealing in coal and a consumer wanting to purchase it would regard coal not in its geological sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood and would include 'charcoal' in the term \"coal\", and held that 'charcoal' fell within the concerned Entry No. 1 of Part III of Schedule II of the Act.\n\nHaving regard to the aforesaid well-settled test the question is whether clinical syringes could be regarded as \"glass ware\" falling within Entry 39 of the First Schedule to the Act ? It is true that the dictionary meaning of the expression \"glass ware\" is \"articles made of glass\" (See : Websters New World Dictionary). However, in commercial sense glass ware would never comprise articles like clinical syringes, thermometers, lactometers and the like which have specialised significance and utility. In popular or commercial parlance a general merchant dealing in \"glass ware\" does not ordinarily deal in articles like clinical syringes, thermometers, lactometers, etc. which articles though made of glass, are normally available in medical stores or with the manufacturers thereof like the assessee. It is equally unlikely that consumer would ask for such articles from a glass ware shop. In popular sense when one talks of glass ware such specialised articles like clinical syringes, thermometers, lactometers and the like do not come up to one's mind.\n\nApplying the aforesaid test, therefore, we are clearly of the view that the clinical syringes which the assessee manufactures and sells cannot be con sidered as \"glass ware\" falling within Entry 39 of the First Schedule of the Act.\n\nIn our opinion, the view taken by the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Jania Medical Stoi'es (supra) is correct and the view of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v.\n\nM/s S.S.R. Syringes and Thermometers (supra) is unsustainable.\n\nIn this view of the matter it is clear that the assessee's turnover up to November 30, 1973 will fall under Entry 44 dealing with\n\n~·\n\n\"hospital equipment\" and the same would be taxable at the rate of 4% and its turnover from December 1, 1973 to March 31, 1974 will be taxable at the rate 7% as an unclassified item and the assessment will have to be made accordingly.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed but there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "INDO INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDO INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSfONER OF SALES TAX,\n\nUTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 25, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 89, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 25, 1981\n\n[ V.D. TULZAPURKAR, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND\n\nAMRENDRA NATH SEN, JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMRENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 386, "end_char": 405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December l, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 810, "end_char": 826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From December l, 1973 onwards Entry 44 was deleted and, therefore, if the clinical syringes did not fall within entry 39 it became an unclassified item under .section 3A(2A) of the U .P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 and the rate of tax was 7%."}}, {"text": "section 3A(2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 964, "end_char": 978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 992, "end_char": 1011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 SCR 279", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 720", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3035, "end_char": 3051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3203, "end_char": 3217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4097, "end_char": 4125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "J. R,1mamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4310, "end_char": 4324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. R,1mamurthi and Miss R. Vaigai for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Vaigai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4334, "end_char": 4343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. R,1mamurthi and Miss R. Vaigai for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Manchroida", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4364, "end_char": 4380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchroida, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the F Respondent."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4382, "end_char": 4398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchroida, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the F Respondent."}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4403, "end_char": 4415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchroida, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the F Respondent."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4483, "end_char": 4494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave raises the question whether hypodermic clinical ."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 30, 197 3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "91,513 up to November 30, 197 3 should be regarded as an unclassified item and taxed at the rate of 3t% or at 4% as \"hospital equipment and apparatus\" under Entry 44 of the First Schedule to the Act and on the turnover of Rs."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5368, "end_char": 5382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "March 31, 197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5469, "end_char": 5482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,552/- for the period from December l, 1973 to March 31, 197 4 at the rate of 7% as an unclassified item."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5689, "end_char": 5703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Muzaffarnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5800, "end_char": 5813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said assessment was upheld in appeal by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Muzaffarnagar and also in revision by the Additional Judge (Revision), Sales Tax, Saharanpur on August 16, 1979."}}, {"text": "August 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5896, "end_char": 5911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said assessment was upheld in appeal by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Muzaffarnagar and also in revision by the Additional Judge (Revision), Sales Tax, Saharanpur on August 16, 1979."}}, {"text": "November 30, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6107, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that up to November 30, 1973 there were two competing entries in the First Schedule to the U.P. Sales Tax Act so far as the item in question is concerned, namely, Entry 39 which ran : \"Glass wares other than hurricane lantern chimneys, optical lenses and bottles\" and Entry 44 which ran : \"Hospital equipment and apparatus\" and for an item falling under the former the rate of tax was 10% while under the latter the rate of tax was 4 % and for an unclassified item the rate was 3 %."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6165, "end_char": 6179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6192, "end_char": 6205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6585, "end_char": 6601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From December 1, 1973 onwards Entry 44 was deleted and, therefore, if the clinical syringes did not fall within Entry 39 it became an unclassified item under s. 3A (2A) of the Act and tl; e rate of tax was 7%."}}, {"text": "s. 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6738, "end_char": 6743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this position that obtained for the relevant periods during the assessment year 1973-74 the a'sessee had claimed before the assessing authorities that its turnover in respect of syringes for the period up to November 30, 1973 was liable to tax at 3; % as an unclassified item or in tbe alternative at 4% as \"hospital equipment\" under Entry 44 and its turnover for the period from December I, 1973 to March 31, 1974 was liable to be taxed at 7% as an unclassified item."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7975, "end_char": 7995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel pointed out that the Revising Authority negatived the contention of the assessee in view of a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. S. S. R. Syringes and Thermometers(1) but urged that the contrary view taken by the Orisa High Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Jania Medical Stores(') that thermometers, lactometers, syringes, eye-glasses, etc."}}, {"text": "Orisa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8124, "end_char": 8140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel pointed out that the Revising Authority negatived the contention of the assessee in view of a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. S. S. R. Syringes and Thermometers(1) but urged that the contrary view taken by the Orisa High Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Jania Medical Stores(') that thermometers, lactometers, syringes, eye-glasses, etc."}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8416, "end_char": 8423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8432, "end_char": 8458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Excise Tax Acts or Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8629, "end_char": 8661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Entry I of Part III of Second Schedule to Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10009, "end_char": 10093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1961] 1 S.C.R. 279", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10317, "end_char": 10336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1967) 2 S.C.R. 720", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "is now well-settled that w bile interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10440, "end_char": 10525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part III of Schedule II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11090, "end_char": 11124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11283, "end_char": 11297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of Schedule II of the Act", "statute": "Part III of Schedule II of the Act"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12391, "end_char": 12405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12457, "end_char": 12474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the view taken by the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Jania Medical Stoi'es (supra) is correct and the view of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v.\n\nM/s S.S.R. Syringes and Thermometers (supra) is unsustainable."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_29_33_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "NEW INDIA SUGAR WORKS ETC. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 27, 1981\n\n' [S. MU.RTAZA FAZAL Au AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] B\n\nRetrospective operation of law-Order levying duty on Khandsari issued- Order, whet.her applies to existing stocks or only to future stockSc--Price fixed less than manufacturing cost-Order, if liable to be quashed.\n\nOn the questions (I) whether an order imposing a levy on Khandsari could have retrospective operation so as to apply to sugar 1manufactured prior to the date of the order and (2) whether in fixing the price of levy sugar the Government C should consider that the price fixed should be sufficient to •cover ihe manufacturing cost.\n\nHELD : L It is not the question of retrospectivity of a statute but its actual working that is relevant.. It is settled law that where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included. Once the notifieation for imposing the levy was made it will naturally apply to the existing stocks of khandsari with the petitioners irrepsective of whether it was manufactured before or after . the order. [31B; 30G]\n\n2; The policy of price control has for its dominant object equitable disJ tribution and availability of: the commodity at fair price to benefifthe consumers; Individual interest, however. precious, must yield to the larger interest of the community namely the consumers. Even if the petitioners have to bar some loss there could be no question of the restrictions imposed on 'them being unreasonabfo. [32 Bl . ' ~-' .\n\nThe fixation of price would be in the interest of consumers rather than that of the producers.. Moreover since the petitioners were allowed to sell freely at any rate they: liked, the.remaining 50% of sugar after, ecluding the 50% w)lich they had \\o give to levey as also the produce by the second anf} third processes, the loss; if any, caused to the petitioners, would be mininal. (32 G] . '\\, ..\n\nORIGIJ\"AL JURISDICTION: Writ .Petition•Nos. 896/81,,, 8Q~~8901\n\n577~591, 592-606,. 6Q7-621,. 622:628,. 629-633, ; 634-37,·; 964~88, 544.\n\n545-575, 766-774; 775-776, 902-63, 897-901, 535-37, 532-J<J,, 529-$31,;\n\n639and540-43/8L ., ., .. 1 ,,.,, .. . . . . . (Under Article 32 of the Constlttio.n) ' . ' . ' ' . ''1\n\nR.K. Puri for the Petitioners 'hiWP 8'96/81; '• ; '' Vimal Dve for the Petitioners in WPs 865:890/81.\n\nA.K. Sen; R.M. Dube and Sal'va Mitter for' the 'Petitioers in WPs 540-43/81.\n\nA Soli J. Sorabjee, S.S. Ray, A.K. Sen and R.K. Jain for the Petitioners in WPs 529·37, 544-575, 577-638, 766-776 and 897-988/81.\n\nS.S. Ray, Soli J. Sorabjee and R.K. Jain for the Petitioners in WPs 634-37/81.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, O.P. Rana, and Mrs. S.\n\nB Dikshit for the Respondent (State of U.P.) in WPs 540-43, 529-37, 540-43, 544-77 and 5.77-638/81.\n\nMK. Banerjee Addi. Sol. Genl. and S.K. Gambhir for the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMiss A. Subhashini for Union of India.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. Having heard counsel for the parties at great length we are satisfied that there is no violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners enshrined in Art. l 9(1)(g) of the Constitution of India nor is Art. 14 attracted to the facts of the present case.\n\nThere is, therefore, no good ground to entertain the petitions. We would, however, like to add that on the materials placed before us the Government may consider the desirability of adopting such measures as may soften the rigours of the impugned orders which, though not arbitrary or excessive so as to violate Art. 14 or 19, do merit some consideration by the Government in order to effectuate the policy under which the impugned notification was made.\n\nThere are, however, two arguments urged before us which need special mention. In the first place it was submitted that in th~ U.P. cases the order impugned imposing a levy on the khandsaii produced by the petitioners cannot have any retrospective operation so as io apply to the stock of sugar manufactured prior to the date of the order and would apply only to the sugar produced after the coming into force of the impugned notification. So far as this argunment is concerned we find no substance in the same because it is not a question of retrospectivity of the statute but its actual working. Once the notification imposing the levy was made it will obviously apply to stock of khandsari produced by the petitioners either before or after the order. This principle has been clearly laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Trimbak Damodar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil and Ors.(1) where Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court regarding the\n\n(1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 700.\n\nI __ ,\n\n• ,\n\nNEW INDIA SUGAR WORKS v. U.P. STATE (Faza! Ali, J.) 31\n\nscope of a Rent Act and Amendment in Rent Act observed as A follows:\n\n\"In this connection it is relevant to distinguish between an existing right and a vested right.\n\nWhere a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included.\"\n\nThis Court.followed the dictum of Buckley, L.J. in the case of West v. Gwynne.(1) In the aforesaid case Buckley, L.J. while construing an amendment in the Act by which the contract was governed observed as follows : - ·\n\nc \"The Act of 1881 thus expressed that in the case of leases made either before or after the commencement of the Act a covenant not to assign without licence should be enforceable just as before......\n\nThis section is to be read as if' it were contained in the Act of 1881, and is dealing with a subjectmatter mentioned in the Act of 1881, and as to which there D is in that Act a provision that the enactment shall apply to leases made either before or after commencement of the Act.\"\n\nHardy, M.R. in a concurring judgment while construing second amendment in section 14 of the Conveyancing Act pointed out thus:- E\n\n\"In the first place, the language of the section is perfectly general, \"in all leases,\" and there is nothing in the section itself to confine it to leases subsequent to the Act.\n\nAlmost every statute affects rights which would have been in existence but for the statute.\"\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, once the notification for imposing the levy was made it will naturally apply to the stock of sugar which was with the petitioners irrespective of the fact that it was manufactured before or after the Order.\n\nIt was next strongly contended that in fixation of the price of levy sugar the Government has not taken into consideration the fact that the petitioners would undergo a serious loss because the price would not be sufficient even to cover their manufacturing cost. We\n\n(I) [1911) 2 Ch.D. I.\n\nare, however, unable to agree with this argument. The policy of price control has for its dominant object equitable distribution and availability of the commodity at fair price so as to benefit the consumers. It is manifest that individual interests; however, precious they may be must yield to the larger interest of the community namely, in the instant case, the large body of the consumers of sugar. In fact, even if the petitioners have to bear some loss there can be no question of the restrictions imposed on the petitioners being unreasonable. In Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. U.0.1.(1) this Court observed as follows ;·\n\n\"If fair price is to be fixed. leaving a reasonable margin of profit, there is never any question of infringement of fnda mental right to carry on business by imposing' reasonable restrictions.\n\nIn dtermh.; ing the reasonableness of 'a 'resti:ictlon imposed by law i_n the. field of industry, trade or commerce, it has to be remembered that the mere fact that some of those who are engaged fn these are alleging loss after the. impsitin of law will not render the law unreasonable.\" (Emphasis Supplied)\n\nSimilar view was taken by this Court in the case of Prag Ice and Oil Mills and Anr. etc. v. Union of lndia(2) where the Court speaking through Beg, CJ., observed as follows.:\n\n\"It has also to be remembered that tl1e object is to secure equitable distribution and availability at fair prices so that it is the interest of the consumer and not of the producer which is the determining factor in applying any objective tests at any particular time.\"\n\nIn this view of the matter the primary consideration in the fixation of price would be the interest of the consumers rather than that of the producers. Moreover, we think .that since the petitioners are allowed to sell freely at any rate they like the remaining fifty per cent of sugar (after excluding the fifty per cent which they have to give for levy) as also the produce by the second and third pro\n\ncesses, the loss if any caused to the petitioners would be minimal.\n\nLastly, it was urged that Sub-Clause (5)-which is Sub-Clause\n\n(3) in the notification issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government-\n\n(1) [1974] 2 S.C.R. 398.\n\n\n/--\n\n• ,\n\n' )\n\nNEW INDIA SUGAR WORKS v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 33\n\nin the impugned notification issued by the U.P. Government is extremely arbitrary inasmuch as by insisting on certificates it deprived the petitioners of the free ; sale of . sugar of the. remaining amount of fifty per cent as also the Khandsari produced by second and third processes.\n\nWe see some force in this argument but the Attorney General frankly conceded that he will see that no inconvenience on this score is caused to the petitioners.\n\nHe gave an undertaking to the Court that he will get the respective Sub-Clauses 5 and 3 of the impugned orders of the U.P. and Madhya Pradesh Governments deleted or withdrawn so as to allow the petitioners to sell the remaining amount of sugar as also the stock produced by the second and third processes without any hitch or hindrance. , This will, however, be subject to routine and quick inspection. In view of this undertaking, therefore we feel that a substantial part of the grievances of the petitioners would be removed. To be on the safe side, however we allow the stay granted in all the petitions to continue until the provisions of respective Sub-Clauses 3 and 5 passed by the State Governments concerned are withdrawn.\n\nI .\n\nWe may also emphasise the fact that the amount of sugar taken by the Government through levy should be properly stored and duly protected froni.. rain and rot and be despatched .to the various control depots expeditiously in order . to ensure a quick and. equitable distribution of the commodity amongst the people at moderate rates. .,.\n\nThe Government may also consider the desirability of giving a bare minimum hearing to the representative of the owners of the cane crushers in future before fixing the rate at which. the levy is ..\n\n' .\n\n~ ,; I ' ' • -, ': , . ' \", taken from the .owners so as ro see that the owners . of the crushers ' aie'ii.oui~'t to such grat loss that they are completely wiped out.\n\nfrom busi'ness. :1 .. _,, '\n\nWith these observations the petitions are dismissed. . '\n\nN.K.A> .r Petitions disrnlssed.·\n\n' ..\n\n.•I:\n\n'•i , I!\n\nL 1, 1_1\n\n, \"°J\n\n, I) -, 11 '.\n\n'. ! . ,_,, .... ,\n\n, -,..I l: II• !", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "NEW INDIA SUGAR WORKS ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEW INDIA SUGAR WORKS ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 27, 1981\n\n' [S. MU.RTAZA FAZAL Au AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2274, "end_char": 2284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R.K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2325, "end_char": 2334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nR.K. Puri for the Petitioners 'hiWP 8'96/81; '• ; '' Vimal Dve for the Petitioners in WPs 865:890/81."}}, {"text": "Vimal Dve", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nR.K. Puri for the Petitioners 'hiWP 8'96/81; '• ; '' Vimal Dve for the Petitioners in WPs 865:890/81."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2428, "end_char": 2436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen; R.M. Dube and Sal'va Mitter for' the 'Petitioers in WPs 540-43/81."}}, {"text": "R.M. Dube", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2438, "end_char": 2447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen; R.M. Dube and Sal'va Mitter for' the 'Petitioers in WPs 540-43/81."}}, {"text": "Sal'va Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2452, "end_char": 2465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen; R.M. Dube and Sal'va Mitter for' the 'Petitioers in WPs 540-43/81."}}, {"text": "A Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2506, "end_char": 2524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, S.S. Ray, A.K. Sen and R.K. Jain for the Petitioners in WPs 529·37, 544-575, 577-638, 766-776 and 897-988/81."}}, {"text": "S.S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2526, "end_char": 2534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, S.S. Ray, A.K. Sen and R.K. Jain for the Petitioners in WPs 529·37, 544-575, 577-638, 766-776 and 897-988/81."}}, {"text": "R.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2549, "end_char": 2558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, S.S. Ray, A.K. Sen and R.K. Jain for the Petitioners in WPs 529·37, 544-575, 577-638, 766-776 and 897-988/81."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2647, "end_char": 2663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ray, Soli J. Sorabjee and R.K. Jain for the Petitioners in WPs 634-37/81."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2717, "end_char": 2733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, O.P. Rana, and Mrs. S.\n\nB Dikshit for the Respondent (State of U.P.) in WPs 540-43, 529-37, 540-43, 544-77 and 5.77-638/81."}}, {"text": "O.P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2753, "end_char": 2762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, O.P. Rana, and Mrs. S.\n\nB Dikshit for the Respondent (State of U.P.) in WPs 540-43, 529-37, 540-43, 544-77 and 5.77-638/81."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nB Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2773, "end_char": 2786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, O.P. Rana, and Mrs. S.\n\nB Dikshit for the Respondent (State of U.P.) in WPs 540-43, 529-37, 540-43, 544-77 and 5.77-638/81."}}, {"text": "MK. Banerjee Addi. Sol. Genl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2878, "end_char": 2906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MK."}}, {"text": "S.K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2912, "end_char": 2924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and S.K. Gambhir for the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2964, "end_char": 2977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3040, "end_char": 3049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. Having heard counsel for the parties at great length we are satisfied that there is no violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners enshrined in Art."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3259, "end_char": 3266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3624, "end_char": 3631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle has been clearly laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Trimbak Damodar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil and Ors.(1) where Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court regarding the\n\n(1) [1962] Supp."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4688, "end_char": 4702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle has been clearly laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Trimbak Damodar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil and Ors.(1) where Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court regarding the\n\n(1) [1962] Supp."}}, {"text": "Rent Act and Amendment in Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4857, "end_char": 4891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Buckley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5205, "end_char": 5212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court.followed the dictum of Buckley, L.J. in the case of West v. Gwynne.(1) In the aforesaid case Buckley, L.J. while construing an amendment in the Act by which the contract was governed observed as follows : - ·\n\nc \"The Act of 1881 thus expressed that in the case of leases made either before or after the commencement of the Act a covenant not to assign without licence should be enforceable just as before......\n\nThis section is to be read as if' it were contained in the Act of 1881, and is dealing with a subjectmatter mentioned in the Act of 1881, and as to which there D is in that Act a provision that the enactment shall apply to leases made either before or after commencement of the Act.\""}}, {"text": "Hardy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5879, "end_char": 5884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardy, M.R. in a concurring judgment while construing second amendment in section 14 of the Conveyancing Act pointed out thus:- E\n\n\"In the first place, the language of the section is perfectly general, \"in all leases,\" and there is nothing in the section itself to confine it to leases subsequent to the Act."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5953, "end_char": 5963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8093, "end_char": 8096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Union of lndia(2) where the Court speaking through Beg, CJ.,"}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 S.C.R. 398", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9004, "end_char": 9023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.P. and Madhya Pradesh Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9664, "end_char": 9699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He gave an undertaking to the Court that he will get the respective Sub-Clauses 5 and 3 of the impugned orders of the U.P. and Madhya Pradesh Governments deleted or withdrawn so as to allow the petitioners to sell the remaining amount of sugar as also the stock produced by the second and third processes without any hitch or hindrance. ,"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_300_329_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK\n\nBANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nMarch 26, 1981\n\n[A.C. GUPTA AND A.P. SEN, Jl]\n\nBanking law-Documents submitted by the seller of goods not in conformity with instructions given in the letter of credit-Duties of the paying bank-Whether bound to determine by physical examination or on expert advice if the goods conformed to the contract-Nature and effect of letter of credit.\n\nPractice-Payment made b.v the paying bank \"under reserve\" as a result of discrepancies in the documents submitted by the seller-High Court, if could grant injunction restrai111i1g the paying bank from collecting the amount paid under reserve.\n\nConstitution of India-Article 136-Supreme Court, if would inte1fere with interlocutory orders under Art. 136.\n\nWords and Phrases-Payment \"under reserve\"-Meaning of.\n\nRespondent No. 2 entered into\"a contract to sell to respondent No. 3 one thousand metric tonnes of \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil\" valued at approxi mately Rs. 86 lakhs pursuant to which the buyer opened a letter of credit with the appellant bank. After despatching the goods to the various destinations to which they were instructed to send, the seller presented 20 sets of documents in the first lot and 27 sets of documents in the second, the aggregate value of which was equivalent to the amount of letter of credit. The appellant bank refused to make payment \"except under reserve\" pointing to a discrepancy in the railway receipts which stated \"Sizola .Brand Pure Mustard Oil Unrefined\" as against the descrip.\n\nti on in the instructions of the letter of credit \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil\".\n\nOn instructions from the seller the respondent bank received the money in respect of the first lot of 20 documents \"under reserve\" and credited the amount to their account with a specific notation that the amount was paid \"under reserve\" as a result of discrepancies between the railway receipts and the instruc lions in the letter of credit.\n\nIn respet of the second lot, the appellant bank refused payment on the ground of the discrepanies in the railway receipts as before as also on the ground that some of the railway receipts were \"stale\".\n\nIn the meantime the appellant bank asked the respondent to refund the amount paid in respect of the first lot of documents underreserve because the\n\nU. CO. BANK V. BANK OF INDlA 301\n\nbills were acceptable to the buyer due to discrepancies. Some correspondence ensued between the parties and the banks; eventually on the faith -of an undertaking given by the seller the appellant bank paid the remainder\" 3.mount in respect oft he 27 bills as well \"under reserve 0 so that the value in respect of both the sets of bills paid to the: sellers in two instalments was made uunder\n\nreserve••.\n\nThe sellers filed a suit in the High Court.\n\nA f:w days thereafter the appellant bank served a letter of demand on the respondent bank for the refund of the entire amount paid to it in respect of the two sets of bills together with inti!rest thereon because, according to it, the bills of exchange had not been retired by the buyer for the reasons that the railway receipts were state that the goods had not been supplied according to the term1 of th~ agreem!nt and that chemical an1lysis of the oil showed that it was not fit for human consumption.\n\nThe - respondent hank in tum wrote to the seller to refund the whole amount \\vhereupon the seller moved the High Court for the grant of an ex parte Od interim injunction restraining the appellant bank _from recalling or reci:iving the amount due from the respondent bank which was granted.\n\nI The High Court appointed a Court receiver with power to sell the goods without any obligation or liability to purchascrS as to their quality, quantity or edibility. At the __ S3.Ie the seller himself bought the goods for Rs. 18 1akhs odd.\n\nThe sale was confirmed by the High Court.\n\nThe single Judge of the liigh cOurt thereupon made the temporary Injunction absolute till the disposal of the suit filed by 1he sellers on the view that the appellant was not entitled under the termi of t..'13 letter of cr.!dit to unilaterally impose a condition of the payment \"under reserve'.' or refuse to pay against the\n\ndocument<> tendered by the sellers merely because of the alleged discrepancies.\n\nA Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed the appellant's appeal with the result that the seller received the whole of the amount of the\n\n~'-,.._,_Jetter of credit as welt as bought the whole lot of goods for Rs. 18.53 Iakhs.\n\n' - Oa the question whether the High Court should, in a transation between a banker and a banker, grant an injunction at the instance of the beneficiary of an irrevocable letter of credit restrainin'g -the issuing bank from recalling the amount paid under r\"\"5erve from the negotiating bank acting on behalf of the beneficiary against a document or guaranteefindemnity at the instance of the beneficiary and (2) whether this Court could, in a matter like this, depart from its normal practice and refuse to. interfere with an i_nterlocutory order under Article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD: J(a) The High Court was wrong in granting the temporary injunc~ tion restraining the appellant bank from recalling the amouD.t paid to the respondent bank. Courts usually refrain from granting injunction to restrain the performance of the contractual obligations arising out of a letter of credit or a\n\n• H\n\nbank guarantee between one bank and another. If such temporary injunctions were to be granted in a transaction between a banker and a banker, restraining a bank from recalling the amount due when payment is made under reserve to another bank or in terms of the letter of guarantee or credit executed by it, the whole banking system in the country would fail. [329 F, 324B-C]\n\n(b) In the instant case the appellant bank was under a duty to its constitu- B ent to scrutinise the documents and could not be compelled to make payment particularly when the description in the document did not tally with that in the letter of credit. It was fully entitled to exercise its judgment for its own protection. Instead of asking the buyers to change the description of the goods in the letter of credit the sellers sought to get over the irregularity by instructing the bankers to execute a letter of guarantee or indemnity. [325 G-H] c\n\n(c) The appellant bank knew little or nothing about the mustard oil. Its ciuty was not to go out and determine by physical examination of the consignments, or employment of experts, whether the goods actually conformed to the contract between the buyer and the seller, nor even determine either from its own or expert advice whether the documents called for the goods whic:1 the buyer would be bound to accept. [326 C-D]\n\n2(a) Bank issuing or confirming a letter of credit is not concerned with the underlying contract between the buyer and seller. The duties of a bank under a letter of credit are created by the document itself; in any case it has the power and is subject to the limitations which are given or imposed by it, in the absence of the appropriate provisions in the letter of credit. [319 B-C]\n\n(bJ The opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the banker and the seller of the goods which imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay. The banker is not bound or entitled to honour the bills of exchange drawn by the seller unless they and such accompanying documents as may be required thereunder, are in exact compliance with the terms of the credit.\n\nSuch documents must be scrutinised with meticulous care.' If the seller has complied with the terms of the letter of credit, however, there is an absolute obligation upon the banker to pay irrespective of any disputes between the buyer and the seller whether the goods are upto the contract or not. [317 C-D]\n\nTarapore and Co., Madras v. Tractors Export, Moscow and Anr. [1969] 2 S.C.R. 920 applied.\n\nHamzeh Malas and Sons v. British Imex Industries Lid. [1958] 2 Q.B. 127 and Urguhart Lindsay and Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bank Lid. [1922] 1 K.B. 318, referred to.\n\n(c) The refusal of the bank to honour a bill of exchange drawn by the seller on presentation of the proper documents constitutes a repudiation of the contract as a whole and the sellers are entitled to damages arising from such a breach. [317 El\n\n(d) A letter of credit constitutes the sole contract with the banker, and the bank issuing the letter of credit has no concern with any question that may arise between the seller and the purchaser of the goods, for the purchase price of which the letter of credit was issued: [319 G]\n\n(e) It is settled Jaw that in dealing with commercial letters of credit the documents tendered by the seller must comply with the terms of the letter of credit, and the banker owes a duty to the bllyer to enmre. that his instructions relative to the do; uments against which the letter of credit is to be honoured are complied with. [322 DJ\n\n(f) A payment under reserve is understood in banking transactions to mean B that the recipient of money may not deem it as his own but mu5t be prepared to return it. on demand. The balance of convenience clearly lies in allowing the normal banking transactions to go forward. The sellers have failed to establish that they would be put to an irreparable loss unless aJ> interim injunction was granted. [329 B-C)\n\nEnglish , Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v. Bank of South Africa [1922) 12 Ll.L. Rep. 21 st. 24, E1uitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd. [1927] 27 Ll.L. Rep. 49, Rayner v. Hambros Bank Ltd. [1943) 1 K.B. 37, Bank Melli Iran v. Barclays Bank [1951] 2 Ll.L. Rep. 367, Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking Co. [1921] 196 App. Div, 504 at p. 507; 188 NYS 162 at p. 164 and Laudisi v. American Exchange National Bank [1924] 239 NYS 234 ; 146 N.E. 347 at 348 referred to.\n\n3(a) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution though untrammelled, are subject to self-ordainerd restrictions. The Court does not, as a matter of rule, interfere with interlocutory orders, save under very exceptional circumstances. [327 HJ\n\n(b) In the instant case there was no justific1tion for the High Court to grant a temporary injunction under order 39 rules l and 2 of C.P.C. to the sellers, the effect of whkh virtually was to restrain a transaction between a banker and a banker. Courts view with disfavour the grant of such temporary injunction. The High Court has prejudged the whole issue by holding that the appellant could not unilaterally impose the conditions of payment 'under reserve' nor was it justified in holding that the documents were 'clean'. [328 BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.79 of the High Court of Bombay in Appeal No. 382 of 1979 in Suit No. 1028/78.\n\nP.S. Narim::m, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Modi, R.A. Kapadia, Raian Karnjawala and M.H. Shah for the Appellant.\n\nK.K. Venugopal, Vinay Bhasin, Rakesh Sahani, Vineet Kumar, G.E. Vahanvati and S.J. Thacker for Respondent No. 1.\n\nA Soli J. Sorabjee, E.J. Ba/sara, S. Ganes//, Narain and P.H. Amin for Respondent No.2 .\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Ba/c<k Mahto and B.P. Singh for Respondent No. 3. \"'(\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal by special leave is from an order of the Bombay High Court dated August 24, 1979, granting a temporary injunction restraining the appellant, the United Commercial Bank.\n\nBy this order the appellant has been restrained from making a recall of a sum of Rs. 85,84,456 paid by it under reserve against the relative bills of exchange drawn against the letter of credit issued by it, from respondent No. l, the Bank of India, and in terms of the Jetter of guarantee or indemnity executed by that Bank, in a suit based on a bankers' letter of credit.\n\nD The facts are somewhat complicated, but it is necessary to\n\ndisentangle the facts to bring out the point of law involved.\n\nThe respondent No. 2, Messrs Godrej Soaps Limited, hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiffs', by a contract dated February 2, 1978 agreed to supply to the respondent No. 3, the Biliar State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, hereinafter referred to as 'the Bihar Corporation', one thousand metric tonnes of 'Sizola Brand pure Mustard oil' the total value of which was apprpximately Rs. 86 lacs, packed in brand new leakproof 62,040 tins of net 16 kg. each at the rate of Rs. 13 7 per tin. The contract provided inter alia that the Bihar Corporation were to open a letter of credit with the appellant, the United Commercial Bank, for the said amount, which the Bihar Corporation_ duly did.\n\nThe letter of credit issued by the appellant was in the following terms:\n\nUnited Commercial Bank Nariman Point Branch\n\nUnited Commercial Bank Frazer Road, Patna Branch, 13th June, 1978.\n\nOffice : Malbourne Road, Calcutta-I.\n\n( i\n\nTo M/s Godrej Soaps Ltd., Eastern Express Highway, Vikhroli, Bombay 400 079.\n\nDear Sirs,\n\nLETTER OF CREDIT No. 1/78\n\nAt the request of Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd., Patna, we hereby establish our confirmed irrevocable Letter of Credit in favour of your good self for account of Messrs Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd., East Boring Road, Patna, for any sum or sums not exceeding in all Rs. 86,00,000 (say Rupees eighty six lakhs only) outstanding at anyone time available by your drafts at sight drawn on Messrs Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. without recourse to drawers for full invoice value of merchandise to be described in the invoice as : 62040 tins of Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil packed in brand new leak proof tins of net 16 kgs. each@ Rs. 137 (Rupees one hundred thirty seven only) per tin.\n\nDespatched from Bombay accompanied by the following documents:\n\n(i) -Signed detailed invoices in duplicate.\n\n(ii) Railway Receipts consigned to or endorsed in favour of UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK marked 'FREIGHT/ TO PAY' evidencing despatch by Railway of the merchandise as stated above.\n\nSigned Delivery order on your godown at ...... fvg. United Commercial Bank covering the delivery of the above-mentioned merchandise.\n\n(iii) Insurance Policies or Certificate covering usual transit risks and rail issued in duplicate and endorsed in blank by Transit Insurance at the cost of openers not exceeding one per cent of value of goods to be effected by beneficiary and to be included in the invoice.\n\nRailway Receipt/Delivery order must be dated not later than H 13.7.1978.\n\nBills of Exchange must be dated and negotiated not later than 20.7. 1978.\n\nsd. Accountant sd. Manager.\n\nThe schedule annexed specified the various destinations to which the goods were to be despatched.\n\nBetween June 22, 1978 and June 26, 1978, the plaintiffs from time to time despatched an aggregate of 24,400 tins of their mustard oil by invoices bearing Nos. 4501 to 4520 of the aggregate value of Rs. 36,52,960 to various destinations mentioned in the schedule annexed to the letter of credit. Between June 17 to July I, 1978 the plaintiffs further despatched an aggregate of 23,080 tills of the said goods covered by invoices Nos. 4521 to 4539 of the aggregate value of Rs. 34,70,312 on July 7 and 8, 1978 the plaintiffs also despatched an aggregate of 10,560 tins covered by invoices Nos. 4540 to 4547 of the aggregate value of Rs. 14,61,184.\n\nThe plaintiffs presented the documents for payment of Rs. 85,84,456 in two lots. There were twenty sets of documents in the first lot, the total value of which was Rs. 36,52,960, the second lot in 27 sets of the total value of Rs. 49,31,496. The first lot consisted of four sets of the value of Rs. 7.30 lacs, seven sets of Rs. 12.78 lacs, five sets of Rs. 9.13 lacs and four sets worth Rs. 7.30 lacs, the second of 27 sets, consisting of 19 sets of Rs. 34.17 lacs and 8 sets of Rs. 14.16 lacs. It is these two lots of documents which are the subject matter of the suit.\n\nWhen the documents were presented by the plaintiffs for payment of Rs. 36, 52,960 against the first lot of 20 sets, and Rs. 49,31,496 against the second lot in 27 sets, the appellant, United Commercial Bank refused to make payment 'except under reserve' on the ground of 'discrepancies'. The main discrepancy was that the goods were described in the railway receipts as \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil 'Unrefined\"'. The plaintiffs accordingly instructed their bankers, the Bank of India, to accept payment of Rs. 36,52,960 against the first lot of documents 'under reserve'.\n\nThe appellant accordingly made an aggregate payment of Rs. 36,52,960 to the Bank of India, that is, the negotiating bank, by three cheques of Rs. 7,30,502, Rs. 12, 78,636 and Rs. 16,43,832. It is significant to note that Bank of India in their turn credited the account of the plaintiffs, who were their constituents, alio 'under reserve', with a\n\nspecific notation that 'it was paid under reserve on account of discre A pancies'.\n\nAs regards the second lot comprising of 27 sets of documents, 19 sets were presented by the plaintiffs on July 3, 1978, with sight drafts of Rs. 1,82,648 each along with bills of exchange together with the relevant documents. On July 5, 1978 the appellant addressed a letter to the plaintiffs refusing to make any payment under the letter of credit due to 'discrepancies' as well as some of the railway receipts being 'stale'. It was clearly stated by the appellant \"We are unable to negotiate the documents and are returning the same to you. However, if you so desire, we shall send the documents on collection basis and shall remit the amount to you on receipt of proceeds\".\n\nAdmittedly, the discrepancies remained till July 12, 1978 as the description of goods in the railway receipts still remained \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil 'Unrefined\"' till the plaintiffs made a request to the Central Railways for the deletion of the word 'Unrefined'.\n\nOn July 12, 1978 the appellant addressed a letter to the Bank of India making a demand for the refund of the amount of Rs.36,52,960 paid under reserve in respect of the first lot of documents stating \"In this connection we wish to state that we are now advised by our Patna Office that the bills are not acceptable to the Corporation due to discrepancies. We shall therefore, thank you if you kindly remit the amount with interest at 5 per cent from the date of payment to you by us to the date of payment by you to us.\" On the same day, the appellant addressed a letter to the plaintiffs in regard to the second lot of 27 documents that the documents were not acceptable due to discrepancies and, therefore, no payment could be made against them under the letter of credit. On the next day, i.e., July 13, 1978 the plaintiffs addressed a letter to the appellant in respect of the first lot of 20 documents 'negotiated and paid by you under reserve', stating that the word 'Unrefined' in the railway receipts should not have been treated as a discrepancy, forwarding copies of telegrams sent by the Central Railway to the various destinations deleting the word 'unrefined', with a request that the appellant may, as regards the 27 documents of the second lot, 'negotiate the documents and pay for the same forthwith'.\n\nOn the same day, the plaintiffs also addressed a letter to the Bihar Corporation stating that the word 'Unrefined' had no relation to the quality but was inserted for the purpose of paying a lower freight, and further that the railway authorit.ies had agreed to amend the railway receipts by deleting the word 'Unrefined'.\n\nOn July 13, 1978 the plaintiffs addressed the following letter to their bankers, the Bank of India :\n\nBank of India, Foreign Exchange Dept., Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay 400 023.\n\nDear Sirs.\n\nJuly 13, 1978.\n\nAttn: MR. SJRUR\n\n19 documents for Rs. 1,92,648 each drawn under L/C No. 1 /78 dated 13.6.1978 of United Commercial Bank Patna Office.\n\nWe are enclosing 19 documents as referred to above - and request you to forward the same to the United Commercial Bank, Nariman Point, Bombay for negotiations of payment.\n\nWe request you to collect these funds forthwith and credit our Cash-Credit Account No.I with you.\n\nWe have complied with all the terms and conditions of the Letter of Credit and feel that United Commercial Bank would make the payment to you without reserve.\n\nYou may accept the payment under reserve if insisted upon by them.\n\nAsst.Financial Controller\n\nThe Bank of India accordingly wrote letter to the appellant stating \"we would accept payment under reserve\". On July 14, 1978 the appellant addressed a letter to the Bank of India returning the 27 documents relating to the second Jot signifying their inability to negotiate the documents due to discrepancies in the description of goods in the railway receipts, stating that mere deletion of the word 'Unrefined' could not make the railway receipts clean, and furthermore, because some of the railway receipts were 'stale'. It also intimated the plaintiffs by their letter of even date that they could lift the 'reserve' without obtaining prior permission of their constituents i.e. the Bibar Corporation.\n\n.. '(\n\n\\ l\n\nThe plaintiffs, being apprehensive that their bankers, the Bank of India, would be bound to refund Rs.36.52 lacs pursuant to the notice of demand served by the appellant inasmuch as the payment was made under reserve, kept a plaint ready on July 17, 1978 for grant of a perpetual injunction against the appellant, and on the same day addressed a letter to the appellant asking for payment of Rs.49,31,496 against the second lot of documents, enclosing a letter of guarantee or indemnity executed by their bankers, which reads :\n\nUnited Commercial Bank, Nariman Point,\n\nBombay 400021.\n\nDear Sirs,\n\nDate July 17,1978\n\nAttn : Mr.P.K. Sharma\n\nLetter of Credit No. I /78 of your Patna Office\n\ndated 13.6. 78-Two sets, each containing 19 & 8 D ,1egotiable documents.\n\nWe are in receipt of your )etters bearing No. Fex/Exp/78 dated 12.7.78 and 14.7.78 on the above subject.\n\nWe refer to our submission of 19 documents through our bankers, Bank of India and 8 documents submitted directly by us to you for negotiation and payment. We learnt from you that you have returned the set of 19 documents to Bank of India pointing out certain discrepancies in the documents to them.\n\nThe set of 8 documents has been returned to us by you stating certain discrepancies under cover of your letter Fex/Exp/GSR/78 dated 12.7.78.\n\nOne of the discrepancies pointed out by you in both the sets of documents ( 19 & 8 ) is regarding the appearance of the word 'unrefined' in the railway receipts, as the same . word does not appear in the Letter of Credit along with the words \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil\". Out of abundant precaution, we then obtained and gave you copies of telegrams issued by the Central Railway to the Station\n\nMasters of the various destination stations, to which the H goods were booked, to the effect that the word \"unrefined\" is superfluous and, therefore, deleted. You have taken\n\nthe stand that by this action of the Central Railway also the documents still does not continue to be in accordance with the letter of credit.\n\n Out of abundant precaution, we are now submitting herewith the railway receipt returned by you wherein the word \"unrefined\" has been physically deleted by the railway authorities.\n\nWe are also enclosing a letter of undertaking which is J letter of undertaking issued by our bankers, the Bank of India, in your name indemnifying you against demurrage, wharfage and such other charges which you may have to pay at various destinations, where the goods have been consigned. This action of ours is without prejudice to any of our rights and contentions.\n\nWe now request you to Pay for these documents forthwith.\n\nDirector.\n\nThe Bank of India executed a letter of indemnity or guarantee to the effect :\n\nUnited Commercial Bank, Mafatlal Centre, Nariman Point Branch, Bombay.\n\nDear Sirs,\n\nBank of India 70/80, M.G.Road Bombay-400023. 18th July, I 978.\n\nIn consideration of your having negotiated Documentary Bills of Exchange drawn by Godrej Soaps Ltd., drawn on Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corpn. dated (various dates) under the commercial letter of credit. No. L/C 1/78 dt.13. 6.78 issued by United Commercial Bank, Frazer Road Branch for account of Bihar State Food and Civil Supplies Corpn., We hereby 'unconditionally' agree to hold you harmless and indemnified for all consequences of nonacceptance and/or non/payment of t_his/these bill (s) exchange by reason of the following discrepancies claims by you:\n\n, 1\n\nu. co. BANK v. BANK OF !NOIA (Sen, J.)\n\nWe have made arrangements for due payment of this/ these bill (s).\n\nWe further unconditionally agree that in the event of the bills being dishonoured on due presentation on account of the above discrepancies claimed by you to reimburse and on demand the equivalent of the above mentioned bill(s) together with all other expenses, demurrage and all such other charges incurred by you in connection with dishonoured bill (s).\n\nNotwithstanding anything contained hereinbefore our liability under this bond is restricted to Rs. 86,00,000 (Rupees Eighty Six lacs only) apart from charges enumerated above and it will remain in force till 17.8.1978. Unless a claim under the guarantee is made against us in writing and received by us before that date all your rights under the said guarantee shall be forfeited and we shall be relieved and discharged from all liability thereunder.\n\nfor BANK OF INDIA sd. P. Accountant sd. P. Manager\n\nIt is significant to note that it was represented by the Bank of India acting on behalf of the plaintiffs,\"We have made arrangements for the payment of these bills\", meaning thereby that the Bihar Corporation had agreed to retire the bills of exchange.\n\nOn July 19, 1978 the representative of the plaintiffs, Messrs Godrej Soaps Ltd. met the representatives of the appellant, the United Commercial Bank at Bombay. It was pointed out to him that first set of 20 documents had not ben accepted by the Bihar Corporation due to discrepancies and that the appellant had, therefore, by their letter dated July 12, 1978 made a demand for refund of Rs. 36,52,960.\n\nAs regards the second lot of 27 documents towards which the balance amount of Rs. 49,31,496 was payable to the Bank of India, in terms of the letter of indemnity or guarantee executed by it, he was informed that the instructions were awaited from the head office and was asked to come in the evening on the same day.\n\nThe plaintiffs on the same day, i. e., on July 19, 1978, brought the suit in the Original Side of the Bombay High Court alongwith an application for the grant of a temporary injunction to restrain the appellant from recalling the amount of\n\nA Rs. 36,52,960 but the learned Single Judge, Bharucha\n\nJ., declined to grant an ex parte ad interim injunction, while allowing liberty to the plaintiffs to take out notice of motion returnable on August 4, 1978 but it appears that no such notice was ever taken out.\n\nB When the appellant came to know of the suit, the plaintiff's\n\nrepresentative made an endorsement at the foot of the letter dated July 17, 1978:\n\nAs per Mr. Sharma's talk with Mr.K.R. Gokulam we hereby undertake not to proceed with this suit. sd.R.V. Shekar\n\n19.7 1978\n\nOn the faith of the undertaking the appellant made payment of Rs.49,31,496 to the Bank of India in terms of the letter of indemnity.\n\nThere is controversy between the parties as to what transpired \" before the payment of Rs.49,31,496 and as to the meaning of the aforesaid endorsement.\n\nWe refrain from making any observations as they would tend to prejudice the rights of the parties. But one thing is clear that R. V. Shekar, Assitant Financial Controller, Godrej Soaps was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the word 'we' meant Messrs.\n\nGodrej Soaps Limited'.\n\nFurther, that payment was secured by making the endorsment.\n\nThe Bank of India addressed two letters dated July 20,1978 to the plaintiffs, that their account had been credited with Rs. 34,70,312 and Rs. 14,61,184 i.e., Rs. 49,31,496 representing the value of the second lot of 27 documents, 'under reserve'.\n\nFrom the narration of these facts, prima facie it appears that the payment of Rs. 36,52,960 against the first lot of 20 documents made by the appellant to the Bank of India, was a payment made 'under reserve' and that of Rs. 49, 31,496 was also made 'under reserve' as well as against the letter of guarantee or indemnity executed by it.\n\nOn August 2, 1978 the appellant served a letter of demand on the Bank of India, for refund of Rs. 85,84,456 together with interest thereon at 15% per annum from the date of payment by it to th date of refund, stating that the bills of exchange had not\n\n~.\n\nbeen retired by the Bihar Corporation, that is the buyers, due to discrepancies. The letter reads :\n\nFex/exp/ I 1 I0/78 2nd August, 1978 Bank of India 70/80 M.G. Road, Bombay 400 023.\n\nAttn: Mr. PUDV AL, Manager (Advance)\n\nDear Sirs,\n\nRe: Your Guarantee Re. C/72/943 .dated 18th July 1978 in our favour for Rs.86.00,000 Document drawn by M/s Godrej Soaps Ltd., under our Frazer Road, Patna Branch L/C I /78 dated 13.6.1978-negotiated by us under reserve.\n\nPlease refer to our letter No. 646/78 dated !st August, 1978.\n\nJn this connection we are now advised by our Patna Office that the bills have not been accepted by the drawees, Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Limited due to /he discrepancies. Our Patna Office is, therefore, arranging to return the documents to us which we hereby undertake to forward to you when received.\n\nIn terms of your Guarantee No. 8/72/943 dated 18th July 1978 tor Rs. 86,00,000 and in terms of our letters date 24.6.1978, 27.6.1978 and 28.6.1978 and two letters of 19.7.1978, under cover of which we had made payment of the bills to you, we hereby call upon you to refund to us the amount of bills viz.\n\nRs. 85,84,456 (Rupees Eighty five lacs eighty four thousand four hundred and fifty six) together with interest from the date of payment by us to you to the date of refund by you to us@ 15%per annum.\n\nIn the meantime, please note that the documents are held by us at your sole risk and responsibility. You may, if you so desire protect the merchandise including keeping insurance covernote valid.\n\nPlease treat this as MOST URGENT.\n\nsd ......... Manager\n\nThe 47 Notary's protest Certificates show that when the bills of exchange were re-presented for payment to the Bihar Corporation on August 2, 1978 the drawees dishonoured the bills of exchange on August 3, 1978 for the reason that (1) the railway receipts accompanying the bills were 'stale', (2) the goods had not been supplied as per the terms of agreement, and (3) the chemical analysis showed that the oil required refinement before being fit for human use,.\n\nThe Bank of India accordingly addressed a letter to the plaintiffs on the next day i.e. August 4, 1978 giving intimation that the appellant by its letter dated August 2, 1978 had made a demand for refund of the amount of Rs. 85,84,456 paid under reserve and in terms of its letter of guarantee or indemnity, seeking their b_'instructions' in the matter.\n\nOn August 6, 1978 which was a Sunday, -the plaintiffs moved learned Single Judge at his residence, alongwith an affidavit of their Sales Manager stating that unless an injunction was granted the Bank of India, according to the banking practice, would make payment of Rs. 85,84,456/- to the appellant, on the -commencement of the banking hours on August 7, 1978. The learned Single Judge granted an ex-parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from recalling or receiving the amount due from the Bank of India.\n\nOn December 17, 1978, the learned Single Judge appointed the Court receiver to be the ad interim receiver with power to sell the goods in question eithet in one lot or separate lots, on 'as is where is basis', without any obligation or liability to purchasers thereof as to quality, quantity or edibility of the said goods. On March 27, 1979 the Court receiver accepted the offer of the plaintiffs to ouy the goods for Rs. 18,53,000 and the sale was confirmed by the High Court on April 4, 1979.\n\nThe learned Single Judge by his order dated August 24, 1979 made the temporary injunction absolute till the disposal of the suit on the view that the appellant was not entitled under the terms of the G letter of credit, to unilaterally impose the condition of payment 'under reserve' or refuse to pay against the documents tendered by the plaintiffs merely because of the alleged discrepancies, nor was it open to it to reject the documents as stale, for in his view, there were indeed no stale documents.\n\nUpon these grounds, he held that the H plaintiffs had aprimafacie case. He, however, added a rider that (1) the- Bank of India was left free to decide whether or not the conditions for payment under the letter of indemnity had been satisfied so\n\nas to justify the making of payment thereunder to the appellant, and\n\n(2) the appellant was not restrained from making a claim upon the Bank of India or from receiving from it the amount payable in terms of the letter of indemnity nor was the Bank of India restrained from making payment thereunder.\n\nThe appellant being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single B Judge dated August 24, 1979 preferred an appeal but a Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed the appeal on October\n\n17, 1979.\n\nThe result of all this has been that the plaintiffs have not only received Rs. 85,84,456 towards the price of 1000 metric tonnes of 'Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil', but also have the mustard oil in question on payment of Rs. 18,53,000.\n\nThe repercussions arising from the learned Single Judge's order dated August 24, 1979 are reflected in the correspondence that ensued between the parties. There is no need to refer to all the letters\n\nexcept a few.\n\nThe plaintiffs by their solicitor's letter dated August D 29, 1979, drew the attention of the Bank of India to the learned Single Judge's order granting injunction, and 'instructed' it not to pay. It reads :\n\nThe said interim order makes it absolutely clear that our clients will in no way be liable and responsible to return the amounts received under reserve and therefore our clients are in no way liable to pay any sum to UCO Bank and therefore you are also not liable at present to pay any sum to UCO Bank under the said letter of indemnity.\n\nIn the circumstances, it will not only be improper but illegal for you to make any payment to UCO Bank.\n\nIn the circumstances, we have been instructed by our clients to request you which we hereby do not to make any payment to UCO Bank. In spite of what is stated herein, if any payment is made by you to UCO Bnk, the same will not be binding on our clients and you will not be entitled to debit such amount to our clients current account with you and our clients will refuse to reimburse you any sum so wrongfully paid by you. Please note that if any payment is made by you, it will be entirely at your risk and peril.\n\nThe appellant by its letter dated August 31, 1979 addressed to the Bank of India made a demand for payment of Rs. 85,84,456 in\n\nterms of the letter of guarantee or indemnity.\n\nBut this was of not avail since the Bank of India as instructed by the plaintiffs, sent a letter dated October 16, 1979 to the appellant, by which it referred to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and refused to make any payment, stating :\n\nIn its order dated 24th August, 1979 the Court has stated that there is no provision regarding staleness of the Railway Receipts in the letter of Credit and it is not open to Bihar Food Corporation to recall the payments made on that ground. Further, it is stated in the said order that 'the protests made upon dishonour of the bills b)' these second defendants show that no discrepancy was made a ground of dishonour.\n\nHaving regard to the observatio.ns in the order of the Court, it cannot be said that the Bills were dishonoured on the presentation on account of the discrepancies.\n\nFurther, the bills do not appear to have been duly presented.\n\nWe understand that you have not appealed against this order. In view of the aforesaid observations in the said order dated 24th August, 1979 the terms of the indemnity cannot be said to have been complied with so as to enable us to make payment to you.\n\nThe Bank of India went on to say that in the circumstances set out above, it had been advised that it was not proper for it to make any payment under the letter of guarantee to the appellant unless it was established in proper proceedings that the terms of the mandate had been complied with so as to entitle it to receive payment and to enable the Bank of India to make payment to it.\n\nThis was contrary to its earlier stand taken in the affidavit filed in June, 1979, in opposition to the notice of motion, by whk:h it denied that 'it was trying to wriggle out of its obligations' under the letter of guarantee or indemnity and by which it said that it 'submits to the order of the Court'.\n\nThe main point in controvery is: Whether the Court should in a transaction between a banker and a banker grant an injunction, at the instance of the beneficiary of an irrevocable letter of credit, re- H straining the issuing bank from recalling the amount paid under reserve from the negotiating bank, acting on behalf of the beneficiary against a docwmeot of i:uarantee/indemnity at the instance of the\n\n--(\n\nbeneficiary ? Another question also arises as to whether the Court A should not in a matter like this, depart from its normal practice, and refuse to interfere with an interlocutory order under Art. 136 of the Y Constitution.\n\nThe nature of the contractual obligations flowing from a banker's letter of irrevocable credit and more particularly, the rights of the seller as the accredited party or beneficiary of the credit, against the is>uing and drawee bank was dealt with by this Court in Tarapore and Co. Madras v. Tractors Export, Moscow and Anr.(1) It was held that the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the banker and the seller of the goods which imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay. It was. however, pointed out relying on a passage in \"Chalmers' Bills of Exchange\" that it can hardly be over-emphasised that the banker is not bound or entitled to honour the bills of exchange drawn by the seller unless they, and such accompanying documents as may be required thereunder, are in exact compliance with the terms of the credit'. Such documents must be scrutinised with meticulous care.\n\nIf the seller has complied with the terms of the letter of credit, however, there is an absolute obligation upon the banker to pay irrespective of any disputes there may be between the buyer and the seller as to whether the goods are up to contract or not. The Court relied upon the two decisions in Hamzeh Malas and Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd.(2) and Urguhart Dnds:iy and Co. Ltd. v. E:istern\n\nBank Ltd.(3) and observed at p. 930 of the Report, that the refusal of the bank to honour the bills of exchange drawn by the seller on presentation of the proper documents constituted a repudiation of the contract as a whole, and the sellers were entitled to damages arising from such a breach.\n\nIn Stein v. Hambro' s Bank of Northern Commerce(4) a contract for the sale of hides by an English seller to a buyer from Venice, to be shipped from India, was financed by an irrevocable letter of credit.\n\nThe buyer, contending that a condition had not been met, instructed the bank to cancel the credit and to refuse acceptance, which was accordingly done.\n\nIn an action by the seller against the issuing bank it was held that there had been a breach of the letter of credit contract and that the seller could recover the amount of the bill of\n\n\n(2) [1958] 2 Q.B. 127.\n\n(3) [ l922] I K.B. 318.\n\n(4) [1921] 9 Ll.L. 433, rev. [1922] 10 Ll.L. Rep. 529 (CA).\n\nexchange for which acceptance was refused. The case was concerned chiefly with the question of the measure of damages.\n\nThe right of the seller to maintain the action, if the conditions had been met, seems to have been assumed without discussion.\n\nThe theory underlying this result is that the issuing bank is not concerned with the sales contract at all.\n\nRowlatt J. said :\n\nThe obligation of the bank is absolute, and is meant to be absolute, that when the documents are presented they have to accept the bill. That Lis the commercial meaning ofit.\n\nThe fulfilment of the terms of the sales contract is a matter for the seller and the buyer alone.\n\nIn Urguhart, Lindsay and Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bank Ltd. (supra) Rowlatt J. held that the position of the banker under an irrevocable credit is in law the same as that of a person who has contracted to buy a shipping document representing the goods shipped, or to be shipped, under the contract between the beneficiary and the person at whose instance the credit has been issued. The credit in this case was opened in pursuance of a contract between Urguhart, Linsday and Co. and Benjamin Jute Mills, by which the former were to manufacture certain machinery and deliver it f.o.b. Glasgow, for shipment to Calcutta. Two instalments of the machinery were manufactured and shipped and duly paid for by the bank. A third instalment was also manufactured and shipped, but the bank in this case refused to take up the shipping documents and honour the draft on the ground that items for extra cost of labour were included in the invoice price of the goods and that the bank had been instructed by Benjamin Jute Mills to refuse payment in those circumstances.\n\nRowlatt J. held that in such a case, the banker must accept and pay for the documents irrespective of any defence which there may be to a claim under the contract of sale and that such defence is solely a matter to be fought out between the buyer and the seller.\n\nIn Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits, Sixth Edn. p. 21, the nature of the obligation created by a banker's commercial credit is succinctly stated. A seller of goods relying on such an instrument believes that he has 'the direct obligation of the issuing bank running in his favour, enforceable by him against that bank, that it will pay his drafts if drawn in compliance with the terms of the letter of credit'. Banks are not concerned with\n\nthe sales contract or the goods ; if it were otherwise credit business A would be impossible.\n\nBanker's commercial credits are almost without exception everywhere made subject to the code entitled the 'Uniform Customs and Prnctices for Documentary Credits', by which the General Provisions and Definitions and the Articles following are to \"apply to all documentary credit and binding upon all parties thereto unless expressly agreed\". A banker issuing or confirming an irrevocable credit usually undertakes to honour drafts negotiated, or to reimburse in respect of drafts paid, by the paying or negotiating intermediate banker and the credit is thus in the hands of the beneficiary binding against the banker. The credit contract is independent of the sales contract on which it is based, unless the sales contract is in some measure incorporated. Unless documents tendered under a credit are in accordance with those for which the credit calls and which are embodied in the terms of the paying or negotiating bank, the beneficiary cannot claim against the paying . bank and it is the paying bank's duty to refuse payment.\n\nGeneral Provision (c) of the Uniform Customs states that :\n\n(c) Credits, by their nature; are separate transactions\n\nfrom the sales or other contracts on which they may be E based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contracts.\n\nand Article 8 emphasises this in providing that :\n\n(a) In documenta:ry credit operations all parties concerned deal in documents and not in goods.\n\nThe authorities are uniform to the effect that a letter of credit constitutes the sole contract with the banker, and the bank issuing\n\nthe letter of credit has no concern with any question that may arise G between the seller and the purchaser of the goods• for the purchase price of which the letter of credit was issued.\n\nThere is also no lack of judicial authority which lay down the neceesity of strict compliance both by the seller with the letter of credit and by the banker with his customer's instructions. In English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v. Bank of South Africa (1) Bailhache, J. said: H\n\n(!) (1922] 13 Ll.L. Rep. 21 st. 24.\n\nIt is elementary to say that a person who ships in reliance on a Jetter of credit must do so in exact compliance with its terms.\n\nIt is also elementary to say that a bank is not bound or indeed entitled to honour drafrs presented to it under a letter of credit unless those drafts with the accompanying documents are in strict accord. with the credit as opened.\n\nAs Lord Sumner said in Equitable Trust Co. of New York v.\n\nDawson Partners Ltd.,(1) approving the dictum of Bailhache J. :\n\nIt is both common ground and common sense that in such a transaction the accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorised to accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents strictly observed. There is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well.\n\nBusiness could not proceed securely on any other lines.\n\nIn Rayner v. Hambros Bank Ltd.(2) the credit called for documents covering a shipment of 'Coromandel groundnuts' ; the invoice tendered was for Coromandel groundnuts, but the bill of lading evidenced a shipment of 'machine-shelled groundnut kernels'; country of origin : British India, and Hambros Bank refused to pay on the ground that the letter of credit called for an invoice and bill of lading both covering a shipment of 'Coromandel groundnuts' whereas the bill of lading did not describe the goods in those terms, their attitude being upheld by the Court of Appeal.\n\nMackinnon, L.J. after quoting Bailhache, J., in English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v. Bank o, f South Africa (supra) and Lord Sumner in Equtiable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd.\n\n(supra) laying down that a person who ships in reliance on 11; letter of credit must do so in exact compliance with its terms, observed :\n\nThe defendant bank were told by their Danish principals to issu~ a letter of credit under which they were to accept documents-an invoice and bills of lading-covering ''Coromandel groundnuts in bags\" .. They were offered bills of lading covering \"machine-shelled groundnut \"kernels\". The country of origin was stated to be British\n\n(1) [1927] 27 Ll.L. Rep. 49.\n\n(2) [1943] 1 K.B. 37.\n\nIndia. The words in that bill of lading clearly are not the A same as those required by the letter of credit. The whole case of the plaintiffs is, in the words of Lord Sumner, that \"they are almost the same, or they will do just as well\".\n\nThe bank, if they had accepted that proposition, would have done so at their own risk.\n\nI think on pure principle B that the bank were entitled to refuse to accept this sight draft on the ground that the documents tendered, to bill of lading in particular, did not comply precisely with the terms of the letter of credit which they had issued.\n\nThe learned Judge dealing with that part of the judgment of Atkinson, J., in which he said that \"a sale of Coromandel ground nuts is universally understood to be a sale of machine-shelled kernels\", said :\n\nWhen Atkinson, J., says that it is \"universally under\n\nstood\" he means that these gentlemen from Mincing Lane D have told him : \"We dealers in Mincing Lane all understand these things.\n\nWe understand that 'Coromandel groundnuts' are machine-shelled kernels, and we understand when we see 'C.R.S.' that that means 'Coromandels'.\n\nI think that is a perfectly impossible suggestion . . It is quite impossible to suggest that a banker is to be affected with E knowledge of the customs and customary terms of every one of the thousands of trades for whose dealings he may issue letters of credit.\n\nIn Bank Melli Iran v. Barclays Bank(1) the documents evidencing a shipment of '100 new, good, Chevrolet trucks' were held not to be a good tender under a credit calling for 'new' trucks. Mc Nair J. held that all the documents tendered and accepted by the defendants were defective and consequently the defendants were not entiled to debit the plaintiff with the amount paid against these documents, although the defendants succeeded on the ground that the plaintiffs had by their conduct ratified the defendant's action in accepting the documents. The dicta in American cases are to the' same effect. In Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking Co. (2) Smith J. said :\n\nA party who is entitled to draw against a letter of credit must strictly observe the terms and conditions under\n\n(I) [l 951] 2 Ll.L. Rep. 367.\n\n(2) (1921] 196 Appl. Div. 504 at p. 507; 188 N.Y.S. 162 at p. 164.\n\nwhich the credit is to become available, and, if he does not, and the bank refuses to honour his draft, he has no cause of action against the bank.\n\nAgain, Hiscock, C. J. in L:iudisi\n\nv. American Exchange Nationc! Bank (1) said :\n\nThe bank has the power and subject to the limitations which are given and imposed by (the customer's) authority.\n\nIf it keeps within the powers conferred it is protected in the payment of the draft. If it transgresses those limitations, it pays at its peril.\n\nThe relevant authorities uniformly lay down in dealing with commercial letters of credit that the docume:lts tendered by the seller must comply with the terms of the letter of credit, and that the banker owes a duty to the buyer to ensure that the buyer's instructions relative to the documents against which the letter of credit is to be lron0ured are complied with.\n\nThe rights of a banker are described in Halsbury's Laws of E1gland, 4th Edn., vol.3, para 141 at p. 106 :\n\nUnless documents tendered under a credit are in accordance with those for which the credit calls and which are em bodied in the promise of the paying or negotiating banker, the beneficiary cannot claim against the paying banker, and it is the paying banker's duty to refuse payment.\n\nThe documents must be those called for, and not documents which are almost the same or which will do just as well.\n\nThe banker is not called upon to know or interpret trade customs and terms. It has been held that where mandate is ambiguous and a paying banker acts in a reasonable way in pursuance of it, he may be protected.\n\nBut this general rule cannot be stertched so far as to protect a banker who pays against docliments describing goods in terms which are similar to, but not exactly the same as, those stipulated in the credit.\n\nThe description of the goods in the relative bill of lading must be the same as the description in the letter of credit, that is, the goods themselves must in each case be described in identical terms, even H though the goods differently described in the two documents are, in\n\n(I) [1924] 239 N.Y. 234: 146 N.E. 347 at 348.\n\nr !\n\n'1·\n\nfact, the same. It is the description of the goods that is all important.\n\nThe reason for this requirement is stated in Davis' Law Relating to Commercial Letters of Credit, 2nd Edn. p. 76 :\n\nIt is not only the buyer who faces the risk of dishonesty or sharp practice on the part of the seller.\n\nFor, in many instances, the banker looks to the goods for reimbursment of the whole or part of the amount he pays under the letter of credit. It is equally to his interests to ensure that such documents are called for by the letter of credit as will result in goods of the contract descripton being ultimately delivered.\n\nThe buyer is not compelled to enter into the sales contract nor , is the banker compelled to issue the letter of credit.\n\nIf either of these contracts is entered into then it is for the buyer and the banker respectively to safeguard themselves by the terms of the contract.\n\nOtherwise they must be prepared to bear any ensuing loss.\n\nBut the liability thus imposed on the issuing banker carries with it a corresponding right that the seller shall, on his part, comply with the terms of the letter of credit and the seller's obligations have been construed as strictly as those of the banker.\n\nWe have already referred to the statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of England w:1ich found a place in Paget's L1w of Banking, 8th Edn. p.648, and we may at the risk of repetiton reproduce the same, to the effect :\n\nUnless documents tendered under a credit are in accordance with those for which the credit calls and which are embodied in the promise of the intermediary or issuing banker, the beneficiary cannot claim against him; and it is the banker's duty to refuse payment. The documents must be those called for and not documents which are almost the same or which seem to do just as well.\n\nIt the light of these principles, the rule is well established that a bank issuing or confirming a letter of credit is not concerned with\n\nthe underlying contract between the buyer and seller.\n\nDuties of a H bank under a Jetter of er.edit are created by the document itself, but in any case it has the power and is subject to the limitations\n\nA which are given or imposed by it, in the absence of the appropriate provisions in the letter of credit.\n\nIt is somewhat unfortunate that the High Court should have granted a temporary injunction, as it has done in this case, to restrain the appellant from making a recall of the amount of B Rs. 85,84,456 from the Bank of India in terms of the letter of guarantee or indemnity executed by it. The courts usually refrain from granting injunction to retrain the performance of the contractual obligations arising out of a letter of credit or a bank guarantee between one bank and another. If such temporary injunctions were to be c granted in a transaction between a banker and a banker, restraining a bank from recall'ing the amount due when payment is made under reserve to another bank or in terms of the letter of guarantee or credit executed by it, the whole banking system in the country would fail.\n\nIn view of the banker's obligation under an irrevocable letter D of credit to pay, his buyer-customer cannot instruct him not to pay.\n\nIn Hamzeh Malas v. British lmex Industries Ltd. (1) the plaintiffs, the buyers, applied for an injunction restraining the sellers, the defendants, from drawing under the credit established by the buyer's bankers. This was refused, Jenkins, LJ. stating, at p. 129, that :\n\nE ...... the opening of a confirmed letter of credit\n\nconstitutes a bargain between the banker and the vendor of the goods which imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay ...\n\nand that 'this was not a case in which the Court ought to exercise its discretion and grant the injunction'.\n\nThe same considerations apply to a bank guarantee.\n\nA letter of credit sometimes resembles and is analogous to a contract of guarantee. In Elian and Anr v. Matsas and Ors. (')\n\nLord Denning, M.R., while refusing to grant an injunction stated :\n\n...... a bank guarantee is very much like a letter of credit.\n\nThe courts will do their utmost to enforce it according to its terms.\n\nThey will not in the ordinary course of things, interfere by way of injunction to prevent its due implementation. Thus they refused in Malas v. British lmex Industries\n\n(I) [1958] 2 Q.B. 127.\n\n(2) [1966] 2 LI. Rep. 495.\n\n-~:\n\nu. co. BONK v. BANK OF INDIA (Sen, J.) 325\n\nLtd. But that is not an absolute rule. Circumstances may A arise such as to warrant interference by injunction.\n\nA Bank which gives a peformance guarantee must honour that guarantee according to its terms. In R.D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd., (1) Kerr, J. considered the position in principle. We would like to adopt a passage from his judgment at p. 761 :\n\nIt is only in exceptional cases that the courts will interfere with the machinery of irrevocable obligations assumed by b:1.nks.\n\nThey are the lif e-Nood of international commerce.\n\nSuch obligations are regarded as collateral to the underlying rights and obligations between the merchants at either end of the banking chain. Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, the courts will leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contracts by litigation or arbitration as available to them or stipulated in the contracts. The courts are not concerned with their difficulties to enforce such claims; these are risks which these merchants take. In this case the plaintiffs took the risk of the unconditional wording of the guarantees.\n\nThe machinery and commitments of banks are on a different level. They must be allowed to be honoured, free from in?erference by the courts.\n\nOtherwise, trust in international commerce could be irreparably damaged. (Emphasis supplied.)\n\nThe observations of Kerr, J. have been cited with approval by Lord Denning, M. R. in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd.(2)\n\nThe appellant was under a duty to its constituent, the Bihar Corporation, to scrutinize the documents, and could not be compelled to make payment particularly w:1e11 the description in the documents did not tally with that in the letter of credit.\n\nIt was fully entitled to exercise its judgment for its own protection. When the appellant againsMhe first lot of 20 documents refused to make payment except 'under reserve' and against the second lot of 27 documents even 'under reserve' the remdy of the plaintiffs was to approach the 'openers', i.e., Bihar Corporation, to instruct the appellant to effect\n\n(l) [[Q77] 3 W.L.R. 752.\n\n(2) [1977] 3 W.L.R. 764.\n\nA a change in the description of the goods from 'Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil' to Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil \"Unreii.1ed\" in the letter of credit. Instead of adopting that course, the irregularity in the description in documents tendered for payment was sought to be got over by the plaintiffs by instructing their bankers, the Bank of India, to execute a letter of guarantee or indemnity.\n\nWhen the bills B of exchange tendered to the Bihar Corporation were dishonoured when presented on August 3, 1978, the legal consequences must follow as between the appellant and the Bank of India.\n\nThere was the inevitable chain of events which could not be prevented by the grant of an injunction. c\n\nThe appellant presumably knew little or nothing about mustard oil.\n\nBankers are not dealers in mustard oil in such a case as this, but dealers in documents only.\n\nThe appellant as the issuing bank was presented with documents and asked to pay a very large sum of money in exchange for them.\n\nIts duty was not to go out and determine by physical examination of the consignments, or employment of experts, whether the goods actually conformed to the contracts between the buyer and the seller, nor even determine either from its own or expert advice whether the documents called for the goods which the buyer would e bound to accept.\n\nThe banker knows only the letter of credit which is the only authority to act, and the documents which are presented under it. If these documents conform to the letter of credit, he is bouncl to pay. If not, he is equally not bound to pay. The letter of credit called for 'Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil' while the railway receipts carried the description \"Siloza Brand Pure Mutsard Oil 'Unrefined' \" and it was not within the province of the appellant to say that the latter description meant identicaily the same thing as the former.\n\nIn an action against a purchaser for reimburseme'lt, it is only necessary to prove that the goods tendered were the g.)ods purchased, no matter how described, i.e., the purchaser was offered that which he had contracted for, while in such a case as this, in an actiorr by the beneficiary against the issuing bank, it makes no difference whether the goods tendered were in fact identical to the goods purchased, the only question being : Did the documents conform to the letter of credit ?\n\nIt is clear from the letters addressed by the appellant to the Bank of India on June 23, 27 and 28, 1978 that the payment of Rs. 36,52,960 by three cheques for Rs. 7,29,872 Rs. 12,78,536 and Rs. 16,43,833 were payments made under reserve. Admittedly\n\n-\",..-\n\nwhen these amounts were paid by the appellant to the Bank of India, the railway receipts were not clean because they contained the description \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil \" Unrefined\".\n\nThe appellant had taken the precaution of saying \"Please note that the payment is made to you 'under reserve' owing to the following discrepancies\". There was a foot-note added: \"Please note that this payment 1s made to you subject to repayment on demand of the bill amount, without loss of exchange to ourselves plus interest and other charges incurred by us, and or by our principals, if the documents are not acceptable to the openers or buyers in view of the discrepancies whatsoever\". It was also added : \"Please also note that this 'reserve' will remain in force until released by us in . writing\". Acceptance of these amounts by the Bank of India on behalf of the plaintiffs was upon these terms.\n\nThe Bank of India and the plaintiffs were thus fully aware that the appellant was not prepared to pay except 'under reserve'. The plaintiffs in their letters addressed to the appellant dated June 22 and 23, 1978 had added in ink the post-script : \"In case of discrepancies, pay to our bankers, Bank of India\". These letters were in respect of 11 out of 20 documents ; it is not suggested that others stand on a different footing.\n\nThe letters conveyed a request to \"negotiate the sight drafts for payment\".\n\nThus, the payment of Rs. 36,52,96'.l against the first lot of 20 documents was 'under reserve' and was also covered by the letter of guarantee or indemnity.\n\nAs regards the second lot of 27 documents, the payment of Rs. 49,31,496 the appellant was not prepared to pay even 'under reserve' because the Bihar Corporation had refused to accept the consignment on the ground int only of discrepa11cies but also because the mustard oil was not fit for human consumption. There was no question of th~ appellant paying this large sum of money except against the letter of guarantee or indemnity executed by the Bank of India. It was represented by the Bank of India that it had made arrangements for due payment of the bills of exchange.\n\nWhen the bills of exchange were dishonoured on being presented on August 3, 1978 the amount of Rs. 49,31,496 became immediately repayble on demand.\n\nThere still remains the question whether the court should interfere with an order of this nature. The Court's powers under ArtJ36 of Constitution are untrammelled, but they are subject to selfordained restrictions. The Court does not, as a matter of rule, H interfere with interlocutory orders, save under very exceptional circumstances.\n\nThe grant of a temporary injunction by the High Court under\n\n0. 39 rr. 1 and 2 appears to be wholly unwarranted. For reasons already stated, the appellant was within its rights in making a recall of the amount of Rs. 85,84,456 paid 'under reserve' and/or in terms of the letter of guarantee or indemnity.\n\nWe fail to appreciate any justification for grant of a temporary injunction to the plaintiffs, the effect of which virtually is to restrain a transaction between a banker and a banker.\n\nThe courts view with disfavour the grant of such temporary injunction.\n\nIn the instant case, the High Court has assumed that the plaintiff has a prima facie case.\n\nIt has not touched upon the question where the balance of convenience lay, nor has it dealt with the question whether or not the plaintiffs would be put to irreparable loss if there was no injunction granted. In dealing with the prima facie case, the High Court assumes that the appellant was in breach. There is no basis for this assumption at all.\n\nThe High Court in this case has pre-judged the whole issue by holding that the appellant could not unilaterally impose the condition of payment 'under reserve', nor was it justified in holding that the documents were 'clean'. The question whether the appellant was in breach is an issue to be tried in the suit. The question whether the documents were 'clean' or 'unclean' is a vexed question on which no opinion could be expressed at this stage. It is also premature at this stage to assume that there was no 'due presentation' of the bills of exchange and their refusal.\n\nNo injunction could be granted under 0.39, rr. 1 and 2 of the Code unless the plaintiffs establish that they had a prima facie case, meaning thereby that there was a bona fide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried. The question that must necessarily arise is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is a prima .f acie case and, if so as between whom ? in view of the legal principles applicable, it is difficult for us to say on the material on re1; ord that the plaintiffs have a prima facie case.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that if the suit were to be brought by the Bank of India, the High Court would not have granted any injunction as it. was bound by the terms of the contract.\n\nWhat could not be done directly cannot be achieved indirectly in a suit brought by the plaintiffs.\n\nEven if there was a serious question to be tried, the High Court liad to consider the: balance of convenience.\n\nWe have no doubt\n\nthat there is no reason to prevent the appellant from recalling the amount of Rs. 85,84,456. The fact remains that the payment of Rs. 36,52,960 against the first lot of 20 documents made by the appellant to the Bank of India was a payment under reseve while that of Rs. 49,31,496 was also made under reserve as well as against the letter of guarantee or indemnity executed by it. A payment 'under reserve' is understood in banking transactions to mean that the recipient of money may not deem it as his own but must be prepared to return it on demand. The balance of convenience clearly lies in allowing the normal ban king transactions to go forward.\n\nFurthermore, the plaintiffs have failed to establish that they would be put to an irreparable loss unless an interim injunction was granted.\n\nIt was, however, tried to be impressed upon us that the balance of convenience lay in granting the injunction since the appellant would not be put to any loss because it had furnished the letter of guarantee against 100 per cent margin, i.e. on deposit being made by the Bihar Corporation of Rs. 85,84,456 for meeting the payment to be. made under the credit. It was also said that the effect of recalling of Rs. 85,84,456 from the Bank of India will result in the plaintiffs facing a serious credit-freeze, as the Bank of India will, on its turn, recall the amount from the plaintiffs.\n\nWe are afraid, these considerations cannot prevail. For all these reasons, we are constrained to hold that there was no justification for the High Court to grant a temporary injunction under 0. 39 rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\n\nIt the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs.\n\nThe order passed by the High Court dated August 24, 1979 granting a temporary injunction restraining the appellant, tbe United Commercial Bank, from recalling Rs. 85,84,456 from the Respondent Nol , the Bank of India is set aside, and the application filed by the plaintiffs, Messrs.\n\nGodrej Soaps Ltd. for the grant of a temporary injunction under 0.39, rr.1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908 is rejected with a direction that the High Court shall try to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible, and in any event, within six months from today. The costs of the appellant shall be borne by the Respondents Nos. I and 2 equally.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 26, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK\n\nBANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nMarch 26, 1981\n\n[A.C. GUPTA AND A.P. 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Narim::m", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10897, "end_char": 10910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.S. Narim::m, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Modi, R.A. Kapadia, Raian Karnjawala and M.H. Shah for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P.H. Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10912, "end_char": 10923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.S. Narim::m, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Modi, R.A. Kapadia, Raian Karnjawala and M.H. Shah for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K.R. Modi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10925, "end_char": 10934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.S. Narim::m, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Modi, R.A. Kapadia, Raian Karnjawala and M.H. Shah for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R.A. Kapadia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10936, "end_char": 10948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.S. Narim::m, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Modi, R.A. Kapadia, Raian Karnjawala and M.H. Shah for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Raian Karnjawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10950, "end_char": 10966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.S. Narim::m, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Modi, R.A. Kapadia, Raian Karnjawala and M.H. Shah for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M.H. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10971, "end_char": 10980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.S. Narim::m, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Modi, R.A. Kapadia, Raian Karnjawala and M.H. Shah for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K.K. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11001, "end_char": 11015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, Vinay Bhasin, Rakesh Sahani, Vineet Kumar, G.E. Vahanvati and S.J. Thacker for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vinay Bhasin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11017, "end_char": 11029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, Vinay Bhasin, Rakesh Sahani, Vineet Kumar, G.E. Vahanvati and S.J. Thacker for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rakesh Sahani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11031, "end_char": 11044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, Vinay Bhasin, Rakesh Sahani, Vineet Kumar, G.E. Vahanvati and S.J. Thacker for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11046, "end_char": 11058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, Vinay Bhasin, Rakesh Sahani, Vineet Kumar, G.E. Vahanvati and S.J. Thacker for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "G.E. Vahanvati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11060, "end_char": 11074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, Vinay Bhasin, Rakesh Sahani, Vineet Kumar, G.E. Vahanvati and S.J. Thacker for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S.J. Thacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11079, "end_char": 11091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, Vinay Bhasin, Rakesh Sahani, Vineet Kumar, G.E. Vahanvati and S.J. Thacker for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11115, "end_char": 11133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, E.J. Ba/sara, S. Ganes//, Narain and P.H. Amin for Respondent No.2 ."}}, {"text": "E.J. Ba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11135, "end_char": 11142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, E.J. Ba/sara, S. Ganes//, Narain and P.H. Amin for Respondent No.2 ."}}, {"text": "S. Ganes//", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11149, "end_char": 11159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, E.J. Ba/sara, S. Ganes//, Narain and P.H. Amin for Respondent No.2 ."}}, {"text": "Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11161, "end_char": 11167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, E.J. Ba/sara, S. Ganes//, Narain and P.H. Amin for Respondent No.2 ."}}, {"text": "P.H. Amin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11172, "end_char": 11181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Soli J. Sorabjee, E.J. Ba/sara, S. Ganes//, Narain and P.H. Amin for Respondent No.2 ."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11205, "end_char": 11221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Ba/c<k Mahto and B.P. Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ram Ba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11250, "end_char": 11256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Ba/c<k Mahto and B.P. Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11271, "end_char": 11281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Ba/c<k Mahto and B.P. Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11353, "end_char": 11356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal by special leave is from an order of the Bombay High Court dated August 24, 1979, granting a temporary injunction restraining the appellant, the United Commercial Bank."}}, {"text": "Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11778, "end_char": 11791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, the Bank of India, and in terms of the Jetter of guarantee or indemnity executed by that Bank, in a suit based on a bankers' letter of credit."}}, {"text": "Godrej Soaps Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12072, "end_char": 12092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Messrs Godrej Soaps Limited, hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiffs', by a contract dated February 2, 1978 agreed to supply to the respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Godrej Soaps Limited"}}, {"text": "February 2, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12159, "end_char": 12175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Messrs Godrej Soaps Limited, hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiffs', by a contract dated February 2, 1978 agreed to supply to the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Biliar State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12222, "end_char": 12278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, the Biliar State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, hereinafter referred to as 'the Bihar Corporation', one thousand metric tonnes of 'Sizola Brand pure Mustard oil' the total value of which was apprpximately Rs."}}, {"text": "Bihar Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12586, "end_char": 12603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contract provided inter alia that the Bihar Corporation were to open a letter of credit with the appellant, the United Commercial Bank, for the said amount, which the Bihar Corporation_ duly did."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12660, "end_char": 12682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contract provided inter alia that the Bihar Corporation were to open a letter of credit with the appellant, the United Commercial Bank, for the said amount, which the Bihar Corporation_ duly did."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank Nariman Point", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12819, "end_char": 12855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of credit issued by the appellant was in the following terms:\n\nUnited Commercial Bank Nariman Point Branch\n\nUnited Commercial Bank Frazer Road, Patna Branch, 13th June, 1978."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13342, "end_char": 13347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd., East Boring Road, Patna, for any sum or sums not exceeding in all Rs."}}, {"text": "Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13516, "end_char": 13561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "86,00,000 (say Rupees eighty six lakhs only) outstanding at anyone time available by your drafts at sight drawn on Messrs Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corpn."}}, {"text": "Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13678, "end_char": 13707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. without recourse to drawers for full invoice value of merchandise to be described in the invoice as : 62040 tins of Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil packed in brand new leak proof tins of net 16 kgs."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13838, "end_char": 13844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Despatched from Bombay accompanied by the following documents:\n\n(i) -Signed detailed invoices in duplicate."}}, {"text": "UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13991, "end_char": 14013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Railway Receipts consigned to or endorsed in favour of UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK marked 'FREIGHT/ TO PAY' evidencing despatch by Railway of the merchandise as stated above."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14801, "end_char": 14814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between June 22, 1978 and June 26, 1978, the plaintiffs from time to time despatched an aggregate of 24,400 tins of their mustard oil by invoices bearing Nos."}}, {"text": "June 26, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14819, "end_char": 14832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between June 22, 1978 and June 26, 1978, the plaintiffs from time to time despatched an aggregate of 24,400 tins of their mustard oil by invoices bearing Nos."}}, {"text": "July 7 and 8, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15282, "end_char": 15300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34,70,312 on July 7 and 8, 1978 the plaintiffs also despatched an aggregate of 10,560 tins covered by invoices Nos."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17125, "end_char": 17137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second lot comprising of 27 sets of documents, 19 sets were presented by the plaintiffs on July 3, 1978, with sight drafts of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17248, "end_char": 17260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 5, 1978 the appellant addressed a letter to the plaintiffs refusing to make any payment under the letter of credit due to 'discrepancies' as well as some of the railway receipts being 'stale'."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17741, "end_char": 17754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, the discrepancies remained till July 12, 1978 as the description of goods in the railway receipts still remained \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil 'Unrefined\"' till the plaintiffs made a request to the Central Railways for the deletion of the word 'Unrefined'."}}, {"text": "Central Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17908, "end_char": 17924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, the discrepancies remained till July 12, 1978 as the description of goods in the railway receipts still remained \"Sizola Brand Pure Mustard Oil 'Unrefined\"' till the plaintiffs made a request to the Central Railways for the deletion of the word 'Unrefined'."}}, {"text": "July 13, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18766, "end_char": 18779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next day, i.e., July 13, 1978 the plaintiffs addressed a letter to the appellant in respect of the first lot of 20 documents 'negotiated and paid by you under reserve', stating that the word 'Unrefined' in the railway receipts should not have been treated as a discrepancy, forwarding copies of telegrams sent by the Central Railway to the various destinations deleting the word 'unrefined', with a request that the appellant may, as regards the 27 documents of the second lot, 'negotiate the documents and pay for the same forthwith'."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20591, "end_char": 20604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 14, 1978 the appellant addressed a letter to the Bank of India returning the 27 documents relating to the second Jot signifying their inability to negotiate the documents due to discrepancies in the description of goods in the railway receipts, stating that mere deletion of the word 'Unrefined' could not make the railway receipts clean, and furthermore, because some of the railway receipts were 'stale'."}}, {"text": "Bibar Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21166, "end_char": 21183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also intimated the plaintiffs by their letter of even date that they could lift the 'reserve' without obtaining prior permission of their constituents i.e. the Bibar Corporation."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank, Nariman Point,\n\nBombay 400021", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21727, "end_char": 21780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. '(\n\n\\ l\n\nThe plaintiffs, being apprehensive that their bankers, the Bank of India, would be bound to refund Rs.36.52 lacs pursuant to the notice of demand served by the appellant inasmuch as the payment was made under reserve, kept a plaint ready on July 17, 1978 for grant of a perpetual injunction against the appellant, and on the same day addressed a letter to the appellant asking for payment of Rs.49,31,496 against the second lot of documents, enclosing a letter of guarantee or indemnity executed by their bankers, which reads :\n\nUnited Commercial Bank, Nariman Point,\n\nBombay 400021."}}, {"text": "P.K. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21824, "end_char": 21835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dear Sirs,\n\nDate July 17,1978\n\nAttn : Mr.P.K. Sharma\n\nLetter of Credit No."}}, {"text": "12.7.78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22023, "end_char": 22030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fex/Exp/78 dated 12.7.78 and 14.7.78 on the above subject."}}, {"text": "14.7.78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22035, "end_char": 22042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fex/Exp/78 dated 12.7.78 and 14.7.78 on the above subject."}}, {"text": "Central Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23119, "end_char": 23134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You have taken\n\nthe stand that by this action of the Central Railway also the documents still does not continue to be in accordance with the letter of credit."}}, {"text": "18th July, I 978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24055, "end_char": 24071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18th July, I 978."}}, {"text": "Godrej Soaps Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24156, "end_char": 24173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consideration of your having negotiated Documentary Bills of Exchange drawn by Godrej Soaps Ltd., drawn on Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corpn."}}, {"text": "17.8.1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25319, "end_char": 25328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "86,00,000 (Rupees Eighty Six lacs only) apart from charges enumerated above and it will remain in force till 17.8.1978."}}, {"text": "BANK OF INDIA", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25567, "end_char": 25580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for BANK OF INDIA sd."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25872, "end_char": 25885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 19, 1978 the representative of the plaintiffs, Messrs Godrej Soaps Ltd. met the representatives of the appellant, the United Commercial Bank at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26692, "end_char": 26709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs on the same day, i. e., on July 19, 1978, brought the suit in the Original Side of the Bombay High Court alongwith an application for the grant of a temporary injunction to restrain the appellant from recalling the amount of\n\nA Rs."}}, {"text": "Bharucha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26877, "end_char": 26885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36,52,960 but the learned Single Judge, Bharucha\n\nJ., declined to grant an ex parte ad interim injunction, while allowing liberty to the plaintiffs to take out notice of motion returnable on August 4, 1978 but it appears that no such notice was ever taken out."}}, {"text": "August 4, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27028, "end_char": 27042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36,52,960 but the learned Single Judge, Bharucha\n\nJ., declined to grant an ex parte ad interim injunction, while allowing liberty to the plaintiffs to take out notice of motion returnable on August 4, 1978 but it appears that no such notice was ever taken out."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27257, "end_char": 27263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B When the appellant came to know of the suit, the plaintiff's\n\nrepresentative made an endorsement at the foot of the letter dated July 17, 1978:\n\nAs per Mr. Sharma's talk with Mr.K.R. Gokulam we hereby undertake not to proceed with this suit."}}, {"text": "K.R. Gokulam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27279, "end_char": 27291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B When the appellant came to know of the suit, the plaintiff's\n\nrepresentative made an endorsement at the foot of the letter dated July 17, 1978:\n\nAs per Mr. Sharma's talk with Mr.K.R. Gokulam we hereby undertake not to proceed with this suit."}}, {"text": "R.V. Shekar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27346, "end_char": 27357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.V. Shekar\n\n19.7 1978\n\nOn the faith of the undertaking the appellant made payment of Rs.49,31,496 to the Bank of India in terms of the letter of indemnity.", "canonical_name": "R. V. Shekar"}}, {"text": "R. V. Shekar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27784, "end_char": 27796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But one thing is clear that R. V. Shekar, Assitant Financial Controller, Godrej Soaps was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the word 'we' meant Messrs.\n\nGodrej Soaps Limited'.", "canonical_name": "R. V. Shekar"}}, {"text": "Godrej Soaps", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27829, "end_char": 27841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But one thing is clear that R. V. Shekar, Assitant Financial Controller, Godrej Soaps was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the word 'we' meant Messrs.\n\nGodrej Soaps Limited'."}}, {"text": "Godrej Soaps Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27915, "end_char": 27935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But one thing is clear that R. V. Shekar, Assitant Financial Controller, Godrej Soaps was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the word 'we' meant Messrs.\n\nGodrej Soaps Limited'."}}, {"text": "August 2, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28590, "end_char": 28604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 2, 1978 the appellant served a letter of demand on the Bank of India, for refund of Rs."}}, {"text": "PUDV AL", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29039, "end_char": 29046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attn: Mr. PUDV AL, Manager (Advance)\n\nDear Sirs,\n\nRe: Your Guarantee Re."}}, {"text": "Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29475, "end_char": 29528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this connection we are now advised by our Patna Office that the bills have not been accepted by the drawees, Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Limited due to /he discrepancies."}}, {"text": "August 3, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30642, "end_char": 30656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sd ......... Manager\n\nThe 47 Notary's protest Certificates show that when the bills of exchange were re-presented for payment to the Bihar Corporation on August 2, 1978 the drawees dishonoured the bills of exchange on August 3, 1978 for the reason that (1) the railway receipts accompanying the bills were 'stale', (2) the goods had not been supplied as per the terms of agreement, and (3) the chemical analysis showed that the oil required refinement before being fit for human use,."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31268, "end_char": 31282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 6, 1978 which was a Sunday, -the plaintiffs moved learned Single Judge at his residence, alongwith an affidavit of their Sales Manager stating that unless an injunction was granted the Bank of India, according to the banking practice, would make payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 7, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31611, "end_char": 31625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85,84,456/- to the appellant, on the -commencement of the banking hours on August 7, 1978."}}, {"text": "December 17, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31791, "end_char": 31808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 17, 1978, the learned Single Judge appointed the Court receiver to be the ad interim receiver with power to sell the goods in question eithet in one lot or separate lots, on 'as is where is basis', without any obligation or liability to purchasers thereof as to quality, quantity or edibility of the said goods."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32115, "end_char": 32129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 27, 1979 the Court receiver accepted the offer of the plaintiffs to ouy the goods for Rs."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32269, "end_char": 32282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18,53,000 and the sale was confirmed by the High Court on April 4, 1979."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32329, "end_char": 32344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Single Judge by his order dated August 24, 1979 made the temporary injunction absolute till the disposal of the suit on the view that the appellant was not entitled under the terms of the G letter of credit, to unilaterally impose the condition of payment 'under reserve' or refuse to pay against the documents tendered by the plaintiffs merely because of the alleged discrepancies, nor was it open to it to reject the documents as stale, for in his view, there were indeed no stale documents."}}, {"text": "October\n\n17, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33527, "end_char": 33544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single B Judge dated August 24, 1979 preferred an appeal but a Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed the appeal on October\n\n17, 1979."}}, {"text": "August D 29, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34049, "end_char": 34066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs by their solicitor's letter dated August D 29, 1979, drew the attention of the Bank of India to the learned Single Judge's order granting injunction, and 'instructed' it not to pay."}}, {"text": "UCO Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34426, "end_char": 34434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\nThe said interim order makes it absolutely clear that our clients will in no way be liable and responsible to return the amounts received under reserve and therefore our clients are in no way liable to pay any sum to UCO Bank and therefore you are also not liable at present to pay any sum to UCO Bank under the said letter of indemnity."}}, {"text": "UCO Bnk", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34853, "end_char": 34860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of what is stated herein, if any payment is made by you to UCO Bnk, the same will not be binding on our clients and you will not be entitled to debit such amount to our clients current account with you and our clients will refuse to reimburse you any sum so wrongfully paid by you."}}, {"text": "August 31, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35203, "end_char": 35218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant by its letter dated August 31, 1979 addressed to the Bank of India made a demand for payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35448, "end_char": 35464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this was of not avail since the Bank of India as instructed by the plaintiffs, sent a letter dated October 16, 1979 to the appellant, by which it referred to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and refused to make any payment, stating :\n\nIn its order dated 24th August, 1979 the Court has stated that there is no provision regarding staleness of the Railway Receipts in the letter of Credit and it is not open to Bihar Food Corporation to recall the payments made on that ground."}}, {"text": "24th August, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35616, "end_char": 35633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this was of not avail since the Bank of India as instructed by the plaintiffs, sent a letter dated October 16, 1979 to the appellant, by which it referred to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and refused to make any payment, stating :\n\nIn its order dated 24th August, 1979 the Court has stated that there is no provision regarding staleness of the Railway Receipts in the letter of Credit and it is not open to Bihar Food Corporation to recall the payments made on that ground."}}, {"text": "Bihar Food Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35772, "end_char": 35794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this was of not avail since the Bank of India as instructed by the plaintiffs, sent a letter dated October 16, 1979 to the appellant, by which it referred to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and refused to make any payment, stating :\n\nIn its order dated 24th August, 1979 the Court has stated that there is no provision regarding staleness of the Railway Receipts in the letter of Credit and it is not open to Bihar Food Corporation to recall the payments made on that ground."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37797, "end_char": 37805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venice", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39571, "end_char": 39577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Stein v. Hambro' s Bank of Northern Commerce(4) a contract for the sale of hides by an English seller to a buyer from Venice, to be shipped from India, was financed by an irrevocable letter of credit."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39598, "end_char": 39603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Stein v. Hambro' s Bank of Northern Commerce(4) a contract for the sale of hides by an English seller to a buyer from Venice, to be shipped from India, was financed by an irrevocable letter of credit."}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40463, "end_char": 40470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rowlatt J. said :\n\nThe obligation of the bank is absolute, and is meant to be absolute, that when the documents are presented they have to accept the bill."}}, {"text": "Urguhart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41205, "end_char": 41213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The credit in this case was opened in pursuance of a contract between Urguhart, Linsday and Co. and Benjamin Jute Mills, by which the former were to manufacture certain machinery and deliver it f.o.b."}}, {"text": "Linsday and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41215, "end_char": 41230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The credit in this case was opened in pursuance of a contract between Urguhart, Linsday and Co. and Benjamin Jute Mills, by which the former were to manufacture certain machinery and deliver it f.o.b."}}, {"text": "Benjamin Jute Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41235, "end_char": 41254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The credit in this case was opened in pursuance of a contract between Urguhart, Linsday and Co. and Benjamin Jute Mills, by which the former were to manufacture certain machinery and deliver it f.o.b."}}, {"text": "Glasgow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41336, "end_char": 41343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Glasgow, for shipment to Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41361, "end_char": 41369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Glasgow, for shipment to Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Gutteridge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42077, "end_char": 42087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits, Sixth Edn."}}, {"text": "Megrah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42092, "end_char": 42098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits, Sixth Edn."}}, {"text": "Article 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43919, "end_char": 43928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bailhache", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44651, "end_char": 44660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v. Bank of South Africa (1) Bailhache, J. said: H\n\n(!) ("}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45082, "end_char": 45088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Sumner said in Equitable Trust Co. of New York v.\n\nDawson Partners Ltd.,(1) approving the dictum of Bailhache J. :\n\nIt is both common ground and common sense that in such a transaction the accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorised to accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents strictly observed."}}, {"text": "Hambros Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45592, "end_char": 45604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rayner v. Hambros Bank Ltd.(2) the credit called for documents covering a shipment of 'Coromandel groundnuts' ; the invoice tendered was for Coromandel groundnuts, but the bill of lading evidenced a shipment of 'machine-shelled groundnut kernels'; country of origin : British India, and Hambros Bank refused to pay on the ground that the letter of credit called for an invoice and bill of lading both covering a shipment of 'Coromandel groundnuts' whereas the bill of lading did not describe the goods in those terms, their attitude being upheld by the Court of Appeal."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45850, "end_char": 45863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rayner v. Hambros Bank Ltd.(2) the credit called for documents covering a shipment of 'Coromandel groundnuts' ; the invoice tendered was for Coromandel groundnuts, but the bill of lading evidenced a shipment of 'machine-shelled groundnut kernels'; country of origin : British India, and Hambros Bank refused to pay on the ground that the letter of credit called for an invoice and bill of lading both covering a shipment of 'Coromandel groundnuts' whereas the bill of lading did not describe the goods in those terms, their attitude being upheld by the Court of Appeal."}}, {"text": "Mackinnon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46153, "end_char": 46162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mackinnon, L.J. after quoting Bailhache, J., in English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v. Bank o, f South Africa (supra) and Lord Sumner in Equtiable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd.\n\n(supra) laying down that a person who ships in reliance on 11; letter of credit must do so in exact compliance with its terms, observed :\n\nThe defendant bank were told by their Danish principals to issu~ a letter of credit under which they were to accept documents-an invoice and bills of lading-covering ''Coromandel groundnuts in bags\" .. They were offered bills of lading covering \"machine-shelled groundnut \"kernels\"."}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47522, "end_char": 47530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge dealing with that part of the judgment of Atkinson, J., in which he said that \"a sale of Coromandel ground nuts is universally understood to be a sale of machine-shelled kernels\", said :\n\nWhen Atkinson, J., says that it is \"universally under\n\nstood\" he means that these gentlemen from Mincing Lane D have told him : \"We dealers in Mincing Lane all understand these things.", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "Mc Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48448, "end_char": 48455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mc Nair J. held that all the documents tendered and accepted by the defendants were defective and consequently the defendants were not entiled to debit the plaintiff with the amount paid against these documents, although the defendants succeeded on the ground that the plaintiffs had by their conduct ratified the defendant's action in accepting the documents."}}, {"text": "Smith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48903, "end_char": 48908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking Co. (2) Smith J. said :\n\nA party who is entitled to draw against a letter of credit must strictly observe the terms and conditions under\n\n(I) [l 951] 2 Ll."}}, {"text": "S. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49113, "end_char": 49119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hiscock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49288, "end_char": 49295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Hiscock, C. J. in L:iudisi\n\nv. American Exchange Nationc!"}}, {"text": "Davis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51376, "end_char": 51381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason for this requirement is stated in Davis' Law Relating to Commercial Letters of Credit, 2nd Edn."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52537, "end_char": 52544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of England w:1ich found a place in Paget's L1w of Banking, 8th Edn."}}, {"text": "Paget", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52569, "end_char": 52574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of England w:1ich found a place in Paget's L1w of Banking, 8th Edn."}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54679, "end_char": 54686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was refused, Jenkins, LJ."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55198, "end_char": 55205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning, M.R., while refusing to grant an injunction stated :\n\n...... a bank guarantee is very much like a letter of credit.", "canonical_name": "Denning"}}, {"text": "Kerr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55946, "end_char": 55950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In R.D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd., (1) Kerr, J. considered the position in principle."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57132, "end_char": 57139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations of Kerr, J. have been cited with approval by Lord Denning, M. R. in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd.(2)\n\nThe appellant was under a duty to its constituent, the Bihar Corporation, to scrutinize the documents, and could not be compelled to make payment particularly w:1e11 the description in the documents did not tally with that in the letter of credit.", "canonical_name": "Denning"}}, {"text": "June 22 and 23, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61578, "end_char": 61598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs in their letters addressed to the appellant dated June 22 and 23, 1978 had added in ink the post-script : \"In case of discrepancies, pay to our bankers, Bank of India\"."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67251, "end_char": 67280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Godrej Soaps Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67631, "end_char": 67648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85,84,456 from the Respondent Nol , the Bank of India is set aside, and the application filed by the plaintiffs, Messrs.\n\nGodrej Soaps Ltd. for the grant of a temporary injunction under 0.39, rr.1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908 is rejected with a direction that the High Court shall try to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible, and in any event, within six months from today.", "canonical_name": "Godrej Soaps Limited"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67719, "end_char": 67742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_330_339_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SANT SINGH NALWA & ANR.\n\nTHE FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER,\n\nHARYANA & ORS., ETC.\n\nMarch 30, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND A.N. SEN, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, S. 2(5) and Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules 1953-Annexure 'A'-Classification of land according to quantity of yield aud quality of soil-Whether valid.\n\nThe appellants who were displaced persons were allotted land which was D entered as sailab land in the revenue records and they became the owners of these lands. After the coming into force of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, the Revenue Authorities proeeded to determine the permissible area of the land of the appellants under section 2(3). They allowed 50 standard acres of land to each of the appellants and declared the balance as surplus land.\n\nThe appellants claimed that the lands allotted to them as displaced persons E fell in a portion of District Karna! which was sailab and adna sailab and according to the classification made under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953 they did not carry any valuation. The Collector dismissed their application.\n\nThe Commissioner dismissed their appeals holding that the Collector was right in treating the surplus area as an unirrigated areas and valuing the same at nine annas per standard acre.\n\nA single Judge accepting the contention of the appellant in his writ petition set aside the orders of the Revenue Court. The Financial Commissioner filed an appeal which was allowed by the Division Bench and the writ petition was dismissed.\n\nIn the appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that : (!)whereas sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Act directed the Government to frame Rules after considering the quantity of the yield and quality of soil, in the Rules framed by the Government the main guide-lines laid down by sub-section(S)were not followed, and the classification made by the Rules under Annexure 'A' was arbitrary without determining the quantity of the yield and quality of the soil, and (2) that even if the classification made in Annexure 'A' was valid, the Reveuue Courts as also the High Courts committed an error of law in misconstruing the classification and in arbitrarily placin2 the surplus area in the category of unirrigated land.\n\nSANT SINGH V. FINANCIAL COMMR. HARYANA 331\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : l(i) The view of the single Judge is not in consonance with the scheme and spirit of the Rules framed under the Act and is bassed on a wrong interpretation !of the nature, extent and ambit of the classification made in Annexure 'A'. The classification is in accordance with provisions of sub-section\n\n(5) of section 2 of the Act and is, therefore, constitutionally valid. [337 E-F, G]\n\n(ii) The Land Resettlement Manual prepared in 1952 by Tarlok Singh shows that the classification has been made in a very scientific manner after taking into consideration all the relevant factors. The Punjab Settlement Manual (4th Edition) prepared by Sir James M. Douie though possessing unimpeachable authenticity was made Jong ago arid since then there have been great changes resulting from various steps taken by the Government for improving the nature and character of the land and the irrigation facilities. Even so, the classification made by Sir James Douie has been adhered to broadly and basically by Tarlok Singh in his Manual which forms the pivotal foundation for. the schedule containing Annexure 'A' framed under the Rules. [335H-336 CJ\n\n(iii) The classifications of land like barani, sailab, abi, nehri, chahi etc. are clearly mentioned in the Punjab Settlement Manual.f0The Rule Making Authority has not in any way either departed from the principles mentioned in sub-section(5) of section 2 of the Act or violated the guidelines contained therein, nor could it be said that the classification made under the Rules has not been made. according to the quantity of yield or the quality of the soil. [336 C, D-E]\n\n(iv) If the dominant object of the act was to take over the surplus area according to the formula contained in various provisions of the Act particularly sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 2, there is no material on the record to show that the Rules do not fulfil or carry out the object contained in the Act. [336 G]\n\nJagir Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors., 44 (1965) Lahore Law Times 143, approved.\n\n2.(i) There was no error in the classification made by the revenue authorities. So far as Karna] District was concerned, there was no sailab land at the time when the Rules were framed and the classification was made. Even if the land in question could be treated as sailab and equated with the land in Sonepat then the valuation would have been at 12 annas which could be more deterimental to the interest of the appellants. The Collector and the Commissioner have rightly treated the land as unirrigated which is the lowest category and whose valuation is given as nine annas per acre. [338C, BJ\n\n(ii) The three categories given in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 2 do not cover the land of the appellants which is sailab or adna sailab and therefore, they cannot be given the benefit of any of these three sub-clauses of the proviso.\n\n[339 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 490 and 2228 (N) of 1970. . ·,, Appeals by certificate from the Judgment and Order dated ... .t 9-10·1969 & 14-1-1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in ·,,,,•· Letters Patent.Appeal Nos. 553 of 1968 & 570 of 1969 respectively.\n\nA Hardev Singh and R.S. Sodhi for the Appellants (In both the\n\nAppeals.)\n\nK.C. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for the Respondent (in both the Appeals)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against judgments dated 9.10.69 and 14.1.1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 553 of 1968 and 570 of 1969 hy which the contentions raised by the appellants ini the two appeals were rejected.\n\nAfter the matter came up in ths Court the two appeals were consolidated as they arose out of almost the same sqbject-matter and involved identical points.\n\nThe facts whieh have given rise to these appeals lie within a very narrow compass and may be briefly summarised thus.\n\nThe appellants were refugees from Pakistan and Sant Singh D Nalwa was allotted 63 standard acres and 8! units in village Marghain and another area of l 9 standard acres and 5! units in Garden Colony in Jundla which were entered as sailab land in the revenue records. The other appellant, Kartar Kaur, was allotted 96 acres, 3 bighas and 13 biswas in the same district. These lands were given to the appellants as they were displaced persons. After the appellants E had become owners of the lands, the State of Punjab passed the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') which later applied to Haryaria also, under which every land owner whether a displaced prso1, allotte~ ot otherwis~ c:rnld not retain any area of latid which fell beyond the extent prescribed by sub-section (3) of s. 2 of the Act.\n\nAfter the coming into force of the Act the revenue authorities proceeded to determine the permissible area of the land of both the appellants so that the area which was found to be in excess may be taken over by the State after paying the compensation as provided in the Act and the Rules made thereunder, viz., The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953 (hereinafter called the 'Rules'). In order to determine the permissible area the Act contains certain provisions by which the entire area held by a land OW!Jer has to be converted into standard acres on the basis of a formula contained in sub-section (5) of s. 2 of the Act which defines 'standard acre' thus : • \" 'Standard acre' mean& a meas11re of area convertible int© ordinary acrc.s of any clat>s 0f land aeordin~ to the\n\n/ t\n\nprescribed scale with reference to the quantity of yield and A quality of soil.\"\n\nSimilarly, the relevant portion of sub-section 5-a which defines 'Surplus Area' may be extracted thus :\n\n\" 'Surplus Area' means the area other than the reserved B area, and, where no area has been reserved, the area in excess of the permissible area selected (under section 5-B or the area wpich is deemed to be surplus area under subsection (!) of section 5C) (and includes the area in excess of the permissible area selected under section 19-B) but it will not include a tenant's permissible area; ... \" C\n\nSo far as the appellant, Sant Singh Nalwa, was concerned, the revenue authorities held that he was entitled to retain 50 (fifty) standard acres being the permissible area and the balance of 13 standard acres and odd units was declared as surplus. Similarly, in the case of the other appellants, Kartar Kaur, she was allowed to retain 50 standard acres and about 15 standard acr.:s of land was taken over being surplus. In the instant appeals, there is no dispute that the formula by which the extent of the land in possession of the appellants had been converted into standard acres was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe\n\nonly point that was canvassed before the revenue authorities as also E in the High Court centred round the question of the nature of the land and the valuation thereof for the purpose of assessing compensation. The appellants case was that as the lands which had been . declared ; urplus or for that matter the entire lands/allotted to them as displaced persons fell in a portion of District Karna) which was sailab and Adna sailab and therefore according to the classification F made under the Rules they did not carry any valuation.\n\nSant Singh Nalwa challenged before the Collector the validity of declaration of the. surplus area and contested the valuation put by the Collector. The Collector dismissed the application by his Order dated 13.3.1963 and held that 13 standard acres and 61 units G of the land had to be declared surplus.\n\nAgainst this Order, Sant Singh filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division where the only point raised by him was that the area was not correctly evaluated.\n\nHis main grievance was that the area in question was equated with Barani land and valuated at the rate of H unirrigated area as given in the valuatian statement of the Karna!\n\nDistrict under Annexure 'A' of the Rules.\n\nThe main contention of\n\nthe appellants before the Commissioner as also before us was that as the surplus area does not fall under any of the categories mentioned in Annexure 'A' it carried no valuation at all.\n\nThe Commissioner, however, dismissed the appeal holding that the collector was right in treating the surplus area as an unirrigated area and valuing the same at 9 annas per standard acre.\n\nThereafter, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was allowed by the Single Judge by his Order dated July 23, 1963.\n\nThe Single Judge set aside the orders of revenue courts and accepted the contention of the appellant. Against this order, the Financial Commissioner filed an appeal under Letters Patent before a Division Bench of the High Court which by its judgment dated l-9.10.69 allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court.\n\nSimilarly, Kartar Kaur, the other appellant also filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division regarding the surplus land and having failed there, filed a writ petition in the High Court on 10.2.1965 which was ultimately dismissed on 10.10.69 and the appeal under Letters Patent against the said Order of the Single Judge was also dismisse_d on 14.1.70.\n\nThus, the position is that both the appellants failed to get any redress from the High Court which ultimately confirmed the orders of the Revenue courts.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants raised two contentions before us.\n\nIn the first place, it was argued that the Revenue courts as also the High Court were in error in holding that the surplus area was rightly evaluated in as much as the classification made under the Rules was ultra vires as being in direct disobedience to the mandate contained in sub-section (5) of s. 2 of the Act. In other words, it was argued that whereas sub-section (5) directed the Government to frame Rules after considering the quantity of the yield and quality of soil, in the Rules framed by the Government under its rule making power given to it by the Statute the main guidelines laid down by sub-section (5) were not followed and the classification made by the Rules under Annexure 'A' was arbitrary without determining the quantity of the yield and the quality of the soil.\n\nWe might mention here that this contentfon appears to have found favour with the Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the appellant, Sant Singh Nalwa but the judgment of the Single Judge'\n\nas already indicated, was reversed by the Division Bench in the A Letters Patent appeal.\n\nSecondly, it was contended that even if the classification made in Annexure 'A' was valid, the Revenue courts as also the High Court committed an error of Law in misconstruing the classification and in arbitrarily placing the surplus area in the category of unirri- B gated land.\n\nComing now to the first point raised by the appellants regard-· ing the constitutionality of the Rules framed under the Act, after hearing the counsel for the parties we find no merit in this contention. Sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Act 1'.merely requires C that the Rule :should classify the land according to the quantity of the yield and quality of the soil. The Rules have classified the land by preparing a schedule consisting of various Annexures which divide the lands according to the quantity of yield and quality of the soil into various categories.\n\nA perusal of the Annexures to the Rules clearly shows that the valuation statement D and the class of land has been described not only as being applicable to one place or the other but in view of the entire topography of every district or tehsil, it is manifest that in a peculiar State like Punjab and Haryana diverse factors, namely, the situation or position of the. land, its nearness to the river, the irrigation facilities, the ravages of flood, the fertility of the land and its pro- E duce and various other similar circumstances have to be taken into consideration in determining the nature and character of the land.\n\nAs far back as 1952, a Land Resettlement Manual was prepared by Tarlok Singh, which was relied upon by the judgment of the Single Judge and at p. 287 the land has been classified in following categories : F \"Chahi and Abi Chahi Nehri Unirrigated Nehri Non-Perennial or other Nehri or Nehri-Inundation\"\n\nThis classification varies from District to District and Tarlok Singh has also given the approximate value of the land. After going through the Land Resettlement Manual we find that the classification\n\nhas been made in a very scientific manner after taking into conside- H ration the relevant factors.\n\nEven Sir James M. Douie in his Punjab Settlement Manual (4th Edition), which is undoubtedly a work of\n\nunimpeachable authenticity, as pointed out by the Single Judge, had made a classification which is almost similar to the one made by Tarlok Singh. It is, however, obvious that the Punjab Settlement Manual by Sir Douie was made Jong ago and since then there have been great changes resulting from various steps taken by the. Government for improving the nature and charcter of the land and the irrigation facilities.\n\nIt is, therefore, not possible for us to rely on the Manual prepared by Sir Douie as the Single Judge had done because that would not be an objective assessment.\n\nEven so, the classification made by Sir James Douie has been adhered to broadly and basically by Tarlok Singh in his Manual which forms the pivotal foundation for the schedule containing Annexure 'A' framed under the Rules.\n\nThe classification of land like barani, sailab, abi, nehri, chahi, etc., are clearly mentioned in para 259 of Sir James's Punjab\n\nSettlement Manual which Sarkaria, J., as he than was, rightly classed as the Bible of Land Revenue Settlement.\n\nThe point, however, that has to be considered in this case is whether the rule making authority has in any way departed from the mandate given or the guidelines contained in the Act. There does not appear to be any material to show that the Rule Making Authority has in any way either departed from the principles mentioned in sub-section (5) of s. 2 of the Act or violated the guidelines contained therein. The appellants were not able to show that the classification made under the Rules has not been made according to the quantity of the yield or the quality of the soil.\n\nNeither any affidavit nor any document has been produced before the courts below to prove tis fact.\n\nIn this state of the evidence the Single Judge was not justified in striking down the Rules as being ultravires.\n\nMoreover, it is obvious that the Rules were made under section 27 of the Act which authorises the Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. If the dominant object of the Act was to take over the surplus area according to the formula contained in various provisions of the Act particularly subsections (3} and (5) of s.2, there is no material on the record to show that the Rules do not fulfil or carry out the object contained in the Act.\n\nMoreover, in Jagir Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors.(1} a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court while considering a similar contention rejected the argument that the Anilexure\n\nframed . under the Rules was bad as it did not consider the nature\n\n(1) 44 (1965] Lahore Law Times 143.\n\n...----\n\nSANT SINGH v. FINANCIAL COMMR. HARYANA (Fczal Ali, J.) 337\n\nand quality of the Soil.\n\nIn this connection, the Division Beneh observed thus :-\n\n\"Jt is thus clear that the formation of an assessment circle neessarily takes into consideration the various factors mentioned by the learned author and those include the nature of soil and its quality apart from various other factors affecting the yield. The circumstance, therefore, that in the Annexure the State of Punjab has been split up into assessment circles, as determined at the time of the Settlement, is highly significant and leaves no doubt that the nature and the quality of the soil inherent in the formation of an assessment circle have been taken into consideration for valuing the land for purposes of its conversion into standard acres. At the same time, the existing sources of irrigation have all been taken into consideration. It is, in the circumstances, impossible to agree that the Annexure in any manner violates the direction contained in the Punjab\n\nSecurity of Land Tenures Act.\n\nWe are, in the circumstances, unable to agree that the disputed rule and Annexure 'A' attached to the Rules are ultra vires the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act.\"\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by the High Court and endorse the same. With due respect, the view taken by Sarkaria, J., as he then was, (the single Judge in the instant case) is not at all in consonance with the scheme and spirit of the Rules framed under the Act and is based on a wrong interpretation of the nature, extent and ambit of the classification made in Annexure 'A'.\n\nWe, therefore, fully agree with the Division Bench judgment of the High Court that the classification is in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (5) of s. 2 of the Act and is, therefore, constitutionally valid.\n\nThe first contention put forward by the counsel for the appellants is therefore overruled.\n\nComing now to the second c_ontention that even if the classification is correct, the revenue authorities were wrong in treating the surplus land in dispute as unirrigated area. We find no substance\n\nin this argument. The relevant Annexure which gives the surplus H land in District Karna! is to be found at page 308 of the compilation of Punjab & Haryana Local Acts (vol. VII) where while lands\n\nclassified as Chahi, Abi, Nehri, Unirrigated and Nehri/Non-perennial are mentioned, there is no mention of sailab or adna sailab lands.\n\nWhereas at page 306 in the same volume there is no sailab land except in tehsil Sonepat. Thus, it appears that so far as Kamal District is concerne, d, there was no sailab land at the time when the Rules were framed and the classification was made.\n\nEven if the land in question could be treated as sailab and equated with the land in Sonepat then the valuation W'>Uld have been at 12 annas as shown at p. 306 of the aforesaid compilation, in which case this would be more detrimental to the interests of the appellants. The Collector and the Commissioner have therefore rightly treated the land as unirrigated which is almost the lowest category and whose valuation is given as 9 annas per acre.\n\nWe, therefore, find no error in the classification made by the revenue authorities.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the counsel for the appellants that as the land in question did not fall in any of the heads of classification made in District Kamal they will carry no value at all because this is directly opposed to the various schemes of the classification made under the Rules. A subsidiary contention in this very argument was that the land should have been valuedin accordance with Rule 2, provisos (a) to (c), which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"2. Conversion of ordinary acres into standard acres.\n\nThe Equivalent, in standard acres, of one ordinary acre of any class of land in any assessment circle, shall be determined by dividing by 16, the valuation shown in Annexure 'A' to these rules for such class of land in the said assessment circle;\n\nProvided that the valuation shall be -\n\n(a) in the case of Banjar Qadim land, one-half of the value of the class previously described in the records and in the absence of any specific class being stated, one-half of the value of the lowest barani land.\n\n(b) in the case of Ba11jar Jadid land, seven-eighth of the value of the relevant class of land as previously entered in the records, or in the absence of specified class in the records of the lowest barani land; and\n\n( c) in the case of cultivated thur land subject to waterlogging, one-eighth of the value of the class of land shown in the records or in the absence of any class, of the lowest barani land.\"\n\nThe three categories given in clauses (a), (b) and (c) as extrac- A ted above do not at all cover the land of the appellants which is sailab or adna sailab and therefore they cannot be given the benefit of any of these three sub-clauses of the proviso.\n\nFor these reasons, the second contention is overruled.\n\nThe result is that we find no merit in the appeals which are B accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "SANT SINGH NALWA & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SANT SINGH NALWA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER,\n\nHARYANA & ORS., ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, HARYANA & ORS., ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 30, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 90, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 30, 1981\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND A.N. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.N. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 2(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "After the coming into force of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 694, "end_char": 706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the coming into force of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "After the coming into force of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Karna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants claimed that the lands allotted to them as displaced persons E fell in a portion of District Karna!"}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1015, "end_char": 1058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1676, "end_char": 1685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "statute": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2694, "end_char": 2703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarlok Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "337 E-F, G]\n\n(ii) The Land Resettlement Manual prepared in 1952 by Tarlok Singh shows that the classification has been made in a very scientific manner after taking into consideration all the relevant factors."}}, {"text": "James M. Douie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab Settlement Manual (4th Edition) prepared by Sir James M. Douie though possessing unimpeachable authenticity was made Jong ago arid since then there have been great changes resulting from various steps taken by the Government for improving the nature and character of the land and the irrigation facilities.", "canonical_name": "James M. Douie"}}, {"text": "James Douie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3327, "end_char": 3338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, the classification made by Sir James Douie has been adhered to broadly and basically by Tarlok Singh in his Manual which forms the pivotal foundation for.", "canonical_name": "James M. Douie"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4183, "end_char": 4192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karna] District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Karna] District was concerned, there was no sailab land at the time when the Rules were framed and the classification was made."}}, {"text": "Sonepat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4721, "end_char": 4728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if the land in question could be treated as sailab and equated with the land in Sonepat then the valuation would have been at 12 annas which could be more deterimental to the interest of the appellants."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5266, "end_char": 5294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[339 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "A Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5549, "end_char": 5563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Hardev Singh and R.S. Sodhi for the Appellants (In both the\n\nAppeals.)"}}, {"text": "R.S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5568, "end_char": 5578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Hardev Singh and R.S. Sodhi for the Appellants (In both the\n\nAppeals.)"}}, {"text": "K.C. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for the Respondent (in both the Appeals)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against judgments dated 9.10.69 and 14.1.1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "R.N. Podar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5639, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for the Respondent (in both the Appeals)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against judgments dated 9.10.69 and 14.1.1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for the Respondent (in both the Appeals)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against judgments dated 9.10.69 and 14.1.1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "9.10.69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5819, "end_char": 5826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for the Respondent (in both the Appeals)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against judgments dated 9.10.69 and 14.1.1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "14.1.1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5831, "end_char": 5840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for the Respondent (in both the Appeals)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed against judgments dated 9.10.69 and 14.1.1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were refugees from Pakistan and Sant Singh D Nalwa was allotted 63 standard acres and 8!"}}, {"text": "Sant Singh D Nalwa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6345, "end_char": 6363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were refugees from Pakistan and Sant Singh D Nalwa was allotted 63 standard acres and 8!", "canonical_name": "SANT SINGH NALWA & ANR"}}, {"text": "Marghain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "units in village Marghain and another area of l 9 standard acres and 5!"}}, {"text": "Jundla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "units in Garden Colony in Jundla which were entered as sailab land in the revenue records."}}, {"text": "Kartar Kaur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6586, "end_char": 6597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other appellant, Kartar Kaur, was allotted 96 acres, 3 bighas and 13 biswas in the same district."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab passed the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6799, "end_char": 6867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Haryaria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6931, "end_char": 6939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the appellants E had become owners of the lands, the State of Punjab passed the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') which later applied to Haryaria also, under which every land owner whether a displaced prso1, allotte~ ot otherwis~ c:rnld not retain any area of latid which fell beyond the extent prescribed by sub-section (3) of s. 2 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7122, "end_char": 7126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State of Punjab passed the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "the State of Punjab passed the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7456, "end_char": 7499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7758, "end_char": 7762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "statute": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953"}}, {"text": "s 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "statute": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "statute": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8281, "end_char": 8290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "statute": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 5C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8364, "end_char": 8374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "statute": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8448, "end_char": 8458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953", "statute": "The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1953"}}, {"text": "Sant Singh Nalwa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8549, "end_char": 8565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of section 5C) (and includes the area in excess of the permissible area selected under section 19-B) but it will not include a tenant's permissible area; ... \" C\n\nSo far as the appellant, Sant Singh Nalwa, was concerned, the revenue authorities held that he was entitled to retain 50 (fifty) standard acres being the permissible area and the balance of 13 standard acres and odd units was declared as surplus.", "canonical_name": "SANT SINGH NALWA & ANR"}}, {"text": "Adna sailab and therefore according to the classification F made under the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9587, "end_char": 9667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sant Singh Nalwa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9703, "end_char": 9719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sant Singh Nalwa challenged before the Collector the validity of declaration of the.", "canonical_name": "SANT SINGH NALWA & ANR"}}, {"text": "13.3.1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9910, "end_char": 9919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector dismissed the application by his Order dated 13.3.1963 and held that 13 standard acres and 61 units G of the land had to be declared surplus."}}, {"text": "Sant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10028, "end_char": 10038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this Order, Sant Singh filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division where the only point raised by him was that the area was not correctly evaluated.", "canonical_name": "SANT SINGH NALWA & ANR"}}, {"text": "Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10066, "end_char": 10106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this Order, Sant Singh filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division where the only point raised by him was that the area was not correctly evaluated."}}, {"text": "July 23, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10936, "end_char": 10949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was allowed by the Single Judge by his Order dated July 23, 1963."}}, {"text": "l-9.10.69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11208, "end_char": 11217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order, the Financial Commissioner filed an appeal under Letters Patent before a Division Bench of the High Court which by its judgment dated l-9.10.69 allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court."}}, {"text": "10.2.1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11528, "end_char": 11537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Kartar Kaur, the other appellant also filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division regarding the surplus land and having failed there, filed a writ petition in the High Court on 10.2.1965 which was ultimately dismissed on 10.10.69 and the appeal under Letters Patent against the said Order of the Single Judge was also dismisse_d on 14.1.70."}}, {"text": "10.10.69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11572, "end_char": 11580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Kartar Kaur, the other appellant also filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division regarding the surplus land and having failed there, filed a writ petition in the High Court on 10.2.1965 which was ultimately dismissed on 10.10.69 and the appeal under Letters Patent against the said Order of the Single Judge was also dismisse_d on 14.1.70."}}, {"text": "14.1.70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11683, "end_char": 11690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Kartar Kaur, the other appellant also filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Ambala Division regarding the surplus land and having failed there, filed a writ petition in the High Court on 10.2.1965 which was ultimately dismissed on 10.10.69 and the appeal under Letters Patent against the said Order of the Single Judge was also dismisse_d on 14.1.70."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12221, "end_char": 12225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13500, "end_char": 13509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14137, "end_char": 14143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal of the Annexures to the Rules clearly shows that the valuation statement D and the class of land has been described not only as being applicable to one place or the other but in view of the entire topography of every district or tehsil, it is manifest that in a peculiar State like Punjab and Haryana diverse factors, namely, the situation or position of the."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14148, "end_char": 14155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal of the Annexures to the Rules clearly shows that the valuation statement D and the class of land has been described not only as being applicable to one place or the other but in view of the entire topography of every district or tehsil, it is manifest that in a peculiar State like Punjab and Haryana diverse factors, namely, the situation or position of the."}}, {"text": "Douie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15394, "end_char": 15399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, however, obvious that the Punjab Settlement Manual by Sir Douie was made Jong ago and since then there have been great changes resulting from various steps taken by the."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are clearly mentioned in para 259 of Sir James's Punjab\n\nSettlement Manual which Sarkaria, J., as he than was, rightly classed as the Bible of Land Revenue Settlement."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16575, "end_char": 16579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17075, "end_char": 17085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17361, "end_char": 17364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19590, "end_char": 19594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haryana Local Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20089, "end_char": 20106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kamal District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20396, "end_char": 20410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, it appears that so far as Kamal District is concerne, d, there was no sailab land at the time when the Rules were framed and the classification was made."}}, {"text": "Kamal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21214, "end_char": 21219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to agree with the counsel for the appellants that as the land in question did not fall in any of the heads of classification made in District Kamal they will carry no value at all because this is directly opposed to the various schemes of the classification made under the Rules."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_340_348_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "ATMA SINGH & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.\n\nApril 2, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD. C.J., A.P. SEN AND\n\nV.BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Municipal Act, 1911, read with Election Rules, 1952 and Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972-State Government notifies inclusion of certain local areas within the limits of Sunam Municipality under sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act-Operation of the notification stayed by the High Court and,\n\ntherfore, the State Government without reconstituting the Municipality into new wards held elections on the basis of the old municipal limits in view of the obligatory proviso to sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act inserted by Punjab Act IO of 1978 as amended by Punjab Act 2 of 1979-Propriety of the action of the State to hold elections in the municipality without de/imitation of wards und preparation of fresh electoral rolls and validity of the elections.\n\nIn exercise of their powers under sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the State Government by its Notification dated August 2, 1976 directed inclusion, in Sunam Municipality, of eight local areas including Moranwali Gram Panchayat, which challenged the validity of the said notification by a writ petition filed before the High Court and obtained stay of operation.\n\nUnder the Election Rules of 1952 and the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972, whenever there is a change in the limits of the municipality the State Government cannot proceed to hold election of councillors without delimitation of the municipality into wards. However, since proviso to subsection 3 of section 13 of the Act, inserted by Punjab Ace 18 of 1978 as amended by Punjab Act 2 of 1979 made it obligatory for the State Government to hold the election before June 30, 1979, along with those of the 42 other municipalities the election of the councillors of the Sunam Municipality was also held on June I 0, 1979 on the basis of the old municipal limits, that is, from the existing 15 wards.\n\nOn June 23, 1979 the appellants who seek to represent about 1,000 voters from the local areas newly added to the municipal limits, filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the election as null and void on the ground that there was no delimitation of wards and no fresh electoral rolls were prepared.\n\nThe High Court by its order dated July JO, 1979 declined to set aside the elections held, but directed that the local areas be given representation under sub-section(5)\n\nof section 5 of the Act. Hence the appeal after obtaining special leave of the A Court .\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD: I. The State Government without reconstituting a municipality into new wards cannot proceed to hold an election of councillors, when there is an extension of the municipal limits. [346 C] 8\n\n2. The whole purpose of delimitation of municipality into wards is to ensure that every citizen should get a fair representation in them unicipalities.\n\nWhen a municipality in reconstituted by the inclusion of any local area within the limits of a municipality under sub-section (3) of section 5 or by the exclusion of any local area from the limits of a municipality under section 7, that is, when there is an alteration of the limits of the municipality, there must of necessity be a division of the reconstituted municipality into new wards without which the elections cannot be held. There can be no:'.dis-enfranchisement of part of the electorate of a municipality. [345 C-D] . -\n\n3. But, in the instant case, the said principle could not be applied due to the stay order passed by single Judge of the Punjab High Court which was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978 and thereafter till April 1, 1980 consequent to the order of stay of dispossession by the Division Bench, dated December 19, 1978 in the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Gram Panchayat, Moranwali. When a local area sought to be •brougb.t within the limits of the municipality by the issue of a notification under sub-section (3) of section 5 was kept out of such limits by reason of the stay order passed by the Division Bench there could, obviously, be no delimitation of the municipality into new wards. [346 C, D; 347 B, A] -\n\n4. To contend that with the di>misnl of the wcit P\"tition on October 23, 1978, the impugned notification was brought into effect and, therefore, the State Government could not proceed with election without delimitation of wards and preparation of fresh electoral rolls is incorrect. It is equally incorrect to say that with the vacation of the stay by the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal on April t, 1980 the whole election would b~ invalidated. [346 F, 347 F]\n\n5. The Elections held on June 10, 1979 were valid and the councillors elected [are [enti.tled to , run their full term or live years as provided in] section\n\n13. The State Government acted with the best of intentions in deciding to hold the elections. The State Governmont had no other alternative but to hold the election of the councillors on the basis of the existing limits of the municipality, that is, from the existing 15 wards due to the amendmont of proviso to subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act by Punjab Act 2of1979 which made it 'obligatory for the State Government to hold the elections before Jun; 30,\n\n1979. [347 E, D]\n\nBhaichandbhai Maganlal Shah v. Th\" State of Gujarat and Ors., 8 Guj. L.R.\n\n210, approved.\n\n6. In view of the fact that a large number of inhabitants of the local areas brought within the municipal limits under sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act,\n\nSUPREME COURTS REPORTS\n\n[198 I] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA who were otherwise eligible to be enrolled as voters but for the stay by the High Court, have thereby been deprived not only of their valuable right to vote at the election but also the right to contest as a candidate for election as a councillor from any of the wards of the municipality or to the office of the President or the Vice-President, the Court directed ; (i) that the local areas included in the municipality should be formed into a ward or wards and representation given to them under sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Act; (ii) that the term .of the coun- B cillors so elected from such local areas shall be co-terminus with the term of the councillors already elected from the existing 15 wards and (iii) that this shall be a purely interim arrangement necessitated by the somewhat unfortunate stay order passed by the High Court and that obviously it cannot extend beyond the term of the present council. (347 G, 348 BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1958 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20th July 1979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2135/79.\n\nP. P. Rao and C. M. Nayar for the Appellants.\n\n0. P. Sharma and M M. Dhillon for Respondents Nos .. 1-5.\n\nS. M. Ashri & G. K. Bansal for the other appearing Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.. This appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, raises a question of some complexity.\n\nThe question is when there is a notification issued under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, for inclusion of certain local areas within the limits of a municipality, whether it is permissible for the State Government to hold elections in the municipality without delimitation of wards and preparation of fresh electoral rolls.\n\nIt arises under the following circumstances.\n\nIn exercise of their powers under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the State Government of Punjab by notification dated August 2,\n\nJ 976, directed inclusion of certain local areas.\n\nThe local areas so included are : (I) Moranwali Panchayat Area, (2) Grain Market Area, (3) Guja Peer Basti, (4) Jakhal Road, (5) ITI Area, (6) BOO Block, (7) Tehsil Court Area and (8) Thei Area. The Gram Panchayat, Moranwali challenged the validity of the said notification by a writ petition filed before the High Court. A learned Single\n\nJudge granted an ad interim stay staying the opration of the impugned notification.\n\nThe writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on October 23, I 978.\n\nThereupon, the Gram Pa.nchayat preferred a Letters Patent Appeal and prayed for grant of stay of operation of the impunged notification. On December\n\nI 9, I 978, a Division Bench passed the following order :\n\nAdmitted. Stay dispossession ad interim.\n\nNotice regarding stay.\n\nIt is common ground that eventually the stay was confirmed by the Division Bench and remained operative till April 1, 1980 when the\n\nLetters Patent Appeal was dismissed.\n\nIn the meanwhile, the State Government decided to hold the elections of councillors of the Sunam Municipality on the basis of the old municipal limits, i.e. from the existing 15 wards, along with those of the 42 other municipalities, since proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 13 of the Act, inserted by Punjab Act 18 of 1978 as amended by Punjab Act 2 of 1979 made it obligatory for the State Government to hold such elections before June 30, 1979. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner issued a notification on April 6, 1979 under r. 3 of the Election Rules, 1952, specifying that the elections in the municipality shall be held on June JO, 1979. On June 23, 1979, i.e. after the whole process of election was over, the appellants, who seek to represent about I 000 voters from the local areas newly added to the municipal limits, filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the election as null and void on the ground that there was no delimitation of wards and no fresh electoral rolls were prepared. The High Court, by its order dated July 20, 1979, declined to set aside the elections held, but directed that the local areas be given representation under sub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Act.\n\nIn support of the appeal, there is a two-fold contention advanced. In the first place, the submission is that when a local area is included within a municipality, elections cannot be held without delimitation of wards and preparation of fresh electoral rolls; and secondly, the submission is that, in any event, with the vacation of stay, the election was invalidated. The first of these submissions is unexceptionable, but it does not arise, and the second appears to us to be wholly devoid of substance.\n\nSub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, which is relevant for our purposes, reads as follows :\n\n.. G\n\n(5) Whefl any local area included in a municipality under sub-section (J) is a Sabha area, or a part thereof under the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, representation to the inhabitants of the local area so included on the committee of the municipality, in which local area is included, shall be given in the prescribed manner.\n\nThe Act does not prescribe the manner of giving representation to the inhabitants when any local area included in a municipality under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 is a Sabha area, unlike that in the case of a municipality or a notified area for which an express provishn is made in sub-s. (6) thereof.\n\nThe matter, therefore, falls to be governed by the Election Rules, 1952 and the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972, framed by the State Government in exercise of their powers under s. 240 (I) (b) and (c) and s. 258 of the Act.\n\nWhenever there is a change in the limits of a municipality, the D State Government cannot \"proceed to hold election of councillors without delimitation of the municipality into wards. The delimitation of wards, a delicate and important task, is entrusted to a Delimitation Board constituted. under r. 3 of the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972 and under r. 4 thereof it is the duty of the Delimitation Board to effect a re-division of a E municipality. That rule reads thus :\n\nFunctions of the Bo(; rd-It shall be the duty of the Board:--\n\n(i) to divide the Municipality into such number of wards as may be necessary, having regard to the number of elected members prescribed by the State Government, for the Committee, and the number of seats reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes; and\n\n(ii) to re-adjusf the wards as and when the limits of the Municipality are altered or there is increase in population of the Municipality or there is abnormal variation in population or voting figures of some of the wards of the Municipality, which requires, such re-adjustment.\n\nIn the delimitation of wards, the Board must observe the principles H laid down inr. 6, namely, (1) all wards shall, as far as practicable, be geographically compact areas, and in delimiting them due regard shall be had to physical features, existing boundaries of administrative units, if any, facilities of communication and public convenience; (2) wards in which seats are reserved for the Scheduled Castes shall be located, as far as practicable, in those areas where the proportion of their population to the total population of the municipality is the largest; arid (3) each municipality shall be divided into wards in such manner that the population of each ward, as far as practicable, is the same throughout the municipality, with a variation upto IO per cent above or below the average population figures.\n\nWhile making a re-division, it may not be possible to achieve mathematical perfection, but there must definitely be a substantial compliance with the requirement that every person should have an equal vote.\n\nThe whole purpose of delimitation of municipalities into wards is to ensure that every citizen should get a fair representation in the municipalities.\n\nWhen a municipality is re-constituted by the inclusion of any local area within the limits of a municipality under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 or by the exclusion of any local area from the limits of a municipality under s. 7, i.e. when there is an alteration of the limits of the municipality, there must of necessity be a division of the re-constituted municipality into new wards without which the elections cannot be held.\n\nThere can be no dis-enfranchisement of a part of the electorate of a municipality. The question was dealt with at some length by the Gujarat High Court in Bhaichandbhai Magan/al Shah v. The State af Gujarat & Ors.(') and it was observed :\n\nIt must follow logically and inevitably from this proposition that the constitution of wards dividing the whole of the municipal district is a sine qua non of a valid election.\n\nIf no wards at all are constituted in the municipal district, the machinery of election cannot go through and equally the machinery of election cannot go through if wards are constituted in respect of a part of the municipal district and the other part is not divided into any ward or wards.\n\nIn such a case there would be lists of voters for the wards which are constituted out of a part of the municipal district but there would be no lists of voters so far as the other part of the municipal district is concerned and no one from that part would be qualified to vote or to stand as a candidate for the election and no Councillors being elected by\n\n(1) 8 Guj. L.R. 210.-\n\nthat part, there would be no representation of that part on the municipality. Where such a situation arises, it is difficult to see how the Municipality can be said to be a Municipality for the whole of the municipal district within the meaning of s. 9.\n\nWe approve of the view taken by the Gujarat High Court.\n\nThere can be no dispute with the principle that the State Government without re-constituting a municipality into new wards, cannot proceed to hold an election of councillors, when there is an extension of the municipal limits, but the difficulty is about the applicability of that principle to the facts of the present case. There is no denying the fact that the effect of the stay order passed by the learned Single Judge staying the operation of the notification issued under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 was to put the said notification in abeyance, with the result that the local areas to which it related were not brought within the municipal limits.\n\nIt is also an undisputed fact D that the stay order passed by the learned Single Judge was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978. It is, however, urged that with the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge on October 23, 1978, the impugned notification was brought into effect and, therefore, the State Government could not proceed with the election without delimitation of wards and preparation of E fresh electoral rolls.\n\nWe are afraid, the contention cannot be\n\naccepted.\n\nThe case presents a rather disturbing feature.\n\nThere were drastic changes brought about in s. 13 of the Act dealing with the term of councillors leading to the supersession of all municipalities in the State and casting an obligation on the State Government to hold fresh elections of councillors, before June 30, 1979. In these circumstances, the Division Bench should have acted with greater circumspection. On the contrary, the Division Bench, on December 19, 1978 passed a stay order staying the dispossession of the Gram .\n\nPanchayat although the Gram Panchayat had applied for staying the operation of the impugned notification. It is somewhat unfortunate that the stay order passed by the Division Bench was couched in rather ambiguous terms, but it had virtually the same effect as the one passed by the learned Single Judge. It is difficult to comprehend the distinction between \"stay of dispossession of the Gram Panchayat\" and \"stay of operation of the impunged notification\". Apparently, the Division Bench, without applying its mind, passed an order staying dispossession of the Gram Panchayat, failing\n\nto realise that the effect of stay would dislocate the whole electoral process.\n\nWhen a local area sought to be brought within the limits of the municipality , by the issue of a notification under sub-s. (3) of s. 5, was kept out of such limits by reason of the stay order passed by the Division Bench, there would obviously be no delimitation of the municipality into new wards.\n\nThere was some doubt created about the purport and effect of the stay order passed by the Division Bench.\n\nThis brought about an inevitable chain of events.\n\nAfter the Division Bench passed the order on December 19, 1978, the State Minister for Transport who represented the Sabha Areas in the State Legis lative Assembly wrote to the Minister for Local Self-Government\n\nto postpone the elections scheduled to be held for the municipality.\n\nWhen the exact nature of the stay order was brought to the notice of the Minister, he agreed with the view of the Local Self-Government\n\nDepartment that the elections to the municipality could not be held without a delimitation of the muincipal area.\n\nEventually, the State Government had no other alternative but to hold the election of the councillors on the basis of the existing limits of the municipality, i.e. from the existing 15 wards, due tothe amendment of Proviso to sub-s.(3) of s.13 of the Act by Punjab Act 2 of 1979 which made it obligatory for the State Government to hold the election before June 30, 1979.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the State Governnent acted with the best of intentions in deciding to hold the elections. The election so held on June I 0, 1979 was a valid election and the councillors elected are entitled to run their full term of five years as provided by sub-s.(2) of s.13.\n\nThe contention that with the vacation of the stay by the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal on April 1, 1980, the whole election would be invalidated, must, therefore, fail.\n\nWe are distressed to find that due to the stay order passed by the Division Bench a large number of inhabitants of the local areas brought within the municipal limits under sub s.(3) of s.5 of the Act,\n\nwho were otherwise eligible to be enrolled as voters, have thereby been deprived not only of their valuable right to vote at the election but also of the right to contest as a candidate for election as a councillor from any of the wards of the municipality or to the office of the President or the Vice President.\n\nBut there is little that can be done in the matter at this stage.\n\nDriven to this situation brought about by the stay orders of the High Court, there is no other alternative but to direct that\n\nthe local areas included in the municipality under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 should be formed into a ward or wards and representation given to them under sub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Act. The term of the councillors so elected from such local areas shall be co-terminus with the term of the C'ouncillors already elected from the existing 15 wards. We are - assured by learned counsel for the State that the State Government shall take immediate steps to comply with this direction. This shall be a purely interim arrangement necessitated by the somewhat unfortunate stay orders passed by the High Court. The interim arrangement cannot obviously extend beyond the term of the present council.\n\nWe hope and trust that the State Government shall, in the meanwhile, take steps to constitute a Delimitation Board under r. 3 of the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972.\n\nAfter the delimitat10n of the municipality into new wards, the State Gowrnment shall proceed to re-fix the number of councillors of the re-constituted municipality under s. 11, prescribe the number of elected councillors afresh as required under cl. (a) of sub-s. (I) of s. J 2 of the Act and issue necessary directions for the preparation of fresh electoral rolls as required under rr. 8 and. 8A of the Election Rules, 1952.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nThere shall be no order as to costs.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "ATMA SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ATMA SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 2, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Election Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363, "end_char": 372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 643, "end_char": 653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 965, "end_char": 974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 982, "end_char": 1008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 2, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1057, "end_char": 1071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of their powers under sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the State Government by its Notification dated August 2, 1976 directed inclusion, in Sunam Municipality, of eight local areas including Moranwali Gram Panchayat, which challenged the validity of the said notification by a writ petition filed before the High Court and obtained stay of operation."}}, {"text": "Sunam Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1095, "end_char": 1113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of their powers under sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the State Government by its Notification dated August 2, 1976 directed inclusion, in Sunam Municipality, of eight local areas including Moranwali Gram Panchayat, which challenged the validity of the said notification by a writ petition filed before the High Court and obtained stay of operation."}}, {"text": "Moranwali Gram Panchayat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1146, "end_char": 1170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of their powers under sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the State Government by its Notification dated August 2, 1976 directed inclusion, in Sunam Municipality, of eight local areas including Moranwali Gram Panchayat, which challenged the validity of the said notification by a writ petition filed before the High Court and obtained stay of operation."}}, {"text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1348, "end_char": 1399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1612, "end_char": 1621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1625, "end_char": 1635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "June 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, since proviso to subsection 3 of section 13 of the Act, inserted by Punjab Ace 18 of 1978 as amended by Punjab Act 2 of 1979 made it obligatory for the State Government to hold the election before June 30, 1979, along with those of the 42 other municipalities the election of the councillors of the Sunam Municipality was also held on June I 0, 1979 on the basis of the old municipal limits, that is, from the existing 15 wards."}}, {"text": "Sunam Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1891, "end_char": 1909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, since proviso to subsection 3 of section 13 of the Act, inserted by Punjab Ace 18 of 1978 as amended by Punjab Act 2 of 1979 made it obligatory for the State Government to hold the election before June 30, 1979, along with those of the 42 other municipalities the election of the councillors of the Sunam Municipality was also held on June I 0, 1979 on the basis of the old municipal limits, that is, from the existing 15 wards."}}, {"text": "June I 0, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1927, "end_char": 1941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, since proviso to subsection 3 of section 13 of the Act, inserted by Punjab Ace 18 of 1978 as amended by Punjab Act 2 of 1979 made it obligatory for the State Government to hold the election before June 30, 1979, along with those of the 42 other municipalities the election of the councillors of the Sunam Municipality was also held on June I 0, 1979 on the basis of the old municipal limits, that is, from the existing 15 wards."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2025, "end_char": 2038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 23, 1979 the appellants who seek to represent about 1,000 voters from the local areas newly added to the municipal limits, filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the election as null and void on the ground that there was no delimitation of wards and no fresh electoral rolls were prepared."}}, {"text": "July JO, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2368, "end_char": 2381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court by its order dated July JO, 1979 declined to set aside the elections held, but directed that the local areas be given representation under sub-section(5)\n\nof section 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2507, "end_char": 2516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3111, "end_char": 3120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3199, "end_char": 3208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3632, "end_char": 3649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the instant case, the said principle could not be applied due to the stay order passed by single Judge of the Punjab High Court which was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978 and thereafter till April 1, 1980 consequent to the order of stay of dispossession by the Division Bench, dated December 19, 1978 in the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Gram Panchayat, Moranwali."}}, {"text": "August 2, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3674, "end_char": 3688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the instant case, the said principle could not be applied due to the stay order passed by single Judge of the Punjab High Court which was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978 and thereafter till April 1, 1980 consequent to the order of stay of dispossession by the Division Bench, dated December 19, 1978 in the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Gram Panchayat, Moranwali."}}, {"text": "October 23, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3692, "end_char": 3708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the instant case, the said principle could not be applied due to the stay order passed by single Judge of the Punjab High Court which was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978 and thereafter till April 1, 1980 consequent to the order of stay of dispossession by the Division Bench, dated December 19, 1978 in the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Gram Panchayat, Moranwali."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3729, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the instant case, the said principle could not be applied due to the stay order passed by single Judge of the Punjab High Court which was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978 and thereafter till April 1, 1980 consequent to the order of stay of dispossession by the Division Bench, dated December 19, 1978 in the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Gram Panchayat, Moranwali."}}, {"text": "December 19, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the instant case, the said principle could not be applied due to the stay order passed by single Judge of the Punjab High Court which was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978 and thereafter till April 1, 1980 consequent to the order of stay of dispossession by the Division Bench, dated December 19, 1978 in the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Gram Panchayat, Moranwali."}}, {"text": "Moranwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3901, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the instant case, the said principle could not be applied due to the stay order passed by single Judge of the Punjab High Court which was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978 and thereafter till April 1, 1980 consequent to the order of stay of dispossession by the Division Bench, dated December 19, 1978 in the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Gram Panchayat, Moranwali."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4047, "end_char": 4056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 10, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Elections held on June 10, 1979 were valid and the councillors elected [are [enti.tled to , run their full term or live years as provided in] section\n\n13."}}, {"text": "section\n\n13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4863, "end_char": 4874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30,\n\n1979.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Governmont had no other alternative but to hold the election of the councillors on the basis of the existing limits of the municipality, that is, from the existing 15 wards due to the amendmont of proviso to subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act by Punjab Act 2of1979 which made it 'obligatory for the State Government to hold the elections before Jun; 30,\n\n1979. ["}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5583, "end_char": 5592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6167, "end_char": 6176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Rao and C. M. Nayar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "C. M. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6812, "end_char": 6823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Rao and C. M. Nayar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6848, "end_char": 6857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M M. Dhillon for Respondents Nos .. 1-5."}}, {"text": "M M. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6862, "end_char": 6874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M M. Dhillon for Respondents Nos .. 1-5."}}, {"text": "S. M. Ashri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6904, "end_char": 6915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Ashri & G. K. Bansal for the other appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "G. K. Bansal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6918, "end_char": 6930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Ashri & G. K. Bansal for the other appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7013, "end_char": 7016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.. This appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, raises a question of some complexity."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7214, "end_char": 7218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7226, "end_char": 7252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7584, "end_char": 7588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7667, "end_char": 7693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of their powers under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the State Government of Punjab by notification dated August 2,\n\nJ 976, directed inclusion of certain local areas."}}, {"text": "August 2,\n\nJ 976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7716, "end_char": 7732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of their powers under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the State Government of Punjab by notification dated August 2,\n\nJ 976, directed inclusion of certain local areas."}}, {"text": "October 23, I 978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on October 23, I 978."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8997, "end_char": 9002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9235, "end_char": 9248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner issued a notification on April 6, 1979 under r. 3 of the Election Rules, 1952, specifying that the elections in the municipality shall be held on June JO, 1979."}}, {"text": "Election Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9267, "end_char": 9287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June JO, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9356, "end_char": 9369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner issued a notification on April 6, 1979 under r. 3 of the Election Rules, 1952, specifying that the elections in the municipality shall be held on June JO, 1979."}}, {"text": "July 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9770, "end_char": 9783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, by its order dated July 20, 1979, declined to set aside the elections held, but directed that the local areas be given representation under sub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9905, "end_char": 9909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Election Rules, 1952", "statute": "the Election Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10444, "end_char": 10448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10456, "end_char": 10482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10665, "end_char": 10696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11024, "end_char": 11028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952", "statute": "the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Election Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11220, "end_char": 11240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11249, "end_char": 11300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11367, "end_char": 11373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "s. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11394, "end_char": 11400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11724, "end_char": 11775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13813, "end_char": 13817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13896, "end_char": 13900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14236, "end_char": 14254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question was dealt with at some length by the Gujarat High Court in Bhaichandbhai Magan/al Shah v. The State af Gujarat & Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15443, "end_char": 15447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15999, "end_char": 16003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16753, "end_char": 16758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17990, "end_char": 17994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19092, "end_char": 19096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19509, "end_char": 19513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19881, "end_char": 19884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20472, "end_char": 20476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20568, "end_char": 20572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21223, "end_char": 21274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21447, "end_char": 21452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972", "statute": "the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972"}}, {"text": "Election Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21681, "end_char": 21701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_349_351_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE. OF PUNJAB\n\nSARWAN SINGH\n\nApril 2, 1981\n\n[ S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nBar of /imitation Under the statute-Whether the entire proceedings instituted after period of limitation including the conviction and sentence becomes non-est- Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (Act II of 1974) Scope of-Section 468, explained.\n\nBased on the audit report dated January 5, 1973 revealing an embezzlement having been committed by the Respondent on 22.8.1972, a challan was presented against him on the 13th October, 1976 under Sec. 406 Penal Code for misappropriating the amounts deposited with him as a Cashier of the Tanda Badha Co-ope,·\n\nrati ve Society, district Patiala. The Trial Court convicted the respondent under ;;. section 406 Penal Code and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rupees one thousand. The respondents' appeal to the High Court was allowed accepting the plea of bar of limitation under section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence the State appeal after obtaining special leave of the Court.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court,\n\nHELD : (i) Taking any of these dates, namely, 22nd August 1972, (Commission of embezzlement), and 5th January 1973 (date of detection of embezzlement) the prosecution was barred by limitation under sections 468(2) (a) and 469(b) of th Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the conviction and the sentence of the respondent as also the entire proceedings culminating in his conviction became non-est. [350 F, 351 G]\n\n(ii) The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecution was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a Jong time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statute seeks to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private party must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. [351 E-F) .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8-4-1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 342 of 1980.\n\nM. S. Dhillon for the Appellant.\n\nT. S. Arora for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 8th April, 1980 by which the respondent Sarwan Singh was acquitted of the charge under s. 406 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIt appears that the respondent-accused was charged under s. 406 of the Penal Code for misappropriating the amounts deposited with him as a cashier of the Tanda Badha Co-operative Society, District Patiala.\n\nThe challan was presented against the accused on the 13th October,\n\n1976. The trial court after recording the evidence acquitted the respondent of the charge under s. 408 but {convicted the respondent of the charge under s. 406 and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-.\n\nThe respondent then filed the appeal to the High Court which allowed the appeal and acquitted the respondent mainly on the ground that the prosecution launched against the respondent was clearly barred by limitation under ss. 468 and 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe High Court was of the view that the charge-sheet clearly shows that the embezzlement is said to have been committed on 22nd August, 1972 and the audit report, through which the offence was detected is dated 5th January, 1973. Taking any of these dates, the prosecution was barred by limitation under s. 468 (2) (c) of the Code. In our opinion, the High Court has taken the correct view of the law.\n\nSection 468(2) (c) may be extracted thus :\n\nSec. 468 (2) (c) :\n\n\"three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but n0t exceeding three years.\"\n\n:::(\n\nPUNJAB v. SARWAN SINGH (Fazal Ali, J.) 351\n\nSection 469 (1) (a) and (6) may be extracted thus :\n\n\"(a) on the date of the offence; or\n\n(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier;\"\n\nIn the instant case as the charge-sheet clearly mentions that the offence was committed on the 22nd August, 1972, the bar of limitation contained in s. 468 (2) (c) clearly applies and the prosecution therefore, is clearly barred by limitation. Even assuming that so far as, the offender is concerned, the commission of the offence came to knowledge of the officer concerned, it would be so according to charge-sheet on January 5, 1973, the date when the audit report was made. Even if this extreme position be accepted, the prosecution would still be barred by limitation under s. 469(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\n\nCounsel for the State of Punjab was unable to assail the point of law derived by the High Court regarding the interpretation of s. 468.\n\nThe object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated. prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complainant must abide by the Jetter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. The prosecution against the respondent being barred by limitation the conviction as also the sentence . of the respondent as also the entire proceedings culminating in the conviction of the respondent herein become non-est. For these reasons given above, we hold that the point of Jaw regarding the applicability of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been correctly decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.\n\nThis Court has also taken the same view in a number of decisions.\n\nThe result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nThe respondent will now be discharged from his bail bonds.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "STATE. OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SARWAN SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SARWAN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OF PUNJAB\n\nSARWAN SINGH\n\nApril 2, 1981\n\n[ S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 311, "end_char": 322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 532, "end_char": 540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 551, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 672, "end_char": 679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "406 Penal Code for misappropriating the amounts deposited with him as a Cashier of the Tanda Badha Co-ope,·\n\nrati ve Society, district Patiala."}}, {"text": "section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 732, "end_char": 743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 754, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 953, "end_char": 964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 468(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1298, "end_char": 1313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1335, "end_char": 1361, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2011, "end_char": 2032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. S. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2506, "end_char": 2519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. Dhillon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2540, "end_char": 2551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Arora for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2617, "end_char": 2625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 8th April, 1980 by which the respondent Sarwan Singh was acquitted of the charge under s. 406 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sarwan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2776, "end_char": 2788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 8th April, 1980 by which the respondent Sarwan Singh was acquitted of the charge under s. 406 of the Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "SARWAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "s. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2823, "end_char": 2829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2837, "end_char": 2854, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2914, "end_char": 2920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2928, "end_char": 2938, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tanda Badha Co-operative Society, District", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3011, "end_char": 3053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the respondent-accused was charged under s. 406 of the Penal Code for misappropriating the amounts deposited with him as a cashier of the Tanda Badha Co-operative Society, District Patiala."}}, {"text": "s. 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3228, "end_char": 3234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3285, "end_char": 3291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 468 and 469", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3628, "end_char": 3654, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "22nd August, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was of the view that the charge-sheet clearly shows that the embezzlement is said to have been committed on 22nd August, 1972 and the audit report, through which the offence was detected is dated 5th January, 1973."}}, {"text": "5th January, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3868, "end_char": 3885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was of the view that the charge-sheet clearly shows that the embezzlement is said to have been committed on 22nd August, 1972 and the audit report, through which the offence was detected is dated 5th January, 1973."}}, {"text": "s. 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3961, "end_char": 3967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 468(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 469", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4780, "end_char": 4786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 5, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5050, "end_char": 5065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even assuming that so far as, the offender is concerned, the commission of the offence came to knowledge of the officer concerned, it would be so according to charge-sheet on January 5, 1973, the date when the audit report was made."}}, {"text": "s. 469(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5209, "end_char": 5218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5226, "end_char": 5258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5277, "end_char": 5292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the State of Punjab was unable to assail the point of law derived by the High Court regarding the interpretation of s. 468."}}, {"text": "s. 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5389, "end_char": 5395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5874, "end_char": 5881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5889, "end_char": 5910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6463, "end_char": 6489, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6524, "end_char": 6553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons given above, we hold that the point of Jaw regarding the applicability of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been correctly decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_34_45_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "ARTI SA-PRU\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 27, 1981\n\n[R.S. PATHAK AND 0. CHlNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nAdmission to medical college-Government Notification No. 41-G.R of 1980 dated 24th September, 1980 purporting to identify certain villages as socially and educationally backward.for applying the pri11ciple nf\"rectification of imbalance in different parts of the S1ate\"-W/1ether the classification is wholly arbitrary a11d without any foundatio11 to sustain ir and conseque111/y the criteria adopted in grallfing admission to the M.B.B.S. course is discriminatory, unreasonable and void-When viva voce test lasts between two to four minutes, whether allotment of 30% of total marks is patently unreasonable and arbitrary-Whether accepting applications beyond the time prescribed on the [!round that qualifying examination in which the applicant appeared was held late and the results were announced after the date prescribed for submitting the applications, bad in law.\n\nRegulationsframed by the Indian Medical Council under section 33 read with section T9A oft he I11dian Medical Council Act, 1956, whether Ito/ding viva voce examination and assigning 30% of the total marks in it is in violation of Article 31 of the Constitution-Whether the presence of a Government official 011 the Selection Committee in the viva vore test is obnoxious to law.\n\nSelection of candidates to be admitted to M.B.B, S. course in the Medical College of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was made by a Selection Committee on the basis of (a) merit in qualifyin.g examination (35_ marks) (b) an objective test (35 marks) and (c) a viva voce test (30 marks). The seats were distributed besides the examination base was determined by a distribution of the seats into three distinct divisions namely, (i) 60% on the basis of open merit ; (ii) 20% on the basis of reservation for scheduled castes and other reserved categories, one of which was broadly described as \"socially and educationally backward classes\" which included candidates from (a) areas adjoining actual line of control and\n\n(b) areas known as \"bad pockets\", including Ladhak and (iii} 20% were reserved as seats to be.filled \"on the basis of inter se merit to ensure rectification of imbalance in the admission for various parts of the State, if any, so as to give equitable and uniform treatment to those parts\".\n\nIn Nishi Maghu v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1253, the Supreme Court held that the selections made under the third category were invalid, inasmuch as the classification made for rectification of regional imbalance without identifying the areas suffering 'from imbalance was vague.\n\nThe Stale Government, therefore, published Notification No. 41 G.R. of 1980 dated 24th September, 1980 purporting to identify certain villages as socially and educationally backward for applying the principle of \"rectification of imbalance in different parts of the States\" and reduced the distribution of seats in the Medical Colleges of the State under this category from 18 to 17% under this category. This order is challenged by the petitioner, an unsuccessful candidate in the selection made for admission to M.B.B.S. course.for the year 1980-81.\n\n)··\n\n----\\\n\nART! SAPRU V. J. AND K. 35\n\nAllowing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD: I. The classification attempted by the State Government by its order dated 24th September, 1980 suffers from tbe vice of arbitrariness and is, therefore, invalid. There was no intelligible data before the Court for sustaining the classification. No doubt the State Government had acted in its own wisdom, but the material to which that wisdom was applied was not disclosed at all. The fact by itself that some hundreds of villages had been brought within the classification is of no assistance whatever. That a comprehensive understanding of regional imbalances from the Anand Committee report and the Sikri Commission report had not been possible yet affords no justification for an arbitrary classification.\n\nThe State failed to bring the case within Article 15(4) of the Constitution.\n\n[39 G; 40 DJ\n\nState of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 761 applied.\n\n2 : I. There is need to revise the marks ratio for the viva voce test because of the very real risk future selections would face on this score. The Government would also do well to ensure that Selection Committees take care to devote sufficient time to the oral interview of individual candidates having regard to the several relevant considerations which must enter into their judgment respecting each candidate. [ 41 D & G]\n\n\n2: 2. The selection cannot be said to _be vitiated on the ground that one of the members, Shri Kunda!, left after some time and therefore the composition of the Interview Cgmmittee varied from time to time, since three out of four members remained present throughout the proceedings and a proportionately small number only of the candidates was interviewed when Shri Kunda! was present. [ 42 D-E]\n\n2 : 3. The appointment of a Government official as a member of the Selection Committee is not obnoxious to the law.\n\nThere is no principle of law disqualifying a Government official from participating on the Interview Committee merely because he is a Government official. It cannot be said that a Government official cannot be a person of high integrity, calibre and qualifications. The constitution of a Committee lies in the wisdom of the State Government and it is expected men suitably qualified in every respect will be appointed to discharge the functions of the Committee. So long as the . State Government acts boQa fide it cannot be said that the presence of a Government official on the Selection Committee vitiates its constitution. [44H, 45 A-Bl\n\n2 : 4. Selection of a number of candidates, in the present -case, cannot be said to have been made because of favouritism on account of relationship or friendship with members of the Selection Committee or because they were related\n\nto important and influential persons in the State. Besides being sketchy and extremely vague, such allegations have been made for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit and there has been no reasonable opportunity to the respondents to H reply to them. [ 42 F]\n\nSUPREME COURT ~J; JPORTS\n\n[198!] 3 S.C.R.\n\n3. The grant of admission to respondents Nos. 7 to 12, in the instant case is in order, inasmuch as the relevant qualifying examination was held ]ate and th~\n\nannoncement of. the results was delayed. The State Government correctly permitted the candidature of these applicants to be considered for inclusion in a common list drawn up to cover canidates for admission to either of the Government Medical Colleges, at Srinagar and at Jammu. Even according to petitioner those respondents have an excellent record and if they had applied in time for admission in the Government College at Srinagar they would certainly have been'admitted on the basis of their meri.t. [42G-H]\n\n' 4.\n\nA competitive entrance examinat, ion is permissible in law in addition to the qualifying examination. Jn regard to the sufficiency of the objectiw test, the absence of a prescribed formal curriculum does not vitiate the objective test.\n\n[44 F]\n\n5. A reading of the regulations framed by the Indian Medical Council under section 33 read with section 19A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 makes it clear that the reservation permissible need not necessarily be confined to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. [44 .E]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 5600, 5601, 5615, 5689-5697 and 6283-6307/1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitµtion)\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikk~, ·.E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R.\n\nSatish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in W.Ps. 5600-01,5615& 5689-97/80. ' '\n\nM. K. Ramamurthy, Miss R. Vaigai, Joginder Singh and J.\n\nRamamurty for the Petitioners in WPs. 6283-6307/80.\n\nS.N. Kacker and A/taf' Ahmed for the Respondents in all the l Writ Petitions.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK J.\n\nThe petitioner challenges the admission of a number of candidates to the M.B.B.S. course in the Government Medical College Srinagar for the session I 980-81.\n\nThe petitioner, who had also applied for admission, was denied it.\n\nShe contends that the criteria adopted in granting admission is discriminatory, unreasonable and void.\n\nThe Principal, Government Medical College, Srinagar invited applications by 3rd April, 1980 for admission to the M.B.B.S. cours~ for the session 1980-81, and the notice specified the qualifying examinations of the Board of Secondary Education, Kashmir, or any other equivalent Board or University which constituted the basis of eligibility.\n\nThe manner and procedure governing the eligibility for admission had been set forth in a Government order\n\nARTI SAPRU v. J. AND K. (Pathak, J.) 37\n\nof 3rd April, 1978, which laid down that a Selection Committee constituted by the Government would determine the inter se merit of eligible candidates on the basis of an interview for judging their\n\n(a) physical fitness, (b) personality, (c) aptitude, (d) general knowledge and (e) general intelligence. This Government order was modified by a subsequent Government order dated 23rd June, 1980 and in the result eligible candidates were now required to appear not only in the viva voce examination but also in an objective test. These two tests along with merit in the qualifying examination of the Board or University constituted the three elements which together combined to form a basis for Selection. The qualifying exammation carried 35 marks, the objective test was allotted 35 marks and the viva voce examination was assigned 30 marks.\n\nBesides the examination base constituted by the aforesaid three criteria, the selection was also determined by a distribution of the seats into three distinct divisions.\n\nOf the total number of seats 50% were earmarked for being filled on the basis of open merit, 25%were reserved for candidates from Scheduled Castes and other reserved categories, one of which was broadly described as \"socially and educationlly backward classes'' and included candidates from (a) areas adjoining actual line of control, and (b) area known as bad pockets including Ladhak.\n\nAfter selection had been made as above the remaining 25% of the seats were to be filled \"on the basis of inter se merit to ensure rectification of imbalance in the admission for the State, if any, so as to give equitable and uniform treatment to those parts\". It was also recited that in case there was no \"visible imbalance\", the seats earmarked under that head were to be distributed among further \"open merit\" candidates.\n\nOn 27th June, 1974, the percentage of seats reserved for the different categories was refixed, so that 60% of the seats were now earmarked for admission on the basis of \"open merit\", 20% for distribution among candidates from the Scheduled Castes and other reserved categories including socially and educationally backward classes, and the remaining 20% of the seats were earmarked for \"ensuring rectification of imbalances\". Still another order dated 21st April, 1976 reduced the reservation for removing regional imbalances from 20% to 18%.\n\nThe selection of candidates for admission to the Government Medical College, Jammu for the academic year 1979-80 was challenged in this Court in Nishi Maghu v. State of Jammu and Kashmir(1)\n\n\nand the Court held that \"the classification made for rectification of regional imbalance without identifying the areas suffering from imbalance was vague and the selections made under that head were accordingly invalid'\". The Court directed that the seats reserved under that head should be added to the quota of seats earmarked for selection on the basis of merit and filled accordingly.\n\nThereafter, in an attempt to remove the deficiency pointed out by this Court in Nishi Maghu (supra), the State Government published Notification No. 41-GR of 1980 dated 24th September, 1980 purporting to identify certain villages as socially and educationally backward for applying the principle of \"rectification of imbalance in different parts of the State\". A long schedule (covering over 60 pages of the record before us) was annexed and listed some hundreds of villages.\n\nAbout the same. time, a Government order was issued fixing 17% of the seats in the M.B.B.S course of the medical colleges of D the State as the admission quota for the purpose of \"rectification of\n\nimbalances.\"\n\nFrom 14th to 17th July, 1980, as many as 660 candidates were interviewed by a Committee at Srinagar by way of viva voce examination. On 21st July, 1980 the State Government issued a directive that a total list of J 25 candidates be prepared against all the seats of the two Government Medical Colleges, at Srinagar and at Jammu.\n\nA Selection List was finalised taking into account the reservations made for various categories and classes by the different Government orders, and was published on 29th September, 1980, and the names of 75 candidates were announced for admission to the M.B.B.S. course to the Govenment Medical College, Srinagar.\n\nThe principal contention of Mr. Soli Sorabjee appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5600 of J 980, is that not with standing this brave attempt to meet the constitutional requirement indicated in Nishi Maghu (supra) the State Government has failed in its purpose.\n\nTt is urged that there was no material before the State Government affording a pertinent basis for classifying these villages.\n\nIt is pointed out that almost whole tehsils of different districts have been identified as socially and educationally backward, 'bad pockets' and areas belonging to the line of actual control have been included and in the result with more than 95 per cent of the villages classified as socially and educationally backward, the inference must be that almost all\n\n. ,\n\n--~ , .+·\n\nJ.., )\n\nof Kashmir Division calls for a reservation quota. It is asserted that a portion of Srinagar city, which includes Sangin Darwaza and Bhagwanpure, has also been identified as socially and educationally backward. To that class have also been added towns where Notified Area Committees exist. The submission is that the classification is wholly arbitrary and without any foundation to sustain it.\n\nThe\n\nmere circumstance, it is urged, that the classification is defined on\n\nB the basis of villages without anything more demonstrates its unconstitutional character.\n\nThe case of the State Government is that the classification fully satisfies the criterion \"social and educational backwardness\". In proof of the assertion it is pointed out that the present selection shows that candidates from areas not included in this classified category have taken 66 seats out of 75 on the basis of open merit.\n\nIt is conceded that a large number of villages have been included in the classification, but it is pointed out that the greater bulk of the population resides in the two cities of Srinagar and Jammu alone and would be equivalent to the population of hundreds of villages taken together. The classification is supported by the consideration that in the nature of things the in habitants of the rural areas are socially. and educationally backward.\n\nIt is urged that merely because some of the villages are administered by Notified Area Committees does not remove the stigma of backwardness. It is admitted that two reports, popularly described as the Anand Committee report and the Sikri Commission report, are under consideration by the Government but, it is said, as a comprehensive appreciation of the situation disclosed by the two reports of all the aspects of social and educational backwardness in the State has not been made yet, the Government has proceeded \"in its own wisdom\" to identify the areas suffering from regional imbalance.\n\nWe are of opinion that the classification attempted by the State Government by its order dated 24th September, 1980 suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and must be declared invalid. There is no intelligible data before us for sustaining the classification. No doubt the State Government has acted in its own wisdom, but the material to which that wisdom was applied has not been disclosed at all. The fact by itself that some hundreds of villages have been brought within the classification is of no assistance whatever.\n\nOver six years ago, this Court in State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon(1) ruled that in the matter of admission of students to medical colleges\n\n(1) [ 1975] 2 S.C.R. 761.\n\na reservation in favour of candidates on the ground that they hailed from rural areas was unconstitutional.\n\nThe Court repelled the argument that it was necessary to reserve seats for candidates from rural areas because they were handicapped in the matter of education. It also rejected the plea that as the number of marks obtained by candidates from rural areas in the qualifying test were much lower than the marks obtained by the general candidates that was an indication of the farmer's educational backwardness. Ray, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed :\n\n\"The reservation for rural areas cannot be sustained on the ground that the rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. This reservation appears to be made for the majority population of the State 80 per cent of the population of the State cannot be a homogeneous class. Poverty in rural areas cannot be the basis of classification to support reservation for rural areas.\"\n\nThe criterion adopted by the State Government cannot be accepted unless supported by other relevant considerations. That a comprehensive understanding of regional imbalances from the Anand Committee report and the Sikri Commission report has not been possible yet affords no justification for an arbitrary classification.\n\nWe are not satisfied that the State Government has succeeded in bringing the case within Article 15 (4) of the Constitution. The material before us is woeful, ly inadequate and fails to sufficiently support the validity of the classification.\n\nWe are of opinion that the order of the State Government dated 24th September, 1980 must be declared invalid.\n\nThe next contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the allocation to the viva voce test of 30 per cent of the total marks is patently unreasonable and arbitrary. Our attention has been drawn to the observations of this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujrb(1) where an allocation of more than 15 per cent of the total marks for the oral interview was regarded as arbitrary and unreasonable and liable to be struck down as constitutionally invalid. It seems to us that the State Government would have done well to apply its mind seriously to the evaluation ratio between the three criteria adopted for admission.\n\nWhen the Government order of 23 rd June, 1980 dividing the total marks between the three criteria was issued, there\n\n\n·-+-\n\n~·\n\nwas ample evidence of the principle and practice adopted by examining bodies of high repute and status in the country. The marks ratio adpoted by the Union Public Service Commission provided wise example. Besides, almost 10 years before this Court in A. Peeriakaruppan, etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.(1) had expressed its disapproval of the ear-marking of 75 marks for the interview test out of 275 marks. And before the selection procees was taken in the present case this Court had already observed in Nishi M:ighu\n\n(supra) that reserving 50 marks for the interview out of 'a total of 150 marks appeared excessive, especially when the time spent was not more than 4 minutes on each candidate. This precisely is what happened here, because on the case of the State Government itself the average time devoted to the oral interview of each candidate was 4 minutes. However, we are reluctant to interfere on this ground because a clear pronouncement that an allocation of more than 15%\n\nof the total marks to the viva voce examination would result in constitutional invalidity has been made only recently, in Ajay Rasia (supra), by this Court and that was after the selection process in the present case had already been taken.\n\nWe would prefer to impress D on the State Government tliat there is need to revise the marks ratio because of the very real risk future selections will face on this score.\n\nThe next contention for the petitioner is that having regard to the number of candidates interviewed and the time applied to conducting the interview no more than two minutes or so could have been given on the average to the oral interview of each candidate, a period demonstrating, in the submission of learned counsel, that the selection process was conducted in a perfunctory manner and there was no real application of the mind to the.selection of candidates.\n\nThe State Government maintains that the time spent was four minutes per candidate'.\n\nWe have given the matter our anxious consideration, and we are unable to hold.that there is adequate material for striking down the selection on this ground.\n\nBut_ here again the State Government would do well to note the observations made by this Court in Ajay Rasia (supra) in this matter, and to ensure that Selection Committees take care to devote sufficient time to the oral interview. of individual candidates having regard to the several relavant considerations which must enter into their judgment respecting each candidate.\n\n(J) (1971] 2 S.C.R. 430.\n\n- G\n\nWe are also told by the petitioner that the composition of the Interview Committee varied from time to time during the interviews.\n\nTherefore, it is said, the selection stands vitiated. It is alleged that while one member, Shri N.S. Pathania, Principal, Medical College, Jammu joined the Committee some time after the interviews had begun, another member, Shri B.R. Kunda!, Deputy Commissioner, Udhampur was present during a part of the proceedings only and left thereafter. In regard to Shri N.S. Pathania, it is not possible to say that his joining with a slight delay has materially affected the validity of the proceedings. And as regards Shri Kunda!, it appears that he was present on the I 4th July, I 980 and according to the petitioner, left on the morning of the next day. It will be noticed that all the members of the Committee except Shri Kunda! were persons closely associated with medical educatfon. Shri B.R. Kunda! was Deputy Commissioner of Udhampur. We also do not know what was the mode , of functioning employed by the Committee, whether it was such as to invalidate the proceedings if one of the members ex necessitas, was unable to participate throughout in them. The respondents maintain that at least three out of four members remain ed present throughout the proceedings.\n\nAnd according to the petitioner, a proportionately small number only of the candidates was interviewed when Shri Kunda! was present. In all the circumstances, we find it difficult to say that Shri Kundal's absence from the Committee vitiated its proceedings.\n\nShri Soli Sorabjee then contends that a number of candidates were selected for admission because of favouritism on account of Y relationship or friendship with members of the Selection Committee er because they were related to important and influential persons in the State. The allegations have for the most part been made for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit and there has been no reasonable opportunity to the respondents to reply to them. Such\n\nallegations on this point as are contained in the writ petition are extremely vague and sketchy, and can form no basis for a finding in favour of the petitioner.\n\nThere is one more contention, and that is that the respondents Nos. 7 to 12 did not apply for admission to the Principal, Government Medical College, Srinagar, and even if they are found to have done so their applications must have been submitted beyond the time prescribed as the qualifying examination in which they appeared was held late and the results were announced after the date prescribed for submitting the applications at Srinagar had expired. lt\n\nARTI SAPRU 'v. J. AND K. (Pathak, J.) 43\n\nappears from the record before us that inasmuch as the relevant A examination was held late and the announcement of the results was delayed the State Government permitted the candidature of these applicants to be considered for inclusion in a common list drawn up to cover candidates for admission to either of the Government Medical Colleges, at Srinagar and at Jammu. Besides, it is conceded\n\nby the petitioner that those respondents have an excellent record B and if they had applied in time for admission to the Government Medical College, Srinagar, they would certainly have been admitteti on the basis of their merit. In the circumstances, we do not propose to interfere with the grant of admission to those respondents.\n\nAccordingly, the only relief which, in our judgment, should be awarded to the petitioner is the quashing of admissions granted irt the quota reserved for rectifying regional imbalances. In consequence, those seats must be filled up on the basis of open merit.\n\nWrit Petitions Nos. 560 I of 1980, 5615 and 5689 to 5697 of\n\n1980, which proceed on the same lines as Writ Petition No. 5600 of D 1980, must be disposed of in like manner.\n\nThe remaining cases, Writ Petitions Nos. 6283 to 6307 of 1980, fall in a separate category. The petitioners here challenge the selection of candidates for admission to the M B.B.S. course in the Government Medical College, Jammu for the year 1980-81; and complain of the denial of admission to them. The facts on which. these writ petitions have been brought and the grounds on which they claim relief are substantially the same as in Writ Petition .No. 5600\n\nof 1980. Indeed, Shri M.K. Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the petitioners, states at the outset that he adopts the submissions urged in that case against the validity of the admissions granted for the purpose of rectification of regional imbalances, in regard to the invalidity alleged by the assigning of 30% marks to the viva voce examination and also in regard to the legal effect on the interview proceedings of the absence of some members of the Selection Committee during part of the proceedings. These pofots have bee11 considered and disposed of by us in that writ petition, and those findings are of equal validity in these writ petitions also.\n\nBesides this, learned counsel for the petitioners raises other contentions.\n\nHe urges that the selections made are not in accordance with the Regulations framed by the Indian Medical Council under\n\ns. 33 read with s .. 19A, Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and H therefore violate the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed\n\nunder Article 15 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is contended that the Regulations are law and are enforceable in a court, and that if they are to prevail the only rese1vation permissible is that in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.\n\nAccording to the Regulations, it is asserted, a Selection Committee can either take into consideration the marks obtained in a qualifyin.g examination or in the competitive test.\n\nNor, it is said, can a viV1 voce examination be permitted as a vehicle for selection. The validity of holdin.g a separate objective test is also assailed as also of assign.ing 35% of the total marks to it.\n\nThe merit test is challenged on the ground that no curricula have been prescribed in relation thereto\n\nObjection to the objective test and the viva voce examination is based on the ground that they fall outside the scheme envisaged by the Regulations made by the Indian Medical Council for admission to the M.B.B.S. course. The respondents, however, question the validity of the Regulations.\n\nWe are then referred by the petitioners to clauses ( j) and (I) of s. 33, Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 in support of the contention that the power of the Council to make regulations extends to making regulations prescribing the examinations and tests for admission. It seems to us prima facie that those provisions do not authorise the Council to do so.\n\nBut we refrain from expressing any final opinion in the matter as the Council is not a party before us.\n\nWe are also not satisfied that the reservations permissible must be confined to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Nor do we find sufficient basis in the submission that there is arbitrariness in providing for 35 marks to a separate objective test in addition to the 35 marks earmarked for the qualifying examination. The grounds taken before us do not justify the conclusion that a competitive entrance examination is not permissible in law in addition to the qualifying examination. In regard to the sufficiency of the objective test, we are not satisfied that the absence of a prescribed formal curriculum vitiates the objective test.\n\nThe next contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the presence of a Government official on the Selection Committee vitiates its constitution. It is stressed that the viva voce test to be acceptable should be conducted by persons who are men of high integrity, calibre and qualifications. There is no principle of law, so far as we know, disqualifying a Government official from participating on the Interview Committee merely because he is a Government official.\n\nNor do we believe that a Government official cannot be a person of high integrity, calibre and qualifications.\n\nThe constitution of a\n\n. .\n\nCommittee lies in the wisdom of the State Government and it is expected that men suitably qualified in every respect will be appointed to discharge the functions of the Committee. So long as the State Government acts bona fide and on the basis of relevant considerations it is not possible to say that the appointment of a Government official is obnoxious to the law.\n\nIn the result, the writ pelitions are allowed insofar that the selection of candidates for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Government Medical Colleges at Srinagar and at Jammu for the year 1980-81 mde on the basis of rectifying regional imbalances is quashed and the respondents are directed to fill up those seats on the basis of open merit. The candidates who will be displaced in consequence have already completed a few months of study and in order to avoid serious prejudice and detriment to their careers it is hoped that the State Government will deal sympathetically with their cases so that while effect is given to the judgment of this Court the rules may be suitably relaxed, if possible by a temporary increase in the number of seats, in order to accommodate the displaced can didates.\n\nIn the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions allowed .", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "PRU\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ARTI SA-PRU\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 27, 1981\n\n[R.S. PATHAK AND 0."}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHlNNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374, "end_char": 376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1007, "end_char": 1029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regulationsframed by the Indian Medical Council under section 33 read with section T9A oft he I11dian Medical Council Act, 1956, whether Ito/ding viva voce examination and assigning 30% of the total marks in it is in violation of Article 31 of the Constitution-Whether the presence of a Government official 011 the Selection Committee in the viva vore test is obnoxious to law."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1036, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1084, "end_char": 1109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1212, "end_char": 1222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Medical Council Act, 1956", "statute": "Medical Council Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Medical College of the State of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1427, "end_char": 1474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Selection of candidates to be admitted to M.B.B, S. course in the Medical College of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was made by a Selection Committee on the basis of (a) merit in qualifyin.g examination (35_ marks) (b) an objective test (35 marks) and (c) a viva voce test (30 marks)."}}, {"text": "(1980) 3 S.C.R. 1253", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2410, "end_char": 2430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nishi Maghu v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1253, the Supreme Court held that the selections made under the third category were invalid, inasmuch as the classification made for rectification of regional imbalance without identifying the areas suffering 'from imbalance was vague."}}, {"text": "24th September, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2745, "end_char": 2765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 G.R. of 1980 dated 24th September, 1980 purporting to identify certain villages as socially and educationally backward for applying the principle of \"rectification of imbalance in different parts of the States\" and reduced the distribution of seats in the Medical Colleges of the State under this category from 18 to 17% under this category."}}, {"text": "SAPRU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3233, "end_char": 3238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAPRU V. J. AND K. 35\n\nAllowing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD: I. The classification attempted by the State Government by its order dated 24th September, 1980 suffers from tbe vice of arbitrariness and is, therefore, invalid."}}, {"text": "Anand Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3868, "end_char": 3883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That a comprehensive understanding of regional imbalances from the Anand Committee report and the Sikri Commission report had not been possible yet affords no justification for an arbitrary classification."}}, {"text": "Sikri Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3899, "end_char": 3915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That a comprehensive understanding of regional imbalances from the Anand Committee report and the Sikri Commission report had not been possible yet affords no justification for an arbitrary classification."}}, {"text": "Article 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 S.C.R. 761", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4132, "end_char": 4151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kunda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4685, "end_char": 4690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selection cannot be said to _be vitiated on the ground that one of the members, Shri Kunda!,", "canonical_name": "Kundal"}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6704, "end_char": 6712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government correctly permitted the candidature of these applicants to be considered for inclusion in a common list drawn up to cover canidates for admission to either of the Government Medical Colleges, at Srinagar and at Jammu."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6720, "end_char": 6725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government correctly permitted the candidature of these applicants to be considered for inclusion in a common list drawn up to cover canidates for admission to either of the Government Medical Colleges, at Srinagar and at Jammu."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7309, "end_char": 7320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7591, "end_char": 7601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "statute": "the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7624, "end_char": 7640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitµtion)\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikk~, ·.E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R.\n\nSatish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in W.Ps.", "canonical_name": "Soli J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "O.N. Tikk~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7642, "end_char": 7652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitµtion)\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikk~, ·.E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R.\n\nSatish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in W.Ps."}}, {"text": ".E.C. Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7655, "end_char": 7670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitµtion)\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikk~, ·.E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R.\n\nSatish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in W.Ps."}}, {"text": "M.L. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7672, "end_char": 7682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitµtion)\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikk~, ·.E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R.\n\nSatish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in W.Ps."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nSatish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7684, "end_char": 7694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitµtion)\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikk~, ·.E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R.\n\nSatish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in W.Ps."}}, {"text": "V.K. Pandita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7700, "end_char": 7712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitµtion)\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikk~, ·.E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R.\n\nSatish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in W.Ps."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7773, "end_char": 7789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthy, Miss R. Vaigai, Joginder Singh and J.\n\nRamamurty for the Petitioners in WPs.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthy"}}, {"text": "R. Vaigai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7796, "end_char": 7805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthy, Miss R. Vaigai, Joginder Singh and J.\n\nRamamurty for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "Joginder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7807, "end_char": 7821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthy, Miss R. Vaigai, Joginder Singh and J.\n\nRamamurty for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "J.\n\nRamamurty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthy, Miss R. Vaigai, Joginder Singh and J.\n\nRamamurty for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kacker and A/taf' Ahmed for the Respondents in all the l Writ Petitions."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8006, "end_char": 8012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK J.\n\nThe petitioner challenges the admission of a number of candidates to the M.B.B.S. course in the Government Medical College Srinagar for the session I 980-81."}}, {"text": "Principal, Government Medical College, Srinagar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8352, "end_char": 8399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Principal, Government Medical College, Srinagar invited applications by 3rd April, 1980 for admission to the M.B.B.S. cours~ for the session 1980-81, and the notice specified the qualifying examinations of the Board of Secondary Education, Kashmir, or any other equivalent Board or University which constituted the basis of eligibility."}}, {"text": "23rd June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9216, "end_char": 9231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Government order was modified by a subsequent Government order dated 23rd June, 1980 and in the result eligible candidates were now required to appear not only in the viva voce examination but also in an objective test."}}, {"text": "27th June, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10670, "end_char": 10685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27th June, 1974, the percentage of seats reserved for the different categories was refixed, so that 60% of the seats were now earmarked for admission on the basis of \"open merit\", 20% for distribution among candidates from the Scheduled Castes and other reserved categories including socially and educationally backward classes, and the remaining 20% of the seats were earmarked for \"ensuring rectification of imbalances\"."}}, {"text": "21st April, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11119, "end_char": 11135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Still another order dated 21st April, 1976 reduced the reservation for removing regional imbalances from 20% to 18%."}}, {"text": "Government Medical College, Jammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11260, "end_char": 11293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selection of candidates for admission to the Government Medical College, Jammu for the academic year 1979-80 was challenged in this Court in Nishi Maghu v. State of Jammu and Kashmir(1)\n\nand the Court held that \"the classification made for rectification of regional imbalance without identifying the areas suffering from imbalance was vague and the selections made under that head were accordingly invalid'\"."}}, {"text": "Nishi Maghu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11873, "end_char": 11884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, in an attempt to remove the deficiency pointed out by this Court in Nishi Maghu (supra), the State Government published Notification No.", "canonical_name": "Nishi Maghu"}}, {"text": "14th to 17th July, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12487, "end_char": 12510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From 14th to 17th July, 1980, as many as 660 candidates were interviewed by a Committee at Srinagar by way of viva voce examination."}}, {"text": "21st July, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12618, "end_char": 12633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st July, 1980 the State Government issued a directive that a total list of J 25 candidates be prepared against all the seats of the two Government Medical Colleges, at Srinagar and at Jammu."}}, {"text": "29th September, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12977, "end_char": 12997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Selection List was finalised taking into account the reservations made for various categories and classes by the different Government orders, and was published on 29th September, 1980, and the names of 75 candidates were announced for admission to the M.B.B.S. course to the Govenment Medical College, Srinagar."}}, {"text": "Govenment Medical College, Srinagar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13089, "end_char": 13124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Selection List was finalised taking into account the reservations made for various categories and classes by the different Government orders, and was published on 29th September, 1980, and the names of 75 candidates were announced for admission to the M.B.B.S. course to the Govenment Medical College, Srinagar."}}, {"text": "Soli Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13159, "end_char": 13172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal contention of Mr. Soli Sorabjee appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Soli J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Srinagar city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14002, "end_char": 14015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is asserted that a portion of Srinagar city, which includes Sangin Darwaza and Bhagwanpure, has also been identified as socially and educationally backward."}}, {"text": "Sangin Darwaza", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14032, "end_char": 14046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is asserted that a portion of Srinagar city, which includes Sangin Darwaza and Bhagwanpure, has also been identified as socially and educationally backward."}}, {"text": "Bhagwanpure", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14051, "end_char": 14062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is asserted that a portion of Srinagar city, which includes Sangin Darwaza and Bhagwanpure, has also been identified as socially and educationally backward."}}, {"text": "1975] 2 S.C.R. 761", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16528, "end_char": 16546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17067, "end_char": 17070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed :\n\n\"The reservation for rural areas cannot be sustained on the ground that the rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes of citizens."}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17935, "end_char": 17945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19095, "end_char": 19126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The marks ratio adpoted by the Union Public Service Commission provided wise example."}}, {"text": "Nishi M:", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19453, "end_char": 19461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And before the selection procees was taken in the present case this Court had already observed in Nishi M:ighu\n\n(supra) that reserving 50 marks for the interview out of 'a total of 150 marks appeared excessive, especially when the time spent was not more than 4 minutes on each candidate.", "canonical_name": "Nishi Maghu"}}, {"text": "Ajay Rasia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20056, "end_char": 20066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, we are reluctant to interfere on this ground because a clear pronouncement that an allocation of more than 15%\n\nof the total marks to the viva voce examination would result in constitutional invalidity has been made only recently, in Ajay Rasia (supra), by this Court and that was after the selection process in the present case had already been taken."}}, {"text": "(1971] 2 S.C.R. 430", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21437, "end_char": 21456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N.S. Pathania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21692, "end_char": 21705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that while one member, Shri N.S. Pathania, Principal, Medical College, Jammu joined the Committee some time after the interviews had begun, another member, Shri B.R. Kunda!,"}}, {"text": "B.R. Kunda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21825, "end_char": 21835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that while one member, Shri N.S. Pathania, Principal, Medical College, Jammu joined the Committee some time after the interviews had begun, another member, Shri B.R. Kunda!,"}}, {"text": "Udhampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21859, "end_char": 21867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deputy Commissioner, Udhampur was present during a part of the proceedings only and left thereafter."}}, {"text": "Kundal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22959, "end_char": 22965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all the circumstances, we find it difficult to say that Shri Kundal's absence from the Committee vitiated its proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Kundal"}}, {"text": "Government Medical College, Srinagar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23765, "end_char": 23801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 to 12 did not apply for admission to the Principal, Government Medical College, Srinagar, and even if they are found to have done so their applications must have been submitted beyond the time prescribed as the qualifying examination in which they appeared was held late and the results were announced after the date prescribed for submitting the applications at Srinagar had expired."}}, {"text": "Medical College, Srinagar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24671, "end_char": 24696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, it is conceded\n\nby the petitioner that those respondents have an excellent record B and if they had applied in time for admission to the Government Medical College, Srinagar, they would certainly have been admitteti on the basis of their merit."}}, {"text": "M.K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25788, "end_char": 25803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, Shri M.K. Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the petitioners, states at the outset that he adopts the submissions urged in that case against the validity of the admissions granted for the purpose of rectification of regional imbalances, in regard to the invalidity alleged by the assigning of 30% marks to the viva voce examination and also in regard to the legal effect on the interview proceedings of the absence of some members of the Selection Committee during part of the proceedings.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthy"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26620, "end_char": 26625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26646, "end_char": 26678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26761, "end_char": 26771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "statute": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27844, "end_char": 27849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27851, "end_char": 27883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_352_357_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SONE LAL & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nApril 3, 1981\n\n[ S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, BAHARUL ISLAM AND\n\nA. VARADARAJAN, JJ. ] .\n\nIndian Penal Code 1860, Ss. 302, 307, 323 read with S. 149-Enmity between parties of the accused and deceased-Altercation and assault-Accused receiving injuries-Accused whether aggressors-Whether entitled to right of private defence.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that there was a long standing enmity between the parties of the deceased and the appellants. There was a vacant plot of land in front of the flour mill and residence of PW. 1. The appellants started throwing rubbish on this piece of land. PW.I and his son, the deceased, objected to this. On the fateful day at about noon there was an altercation in connection with the throwing of rubbish, and at about 8 p.m. one of the appellants armed with a lathi went to the flour mill and challenged PW. 1 and his companions. At the call of this appellant, the other appellants who were armed with gun, pistol, Jathi and spear arrived at the spot. PW. 1 managed to snatch the spear from the hands of one of the appellants and started giving blows to the assailants in order to defend himself. At that time two of the appellants fired their gun and pistol as a result of which the son of PW. 1 received injuries, to which he succumbed while being removed to the Police Station. The defence of the appellants was one of alibi and that the offence had not taken place on the land of\n\nPW. I.\n\nThe appellants were tried before the Sessions Judge who convicted and f sentenced them under Sections 302, 307 and 323 read with Section 149 of the -,.\n\nPenal Code.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the appeal. It agreed with the ttial Court and found that the prosecution case was established by the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and that the defence version of the case had to be rejected on account of the inconsistent pleas made by the appellants before the committing court and the Sessions Court.\n\nIn the appeal in this Court, it was contended that there was no finding by H the trial and appellate courts as to how the assault initially started and which party was the aggressor, that the prosecution had not explained .as to how the\n\n----- -\n\nI •\n\nSONELAL v. U. P. STATE (Baharu/ Islam, J.) 353\n\nappellants received the injuries, and that the appellants had the right of private A defence and, therefore, they had committed no offence.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : l. The High Court rightly accepted the prosecution case as true and held that the defence case was false.\n\n(356 F]\n\nThe findings of the two courts below indicate that it was the appellants who were the aggressors and that the occurrence took place on the land lying in front of the house of PW. I who was in possession thereof and that the deceased and PW. I had the right of private defence of property and person and that they exercised that right. The appellants who were the aggressors, even if they received injuries from the victims of their aggression, cannot have any right of private defence. The findings are that the deceased and PW. 1 were unarmed and that P.W. I snatched the weapon from one of the assailants and caused injuries to them. If the decesed and the other prosecution witnesses had been the aggressors, PW. l would not have come without his licensed gun.\n\n[356 H-357A, 356 E]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 220 of 1974.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 9th January, 1974 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 356/77 connected with Criminal Appeal No. 723 of 1970.\n\nR. K. Garg, S. S. Bhatnagar, V. J. Fra11cis <ind Sunil Kumar Jain for the Appellants .\n\nR. K. Bhat for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J. This appeal by special leave has been directed against the judgment and order passed by the Allahabad High Court dismissing two appeals filed by the appellants before it.\n\nThe appellants were convicted under Sections 302, 307 and 323 all read with Section 149 of the Penal Code. They were sentenced to imprisonment for life, . each, under Section 302/ 149, rigorous imprisonment for 7 years, each, under Section 307/149 and rigorous imprisonment for six months, each, under Section 323/149 of the Penal Code.\n\nAppellants Harish Chandra and Nathu were further convicted under Section 148 of the Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years, each. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.\n\nThe facts material for the purpose of disposal of this appeal may be stated thus. The prosecution alleges that there was\n\nA long standing enmity between the parties of the deceased and the appellants.\n\nSome time prior to the incident a flour mill was installed and a house constructed by P.W. I, Pahelwan, in his plot of land. In front of the flour mill and the residence of Pahelwan there was some vacant land in his possession.\n\nThe appellants had started\n\nthrowing rubbish on the land.\n\nPahelwan and his son, Ram Swarup\n\n(deceased) objected to this.\n\nThe appellants were annoyed at the objection of Pahelwan and his son Ram Swarup. On 31st December, 1968 at about noon appellants Harish Chandra and Ram Sewak had some altereation with Pahelwan and Ram Swarup in connection with throwing of rubbish on the aforesaid land attd as a consequence the relation between the parties worsened.\n\nIn the evening at about 8 O'clock on the !st of January, 1969, appellant, Ram Sewak, armed with a lathi went to the front of the flour mill of Pahelwan and started to hurl abuses on Pahelwan and his son Ram Swarup.\n\nAppellant, Ram Sewak, challenged Pahelwan and his companions to see them that day.\n\nAt that time, it has been alleged, an electric light was burning in the front of the room of the flour mill as usual.\n\nAt the call of the appellant, Ram Sewak, the other appellants came variously armed with lathis and spears and started giving blows to Pahelwan and his son, Ram Swarup, both of whom, according to the prosecution, were unarmed.\n\nPahelwan, somehow, managed to snatch the spear from the hand of the appellant, Ishwari, and started giving blows to the assailants in order to defend himself.\n\nAt that time, it has been further stated, appellants Harish Chandra and Nathu fired their gun and pistol respectively.\n\nAs a result, Ram Swamp was hit and he fell down in front of the flour mill.\n\nThe shot of Nathu hit P.W. I Pahelwan, Lal Ram and Shri Kishan, all of whom received injuries, Lekh Raj, P.W., then attacked the appellants with his lathi, as a result of which some injuries were caused to the appellants including Harish Chandra. Thereafter the appellants escaped.\n\nRam Swarup succumbed to bullet injuries while he was being removed to the police station.\n\nA first information report was lodged by P.W. I, and eventually the appellants were committed to the court of Sessions that convicted and sentenced as stated above. Their appeal was also dismissed by the High Court as earlier stated.\n\nH 4.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants submitted that large number of injuries had also been received by the appellants and that there was no finding by the courti> below as to how the assault\n\nSONELAL V. U.P. STATE (Baharul Is/cm, J.) 355\n\ninitially started and which party was the aggressor, prosecution has not explained as to how the appellants received ti:e injuries. As such, he submitted, the conviction for the offences with the aid of Section 149, Penal Code, was bad in law.\n\nIn support of his contention he relied on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1976 S. C. 2263. This Court in A.l.R. 1976 S.C. 2263(1) has held:\n\n\"(!) That the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version;\n\n(2) that the witnesses who have denied the pre, cnce of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable;\n\n(3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered\n\nprobable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case.\n\nThe omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one.\"\n\nThe submission of the learned counsel is that the injuries found in the persons of the appellants have not been explained by the prosecution.\n\nThe injuries are serious. The appellants had the right of private defence, and therefore, they have committed no offence.\n\nThe submission of the learned counsel is not warranted by the findings of the High Court. The High Court agreeing with the trial Court has found that the prosecution case as alleged has been established by the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.\n\nThe High Court as well as the trial Court has rejected the defence version of the case, in view of their inconsistant pleas before the Committing Court and the trial Court. Before the Committing Magistrate pleas of appellants, Harish Chandra and Soney Lal, were alibi.\n\nThe defence of appellants, Ram Sewak and Nathu, was that the occurr-\n\n(I) Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar.\n\nence had not taken place on the land of P. W. 1, Pahelwan, as al1eged by the prosecution, but it had taken place at a different place.\n\nAccording to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased.\n\nThe defence of appellant, Ishwari, before the Committing Magistrate was that Pahelwan (P.W.l), Lekh Raj and others attacked hie1, as a result of which he became unconscious.\n\nThe defem:e of the appellants before the Sessions Judge was one of the right of private defence.\n\nThe defence of appellant Harish Chander before the Sessions Judge was an alibi.\n\nThe defence of the other appellanls was that Ishwari had been returning from Ghurwal Chak.\n\nAt that time he was attacked by the prosecution witnesses and the deceased. The incident took place on a land between residence and flour mill of P.W. l and in that assault the appellants had to defend themselves.\n\n5. On a consideration of the evidence on record the learned High Court agreeing with the Sessions Judge has accepted the version of the prosecution and rejected that of the defence. In coming to that conclusion the High Court has also taken notice of the fact that P.W. I. had a licensed gun.\n\nHad he and Ram Swarup and other P.W's been the aggressors, he (P.W.l) would not have come without the gun. In view of the \"inconsistent pleas\" and\n\n\"in view of the fact that no infirmity worth the name has been shown in . the statement of eye witnesses of the occurrence\", the High Court accepted the prosecution case as true and held \"that the defence case is false\".\n\nThe High Court has also held that \"appellants were the aggressors\".\n\nIt is therefore, not correct to suggest as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that there were no findings on record to show as to how the quarrel started and that the appellants were the aggressors.\n\n6. From the findings of learned courts below the facts that emerge are (I) that it was the appellants who were the aggressors;\n\n(2) that the occurrence took place on the land in front of the house of P.W.1, Pahelwan, who was in possession thereof; (3) that P.W.1 and the deceased bad the right of the private defence of property and person and they did exercise that right.\n\nAggresr- _,,.-\n\nSONELAL v. U.P. STATE (Baharul Islam, J.) 357\n\nsors, even if they receive injuries from the victims of their aggression cannot have the right of private defence.\n\nThe findings are that P.W.l and the deceased were unarmed. P.W.1 snatched a weapon from one of the assailants and caused injuries on them.\n\nOn the top of it two of the appellants brought fire arms and fired at the deceased and the P. W. I, as a result of which the deceased expired. The submissions of learned counsel for the appellants do not stand scrutiny.\n\n7. This appeal has no merit and is dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "SONE LAL & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SONE LAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 3, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nApril 3, 1981\n\n[ S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, BAHARUL ISLAM AND\n\nA. VARADARAJAN, JJ. ] ."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 302, 307, 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "S. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "Sections 302, 307 and 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1547, "end_char": 1572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1617, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. S. Bhatnagar, V. J. Fra11cis <ind Sunil Kumar Jain for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "S. S. Bhatnagar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. S. Bhatnagar, V. J. Fra11cis <ind Sunil Kumar Jain for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3632, "end_char": 3648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. S. Bhatnagar, V. J. Fra11cis <ind Sunil Kumar Jain for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "R. K. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3671, "end_char": 3681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Bhat for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Sections 302, 307 and 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4032, "end_char": 4042, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4169, "end_char": 4180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4272, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4286, "end_char": 4300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellants Harish Chandra and Nathu were further convicted under Section 148 of the Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years, each.", "canonical_name": "Harish Chandra"}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4305, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellants Harish Chandra and Nathu were further convicted under Section 148 of the Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years, each.", "canonical_name": "Nathu"}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4340, "end_char": 4351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4359, "end_char": 4369, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pahelwan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4855, "end_char": 4863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In front of the flour mill and the residence of Pahelwan there was some vacant land in his possession.", "canonical_name": "Pahelwan"}}, {"text": "Pahelwan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4970, "end_char": 4978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pahelwan and his son, Ram Swarup\n\n(deceased) objected to this.", "canonical_name": "Pahelwan"}}, {"text": "Ram Swarup", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4992, "end_char": 5002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pahelwan and his son, Ram Swarup\n\n(deceased) objected to this.", "canonical_name": "Ram Swarup"}}, {"text": "31st December, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5118, "end_char": 5137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31st December, 1968 at about noon appellants Harish Chandra and Ram Sewak had some altereation with Pahelwan and Ram Swarup in connection with throwing of rubbish on the aforesaid land attd as a consequence the relation between the parties worsened."}}, {"text": "Ram Sewak", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5182, "end_char": 5191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31st December, 1968 at about noon appellants Harish Chandra and Ram Sewak had some altereation with Pahelwan and Ram Swarup in connection with throwing of rubbish on the aforesaid land attd as a consequence the relation between the parties worsened."}}, {"text": "st of January, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5411, "end_char": 5430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of January, 1969, appellant, Ram Sewak, armed with a lathi went to the front of the flour mill of Pahelwan and started to hurl abuses on Pahelwan and his son Ram Swarup."}}, {"text": "Ishwari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pahelwan, somehow, managed to snatch the spear from the hand of the appellant, Ishwari, and started giving blows to the assailants in order to defend himself.", "canonical_name": "Ishwari"}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6384, "end_char": 6389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shot of Nathu hit P.W. I Pahelwan, Lal Ram and Shri Kishan, all of whom received injuries, Lekh Raj, P.W., then attacked the appellants with his lathi, as a result of which some injuries were caused to the appellants including Harish Chandra.", "canonical_name": "Nathu"}}, {"text": "Pahelwan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6401, "end_char": 6409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shot of Nathu hit P.W. I Pahelwan, Lal Ram and Shri Kishan, all of whom received injuries, Lekh Raj, P.W., then attacked the appellants with his lathi, as a result of which some injuries were caused to the appellants including Harish Chandra."}}, {"text": "Lal Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shot of Nathu hit P.W. I Pahelwan, Lal Ram and Shri Kishan, all of whom received injuries, Lekh Raj, P.W., then attacked the appellants with his lathi, as a result of which some injuries were caused to the appellants including Harish Chandra."}}, {"text": "Kishan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shot of Nathu hit P.W. I Pahelwan, Lal Ram and Shri Kishan, all of whom received injuries, Lekh Raj, P.W., then attacked the appellants with his lathi, as a result of which some injuries were caused to the appellants including Harish Chandra."}}, {"text": "Lekh Raj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6467, "end_char": 6475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shot of Nathu hit P.W. I Pahelwan, Lal Ram and Shri Kishan, all of whom received injuries, Lekh Raj, P.W., then attacked the appellants with his lathi, as a result of which some injuries were caused to the appellants including Harish Chandra."}}, {"text": "Ram Swarup", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6655, "end_char": 6665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Swarup succumbed to bullet injuries while he was being removed to the police station.", "canonical_name": "Ram Swarup"}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7450, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Soney Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9158, "end_char": 9167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the Committing Magistrate pleas of appellants, Harish Chandra and Soney Lal, were alibi."}}, {"text": "Zorawar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9527, "end_char": 9534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased."}}, {"text": "Lala Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9631, "end_char": 9639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased."}}, {"text": "Sbri Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9641, "end_char": 9652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased."}}, {"text": "Triloki", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9654, "end_char": 9661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased."}}, {"text": "Ram Swarup Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9663, "end_char": 9680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased."}}, {"text": "Munna Jamadar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9682, "end_char": 9695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased."}}, {"text": "Lekthraj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9697, "end_char": 9705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them there was a quarrel in respect of some property between Ram Swarup, (deceased) and Zorawar, brother-in-law of Ram Swarup, in which appellant Nathu intervened whereupon Pahelwan (P.W. l), Lala Ram, Sbri Kishan, Triloki, Ram Swarup Prasad, Munna Jamadar, Lekthraj and others attacked the appellants and in that incident injuries were received by P.W. I and the deceased."}}, {"text": "Ishwari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9840, "end_char": 9847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of appellant, Ishwari, before the Committing Magistrate was that Pahelwan (P.W.l), Lekh Raj and others attacked hie1, as a result of which he became unconscious.", "canonical_name": "Ishwari"}}, {"text": "Harish Chander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10112, "end_char": 10126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of appellant Harish Chander before the Sessions Judge was an alibi.", "canonical_name": "Harish Chandra"}}, {"text": "Ram Swarup", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Had he and Ram Swarup and other P.W's been the aggressors, he (P.W.l) would not have come without the gun."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12387, "end_char": 12393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_358_366_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "WEALTH TAX OFFICER, CALICUT\n\nC. K. MAMMED KA YI (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS\n\nL.RS. T.M. POCKER & ORS.\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND E.S. VENKATARAMJAH, JJ.)\n\nWealth Tax Act, 1957-Section 3-\"lndividual\"-Whether includes Mapi/la -'!\n\nMarumakkathayam Tarawad (Muslim undivided family) governed by Marumakukathayam Act.\n\nThe assessee who was the Karnavan of Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad registered as impartible within the meaning of section 20(1) of the Mapilla Marumakkathayam Act, 1939 was assessed to wealth tax on the net wealth of his Tarawad in the capacity of an individual under section 3 oft he Wealth Tax Act.\n\nThe assessee's challenge as to the constitutional validity of section 3 as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution was rejected by the High Court.\n\nThe High Court, however, held by majority, that non-Hindu Undivided Families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawads were altogether outside the purview of the charging section of the Act. The assessment was, therefore, quashed.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the Revenue that the expression \"individual\" in section 3 took in a body or group of individuals like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad for being assessed to wealth tax and that long legislative practice obtaining in the taxing scheme Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawads have always been treated and assessed in the status of ''individual\".\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : J.\n\nThe term \"individual\" in section 3 includes a group of individuals like [Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad. The term \"individual\" does not mean only a human being but is wide enough to include a group of persons forming a natural unit. (365 E]\n\nThe canon of construction applicable to Entries in the Legislative Lists of the Constitution would be different from the canon of construction applicable to terms used in a taxing statute. While the object of an entry in the Legislative Lists is to demarcate a wide field by the use of compendious words the rule of construction applicable to a taxing statute must ensure _that the\n\nWEALTH TAX OFFICER V. C.K.M. KAYI 359\n\nsubject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the A obligation. [364 B-C]\n\nRussell v. Scott, [1948] A.C. 422, referred to.\n\n3. The general scheme of the Wealth Tax Act is to assess to tax all persons who happen to possess wealth beyond the statutory limit and since the Act imposes a general tax on the entire wealth of the community the presumption would be of equality of incidence rather than exemption of a few. Secondly, the term \"individual'' can be read in plural and so read would include a body or group of individuals like Mapilla Tarawad. Thirdly t.he two terms 'individual' and 'Hindu Undivided Family' cannot b3 said to have been used in anti-thesis with each other. Section 3, the charging section, is merely concerned with specifying different assessable units for the purposes of assessment of wealth and imposition of the levy.\n\n[364 E-F]\n\n4. It is well settled that the legislature can select persons, properties, transactions and objects for the imposition of a tax and for that purpose classify as many different assessing units as it could reasonably think necessary. This is how the three assessable units have come to be specified in that section. [364 G]\n\n5. Specific mention of Hindu Undivided Family in section 3 does not D result in the exclusion of a group of individuals who only form a unit by reason of their birth like a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tara wad from the operation of the scheme. [365 A]\n\n6. The argument that because ol the references to wife, daughter and child of an individual in section 4 the term \"individual\" in section 3 should be construed as referable to a single human being is without force. Similarly, absence of provisions similar to those applicable to Hindu Undivided Family for assessing groups of individuals who form non-Hindu Undivided Families cannot affect or control the charging section. [365 D-E]\n\n7. The legislative practice in the country in the taxing scheme had always been to treat and assess Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad as an \"individual\".\n\n[365 F] F\n\nV. Venugopala Ravi Varma Rajah v. Union of India and Another, 74 I.T.R. 49 referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1543 of 1971.\n\n,,,_, Appeal by certificate from the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.1965 of the Kerala High Court in O.P.674 of 1958.\n\nB.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nG.C. Sharma, E.D. Helmes, S.P.Nayar and R.S. Sharma for H the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThis appeal, by certificate granted by the Kerala High Court, raises the question whether Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads of North Malabar-Muslim undivided families governed by Marumakkathayam Act (Madras Act 17 of 1939)- fall within the expression 'individual' and are assessable to tax under s. 3 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957?\n\nThe checkered history through which this litigation has passed may briefly be indicated in order to appreciate how the aforesaid question arises for our determination. At the relevant time deceased respondent was the karnavan of a Mappilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad registered as impartible within the meaning of s. 20(1) of the Mapilla Marumakkathayam Act (Madras Act 17 of 1939).\n\nHe was assessed to wealth tax for the assessment year 1957-58 on the net wealth of his Tarwad considered as an individual under s.3 of the Wealth Tax Act, J 957 and on completion of the assessment a demand notice dated July 16, 1958 was served on him for payment.\n\nOn September JO, 1958 he filed a writ petition being O.P. No. 674 of 1958 seeking to quash the said assessment and the demand notice on the ground of unconstitutionality of the Wealth Tax Act No. 27 of 1957 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). Four other writ petitions were also filed by the karnavans of Hindu undivided families of Malabar and Cochin governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act No. 22 of 1923 challenging the constitutionality of the Act.\n\nSince comll}on questions of law arose for determination, the High Court disposed of the writ petitions by a common judgment. The constitutionality of the Act was challenged on two grounds-·( a) that the Parliament was not competent to include a Hindu undivided family in the charging s. 3 of the Act in view of Entry 86 in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and (b) that the charging s. 3 of the Act was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The High Court repelled the first ground of challenge and held that Parliament . was competent to include a Hindu undivided family in s. 3 of the Act as constituting a body or group of individuals coming within the term 'individuals' in Entry 86, but accepted the latter ground of challenge by its judgment rendered on July I, 1951.\n\nIt took the Jview that there was discrimination as between Hindu undivided families and Muslim . Mapilla Tarwads which were also undivided families and, therefore, the charging section in so far as it governed undivided families was hit by Art. 14. The High Court observed that the Department had . failed to substantiate its contention that Muslim Mapilla Tarwads\n\n-~--\n\nwere so insignificant in number that their existence could be ignored in the context of the attack under Art. 14.\n\nThe Department carried the matter in appeal to this Court. By its judgment dated February I 7, 1964, this Court set aside the judgment and orders of the High Court and remanded the cases to the High Court to consider whether Art. 14 applied to the cases or not after giving the parties opportunity of putting forward their respective cases supported by facts and figures.\n\nIn doing so, this Court observed that on the question raised under Art. 14 the High Court seemed to take the view that it was for the State to show that Art. 14 was not applicable, that this was not correct and that it was for the party who came forward with the application that equality before the law or equal protection of laws was being denied to him to adduce facts to prove such denial.\n\nOn remand, out of the two contentions initially formulated by the assessees, the first relating to the constitutionality of the Act in relation to Entry 86 in List I had in the meantime been squarely dealt with and over-ruled by this Court in the case of Banarsi Dass v.\n\nWealth Tax Officer(1) and, therefore, the same was not pressed and only the second contention regarding the validity of the charging s. 3 as being violative of Art. 14 was argued before the High Court.\n\nEach one of the three learned Judges, who heard the matter ultimately rejected the challenge and held that s. 3 was not violative of Art. 14, but each one did so for different reasons and in that process the majority reached the conclusion that non-Hindu undivided families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads, were altogether outside the purview of the charging s. 3 and hence assessment made and the demand notice served on the deceased respondent deserved to be quashed.\n\nJustice Velu Pillai took the view that the legislative entries in a constitution were to be widely and liberally construed but not the provisions of a taxing statute, that though the term 'individuals' in Entry 86 of List I would be comprehensive enough to include a body or group of individuals like undivided Hindu families similar construction of the expression 'individual' in s. 3 of the Wealth Tax Act so as to include non-Hindu undivided families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads was not warranted, that the term 'individual' in s. 3 of Act occurred in anti-thesis with the terms 'Hindu undivided family' and if all undivided families were included in the terms 'individual' there was no necessity to mention Hindu undivided family as a distinct taxing unit.\n\n. (1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 355.\n\nHe, therefore, came to the conclusion that non-Hindu undivided families were not covered by the term 'individual' and were, therefore outside the charging section of the Act, but their exclusion from the charging section did not attract the vice of discrimination under Art. 14 inasmuch as it had been established that there were only 22 Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads in the whole country and as such constituted an insignificant or microscopic minority and their exclusion from the charging provision was neither deliberate nor material and, therefore, s. 3 did not violate Art. 14. Justice V.P.\n\nGopalan Nambiyar, however, took the view that the expression 'individual' in s.3 of the Act properly read included a group of individuals who were members of a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad but since such interpretation of the term 'individual' led to differential treatment to such non-Hindu undivided families as compared to Hindu undivided families including Hindu Marumakkathayam Tarwads and would be violative of Art. 14 he would read down that expression so as to exclude Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads and on reading down the expression as aforesaid s. 3 avoided the vice of discrimination under Art. 14.\n\nJustice T.S.\n\nKrishnamoorthy Iyer, however, took the view that the expression 'individual' in s.3 of the Act included group of individuals who were members ofa Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad as, according to him, the specific mention of 'Hindu undivided families' as a separate assessable entity in the charging section could not restrict the meaning of the term 'individual' and, therefore, Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads were assessable under s.3 of the Act and that even after inclusion of such group of individuals within the expression 'individual' the charging s.3 of the Act was not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. He took the view that the equality clause permitted the legislature a wider discretion to classify persons, properties or transactions into different categories and tax them differently under its power of taxation, that a Hindu Marumakkathayam Tarwad and a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad were not similarly situate, that the classification made by the legislature was rational and, therefore, the Act which provided for lower limit of exemption to individual and higher limit of exemption to Hindu undivided family could not amount to hostile discrimination against group of individuals constituting the Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad.\n\nIn his view there was no substance in the challenge to s. 3 of the Act under Art. 14 and the writ petition was liable to be dismissed.\n\nHowever, in accordance with the view of the majority that Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads were outside the purview of s. 3 of the Act the writ petition was allowed and the assess\n\n'\"(\n\n---~\n\nment made and demand notice served on the deceased respondent were quashed. In other words, though all the learned Judges repelled the challenge to the charging section based on Art. 14 of the Constitution, the majority reached that conclusion by holding that Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads were outside the purview of s. 3 of the Act.\n\nIt is this latter view which is being challenged before us by the Department in this appeal.\n\nCounsel for the Revenue urged two contentions in support of the appeal.\n\nIn the first place he supported the construction placed by Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J., on the expression 'individual' in s. 3 of the Act that it took in a body or group of individuals like a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad for being assessed to wealth tax.\n\nSecondly, he urged that such construction was in accord with the long legislative practice obtaining in the taxing scheme in the country under which Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads have always been treated and assessed in the status of individual-a legislative practice that has been judicially noted by this Court in the case of V. Venugopala Ravi Varma Rajah v. Union of India and Another.(1) On the other hand, counsel for the respondent assessee canvassed for our acceptance the view taken by Velu Pillai, J., that the expression 'individual' in s. 3 did not cover non-Hindu undivided families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads and these were, therefore, outside the purview of the charging provision. He attempted to strengthen that view by contending that the expression 'individual' in s. 3 meant a single individual as a human being and according to him this was clear from the fact that references to 'wife', 'daughter' and 'child' of an individual occur in s. 4 of the Act. He further pointed out that under s. 5(1) (ii) wealth tax was not payable by an assessee in respect of his interest in the coparcenary property of any Hindu undivided family of which he is a member but there was no corresponding exclusion of the interest of the assessee in the property of a non-Hindu undivided family like a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad from the incidence of the tax and this also suggested that the term 'individual' in s. 3 was not intended to include a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad.\n\n• Section 3 of the Act at the material time ran thus :\n\n\"Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every financial year commencing\n\non and from the first day of April, 1957, a tax (hereinafter H\n\n(1) 74 I.T.R. 49.\n\nreferred to as wealth tax) in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu undivided family and company at the rate or rates specified in the schedule.\"\n\nIt cannot be disputed that the canon of construction applicable to Entries m the three Legislative Lists occurring in a Constitution would be different fwm the canon of construction that would apply to terms or expressions used in a taxing statute. The object of an Entry in any Legislative List is to demarcate as wide a Legislative field as possible by the use of compendious words or expressions while the rule of construction applicable to a taxing statute must ensure that \"the subject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the obligation\" (per Lord Simonds in Russell v. Scott(1).\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that because the expression. 'individuals' occurrjng in Entry 86 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution takes within its ambit a Hindu undivided family, it would not automatically follow that the term 'individual' occurring in s. 3 of the Wealth Tax Act 19.J7 would include a non-Hindu undivided family like a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad, but the qestion will have to be considered in the light of the scheme of the Wealth Tax Act itself.\n\nThe enactment is intended to provide for the levy of wealth-tax; the general scheme thereof is to assess all persons who happen to posess or earn wealth beyond a particular limit fixed by the statute to wealth-tax and since the Act imposes a general tax on the entire wealth of the community the presumption would be of equality of incidence rather than exemption of a few.\n\nSecondly, the term 'individual' under s. 13 (2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 can be read in plural and as such would include a body or group of individuals like a Mapilla Tarwad. Thirdly, there is no warrant for suggesting that the two terms 'individual' and 'Hindu undivided family' have been used in anti-thesis with each other, for s. 3 being the charging provision is merely concerned with specifying different assessable units for purposes of assessment of wealth and imposition of the levy; it cannot be disputed that the Legislature can select persons, properties, transactions and objects for the imposition of a levy and for that purpose classify as many different a ; sessing units as it could reasonably think necessary and this is how three assessable units namely, 'individual', 'Hindu undivided family' and 'company' (which was later omitted) have come to be specified in s. 3.\n\nIn our view the specific\n\n(I) [1948] A.C. 422.\n\n... __ ..\n\nWEALTH TAX OFFICER v. C.K.M. KAY! (Tulzapurkar, J.) 365\n\nmention of Hindu undivided family in the section does not result in the exclusion of group of individuals who only form a unit by reason of their birth like a Mapilla Tarwad from the operation of the section. It is difficult to accept the argument that if term 'individual' was intended to include joint families or undivided families it was redundant to specify Hindu undivided families.\n\nIn the context of the argument that the term 'individual' can refer only to a single human being it will be apposite to refer to what this Court has observed in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi.(1) At page 620 of the report\n\nthis Court has said : C\n\n\" ......... word 'individual' has not been defined under the Act (Indian Income Tax Act 1922) and there is authority for the proposition that the word 'individual' does not mean only a human being but is wide enough to include a group of persons forming a natural unit.\"\n\nThe contention that because there are references to 'wife', 'daughter' and 'child' of an individual in s. 4 the term 'individual' in s. 3 should be construed as referable to a single human being cannot obviously .be accepted.\n\nSimilarly absence of provisions similar to those applicable to Hindu undivided family for assessing group of individuals who form non-Hindu undivided families [provisions like s. 5 (I) (ii)] cannot affect or control in any manner the charging section.\n\nOn construction, therefore, we are clearly of the view that the term 'individual' in s. 3 includes a group of individuals like a Mapilla Tarwad.\n\nFurthermore, we would like to point out that the aforesaid construction would be in accord with the legislative practice obtaining in the taxing scheme in the country whereunder Parliament has always been treating and assessing Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads in the status of 'individual' under the various taxing statutes. In V. Venugopala Ravi Varma Rajah v. Union of India and Another (supra), a case arising under the Expenditure Tax Act (29 of 1957), the question for determination was whether s. 3 of that Act was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because a Hindu undivided family (specifically mentioned as a distinct assessing unit) governed by the Marumakkathayam Law had to pay tax at a higher\n\n(!) 32 I.T.R. 615.\n\nA rate by reason of the amalgamation of the expenditure of all the members .of the family whereas a Mapilla undivided family was required to pay tax at a lower rate since the members of such family governed by the Marumakkathayam Law were liable to be taxed as individuals under the section and this Court answered the question in the negative. While doing so this Court pointed out how Parlia- B ment had been accustomed in enacting tax laws to make a distinction between a Hindu undivided family consisting of Hindus and undivided families of Mapillas and how for purposes of taxing statutes Mapilla Tarwads have always been regarded as individuals.\n\nThe relevant observations in this behalf run as follows : c\n\n\"Under the taxing Acts the scheme of treating a Hindu Undivided Family has been adopted for a long time, e.g., the Indian Income-tax Act IX of 1869, Indian Income-tax Act IX of 1870, Indian Income-tax Act XII of 1871, ActVIIIofl872, Act II of 1886, Act VIIofl918, Act XI of 1922, Act 43 of 1961 have treated a Hindu Undivided Family as a distinct taxable entity. Similarly under the Wealth-tax 27 of 1957 and the Gift-tax Act 18 of 1958, the Hindu Undivided Family is made a unit of taxation.\n\nUnder the Business Profits Tax Act, 21 of 1947 and the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 also the Hindu Undivided Family was made a unit of taxation. For the purposes of these Act.s Mapilla Tcrwads governed by the Marumakkathayam law have been regard<d as individuals.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nFor all these reasons we hold that the term 'individual' in s. 3 of the Act includes within its ambit Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads and they are well within the purview of the taxing provisions of the enactment. Further, even after their inclusion in the term 'individual' s. 3 of the Act would not be violative , of Art. 14 for the same reasons for which s. 3 of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957 has been held to be not so violative by this Court in V.\n\nVenugopala' s case (supra).\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed but there will be no order as to costs.\n\n. P.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed •", "total_entities": 108, "entities": [{"text": "WEALTH TAX OFFICER, CALICUT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WEALTH TAX OFFICER, CALICUT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. K. MAMMED KA YI (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS\n\nL.RS. T.M. POCKER & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. K. MAMMED KAYI (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS L.RS. T.M. POCKER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 442, "end_char": 455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Mapilla Marumakkathayam Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 463, "end_char": 496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mapilla Marumakkathayam Act, 1939", "statute": "the Mapilla Marumakkathayam Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 613, "end_char": 627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 692, "end_char": 701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724, "end_char": 734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Undivided Families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawads were altogether outside the purview of the charging section of the Act", "statute": "Hindu Undivided Families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawads were altogether outside the purview of the charging section of the Act"}}, {"text": "Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1172, "end_char": 1203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the Revenue that the expression \"individual\" in section 3 took in a body or group of individuals like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad for being assessed to wealth tax and that long legislative practice obtaining in the taxing scheme Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawads have always been treated and assessed in the status of ''individual\".", "canonical_name": "Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Undivided Families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawads were altogether outside the purview of the charging section of the Act", "statute": "Hindu Undivided Families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawads were altogether outside the purview of the charging section of the Act"}}, {"text": "Mapilla Tarawad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, the term \"individual'' can be read in plural and so read would include a body or group of individuals like Mapilla Tarawad."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2817, "end_char": 2826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3366, "end_char": 3375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3661, "end_char": 3670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B.B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4434, "end_char": 4444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4454, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G.C. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C. Sharma, E.D. Helmes, S.P.Nayar and R.S. Sharma for H the Respondents."}}, {"text": "E.D. Helmes", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4501, "end_char": 4512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C. Sharma, E.D. Helmes, S.P.Nayar and R.S. Sharma for H the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.P.Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C. Sharma, E.D. Helmes, S.P.Nayar and R.S. Sharma for H the Respondents."}}, {"text": "R.S. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4528, "end_char": 4539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C. Sharma, E.D. Helmes, S.P.Nayar and R.S. Sharma for H the Respondents."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThis appeal, by certificate granted by the Kerala High Court, raises the question whether Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads of North Malabar-Muslim undivided families governed by Marumakkathayam Act (Madras Act 17 of 1939)- fall within the expression 'individual' and are assessable to tax under s. 3 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957?"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4668, "end_char": 4685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nThis appeal, by certificate granted by the Kerala High Court, raises the question whether Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads of North Malabar-Muslim undivided families governed by Marumakkathayam Act (Madras Act 17 of 1939)- fall within the expression 'individual' and are assessable to tax under s. 3 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957?"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4919, "end_char": 4923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads of North Malabar-Muslim undivided families governed by Marumakkathayam Act", "statute": "Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads of North Malabar-Muslim undivided families governed by Marumakkathayam Act"}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5264, "end_char": 5272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "September JO, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5602, "end_char": 5620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September JO, 1958 he filed a writ petition being O.P. No."}}, {"text": "Malabar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four other writ petitions were also filed by the karnavans of Hindu undivided families of Malabar and Cochin governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act No."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5940, "end_char": 5946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four other writ petitions were also filed by the karnavans of Hindu undivided families of Malabar and Cochin governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act No."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6255, "end_char": 6265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitutionality of the Act was challenged on two grounds-·( a) that the Parliament was not competent to include a Hindu undivided family in the charging s. 3 of the Act in view of Entry 86 in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and (b) that the charging s. 3 of the Act was violative of Art."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6389, "end_char": 6405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6452, "end_char": 6456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6485, "end_char": 6492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6648, "end_char": 6652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July I, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6833, "end_char": 6845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was competent to include a Hindu undivided family in s. 3 of the Act as constituting a body or group of individuals coming within the term 'individuals' in Entry 86, but accepted the latter ground of challenge by its judgment rendered on July I, 1951."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7325, "end_char": 7332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February I 7, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated February I 7, 1964, this Court set aside the judgment and orders of the High Court and remanded the cases to the High Court to consider whether Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7560, "end_char": 7567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7775, "end_char": 7782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7861, "end_char": 7868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8508, "end_char": 8512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8535, "end_char": 8542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8685, "end_char": 8689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8711, "end_char": 8718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8942, "end_char": 8946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Velu Pillai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9062, "end_char": 9073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Velu Pillai took the view that the legislative entries in a constitution were to be widely and liberally construed but not the provisions of a taxing statute, that though the term 'individuals' in Entry 86 of List I would be comprehensive enough to include a body or group of individuals like undivided Hindu families similar construction of the expression 'individual' in s. 3 of the Wealth Tax Act so as to include non-Hindu undivided families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads was not warranted, that the term 'individual' in s. 3 of Act occurred in anti-thesis with the terms 'Hindu undivided family' and if all undivided families were included in the terms 'individual' there was no necessity to mention Hindu undivided family as a distinct taxing unit."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9435, "end_char": 9439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9513, "end_char": 9544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Velu Pillai took the view that the legislative entries in a constitution were to be widely and liberally construed but not the provisions of a taxing statute, that though the term 'individuals' in Entry 86 of List I would be comprehensive enough to include a body or group of individuals like undivided Hindu families similar construction of the expression 'individual' in s. 3 of the Wealth Tax Act so as to include non-Hindu undivided families like Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads was not warranted, that the term 'individual' in s. 3 of Act occurred in anti-thesis with the terms 'Hindu undivided family' and if all undivided families were included in the terms 'individual' there was no necessity to mention Hindu undivided family as a distinct taxing unit.", "canonical_name": "Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarawad"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9594, "end_char": 9598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1965] 2 S.C.R. 355", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9831, "end_char": 9850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10123, "end_char": 10130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10409, "end_char": 10413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10430, "end_char": 10437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.P.\n\nGopalan Nambiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10447, "end_char": 10469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice V.P.\n\nGopalan Nambiyar, however, took the view that the expression 'individual' in s.3 of the Act properly read included a group of individuals who were members of a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad but since such interpretation of the term 'individual' led to differential treatment to such non-Hindu undivided families as compared to Hindu undivided families including Hindu Marumakkathayam Tarwads and would be violative of Art."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10530, "end_char": 10533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10872, "end_char": 10879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T.S.\n\nKrishnamoorthy Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11076, "end_char": 11101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice T.S.\n\nKrishnamoorthy Iyer, however, took the view that the expression 'individual' in s.3 of the Act included group of individuals who were members ofa Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad as, according to him, the specific mention of 'Hindu undivided families' as a separate assessable entity in the charging section could not restrict the meaning of the term 'individual' and, therefore, Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwads were assessable under s.3 of the Act and that even after inclusion of such group of individuals within the expression 'individual' the charging s.3 of the Act was not violative of Art."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11162, "end_char": 11165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11514, "end_char": 11517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11636, "end_char": 11639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11672, "end_char": 11679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12393, "end_char": 12397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12415, "end_char": 12422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12592, "end_char": 12596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12843, "end_char": 12850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12985, "end_char": 12989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishnamoorthy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place he supported the construction placed by Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J., on the expression 'individual' in s. 3 of the Act that it took in a body or group of individuals like a Mapilla Marumakkathayam Tarwad for being assessed to wealth tax."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13288, "end_char": 13292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13974, "end_char": 13978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14220, "end_char": 14224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14394, "end_char": 14398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14445, "end_char": 14452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14852, "end_char": 14856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14922, "end_char": 14931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15960, "end_char": 15967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of an Entry in any Legislative List is to demarcate as wide a Legislative field as possible by the use of compendious words or expressions while the rule of construction applicable to a taxing statute must ensure that \"the subject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the obligation\" (per Lord Simonds in Russell v. Scott(1)."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16099, "end_char": 16115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16259, "end_char": 16263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16888, "end_char": 16893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16905, "end_char": 16930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17189, "end_char": 17193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17740, "end_char": 17744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18604, "end_char": 18630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18913, "end_char": 18917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18943, "end_char": 18947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19375, "end_char": 19379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19936, "end_char": 19940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19970, "end_char": 19977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21005, "end_char": 21019, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21032, "end_char": 21053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21066, "end_char": 21087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gift-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21296, "end_char": 21308, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21432, "end_char": 21460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21724, "end_char": 21728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21939, "end_char": 21943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21983, "end_char": 21990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22022, "end_char": 22026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Expenditure Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22034, "end_char": 22059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.\n\nVenugopala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22114, "end_char": 22128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 for the same reasons for which s. 3 of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957 has been held to be not so violative by this Court in V.\n\nVenugopala' s case (supra)."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_367_386_EN", "year": 1981, "text": ". .,..\n\nM.M. QUASlM\n\nMANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS.\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n(D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nBihar BuildingJ (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1947-S.r. 2( d), JJ(I)(c) Expln. and ll(I)(d)-Landlord-Meaning of-Suit for eviction a/tenant on ground o[bo11ajide persolUJI requirement aud default-Partition of properties of landlord- Suit property a/lolled to a perso11not a party to the eviction proceedings\n\n- Whether landlord entitled to maintain and continue evtrtion proceedings.\n\nInterpretation of Statures-Admin/strtlf ion a/ Rent Acrs-Co_urts to bear in mind object and intendment of legislaturt.\n\nWords and Phrases-Land/ord-Meanin.t? of-Ss. 2( d) and II (I)( c) Expln.\n\nBihar Buildings (Lease, RtJu and EvictiOII) Control Act, 1947.\n\nRespondents 1 and 2 are the brother's sons of Respondent No. 3. These respondents commenced an action for ejectment of the appellant from a shop under section J J(l)(c) & (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, alleging that the respondents in good fnilh required posses sion of the shop for opening an office and a clinic by the first respondent who\n\nhad become a qualified medical practitioner, and that there was default In payment of rent for a period of three months i.e. September, October and November, 1972. The appellant contested the suit for eviction contending that he did not commit default in payment of rent for tho three months uod that the same was paid but no receipt was passed and that !IS the respondents were avoiding the statutory liability of passing the receipt acknowledging payment of rent, the appellant was forced to send the rent by money-order from December, 1\"972 and he sent the same month after month, und therefore, he could not be dubbed a defaulter. The ground for personal requirement was controverted contending that the property belonged to a flrm, and therefore, the same cannot be claimed for the use of any one partner for his business other than\n\nthe business of the firm. It was further contended that the respondents also owned a number of houses and their requirementfor Respondent No. l was incorrect and unwarranted.\n\nThe Trial Court held against the appellant both on the Question of default in payment of rent and personal requirement and ordered eviction.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal and when the appeal was pending before the appellate authority, he moved an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of CiviJ Procedure contending that there had been a partition of the properties amongst the members of the firm and the suit shop bad been alloued\n\nF ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA to one 'P' who was neither a plaintiff nor a party to the proceedings and if the shop belonged to him as an exclusive owner, the respondents and espcciaJiy respondent No. l could not seck to evict the appellant for his personal require meot of the suit shop. The appellate judge holding that the respondents were accepted by the appellant as the landlords of the suit shop, the subsequent partition decree would not help the appellant and agreeing with the finding of the Trial Court that there was default in payment of rent for a period of three B months, he dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe second appeal to the High Court by the appellant was dismissed, hold ing that the appellant had not moved the first appellate court with a proper application under order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as there was no such application on the record of the case the contention could not be entertained, and that the appellant did not chaUenge the finding of the courts on the question of default in payment of rent.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant tenant that : (I) the High Court was in error in rejecting the contention of the appellant that the ground of personal requirement was no more available to the respondents in view of the partition decree because not only the landlord must prove his requirement at the commencement of the action but the landlord for whose requirement the action is commenced must show that his requirement continues throughout the course of proceedings and that he had a subsisting interest in the premises of which possession is sought for his own use,\n\n(2) the High Court was in error in observing that in the absence of a proper application under order 41, rule 27 the Court could not entertain the contention thereby sought to be raised, and that the finding that the appellant was in default in payment of rent for a period of two months yras not• questioned before it.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. The decree of the H igh Court and the first appellate court are set aside and the case remanded to the first appellate court, which after granting the application under order 41, rule 27, and taking the certified copy of the decree in the partition suit on record and after giving an opportunity to the parties to lead any additional evidence should decide, whether the partition . decree transfers the suit shop to 'P.' exclusively and whether the respondents can maintain the action and are entitled to evict the appellant on the ground of personal requirement of respondent No. I and lor on the ground of default. . [385 G-386 Bl\n\n2. The expresion 'landlord' which has been defined in section 2(d) of the Rent Act is an inclusive definition couched in very wide language. This wide amplitude of the expression has however been cut down by the explanation appended to sub-clause (c) of sub-section (J) of section 11. The person claiming. possession on the ground of his reaonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a land.lord in the sense that he is the owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude ca11not be treated as landJord for the purposes of section I J(l)(c). [376 G-378 B}\n\n,-·--\"\n\n·-(\n\nM. M. QUASIM V. M. L. SHARMA 369\n\n3. The legislature by restricting the meaning of the expression 'landlord' for the purpose of Section I J(l)(c), manifested it~ intention namely that landlord alone can stte for eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is\n\none who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. A rent collector or an <\\gent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord , nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he\n\nwants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the\n\nreal owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own ocupation. [378 C, G]\n\nIn the instant case the application for additional evidence was filed after the argunwnts were concluded. The Judge had no objection in treating it to be one under Or 41 rule 27, took it on record and examined it on merits. The High Court \\~S clearly in error in ignoring the evidence in second appeal on a technical consideration that a proper application under order 41, rule 27, was not placed before the first appellate court. [373 F, 374 C, 375 AB]\n\nl n the instant case, there was a proper and regular application to meet with the requirements of order 41, rule 27, CPC for additional evidence inviting the court's attention to a subsequent event of vital importance cuttin.g at the root of the plaintiff's right to continue the action. Coupled with it, thre was evidence\n\nin the form of a certified copy of the decree in a partition suit showing that the respondents eve'n if they had some shade of title to commence action, they having lost all interest in the property and the property having become one of exclusive ownership of a person not a party to the proceedings wert: no more entitled to continue the proceedings for their own benefit.\n\nBoth the lower appellate court and the High Court were clearly in error in ignoring this vital piece of evidence which goes to the root of the matter and which would non-suit the respondents.\n\n[381 C, G) Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu\n\nv. The Motor & General T, aders, ( 1975] 3 S.C.R. 958 and Laclunesltwar Prasad Sltukul v. Kesluvar La! Chaudllri, (I 940} F.C.R. 85, referred to.\n\nThe t ime honomed nolion that the right of re-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sold judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetier the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only oo proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord. When examin ing a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is som~ vacant\n\npremises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the clement of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison de'etre of the Rent Act. If it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, th11t by itself may not be sutiicient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable\n\n\n(1981] 3 S.C. R.\n\nCor the purpose of his occupation or for the purpos~ for which he requires the\n\npremises in respect of which the action is commencd in the Court. To say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seck to remove the tenant would be unsupported by the Rent Act. This approach would put a premium on the landlord's greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his posscsion at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted, nnd, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in cnactiny 1hc same. The Court must understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and ono of the nccessitie~ of life-shelter. [383 C-384 A]\n\nJn the instant clse there are some recitals in the judgment of the High Court which show (i) that certain aspects have been disposed of cursorily; Jacking precision, and (ii) that a tenant who examined as many as eightw itncsses including himself to prove that the rent was paid and who specifically pleaded that fact in reply to the notice served by the landlords and who meticulously fought his sc, by making an application for additional evidence at the appellate stage would not give up the contention and if he hac in fact given i 1 up there was no justification for still taking the matter to the hihest court. The sub sequent event of partition of the properties have a dircet 1mpact on the title or the\n\nlandlordrespondents to evict the appellant on the ground of non-payrmnt of\n\nrent. A remand of the case is therefore inevitable. [3!!4 G-385 .H, Ci]\n\nCIVIL 1\\PPELLATE J uRISOJCTlON : Civil Appeal No. 758 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order/ Decree dated 5.10.1977 of the Patna High Court (Ranchi Bench)\n\nRanchi in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 204 of 1976 (R).\n\nR.K. Garg, V..J. Francis, D.K. Gnrf( and S. K. Jain for the Appellant.\n\nI ~\n\nSmjoo Prasad. S.N.\n\nMisra and A.N. Bardiyar for the .-./ Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDesAI, J. A tenant under a decree of eviction questions its correctness in this appeal by special leave.\n\nRespondents l and 2 are the brother's sons of respondent 3 Kishorilal Vishwakarma. Respondents commenced an action for ejectment of the appellant under section II (2)(c) & (d) of the H Bihar Builldings (Lease, Rent & Eviclion) Control Act. 1947 ('Rent Act' for short) from a shop forming part of holding No. 188 of Ward No. 3 within the area of Giridih municipality in Bihar State.\n\nM. M. QUASIM v. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 371\n\nClaim for possession was founded on the ground mentioned in .s. 11\n\n(l) (c) alleging that the respondents in good faith required possession of the shop for opening an office and a clinic by first respondent\n\nManoharla! Sharma who by thett had become a qualified medical practitioner having obtained M.B.B.S. degree. The additional ground on which the claim rdted was the usual one of default in payment of.rent for a period of two months and more as envisaged by s. 11 (I) (d). Default complained of was failure to pay rent for the\n\nmonths of September, October and November, 1972.\n\nAppellant contested the suit, inter a!iCJ, contending that he did not commit default in payment cf rent for the months of September, October and November, 1972, and that the same was paid but no receipt was passed and that as the respondents were avoiding statutory liability of passing the receipt acknowledging payment of rent the appellant was forced to send the rent by Money Order from December 1972 and he sent the same month afrer month, and, therefore, he could not be dubbed a defaulter within the meaning of s. 11 (1) (d). Controverting the ground of personal requirement,\n\nthe appellant contended that the property belonged to a firm and, therefore, the same cannot be claimed for the use of any one partner for his business other than the business of the firm. And in any case,\n\nthe respondents have number of houses in their possession and the requirement alleged on behalf of Manoh!'lrlal Sharma was incorrect and unwarranted.\n\nThe learned trial judge framed as many as nine issues. He held against the appellant both on the question of default in payment of rent and the personal requirement and after answering\n\nsome technical defences raised by the appellant, learned trial judge decreed the suit. The appellant preferred an appeal to the appellate authority.\n\nWhen the appeal was pending -before the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Giridih, the appellant filed an application supported by an affidavit on September 28, 1976, purporting to be under order 41, rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure contending therein that as originally concended by him the shop belonged to a firm and in Suit No. 4 of 1974 there has been a partition of the properties amongst the members of t.he firm and the suit shop has been allotted to one Pyarelal, who is neither a plaintiff nor a party to the proceedings and if the shop now beloags to Pyarelal as an exclusive owner, the respondents and especially respondent I Manobar Lal Sharma cannot seek to evict the appellant for his\n\npersonal requirement of the suit shop. This application was filed\n\n\n(1981} 3 S.C . .R.\n\nwith an affidavit drawn at the foot of the application itself. The learned appellate judge referred to this application in paragraph 12 of his judgment and negatived the contention therein rai'\\ed observing that allotment of the suit shop to Pyarelal has taken place after the suit was filed and that as earlier tile respondel'lts were accepted by the appellant as the landlords of the sui( shop, the subsequent partition riecrec would not help the appellant. He then made a cryptic observation that 'in any view of the matter the finding of the learned Munsif regarding personal necessity is correct and there is no ground for interference. ' He agreed with the finding of the trial Court that there was default in payment of rent for a period of\n\nthree months, and, therefore, also the respondents were entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in s. 11 (J) (d) of the Rent Act.\n\nAccordingly he dismissed the appeal with costs.\n\nA second appeal to the High Court by the tenant met with the same fate. It is, however, advantageous to notice the approach of the High Court to the £\\'0 contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. The contention of the tenant that the ground for personal relluirt'ment of respondent I Manoharlal Sharma no more survives because he has no subsisting interest in the suit shop in view of the partition decree in Suit No. 4 of 1974 was negatived observing that the aprellant had not moved the 1irst appellate court with a proper application under order 41 , rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure\n\nand as there was no such application on the record of the case the contention could not be entertained. Alternatively, the High Court found it difficult to accept the contention lhat during the pendency of I he appeal jf the bouse in question was allot ted to the share of one of the co-sharers of the decree (sic) tHe decree which had been passed in their favour becomes nullity and is liable to be set aside by the appellate court on this .~:.rround alone.\n\nRelevant to the second contention the H igh Court observed that the appellant did not challenge the finding of the two courts below on the question of default in payment of rent. Accordingly the High Court dismissed the second appeal with costs. Hence this appeal.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant canvassed the same two contentions before us which were pressed before the High Court. It was contended that the High Court was clearly in error in rejecting the contention of the appellant that the ground of personal requirement was no more available to the r¢spondents in view of the partition decree in Suit No. 4 of 1974 because not only the landlord must prove his requirement at the commencement of the action but\n\n..... ~\n\nM. M. QUASiM V. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) '})3\n\nthe landlord for whose requirement the action is commenced must shOW that his requirement continues throughout the course of proeedings and that he has a subsisting interest in the premises of hich possession is sought for his own use.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this submission 0:1 Pasupufeti Venbtesw.:tr!u v.\n\nTh~ Motor & General Trader.r.(l) It was also contended that the High court was in error in observing that in the absence of a proper application under order 41. rule 27 the court could not entertain the contention thereby sought to be raised. It was also contended\n\nthat the High Court was in error in observing that the finding that the appellant was in default in payment of rent for a priod of two months was not questioned belorc it.\n\nRespondents I and 2 are the sons of one Sunderlal Sharma.\n\nRespondent 3 is the brother of Sunderbl Sh:1rma. One Pyarelal is also a brother of Sundcrlal Sharma and Respondent 3 and thu-; an uncle of respondents I and 2. These facts have become very relevant for evaluating and disposing of the contention ca.JVassed before us.\n\n' Action for ejectment was filed by re; p:mdcnts I and 2 }.f:lnoharlal Sharma and .Motilal Sharma sons of deceasd SunJcrlal Sharma, and respJnJcnt 3 Kishorilal Vishwakarma, brotlter of Sundcrlal Sharma, inter alia. stating that they are tbe owners of the suit shop and are thus landlords within the meaning of Rent Act and that they require p nsssion of the suit premises, firstly on the ground that Manoharlal Sharma wants to open his clinic in the suit shop and !..-condly, that the appell:wt tenant has committed default in payment of rent fur a period of two months and more.\n\nAt the first appellate stage appellant filed an application, tn the cause . title of which it i!i mentioned that it is an application purporting to be under ordlr 41 rule 27, C.P.C. and at the foot of it there is a swor.t alfidavit with reference to the contents of tle application. Jn thi~ application it has been in terms 5lated that in suit No. 4 of 1974 (Kishoril!d Visl111'.1kumr.I v.\n\nPyuT<Iu/ Vishwulwmw) for partition of the assets of the firm ther.e h.as been a compromise on August 16, 1974, and that by the partthon elftcted by the decree the suit shop has bec11 ullvtted to Pyarelal\n\na~<J thereby lie became the owner and landlord of the suit shop With reference to the appcllnnt nnd as he is neither a party to the\n\n---:----_\n\nfl) (1975) 3S C.R. 9~8.\n\n, ;\n\n~ ' ' ! . !\n\nI ' \\\n\n~ : ! -:'\n\nf t ! ! ' t ' L I I t\n\n/, . :.;\n\n\n[ 1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nsuit nor has he applied to be joined as a party to the suit, the present respondents have no subsisting interest in the property and, therefore, a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the Rent Act could not be pl ssed in their favour.\n\nHe requested for setting aside the decree on this ground. It was further stated in the application that this fact being in the special knowledge of the respondents did not come to the knowledge of the appellant and not\\vithstanding the exercise of due diligence such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not after the exercise of due diligence be produced by him, and, therefore, he sought to produce this additional evidence at the appellate stage. A request was made t9 accept the certi.fied copy of the partition decree evidencing the fact alleged in the application. The learned appellate judge did not find fault either with the form of the application or compliance with the technical requirement of order 41, rule 27, or in any delay in moving the court for taking on record the additional evidence, The learned judge of the first appellate court disposed of the contention raised in the application on merits as would be evident from paragraph 12 of his judgment. Not to confound the issue on this point any more, the observation of the learned judge of the first appellate court may be extracted;\n\n''After the argument was heard, the deft. appellant bas filed the certified copy of the compromise decree of P.s 4 of 1974 (page 10 begins) Relying on this decree it has been alleged that the house in question has now been allotted to one Pyarelal who is not party to this suit.\n\nSo, now, the plffs have no c~:mce rn with the suit house.\n\nThis event had taken place after passing of the decree. If Pyarelal was cosharer then other co-sharer is competent to file a suit on behalf of the other. From the \"notice reply ext.\n\nI it will appear that ownership of the plffs respondent of T.S. 47/73 was accepted.\n\nOnce they have accepted that the plaintiffs are the owner now the defendant appellant can not say that the pltl's are not the owner of the suit premises.\n\nThis partition decree will not help the defendant to say that the pUI do not require the house now ? In execution of that partition decree, also the vacant possession will be required. So, in any view of the matter 1 find that the findings of the matter I find that the findings of the learned Munsif, regarding the personal necessity is correct and there is ground for interference.\n\nTbe learned Munsif has rightly appreciated the evidence and has come to th'e correct findings.\"\n\n.. ..._ __ _\n\nM. M. QUASIM 1'. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 375\n\nIt would unquestionably appear that the learned judge entertained the application for additional evidence, took it on record and examined it on merits.\n\nI.n this background, in our opinion, the High Cou'rt was clearly in error in ignoring this evidence in second appeal on a technical consideration that a proper application under order 41 , r. 27 was not B placed before the first appellate courl. Here is what the High Court says:\n\n\"Whenever any additional evidence is produced before an appellate court a regular applicarion under order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure is filed. There is no such application in the records of the case.\"\n\nObviously, this is contrary to recvrd. But the High Court appeared\n\nto be in two minds when it proceeded to entertain the contention on merits and negatived it on merits. Says the High Court further on\n\nthis point as under : D\n\n\" Apart from that, it is difficult to accept the contention that during the pendency of the appeal if the house in question is allotted to the share of one of the co-sharers of the decree, the decree which had been passed in their favour becomes nullity and is liable to be set aside by the appellate court on this ground alone.\n\nThis aspect of the matter has\n\n(sic) considered on several occasions by this Court where the plaintiff, during the pendency of the suit has assigned his interest. Even in those cases it has been held that by mere assignment the plaintiff does not Jose the right to maintain the suit. In my view, the position will be all the more difficult for the defendant if any such objection is taken for the first time in the court of appeal.\"\n\nWhat precedents are relied upon by the High Court when it says that the aspect required to be considered by it has been examined on a number of occasions left us guessing because there is no citation in the judgment. If the precedent relied upon was quoted in the judgment we could have profitably examined the precedent itself.\n\nIn tbe absence of it the contention being a pure question of law will have to be examined on its own merits.\n\nThe procedural conundrum may be cleared out at the threshold.\n\nWas there a proper application before the appellate court under\n\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\norder 41, rule 27 . . It must be answered in the aftirmatlve. The application Annexur~ II page 36 of the record recites in its title as: 'Petition under order 41, rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code'. It is founded on an affidavit. It is a well recognised practice commonly adopted m courts that where an application is required to be supported by an affidavit the application is drawn up and at the foot of it an affidavit is sworn. Even taking the most technical view of the\n\nrequireme.nt of order 41, r.27, C.P.C. the petition purporting to be under order 41 rule 27 meets with the requirement of the situation.\n\nThe contention of delay in moving the application will be presently examined but the High Court could not have rejected the contention\n\nraised by the appellant on the ground that a .proper application under order 41, rule 27, is not to be found on record. To some extent this observation would indicate that the rec~>rd of the case was not examined with the thoroughness as is expected in disposing of the appeal. In fact, the first appellate court whose grievance was that the application was filed after the arguments were concluded, bas had no objecti9n in treating the application to be one under order 41, rule 27. It has been so treated and has been disposed of on merits as per the passage from the judgment extracted hereinbefore.\n\nThe Hjgh Court, therefore, was squarely in error in rejecting the contention on the narrow ground that there was no proper application under order 4l , rule 27.\n\nNow, probing the merits of the contention, the first thing that stares in the face is whether where a suit is filed by a person claiming to be landlord on tbe ground that he in good faith requires the suit premises for his own use and cccupation, would he still be entitled to a decree for possession on this grvund even if during the course of proceedings his interest in the suit premises has come to\n\na11 end and on the date of the final decree he had no subsisting interest in the suit premises?\n\nIn other word~ . how should the Court approach a proceeding under the Rent Act while taking into consideration the subsequent events which would non-suit the plaintiff?\n\nThe expression 'landlord' has been defined in s. 2 (d) of the Rent Act wbich reads as under :\n\n\" landlord\" includes the persons who fo r the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building wl~ etber on his own account or on behalf or another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit, or himself and others or as an agent. trustee, executor, administrator,\n\n' -(\n\nM. M. QUASJM 1' • .M. t. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 377\n\nreceiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent, or .\\ bl! entitled to receiv~ the rent if the building were let to a tenant.\"\n\nThe inclusive definition is couched in very wide language. However\n\nthis wide amplitude of the expression has been cut down by the explanation appended to sub-clause (c) of su b-setion (I) of s. 11 B which reads a under :\n\n\" 11.\n\nEviction of tenants :\n\n(a) Notwithstanding anything contained In any contract or Jaw to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and to those of section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction there-from except in execution of a decree passed by the Coun on one or more of the foUowing grounds;-\n\n(c) Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord;\n\nProvided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation the Court shall pass a decree accordingly. and fix\n\nproportionately fair rent f()f the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall thenceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (aa) of section 2. and the rent so fixed sha11 be deemed to be the fa1r rent fixed under section 5;\n\nExplanation : In this clause the word \"landlord\" shall not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of section 2.\"\n\nTherefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in s.l l (1) (c), the person claiming possession on the ground of\n\n\n[1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nhis reasonable requirement of the the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude cannot be treated.as a landlord for the purposes of s. II (I) (c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the sub-section. By restricting the meaning of expression landlord for the purpose of section I l(l)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself a~:td exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of lhe section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the buildings for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the\n\npersonal requirement of that person for whosz benefit he holds the building. The second Clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of subclause (c) of sub-section (I) of s. ll, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someo:e who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent •collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the prop!rty. For the purposes of s. ll{l)(c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and w:10 has a right lv remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else.\n\nTt is such a person who cat\\ seek to evict the tenant on the gwund that he requires possession in good faith for\n\nhis own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in .his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore. a landlord within the expanded inclusive delinilion of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seelc to evict the tenant on the\n\nground that he wants possession of the premises for his own oc.cupation. That can be the only reasonable interpertation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clause (c) of s. I I (I) which reads: \"Where\n\nbuilding is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord\n\nM. M. QUASJM v. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 379\n\nfor his own occupation ..... .''. Assuming thai the expression 'landlord' has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition cla use, even a rent collector or a receiver\n\nof the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to clause (d) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression 'landlord' would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word 'owner' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would .\n\nbe entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation.\n\nThe next step to b.! taken is whether where a person claiming to be such a landlord has s0ug'tt to evict the tenant for his own\n\noccupation of the building but lost his interest in entirely in the building during the pendency of the appeal whicb is a continuation of the suit. Would he still be entitled to maintain or continue the action after the cessation or extingujshment of his interest in the building? To examine this contention on merits one feature of the proceedings under the Rent Act may be taken into consideration.\n\nTo what extent and in what circumstances the court can take notice of evnts subsequent to the institution of the action is the core\n\nproblem. This is no more res integra and need not be examined in depth. In Pasupuleti Venkataesw:rlus' case this Court examined this\n\nquestion in relation to a proceeding under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The landlord in that case sought to .evict the tenant as he wanted to start .his own bussiness in the demised premises. In other words, action was for eviction for personal requirement. In the zig-zag course vf proceedings it transpired that subsequent to rhe commencement of the action the landlord had come into possession of another shop wltich would meet with his requirement and on this subsequent event tenant requested the court to non-suit the plaintiff. At that stage the proceedings were pendings before the High Court in a revision petition at the instance of the landlord questioning a remand to the trial court by the first appellate court for investigation of certain facts. 111 this revision at the instance of the landlord the High Court took notice of the subsequent event that tbe landlord's requircmenr had been fully satisfied as he had come in possession of another shop. ln appeal by the landlord to this Court, a serious exception was taken that the High Court could not have taken into consideration an event subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings and non-\n\n\n[1981} 3 S.C.R.\n\nsuit the landlord an that too at a stage when the proceedings were pending in revision at the instance of the landlord. Negativing this contention and dismissing the appeal this Court, after referring to the decision in L'lchmeshwar PrMad Shukuf v. KPshwar La/ Chaudhrj(l) quoted with approval the following passage from Paflerson v. State of Afohama(') :\n\n\"We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment ltnder review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.''\n\nIn the leading judgment in L1chmeshwar Prurud S/wkuf's case Varadachariar, J. observed that an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing the Courts in fndia have in numerous cases recognised that in moulding the relief to be granteJ in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled ro take into account even facts which have come into existence after the decree appealed against was made.\n\nKrishna lyer, J. summed up the position iu Pasupuferi VenkatPSII'urfu' s case :\n\n\"It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding Equally clear is the principle\n\nthat procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising <fter the lis has come to court and llas a fundamental impact on rhe right to relief\n\nor the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal. it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stulrify or render inept the decretal remedy.\n\nEquity justifies binding the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances.\n\nNor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court.\n\nIf the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort LO that course in law or\n\n(I) [1940] F.C.R. 85\n\n(2) 294 U.S. 600 at (1)7,\n\n. y\n\nM. M. QUASIM v. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 381\n\njustice...\n\nWe affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many case) must, take cautious cognizance of een.ts and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.\"\n\nTo sum up, there was a proper and regular applicatio:1 to meet with the requirements of order 41, rule 27, Ci>C for additional evidence inviting the Court's attention to a subsequent event of vital importance cutting at the root o the plaiatiff's right to continue the action.\n\nCoupled with it, there was evidence in the form of a certified copy of the decree showing that the plaintiffs, even if they had some shade of title to commence action, they having lost all interest in the property and the property having become one of exclusive ownership of a person not a party to the proceedings, were no more entitled to\n\ncontmue the proceedings for their own benefit.\n\nHave the first appellate court a:1d the High Court acted in\n\naccordnce with law in ignoring this subsequent event of vital importance? The tlrst appellate court, as pointed out earlier, proceeded to examine the contention on merits and rejected it on the ground that this bhg an event subseq•tent to the passi lg of the decree by the tr ial court, no notice could be taken of it, a view contrary to the Jaw laid down by this Court.\n\nSame is true of tl:e High Court when it said that even if the landlord who\n\nommenced action lost all interest in the property subsequent to the passing of the decree, the decree does not become a nullity and at any rate no note of the subsequent events can be taken in the absence of a proper application under order 41, rule 27, C P.C.\n\nBut the next observation of the High Court that where the plaintiff landlord's interest in the property is extinguished subsequent to the decree by the trial coort, be does not lose his right to maintain and continue the action, is opposed to tl1e very scheme of the Rent Act\n\nand the provisions contained in ss. I I ( l)(c) and 12.\n\nBoth the courts were, therefore, clearly in error in ignoring this vital piece of evidence which goes to the root of the matter and w.:>uld surely nonwit the plaintiffs.\n\nOnce this subsequent event of landlord's interest in the property getting extinguished as the property in question is allotted as an\n\nexclusive owner to a sharer upon a partition amongst co-sharers, H is properly evaluated, unless some proper explanation is offered by the landlords who are parties to the proceedings, the plaintiffs are I\n\n\n(1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA liable to be non-suited. This does not require muc:1 of a discussion\n\nbecause plaintiffs sought possession for personaJ requirement of respondent I Manohar l al Sharma. Monohar Lal Sharma wanLed to start his clinic, as he is a qualified medical practitioner, in the suit premises. Manohar Lal Sharma is neither an owner nor a co-owner\n\nnor he has any interest in the suit property since the date of parti B lion effected by compromise between the co-sharers in Suit No. 4/75.\n\nIf action were to start today a or day after the decree for partition, could Manobar Lal Sharma ever file a suit for evicting the present appellant from the suit shop on the grounri that he wanted to start his c1inic in the suit shop ? lf Manobarlal Sharma can bring such an actjon he can as well evcit any tenant from any premises with which C he has no connection. Even if at the commencement of the action Manoharlal Sharma was a co-owner alongwirh his brother and\n\nuncle and, therefore, he had a semblance of title to commence action for eviction, vnce the co-owner parted company, panitioned property by metes and bounds and the suit property came to be allotled to Pyarelal as an exclusive owner. Manoharlal Sharma D cannot claim eviction of the tenant from such property in whicb he has no subsisting interest. And even tf this event occurred subsequent to the passing of the decree by the trial court, this subsequent event should ha\"e been noticed at the appellate stage because the appeal is nothing else but a continuation of the suit and in a proceeding under the Rent Act the relief E has to be moulded according to the situation on the date of the decree; the decree would mean the decree which is final and\n\nnot correctible by any judicial ; proceeding. Manoharlal Sharma, therefore, cannot seck to evict the tenant for his personal requirement. Therefore, the suit for evict tOn under s.ll (I )(c) would ordinarily fail on this ground.\n\nHowever, as the the fresh F evidence is being take11 into cunsideration and a<; both the appellate courts and the High Courl have erred in approaching the matter by ignoring the subsequent event, it would be presently pointcu out that in order to do justice between the parties the matter will have to be remanded to the first appellate court.\n\nG Before turning to rhe nexr topic, a word about the judicial\n\napproach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord under tt-e Rent Act would not be our of place. The learned judge of the first appellate courr while upholding the claun of personal\n\nrequirement of respondent I bas observed as under.\n\n\"It is ror the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fir ard prorer.\n\nTt is not for the defendant to suggest as\n\n...,..\n\nM. M. QUASIM V. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 383\n\nto what they should do. The defendant has led evidence to show that the plaintiffs have got some more houses at Girdih ...... The defendant appellant has also filed certified copy of judgment of one suit No. 47[73 which is Ext. D only to show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house at Giridih. I have already pointed out earlier that it is for the plaintiffs to decide which of the houses is suitable for them. It is not for the defendant to suggest that the house which will fall vacant in the near future is most suitable house for the plaintiffs\".\n\nThis approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all States in the country. The time honoured notion that the right of re-entry is unfettered and that the mvner landlord is the sole judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord.\n\nWhen examining a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison de'elre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the\n\nlandlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court.\n\nTt would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would .put a premium on the landlord's greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendetJcy the Rent Act was enacted and. therefore, 'it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent Act to bear in .mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the\n\n\n(1981) 3 S.C.R\n\nA same. The Court must understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and one of necessities of lifeshelter-and the way in which one part of the snciety exacts tribute from another for permission-to inhabit a portion of the globe.\n\nTn 'The Sociology of Law', edited by Pat Carlen. the author examhes the rent and rent legislation in England and Wales and observes as under : B\n\n\"The prevailing paradigms of nco - clasical economics and empiricist political theory hac determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that they and other social events appear as random existences independent of thtir historical formation.\n\nThe force of any theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and this in turn dcpc1ds on the wider image of social relations which produces it''.\n\nIt was, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that even if in view of the subsequent event the plaintiffs landlords were not entitled to reco, er possession on tile ground set out in s. II (I )(c) yet the respondents would still be entitled to evict the appellant on the ground mentioned in s. 11 (I) (d) inasmuc'l as all the courts have concurrently found that the appellant was ia default of payment of rcnr for a period of three months, i. e. September, October and November, 1972, and tha~ this finding was not even questioned before the High Court as mentioned in paragraph 3 of the judgment of the High Court. The appellant has set out ground No. V in his petition for special leave in the following terms :\n\n\" Because the High Court erred in holding that the findi11gs regarding default in payment of rent and of personal necessity were not challenged before the lligh Court\"'.\n\nUndoubtedly, what the High Court srates 111 its judgme:1t on the question whether a particular finding was challenged or not challenged is entitled to highec; t respect at our hands and must ordinarily be always accepted.\n\nWe have lingering hesitation in the facts of this case for two specific reasons : (I) that there are some recitals in the judgment of the High Court spectlicallv referred to herein before which show that cerrain aspects have been disposed of cursorily, lacking precision; and (ii) that a tenant who examined as many as eight witnrsses including himself to prove that the rent\n\nwas paid and who specifically pleaded that fact in reply to the notice served by the landlords and who meticulously fought his case by making an application for additional evidence nt the appellate\n\n---·\n\nM.M. QUASJM II. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 385\n\nstage would not give up the contention and if he had in fact given\n\nit up there was no justification for still taktng the matter to tbe highest court. Even then we would have overlooked the contention to the contrary and accepted what has been stated in the judgment but for the fact that subsequMt event stated hereinabove may have a direct impact on the title of the landlords-repondents to evict the appellant on the ground of non-payment of rent.\n\nIf on examining and evaluating the contents of the certified copy of the decree in partHion suit No. 4/74 it is established conclusively that the property has been exclusively allotted to Pyarelal who has not applied to be joined as party to these proceedings though he has filed some affidavit in this appeal before this Court and if no reservation is made in the decree for continuation of the\n\nproceedings for recovering possession on the ground of non-payment of rent in favour of the present respondents nor have the present respondents undertaken any liability to continue the proceedings on behalf of Pyarelal Shanna for the limited purpose of recovery of rent, in our opinion it would be extremely doubtful if the respondents can still maintain the action for recovering rent and for possession on the grounds mentioned in s. I I (l)(c) & (d). That aspect has not at all been examined either by the first appellate Court or by the High Court. lf 'A', a landlord commences action for eviction against his tenant on the only ground of nonpayment of rent and during the pendency of the proceedings transfers the property lock stock and barrel to a third person and if the third person is not\n\nbefore the Court, without finally expressing any opinion because the remand is contemplated, it is just unthinkable that such a landlord can continue the suit even after be bad no interest in the property.\n\nThe aspect may have to be examined in the background of the contract between the landlord who commenced the action and his\n\ntransfcr'!e, or the transferee having rserved some right came to the Court for being impleaded as a party to continue the action and his, right to continue, may be examined. These aspects arc not examined by any Court though decision on them goes to the root of the matter.\n\nTherefore, a remand is inevitable in the circumstances of this case.\n\nAccordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the decree of the High Court and the first appellate Court and remand tbe case to the first appellate Court which, after granting the application\n\nunder order 41, r. 27 and taking the certified copy of the decree in partition suit No. 4/74 on record and after giving an opportunity H to the parties before it to lead any addilional evidence pursuanl to this additonal evidence, would decide che following two questions:\n\n\n[1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\n(J) Does the partiton decree transfer the suit shop to Pyarelal Sharma exclusively ?\n\n(2) If yes, can the respondents (plaintiffs) maintain action and are entitled to evict the appellant (defendant) on the ground of personal requirement of Manohar Lal Sharma (respondent 1) and/or on the ground of default as contemplated by s. l J (I)( d) of the Rent Act ?\n\nOn the evidence on these issues the Court may mould the final relief copsistent with its findings.\n\nWith this direction the appeal is remanded to the first appellate Court. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. ~\n\n( -\\.", "total_entities": 105, "entities": [{"text": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 7, 1981\n\n(D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Control Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 2( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 671, "end_char": 680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act 1947", "statute": "Control Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 748, "end_char": 765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 993, "end_char": 1010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order 41, Rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2438, "end_char": 2455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3415, "end_char": 3432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3436, "end_char": 3463, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4388, "end_char": 4405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5334, "end_char": 5346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. M. QUASIM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5992, "end_char": 6004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "376 G-378 B}\n\n,-·--\"\n\n·-(\n\nM. M. QUASIM V. M. L. SHARMA 369\n\n3.", "canonical_name": "M. M. QUASIM"}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7615, "end_char": 7632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1975] 3 S.C.R. 958", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8481, "end_char": 8499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "To curb this very tendency the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10338, "end_char": 10377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R.K. 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Bardiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11896, "end_char": 11909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N.\n\nMisra and A.N. Bardiyar for the .-./ Respondents."}}, {"text": "DesAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11981, "end_char": 11986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDesAI, J. A tenant under a decree of eviction questions its correctness in this appeal by special leave.", "canonical_name": "DesAI"}}, {"text": "Kishorilal Vishwakarma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12146, "end_char": 12168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents l and 2 are the brother's sons of respondent 3 Kishorilal Vishwakarma."}}, {"text": "Bihar State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12456, "end_char": 12467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 within the area of Giridih municipality in Bihar State."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12577, "end_char": 12582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manoharla! Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12724, "end_char": 12741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11\n\n(l) (c) alleging that the respondents in good faith required possession of the shop for opening an office and a clinic by first respondent\n\nManoharla!", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12979, "end_char": 12984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13617, "end_char": 13622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manoh!'lrlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13989, "end_char": 14008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And in any case,\n\nthe respondents have number of houses in their possession and the requirement alleged on behalf of Manoh!'lrlal Sharma was incorrect and unwarranted.", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Giridih", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14425, "end_char": 14469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the appeal was pending -before the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Giridih, the appellant filed an application supported by an affidavit on September 28, 1976, purporting to be under order 41, rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure contending therein that as originally concended by him the shop belonged to a firm and in Suit No."}}, {"text": "September 28, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14535, "end_char": 14553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the appeal was pending -before the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Giridih, the appellant filed an application supported by an affidavit on September 28, 1976, purporting to be under order 41, rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure contending therein that as originally concended by him the shop belonged to a firm and in Suit No."}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14578, "end_char": 14595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14597, "end_char": 14620, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pyarelal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14851, "end_char": 14859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1974 there has been a partition of the properties amongst the members of t.he firm and the suit shop has been allotted to one Pyarelal, who is neither a plaintiff nor a party to the proceedings and if the shop now beloags to Pyarelal as an exclusive owner, the respondents and especially respondent I Manobar Lal Sharma cannot seek to evict the appellant for his\n\npersonal requirement of the suit shop.", "canonical_name": "Pyarelal Shanna"}}, {"text": "Manobar Lal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15026, "end_char": 15044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1974 there has been a partition of the properties amongst the members of t.he firm and the suit shop has been allotted to one Pyarelal, who is neither a plaintiff nor a party to the proceedings and if the shop now beloags to Pyarelal as an exclusive owner, the respondents and especially respondent I Manobar Lal Sharma cannot seek to evict the appellant for his\n\npersonal requirement of the suit shop.", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16043, "end_char": 16048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manoharlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16413, "end_char": 16430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the tenant that the ground for personal relluirt'ment of respondent I Manoharlal Sharma no more survives because he has no subsisting interest in the suit shop in view of the partition decree in Suit No.", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "order 41 , rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16672, "end_char": 16690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16694, "end_char": 16721, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. M. QUASiM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17913, "end_char": 17925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1974 because not only the landlord must prove his requirement at the commencement of the action but\n\n..... ~\n\nM. M. QUASiM V. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) '})3\n\nthe landlord for whose requirement the action is commenced must shOW that his requirement continues throughout the course of proeedings and that he has a subsisting interest in the premises of hich possession is sought for his own use.", "canonical_name": "M. M. QUASIM"}}, {"text": "M. L. SHARMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17929, "end_char": 17941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1974 because not only the landlord must prove his requirement at the commencement of the action but\n\n..... ~\n\nM. M. QUASiM V. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) '})3\n\nthe landlord for whose requirement the action is commenced must shOW that his requirement continues throughout the course of proeedings and that he has a subsisting interest in the premises of hich possession is sought for his own use."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17943, "end_char": 17948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1974 because not only the landlord must prove his requirement at the commencement of the action but\n\n..... ~\n\nM. M. QUASiM V. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) '})3\n\nthe landlord for whose requirement the action is commenced must shOW that his requirement continues throughout the course of proeedings and that he has a subsisting interest in the premises of hich possession is sought for his own use.", "canonical_name": "DesAI"}}, {"text": "Sunderlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18760, "end_char": 18776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents I and 2 are the sons of one Sunderlal Sharma.", "canonical_name": "Sunderlal Sharma"}}, {"text": "Sunderbl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18810, "end_char": 18818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 3 is the brother of Sunderbl Sh:1rma."}}, {"text": "Sundcrlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18862, "end_char": 18878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Pyarelal is also a brother of Sundcrlal Sharma and Respondent 3 and thu-; an uncle of respondents I and 2.", "canonical_name": "Sunderlal Sharma"}}, {"text": "lnoharlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19108, "end_char": 19124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Action for ejectment was filed by re; p:mdcnts I and 2 }.f:lnoharlal Sharma and .Motilal Sharma sons of deceasd SunJcrlal Sharma, and respJnJcnt 3 Kishorilal Vishwakarma, brotlter of Sundcrlal Sharma, inter alia.", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": ".Motilal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19129, "end_char": 19144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Action for ejectment was filed by re; p:mdcnts I and 2 }.f:lnoharlal Sharma and .Motilal Sharma sons of deceasd SunJcrlal Sharma, and respJnJcnt 3 Kishorilal Vishwakarma, brotlter of Sundcrlal Sharma, inter alia."}}, {"text": "SunJcrlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19161, "end_char": 19177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Action for ejectment was filed by re; p:mdcnts I and 2 }.f:lnoharlal Sharma and .Motilal Sharma sons of deceasd SunJcrlal Sharma, and respJnJcnt 3 Kishorilal Vishwakarma, brotlter of Sundcrlal Sharma, inter alia.", "canonical_name": "Sunderlal Sharma"}}, {"text": "Sundcrlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19232, "end_char": 19248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Action for ejectment was filed by re; p:mdcnts I and 2 }.f:lnoharlal Sharma and .Motilal Sharma sons of deceasd SunJcrlal Sharma, and respJnJcnt 3 Kishorilal Vishwakarma, brotlter of Sundcrlal Sharma, inter alia.", "canonical_name": "Sunderlal Sharma"}}, {"text": "Manoharlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19447, "end_char": 19464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stating that they are tbe owners of the suit shop and are thus landlords within the meaning of Rent Act and that they require p nsssion of the suit premises, firstly on the ground that Manoharlal Sharma wants to open his clinic in the suit shop and !..", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19803, "end_char": 19808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21451, "end_char": 21468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21963, "end_char": 21966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22435, "end_char": 22440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23691, "end_char": 23708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23712, "end_char": 23739, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25387, "end_char": 25404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25540, "end_char": 25557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25897, "end_char": 25902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "order 41 rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25940, "end_char": 25956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26210, "end_char": 26227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26604, "end_char": 26621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27622, "end_char": 27626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28347, "end_char": 28352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28568, "end_char": 28578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained In any contract or Jaw to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained In any contract or Jaw to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29456, "end_char": 29465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained In any contract or Jaw to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained In any contract or Jaw to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29537, "end_char": 29546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained In any contract or Jaw to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained In any contract or Jaw to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29654, "end_char": 29663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33638, "end_char": 33640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "To examine this contention on merits one feature of the proceedings under the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33960, "end_char": 34046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pasupuleti Venkataesw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34289, "end_char": 34310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pasupuleti Venkataesw:rlus' case this Court examined this\n\nquestion in relation to a proceeding under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960."}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34445, "end_char": 34462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L1chmeshwar Prurud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36338, "end_char": 36356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the leading judgment in L1chmeshwar Prurud S/wkuf's case Varadachariar, J. observed that an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing the Courts in fndia have in numerous cases recognised that in moulding the relief to be granteJ in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled ro take into account even facts which have come into existence after the decree appealed against was made."}}, {"text": "wkuf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36359, "end_char": 36363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the leading judgment in L1chmeshwar Prurud S/wkuf's case Varadachariar, J. observed that an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing the Courts in fndia have in numerous cases recognised that in moulding the relief to be granteJ in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled ro take into account even facts which have come into existence after the decree appealed against was made."}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36371, "end_char": 36384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the leading judgment in L1chmeshwar Prurud S/wkuf's case Varadachariar, J. observed that an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing the Courts in fndia have in numerous cases recognised that in moulding the relief to be granteJ in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled ro take into account even facts which have come into existence after the decree appealed against was made."}}, {"text": "Krishna lyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36706, "end_char": 36718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna lyer, J. summed up the position iu Pasupuferi VenkatPSII'urfu' s case :\n\n\"It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding Equally clear is the principle\n\nthat procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process."}}, {"text": "Pasupuferi VenkatPSII'urfu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36749, "end_char": 36775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna lyer, J. summed up the position iu Pasupuferi VenkatPSII'urfu' s case :\n\n\"It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding Equally clear is the principle\n\nthat procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process."}}, {"text": "[1940] F.C.R. 85", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37807, "end_char": 37823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 600", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37835, "end_char": 37841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38385, "end_char": 38402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 41, rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39709, "end_char": 39726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manohar l al Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40750, "end_char": 40769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This does not require muc:1 of a discussion\n\nbecause plaintiffs sought possession for personaJ requirement of respondent I Manohar l al Sharma.", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Monohar Lal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40771, "end_char": 40789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Monohar Lal Sharma wanLed to start his clinic, as he is a qualified medical practitioner, in the suit premises."}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40883, "end_char": 40901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lal Sharma is neither an owner nor a co-owner\n\nnor he has any interest in the suit property since the date of parti B lion effected by compromise between the co-sharers in Suit No.", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Manobar Lal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41156, "end_char": 41174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If action were to start today a or day after the decree for partition, could Manobar Lal Sharma ever file a suit for evicting the present appellant from the suit shop on the grounri that he wanted to start his c1inic in the suit shop ?", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Manobarlal Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41318, "end_char": 41335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lf Manobarlal Sharma can bring such an actjon he can as well evcit any tenant from any premises with which C he has no connection.", "canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS"}}, {"text": "M. M. QUASIM V. M. L. SHARMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43314, "end_char": 43342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tt is not for the defendant to suggest as\n\n...,..\n\nM. M. QUASIM V. M. L. SHARMA (Desai, J.) 383\n\nto what they should do."}}, {"text": "Girdih", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43472, "end_char": 43478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant has led evidence to show that the plaintiffs have got some more houses at Girdih ...... The defendant appellant has also filed certified copy of judgment of one suit No."}}, {"text": "Giridih", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43685, "end_char": 43692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D only to show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house at Giridih."}}, {"text": "To curb this very tendetJcy the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45873, "end_char": 45913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pat Carlen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46384, "end_char": 46394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn 'The Sociology of Law', edited by Pat Carlen."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46448, "end_char": 46455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the author examhes the rent and rent legislation in England and Wales and observes as under : B\n\n\"The prevailing paradigms of nco - clasical economics and empiricist political theory hac determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that they and other social events appear as random existences independent of thtir historical formation."}}, {"text": "Wales", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46460, "end_char": 46465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the author examhes the rent and rent legislation in England and Wales and observes as under : B\n\n\"The prevailing paradigms of nco - clasical economics and empiricist political theory hac determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that they and other social events appear as random existences independent of thtir historical formation."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47236, "end_char": 47241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.M. QUASJM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48636, "end_char": 48647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have lingering hesitation in the facts of this case for two specific reasons : (I) that there are some recitals in the judgment of the High Court spectlicallv referred to herein before which show that cerrain aspects have been disposed of cursorily, lacking precision; and (ii) that a tenant who examined as many as eight witnrsses including himself to prove that the rent\n\nwas paid and who specifically pleaded that fact in reply to the notice served by the landlords and who meticulously fought his case by making an application for additional evidence nt the appellate\n·\n\nM.M. QUASJM II.", "canonical_name": "M. M. QUASIM"}}, {"text": "Pyarelal Shanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49742, "end_char": 49757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "proceedings for recovering possession on the ground of non-payment of rent in favour of the present respondents nor have the present respondents undertaken any liability to continue the proceedings on behalf of Pyarelal Shanna for the limited purpose of recovery of rent, in our opinion it would be extremely doubtful if the respondents can still maintain the action for recovering rent and for possession on the grounds mentioned in s. I I (l)(c) & (d).", "canonical_name": "Pyarelal Shanna"}}, {"text": "Pyarelal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51550, "end_char": 51565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4/74 on record and after giving an opportunity H to the parties before it to lead any addilional evidence pursuanl to this additonal evidence, would decide che following two questions:\n\n[1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\n(J) Does the partiton decree transfer the suit shop to Pyarelal Sharma exclusively ?", "canonical_name": "Pyarelal Shanna"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52097, "end_char": 52103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_387_401_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "BARENDRA PRASAD RAY & ORS.\n\nTHE INCOME-TAX OFFICER 'A' WARD\n\nFOREIGN SECTION AND ORS.\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n(R.S. PATHAK, A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMJAH, JJ.]\n\nIn:ome Tax Act, 1961, Sections 2(13), 2(36), 9(1), 163(1} and 195(2). scope of-Words and phrases-\"Business\" and \"having business connection\"- explained-Presumption of obligation of the agent to deduct the tax payable under the Income Tax Act at source on paym!nt m1de to a n?n-resident.\n\nThe appellants are partners of a firm of Solicitors at Calcutta and they had been engaged by a German Corporation to act on its behalf in three suits pending before the High Court at Calcutta. A firm of Solicitors in London, namely M/s.\n\nAshurst, Morris, Crisp & Co., which was also acting on behalf of the German Corporation instructed the appellants to retain Mr. Blanco White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law, to argue the case in the aforesaid three suits. The appellants did not deliver any briefs to him and also did not pay or undertake any obligation to pay any fees for his services. The briefs had been earlier delivered by the London Solicitors. Mr. Blanco White left India on February 17, 1970 after arguing the cases for 13 days commencing from January 27, 1970 to February 16,\n\n1970, without making any arrangement regarding the payment of the Income Tax on the fees earned by him.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer informed the appellants that he proposed to proceed against them under section 163(1) of the Act treating them as the agents of Mr.\n\nBlanco White on the ground that the income arising out of professional charges had arisen on account of the business connection that existed between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White. Thereafter the appellants challenged the said order of the Income Tax Officer by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Calcutta. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a premature one taking the view that the question whether the case came within the purview of section 163(1) of the Act had to be determined after ascertainment of facts by the Income tax Officer. The appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed by a Division Bench holding (a) there was business connection (directly or indirectly through correspondence) between the appellants' firm and their nonresident British Counsel Mr. Blanco White and that an agency could very well be said to have been established between them ; (b) there was busine's connection between them and (c) income di:! either accrue or arise to Mr. Blanco White in India. However, the Division Bench granted certificate to the appellants under Article 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : I. From the facts and other material on 1ecord there was connection between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White. The said connection cannot also be termed as a casual one h1ving regard to the period over which it had existed. It was real and intimate an<l Mr. Blanco White earned the fees for arguing the case in India only through the said connection. From the year B 1965 there was correspondence between the appellants and the London Solicitors who in their turn had engaged Mr. Blanco White in connectbn with the suits in question.\n\nMr. Blanco White appeared before the High Court along with Indian counsel engaged by the appellants, though with the leave of the Co\"Jrt granted presumably under section 32 of the Advocates Act, 1951.\n\nMr. Blano White could appear only with the consent of the appellants who were the Solicitors on record. [398 A-Fl c\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, P11niab v. R.D. Aggarwal and Co. and Anr., 56 I.T.R. 20, applied.\n\n2. It is incorrect to suggest that it was the intention of the Parliament to exclude non-residents engaged in learned professions from the operation of section 9(1).\n\nThe words in section 9(1) land section 163 are comprehensive enough to include all heads of income mentioned in section 14 of the Act.\n\n[399 F DJ,\n\nThe expression \"business\" does not necessarily mean trade or manufacture only it is being used as including within its scope professions, vo; ations, and callings from a fairly long time. From section 2(b) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, it is clear that the \"business is one of wide import and it means an activity carried on continuously and systematically by a person by the application of his labour or skill with a view to earning an income. In the context in which the expression \"business connection\" is used in section 9(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 there is no warrant for giving a restricted meaning to it excluding \"professional connection\" from its scope. (400 B-D, 401 A-BJ\n\nCommissioner of income Tax, Bombay v. Currimbhoy Ebrahim and Sons Ltrr., 3 I.T.R. 395; Christopher Barker and Sons v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [1919] 2 K.B. 222 at page 228 and Commissioner of Inlan.i Revenue v.\n\nMarine Steam Turbine Comp:my Limited, [1920] l K.B. 193, quoted with approval.\n\n4. In the instant case, (a) it cannot be said that since Mr. Blanco White could not appear as connsel as of right either under the Advocates Act or under the Calcutta High Co.trt Origiml Side Rules, he could not be treated as having any business connection with the appellants ;\n\n(b) since Mr.\n\nBlanco White appeared along with the Indian counsel engaged by the appellants and the appellants continued to represent the German Corporation when Mr.\n\nBlanco White argued the case bfore the High Coc1rt, it cannot be said that Mr. White was a stranger to the appellants; (c) the appellants may not have engaged him to argue the case but, they allowed him at the request of the London Solicitors to argue the case and willingly co-operated with him in doing so ; (dJ the appllants may not have undertaken to pay Mr. White's fees but he could not have argued and earned the fees without associating himself with the appellants. The fact that Mr. Blanco White being a barrister could not file a\n\n~·-\n\nsuit to recover the fees would not make any difference ; and (e) that it is seen from the correspondence that Mr. Blanco White has earned the fees amounting to Pounds 2200 with refreshers at the !ate of Pounds 220 per d>y, for the work done in rr..:;;.. Therefore, the appellants are liable to tax agents of Mr. Blanco White under section 153(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.\n\n(401 B-E]\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1038 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by certificate from the Judgment and Order dated the 19th February 1973 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 200 of 197 l.\n\nS. Chowdhuri, P.P. Ginwa!a, T.A. Ramachandran and D.N. Gupta for the Appellants.\n\nV.S.\n\nDesai, Respondents No.\n\nClwmp:it l & 2.\n\nMiss A. Subhashini for\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMJAH, J. This appeal by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution arises out of a writ petition filed by the appellants under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Calcutta. The appellants are p:irtners of a firm of Solicitors known as M/s. Orr Dignam & Co. having its office at Calcutta. The appellants acted as the S::ilicitors of a Ger.nan Corpor!ltion known as Ferbwerke Hoec:1st Aktie,1g~>elL;(iaft Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning (a Corporation organised under the law of Federal Republic of Germany) (hereinafter referred to as 'the German Corporation' ) in two suits filed on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court-one Suit No. 5 l l of l 962 filed by the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. against German Corp)ration and another Suit No. l J 24 of 1962 filed by the German Corporation against the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. on the alleged infringemellt of a patent. The appella'lts were instructed by a firm of SJlicitors in London namely M/s. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp & Co. (hereinafter referred to as 'the London Solicitors') who were also acting for the German Corp::iration by a cable dated May 31, J 965 to retain in the said suits Mr.\n\nBlarico White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law.\n\nOn his arrival in India, the appellants accordiagly retained Mr. Blanco White as the counsel to argue the case of their clients-the German Corporation even though they did not deliver any briefs to him and also did not\n\npay or undertake any obligation to pay any fees for his services.\n\nThe briefs had been earlier delivered by the London Solicitors.\n\nIt is stated that they did not know as to how much amount was payable to him by the London Solicitors by way of fees.\n\nThe hearing of one of the said two suits lasted for thirteen days commencing from January 27, 1970 and was concluded on February 16, 1970. Mr Blanco White left India on February 17, 197J after the hearing was over without making any arrangement regarding the payment of income tax on the fees earned by him by arguing the case of the German Corporation. Thereafter on February 19, 1970,\n\nthe appellants received a notice from the Income-tax officer, 'A' Ward, Foreign Section asking them to furnish information about the fees earned in India by Mr. Blanco White as wunsel engaged by them to argue the case of their clients i.e. th~ German Corporation and also drawing their attention to the liability arising under section 195\n\n(2) of the Income-tax Act. 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which required them to deducl the tax payable under the Act at source on payments made to a non-resident.\n\nThe appellants sent a reply to that Jetter on February 24, I 970 stating that Mr. Blanco White had been engaged by the London Solicitors of the German Corporation to appear before the Calcutta High Courr on behalf of the German Corporation and that they had netither briefed him nor had they incurred any liability to pay him any fees.\n\nThey, therefore, denied their liability under section 195(2) of the Act.\n\nIncidentally it may be stated here that the appellants referred to one other suit i.e. Suit No. 422 of 1963 on the file of the Calcutta High Court filed by the German Corporation against Albert David Ltd. in which also Mr. Blanco White had been engagd for the German Corporation. Thereupon by a letter dated February 27,1970 the Income-Jax Officer informed the appellants that he proposed to proceed against t!-:em under section 163 (l) of the Act treating them as the agents of Mr. Blanco White on the ground that the income in question had arisen on account of the business connection that existed between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White. To this, the appellants sent a long reply dated March JO/ I I, 1970 denying their liability to be proceeded against under section 163 (I) of the Act.\n\nIn the course of the said reply, the appellants contended inter alia that they had not either engaged or briefed Mr. Blanco White in the three suits on the file of the Calcutta High Court; that they had not paid or promised to pay any fees to him and that, therefore, no income had accrued to Mr. Blanco White on account of any business connection that existed between them and Mr. Blanco White.\n\nThe appellants further contended that as Mr.\n\nBlanco White was a\n\nbarrister who was not carrying on any busit1ess but had only; rendered professional service in Calcutta, the connection if any, could not be a business connecti n. They also questioned the jurisdiction of the Incometax Officer to make any assessment treating them as the representative assessees of Mr. Blanc0 White.\n\nThe Inc0me-tax Officer by his letter dated March 25, 1970 rejected the plea of the appellants and called upon them to appear before them on April 18, 1970 to make any other submission that they had to make.\n\nThereafter the appellants filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Calcutta and obtained a rule nisi on May 25,197J calli11g upo11 the Income-tax Officer, )he Commissioner of focome-tax West Bengal [and the Union of India to show cause as to why the proposal to initiate proceedings under the Act as stated above should not be quashed a11d a writ in the nature of mandamus prohibiting them from proceeding against the appellants under section 163(1) of the Act should rtot be issued.\n\nThe petition was contested by the respondents. In the Counter Affidavit filed by the [ncome-tax O'.ficer, it was asserted that the Department had received inform1tion that Mr. Blanco White had charged Rs. 17,000/- per day by way of fees for appearing in the Calcutta High Court in the suits referred to above; that Mr. Blanco White was not domiciled in India; that inasmuch as his stay in India did not exceed ninety days it was not necessary for him to obtain a Tax Exemption Certificate for leaving India; that the appellants had acted as instructing Solicitors to the German Corporation in the three suits in which Mr. Blanco White had argued as counsel; that he could not have, according to the Calcutta High Court Rules (Original Side ) appeared before that court unless he was instructed by an Attorney of that Court w:10 i:i th~ instant case happened to be the appellants and that, therefore, there existed a business connection which brought the appellants within the scope of section 163(1) of the Act.\n\nIt was also contended by the respondents that the petition was premature as the matter had still to be decided in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act.\n\nThe learned Single Judge who heard the petition was of the view that the question whether the case came within he purview of section 163(1) had to be determined after ascertainment of facts by the Income-tax Officer and that therefore, the petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground that it was a premature one. According11y he dismissed it without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.\n\nAggrieved by the decision of the Single Judge, the appellants preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding, inter\n\nalia, that from the facts disclosed before the Court it appeared that from May 31, 1965 upto Febuary 16, 1970 there was business connection (directly of indirectly through correspondence) between the appellants firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr.\n\nBlanco White, that it could not be said that there was no element of continuity and that the transaction was a solicitory and isolated one and that taking into account the surrounding circumstances and particularly the relationship between the Solicitors and a counsel, an agency could very well be said to have been established between the appellants' firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr. Blanco White.\n\nThe Division Bench further held that there was business connection between them and that it was not possible to accept the contenions of appellants that no income either accrued or arose to Mr. Blanco White in India. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. On a certificate granted by tle Division Bench under Article J 33 of the Constitution, the appellants ha\\'e come up in appeal to this Court against the judment of the Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nD Jt should be stated here that alongwith the petition for a\n\ncc:rtificate under Article 133 of the Constitution, the appellants filed an application before the High Court for stay of further proceedings before the Department. On that application, the High Court passed an order on March 12, 1973 stating that the order of stay already granted would continue subject to the following modification:\n\n\" ( J) The respondents will be at liberty to decide after giving the petitioners a hearing whether the petitioners firm should be treated as agent of Mr. Blanco White under section 163 of the Income-tax Act J 961;\n\n(2) If they so decide the respondents will be at liberty to issue a notice unde.r section 148 of the Act but will not take any futher steps thereafter until. the disposal of the application;\n\n(3) The petitioners will also be at liberty to appeal from any order made under section 163 without prejudice to their contentions in the proposed appeal to the Supreme Court''.·\n\nWe are informed that pursuant to the liberty given by the said order, the Income-tax Officer made an order on March 23, 1977 treating the appellants' firm as the agent of Mr. Blanco White under section 163(1) of the Act and also on the same date issued a notice\n\nunder section J 48 of the Act to the appellants to file a return of the income of Mr.\n\nBlanco White. It is also stated that the appellants preferred an appeal against that order before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner without prejudice to the appellants' contentions in their appeal to this Court.\n\nUltimately on November 30, 1973 this Court made an order that the appellants might apply to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for an order of stay in respect of the question whether they were agents of Mr. Blanco White and that at any rate even if the Income-tax Officer were to proceed with the case, he would make the assessment but would not make a final demand till the disposal of the appeal. It is further stated that pursuant to the notice under section i 48 of the Act, the appellants filed a 'nil' return.\n\nThereafter we are informed that the Incometax Officer intimated the appellants on September 17, 1977 that he had completed the assessment of Mr. Blanco White for the assessment year 1970-7 l treating the appellants' firm as the agent and that copies of the assessment order, demand notice and challan would be forwarded to them after disposal of this appeal.\n\nIt is necessary to refer at this stage to certain relevant facts of the case. The appellants were acting as the Solicitors of the German Corporation in India in the cases referred to above and the London.\n\nSolicitors were acting as its Solicitors in London. Suits Nos. 511 and l 124 had been instituted in 1962 and suit No. 422 in 1963. On May 31, 1965, the London Solicitors sent a cable to the appellants which read as follows :-\n\n\"Dignior Calcutta We act for Farewerke Hoechst this country and understand that you act India stop in connection acting infringement Indian Tolbutamide patent have been instructed to retain Blanco White as cou11sel to attend hearings Calcutta and Bombay stop Imperative to know. dates of respective actions since counsel can only accept subject to other Commitments stop Please cable hearing dates if known or date when Information available stop Our Ref Lee.\n\nAshursts London\n\nCol Blanco White REF : LCC.\"\n\nThe above cable shows that the London Solicitors had sought\n\ninformation about the suits in Calcutta to enable them to engage H Mr. Blanco White to plead on behalf of the German Corporation in the said suits.\n\nOn December 23, 1969, the London Solicitars\n\nwrote a letter to the appellants in which it was stated that the copies of certain documents sent by the appellants had been handed over to Mr.\n\nBlanco White in addition to copies of certaii1 other documents which they themselves had handed over to him.\n\nA part of the aforesaid letter which is relevaut for the purpose of the present case, is reproduced below :-\n\n\" ......... We are asking Mr.\n\nDivecha of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Limited, Bombay, to arrange for copies of the evidence in tbe Bombay case to be sent to you.\n\nThe formulation of the evidence can then be discussed between you and your Counsel and Mr. Blanco White when he arrives in Calcutta. The remaining documents which we are sending you are three bound volumes of pleadings which you sent to us in the early stages but which will no doubt be of use to you at the trial, Mr. Blanco White of course has copies of all the pleadings in the three cases.\n\nThere are a number of points which Mr. Blanco White has asked us to put to you for consideration and these are as follows :-\n\nl. It is not entirely clear from the pleadings that Indian Patent No. 66049 is a document in the Albert David case.\n\nWill you please consider whether this specification may have to be strictly proved ?\n\nIn the infringement action by Hoechst against Bengal Chemicals, the defendants have objected there is no claim against the second and third defendants, that is the inventors named in the Patent. Mr. Blanco White sees no reason to pursue this point and, subject to your views, would suggest that it is abandoned.\n\n3. In the threats action by Bengal Chemicals, again subject to your views, Mr. Blanco White would not propose to argue that Hoechst did not in fact threaten proceedings.\n\nAlso in the threats action, there is a point which we would mention here on which we are asking Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Limited of Bombay for information. Bengal H Chemicals have said in their affidavits filed in the interlocutory proceedings in April 1962 that they stopped production of Tolbutamide because of the threats made by Hoechst.\n\n) )·\n\nB. P. RAY v. INCOME TAX OFFICER (Venkatarnmiah, J.) 395\n\nAt the same time it appears that they published advertisements in the Punjab Medical Journal and the Indian Medical Journal of !st May of that year. We are asking Hoechst Pharmaceuticals if they can say when these advertisements would have had to have been sent to those Journals for publication on that date.\n\nMr. Blanco White will be flying in Calcutta on BOAC Flight No. 914 leaving London on Tuesday, 20th January 1970 and arriving at 6.40 a.m. local time on Wednesday, 21st January.\n\nHe would like to have preliminary discussion with you and counsel on matters of procedure, etc. on Thursdaymorning and possibly Wednesday afternoon. We believe that the gentlemen from Hoechst, Frankfurt plan to arrive in Calcutta on Thursday, 22nd January, so as to be available for m0re -detailed talks starting on Friday. We are asking Hoechst, Bombay to arrange for hotel accommodation for Mr. Blanco White.\"\n\nThen there is the letter dated January 8, 1970 written by the London Solicitors to the appellants enclosing copies of the briefs which had been delivered by the London Solicitors to Mr. Blanco White.\n\nThe said suits came up for hearing on January 27, 1970.\n\nThe appellants had engaged Mr. P.P. Ginwala, Mr. A.K. Basu and Mr. Sankar Ghose to appear on behalf of the German Corporation in the said suits. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition filed before the High Court out of which this appeal arises, the appellants have stated as follows :\n\n\"On 27th January 1970 the said suits were called on before his Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.L. Roy. It was decided to take up Suit No. I 124 of 1962 first.\n\nIn the said suit Mr. Blanco White, Q.C. appeared with Mr. P.P.\n\nGinwala, Mr. A.K. Basu and Mr. Sankar Ghose. The said suit No. 1124 of 1962 was heard on 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th January 1970, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, ! 2th, 13th and 16th February 1970 and judgment was reserved. The other suits were adjourned until after the judgment.\"\n\nIn his letter dated March 21, I 973 written to the London Solicitors marked as Annexure 'E' to the writ petition, Mr. Blanco H White while attempting to make out a case supporting the appellants admitted that he was not disputing that when he was actually in\n\nA Court in Calcutta, he was, formally, there on instructions from the appellan!s as attorneys. The relevant part of that letter reads :\n\n\"Dear Mr. Gane, Parbwerke Hoechst v. Bengal Chemical.\n\nCertainly I can confirm that, when I appeared before the Calcutta High Court in January and February 1970. I was briefed by your firm and not by Orr. Dignam & Co. Accordingly, whilst I would not dispute that when I was actually in Court in Calcutta I was, formal!y, there on instructions from Orr.\n\nDignam as attorneys of record, all arrangements relating to my fees were made with you (as the English Solicitors of Hoechst in Germany) and Orr. Dignam were at no time concerned with these arrangements.\"\n\nMr. Blanco White left India on February 17, l 970 without making any arrangment for the settlement of his liability under the Act. When the Income-tax Officer issued the notice dated February 19, 1970 to the appellants drawing their attention to the provisions contained in section l 9.3(2) of the Act and requesting them to furnish information regarding the income earned by Mr. Blanco White by arguing the case before the Calcutta High Court on behalf of the German Corporation, the appellants replied on February 24, 1970 stating that the London Solicitors had engaged Mr. Blanco White to appear on behalf of the German Corporation before the Calcutta High Court; that the appellants had not briefed him nor did they know on what fees, if any, he had been engaged.\n\nIn their letter dated March l 0/ i I, 1970 to the notice dated February 17, 1970 issued by the Income-tax Officer to the appellants under section 163(1) of the Act, the appellants again stated that they had not engaged or delivered any brief to Mr. Blanco White and that tliey had no business connection with him. It was urged before the High Court by the appellants that there was no sort of connection between the appellants and Mr.\n\nBlanco White and even if there was any connection, it was just a casual one and could in no case be termed as business connection: that they bad not unde1iaken to pay any fees to him for appearing in the suits and that, therefore, the appellants were not liable to be assessed.\n\nThe Division Bench of the High Court which heard the appeal came to the conclusion that there was business connection between the appellants and Mr.\n\nBlanco White: that it could not be said that there was no element of H continuity and the transaction was a stray or an isolated one and that the appellants were not entitled to the issue of the writ prayed for on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.\n\n• '\n\nFor proper appreciation of the contentions advanced by the parties before us, it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act. Section 160(1) (i) of the Act provides that in respect of the income of a non-resident specified in sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act, the agent of the non-resident, including a person who is treated as an agent under section 163 is a representative assessee.\n\nSection 161 (1) of the Act stipulates that every representative assessee, as regards the income in respect of which he is a representative assessee, shall be subject to the. same duties, responsibilities and liabilities as if the income were income received by or accruing to or in favour of him beneficially, and shall be liable to assessment in his own name in respect of that income;. but any such assessment shall be deemed to be made upon him in bis representative capacity only, and the tax shall, subject to the other provisions contained in Chapter XV of the Act be levied upon and recovered from him in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person represented by him.\n\nSection 163 (l)(b) and (c) of the Act provides that for purposes of the Act any person in India who has any business connection with the non-resident or from or through whom the non-resident is in receipt of any income whether directly or indirectly can be treated as an agent of such nonresident.\n\nSection 5(2) of the Act inter alia provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the total income of any previous year of a person who is a non-resident includes all income from whatever source derived which accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India during such year.\n\nThe relevant part of section 9(1) of the Act reads :\n\n\"(!) The following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India-\n\n(i) all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection ·\n\nin India, or through or from any property in India, or through or from any asset or source of income in India or through the transfer of a capital asset situate in India;\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of this clause-(a) in case of a business of which all the operations are not carried out in India, the income of the business deemed under this clause to accrue or arise in India shall be only such part of the income as is reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in [ndia ......... \"\n\nFrom the facts stated above it is seen that from the year I 965 there was correspondence between the appellants and the London Solicitors who in their turn had engaged Mr. Blanco White in connection with the suits in question. It shows that there was a connection between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White though it was an indirect one.\n\nAfter his arrival in Iridia, it must be assumed that the appellants had done all that was suggested in the letter of he. London Solicito, rs datec; I December 23, 1969.\n\nIt is adm1ttedthat Mr. Blanco White appeared with the Indian counsel engaged by the appellants and argued the case on behalf of the client of the appellants in the suit in which they were acting as solicitors.\n\nEven though the appellants did not hand over any briefs directly to Mr. Blanco White, it is seen that part of the records handed over to Mr. Blanco White by the London Solicitors consisted of the copies of records sent by the appellants to the London Solicitors.\n\nIt is further seen that Mr. Blanco White appeared before the High Court alongwith the Indian counsel engaged by the appellants, though with the leave of the Court granted presumably under section 32 of the Advocates Act 1961. We are also of the view that there must have been discussion between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White before the case was argued by him.\n\nMoreover, Mr. Blanco White could appear only with the consent of the appellants who were the Solicitors on record.\n\nIn the circumstances, it cannot be said that the High Court was wrong in holding that there was connection between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White.\n\nThe said connection cannot also be termed as a casual one having regard to the period over which it had existed. It was real and intimate and Mr. Blanco White earned the fees for arguing the case in India only through the said connection. The case satisfies the test laid down by this Court in Commissioner of Tncome-tax, Punjab v.\n\nR.D. Aggarwal and Co. and Anr.(1) for holding that there was connection between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White. The finding of the High Court on the above question also appears to be well founded.\n\nThe only remammg question which needs examination is whether the said connection was a business connection. The contention of the appellants is that a professional connection cannot amount to a business connection attracting section 9(1) of the Act.\n\nIn support of this contention the appellants depend upon the definitions of the expressions 'business' and 'profession' found in\n\n(I) 56 l.T.R. 20\n\nsection 2 (13) and section 2(36) of the Act. Section 2(13) of the Act reads:\n\n\"business\" includes any trade, commerce, or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture\".\n\nSection 2(36) of the Act provides:\n\n\" \"Profession\" includes vocation \".\n\nSection 14 of the Act which enumerates the heads of income whicb give rise to a liability to tax under the Act treats the income from profits and gains of bcisiness and profession as a sic1gle head.\n\nSections 28 to 44B of the Act constitute the fascicule of provisions dealing generally with the computation of income from business and profession although not all those provisions are applicable to income from a profession.\n\nThe definition of the expression 'business' given in the Act is an inclusive one.\n\nThe expression 'business connection' however is not defined in the Act.\n\nIt is manifest that the words in section 9(1) and section 163 are comprehensive enough to include all heads of income mentioned in section I 4 of the Act. It is no doubt true that there is specific reference to 'business' in section 9(1) and there is no reference to 'profession'. But no tenable reason is discernible from the statute for excluding income arising out of profession from its scope. In this connection two submissions are made on behalf of the appellants - (1) that it was he intention of the Parliament to exclude non-residents engaged in learned professions from the operation of section 9(1) and that even if the intention of the Parliament was not to exclude such persons from section 9(1) since there is an omission to refer to them expressly the lacuna should not be made good by giving a wide interpretation to the expression 'business connection'. We do not find that there is any substance in the first submission. There could be no good reason for the Parliame11t for excluding non-resident professional men from the purview of section 9(1) of the Act.\n\nThere is no material on which we can reach that conclusion. In so far as the second submission is concerned, we have to examine whether it would really amount to filling up a lacuna in the section if the expression 'business connection' is interpreted as including within its scope 'Professsional Connection' also.\n\nIn Commissioner of Income Tax.\n\nBombay v.\n\nCurrimbhoy Ebrahim & Sons Ltd.,(1) Sir George Rankin speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council while construing the expression 'business connection ' in section 42(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 observed :\n\n\"The phrase \" business connection \" is different from, though doubtless not unreleated to, the word \"business\" of which there is a definition in the Act\".\n\nThe expression 'business' does not necessarily mean trade or manufacture only. It is being used as including within its scope professions, vocations and callings &from a fairly long time.\n\nThe Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'business' as 'stated occupation, profession or trade' and ' a man of business is defined as maning 'an attorney' also. In view of the above dictionary meaning of the word 'business' it cannot be said that the definition of business given in section 45 of the partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Viet. c. 39) was an extended definition intended for the purpose of that Act only.\n\nSection 45 of that Act says:\n\n\"The expression \" business includes every trade, occupation, or profession\".\n\nSection 2(b) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 also defines \" business\" thus :\n\n\" \"business\" includes every trade, cccupation and profession\".\n\nThe observation of Rowlatt, J. in Christuphu Barker & Sons\n\nv. Commissioner of Inland Revenu<(') \"All professions are business, but all businesses are not professions, ......... \" also supports the view that professions are generally regarded as businesses.\n\nThe same learned Judge in another case Commissioner of Inland Revenue v.\n\nMarine Steam Turbine Company Limittd(3) held:\n\nThe word 'business' however is also used in another and a very different sense, as meaning an active occupation or profession continuously carried on and it is in this sense the word is used in the Act with which we are here concerned. '\n\n(!) 3 I.T.R. 395\n\n(2) (1919] 2 K.B. 222 at page 228\n\n(3) (1920] I K.B. 193\n\n.~·\n\nB. P. RAY v. INCOME-TAX OFFICER (Venkataramiah, J.) 401\n\nThe word 'business' is one of wide import and it means an activity carried on continuously and systematically by a person by the application of his labour or skill with a view to earning an mcome.\n\nWe are of the view that in the context in which the expression 'business connection' is used in section 9 (!)of the Act, there is no warrant for giving a restricted meaning to it excluding' professional connections' from its scope.\n\nThere is very little substance in the submission made on behalf of the appellants that since Mr. Blanco White could not appear as counsel as of right either under the Advocates Act or under the Calcutta High Court Original Side Rules, he could not be treated as having any business connection with the appellants.\n\nAs noticed earlier, Mr. Blanco White appeared alongwith the Indian counsel engaged by the appellants and the appellants continued to represent the German Corporation when I\\fr. Blanco White argued the case before the High Court. It is difficult to hold that he was a stranger to the appellants. The appellants may not have engaged him to argue the case but they allowed him in: the request of the London Solicitors to argue the case and willingly cooperated with him in doing so. That it was their case that Mr. Blanco White argued cannot be denied. The appellants may not have undertaken to pay his fees but he could not have argued and earned the fees without associating himself with.the\n\nappellants . .The fact that Mr. Blanco White being a barrister could not file a suit to recover the fees would not make any difference in this ·\n\ncase as in the letter dated August 19, 1980 written by the London Solicitors to the appellants which is produced before us it is stated that the fees of Mr. Blanco White amounted to £ 2200 with refreshers at the rate of £ 220 per day.\n\nWe need not go into the correctness of these figures but the fact remains that Mr. Blanco White has earned income for the work done in India.\n\nWe do not propose to go into question as to what would happen if no fees have been realised by him at all.\n\nIn view of the foregoing we are of the view that the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court which is under appeal does\n\nnor call for interference.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nThe parties shall, however, bear their costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 156, "entities": [{"text": "BARENDRA PRASAD RAY & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BARENDRA PRASAD RAY & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER 'A' WARD\n\nFOREIGN SECTION AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER 'A' WARD FOREIGN SECTION AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 7, 1981\n\n(R.S. PATHAK, A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMJAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 2(13), 2(36), 9(1), 163(1} and 195(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Presumption of obligation of the agent to deduct the tax payable under the Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 307, "end_char": 396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are partners of a firm of Solicitors at Calcutta and they had been engaged by a German Corporation to act on its behalf in three suits pending before the High Court at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm of Solicitors in London, namely M/s.\n\nAshurst, Morris, Crisp & Co., which was also acting on behalf of the German Corporation instructed the appellants to retain Mr. Blanco White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law, to argue the case in the aforesaid three suits."}}, {"text": "Ashurst", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 681, "end_char": 688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm of Solicitors in London, namely M/s.\n\nAshurst, Morris, Crisp & Co., which was also acting on behalf of the German Corporation instructed the appellants to retain Mr. Blanco White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law, to argue the case in the aforesaid three suits."}}, {"text": "Blanco White Q.C.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 809, "end_char": 826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm of Solicitors in London, namely M/s.\n\nAshurst, Morris, Crisp & Co., which was also acting on behalf of the German Corporation instructed the appellants to retain Mr. Blanco White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law, to argue the case in the aforesaid three suits.", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 846, "end_char": 860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm of Solicitors in London, namely M/s.\n\nAshurst, Morris, Crisp & Co., which was also acting on behalf of the German Corporation instructed the appellants to retain Mr. Blanco White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law, to argue the case in the aforesaid three suits."}}, {"text": "Blanco White", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Blanco White left India on February 17, 1970 after arguing the cases for 13 days commencing from January 27, 1970 to February 16,\n\n1970, without making any arrangement regarding the payment of the Income Tax on the fees earned by him.", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1206, "end_char": 1211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Blanco White left India on February 17, 1970 after arguing the cases for 13 days commencing from January 27, 1970 to February 16,\n\n1970, without making any arrangement regarding the payment of the Income Tax on the fees earned by him."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1215, "end_char": 1232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Blanco White left India on February 17, 1970 after arguing the cases for 13 days commencing from January 27, 1970 to February 16,\n\n1970, without making any arrangement regarding the payment of the Income Tax on the fees earned by him."}}, {"text": "January 27, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1285, "end_char": 1301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Blanco White left India on February 17, 1970 after arguing the cases for 13 days commencing from January 27, 1970 to February 16,\n\n1970, without making any arrangement regarding the payment of the Income Tax on the fees earned by him."}}, {"text": "February 16,\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1305, "end_char": 1323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Blanco White left India on February 17, 1970 after arguing the cases for 13 days commencing from January 27, 1970 to February 16,\n\n1970, without making any arrangement regarding the payment of the Income Tax on the fees earned by him."}}, {"text": "section 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1518, "end_char": 1532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the appellants challenged the said order of the Income Tax Officer by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "section 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2106, "end_char": 2120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2731, "end_char": 2742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3526, "end_char": 3536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3544, "end_char": 3563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Blano White", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3570, "end_char": 3581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Blano White could appear only with the consent of the appellants who were the Solicitors on record. [", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3841, "end_char": 3851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is incorrect to suggest that it was the intention of the Parliament to exclude non-residents engaged in learned professions from the operation of section 9(1)."}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1951", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3958, "end_char": 3970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1951", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1951", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4057, "end_char": 4067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1951", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4286, "end_char": 4298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1951", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4306, "end_char": 4334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4617, "end_char": 4629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4637, "end_char": 4657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Blanco White could not appear as connsel as of right either under the Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5149, "end_char": 5232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Origiml Side Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5267, "end_char": 5285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "White", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5615, "end_char": 5620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, (a) it cannot be said that since Mr. Blanco White could not appear as connsel as of right either under the Advocates Act or under the Calcutta High Co.trt Origiml Side Rules, he could not be treated as having any business connection with the appellants ;\n\n(b) since Mr.\n\nBlanco White appeared along with the Indian counsel engaged by the appellants and the appellants continued to represent the German Corporation when Mr.\n\nBlanco White argued the case bfore the High Coc1rt, it cannot be said that Mr. White was a stranger to the appellants; (c) the appellants may not have engaged him to argue the case but, they allowed him at the request of the London Solicitors to argue the case and willingly co-operated with him in doing so ; (dJ the appllants may not have undertaken to pay Mr. White's fees but he could not have argued and earned the fees without associating himself with the appellants."}}, {"text": "section 153(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6435, "end_char": 6455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(401 B-E]\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. Chowdhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6688, "end_char": 6700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 of 197 l.\n\nS. Chowdhuri, P.P. Ginwa!a, T.A. Ramachandran and D.N. Gupta for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P.P. Ginwa!a", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6702, "end_char": 6714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 of 197 l.\n\nS. Chowdhuri, P.P. Ginwa!a, T.A. Ramachandran and D.N. Gupta for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "P.P.\n\nGinwala"}}, {"text": "T.A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 of 197 l.\n\nS. Chowdhuri, P.P. Ginwa!a, T.A. Ramachandran and D.N. Gupta for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "D.N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6738, "end_char": 6748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 of 197 l.\n\nS. Chowdhuri, P.P. Ginwa!a, T.A. Ramachandran and D.N. Gupta for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "V.S.\n\nDesai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6770, "end_char": 6781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S.\n\nDesai, Respondents No."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6822, "end_char": 6835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A. Subhashini for\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMJAH, J. This appeal by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution arises out of a writ petition filed by the appellants under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMJAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6885, "end_char": 6898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A. Subhashini for\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMJAH, J. This appeal by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution arises out of a writ petition filed by the appellants under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6936, "end_char": 6947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7047, "end_char": 7068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Federal Republic of Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7409, "end_char": 7436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants acted as the S::ilicitors of a Ger.nan Corpor!ltion known as Ferbwerke Hoec:1st Aktie,1g~>elL;(iaft Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning (a Corporation organised under the law of Federal Republic of Germany) (hereinafter referred to as 'the German Corporation' ) in two suits filed on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court-one Suit No."}}, {"text": "Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7601, "end_char": 7646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 l l of l 962 filed by the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. against German Corp)ration and another Suit No."}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7929, "end_char": 7935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appella'lts were instructed by a firm of SJlicitors in London namely M/s. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp & Co. (hereinafter referred to as 'the London Solicitors') who were also acting for the German Corp::iration by a cable dated May 31, J 965 to retain in the said suits Mr.\n\nBlarico White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law."}}, {"text": "May 31, J 965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appella'lts were instructed by a firm of SJlicitors in London namely M/s. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp & Co. (hereinafter referred to as 'the London Solicitors') who were also acting for the German Corp::iration by a cable dated May 31, J 965 to retain in the said suits Mr.\n\nBlarico White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law."}}, {"text": "Blarico White Q.C.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8116, "end_char": 8134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appella'lts were instructed by a firm of SJlicitors in London namely M/s. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp & Co. (hereinafter referred to as 'the London Solicitors') who were also acting for the German Corp::iration by a cable dated May 31, J 965 to retain in the said suits Mr.\n\nBlarico White Q.C., a resident of the United Kingdom, who was a barrister having considerable practice in the branch of patent law.", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "February 16, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8840, "end_char": 8857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The hearing of one of the said two suits lasted for thirteen days commencing from January 27, 1970 and was concluded on February 16, 1970."}}, {"text": "February 17, 197J", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr Blanco White left India on February 17, 197J after the hearing was over without making any arrangement regarding the payment of income tax on the fees earned by him by arguing the case of the German Corporation."}}, {"text": "February 19, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9088, "end_char": 9105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on February 19, 1970,\n\nthe appellants received a notice from the Income-tax officer, 'A' Ward, Foreign Section asking them to furnish information about the fees earned in India by Mr. Blanco White as wunsel engaged by them to argue the case of their clients i.e. th~ German Corporation and also drawing their attention to the liability arising under section 195\n\n(2) of the Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9435, "end_char": 9446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9459, "end_char": 9473, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 24, I 970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9672, "end_char": 9690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants sent a reply to that Jetter on February 24, I 970 stating that Mr. Blanco White had been engaged by the London Solicitors of the German Corporation to appear before the Calcutta High Courr on behalf of the German Corporation and that they had netither briefed him nor had they incurred any liability to pay him any fees."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Courr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9810, "end_char": 9829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants sent a reply to that Jetter on February 24, I 970 stating that Mr. Blanco White had been engaged by the London Solicitors of the German Corporation to appear before the Calcutta High Courr on behalf of the German Corporation and that they had netither briefed him nor had they incurred any liability to pay him any fees."}}, {"text": "section 195(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10009, "end_char": 10023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10164, "end_char": 10183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "422 of 1963 on the file of the Calcutta High Court filed by the German Corporation against Albert David Ltd. in which also Mr. Blanco White had been engagd for the German Corporation."}}, {"text": "Albert David Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10224, "end_char": 10241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "422 of 1963 on the file of the Calcutta High Court filed by the German Corporation against Albert David Ltd. in which also Mr. Blanco White had been engagd for the German Corporation."}}, {"text": "February 27,1970 the", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10345, "end_char": 10365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon by a letter dated February 27,1970 the Income-Jax Officer informed the appellants that he proposed to proceed against t!-:em under section 163 (l) of the Act treating them as the agents of Mr. Blanco White on the ground that the income in question had arisen on account of the business connection that existed between the appellants and Mr. Blanco White."}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March JO/ I I, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this, the appellants sent a long reply dated March JO/ I I, 1970 denying their liability to be proceeded against under section 163 (I) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10804, "end_char": 10815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Blanco White", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11276, "end_char": 11288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants further contended that as Mr.\n\nBlanco White was a\n\nbarrister who was not carrying on any busit1ess but had only; rendered professional service in Calcutta, the connection if any, could not be a business connecti n. They also questioned the jurisdiction of the Incometax Officer to make any assessment treating them as the representative assessees of Mr. Blanc0 White.", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11391, "end_char": 11399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants further contended that as Mr.\n\nBlanco White was a\n\nbarrister who was not carrying on any busit1ess but had only; rendered professional service in Calcutta, the connection if any, could not be a business connecti n. They also questioned the jurisdiction of the Incometax Officer to make any assessment treating them as the representative assessees of Mr. Blanc0 White."}}, {"text": "Blanc0 White", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11599, "end_char": 11611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants further contended that as Mr.\n\nBlanco White was a\n\nbarrister who was not carrying on any busit1ess but had only; rendered professional service in Calcutta, the connection if any, could not be a business connecti n. They also questioned the jurisdiction of the Incometax Officer to make any assessment treating them as the representative assessees of Mr. Blanc0 White.", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11657, "end_char": 11671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inc0me-tax Officer by his letter dated March 25, 1970 rejected the plea of the appellants and called upon them to appear before them on April 18, 1970 to make any other submission that they had to make."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11754, "end_char": 11768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inc0me-tax Officer by his letter dated March 25, 1970 rejected the plea of the appellants and called upon them to appear before them on April 18, 1970 to make any other submission that they had to make."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11871, "end_char": 11882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 25,197J calli11g", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11965, "end_char": 11985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the appellants filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Calcutta and obtained a rule nisi on May 25,197J calli11g upo11 the Income-tax Officer, )he Commissioner of focome-tax West Bengal [and the Union of India to show cause as to why the proposal to initiate proceedings under the Act as stated above should not be quashed a11d a writ in the nature of mandamus prohibiting them from proceeding against the appellants under section 163(1) of the Act should rtot be issued."}}, {"text": "section 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12296, "end_char": 12310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13331, "end_char": 13345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13652, "end_char": 13666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 31, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14201, "end_char": 14213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding, inter\n\nalia, that from the facts disclosed before the Court it appeared that from May 31, 1965 upto Febuary 16, 1970 there was business connection (directly of indirectly through correspondence) between the appellants firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr.\n\nBlanco White, that it could not be said that there was no element of continuity and that the transaction was a solicitory and isolated one and that taking into account the surrounding circumstances and particularly the relationship between the Solicitors and a counsel, an agency could very well be said to have been established between the appellants' firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr. Blanco White."}}, {"text": "Febuary 16, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14219, "end_char": 14235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding, inter\n\nalia, that from the facts disclosed before the Court it appeared that from May 31, 1965 upto Febuary 16, 1970 there was business connection (directly of indirectly through correspondence) between the appellants firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr.\n\nBlanco White, that it could not be said that there was no element of continuity and that the transaction was a solicitory and isolated one and that taking into account the surrounding circumstances and particularly the relationship between the Solicitors and a counsel, an agency could very well be said to have been established between the appellants' firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr. Blanco White."}}, {"text": "Blanco White", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14385, "end_char": 14397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding, inter\n\nalia, that from the facts disclosed before the Court it appeared that from May 31, 1965 upto Febuary 16, 1970 there was business connection (directly of indirectly through correspondence) between the appellants firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr.\n\nBlanco White, that it could not be said that there was no element of continuity and that the transaction was a solicitory and isolated one and that taking into account the surrounding circumstances and particularly the relationship between the Solicitors and a counsel, an agency could very well be said to have been established between the appellants' firm and the non-resident British counsel, Mr. Blanco White.", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15338, "end_char": 15349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 12, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15539, "end_char": 15553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that application, the High Court passed an order on March 12, 1973 stating that the order of stay already granted would continue subject to the following modification:\n\n\" ( J) The respondents will be at liberty to decide after giving the petitioners a hearing whether the petitioners firm should be treated as agent of Mr. Blanco White under section 163 of the Income-tax Act J 961;\n\n(2) If they so decide the respondents will be at liberty to issue a notice unde.r section 148 of the Act but will not take any futher steps thereafter until."}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15829, "end_char": 15840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15848, "end_char": 15862, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15953, "end_char": 15964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16143, "end_char": 16154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16224, "end_char": 16237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the disposal of the application;\n\n(3) The petitioners will also be at liberty to appeal from any order made under section 163 without prejudice to their contentions in the proposed appeal to the Supreme Court''.·"}}, {"text": "March 23, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16353, "end_char": 16367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are informed that pursuant to the liberty given by the said order, the Income-tax Officer made an order on March 23, 1977 treating the appellants' firm as the agent of Mr. Blanco White under section 163(1) of the Act and also on the same date issued a notice\n\nunder section J 48 of the Act to the appellants to file a return of the income of Mr.\n\nBlanco White."}}, {"text": "section 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16437, "end_char": 16451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 30, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16823, "end_char": 16840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately on November 30, 1973 this Court made an order that the appellants might apply to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for an order of stay in respect of the question whether they were agents of Mr. Blanco White and that at any rate even if the Income-tax Officer were to proceed with the case, he would make the assessment but would not make a final demand till the disposal of the appeal."}}, {"text": "September 17, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17410, "end_char": 17428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter we are informed that the Incometax Officer intimated the appellants on September 17, 1977 that he had completed the assessment of Mr. Blanco White for the assessment year 1970-7 l treating the appellants' firm as the agent and that copies of the assessment order, demand notice and challan would be forwarded to them after disposal of this appeal."}}, {"text": "December 23, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18842, "end_char": 18859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 23, 1969, the London Solicitars\n\nwrote a letter to the appellants in which it was stated that the copies of certain documents sent by the appellants had been handed over to Mr.\n\nBlanco White in addition to copies of certaii1 other documents which they themselves had handed over to him."}}, {"text": "Divecha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19280, "end_char": 19287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A part of the aforesaid letter which is relevaut for the purpose of the present case, is reproduced below :-\n\n\" ......... We are asking Mr.\n\nDivecha of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Limited, Bombay, to arrange for copies of the evidence in tbe Bombay case to be sent to you."}}, {"text": "Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Limited, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19291, "end_char": 19330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A part of the aforesaid letter which is relevaut for the purpose of the present case, is reproduced below :-\n\n\" ......... We are asking Mr.\n\nDivecha of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Limited, Bombay, to arrange for copies of the evidence in tbe Bombay case to be sent to you."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19377, "end_char": 19383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A part of the aforesaid letter which is relevaut for the purpose of the present case, is reproduced below :-\n\n\" ......... We are asking Mr.\n\nDivecha of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Limited, Bombay, to arrange for copies of the evidence in tbe Bombay case to be sent to you."}}, {"text": "Albert David", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20027, "end_char": 20039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66049 is a document in the Albert David case."}}, {"text": "Hoechst", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20163, "end_char": 20170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the infringement action by Hoechst against Bengal Chemicals, the defendants have objected there is no claim against the second and third defendants, that is the inventors named in the Patent."}}, {"text": "Bengal Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20179, "end_char": 20195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the infringement action by Hoechst against Bengal Chemicals, the defendants have objected there is no claim against the second and third defendants, that is the inventors named in the Patent."}}, {"text": "Bengal H Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20772, "end_char": 20790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bengal H Chemicals have said in their affidavits filed in the interlocutory proceedings in April 1962 that they stopped production of Tolbutamide because of the threats made by Hoechst."}}, {"text": "Hoechst Pharmaceuticals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21185, "end_char": 21208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are asking Hoechst Pharmaceuticals if they can say when these advertisements would have had to have been sent to those Journals for publication on that date."}}, {"text": "Frankfurt", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21704, "end_char": 21713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We believe that the gentlemen from Hoechst, Frankfurt plan to arrive in Calcutta on Thursday, 22nd January, so as to be available for m0re -detailed talks starting on Friday."}}, {"text": "P.P. Ginwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22213, "end_char": 22225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants had engaged Mr. P.P. Ginwala, Mr. A.K. Basu and Mr. Sankar Ghose to appear on behalf of the German Corporation in the said suits.", "canonical_name": "P.P.\n\nGinwala"}}, {"text": "A.K. Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22231, "end_char": 22240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants had engaged Mr. P.P. Ginwala, Mr. A.K. Basu and Mr. Sankar Ghose to appear on behalf of the German Corporation in the said suits."}}, {"text": "Sankar Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22249, "end_char": 22261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants had engaged Mr. P.P. Ginwala, Mr. A.K. Basu and Mr. Sankar Ghose to appear on behalf of the German Corporation in the said suits."}}, {"text": "27th January 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22469, "end_char": 22486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 6 of the writ petition filed before the High Court out of which this appeal arises, the appellants have stated as follows :\n\n\"On 27th January 1970 the said suits were called on before his Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.L. Roy."}}, {"text": "K.L. Roy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22561, "end_char": 22569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 6 of the writ petition filed before the High Court out of which this appeal arises, the appellants have stated as follows :\n\n\"On 27th January 1970 the said suits were called on before his Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.L. Roy."}}, {"text": "P.P.\n\nGinwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22686, "end_char": 22699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the said suit Mr. Blanco White, Q.C. appeared with Mr. P.P.\n\nGinwala, Mr. A.K. Basu and Mr. Sankar Ghose.", "canonical_name": "P.P.\n\nGinwala"}}, {"text": "27th, 28th, 29th, 30th January 1970, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, ! 2th, 13th and 16th February 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22781, "end_char": 22882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1124 of 1962 was heard on 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th January 1970, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, !"}}, {"text": "March 21, I 973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22989, "end_char": 23004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his letter dated March 21, I 973 written to the London Solicitors marked as Annexure 'E' to the writ petition, Mr. Blanco H White while attempting to make out a case supporting the appellants admitted that he was not disputing that when he was actually in\n\nA Court in Calcutta, he was, formally, there on instructions from the appellan!s as attorneys."}}, {"text": "Blanco H White", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23087, "end_char": 23101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his letter dated March 21, I 973 written to the London Solicitors marked as Annexure 'E' to the writ petition, Mr. Blanco H White while attempting to make out a case supporting the appellants admitted that he was not disputing that when he was actually in\n\nA Court in Calcutta, he was, formally, there on instructions from the appellan!s as attorneys.", "canonical_name": "Blarico White Q.C."}}, {"text": "Gane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23376, "end_char": 23380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant part of that letter reads :\n\n\"Dear Mr. Gane, Parbwerke Hoechst v. Bengal Chemical."}}, {"text": "Orr. Dignam & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23566, "end_char": 23583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I was briefed by your firm and not by Orr."}}, {"text": "Dignam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23720, "end_char": 23726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dignam as attorneys of record, all arrangements relating to my fees were made with you (as the English Solicitors of Hoechst in Germany) and Orr."}}, {"text": "Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23848, "end_char": 23855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dignam as attorneys of record, all arrangements relating to my fees were made with you (as the English Solicitors of Hoechst in Germany) and Orr."}}, {"text": "February 17, l 970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23957, "end_char": 23975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Blanco White left India on February 17, l 970 without making any arrangment for the settlement of his liability under the Act."}}, {"text": "February 24, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24433, "end_char": 24450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Income-tax Officer issued the notice dated February 19, 1970 to the appellants drawing their attention to the provisions contained in section l 9.3(2) of the Act and requesting them to furnish information regarding the income earned by Mr. Blanco White by arguing the case before the Calcutta High Court on behalf of the German Corporation, the appellants replied on February 24, 1970 stating that the London Solicitors had engaged Mr. Blanco White to appear on behalf of the German Corporation before the Calcutta High Court; that the appellants had not briefed him nor did they know on what fees, if any, he had been engaged."}}, {"text": "March l 0/ i I, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24717, "end_char": 24737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In their letter dated March l 0/ i I, 1970 to the notice dated February 17, 1970 issued by the Income-tax Officer to the appellants under section 163(1) of the Act, the appellants again stated that they had not engaged or delivered any brief to Mr. Blanco White and that tliey had no business connection with him."}}, {"text": "section 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24833, "end_char": 24847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 160(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25969, "end_char": 25983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26088, "end_char": 26097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26193, "end_char": 26204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26236, "end_char": 26247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter XV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26785, "end_char": 26806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26965, "end_char": 26976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27264, "end_char": 27276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XV of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27584, "end_char": 27596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Iridia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28662, "end_char": 28668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his arrival in Iridia, it must be assumed that the appellants had done all that was suggested in the letter of he."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29474, "end_char": 29484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29492, "end_char": 29510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30683, "end_char": 30695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30857, "end_char": 30866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(36)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30876, "end_char": 30889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(13)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30902, "end_char": 30915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(36)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31070, "end_char": 31083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31143, "end_char": 31153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 28 to 44B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31343, "end_char": 31361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31758, "end_char": 31770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31775, "end_char": 31786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31950, "end_char": 31962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32322, "end_char": 32334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32421, "end_char": 32433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32778, "end_char": 32790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "George Rankin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33202, "end_char": 33215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay v.\n\nCurrimbhoy Ebrahim & Sons Ltd.,(1) Sir George Rankin speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council while construing the expression 'business connection ' in section 42(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 observed :\n\n\"The phrase \" business connection \" is different from, though doubtless not unreleated to, the word \"business\" of which there is a definition in the Act\"."}}, {"text": "section 42(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33331, "end_char": 33344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33352, "end_char": 33378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34024, "end_char": 34034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34157, "end_char": 34167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34265, "end_char": 34277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34285, "end_char": 34313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34430, "end_char": 34437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observation of Rowlatt, J. in Christuphu Barker & Sons\n\nv. Commissioner of Inland Revenu<(') \"All professions are business, but all businesses are not professions, ......... \" also supports the view that professions are generally regarded as businesses."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35462, "end_char": 35471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35766, "end_char": 35779, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 19, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36780, "end_char": 36795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The fact that Mr. Blanco White being a barrister could not file a suit to recover the fees would not make any difference in this ·\n\ncase as in the letter dated August 19, 1980 written by the London Solicitors to the appellants which is produced before us it is stated that the fees of Mr. Blanco White amounted to £ 2200 with refreshers at the rate of £ 220 per day."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_402_418_EN", "year": 1981, "text": ". F\n\nAHMED IBRAHIM SAHIGRA DHORAJI\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n( R. S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nWealth Tax Act, 1957-Section 2(m)-Finance Act, 1965 gave incentives for voluntary disclosute of concealed income-Assessee declared large amount of such income and paid tax as provided by Finance Act-Tax so paid-Whether an allowable deduction as \"debt owed\" under the Wealth Tax Act.\n\nAs part of a measure to mop up unaccountt!d money on which no income tax had been paid, an incentive scheme was prepared by the Government under which a person disclosing such income was required to pay a specified rate of tax without attracting the penal provisions of the Income Tax Act. Section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965 provided that a person making a voluntary disclosure of his income in accordance with the provisions of the section would be charged income tax at a specified rate notwithstanding anything contained in the Income Tax . Act.\n\nThe assessee had a large sum of such unaccounted money in his possession.\n\nWithout allocating the total sum amongst the different assessment years, he declared that he had a sum of Rs. 7 lakhs in his possession which was earned by him during the assessment years 1957-58 to 1964-65. Income Tax in respect of this income computed in accordance with section 68 of the Finance Act was paid by him .\n\nIn the wealth tax returns filed by him in response to the notice issued by the Wealth Tax Officer for re-assessment consequent on the disclosure of his wealth the assessee claimed deductions of income-tax paid under section 68 of the Finance Act. But the Wealth Tax Officer disallowed the claim holding that since the assessee had not shown the liability to pay income tax in his balance sheets for the respective years the deductions claimed by him could not be allowed in any of the assessment years.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal, on the other hand, held that the liability constituted a \"debt owed\" because in truth and substance, it was a liability under the Income Tax Act, 1922 or 1961 and not a new liability created by the Finance Act, 1965.\n\nOn reference the High Court held in favour of the Revenue on the ground that section 68 of the Finance Act enacted a new charge of tax on an ad hoc\n\nA.l.S. DHORAJI v. C.W.T. 403\n\nbasis on disclosed income and, therefore, it was not a \"debt owed\" which could A be allowed as a deduction under the Wealth Tax Act.\n\nOn behalf of the Revenue it was contended that since the tax paid by the assessee under the voluntary disclosure scheme was in discharge of a liability created for the first time by the Finance Act, 1965 it was not an allowable deduction under the Wealth Tax Act.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The assessee was entitled to claim deduction of income tax paid on the amounts added to his total wealth under section 2 (m) of the Wealth\n\nTax Act in the course of the assessment proceedings. (418 BJ C\n\nI. Merely because the amounts were disclosed in a declaration under section 68 of the Finance Act, they did not cease to be incomes not already charged to income tax.\n\nAlthough the Finance Act merely I evied a fixed rate of tax in respect of all the income disclosed without allowing deductions, exemptions and such other allowances which are allowable under the Income Tax Acts, its function was no more than that of an an nu a 1 Finance Act despite the fact that it made certain alterations in regard to the filing of declaration and computation of taxable income. (414 G-H]\n\nThe nature of the declaration which was dependent on the volition of the declarant and the fact that the liability to tax the amount was contingent upon the willingness of the declaranl to disclose the amount would not make a difference because such voluntary disclosure, even in the absence of section 68,\n\nwould have exposed the assesseee lo assessment or reassessment. The voluntary E character of the declaration cannot alter the character of the tax. [415 A-BJ\n\nThe true position is that the amount declared has the liability to pay income tax embeded in it on the valuation date but only the ascertainment of that liability is postponed to a future date. (417 CJ\n\nJn the instant case its determination was allowed to be done in accordance with the provisions of section 68.\n\nEven though this section was a complete code in itself it was only a scheme which provided a method for the liquidation of an\n\nltlready existing income tax liability which was present on the relevant valuation date. [417D]\n\nNor did the absence of allocation of the amount disclosed amongst different assessment years detract the tax from being called a tax on income because such allocation would not achieve any additional purpose in the scheme of section 68.\n\nThis section is in the nature of a package deal. The net result achieved was that the declarant was treated as having discharged all his liability in respect of such income under the income tax Jaw. (415 El\n\n5. The finding of the High Court that section 68 created a fresh charge is incompatible with the foundation of the very reassessment proceedings under section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act. (415 HJ .\n\nMoreover section 68, at more than one place slated that what was payable was income tax which clearly showed that what was p; iyable under the section B was income tax. [ 412 B-C] ·\n\nC.I.T. v. Kha/au Makanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 40 LT.R. 189; Madurai District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Third I.T.O., IOI I.T.R. 24, distingu ishcd.\n\nC. K. Babu Naidu v. Wealth Tax Officer, 112 ITR 34; C.W.T. v. GirdhariLal, 99 ITR 79; C. W.T. v. BX Sharma, 110 LT.R. 902; C. W.T. v. Bansidhar Poddar,\n\n112ITR 957; D. C. Shah v. C.W.T., 117 ITR 348; Bhagwandas Jain v. Addi.\n\nC.W.T. 116 !TR 347 and Bhagwanidas Binani v. C.W.T., 124 ITR 783, approved.\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1217- 1222 of 1973.\n\nD Appeals by certificate from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n21.12.1972 of the Gujarat High Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. 2 of 1969.\n\nV. S. Desai, Shardul S. ShroJ!' and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nOn the basis of a certificate granted under section 29(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the appellant has filed these appeals against the judgment and order dated December 21, 1972 of the High Court of Gujarat in Wealth-tax Reference No. 2 of 1969.\n\nThe questions referred to the High Court under section 27 of the Act by the Incometax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench read thus:\n\n\"(I). Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the liability in respect of income-tax payable on the concealed income disclosed by the assessee pursuant to section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965 is deductible under section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in computing the net wealth of the assessee for the\n\nA.I.S. DHORAJI v. C.W.T. (Venkataramiah. J.) 405\n\nassessment years 1959-60, 1960-61, 1961-62, 1962-63, A\n\nI 963-64 and 1964-65.\n\n(2) Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the liability to pay tax on the amount disclosed under section 68 of the Finance Act J 965, arose not under that Finance Act but under section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, J 922.\"\n\nHaving regard to the assessment years in question, the second question should be read as including within its scope also the question whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the liability to pay tax on the amount disclosed under section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965 arose not under that Finance Act but under section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.\n\nThe assessee, who is the appellant in these appeals, had been assessed on the basis of his returns of net wealth and the statements filed therewith in the status of an. individual to wealth-tax under section 16(3) of the Act during the assessment years 1957-58 to, 1964-65 on various dates between January 15, 1960 and July 14 1964.\n\nSubsequently the assessee made a disclosure under section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Finance Act') of Rs. 7,00, COO which had been shown as having been covered by some hundi transactions with a concern known as M/s Abdul Razack & Co. in his books of account at the Bombay branch of his business. Alongwith the declaration the assessee filed a statement that this concealed income had been earned by him during the assessment years 1957-58 to 1964- 65.\n\nHe, however, did not allocate the total um disclosed amongst different assessment years but showed it in a'.Jump sum. The amount of income-tax was computed at 60% of the total concealed income and it was paid as contemplated under secton 68 of the Finance Act. The Wealth-tax Officer thereafter reopened the assessments of the assessee to wealth-tax for assessment years 1957-58 to 1964-65 on the ground that he had reason to believe that certain wealth of the assessee had escaped assessment during the said years and that his belief was founded on the disclosure made by the assessee under section 68 of the Finance Act.\n\nWe are concerned in these appeals only with the assessrr.ent years 1959-60 to 1964-65. On scrutiny it was found on the basis of peak cash credits in each assessment year that the amounts covered by hundies were as under :\n\n406 SUl.'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAssessment years\n\n1959-60\n\n1960-61\n\n1961-62\n\n1962-63\n\n1963-64\n\n1964-65\n\nPeak cash credits\n\nRs. 4,57,465/-\n\nRs. 5,59,823/-\n\nRs. 6,38,325/-\n\nRs. 6,82,974/-\n\nRs. 7,01,578/-\n\nRs. 7,01,578/-\n\nAs can be seen from the above statement, the assessee had substantial sums with him in the years in question which had not been disclosed earlier.\n\nSince these amounts constituted the wealth which was liable to tax on the respective valuation dates, the assessee filed returns of wealth for the above mentioned years in compliance with the notices issued to him and in the course of the assessment proceedings he claimed the deduction for incometax payable by him in respect of the sums which had been progressively earned by him from year to year and which were liable to income tax under the relevant income tax law in force during the years relying upon the decision of this Court in Kesoram Industries and Cot/on Mills Ltd v.\n\nCommissioner of Wealth-tax (Central), Calcutla.(1) The Wealth-tax Officer, however, held that since in his balance sheets the assessee had not shown the liability to pay income-tax, the deduction of the amounts claimed could not be allowed in any of the assessment years and accordingly the orders of reassessment were passed by him after disallowing the claim made by the assessee.\n\nHe, however, included the sums mentioned in the above statement in the net wealth of the respective assessment years and determined the wealth-tax payable by the assessee.\n\nThe appeals filed by the assessee against the orders of the Wealth-tax Officer before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were dismissed.\n\nOn further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate-Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the deduction claimed in respect of each assessment year was in truth and substance a liability under the Indian Income-tax Act, I 922 or the Income-tax Act, 1961, as the case may be, and not a new liability created. by the Finance Act, and, therefore, it constituted a 'debt owed' by the assessee on the respective valuation dates within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Act and that the deduction claimed should be allowed while computing the net wealth\n\n(I) 59 I.T.R. 767.--(1966] 2 SCR 688.\n\nA.l.s. DHORAJI v. C.W.T. (Venkataramiah. J.) 407\n\nof the assessee.\n\nAccordingly the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee.\n\nThereafter at the instance of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax, the Tribunal referred under section 27 of the Act the two questions mentioned above to the High Court. After hearing the parties, the High Court answered both the questions in the negative and in favour of the Revenue by its judgment dated December 21, 1972.\n\nOn a certificate granted by the High Court under section 29( l) of the Act, the assessee has come up in appeal to this Court. '\n\nThe relevant part of section 2(m) of the Act reads :\n\n\"2. (m} \"net wealth\" means the amount by which the aggregate value computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act of all the assets, wherever located belonging to the assessee on the valuation date, including assets required to be included in his net wealth as on that date under this Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the valuation date other than,,,,,, ... \"\n\nIn the se of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) this Court has held that income-tax other than that falling under clause (iii) of section 2(m} of the Act payable on the valuation date is a debt owed by the assessee and hence is deductible from the total wealth of the assessee while determining the net wealth for the purpose of levying wealth-tax.\n\nThe principal question which arises for consideration in these appeals relates to the true character of the tax. paid by the assessee in the proceedings under section 68 of the Finance Act and the applicability of the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra). Since it is contended by the assessee that the tax so paid was the tax which he was liable to pay under the relevant income-tax law in force during the assessment years in question and it is urged by tlie Department that the said payment was in discharge of a liability created for the first time by the Finance Act, it is necessary to examine the provisions of section 68 of the Finance Act in some detail, in so far as they relate to the question involved in this case. The relevant part of section 68 of the Finance Act which came into force on March I, 1965 reads :\n\n\"68. Voluntary disclosure of income -(I) Where any person makes a declaration in accordance with sub-section\n\n(2) in respect of the amount representing income-\n\n(a) which he has failed to disclose in a return of income for any assessment year filed by him before the first day of March, 1965, under the lndian'Jncome-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), or the Income-tax Act, 1961 (XLIJI of 1961 ), or\n\n(b) which has escaped assessment for any assessment year for which an assessment has been made before the 1st day of March 1965, under either of the said Acts, or\n\n(c) for the assessmen_t of which no either of the said Acts has been\n\nI st day of March, 1965,\n\nproceeding under taken before the\n\nhe shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Acts, be charged income-tax at the rat!! specified in subsection (3) in respect of the amount so declared if he,-\n\n(i) pays the amount. of income-tax as 1computed at the said rate, or\n\n(ii) furnishes adequate security for the payment thereof in accordance with sub-section (4) and undertakes to pay such income-tax within a period, not exceeding six months, from the date of the declaration as may be specified by him therein, or\n\n(iii) on or before the 31st day of May, 1965, pays such amount as is not less than one-half of the amount of income-tax as computed at the said rate or furnishes adequate security for the payment thereof in accordance with sub-section (4), and in 1 either case assigns any shares in, or debentures of, a joint stcck company or mortagages any immovable property, in favour of the President of India by way of security for the payment of the balance and undertakes to pay such balance within the\n\nperiodfreferred to in clause (ii).\n\nA.LS. DHORAJI v. C.W.T. (Venkataramiah, J.} 409\n\n(2) The declaration shall be made to the Commissioner, and shall specify the period required to be specified under clause (ii) of sub-section (I), contain the name, address and signature of the person making the declaration and also full information in respect of the following matters, namely : -\n\n(a) Whether he was assessed to income-tax or not and, if assessed, the ame of the Income-tax Circle in which he was assessed.\n\n(b) The amount of income declared, giving where avPjlable, details of the. financial year or years in w.lich the income was earned and the amount pertaining to each such year.\n\n(c} Whether the amount declared is represented by cash (including bank deposits), bullion, investments in shares, debts due from other persons, commodities, or any other assets, and the name in which it is held and location thereof :\n\nProvided that the declaration shall be of no effect unless it is made after the 28th day of February, 1965, and before the 1st day of June, 1965.\n\n(3) The rate of income-tax chargeable in respect of the amount referred to in sub-section (l) shall be sixty per cent, of such amount :\n\nProvided that if before the 1st day of April, 1965, the tax on the amount declared is paid by the declarant at the rate of fifty seven per cent, of such amount, he shall not be liable to pay any further tax on such amount.\n\n( 4) A person shall not be considered to have furnished adequate security for the payment of the tax for the purposes of sub-section (l) unless the payment is guaranteed by a scheduled bank or the person makes an assignment, in favour of the President of India, of any security of the Central or State Government.\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of this sub-section, where an assignment of Government securities is made in\n\nfavour of the President, the amount covered by such assignment shall be the market value of the securities on the date of the assignment.\n\n(5) Any amount of income-tax paid in pursuance of a declaration made under this section shall not be refundable in any circumstances, and no person who has made the declaration shall be entitled, in respect of any amount so declared or any amount of tax so paid, to reopen any assessment or reassessment made under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), or the Income-tax Act, 1961 (XLIH of 1961 ), or the Excess Profits Tax Act, 194) (XV of l 940), or the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 (XXI of 1963), or the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, l 954 (VII of 1964) or claim any set-olf or relief in any appeal, reference, revision or other proceeding in relation to any such assessment or reassessment.\n\n(6) (a)· Any amount declared by any person under this section in respect of which the tax referred to in subsection (3) is paid shall not be included in his total income for any assessment under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (SJ if he credits in the books of account, if any, mainta:ned by him for any source of income or in any other rcord, the amount declared as reduced by the tax paid thereon under this section ... \"\n\nSection 68( I) of the Finance Act provides that where any person males a declaration in accordance with section 68(2) in respect of any amount representiig income which he has failed to disclose in his return or which has escaped assessment for any assessment year for which an assessment has been made before March I,\n\n1965 under either of the two Acts namely the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the Income-tax Act, 1901 or for the assessment of which no proceeding is taken before March 1, 1965, he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Acts, be charged incometax at the rate specified in sub-section (3) thereof in respect of the amount so declared. If he pays the amount of income-tax as computed at the said rate or furnishes adequate security for the payment thereof in accordance with sub-section (4) thereof and undertakes to pay such income-tax within the period specified in the section, he would be absolved from the liability under the relevant law of iny\n\nA.LS. DHORAJI v. C.W.T. (Venkatc, nmiah, J.) 411\n\ncome-tax. The declaration should, however, be filed with the particulars mentioned in section 68(2).\n\nSection 68(3) provides that the rate of income-tax chargeable in respect of the amount referred to in the declaration shall be sixty percent of such amount provided that if the tax is paid within April l, 1965, the tax payable would be fifty seven percent. Sub-section ( 5) of section 68 of the Finance Act provides that any amount of income-tax paid in pursuance of a declaration made under that section shall not be refundable in any circumstances nor a declarant is entitled in respect of any amount declared or tax paid thereon to reopen any assessme; it or reassessment made under the Indian Income-tax Act 1922, or Income-tax Act, 1961 or any other Act mentioned therein.\n\nHe cannot also claim any set-off or relief in any appeal, reference, revision or other proceeding in relation to any such assessment or reassessment.\n\nClause (a) of sub-section (6) of section 68 grants immunity from proceedings under the Acts mentioned in section 68 (5) to the assessee by providing that any amount declared by any person under section 68, in respect of which the tax referred to in sub-section (3) thereof is paid, shall not be included in his total income for any assessment under any of the assessments made under any of the Acts mentioned in section 68(5) if he credits in the books of account, if any, maintained by him for any source of income or in any other record, the amount declared as reduced by the tax paid thereon under section 68.\n\nOn an examination of the several provisions contained in section 68 of the Finance Act it becomes clear that they had ben enacted as a part' of the measures adopted with a view to unearthing unaccounted money in possession of the members of the public on which income-tax had not been paid and also to create an incentive to such persons to make disclosure of their unaccounted incomes and to pay tax thereon at the specified rate without the liability to pay any interest thereon or penalities for non-compliance with the law of income-tax.\n\nThe declaration to be tiled by a person under section 68 is about an aniount representing his income earned in an earlier accounting period which has not been subjected to tax in the ordinary course although income-tax was payable in respect of it. If the declarant pays tax at the rate specified in sub-section (3) of section 68 he would be absolved from any further liability to tax on such income. The declaration has to be made before the Commissioner of Income-tax and it should contain full information, namely whether he was asessed to income-tax or not and if assessed, t1'e nanie of the Income-tax circle in which he was assessed, the\n\namount of income declared giving where avail able, details of the financial year or years in which the income was earned and the amount pertaining to each such year and whether the amount declared is represented by cash (including bank deposits), bullion, investment in shares, debts due from other persons, commodities or any other assets and the name in which it is held and the location thereof.\n\nSection 68 also states at more than one place that what is payable pursuant to a declararion is income-tax.\n\nSection 68 (J) contains words such as, \"he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Acts be charged income tax at the rate specified in sub-section (3)\", \"if he pays the amount of income-tax at the said rate\" a_nd \"undertakes to pay such income-tax\".\n\nSection 68(3) contains the words : \"the rate of income-tax chargeable\". Section 68(5) refers to : \"(a) any amount of income-tax paid\" and section 68(7) contains the words : \"paid the income-tax under this section\".\n\nThese words show that Parliament was of the view that what was payable under section 68 was income-tax.\n\nThe points of difference between any Finance Act, that may be passed annually fixing the rates of income tax and section 68 of\n\nthe Finance Act, however, relate to (i) the time within which and the manner in which information in regard to the income is to be furnished, (ii) the method of computation of taxable income and\n\n(iii) the rate of tax payable on such income. The declaration which is equivalent to a return to be filed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 or Income-tax Act, 1961, need not contain all the parti culars that have to be furnished in such return.\n\nThe declaration can be filed during the period mentioned in proviso to section 68(2).\n\nThere is no provision to claim various deductions, exemptions, set off etc. in respect of the income disclosed in the declaration as in the case of income shown in an ordinary return.\n\nSince the rate of tax is a uniform one and does not vary with the quantum of the income disclosed, there is no need to trace it to any specific assessment year.\n\nFurther the declaration is a voluntary one and it is not pursuant to any notice issued by the Department.\n\nThe question is whether these distinguishing features make the amount disclosed in a declaration anything different from the income of an assessee and the tax paid under section 68, anything different from a tax on income.\n\nIn other words, does section 68 impose a new charge on the income of the declarant for the first time wholly independent of the levy under section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 or section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? The High\n\n..,...-··\n\nA.LS. DHORAJl v. c.w.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 413\n\nCourt has given the following reasons for holding that the tax pid under section 68 is not tax on income payable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and Income-tax Act, 1961 : (i) the charge under the Income-tax Act is on the total income of the previous year and not on any particular item of incJme but that is not so under section 68, (ii) payment of tax under section 68 has no reference to any assessment year and unless it is correlated to an assessment year it can not be ordinary income-tax and (iii) the disclosed income is chargeable to tax without allowing usual deductions and without providing for any procedure for quantification.\n\nThe High Court proceeded to hold that section 68 enacted a new charge of tax, on an ad hoc basis, on disclosed income irrespective of the assessment year in which it was earned. The disclosure of concealed income coupled with the payment of tax as contemplated in clause (i) of sub-section (I), according to the High Court, not only created a charge of tax but also satisfied it.\n\nIn its view, the disclosure of concealed income coupled with furnishing of security and undertaking as contemplated in clause (ii) created a new charge of tax and when the undertaking was carried out by payment of tax, the liability arising from the charge of tax was satisfied.\n\nOne basic fallacy underlying the conclusion of the High Court that a new charge is being levied under section 68 appears to be the assumption that the amount in question in respect of which tax is payable under that provision was not liable to income-tax earlier.\n\nIt should be borne in mind that the declaration contemplated under section 08 is a declaration in respect of income of earlier years, which had been concealed and on which tax was payable during the relevant assessment years in the ordinary course.\n\nSection 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and section 4 of Income-tax Act, l 961 which are couched more or less in the same language state that where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, income-tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the relevant Act in respect of the total income of the previous year or previous years, as the case may be, of every person. Now it is well settled by a series of judicial decisions that the liability to income-tax arises by virtue of the charging section in the relevant Income-tax Act and it arises not later than the close:of . . the prev10us year, even though the rate of tax for the year of assessment may be fixed after the close of the previous year and the assessment has necessarily to be made after the previous year.\n\nThe quality of chargeability of any income to tax is not dependent upon the passing of the Finance Act though its quantification may be governed by the provisions of the Finance Act in respect of any assessment year vide Wallace Brothers and Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissionfr of Jncome-tax(1), Messers Challuram Hori/ram Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-lax and Ors.(2) and Kahva D1vadallom & Ors. v.\n\nThe Union of India & Ors.(3) In the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) summarized the legal position thus :-\n\n\"To summarize : A debt is a present obligation to pay an ascertainable sum of money, whether the anhmnt is payable in praesenti or in juturo: dehitum in praesenti, solvendum in ji1turo.\n\nBut a sum payable upon a contingency does not become a debt until the said contingency has happened.\n\nA liability to pay income-lax is a present liability though it becomes payable after it is quantified in accordance with ascertainable data.\n\nThere is a perfected debt at any rate on the last day of the accounting year and not a contingent liability.\n\nThe rate is always easily ascertainable. If the Finance Act is passed, it is the rate fixed by that Act; if the Finance Act has not yet been passed, it is the rate proposed in Finance Bill pending before Parliament or the rate in force in the preceding year, whichever is more favourable to the assessee.\n\nAll the ingredients of a \"debt\" are present.\n\nIt is a present liability of an ascertainable amount.\"\n\nIt is thus clear that if the assessee had brought to the notice of the Department in the usual course the existence of incomes which were later on declared under 'ection 68, they would have been taxed during the relevant assessment year.\n\nHence merely because they are disclosed in a declaration filed under section 68, they cannot cease to be incomes not already charged for income tax.\n\nIt is true that the Finance Act in question merely levied a fixed rate of tax in respect of all the income disclosed without allowing deductions, exemptions and set-off under the relevant income-tax law yet its function was no more than that of a Finance Act passed annually even though it made certain alterations with regard to filing of declaration and computation of taxable income\n\n(I) 16 l.T.R. 240. (P.C.)\n\n(2) (1955]2 S.C.R. 290 : 27 l.T.R. 709 (S.C.)\n\n(3) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 191 : 49 J.T.R. 165 (S.C.l\n\nA.I.S. DHORAJI v. C.W.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 415\n\nIt was, however, urged on behalf of the :oepartmen t that ~the nature of the declaration which was dependent upon the volition of the declarant and the fact that the liability to tax the amount mentioned therein was contingent upJn the willingness of the declarant to disclose the amount ought to make a difference.\n\nWe do not think so because any such voluntary disclosure by an assessee even in the absence 0f section 68 would have exposed him to an assessment or reassessment, as the case may be, being made in respect of the sum disclosed as part of the income of the relevant assessment year and of course with the additional liability to payment of interest and levy of penalty and perhaps with the right to claim deductions, if any, admissible in the 'circumstances of the case and the benefit of other prccedural rights. The voluntary c:1aracter of the declaration cannot, therefore, alter the character of the tax.\n\nThere is also no substance in the contention that in the absence of the allocation of the amount disclosed amongst dil'i'erent assessment years the tax payable under section 68 cannot be termed as a tax on income because snch allocation would not ac'.1ieve any additional purpose in the scheme of section 68.\n\nIrrespective of the other income which may have been determined in an ordinary proceeding under the relevant law of income-tax, a fixed rate of tax is payable under section 68(3) and hence the amount disclosed being treated as the income of any particular year would not make any difference regarding the quantum of tax.\n\nNor is there any other purpose to be served by such allocation.\n\nSection 68 is in the nature of a package deal but the net result achieved is that the declarant is treated as having discharged all his liability in respect of the said income under the income-tax law.\n\nThere is one other circumstance which may be noticed here.\n\nThe tax levied under section 68 can be only a tax on income. If we hold it otherwise it may become a tax on wealth itself.\n\nThe basis of tbe liability in this case is the admission made by the declarant that the amount declared was his income earned in previous years but concealed from the knowledge of the Department.\n\nIn these circumstances it cannot be said that the amount declared under section 68 is not income which was not taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 or the Income-tax Act, 1961, as the case may be. The finding of the High Court that section 68 created a fresh charge is incompatible with tbe foundation of the very reassessment proceedings under section 17 of the Act.\n\nThe basis of these proceedings is the information which the Wealth-tax Officer acquired\n\nfrom the declaration filed by the assessee, in this case that the assessee was in possession of unaccounted funds represented by the non-genuine hundis which had progressively reached the level of Rs. 7,01,578 during the assessment year 1964-65 from the level of Rs. 4,57,465 in 1959-60 by gradual accumulation of income.\n\nBut for this assumption, in the absence of any other material, reassessment under the Act would have been possible only in the last year in which the .disclosure was made. That, however, is not the case here.\n\nThe High~Court in support of its view has relied on the decision of the Kerala High Court, though not the reason given in support of that decision in C. K. Babu Naidu v. Wealth-tax Officer.(1} That decision has since been reversed in appeal by a Division Bench of that Court in C. K. Babu Naidu v. Wealth-tax Officer, 'A' Ward, Calicut & anr.(2) in which the Kerala High Court has held that the liability for tax arising under section 68 of the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961 itself and accordingly has allowed the dedl1ction of tax paid under section 68 as a 'debt owed' on the valuation date.\n\nIn Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Haryana, H.P. & Delhi-I/I v. Girdhari La/(3), Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. B. K. Sharma(4), Commissioner of Wealth- /ax, West Bengal-III, Calcutta v. Bansidhar Poddar,(5) D. C. Shah v.\n\nCommissioner of U'ealth-trx, Mysore(6) and Shri Bhagwandas Jain v.\n\nAddi. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, M. P.(7), the High Courts of Delhi, Allahabad, Calcutta, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh have accepted the view that the tax paid under section 68 of the Finance Act should be treated as a 'debt owed' for purposes of determining net wealth as defined in section 2(m) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay has also reached the same conclusion in Bhagwanidas Binam v. Commissioner of w, altl.-tax, Bombay City-Jll(8) but in doing so it observed that \"it appears to us that although it is not possible to say that the amount of income-tax paid under section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965 is income-tax under the charging sec-\n\n(I) 82 I.T.R. 410 (Kerala)\n\n(2) 112 l.T.R. 341 (Kerala)\n\n(3) 99 I.T.R. 79 (Delhi)\n\n(4) 110 J.T. R. 902 (All.)\n\n(5) 112 I.TR. 957 (Cal.)\n\n(6) 117 I.T.T. 348 (Karnataka)\n\n(7) J 16 l.T.R. 347 (Madhya Pradesh)\n\n(8) 124 I.T.R. 783 (Born.)\n\n...,, .• --\n\nA.I.S. DHORAJJ v. C.W.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 417\n\ntion 3 or section 4 of the LT. Acts, it must be regarded as incometax paid in lieu of such income-tax and would be entitled to the same considerations as lavished by the Supreme Court on the ordinary charge of income-tax\". The High Court of Bombay appears to take the view as the High Court of Gujarat has done in the decision under appeal that a new liability is created by section 68 but it however would not have any adverse effect on the right of the assessee to claim the deduction.\n\nWhile we approve of the conclusion reached by the High Court of Bombay, we feel that the said decision to the extent it attempts to follow the reason given by the Gujarat High Court to hold that the liability under section 68 is a fresh liability is not correct. The true position is that the amount declared has the Jiability to pay income-tax imbedded in it on the valuation date but only the ascertainment of that liability is postponed to a future date. In the instant case, its determination is allowed to be done in -accordance with the provisions of section 68. Even though it may appear to be itself a complete code, it is only a scheme which provides a method for the liquidation of an already existing income-tax liability which was present on the relevant valuation date. The view does not in any way go counter to any observations made by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City Iv.\n\nKhatau Makanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.(') In that case this Court was concerned with the validity of a charge levied by the Finance Act, 1951 in respect of dividends distributed in excess of the specified limit under clause (ii) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to that Act as applied to the assessment year 1953-54 by the Finance Act, 1953. This Court held that income-tax was a tax on income of the previous year and it would not cover some thing which was not the income of the previous year or made fictionally so and according to the scheme of that provision it was impossible to say that the additional income-tax was properly laid upon the total income because what was actually taxed was never a part of the total income of the previous year.\n\nThis decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case where what is taxed is the income which was ordinarily liable to tax but which had not been included in the return of the assesssee, or which had escaped assessment or which was still to be assessed to incometax under the relevant Income-tax Act. It was in fact a part of the total income though not assessed till the declaration was made.\n\nMerely because it is stated that the rate of tax charged on the\n\n(I) 40 I.T.R. 189 (S.C.)~[1960] 3 SCR 873.\n\namount declared is sixty per cent or fifty-seven per cent as the case may be it does not cease to be a part of the total income.\n\nThis is not a case where what was not in fact income had been converted into income by section 68.\n\nFor the same reason the Department cannot derive any support from the observations made by this Court in Madurai District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Third Incometax Officer, Madurai.( 1) We are, therefore, of the view that the assessee was entitled to claim deduction of income tax payable on the amounts added to his total wealth under section 2(m) of the Act in the course of the reassessment proceedings.\n\nIn the result these appeals are allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the questions referred to it are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.\n\nThe Department will pay the costs of the appellant-assessee, Hearing fee one set.\n\nP.B, R.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(I) 101 I.T.R. 24 (S.C.)", "total_entities": 166, "entities": [{"text": "F\n\nAHMED IBRAHIM SAHIGRA DHORAJI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AHMED IBRAHIM SAHIGRA DHORAJI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 86, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F\n\nAHMED IBRAHIM SAHIGRA DHORAJI\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n( R. 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S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6066, "end_char": 6077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, Shardul S. ShroJ!'"}}, {"text": "Shardul S. ShroJ", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6079, "end_char": 6095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, Shardul S. ShroJ!'"}}, {"text": "H. S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6102, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and H. S. Parihar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6136, "end_char": 6147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P. A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6172, "end_char": 6185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6251, "end_char": 6264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nOn the basis of a certificate granted under section 29(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the appellant has filed these appeals against the judgment and order dated December 21, 1972 of the High Court of Gujarat in Wealth-tax Reference No.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "section 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6314, "end_char": 6327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6335, "end_char": 6355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6605, "end_char": 6615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Incometax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The questions referred to the High Court under section 27 of the Act by the Incometax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench read thus:\n\n\"(I)."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6865, "end_char": 6875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6883, "end_char": 6900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6921, "end_char": 6933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1965", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7251, "end_char": 7261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7331, "end_char": 7340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7355, "end_char": 7369, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7616, "end_char": 7626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7695, "end_char": 7704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1965", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7712, "end_char": 7732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7935, "end_char": 7948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8119, "end_char": 8129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8137, "end_char": 8154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Abdul Razack & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8318, "end_char": 8336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7,00, COO which had been shown as having been covered by some hundi transactions with a concern known as M/s Abdul Razack & Co. in his books of account at the Bombay branch of his business."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8368, "end_char": 8374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7,00, COO which had been shown as having been covered by some hundi transactions with a concern known as M/s Abdul Razack & Co. in his books of account at the Bombay branch of his business."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9148, "end_char": 9158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1965", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11256, "end_char": 11270, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11285, "end_char": 11305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11497, "end_char": 11509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "(1966] 2 SCR 688", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11622, "end_char": 11638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11862, "end_char": 11872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "December 21, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12074, "end_char": 12091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After hearing the parties, the High Court answered both the questions in the negative and in favour of the Revenue by its judgment dated December 21, 1972."}}, {"text": "section 29( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12143, "end_char": 12157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12244, "end_char": 12256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12708, "end_char": 12748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "m} \"net wealth\" means the amount by which the aggregate value computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act of all the assets, wherever located belonging to the assessee on the valuation date, including assets required to be included in his net wealth as on that date under this Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the valuation date other than,,,,,, ... \"\n\nIn the se of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) this Court has held that income-tax other than that falling under clause (iii) of section 2(m} of the Act payable on the valuation date is a debt owed by the assessee and hence is deductible from the total wealth of the assessee while determining the net wealth for the purpose of levying wealth-tax."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13740, "end_char": 13750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13871, "end_char": 13881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March I, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13926, "end_char": 13939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant part of section 68 of the Finance Act which came into force on March I, 1965 reads :\n\n\"68."}}, {"text": "Jncome-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14259, "end_char": 14279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14301, "end_char": 14321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "31st day of May, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15150, "end_char": 15171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of income-tax as 1computed at the said rate, or\n\n(ii) furnishes adequate security for the payment thereof in accordance with sub-section (4) and undertakes to pay such income-tax within a period, not exceeding six months, from the date of the declaration as may be specified by him therein, or\n\n(iii) on or before the 31st day of May, 1965, pays such amount as is not less than one-half of the amount of income-tax as computed at the said rate or furnishes adequate security for the payment thereof in accordance with sub-section (4), and in 1 either case assigns any shares in, or debentures of, a joint stcck company or mortagages any immovable property, in favour of the President of India by way of security for the payment of the balance and undertakes to pay such balance within the\n\nperiodfreferred to in clause (ii)."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15519, "end_char": 15524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of income-tax as 1computed at the said rate, or\n\n(ii) furnishes adequate security for the payment thereof in accordance with sub-section (4) and undertakes to pay such income-tax within a period, not exceeding six months, from the date of the declaration as may be specified by him therein, or\n\n(iii) on or before the 31st day of May, 1965, pays such amount as is not less than one-half of the amount of income-tax as computed at the said rate or furnishes adequate security for the payment thereof in accordance with sub-section (4), and in 1 either case assigns any shares in, or debentures of, a joint stcck company or mortagages any immovable property, in favour of the President of India by way of security for the payment of the balance and undertakes to pay such balance within the\n\nperiodfreferred to in clause (ii)."}}, {"text": "28th day of February, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16625, "end_char": 16651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c} Whether the amount declared is represented by cash (including bank deposits), bullion, investments in shares, debts due from other persons, commodities, or any other assets, and the name in which it is held and location thereof :\n\nProvided that the declaration shall be of no effect unless it is made after the 28th day of February, 1965, and before the 1st day of June, 1965."}}, {"text": "1st day of June, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16668, "end_char": 16689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c} Whether the amount declared is represented by cash (including bank deposits), bullion, investments in shares, debts due from other persons, commodities, or any other assets, and the name in which it is held and location thereof :\n\nProvided that the declaration shall be of no effect unless it is made after the 28th day of February, 1965, and before the 1st day of June, 1965."}}, {"text": "1st day of April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16857, "end_char": 16879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The rate of income-tax chargeable in respect of the amount referred to in sub-section (l) shall be sixty per cent, of such amount :\n\nProvided that if before the 1st day of April, 1965, the tax on the amount declared is paid by the declarant at the rate of fifty seven per cent, of such amount, he shall not be liable to pay any further tax on such amount."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17933, "end_char": 17960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17982, "end_char": 18002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18078, "end_char": 18108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies (Profits) Surtax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18131, "end_char": 18161, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 68( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18756, "end_char": 18770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18860, "end_char": 18873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Acts namely the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19105, "end_char": 19148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19157, "end_char": 19177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 1, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19239, "end_char": 19252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) (a)· Any amount declared by any person under this section in respect of which the tax referred to in subsection (3) is paid shall not be included in his total income for any assessment under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (SJ if he credits in the books of account, if any, mainta:ned by him for any source of income or in any other rcord, the amount declared as reduced by the tax paid thereon under this section ... \"\n\nSection 68( I) of the Finance Act provides that where any person males a declaration in accordance with section 68(2) in respect of any amount representiig income which he has failed to disclose in his return or which has escaped assessment for any assessment year for which an assessment has been made before March I,\n\n1965 under either of the two Acts namely the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the Income-tax Act, 1901 or for the assessment of which no proceeding is taken before March 1, 1965, he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Acts, be charged incometax at the rate specified in sub-section (3) thereof in respect of the amount so declared."}}, {"text": "section 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19877, "end_char": 19890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1901", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "Section 68(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19893, "end_char": 19906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1901", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20170, "end_char": 20180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1901", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20483, "end_char": 20509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20514, "end_char": 20534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20756, "end_char": 20766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20828, "end_char": 20838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20917, "end_char": 20927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21135, "end_char": 21148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21324, "end_char": 21334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21394, "end_char": 21404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21926, "end_char": 21936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22199, "end_char": 22209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22925, "end_char": 22935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23034, "end_char": 23044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23299, "end_char": 23312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23371, "end_char": 23384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23437, "end_char": 23450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23537, "end_char": 23547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These words show that Parliament was of the view that what was payable under section 68 was income-tax."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23592, "end_char": 23602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23733, "end_char": 23743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "declaration which is equivalent to a return to be filed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23994, "end_char": 24087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24091, "end_char": 24111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24265, "end_char": 24278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24905, "end_char": 24915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24980, "end_char": 24990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25098, "end_char": 25107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25115, "end_char": 25142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25146, "end_char": 25155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25163, "end_char": 25183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25329, "end_char": 25339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25379, "end_char": 25406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25411, "end_char": 25431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25459, "end_char": 25473, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25584, "end_char": 25594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25622, "end_char": 25632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25942, "end_char": 25952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26667, "end_char": 26677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 08", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26897, "end_char": 26907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27080, "end_char": 27089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27097, "end_char": 27124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27129, "end_char": 27138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27142, "end_char": 27156, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27718, "end_char": 27732, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28460, "end_char": 28469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe Union of India & Ors.(3) In the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) summarized the legal position thus :-\n\n\"To summarize : A debt is a present obligation to pay an ascertainable sum of money, whether the anhmnt is payable in praesenti or in juturo: dehitum in praesenti, solvendum in ji1turo."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29787, "end_char": 29797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1964] 3 S.C.R. 191", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30333, "end_char": 30352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30403, "end_char": 30416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.)\n\n(2) (1955]2 S.C.R. 290 : 27 l.T.R. 709 (S.C.)\n\n(3) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 191 : 49 J.T.R. 165 (S.C.l\n\nA.I.S. DHORAJI v. C.W.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 415\n\nIt was, however, urged on behalf of the :oepartmen t that ~the nature of the declaration which was dependent upon the volition of the declarant and the fact that the liability to tax the amount mentioned therein was contingent upJn the willingness of the declarant to disclose the amount ought to make a difference.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30839, "end_char": 30849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31518, "end_char": 31528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31649, "end_char": 31659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31827, "end_char": 31840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32049, "end_char": 32059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32333, "end_char": 32343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32705, "end_char": 32715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32762, "end_char": 32789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32797, "end_char": 32817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32874, "end_char": 32884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32987, "end_char": 32997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33705, "end_char": 33722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High~Court in support of its view has relied on the decision of the Kerala High Court, though not the reason given in support of that decision in C. K. Babu Naidu v. Wealth-tax Officer.(1} That decision has since been reversed in appeal by a Division Bench of that Court in C. K. Babu Naidu v. Wealth-tax Officer, 'A' Ward, Calicut & anr.(2) in which the Kerala High Court has held that the liability for tax arising under section 68 of the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961 itself and accordingly has allowed the dedl1ction of tax paid under section 68 as a 'debt owed' on the valuation date."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34060, "end_char": 34070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34078, "end_char": 34157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34226, "end_char": 34236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "High Courts of Delhi, Allahabad, Calcutta,", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34612, "end_char": 34654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Wealth-tax, M. P.(7), the High Courts of Delhi, Allahabad, Calcutta, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh have accepted the view that the tax paid under section 68 of the Finance Act should be treated as a 'debt owed' for purposes of determining net wealth as defined in section 2(m) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34731, "end_char": 34741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34849, "end_char": 34861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34879, "end_char": 34899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay has also reached the same conclusion in Bhagwanidas Binam v. Commissioner of w, altl.-tax, Bombay City-Jll(8) but in doing so it observed that \"it appears to us that although it is not possible to say that the amount of income-tax paid under section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965 is income-tax under the charging sec-\n\n(I) 82 I.T.R. 410 (Kerala)\n\n(2) 112 l.T.R. 341 (Kerala)\n\n(3) 99 I.T.R. 79 (Delhi)\n\n(4) 110 J.T. R. 902 (All.)"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35142, "end_char": 35152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Finance Act was nothing other than the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35160, "end_char": 35177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35525, "end_char": 35534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1965", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35685, "end_char": 35698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acts, it must be regarded as incometax paid in lieu of such income-tax and would be entitled to the same considerations as lavished by the Supreme Court on the ordinary charge of income-tax\"."}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35795, "end_char": 35816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay appears to take the view as the High Court of Gujarat has done in the decision under appeal that a new liability is created by section 68 but it however would not have any adverse effect on the right of the assessee to claim the deduction."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35890, "end_char": 35900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1965", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36167, "end_char": 36185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While we approve of the conclusion reached by the High Court of Bombay, we feel that the said decision to the extent it attempts to follow the reason given by the Gujarat High Court to hold that the liability under section 68 is a fresh liability is not correct."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36219, "end_char": 36229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36561, "end_char": 36571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36897, "end_char": 36908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view does not in any way go counter to any observations made by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City Iv."}}, {"text": "Khatau Makanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36914, "end_char": 36958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khatau Makanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.(') In that case this Court was concerned with the validity of a charge levied by the Finance Act, 1951 in respect of dividends distributed in excess of the specified limit under clause (ii) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to that Act as applied to the assessment year 1953-54 by the Finance Act, 1953."}}, {"text": "that case this Court was concerned with the validity of a charge levied by the Finance Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36965, "end_char": 37061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37167, "end_char": 37222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37272, "end_char": 37289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37995, "end_char": 38009, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 SCR 873", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38195, "end_char": 38211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38431, "end_char": 38441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38788, "end_char": 38800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_419_434_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, AMRITSAR\n\nSURESH SETH\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n[ R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nWealth Tax Act, 1957-Scope of section 18(1) (a) of the Act-Whether the offenre relating to the omission to file the Wealth Tax Returns was a continuing offence--Penalty has to be computed in accordance with the law in force on the last day on which the return in question has to be filed-The 1964 and 1969 Amendments to the Wealth Tax Act has no retrospective effect.\n\nThe assessee-respondent filed his Wealth Tax returns for the assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66 on March 18, 1971, while he was required by section 14(1) of the Act to file the return for the assessment year 1964-65 on or before June 30, 1964 and the return for the assessment year 1965-66 on or before June\n\n30, 1965. The Wealth Tax Officer completed the assessment for the said years on March 22, 1971 and also commenced proceedings for levying penalty under section 18(1) (a) of the Act for the late submission of returns. The Wealth Tax Officer levied the penalties for different periods at different rates, as provided by the 1964 and 1969 Amendments, treating the failure to file the return in time as a \"continuing offence\"_ The orders levying penalties were upheld in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, Amritsar. A consolioated reference made by the Tribunal at theinstance of the assessee was answered by the High Court of Punjab in favour of the assessee after rejecting the contention of the department that the default or failure to file the return in time was a continuing default and that the penalty had to be computed for the period prior to April I, 1965 in accordance with section 18 as it stood prior to its amendment by the Wealtli-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964, for the period between April 1, 1965 to March 31, 1969 in accordance with section 18 of the Act as amended by the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 and for the period between April I, 1969 to March 18, 1971 (on which date the returns were filed) in accordance with section 18 of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the Department has filed these appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nDismissing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD 1:1. Where the default complained of is one falling under section 18(1) (a) of the Wealth Tax At, the penalty has to be computed in accordance\n\nwith the law in force on the last day on which the return in question had to be H filed. Neither the amedment made in 1964 nor the amendment made in 1969 has retrospective effect. [ 434 C-D)\n\n1 :2. Section 18 of the Wealth Tax Act does not require the assessee to file a return during every month after the last day to file it is over. Non-performance of any of the acts mentioned in section 18(1) (a) of the Act gives rise to a single default and to a single penalty, the measure of which, however, is geared up to the time lag between the last date on which the return has to be filed and the\n\ndak on which it is filed.\n\nThe default, if any committed is committed-on the last date allowed to fil~ the return. The default cannot be one committed every month thereafter. [433 G-H, 434 A]\n\nl :3. The words \"for every month during which tt>e default continued\" indicate only the multiplier to be adopted in determining the quantum of penalty and do not have the effect of making the default in question a continuing one. Nor do they make the amended provisions modifying the penalty applicable to earlier defaults in the absence of necessary provisions in the amending Acts; The principle underlying section 6 of the General Clauses Act is clearly applicable to these cases. [ 434 B-C]\n\n2:1. A liability in law ordinarily arises out of an act of commission or an act of omission. When a person does an act which Jaw prohibits him from doing it and attaches a penalty for doing it, he is stated to have committed an act of commission which amounts to a wrong in the eye of Jaw. Similarly when a person omits to do an act which is required by law to be performed by him and attaches a penalty for such omission, he is said to have committed an act of omission which is also a wrong in the eye of law. Ordinarily a wrongful act or failure to perform an act required by law to be done becomes a completed act of commission or of omission, as the case may be, as soon as the wrongful act is committed in the former case and when the time prescribed by law to perform an act expires in the latter case and the liability arising thereform gets fastened as soon as the act of commission or of omission is completed. The extent of that liability is ordinarily measured according to the law in force at the time of such completion. In the case of acts amounting to crimes the punishment to be imposed cannot be enhanced at all under our Constitution by any subsequent legislation by reason of Article 20(1) of the Constitution which declares that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the comission of the offence. In other cases, however, even though the liability may be enhanced it can only be a subsequent law (of course subject to the Constitution) which either by express words or by necessary implication provides for such enhancement. (429 G-H, 430 A-DJ\n\n2:2. The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrongdoer continuously liable for penalty. A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default. [ 430 D-E]\n\n2:3. The court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature. In the instant case whenever the question of levying penalty arises what has to be first considered is whether the assessee has failed without reasonable cause to file the return as required by law and if it is held that he has failed to do so then penalty has to be levied in accordance with the measure provided in the Act. When the default is the filing of a delayed return the penalty may be correlated to the time lag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed and the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the ; case for purposes of determining the quantum of penalty but the default however is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not a continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day. [430 E-Hl\n\n2:4. Where the wrong complained of is the omission to perform a positive duty requiring a person to do a certain a; t the test to determine whether such a wrong is a continuing one is whether the duty in question is one which requires him to continue to do that act. Breach of a covenant to keep the premises in good repair, breach of a continuing guarante~, obstruction to a right of way, obstruction to the right of a person to the unobstructed flow of water, refusal by a man to maintain his wife and children whom he is bound to maintain under law and the carrying on of mining operations or the running of a factory without complying with the masures intended for the safety and well-being of workmen may be illustrations of continuing breaches or wrongs giving rise to civil or criminal liability, as the case may be, de die in diem. [433 A-D]\n\nHole v. Chard Union, [1894] l Ch. D. 293, quoted with approval.\n\nState v. A. Bhiwandiwalla, A. I. R. 1955 Born. 161 ; The State v. Kunja Behari Chandra and Ors. A. I. R. 1954 Patna 37 J, approved,\n\nBalkrishna Sava/ram Pujari and Ors. v. Shree D:iyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and Ors,, [1959] Supp. 2 S; C.R. 476, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos; 768-769 of 1978.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 28.1.1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Income Tax F Reference No. 29 of 1975.\n\nB. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nG. C. Sharma, E. D. Helms, R. S. Sh[lrma and K. B. Rohtagi for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar has filed the above appeals by special leave against the H ljudgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in a reference made under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter\n\nA referred to as 'the Act') answering in favour of the assessee the following two questions :\n\n\"I. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the offence relating to the omission to file the Wealth- B tax returns was a continuing offence ?\n\n2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law upholding the penalties of Rs. 5382/- and Rs. 7759/- levied by the department on the assessee under section 18(l)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act, C 1957, for the assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66 respectively ?\"\n\nThe assessee, the respondent in these appeals filed his wealthtax returns for the assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66 on March 18, 1971 while he was required by section 14(1) of the Act to file the D return for the assessment year 1964-65 on or before June 30, 1964 and the return for the assessment year 1965-66 on or before June 30,\n\n1965. The Wealth-tax Officer completed the assessments for the aforementioned years on March 22, 1971 determining the total wealth at Rs. 1,45,800/- for the assessment year 1964-65 as against the declared wealth of Rs. 1,38,550/- and at Rs. 1,65,200/- for the assessment E year 1965-66 as against the declared wealth of Rs. l ,59,127/- and also commenced proceedings for the levying penalty under section 18(1)(a) of the Act for late submission of returns.\n\nUltimately the penalties were levied as follows :\n\n\"Assessment year 1964-65 :\n\n(i) For the period from 1.7.64 to 31.3.69:\n\nPenalty at 2% p.m. subject to maximum of 50% of the wealth-tax payable under section 18(1)(a) before its amendments on 1.4.69 by the Finance Act, 1969: Rs. 115/-\n\n(ii) For the period from 1.4.69 to 18.3:71 Penalty at l /2 % of the net wealth for each month of the default under section l 8(l)(a} as amended by the Finance Act, 1969 : Rs. 5,267/-\n\nRs. 5,382/-\n\nAssessment year 1965-66 :\n\n(i) For the period from I. 7.65 to 30.3.69\n\nPenalty at 2% p.m. subject to maximum of 50% of the wealth-tax payable under section 18 (I )(a) before its amendment on\n\nJ.4.69 by the Finance Act, 1969 : Rs. 163/- B\n\n(ii) For the period from 1.4.69 to 18.3.71 Penalty at I /2% of the net wealth for each month of default under section 8(1 )(a) as amended on 1.4.69 by the Finance Act, 1969: Rs. 7,596/-\n\nRs. 7,759/-\n\nThe above orders levying penalties were upheld in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner an.d the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, Amritsar. At the instance of the assessee a consolidated reference was made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court referring the above two questions for its opinion. The High Court answered the said questions in favour of the assessee after rejecting the contention of the department that the default or failure to file the return in time was a continuing default and that the penalty had to be computed for the period prior to April l, 1965 in accordance with section 18 as it stood prior to its amendment by the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964, for the period between April I, 1965 to March 31, I 969 in accordance with section 18 of the Act as amended by the Wealth-tax <Amendment) Act, 1964 and for the period between Aprill, 1969 to March J8, 1971 (on which date the returns were filed) in accordance with sec. 18 of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1966. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the Department has filed these appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution. .\n\nBefore dealing with the contentions of the parties, it is appro- G priate to set out the provisions of the Act which have a bearing on the question involved in the present appeals as they stood during the relevant periods :\n\nPrior to April 1, 1965, sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 14 . ff of the Act stood as follows :-\n\n\"14. Return of wealth-(1) Every person whose net wealth on the valuation date was of such amount as to render him liable to wealth-tax under this Act shall, before the thirtieth day of June of the corresponding assessment year, furnish to the Wealth-tax Officer a return in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner setting forth his net wealth as on the valuation date;\n\n(2) ................. .\n\n(3) The Wealth-tax Officer may, if he is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, extend the date for the delivery of return under this section.\"\n\nAfur April I, 1965:\n\n\"14. (l) Every person, if his net wealth or the net wealth of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act on the valuation date was of such an amount as to render him liable to wealth-tax under this Act, shall, before the thirtieth day of June of the corresponding assessment year, furnish to the Wealth-tax Officer a return in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner setting forth the net wealth as on the valuation date.\n\n(2) ............. ..\n\n(3) The Wealth-tax Officer may, if he is rntisfied that it is necessary so to do, extend the date for the delivery of the return under this section .. \" ' ,, r\n\nSection 15 of the Act which has not undergone any change since the commencement of the Act reads :\n\n\"15. Return after due date and amendment of return- If any person has not furnished a return within the time allowed under section 14 or having furnished a return under that section discovers any omission or a wrong statement therein, he may furnish a return or a revised return, as the case may be, at any time before the assessment is made.\"\n\nThe relevant parts of section 18 of the Act as they stood\n\ndurig the three periods referred to above read as follows :-\n\nPrior to April 1, 1965\n\n\"18. (I) If the Wealth-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person-\n\n(a) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return of his net wealth which he is required to furnish under sub-section (I) or sub-section. (2) of section 14 or section 17 or has without reasonable cause failed to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner required; or\n\n(b)\n\n(c)\n\nhe or it may, by order in writing, direct that such person D shall pay by way of penalty-\n\n(i) in the case referred to in clause (a), in addition to the amount of wealth-tax payable by him, a sum not exceeding one and a half times the amount of such tax, and ......... \"\n\nBetween April 1, 1965 and March 31, 1969\n\n\"18. (I) If the Wealth-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person-\n\n(a) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return of his net wealth which he is required to furnish under sub-section (a) of section 14 or by notice given under sub-section (2) of section 14 or section 17 or has without reasonable cause failed to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner required by sub-section (!) of section 14 or by such notice, as the case may be; or\n\n(b) ................. .\n\n(c) ................ ..\n\nhe or it may, by order in writing, direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty-\n\n(i) in the cases referred to in clause (a), in addition to the amount of wealth-tar, if any, payable by him, a sum equal to two per cent of the tax for every month during which the default continued, but not exceeding in the aggregate fifty per cent of the tax; ........ .\n\nAfier April 1, 1969 and as on March 18, 1971 on whilh date the returns were flied.\n\n\"18. (I) If the Wealth-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person-\n\n(a) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return which he is required to furnish under sub-section (I) of section 14 or by notice given under sub-section\n\n(2) of section 14 or section 17, or has without reasonable cause failed to furnish within the time allowed and in the manner required by sub-section (I) of section 14 or by such notice, as the case may be; or\n\n(b)\n\n(c) .................... .\n\nhe or it may, by order in writing, direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty-\n\n(i) in the cases referred to in clause (a), in addition to the amount of wealth-tax, if any, payable by him, a sum, for every month during which the default continued, equal to one-half per cent of-\n\n(A) the net wealth assessed under section 16, as reduced by the amount of net wealth on which in accordance with the rates of wealth tax specified in Paragraph A of Part I of the Schedule or Part II of the Schedule, the wealth-tax chargeable is nill; or\n\n(B) the net wealth assessed under section 17, where assess\n\nment has been made under that section, as reduced by-\n\n(I) the net wealth, if any, assessed previously under sec- A tion 16 or section 17 or\n\n(2) the amount of net wealth on which in accordance with the rates of wealth-tax specified in Paragraph A of Part I of the Schedule or Part II of the Schedule, the wealthtax chargeable is nil,\n\nwhichever is greater, but not exceeding, in the aggregate, an amount equal to the net wealth assessed under section 16, or, as the case may be, the net wealth assessed under section 17, as reduced in either case in the manner aforesaid; ............ \"\n\nNow let us analyse the above provisions of law.\n\nSection 14 of the Act which has not undergone any material change from the commencement of the Act in so far as the question involved in these appeals is concerned requires a person the value of whose wealth is such as would attract the liability to pay tax to file a return of his wealth as on the valuation date in the prescribed manner before the Wealth-tax Officer on or before the thirtieth of June of the assessment year or on or before any date upto which the Wealth-tax Officer has extended the time to file the return.\n\nSection i 5 of the Act, however, enables such a person to file a return at any time before the assessment is made. The distinction between section 14 and section 15 of the Act lies in the fact that whereas under section 14 a duty is imposed on the assessee to file a return within the prescribed date, section 15 enables him to file a return before the assessment is made even though the last date prescribed by section 14(1) is over.\n\nSection 18 of the Act deals with three types of penalties for certain specified acts or omissions on the part of the assessee referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (I) thereof.\n\nWe are concerned in this case with the question of levy of penalty in respect of omissions referred to in clause (a) of section 18(1) of the Act. There are four kinds of omissions referred to in that clause-(i) failure to furnish the return which the assessee is required to furnish under sub-section (i) of section 14; (ii) failure to furnish the return as required by a notice issued under section 14(2) or section 17, (iii) failure to furnish the return as required by section 14(1) within the time allowed and in the prescribed manner and (iv) failure to furnish the return as required by a notice issued under section 14(2) or section 17 within the time allowed and in the prescribed manner.\n\nEach one of these omissions expose the assessee to the \\evy of penalty unless reasonable cause is shown for not performing\n\nthe duty. In clause (i) of section 18(1) of the Act, the penalty leviable for any of the omissions referred to in section 18(l)(a) is set out but the measure of penalty imposable has varied from time to time. Prior to April 1, 1965 the penalty imposable was a sum\n\n~'iTot exceeding one and a half times the amount of wealth tax payable by the assessee during the assessment year in question.\n\nWithin the outer limit referred to above, the officer concerned or the Tribunal as the case may be could impose any amount as penalty having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case including perhaps the time that had elapsed from the last day allowed to file the return.\n\nBetween April J, 1965 and March 31, 1969 the measure of penalty was regulated by section J 8 of the Act as amended in 1964. During that period the penalty imposable was a sum equivalent to two per cent of the tax for every month during which the default continued but not exceeding in the aggregate fifty per cent of the tax. The penalty leviable during this period was less onerous than it was before April l, 1965. Then came the amendment made by the Finance Act of 1969.\n\nAfter April l, 1969 by_ reason of the amendment introduced by the Finance Act of 1969 the penalty imposable was altered to a sum for every month during which the default continued equal to.one-half per cent of the net wealth calculated in accordance with the amended provisions in section 18. The penalty leviable during this period was more drastic than what it was before.\n\nOne significant difference between the law as it existed prior to April I, 1965 and the law as it existed during the subsequent l\\yo periods is that whereas during the period prior to April I, 1965 there was no specific reference in clause (i) of section 18 (a) to the time lag between the last date on which the return had to be filed and the date on which it was actually filed, the said factor was expressly required to be taken into consideration after April I, 1965 while determining the penalty payable by the assessee.\n\nAnother ii.gnificant factor which requires to be borne in mind is that neither the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 nor the Finance Act, 1969 by which section 18 of the Act was amended expressly stated that the amended provisions of section 18 would be applicable to an assessee who had failed to file the return in respect of any preceding assessment year and the said default had continued after the amendment came into force except using the phrase \"for every month during which the default continued\", in that part of section 18 which prescribed the measure of penalty.\n\nThe contention of the Department is that whatever may have been the position of law before April I, 1965, on and after that date\n\nthe default committed by an assessee in not filing a return as required by section 14(1) of the Act amounted to a continuing wrong which attracted the penalty as provided by the law in force at the time when such default continued. In other words it is contended that in this case since the assessee who had to file a return after April I,\n\n1965 for assessment year 1965-66 had not filed the same till March 13, 1971 penalty had to be computed for the period upto April 1, 1969 under the provisions of section 18 of the Act as it stood during that period and for the subsequent period additional penalty should be levied in accordance with section 18 as amended by the Finance Act, 1969.\n\nRelying upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Kera/a v. Smt. V. Pathummabi(') it is argued that amendments made in 1964 and 1969 brought about a qualitative change in the nature of the default contemplated under section 18 and that what could have been a completed default before Aprill, 1965 became a continuing default. Even assuming that this argument is correct it has to be held that the decision of the High Court in so far as the default committed by the assessee in not filing the return in respect of the assessment year 1964-65 is concerned is not erroneous. What remains to be considered is whether the decision in respect of the default committed by the assessee in not filing the return due on June 30, 1965 for the assessment year 1965-66 is liable to be interfered with.\n\nTo repeat, the relevant part of section 18 of the Act can be divided into two parts-the first part contained in clause (a) of section 18(1) setting out the gist of the default and the second part prescribing the measure of penalty. The former part has more or less remained the same from the commencement of the Act and it is only the latter part which has undergone changes.\n\nThe question is whether by reason of the changes in the latter part, there has been a change in the nature of the wrong referred to in section 18 (I) (a)•· of the Act.\n\nA liability in law ordinarily arises out of an act of commission or an act of omission. When a person does an act which Jaw pro hi bits him from doing it and attaches a penalty for doing it, he is stated to have committed an act of commission which amounts to a wrong in the eye of law.\n\nSimilarly when a person omits to do an act which is required by law to be performed by him and attaches a penalty for such omission, he is said to have\n\n(I) 108 J.T.R. 689.\n\ncommitted an act of omission which is also a wrong in the eye of law.\n\nOrdinarily a wrongful act or failure to perform an act required by law to be done becomes a completed act of commission or omission, as the case may be, as soon as the wrongful act is committed in the former case and when the time prescribed by law to perform an act expires in the latter case and the liability arising therefrom gets fastened as soon as the act of commission or of omission is completed. The extent of that liability is ordinarily measured according to the Jaw in force at the time of such completion. In the case of acts amounting to crimes the punishment to be imposed cannot be enhanced at all under our Constitution by any subsequent legislation by reason of Article 20 (I) of the Constitution which declares that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.\n\nIn other cases, however, even though the liability may be enhanced it can only be done by a subsequent Jaw (of course subject to the Constitution) which either by express words or by necessary implication provides for such enhancement. In the instant case the contention is that the wrong or the default in question has been altered into a continuing wrong or default giving rise to a liability de die in diem, that is, from day to day. The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrong doer continuously liable for penalty.\n\nA wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default.\n\nIt is reasonable to take the view that the court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature. In the instant case whenever the question of levying penalty arises what has to be first considered is whether the assessee has jailed without reasonable cause to file the return as required by law and if it is held that he has failed to do so then penalty has to be levied in accordance with the measure provided in the Act.\n\nWhen the default is the filing of a delayed return the penalty may be correlated to the time Jag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed aPd the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the case for purposes of determining the quantum of penalty but the default however is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not a continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day.\n\nExplaining the expression\n\n\"···\n\n'a continuing cause of action' Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union(1) A observed :\n\n\"What is a continuing cause of action ? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought.\"\n\nIn the same decision, Lord Justice A. L. Smith who concurred with the above view said :\n\n\"If once a cause of action arises, and the acts complained of are continuously repeated, the cause of action continues and goes on de die in diem. It seems to me that there was a connection in the present case between the series of acts before and after the action was brought; they were repeated in succession, and became a continuing cause of action.\n\nThey were an assertion of the same claim-namely, a claim to continue to pour sewage into the stream-and a continuance of the same alleged right. In my opinion, there was here a continuing cause of action within the meaning of the rule.\"\n\nThe distinction between a continuing offence and an offence which is not a continuing one is well brought out in the decision of the High Court of Bombay in State v. A. H. Bhiwandiwalla('). In that case,' the accused-respondent had been charged with two offences namely, (a) failure to apply for registration of his factory and to give notice of occupation and (b) running the factory without a licence issued under the Factories Act, 1948. The accused had a plea of limitation against the prosecution.\n\nIn that context the High Court observed : ·\n\n\"In civil law, we often refer to a continuing or recurring cause of action.\n\nSimilarly, even in criminal law the expression \"continuing offence\"is frequently used. As observed by Beaumount C. J. in-'Emperor v. Chhotalal Amarchand', AIR 1937 Born 1 (FB) the expression \"continuing offence\" is not a very happy expression. It assumes, says the learned Chief Justice-\n\n(!) [1894] 1 Ch.D. 293.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1955 Born. 161.\n\n\" ...... that you can have a continuing offence in the sense in which you can have a continuing tort, or a continuing breach of contract, and I doubt, myself whether the assumption is well founded, having regard to the provisions of the_ Criminal Procedure Code as to the framing of charges and as to the charges which can be tried at one and the same trial.\n\nIt is quite clear that you could not charge a man with committing an offence 'de die in diem' over a substantial period.\"\n\nEven so, this expression has acquired a well-recognised meaning in criminal law. If an act committed by an accused person constitutes an offence and if that act continues from day to day, then from day to day a fresh offence is committed by the accused so long as the act continues.\n\nNormally and in the ordinary course an offence is committed only once. But we may have offences which can be committed from day to day and it is offences falling in this latter category that are described as continuing offences.\"\n\nAccordingly the High Court of Bombay held in Bhiwandiwa/la' s case (supra) that the failure to apply for registration of the factory under the Factories Act and to give notice of occupation thereof was not a continuing offence but the running of the factory without a licence issued thereunder was a continuing offence.\n\nSection 39 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923 which came up for consideration before the Patna High Court in The State v. Kunja Behari Chandra & Ors.(1) on which reliance was placed by the Revenue is a case of continuing offence.\n\nSection 39 provided :\n\n\"39. Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act or of any regulation, rule or bye-law or of any order made thereunder for the contravention of which no penalty is hereinafter provided shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and in the case of a continuing contravention, with a further fine which may extend to one hundred rupees for every day on which the offender is proved to have persisted in the contravention after the date of the first conviction.\"\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1954 Patna 371.\n\n, -\n\nIn this case the 111nguage of the section itself made it obvious A tllat its violation resulted in a continuing offence.\n\nThe true principle appears to be that where the wrong complained of is the omission to perform a positive duty requiring a person to do a certain act the test to determine whether such a wrong is a continuing one is whether the duty in question is one which requires him to continue to do that act.\n\nBreacl1 of a covenant to keep the permises in good repair, breach of a continuing guarantee, obstruction to a right of the way, obstruction to the right of a person to the unobstructed flow of water, refusal by a man to maintain his wife and children whom he is bound to maintain under law and the carrying on of mining operations or the running of a factory without complying with the measures intended for the safety and well-being of workmen may be illustrations of continuing breaches or wrongs giving rise to civil or criminal liability. as the case my be, de die in diem.\n\nIn Balkrishna Sava/arm Pujari & Ors. v. Shree Dayaneshwar Mcharrj Sansth::m & Ors.(1) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed\n\n\"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the clamage resulting from the act may continue.\n\nIf, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continue, then the act constitntes a continuing wrong.\n\nIn this connection it is necessery to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described at the effect of the said injury.\"\n\nSection 18 of the Act with which we are concerned in this case, however, does not require the assessee to file a return during every month after the last day to file it is over.\n\nNon-performance of any of the acts mentioned in section 18(J)(a) of Act gives rise to a single default and to a single penalty, the measure of which,\n\n(l) (1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 476.\n\nA however, is geared up to the time lag between the last date on which the return has to be filed and the date on which it is filed.\n\nThe default, if any committed is committed on the last date allowed to file the return.\n\nThe default cannot be one committed every month\n\nthereafter. The words 'for every month during which the default continued' indicate only the multiplier to be adopted in determining the quantum of penalty and do not have the effect of making the default in question a continuing one.\n\nNor do they make the amended provisions modifying the penalty applicable to earlier defaults in the absence of necessary provisions in the amending Acts.\n\nThe principle underlying section 6 of the General Clauses Act is clearly applicable to these cases.\n\nIt may be stated here that the majority of the High Courts in India have also taken the same view.\n\nIn the result we hold that where the default complained of is one falling under section 18(1 )(a) of the Act, the penalty has to be computed in accordance with the law in force on the last day on which the return in question had to be filed. Neither the amendment made in 1964 nor the amendment made in 1969 has retrospective effect.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nHearing fee one set.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n~·", "total_entities": 132, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, AMRITSAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, AMRITSAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SURESH SETH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURESH SETH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, AMRITSAR\n\nSURESH SETH\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n[ R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Amendments to the Wealth Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 416, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendments to the Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Amendments to the Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "March 22, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 870, "end_char": 884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Wealth Tax Officer completed the assessment for the said years on March 22, 1971 and also commenced proceedings for levying penalty under section 18(1) (a) of the Act for the late submission of returns."}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 942, "end_char": 955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendments to the Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Amendments to the Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1312, "end_char": 1367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Wealth Tax Officer levied the penalties for different periods at different rates, as provided by the 1964 and 1969 Amendments, treating the failure to file the return in time as a \"continuing offence\"_ The orders levying penalties were upheld in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, Amritsar."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1466, "end_char": 1486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A consolioated reference made by the Tribunal at theinstance of the assessee was answered by the High Court of Punjab in favour of the assessee after rejecting the contention of the department that the default or failure to file the return in time was a continuing default and that the penalty had to be computed for the period prior to April I, 1965 in accordance with section 18 as it stood prior to its amendment by the Wealtli-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964, for the period between April 1, 1965 to March 31, 1969 in accordance with section 18 of the Act as amended by the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 and for the period between April I, 1969 to March 18, 1971 (on which date the returns were filed) in accordance with section 18 of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1739, "end_char": 1749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1901, "end_char": 1911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2091, "end_char": 2101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2842, "end_char": 2855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3656, "end_char": 3665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3692, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4939, "end_char": 4952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8167, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8188, "end_char": 8201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G. C. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8222, "end_char": 8234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Sharma, E. D. Helms, R. S. Sh[lrma and K. B. Rohtagi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "E. D. Helms", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8236, "end_char": 8247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Sharma, E. D. Helms, R. S. Sh[lrma and K. B. Rohtagi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sh[lrma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8249, "end_char": 8262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Sharma, E. D. Helms, R. S. Sh[lrma and K. B. Rohtagi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. B. Rohtagi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8267, "end_char": 8280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Sharma, E. D. Helms, R. S. Sh[lrma and K. B. Rohtagi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8346, "end_char": 8359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar has filed the above appeals by special leave against the H ljudgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in a reference made under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter\n\nA referred to as 'the Act') answering in favour of the assessee the following two questions :\n\n\"I. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the offence relating to the omission to file the Wealth- B tax returns was a continuing offence ?"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8481, "end_char": 8513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar has filed the above appeals by special leave against the H ljudgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in a reference made under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter\n\nA referred to as 'the Act') answering in favour of the assessee the following two questions :\n\n\"I. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the offence relating to the omission to file the Wealth- B tax returns was a continuing offence ?"}}, {"text": "section 27(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8540, "end_char": 8553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8561, "end_char": 8581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 18(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9093, "end_char": 9109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Wealth-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9117, "end_char": 9131, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9365, "end_char": 9378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth-tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 18(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9937, "end_char": 9953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10198, "end_char": 10214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10254, "end_char": 10271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10435, "end_char": 10452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10629, "end_char": 10639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10687, "end_char": 10704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10830, "end_char": 10846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10875, "end_char": 10892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11550, "end_char": 11560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11712, "end_char": 11722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11901, "end_char": 11908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11916, "end_char": 11955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12047, "end_char": 12058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1966", "statute": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12317, "end_char": 12330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before dealing with the contentions of the parties, it is appro- G priate to set out the provisions of the Act which have a bearing on the question involved in the present appeals as they stood during the relevant periods :\n\nPrior to April 1, 1965, sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 14 ."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12360, "end_char": 12370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1966", "statute": "the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13639, "end_char": 13649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13862, "end_char": 13872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14106, "end_char": 14116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14299, "end_char": 14381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14570, "end_char": 14580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act", "statute": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14584, "end_char": 14594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner 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("}}, {"text": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15098, "end_char": 15180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15349, "end_char": 15359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act", "statute": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15404, "end_char": 15414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act", "statute": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15418, "end_char": 15428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner 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"statute": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16614, "end_char": 16624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act", "statute": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17024, "end_char": 17034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act", "statute": "Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under this Act"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17279, "end_char": 17289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17432, "end_char": 17442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17749, "end_char": 17759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17815, "end_char": 17825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17943, "end_char": 17953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18611, "end_char": 18621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18626, "end_char": 18636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18684, "end_char": 18694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18774, "end_char": 18784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18884, "end_char": 18897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18908, "end_char": 18918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19223, "end_char": 19236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19411, "end_char": 19421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19495, "end_char": 19508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19512, "end_char": 19522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19575, "end_char": 19588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19718, "end_char": 19731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19735, "end_char": 19745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19952, "end_char": 19965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20039, "end_char": 20055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April l, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21005, "end_char": 21018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The penalty leviable during this period was less onerous than it was before April l, 1965."}}, {"text": "Then came the amendment made by the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21020, "end_char": 21067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April l, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21084, "end_char": 21097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After April l, 1969 by_ reason of the amendment introduced by the Finance Act of 1969 the penalty imposable was altered to a sum for every month during which the default continued equal to.one-half per cent of the net wealth calculated in accordance with the amended provisions in section 18."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21359, "end_char": 21369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the amendment made by the Finance Act", "statute": "Then came the amendment made by the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21701, "end_char": 21711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the amendment made by the Finance Act", "statute": "Then came the amendment made by the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22105, "end_char": 22122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22132, "end_char": 22142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22214, "end_char": 22224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22503, "end_char": 22513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22761, "end_char": 22774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "March 13, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23088, "end_char": 23102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words it is contended that in this case since the assessee who had to file a return after April I,\n\n1965 for assessment year 1965-66 had not filed the same till March 13, 1971 penalty had to be computed for the period upto April 1, 1969 under the provisions of section 18 of the Act as it stood during that period and for the subsequent period additional penalty should be levied in accordance with section 18 as amended by the Finance Act, 1969."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23188, "end_char": 23198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23326, "end_char": 23336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23355, "end_char": 23372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23408, "end_char": 23425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Kera/a v. Smt."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23623, "end_char": 23633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "June 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24118, "end_char": 24131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What remains to be considered is whether the decision in respect of the default committed by the assessee in not filing the return due on June 30, 1965 for the assessment year 1965-66 is liable to be interfered with."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24230, "end_char": 24240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24324, "end_char": 24337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1969", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1969"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24710, "end_char": 24720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25958, "end_char": 25968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28065, "end_char": 28072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Explaining the expression\n\n\"···\n\n'a continuing cause of action' Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union(1) A observed :\n\n\"What is a continuing cause of action ?"}}, {"text": "A. L. Smith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28417, "end_char": 28428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same decision, Lord Justice A. L. Smith who concurred with the above view said :\n\n\"If once a cause of action arises, and the acts complained of are continuously repeated, the cause of action continues and goes on de die in diem."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29196, "end_char": 29216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The distinction between a continuing offence and an offence which is not a continuing one is well brought out in the decision of the High Court of Bombay in State v. A. H. Bhiwandiwalla(')."}}, {"text": "Factories Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29483, "end_char": 29502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Beaumount", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29791, "end_char": 29800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Beaumount C. J. in-'Emperor v. Chhotalal Amarchand', AIR 1937 Born 1 (FB) the expression \"continuing offence\" is not a very happy expression."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30269, "end_char": 30292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhiwandiwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31074, "end_char": 31084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the High Court of Bombay held in Bhiwandiwa/la' s case (supra) that the failure to apply for registration of the factory under the Factories Act and to give notice of occupation thereof was not a continuing offence but the running of the factory without a licence issued thereunder was a continuing offence."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31172, "end_char": 31185, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31350, "end_char": 31360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Mines Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31368, "end_char": 31390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31434, "end_char": 31450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 39 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923 which came up for consideration before the Patna High Court in The State v. Kunja Behari Chandra & Ors.(1) on which reliance was placed by the Revenue is a case of continuing offence."}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31576, "end_char": 31586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Mines Act, 1923", "statute": "the Indian Mines Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33210, "end_char": 33224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Shree Dayaneshwar Mcharrj Sansth::m & Ors.(1) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed\n\n\"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury."}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33914, "end_char": 33924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(J)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34141, "end_char": 34157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34964, "end_char": 34973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34981, "end_char": 35000, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35102, "end_char": 35107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated here that the majority of the High Courts in India have also taken the same view."}}, {"text": "section 18(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35220, "end_char": 35237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_435_448_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "HINDUSTAN BROWN BOVERI LTD. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nGujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969-Sections 16 and 49(2)-Scope of.\n\nExercising power under section 49(2) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, the State Government exempted the entire tax payable on sale of goods (other than prohibited goods) by a registered dealer to an electrical undertaking, certified for the purposes by the Commissioner; if the electrical undertaking, furnished to the selling dealer a certificate in the requisite form that the goods purchased were required for the generation or distribution of electricity by the undertaking.\n\nBut according to section 16 or the Act where a dealer has purchased any taxable goods under a certificate given by him under section 13 and has used the goods for a purpose contrary to such certificate, such dealer becomes liable to pay tax on the purchase price of the goods.\n\nThe appellants who were recognised dealers purchased raw materials of E taxable goods from registered dealers by furnishing a certificate in Form 19 by reason of which no sales tax had been paid by them. After manufacturing the goods with raw materials, they sold part of the manufactured goods to an electrical undertaking in the State against 'C' forms to claim exemption from tax on them by virtue of a notification issued under section 49(2) of the Act. No tax had been paid on sales effected by them in favour of the electrical undertaking.\n\nOn the ground that the undertaking furnished in Form 19 had been violated, the Sales Tax Officer levied purchase tax under section 16 on the raw-materials purchased by the appeilants.\n\nThe appellants were unsuccessful in their appeals before the Assistant Commissioner as well as before the Sales Tax Tribunal. The High Court answered the references against the assessees and in favour of the Revenue.\n\nIt was contended on behall of the appellants (1) that the goods manufactured by them not having been goods the sale or purchase of which had been exempted from tax by inclusion in Schedule I they could not be treated as\n\nhaving infringed the terms of Form No. 19 notwithstanding the fact that partiff cular sales made by them to the electrical undertaking were exempted from payment of tax (2) the condition in Form 19 became satisfied immediately on the\n\nA goods being manufactured by the appellants as at that stage the goods were really taxable and that a subsequent event of sale to the electrical undertaking could not be considered as a violation of the said condition and (3) in a transaction of sale if the sale was exempted from lax it could not be said that the purchase was also exempted.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (I) The expression \"taxable goods'\" defined in section 2(3~) of the Act means goods other than those on the sales or purchase of which no tax is payable under section 5 and section 49 or a notification issued thereunder.\n\nBy this definition the dichotomy that existed between \"taxable goods\" and \"lax.\n\nable events\" in the now repealed Act (The Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 which was in force in the State before the present Act) had been given a go by.\n\nIt may be that section 5 and Schedule I refer 10 goods only but section 49 deals with only taxable events which result in the exemption from payment of tax on the happening of the conditions mentioned therin or in the notification even though the goods in question do not come under Schedule 1. [ 446 F-H]\n\n(2) To find out whether the goods are taxable goods or not one has to wait till the disposal of the goods by the dealer in view of the definition of the said expression which takes away goods sold under circumstances attracting section 49 from the scope of the meaning of that expression. [ 447 A]\n\n(3) If the sale is exempt from tax under section 49 the goods sold would not be taxable goods. [ 447 BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1185 of 1979,\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.1978 of the Gujarat High Court in Sales Tax Reference No. 24 of 1978.\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1187 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.1978 of the Gujarat High Court in Sales Tax Reference No.\n\nI I of 1977.\n\nK. H. Kaji, T. Sridharan, R. D. Pathak, Miss C. K. Sucharita and Mrs. S. Bhandue for the Appellant in both the Appeals.\n\nS. T. Desai and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in both the Appeals.\n\nHINDUSTAN BROWN BOYER! v. GUJARAT. (Venkataramiah, J.) 437\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nSince a common question of law is involved in these two appeals by special leave, they are disposed of by this common judgment.\n\nThe appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1185 of 1979 is M/s. Hindustan Brown Boveri Ltd., a company engaged in the business of manufacturing certain goods which are used in electrical undertakings for the purpose of generating and distributing electrical energy. It is registered as dealer under the provisions of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 (Gujarat Act No. I of 1970) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').\n\nFor the purpose of manufacturing the goods, the appellant which was also a recognised dealer under the Act purchased raw materials during the period between May 6, 1970 and March 31, 1971 after furnishing a certificate in Form No. 19 as provided under section 13(l)(B) of the Act read with Rule 24(4) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') framed under the Act stating that the raw materials purchased by it would be used in manufacturing taxable goods which would be sold by it in the State of Gujarat. Some part of the goods manufactured by the appellant were sold to a certain electrical undertaking in the State of Gujarat against 'C' forms in order to claim exemption from payment of tax on the said sales under the Act by virtue of a notification issued under section 49(2) of the Act exempting the goods sold to electrical undertakings for being used in generation and distribution of electrical energy. On coming to know of the said sales, the Sales Tax Officer, who was the assessing authority under the Act levied purchase tax under section 16 of the Act on the raw materials purchased by the appellant on the ground that the undertaking given in Form No. 19 had been violated. The appeals filed by the appellant before the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Gujarat Sales Tax Tribunal against the said levy were unsuccessful.\n\nThereafter at the instance of the appellant the Tribunal referred the following question of law to the High Court of Gujarat under section 69 of the Act :-\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, a11 j Jn a correct interpretation of sub-section (33) of section 2 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 the Tribunal was right in deciding that the applicant was liable to pay\n\npurchase tax under section 16 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, H 1969 on the ground that certain electric goods manufactured\n\nout of raw materials etc. purchased against declaration in Form 19 were sold to Gujarat State Electricity Board against declarations in Form C prescribed in Entry 5 of the Government Notification issued under section 49 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 ?\"\n\nB .\n\nThe appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1187 of 1979 is M/s.\n\nElecon Engineering Co. Ltd. which is engaged in manufacturing heavy machinery and gear conveyers. It is also a recognied dealer under the Act.\n\nLike the appellant in Civil Appeal 118 5 of 1979, this appellant also purchased raw materials by furnishing certificates in Form No. 19 and later on sold a part of the goods manufactured C by it to a certain electrical undertaking against Form No. 'C' and . ., claimed exemption under the notification issued under section 49(2) I of the Act. In this case also the Sales Tax Officer levied purchase tax under section 16 of the Act for violation of the undertaking given in Form No. 19. The appeals to the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Gujarat Sales Tax Tribunal failed. Thereafter D at the instance of the appellant, the Gujarat Sales Tax Tribunal referred the following question for the opinion of the High Court of Gujarat:-\n\n. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in holding that the sales of machineries and conveyers manufactured by the applicant to an electrical undertaking against Form 'C' under Entry 5 of the Government Notification issued under section 49 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 resulted in the breach of the declarations in Form 19 as the goods so nianufactured and sold did not amount to manufacture of taxable goods?\"\n\nIt is seen from the two questions referred to above that they are substantially the same. The High Court answered the said questions in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees by two G separate orders following its earlier decision in M/s. Nciwroji N.\n\nVakil & Co. v. State of Gujarat(1). The appellants have filed these appeals against the decision of the High Court by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nWe shall now briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the ff Act.\n\nSection 2(10) of the Act defines a 'dealer' as any person who\n\n(I) Sales Tax Reference No. 1 of 1977 decided on November 24/27, 1978.\n\nHINDUSTAN llROWN BOVERI v. GUJARAT (Venkataramiah, J.) 439\n\nbuys or sells goods in connection with his business and when he obtains a certificate of registration he becomes a registered dealer.\n\nSection 32 of the Act provides for the recognition of a registered dealer.\n\nIt says that where during the previous or current year, the value of all taxable goods manufactured for sale by \"a dealer registered under section 29 or by a dealer registered under section 30,\n\nwhose turnover of sales or purchases has subsequently, exceeded the limits specified in sub-section (4) of section 3, exceeds Rs. 3,000/- such dealer on application by him may be granted recognition by the Commissioner and on such recognition being granted, he becomes a recognised dealer.\n\nSection 5 of the Act says that subject to the conditions or exceptions (if any) set out against each of the goods specified in column 3 of the Schedule I to the Act, no tax shall be payable on the sales or purchases of any goods specified in that Schedule. Section 6 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and to any rules made thereunder there shall be paid by every dealer who is liable to pay tax under the Act, the tax or taxes leviable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the Act.\n\nIn order to en sure that as far as possible the incidence of tax under the Act is not felt at more than one' point in the series of transactions of sales and purchases of goods other than declared good in the State of Gujarat, sections 7, 8 and 10 of the Act are enacted as follows :\n\n\"7. Levy of sales tax on goods in Schedule II, Part A.-There shall be levied a sales tax on the turnover of sales of goods specified in Part A of Schedule II at the rate set out against each of them in column 3 thereof, but after deducting from such turnover,-\n\n(i) resale of goods on the purchase of which the dealer is liable to pay purchase tax under sec. 16.\n\n(ii) resales of goods purchased by him from a Registered dealer.\n\n(iii) sales of goods, of resales of goods to which clauses\n\n(i) and (ii) do not apply, to a Recognised dealer or to a Commission agent holding a permit who purchases on behalf of a principal who is a Recognised dealer, upon such dealer or Commission agent, as the case may be, furnishing in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in sub-clause (B) and item (ii) of sub-clause (C) of\n\nsub-sec. (I) of sec. 13, a certificate as provided therein, and\n\n(iv) sales of goods or resales of goods to which clauses\n\n(i) and (ii) do not apply, to a Licensed dealer or to a Commission agent holding a permit who purchases on behalf of a principal who is a Licensed dealer, upon such dealer or Commission agent, as the case may be; furnishing in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in item (i) of sub-clause (A) and item (i) (a) of sub-clause (C) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13, a certificate as provided\n\ntherein.\"\n\n\"8. Levy of general sales tax on goods in Schedule II Part B-There shall be levied a general sales tax on the turnover of sales of goods specified in Part B of Schedule II at the rate set out against each of them in column 3 thereof, but after deducting from such turnover,-\n\n(i)\n\nAl resales of goods on the purchase of which the dealer is liable to pay purchase tax under sec. 16;\n\n(ii) resales of goods purchased from a Registered dealer by a dealer who is not a Licensed dealer at the time of such purchase; and\n\n(iii) sales of goods, or resales of goods to which clauses (i) and (ii) do not apply, to a Licensed dealer, Recognised dealer or to a Commission agent holding a permit, who purchases on behalf of a principal who is a Licensed dealer or a Recognised dealer, upon such dealer or Commission agent as the case may be furnishing, in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in sec. 13, a certificate as provided therein.\"\n\n\"IO.\n\nLevy of sales tax and general sales tax on goods specified in Schedule III.-(!) There shall be levied a sales tax on the turnover of sales of goods specified in Schedule III at the rate set out against each of such goods in column 3 thereof, but after deducting from such turnover,-\n\n(i) resales of goods on the purchase of which the dealer is liable to pay purchase tax under sec. 16,\n\nHINDUSTAN BROWN BOVERI v GUJARAT (Venkataramiah, J.) 441\n\n(ii) resales of goods purchased by him from a Regis- A tered dealer,\n\n(iii) sales of goods, or resales of goods to which clauses\n\n(i) and (ii) do not apply, to a Recognised dealer or to a Commission agent holding a permit who purchases on behalf of a principal who is a Recognised dealer, upon such dealer or Commission agent, as the case may be, furnishing in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in sub-clause (B) and item (ii) of sub-clause (C) of sub-sec. (I) of sec 13, a certificate as provided therein, and\n\n(iv) sales of goods or resales of goods to which clauses\n\n(i) and (ii) do not apply, to a Licensed dealer or to a Commission agent holdinga permit who purchases on behalf of a principal who is a Licensed dealer, upon such dealer or Commission agent as the case may be, furnishing in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in item (i) of sub-clause (A) and item (i) (a) of sub-clause (C) of sub-sec. (I) of sec. J 3, a certificate a~ provided therein.\n\n(2) There sl; all be levied a general sales tax on the turnover of sales of goods specified in Schedule III at the rate set out against each of such goods in column 4 thereof, but after deducting from such turnover-\n\n(i) resales. of goods purchased from a Registered dealer, -by a dealer who 1s not a Licensed dealer at the time of such purchase; and\n\n(ii) sales of goods, or resales of goods which clause\n\n(i) does not apply to a Licensed dealer, or Recognised dealer or a Commission . agent holding a\n\nPermit who purchases on behalf of a principal who is a Licensed dealer or a Recognised dealer upon such dealer or Commission agent, as the case may be, furnishing in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in sec. 13 a certificate as provided therein.\"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981) 3.S.C.R.\n\nA It may be noted that in the above provisions that from the turnover of sales of goods of a dealer which are otherwise taxable, the turnover of goods sold to a Recognised dealer, upon such Recognised dealer furnishing in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in sub-clause (B) of sub-section(!) of section 13 of the Act a certificate as provided therein becomes deductible and B no tax is payable on such sales in favour of the Recognised dealer.\n\nThe relevant part of section 13 of the Act reads thus :-\n\n\"13.\n\nNo deduction from turnover except on a certificate.--(!) There shall not be deducted from the turnover of sales, sales of goods to a Licensed dealer, Recognised dealer or to a Commission agent holding a permit purchasing on behalf of his principal, as provided in sections 7, 8 and IO unless-\n\n(A) .......... ..\n\n(B) The Recognised dealer certifies in the prescribed form, that the goods other than prohibited goods sold to him are goods purchased by him for use by him as raw or processing materials or as consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale by him; or ...... \"\n\nRule 24(4) of the Rules prescribes that the certificate issued by a Recognised dealer shall be in Form No. 19. The relevant part of Form No. 19 reads :-\n\n\" ............ and that the goods purchased by me/the said .. : ........ and specified in bill/cash memo/invoice No ...... dated ......... of M/s .......... address ............ wi// be used by me/the said ............ as raw/or processing materials or con sumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods viz.\n\n: ....... .for sale by me/the said .. ,._, ..... and that such sale shall not take place outside the State of Gujarat.\n\n (Emphasis supplied)\"\n\nThe expression 'taxable goods' . is defined by section 3(33) of the Act thus:-·\n\n. \"2(33). \"taxable goods\" means goods other than\n\nthoe on the sale or purchase of whiCh no tax is payable under sec. 5 or sec. 49 or a notification issued thereunder.\"\n\nHINDUSTAN BROWN BOVERI v. GUJABAT (Venkataramiah, J.) 443\n\nSub-section (I) of section 49 provides that subject to the conditions or exemptions, if any, specified in relation to them, the classes of sales or purchases referred in clauses (i) to (vii) of section 49(1) shall be exempt from the payment of the whole of tax payable under the provisions of the Act. Sub-section 2 of section 49 of the Act authorises the State Government to exempt any other specified class of sales by a notification published in the Official Gazette.\n\nSection 49(2) reads :-\n\n\"49. Exemptions-(!) ........... .\n\n(2) Subject to such conditions as it may impose, the State Government may, if it considers it necessary so to do in the public interest, by notification in the Official Ga:i; ette, exempt any specified class of sales or purchases from payment of the whole or any tax payable under the provisions of this Act.'\n\nBy a notification dated April 29, 1970 issued under section 49(2) of the Act the State Government exempted the entire tax payable on sales of goods (other than prohibited goods) by a registered dealer to an electrical undertaking, certified for the purpose by the Commissioner, if the electrical undertaking furnished to the selling dealer a certificate in Form appended to the notification stating inter alia that the goods purchased were required for the use of the generation or distribution of electrical energy by the undertaking.\n\nIn view of the above notification the sales made to the electrical undertaking become exempt from payment of sales tax under the Act on the undertaking furnishing the required certificate and no tax was paid by the appellants in these two appeals on sales of goods effected by them in favour of the electrical undertaking. It is now necessary to refer to section 16 of the Act, the relevant part of which.reads:-\n\n\"16. Liability to purchase tax for contravention of terms of certificate etc.-(1) Where any dealer or Commission agent has purchased any taxable goods under a certificate given by him under section 12 or 13, and\n\n(a) contrary to such certificate, the goods are used for another purpose, or are not resold or despatched in the manner: and within t, he period certified, or ·\n\n(b) on the resales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, of the goods so purchased, no tax under the Central Sales Tax Act 1956 (LXXIV of 1956), is actually payable by him on account of any deduction admissible under any of the provisions of the said Act.\n\nthen such dealer or Commission agent shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of the goods purchased under such certificate; and accordingly, he shall include the purchase price thereof in his turnover of purchases in his declaration or return under section 40 which he is to furnish next thereafter.\n\n(2) ........ .\n\n(3) the purchase tax leviable under this section in respect of any goods specified in Schedule II or III shall be the aggregate of all taxes which would have been leviable thereon but for the certificate given under section 12 or 13.\n\n( 4) If any question arises whether the purchase price of goods purchased under a certificate given under section 12 or 13 is not liable to be included in the turnover of purchases of a dealer or Commission agent under this section, the burden of so proving shall be upon such dealer, or as the case may be, the Commission agent.\"\n\nSection 16 of the Act provides that where a dealer has purchased any taxable goods under a certificate given by him under section 13 and has used the goods for a different purpose contrary to such certificate, then such dealer shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of the goods purchased under such certificate and his liability has to be computed in the manner stated in that sect ion.\n\nIt is this liability of the appellants that .is in dispute in these appeals.\n\nIt is not disputed that the appellants are recognised dealers; that they had purchased raw materials which were taxable goods (other than prohibited goods) from registered dealers against certi ficates issued by them in Form No. 19; that no sales tax had been paid on sales in their favour; that they had manufactured goods by using the said raw materials that they had sold a part of the goods to an electrical undertaking notified under section 49(2) of the Act and that no tax had been paid Ol) sales effected by them in\n\nHINDUSTAN BROWN ROVERJ v. GUJARAT (Venkataramiah, J.) 445\n\nfavour of the electrical undertaking.\n\nIt is also not disputed that in Form No. 19 the appellants had stated that the raw materials purchased by them would be used to manufacture taxable goods which would be sold inside the State of Gujarat. The question for consideration is whether the appellants had used the raw materials for another purpose contrary to the terms of Form No. 19.\n\nThe contention of the Department is that tbe appellants had contravened Form No. 19 by manufacturing goods which were not 'taxable goods' and hence were liable to pay purchase tax on the purchase of raw materials under section 16 of the Act and the contention of the appellants is that the goods manufactured and sold by them to the electrical undertakin_gs were 'taxable goods' and merely because they were sold to an electrical undertaking under transactions exempted by section 49(2) of the Act, the goods did . not cease to be taxable goods.\n\nThe solution to the question, therefore, lies on the true meaning of the expression 'taxable goods'.\n\nRelying upon the decision of this Court in the State tJf Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswami and Ors.(1) it is urged on behalf of the appellants thaHhe expressions 'taxable persons', 'taxable goods' and 'taxable events' are entirely different concepts in sales tax law; that the goods in question were taxable goods as any sale of those goods not covered by section 49(1) and (2) would make such sale taxable and that section 49( I) and (2) of the Act referred to only events which resulted in the exemption from payment of sales tax. It is further argued that all goods the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under the Act are taxable goods and that goods would not be taxable goods only when their sales are exempted generally from payment of tax as provided in section 5 of the Act.\n\nIt is, therefore, contended that the goods manufactured by the appellants not having been goods, the sale or purchase of which had been exempted from tax by inclusion in Schedule I to the Act, the appellants could not be treated as having infringed the terms of Form No. 19, notwithstanding the existence of the circumstance that the particular sales made by them to the electrical undertakings were exempt from pay- ment of tax.\n\nThe second ground urged on behalf of the appellants is that the condition under Form No. 19 became satisfied immediately on the goods being manufactured by the appellants as at that stage the goods were really taxable and that a subsequent event of sale to the electrical undertaking cannot be considered as having violated the said condition. The third ground urged by the appel-\n\n(!) 36 STC I 91\n\n!ants is that a transaction of sale involved two facetsa sale and a . purchase and if a sale is exempted from tax, it cannot be said the purchase is also exempted. On the above footing 'it is contended that since under section 49(2) only the tax on sale is exempted and nothing is said about the liability of the purchaser to tax, it cannot be said that the goods which were otherwise taxable had become non-taxable on being sold under a transaction which attracted section 49(2) of the Act. ,\n\nWe find no substance in any of the three grounds urged on behalf of the appellants for the reason that the present case is governed by the definition of the expression 'taxable goods' in sectio11 2(33) of the Act. It is interesting to note that the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Bombay Act No. I of 1959) which was in force in the State of Gujarat before the Act came into force and which was repealed by section 88 of the Act contained the definition of the expression 'taxable goods' in section 2(33) thereof.\n\nThe expression 'taxable goods' was defined in the Bombay Act as 'goods other than . those on the sale or purchase of which no fax is payable under section 5'. In the Bombay Act there was also a provision corresponding to section 49 of the Act in section 41 thereof which empowered the State Government subject to such conditions as it may impose to exempt by a notification published in the Official Gazette any specified class of sales or purchases from payment of the whole or any part of any tax payable thereunder if the State Government was satisfied that it was necessary so to do in the public interest. Still the definition of 'taxable goods' in that Act did not refer to sales exempted under section 41 thereof.\n\nBut in the Act which repealed and replaced the Bombay Act the meaning of the expression 'taxable goods' has been narrowed down as section 2(33) of the Act reads- 'taxable goods' means goods other than those on the sale or purchase o( which no tax is payable under section 5 (which corresponds to section 5 of the Bombay Act) and section 49 of the Act (which corresponds to section 41 of the Bombay Act) or a notification issued thereunder. By this definition, the dichotomy that is stated to exist between 'taxable goods' and 'taxable events' has been given a go by. It may be that section 5 and Schedule I refer to goods only but section 49 deals with only taxable events which result in the exemption[from payment of tax on the conditions mentioned . therein or in the notification issued thereunder being satisfied even though the goods in question do not come under Schedule I. Secondly one has to wait till the disposal of the goods by the dealer to find out whthr tre gcods are taxable goods or not in view of the\n\n·.\"'<' ..\n\nHINDUSTAN BROWN! BOYER! v. GUJARAT (Venkataramiah, J.) 447\n\ndefinition of the said expression which takes away goods sold under circumstances attracting section 49 from the scope of the meaning of that expression.\n\nNor does the third ground survive for the very same reil8on. If the sale is exempt from 'tax under section 49 of the Act, the goods sold would not be taxable goods.\n\nWe need not go into the question whether the purchaser in a sale under section 49 of the Act has to pay tax in these cases.\n\nThis reason also disposes of an allied argument of the appellants that the possibility of any Iia- / bility arising under section 50 of the Act on the breach of any condition imposed by section 49 or the notification issued thereunder would absolve the appellants of their liability to pay the tax under section 16 of the Act.\n\nAny such levy made under section 501has not been shown to have any effect in law on the liability of the appellants under section 16.\n\nThe scheme of the Act appears to be that sales tax should be levied on goods which are not included in Schedule I at least once inside the State in the series of sales and purchases even though they may have been converted into manufactured goods and that is why Form No. 19 requires the purchaser to state that the goods will be used by him as raw or processing materials or as consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale by hiin inside the State and section 16 of the Acf provides that where any dealer ha~ pu.rchased any taxable goods under a certificate given by him under section 12 or section 13 of the Act and contrary to such certificate the goods are used for another purpose or are not resold or despatched in the manner and within the period certified or on the resales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, of the goods so purchased no tax under the Central Sales Tax Act is actually payable by him on account of any deductions admissible under any of the provisions of that Act, then such dealer shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of the goods purchased under such certificate. The deliberate alteration of the definition of 'tax• able goods' in the Act also is attributable to the said intention of the State Legislature.\n\nThe appeliants also cannot derive any assistance from the decision of this Court in Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commission°r, Sales Tax and Anr.(1) as these cases are governed by\n\n(1) 41 S.T.C. 409.\n\nA the provisions of the Act and as there appears to be no similarity between the facts of these appeals and the facts involved in that case.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in these appeals. The appeals are dismissed with costs. Hearing fee one set.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed\n\n,, ..\n\n• •", "total_entities": 147, "entities": [{"text": "HINDUSTAN BROWN BOVERI LTD. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HINDUSTAN BROWN BOVERI LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nApril 7, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. 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H. Kaji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4252, "end_char": 4262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. H. Kaji, T. Sridharan, R. D. Pathak, Miss C. K. Sucharita and Mrs. S. Bhandue for the Appellant in both the Appeals."}}, {"text": "T. Sridharan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4264, "end_char": 4276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. H. Kaji, T. Sridharan, R. D. Pathak, Miss C. K. Sucharita and Mrs. S. Bhandue for the Appellant in both the Appeals."}}, {"text": "R. D. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4278, "end_char": 4290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. H. Kaji, T. Sridharan, R. D. Pathak, Miss C. K. Sucharita and Mrs. S. Bhandue for the Appellant in both the Appeals.", "canonical_name": "R. S. PATHAK"}}, {"text": "C. K. Sucharita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. H. Kaji, T. Sridharan, R. D. Pathak, Miss C. K. Sucharita and Mrs. S. 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{"document_id": "1981_3_449_459_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "JETHABHAI KHATAU & CO.\n\nLUXMI NARAYAN COTTON MILLS LTD. & ORS.\n\nApril JO, 1981\n\n[A.C. GUPTA AND D.A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Art, 136-lnterim orders by the High Courtlnterference by Supreme Court-When arises.\n\nThe appellant filed a suit for recovery of certain amounts due from the first respondent company. By the time the suit came up for hearing the first respondent company was superseded and an Administrator was appointed. The suit was compromised and a consent decree was passed, the company being held liable and directed to make payment of Rs. 2.85 lakhs with interest at 6% from the date of the decree. The first respondent company received a sum of about Rs. 15 lakhs from the Custodian of Enemy Property as compensation in respect of certain cotton mills owned by it. The third respondent was appointed a receiver in respect of this amount and he desosited a sum of Rs. 8 lakhs of the compensation amount into a fixed deposit account with a Bank. The decretal amount having become due and payable the appellant by an order dated April 12, 1978 obtained an interim attachment of the money in the fixed deposit account of the hank, which was confirmed by order dated April 24, 1978. On May 4, 1978 upon a petition by the appellant, the Court directed the receiver, 3rd respondent to pay the decretal amount to the appellant out of the amount in the fixed deposit account of the judgment-debtor with the Bank. As this order was not implemented, the appellant again moved the Court and by its order dated the May 24. 1978 the Court directed the receiver to pay the amount to the decree holder and the Bank, the keeper of the fixed deposit account of the receiver was also put under an obligation not to raise any objection on the receiver withdrawing the money and paying the same to the decree holder. These directions not being obeyed, the appellant moved the Court for holding the third respondent receiver and the fourth respondent Bank in contempt and for passing appropriate orders for punishing them for contempt. Respondents 5 and 6 were in the meanwhile appointed as joint receivers.\n\nA solemn undertaking was given by the Bank to the Court that the decretal amount would be paid. In view of the undertaking the Court did not pass any orders on the contempt application. On March 7, 1980 the Court declined to grant the prayer for discharge of the receiver 3rd respondent and directed that the balance after payment of the dcretal amount in the fixed deposit account will be held by the receiver. The Court however at the instance of the joint receivers-Respondents 5 and 6 stayed the order for a fortnight.\n\nA Three appeals were filed against the order dated March 7, 1980. Two\n\nappeals were preferred by the 1st respondent company and one appeal was preferred by 2nd respondent, State of West Bengal. In the appeals preferred by the Jst respondent company the High Court by its order dated March 27, 1980 granted ad interim stay in the matter, by directing that the Bank would not dis burse any amount in respect of the fixed deposit account and by issuing an injunction restraining the appellant from obtaining any payment.\n\nAllowing the appeals to this Court,\n\nHELD: The order made by the Division Bench on March 27, 1980 and continued on September 9, 1980 are set aside. The order dated May 4, 1978 and May 24, 1979 as also the undertaking given by the Manager of the 4th respondent Bank through its Counsel on June 7, 1979 would be revived and would be effective and will have to be implemented.\n\nThe 4th Respondent Bank will pay the decretal amount to the appellant, the appellant shall pass a receipt acknowledging receipt and the liability of the 4th Respondent company to the 3rd Respondent receiver shall thereupon stand discharged. Before the amount is paid, the appellant shall give security to the satisfection of the High Court and also an undertaking on affidavit that in the event of the appeals being allowed, the appellant shall deposit the said amount with the High Court within one month from the date of the order of the appellate Bench.\n\n[ 459 C-F]\n\n2. This Court ordinarily does not interfere with interim orders unless and until manifest injustice convulsively shakes it. [ 455 E]\n\nIn the instant case the interim order made by the Division Bench on September 9, 1980 confirming the ad interim order dated March 7, 1980 has to be interfered to a limited extent to avoid the impression that the Court's process can be lightly trifled with. [458 HJ\n\n3. Failure to comply with the Court's mandatory directions led the appellant to file a petition for contempt. The alleged contemners impleaded were 1st respondent company and the 4th respondent Bank. At the hearing, counsel for the 4th respondent unreservedly agreed to comply with the order of the Court. It was because the Bank unreservedly and unconditionally agreed and undertook to pay up the amount that the motion for taking action in contempt was discharged by the Court. [ 457 E, HJ\n\n4. The order Jated June 7, 1979 is not a fresh order on merits. lt was merely an implementation of tlie order dated May 24, 1979 which appears to have become final and binding. [ 458 A]\n\n5. The three appeals were preferred against the order dated March 7, 1980.\n\nThat order had nothing to do with the order dated May 24, 1979 or the order dated June 7, 1979. At any rate, the order dated May 24, 1979 appears to have become final. [ 458 DJ '\n\nCivrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1256-1258 of 1981.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated A 9.9.1980 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal Nos. 94, 122 & 95 of 1980 respectively.\n\nS.N. Kacker and H.R. Puri for the Appellant.\n\nShankar Ghosh, B.P. Maheshwari and Miss Asha Jain for B Respondent No.I.\n\nDalip Sinha, G.S. Chatterjee and P.K. Chatterjee for Respondent No.2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nM/s Jethabhai Khatu & Co., a partnership firm, is the appellant in all the three appeals. The respondents in all the three appeals are : (I) Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., an incorporated Company ('company' for short), (2) State of West Bengal, (3) S.K. Dutta, who was for some time a receiver appointed by the High Court; (4} Grindlays Bank, ('Bank' for short), having a fixed deposit account in the name of Receiver. S.K. Dutta on behalf of Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., (5) A.K. Dutta, and (6) R.C.\n\nDeb, who claim to have been appointed as joint receivers after removal of Sh. S.K. Dutta.\n\nAppellant filed suit No. 1194/66 against the company on the original side of the Calcutta High Court to recover a certain amount due under two separate heads.\n\nBy the time the suit came up for hearing the board of Directors of the 1st respondent company was superseded and one Gurudas Sharma was appointed as an Administrator. The Administrator on behalf of the !st respondent company entered into a compromise with the appellant in respect of the claim in suit of the appellant and after obtaining leave of the Court to settle the matter, invited a consent decree by .which the company was held liable and directed to pay Rs. 2,85,000 with interest thereon at 6% per annum from January 6, 1970, the date of the decree, till realisation.\n\nThe 1st respondent company was given an option to pay the decretal amount by monthly instalments of Rs. 5,000, the first instalment becoming due and payable on March 15, 1970, and each subsequent instalment to-bepaid by 15th day of the next succeeding month. The default clause in the consent decree provided that if the company comitted default in payment of any two instalments within the time stipulated in the decree, the whole of the decretal amount and the interest on the balance of the decretal\n\namount will become due and payable at once. It appears that the !st respondent company received Rs. 15,00,000 from the Custodian of Enemy Property in respect of its cotton Mills situated in Narayanganj, Bangladesh. The 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta appears to have been appointed a receiver in respect of this compensation amount and he appears to have deposited Rs. 8,40,000 out of the compensation amount in fixed deposit account evidenced by receipt No.\n\nJ 002-2539 with the Bank at its Netaji Subhash Road Branch, Calcutta. The appellant, by an order dated April 5, 1978, of the Calcutta High Court, obtained leave to execute the decree by attachment of funds lying in tl1e hands of the 3rd respondent receiver S.K.\n\nDutta (Annexure 'D'). By the date of the order Rs. 4,20,702. 94 p. had become due and payable under the decree.\n\nPursuant to this order an interim attachment was levied under Order 21 Rule.52 C.P.C. on the amount covered by the aforementioned fixed deposit receipt, and accordingly the Master of the Court, Shri S. K. Ghosh informed the 3rd respondent receiver by the writ of the Court dated . April 12, 1978, that the receiver shall hold the money under the fixed deposit account subject to such order as may be made respecting the same in the suit in which he had been appointed a receiver and subject to further orders of tbe Court (Annexure 'E'). The Master confirmed the interim attachment by his order dated April 24, 1978 (Annexure 'F'). On May 4, 1978 upon a petition by the appellant the Court directed the receiver 3rd respondent to pay the sum of Rs. 4,20;702. 94 to the appellant decree-holder out of the amount in the fixed deposit account of the judgment-debtor with the Bank in fixed deposit receipt No. 1002-2539 standing in the name of the receiver which was attached in terms of order dated April 12, 1978, as confirmed by the order dated April 24, 1978. Presumably neither the 3rd respondent receiver nor the Bank effectively implemented the order dated May 4, 1978, whereup:>n the appellant moved the Court during the vacation on May 24, l 979, for an appropriate direction and a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court working as vacation judge gave the directions prayed for.\n\nAs this order has some legal consequences in. this matter, it would be advantageous to extract it. It reads as under :\n\n\"There will be an order in terms of prayers (a) & (b) of the petition.\n\nPrayer (a) : That the receiver Sudhir Kumar Dutta be forthwith directed to instruct and intimate to the Grindlays Bank Ltd., Netaji Subhash Road Branch, Calcutta, to pay\n\na sum of Rs. 4,29,702.94 p. to the petitioner decree-holder A in terms of the payment order dated 4th May, 1978 out of the amount of the Fixed Deposit of the judgment-debtor with Grindlays Bank Ltd., in Fixed Deposit Receipt No. 1002 2539 which has been lying attached in terms of the order dated 12th April, 1978 and is confirmed by the order dated 24th April, 1978 and the said Grindlays Bank Ltd., B Netaji Subhash Road, Branch, Calcutta, be directed to pay the said sum of Rs. 4,20,702.94 p. to the petitioner decreeholder;\n\nPrayer (b) : That Grindlays Bank Ltd., Netaji Subhash Road Branch, Calcutta, be directed to pay the said sum of Rs. 4,20, 702.94 p. to the petitioner decree-holder in terms of the payment order dated 4th May, 1978, out of the said fixed deposit receipt No. 1002-2539.\"\n\nEffectively this order of the Court directed the receiver to pay the amount therein mentioned to the decree-holder and the Bank, the keeper of the fixed deposit account of the receiver was also put under an obligation not to raise any objection on receiver withdrawing the money and paying the same to the decree-holder. In fact upon its true construction, the Bank was also under an obligation to take effective steps to pay the amount mentioned in the order to the decree-holder.\n\nIt appears that these directions were not obeyed.\n\nConsequently, the appellant moved the Court for holding the 3rd respondent receiver S.K. Dutta and the 4th respondent Bank in contempt and for passing appropriate order for punishing them for contempt unless they purged themselves of the contempt.\n\nOn June 7, 1979, when the petition for taking action against the alleged contemners came up before the Court, respondents 5 and 6 appear to have been appointed as joint receivers. The Bank appeared through its counsel Mr. Majumdar and the joint receivers appeared forth emselves as well as for theii respective clients, namely, 1st respondent company and the 2nd respondent State of West Bengal. Mr. Majumder; learned advocate for the Bank undertook to the Court to comply with the order dated May 24, 1979, to pay the amount therein mentioned to M/ s Maharia & Co. Advocate-on-record for the appellant. The court directed that on such payment being made the Bank shall be absolved from all the liabilty in respect of the said amount. The Court specifically noted that in view of the undertaking given by the learned advocate on behalf of the\n\n'r.Ianager of the Bank, the Court was not inclined to pass any order in respect of the contempt application and the application for taking action in contempt was accordingly disposed of.\n\nAt this stage.\n\nMr. A.K. Dutta appearing for the 1st respondent company prayed for stay of a portion of the order of the Court which prayer was specifically refused observing that as no fresh orders have been passed on that day affecting the interests of the said Company, no question of granting stay of a portion of the order arises. The Court specifically directed that all the parties and particularly the Manager of the Bank should act on the signed copy of the minutes. It appears that the solemn undertaking given by the Bank was not acted upon . . Probably soon thereafter some interim orders were obtained as would transpire from the order of Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. dated March 7, 1980.\n\nWhen the matter came up on March 7, 1980, the court observed that there will by no order on the applications before it save and except that the receiver will hold the balance sum of Rs. 4,19,697.06p till further order of the Court. The Court also declined to grant prayer for discharge of the receiver S.K. Dutta, the 3rd respondent, because notice of the application was not served upon him. This observation would, however, establish that till March 7, 1980, the 3rd respondent was not discharged as a receiver though from the recitals in the order dated June 7, 1979, it appears that by that date A.K. Dutta and R.C. Deb were functioning as joint receivers.\n\nIn this order it was distinctly made clear that except what is stated specifically in the order all interim orders were vacated. However, the Court at the instance of join(receivers stayed the portion of the order dated March 7, 1980, for a period of a fortnight. To clarify the position it may be mentioned that when the Court directed that balance of Rs. 4,19,697.06 will be held by the receiver it would imply that that would be the balance after payment of the amount directed to be paid to the appellant. Specifically this order has the effect of confirming the earlier order dated May 24, 1970, to pay the decretal amount to the appellant.\n\nIf appears that thereafter three appeals came to be filed before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. Appeal No. 95/80 and Appeal No. 94/80 were preferred by the 1st respondent company. Appeal No. 122/80 was preferred by the 2nd respondent State of West Bengal. These three appeals were preferred against the order dated March 7, 1980, made by Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J.\n\nIn the two appeals preferred by the Ist respondent company a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by its order dated\n\n._,,\n\nMarch 27, 1980,' granted ad interim stay as under :\n\n\"The Joint Receivers, R.C. Deb and A.K. Dutta are directed not to part with any money lying deposited under the fixed deposit receipt No. 1002/2529 in the Grindlays Bank.\n\nB There will be an order directing the Grindlays Bank Ltd., of 29, Netaji Subhash Road not to disburse any amount in respect of fixed deposit No. 1002-2539 standing in the name of S.K. Dutta, the fixed deposit receipt whereof is lying deposited with the present joint receivers R.C. Deb and A.K. Dutta......\n\nOrder of injunction restraining Jethabhai Khatau and Co. from obtaining any payment out of the moneys lying in the Grindlays Bank and held by the joint receivers or receiver.\"\n\nThis interim order was confirmed by the Division Bench by its order dated September, 9, 1980.\n\nHence these three appeals by special leave.\n\nFrankly, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with interim orders unless and until manifest-injustice convulsively shakes it. Even then, with our usual response of reluctance to undertake to examine interim orders, only a notice to show cause why special leave should not be granted and the interim stay application not be considered, was issued to the respondents. After notices were served and counter-affidavits and rejoinder affidavits were filed, this matter came before us about four weeks back, our hands off attitude to interim orders manifested itself when we adjourned the matter for four weeks indicating to the parties, especially the respondents who are appellants before the High Court, to take effective steps to get their appeals placed on the cause list for hearing and to move for expeditious disposal of the same.\n\nWe also declined to grant any interim relief.\n\nWe so adjourned the matter in the fond hope that we may hang on to our tenuous view that ordinarily we would not undertake to deal with interim orders.\n\nOur hope has pro\\_'.ed a mirage.\n\nWhen this matter was listed before us on April 3, 1981, Mr.\n\nH Kackkar, learned counsel for the Appellant stated that almost within the dying embers of the time granted by this Court an attempt was\n\nmade by the respondents to get their matter listed in 'the High Court and the only order that the court has made is that the appeals be added to the cause list of the Division Bench and it would be anybody's guess when this last added matter would reach hearing.\n\nHaving no a!ternative left open to us, we have heard the matter.\n\nAs the appeals are pending before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and are to be heard on merits, we would make every manageable human effort to avoid any expression of opinion which may even remo(ely interfere with judicious adjudication of the issues before the Division Bench. However, we make it clear that even if there is any express or implied opinion discernible in this order, the same has to be wholly ignored by the High Court whiledisposing of the appeals on merits. With this extra caution we proceed to dispose of these appeals. As every. stage of the proceeding has been neatly delineated by us with the orders of t.he Court referred to in details, the j permissible inferences may alone be set out.\n\nWhat is the injudicious situation which may bring disrepute to judicial process, stares in the face.\n\nThe consent decree under which appellant was entitled to recover Rs. 2,85,000 with interest, at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the decree till realisation was made by the Court on January 6, 1970. The decree without being satisfied in its minutest part has collected dust for 11 years. And at present who is impeding the execution of the decree ?\n\nIt is the l st respondent company which has been a party to the consent decree and which decree has become final and unassailable There is no proceeding at precent questioning the correctness, validity or legality of the decree or its binding character on the l st respondent company.\n\nIt is again incontrovertible that the judgment-debtor 1st respondent company has in its fixed deposit with the 4th respondent Bank a sum of Rs. 8,40,000.\n\nThat his amount is of the ownership of the judgment-debtor is not in dispute. 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta was once a receiver.\n\nRespondents say that he has been re@]Ved and respondents 5 and 6 who are respectively the Advocates of the 1st respondent company and the 2nd respondent State of West Bengal claim to be appointed as joint receivers. The date of appointment is not made clear but the order dated March 7, 1980 (Annexure 'J') by Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. leaves no room for doubt that till that date 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta was not discharged as receiver.\n\nThe High Court on a petition of the appellant levied attachment A under order 21 Rule 52 C.P.C. on the amount lying in fixed deposit account with 4th respondent Bank in the name of 3rd respondent S.K.Dutta as receiver of the first respondent company by order dated April 5, 1978. This attachment order wa!t levied by the Master of the Court and the interim attachment was confirmed. Admittedly these orders were not challenged.\n\nSabyasachi Muk\"1rjee, J. by his order dated M'.ly 4, 1978, directed 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta to pay the amount of Rs. 4 ,20, 702.94 P. out of the amount lying in fixed deposit receipt No. 1002-2539 with the fourth respondent Bank to the appellant in saTisfaction of the decree. This order may appear to have become final as not having been questioned by any one. Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. by his order dated May 24, 1979, directed 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta, receiver of the Ist respondent company to pay Rs. 4,20,702.94 p. out of the fixed deposit account held by him as rece'1ver of the Ist respondent company to the appellant and a com; equential order was made directing the Bank to pay the amount set out in the order tothe appellant. This order dated May 24, 1979, may appear to have become final as it appears not to have been questioned, challenged or appealed by any one.\n\nFailure to comply with the court's mandatory direction led the appellant to file a petition for contempt. The alleged contemners im:pleaded were Ist respondent company and the 4th respondent Bank. When this petition for taking action in contempt came up before Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. there appeared on the scene one Mr. Majumdar, learned counsel for the 4th respondent Bank as we:ll as the two joint receivers functioning in dual capacity as joint re1; eivers as well as learned counsel for the respective clients,. namely, 1st respondent company and the 2nd respondent State of West Bengal. At the hearing of this motion for taking action for contempt, Mr. Majumdar learned counsel for the 4th resp:rndent unreservedly agreed to comply with the order of the Court on May 24, 1979, which means that he agreed and undertook to pay the amount of Rs. 4,20,702.94 out of the fixed deposit account in the name of 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta, receiver of the l>t respondent comany. It is because the Bank agreed unreservedly and unconditionally to pay up the amount that the motion for taking action in contempt was discharged by the Court.\n\nNo action was sought to be taken against the joint receivers who had interposed themselves in the meantime.\n\nTherefore, the court declined to accede to their request to stay a\n\nportion of the order.\n\nThe order dated June 7, 1979, is not a fresh order on merits. It was merely an implementation of the order dated May 24, 1979, which may appear to have become final and binding.\n\nYet the 1st respondent company and the 2nd respondent State of West Bengal took no further action and surprisingly the Bank also joined hands with them by not paying the amount till March 7, 1980.\n\nMaybe, there may be some interim orders.\n\nWe are not made knowledgeable about the nature and character of those interim orders save and except what has been recited in the order dated March 7,1980, of Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. However, there seems to be some apparent collusion between the company on one hand and the joint receivers in not complying with the court's order dated May 24, 1979, even though. action for contempt was avoided by giving an unconditional undertaking to carry out that order.\n\nThe three appeals were preferred against the order dated March 7, 1980. That order has nothing to do with order dated May 24,1979, or the order dated June 7, 1979. At any rate, the order dated May 24,1979, may appear to have become final.\n\nWould it be appropriate in such circumstances to grant an interim stay of the portion of an order which may appear to have become final in an appal against an altogether different order?\n\nMr. Shankar Ghose, lear.1ed counsel for the respondent wanted us to take note of various allegations against the 3rd respondent, the receiver, the fact that he was removed, the fact that he was colluding with the appellant and that he was negligent as also that he was discharged at some stage of the proceedings. At this stage, these contentions in our opinion are not very relevent. Maybe, there is merit in these contentions.\n\nMaybe, the Division Bench hearing the appeals by the 1st and 2nd respondent will examine these contentions on merits. The only live issue is whether would it be fair while granting stay of the order dated March 7, J 980 to effectively stay the order dated March 24,1979, which appears not to be under appeal though its validity may be questioned in the course of hearing of the appeal? lf that be so, could the Court overlook attempt of the Jst and 2nd respondents to circumvent the order by obtaining an interim stay in such manner that an order not under appeal gets frozen ? It is, therefor.:, that we propose to interfere with the interim order made by the Division Benc:1 of the Calcutta High Court on September 9, 1980, confirming the ad interim order dated March 7, J 980, to a limited extent so that an impression that the court's process can be lightly trifled with, may be avoided.\n\n~··\n\n'.,\n\nJ. KHATAU & co. v. LUXMJ NARAYAN COTTON MILLS (Desai, J.) 459\n\nUnder the circumstances the proper thing to do would be to set aside the interim stay order dated March 27, 1980, as also the order dated September 9, 1980, confirming the interim order but in order to ensure the resultant justiee as we are interfering with an interim order, we consider it proper to give certain directions, while restoring status quo ante in the event the appeals filed by respon• dents 1 and 2 are allowed or any specific positive direction is given by the court in this behalf.\n\nWe accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the orders made by the Division Bench on March 27, 1980 and September 9, 1980. The result would be that the order dated May 4, 1978, by Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. and order dated May 24, 1978, made by Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. as also the undertaking given by the manager of the 4th respondent Bank through his learned counsel Shri Majumdar before Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. on June 7, 1979, would be revived and would be effective and will have to be implemented. In pursuance to the aforementioned two orders, the 4th respondent Bank will have to pay Rs. 4,20,702.94 p. to the decree-holder appellant towards the decretal amount.\n\nOn receipt of the amount the appellant shall pass a receipt acknowledging receipt of the amount and to the extent of the payment of the amount herein indicated the liability of the 4th respondent Bank to the 1st respondent company or anyone claiming on its behalf or the 3rd respondent receiver shall stand discharged.\n\nBefore the amount is paid, the appellant shall give security to the satisfaction of the High\n\nCourt and also an undertaking on affidavit to the Division Bench of the Calcutt!! High Court before which the appeals preferred by the 1st and 2nd respondents are pending that in the event the appeals are allowed which makes it consequently necessary for the appellant to repay the amount received from the 4th respondent Bank in payment of the decretal amount, the appellant shall deposit the said amount with the Calcutta High Court within one month from the date of the order of the appellate Bench.\n\nThe appeals will stand disposed of as herein indicated with no orderas to cost.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n- I A", "total_entities": 71, "entities": [{"text": "JETHABHAI KHATAU & CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JETHABHAI KHATAU & CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LUXMI NARAYAN COTTON MILLS LTD. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LUXMI NARAYAN COTTON MILLS LTD. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April JO, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 78, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April JO, 1981\n\n[A.C. GUPTA AND D.A. DESAI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A.C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution of India 1950, Art, 136-lnterim orders by the High Courtlnterference by Supreme Court-When arises."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1058, "end_char": 1072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decretal amount having become due and payable the appellant by an order dated April 12, 1978 obtained an interim attachment of the money in the fixed deposit account of the hank, which was confirmed by order dated April 24, 1978."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1194, "end_char": 1208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decretal amount having become due and payable the appellant by an order dated April 12, 1978 obtained an interim attachment of the money in the fixed deposit account of the hank, which was confirmed by order dated April 24, 1978."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1213, "end_char": 1224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1978 upon a petition by the appellant, the Court directed the receiver, 3rd respondent to pay the decretal amount to the appellant out of the amount in the fixed deposit account of the judgment-debtor with the Bank."}}, {"text": "May 24. 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As this order was not implemented, the appellant again moved the Court and by its order dated the May 24."}}, {"text": "March 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2308, "end_char": 2321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 7, 1980 the Court declined to grant the prayer for discharge of the receiver 3rd respondent and directed that the balance after payment of the dcretal amount in the fixed deposit account will be held by the receiver."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2815, "end_char": 2835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two\n\nappeals were preferred by the 1st respondent company and one appeal was preferred by 2nd respondent, State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2926, "end_char": 2940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeals preferred by the Jst respondent company the High Court by its order dated March 27, 1980 granted ad interim stay in the matter, by directing that the Bank would not dis burse any amount in respect of the fixed deposit account and by issuing an injunction restraining the appellant from obtaining any payment."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3277, "end_char": 3294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeals to this Court,\n\nHELD: The order made by the Division Bench on March 27, 1980 and continued on September 9, 1980 are set aside."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3342, "end_char": 3354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order dated May 4, 1978 and May 24, 1979 as also the undertaking given by the Manager of the 4th respondent Bank through its Counsel on June 7, 1979 would be revived and would be effective and will have to be implemented."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3450, "end_char": 3462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order dated May 4, 1978 and May 24, 1979 as also the undertaking given by the Manager of the 4th respondent Bank through its Counsel on June 7, 1979 would be revived and would be effective and will have to be implemented."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kacker and H.R. Puri for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H.R. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5676, "end_char": 5685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kacker and H.R. Puri for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Shankar Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5706, "end_char": 5719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shankar Ghosh, B.P. Maheshwari and Miss Asha Jain for B Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Ghosh"}}, {"text": "B.P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5721, "end_char": 5736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shankar Ghosh, B.P. Maheshwari and Miss Asha Jain for B Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Asha Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5746, "end_char": 5755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shankar Ghosh, B.P. Maheshwari and Miss Asha Jain for B Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Dalip Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nDalip Sinha, G.S. Chatterjee and P.K. Chatterjee for Respondent No.2."}}, {"text": "G.S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5793, "end_char": 5808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nDalip Sinha, G.S. Chatterjee and P.K. Chatterjee for Respondent No.2.", "canonical_name": "G.S. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "P.K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nDalip Sinha, G.S. Chatterjee and P.K. Chatterjee for Respondent No.2.", "canonical_name": "G.S. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5895, "end_char": 5900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nM/s Jethabhai Khatu & Co., a partnership firm, is the appellant in all the three appeals."}}, {"text": "Jethabhai Khatu & Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nM/s Jethabhai Khatu & Co., a partnership firm, is the appellant in all the three appeals.", "canonical_name": "JETHABHAI KHATAU & CO"}}, {"text": "Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6047, "end_char": 6078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents in all the three appeals are : (I) Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., an incorporated Company ('company' for short), (2) State of West Bengal, (3) S.K. Dutta, who was for some time a receiver appointed by the High Court; (4} Grindlays Bank, ('Bank' for short), having a fixed deposit account in the name of Receiver.", "canonical_name": "LUXMI NARAYAN COTTON MILLS LTD. & ORS"}}, {"text": "S.K. Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6157, "end_char": 6167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents in all the three appeals are : (I) Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., an incorporated Company ('company' for short), (2) State of West Bengal, (3) S.K. Dutta, who was for some time a receiver appointed by the High Court; (4} Grindlays Bank, ('Bank' for short), having a fixed deposit account in the name of Receiver.", "canonical_name": "S.K.\n\nDutta"}}, {"text": "Grindlays Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents in all the three appeals are : (I) Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., an incorporated Company ('company' for short), (2) State of West Bengal, (3) S.K. Dutta, who was for some time a receiver appointed by the High Court; (4} Grindlays Bank, ('Bank' for short), having a fixed deposit account in the name of Receiver."}}, {"text": "S.K. Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6327, "end_char": 6337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Dutta on behalf of Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., (5) A.K. Dutta, and (6) R.C.\n\nDeb, who claim to have been appointed as joint receivers after removal of Sh.", "canonical_name": "S.K.\n\nDutta"}}, {"text": "Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6351, "end_char": 6382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Dutta on behalf of Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., (5) A.K. Dutta, and (6) R.C.\n\nDeb, who claim to have been appointed as joint receivers after removal of Sh."}}, {"text": "A.K. Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Dutta on behalf of Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., (5) A.K. Dutta, and (6) R.C.\n\nDeb, who claim to have been appointed as joint receivers after removal of Sh.", "canonical_name": "S.K.\n\nDutta"}}, {"text": "R.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6408, "end_char": 6412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Dutta on behalf of Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd., (5) A.K. Dutta, and (6) R.C.\n\nDeb, who claim to have been appointed as joint receivers after removal of Sh."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6586, "end_char": 6605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1194/66 against the company on the original side of the Calcutta High Court to recover a certain amount due under two separate heads."}}, {"text": "Gurudas Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6782, "end_char": 6796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the time the suit came up for hearing the board of Directors of the 1st respondent company was superseded and one Gurudas Sharma was appointed as an Administrator."}}, {"text": "January 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7184, "end_char": 7199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,85,000 with interest thereon at 6% per annum from January 6, 1970, the date of the decree, till realisation."}}, {"text": "Narayanganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7938, "end_char": 7949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,00,000 from the Custodian of Enemy Property in respect of its cotton Mills situated in Narayanganj, Bangladesh."}}, {"text": "Bangladesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7951, "end_char": 7961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,00,000 from the Custodian of Enemy Property in respect of its cotton Mills situated in Narayanganj, Bangladesh."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J 002-2539 with the Bank at its Netaji Subhash Road Branch, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8305, "end_char": 8318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, by an order dated April 5, 1978, of the Calcutta High Court, obtained leave to execute the decree by attachment of funds lying in tl1e hands of the 3rd respondent receiver S.K.\n\nDutta (Annexure 'D')."}}, {"text": "S.K.\n\nDutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8459, "end_char": 8470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, by an order dated April 5, 1978, of the Calcutta High Court, obtained leave to execute the decree by attachment of funds lying in tl1e hands of the 3rd respondent receiver S.K.\n\nDutta (Annexure 'D').", "canonical_name": "S.K.\n\nDutta"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8657, "end_char": 8662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. K. Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8777, "end_char": 8788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this order an interim attachment was levied under Order 21 Rule.52 C.P.C. on the amount covered by the aforementioned fixed deposit receipt, and accordingly the Master of the Court, Shri S. K. Ghosh informed the 3rd respondent receiver by the writ of the Court dated ."}}, {"text": "May 24, l 979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9815, "end_char": 9828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Presumably neither the 3rd respondent receiver nor the Bank effectively implemented the order dated May 4, 1978, whereup:>n the appellant moved the Court during the vacation on May 24, l 979, for an appropriate direction and a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court working as vacation judge gave the directions prayed for."}}, {"text": "Sudhir Kumar Dutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10195, "end_char": 10213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prayer (a) : That the receiver Sudhir Kumar Dutta be forthwith directed to instruct and intimate to the Grindlays Bank Ltd., Netaji Subhash Road Branch, Calcutta, to pay\n\na sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Majumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12139, "end_char": 12147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bank appeared through its counsel Mr. Majumdar and the joint receivers appeared forth emselves as well as for theii respective clients, namely, 1st respondent company and the 2nd respondent State of West Bengal.", "canonical_name": "Majumdar"}}, {"text": "Majumder", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12317, "end_char": 12325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Majumder; learned advocate for the Bank undertook to the Court to comply with the order dated May 24, 1979, to pay the amount therein mentioned to M/ s Maharia & Co. Advocate-on-record for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Majumdar"}}, {"text": "Maharia & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12469, "end_char": 12482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Majumder; learned advocate for the Bank undertook to the Court to comply with the order dated May 24, 1979, to pay the amount therein mentioned to M/ s Maharia & Co. Advocate-on-record for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Padma Khastgir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13606, "end_char": 13620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Probably soon thereafter some interim orders were obtained as would transpire from the order of Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. dated March 7, 1980."}}, {"text": "7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13637, "end_char": 13644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Probably soon thereafter some interim orders were obtained as would transpire from the order of Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. dated March 7, 1980."}}, {"text": "R.C. Deb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This observation would, however, establish that till March 7, 1980, the 3rd respondent was not discharged as a receiver though from the recitals in the order dated June 7, 1979, it appears that by that date A.K. Dutta and R.C. Deb were functioning as joint receivers."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14896, "end_char": 14908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Specifically this order has the effect of confirming the earlier order dated May 24, 1970, to pay the decretal amount to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Grindlays Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15728, "end_char": 15747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B There will be an order directing the Grindlays Bank Ltd., of 29, Netaji Subhash Road not to disburse any amount in respect of fixed deposit No."}}, {"text": "Jethabhai Khatau and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16030, "end_char": 16054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1002-2539 standing in the name of S.K. Dutta, the fixed deposit receipt whereof is lying deposited with the present joint receivers R.C. Deb and A.K. Dutta......\n\nOrder of injunction restraining Jethabhai Khatau and Co. from obtaining any payment out of the moneys lying in the Grindlays Bank and held by the joint receivers or receiver.\""}}, {"text": "September, 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16249, "end_char": 16267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This interim order was confirmed by the Division Bench by its order dated September, 9, 1980."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17428, "end_char": 17441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this matter was listed before us on April 3, 1981, Mr.\n\nH Kackkar, learned counsel for the Appellant stated that almost within the dying embers of the time granted by this Court an attempt was\n\nmade by the respondents to get their matter listed in 'the High Court and the only order that the court has made is that the appeals be added to the cause list of the Division Bench and it would be anybody's guess when this last added matter would reach hearing."}}, {"text": "H Kackkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17448, "end_char": 17457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this matter was listed before us on April 3, 1981, Mr.\n\nH Kackkar, learned counsel for the Appellant stated that almost within the dying embers of the time granted by this Court an attempt was\n\nmade by the respondents to get their matter listed in 'the High Court and the only order that the court has made is that the appeals be added to the cause list of the Division Bench and it would be anybody's guess when this last added matter would reach hearing."}}, {"text": "order 21 Rule 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20183, "end_char": 20199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20200, "end_char": 20205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S.K.Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20307, "end_char": 20316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court on a petition of the appellant levied attachment A under order 21 Rule 52 C.P.C. on the amount lying in fixed deposit account with 4th respondent Bank in the name of 3rd respondent S.K.Dutta as receiver of the first respondent company by order dated April 5, 1978.", "canonical_name": "S.K.\n\nDutta"}}, {"text": "Sabyasachi Muk\"1rjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20540, "end_char": 20560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sabyasachi Muk\"1rjee, J. by his order dated M'.ly 4, 1978, directed 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta to pay the amount of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sabyasachi Muk\"1rjee"}}, {"text": "Manoj Kumar Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20904, "end_char": 20925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. by his order dated May 24, 1979, directed 3rd respondent S.K. Dutta, receiver of the Ist respondent company to pay Rs."}}, {"text": "March 7,1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23320, "end_char": 23332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not made knowledgeable about the nature and character of those interim orders save and except what has been recited in the order dated March 7,1980, of Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. However, there seems to be some apparent collusion between the company on one hand and the joint receivers in not complying with the court's order dated May 24, 1979, even though."}}, {"text": "May 24,1979,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23831, "end_char": 23843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At any rate, the order dated May 24,1979, may appear to have become final."}}, {"text": "Shankar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24070, "end_char": 24083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shankar Ghose, lear.1ed counsel for the respondent wanted us to take note of various allegations against the 3rd respondent, the receiver, the fact that he was removed, the fact that he was colluding with the appellant and that he was negligent as also that he was discharged at some stage of the proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Ghosh"}}, {"text": "March 7, J 980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24701, "end_char": 24715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only live issue is whether would it be fair while granting stay of the order dated March 7, J 980 to effectively stay the order dated March 24,1979, which appears not to be under appeal though its validity may be questioned in the course of hearing of the appeal?"}}, {"text": "March 24,1979,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24752, "end_char": 24766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only live issue is whether would it be fair while granting stay of the order dated March 7, J 980 to effectively stay the order dated March 24,1979, which appears not to be under appeal though its validity may be questioned in the course of hearing of the appeal?"}}, {"text": "Sabyasachi Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26147, "end_char": 26167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result would be that the order dated May 4, 1978, by Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. and order dated May 24, 1978, made by Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. as also the undertaking given by the manager of the 4th respondent Bank through his learned counsel Shri Majumdar before Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. on June 7, 1979, would be revived and would be effective and will have to be implemented.", "canonical_name": "Sabyasachi Muk\"1rjee"}}, {"text": "May 24, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26188, "end_char": 26200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result would be that the order dated May 4, 1978, by Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. and order dated May 24, 1978, made by Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. as also the undertaking given by the manager of the 4th respondent Bank through his learned counsel Shri Majumdar before Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. on June 7, 1979, would be revived and would be effective and will have to be implemented."}}, {"text": "Calcutt!! High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27127, "end_char": 27147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the amount is paid, the appellant shall give security to the satisfaction of the High\n\nCourt and also an undertaking on affidavit to the Division Bench of the Calcutt!!"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_460_473_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER\n\nRAM GOPAL SHUKLA\n\nApril JO, 1981\n\n(A.D. KOSHAL AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.J\n\nUttar Pradesh Promotion by Selection in Consultation with Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1970, Rules 7A and 7B-Whether the rules are discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nNew plea-New plea cannot be allowed at the time of hearing of the appeal in the Supreme Court.\n\nThe selection for the posts of Tehsildars in the State of U.P. was to be made by promotion from amongst various sources such as Naib Tehsildars, Peshkars of the Kumaon Division, Kanungos, Kanungo Inspectors or Instructors and Sadar Kanungos as per the procedure laid down in rules known as Uttar Pradesh Adheenasth Rajaswa Karyakari (Tehsildar) Sewa Niyamavali, 1966. The procedure for selection is regulated by Rule 9 and under sub-section (6) of this Rule a E select list will be drawn in order of merit separately for substantive vacancies and temporary vacancies and officials will be offered officiating or temporary vacancies in the order in which their names have been arranged in the \"select list\" as and when the vacancies occur during the course of the year.\n\nThis \"select list\" will hold good only for one year or until such time a review is made at the following selections.\n\nF Subsequently, the State Government made the Uttar Pradesh Promotion by Selection in Consultation with Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1970, which governed various services, to be more specific 29 Uttar Pradesh services including the services of Tehsi!dars. The purpose of these rules was to standardise the procedure for promotion and make it uniform in respect of such services. The procedure laid down in the 1970 Rules for promotion as Tehsildars was not substantially different from that laid down in the Tehsildars Rules, 1966. By a G Notification No. 42/4/196:-Appointment, 3 dated 4th July, 1972 two new rules were introduced, namely, Rules 7A and 7B, in the 1970 Rules. -As per these newly added rules candidates in the Select List made under the 1966 Rules were to be appointed against substantive vacancies in preference to any candidates selected in accordance with the provisions of the 1970 Rules and nnless the candidates in the list were exhausted, other eligible candidates were not to be considered for H promotion so that thei.r chances of promotion would be deferred to an undated future.\n\nU.P. STATE V. RAMGOPAL 461\n\nThe respondent who started his service as Kanungo in 1949, was promoted as Naib Tehsildar and in 1962 he was confirmed as such. In 1963, he was appointed as Tehsildar in an officiating capacity. In accordance with the 1966 Rules the\n\nUttar Pradesh, Public Service Commission selected 148 persons for substantive appointment as Tehsildars and their names were shown in a list known as Li st-A. The Commission also selected 300 other persons for temporary or officiating appointment as Tehsildars during the coming years and their names figured in what was called List-B. The respondent was, however, not selected and his name could not be included in either of the aforesaid two lists because he had an adverse entry forming part of the remarks recorded on his work and conduct and had also been shown down below at serial 557 in the seniority list of Naib Tehsildars in the year 1966. Though the adverse entry was expunged in the year 1969 and his seniority was also re-fixed at serial number 216 on 6th October, 1970, since there was no selection after 1966, his name could not be included in either of the two lists even thereafter.\n\nThe respondent challenged the vires of Rules 7A and 7B by filing a petition uuder Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Allahabad. That petition was allowed in part and Rules 7 A and 7B were declared ultra vi res Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, in the impugned judgment. Hence the - appeal by special leave by the State.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court,\n\nHELD: 1:1. Rules 7A and 7B of the Uttar Pradesh Promotion by Selection in O; msultation with Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1970 .. are\n\nultra rires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (466 E, 473 A-BJ\n\n1 :2.\n\nThe grievance of the respondent, namely, that he had a fundamental E right of being considered for promotion when others similarly situated were so condsidered and teat if he was not considered in a situation like that, he was discriminated against and was denied equality of opportunity is not only factually correct but well founded. [ 467 B-C]\n\n2:1. It is true that the rules regulating the conditions of service are within the executive power of the State or its legislative power under the proviso to Articles 309 of the Constitution, but even so, such rules have to be reasonable, fair and not grossly unjust if they are to survive the test of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. A rn le, which contemplates tl1at unless the list of 300 persons is exhausted no other person can be selected obviously, is unjust and it deprives other persons in the same situation of the opportunity of being considered for promotion. [ 4 70 F-H]\n\nG 2:2. The classification in this case cannot be said to be a reasonable classification based on the intelligible differentia having a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The only basis of grouping the 300 persons in one category is that they were included in the select list of 1966 and that ihey were officiating. The respondent, in the instant case, could not be selected in the selection of 1966 on account of an adverse entry which was subsequently expunged. His position in the H seniority list was also corrected but because no selection took place after 1966.\n\nThe respondent could not be included in the list for no fault of his. If 1her1 hfld\n\nbeen a selection and the list had been revised every year, as is the requirement of the rules, the responde/lf, and like him many others, would have been included in the list. For example, some candidates who had not completed seven years could not be eligible for promotion and could not be included in the Select List of 1966 but after a lapse of time they became eligible and they might have been selected if selection had taken place. But, the door for promotion had been foreclosed for the respondent and many others like him by Rules 7 A and 7B for no fault of theirs. The objection taken by the Public Service Commission and the letter of the Secretary of the Board of Revenue addressed to the Government indicating that it would take about 24 years to absorb 300 persons included in List-B and, therefore, recommending that the list may not be enforced would point out unmistakably that the selection was unnecessarily postponed only to accommodate the 300 persons included in the Select List of 1966. There is no rational basis for such a departure from the ordinary operation of the 1970 Rules which envisaged the preparation of a new list every year and for singling out one particular list for according preferential treatment to others in the similar situtations.\n\n[ 469 B-F, 470 A-C]\n\nStale of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and others [1974] 1 S.C.R. 771 ; Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and others, [1978] I S.C.R. 787 and Ganga Ram and others v. Union of India and others, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 481, applied.\n\nReserve Bank of India v. C.S. Rajappan Nair and others, I.L.R. 1977 (1) Kerala 398, approved.\n\n3. In a case where the vires of certain rules were challenged as being vioMive of the Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, only State is a necessary party. The other persons likely to be affected by the declaration of the rules as ultra vires are E only proper parties. [471 E-F]\n\n4. A party cannot be prmittd to take up a new plea in the appeal for the first time before this Court which was not taken before the High Court in writ petition. [ 472 E-F]\n\nGeneral Manager, South Central Railway, Secundrabad and Anr. v. A. V.R.\n\n\nB. Gopalaiah v. Govern nent of Andhra Pradesh, A.LR. 1969 A.P. 204 and J.S. Sachdev and Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India and Anr., I.L.R. (1973) II Delhi 392, approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 29th March, 1980 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) Lucknow in Writ Petition No. 524 of 1979.\n\nAND\n\nCIVL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION Nos. 4905 and 11949 of 1980. ..\n\nG.N. Dixit, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and H.R. Bhardwaj for the A Appellants.\n\nS.N. Kackar, K.K. Mohan, Rajiv Datta and A.S. Pandit for the Respondent.\n\nA.N. Pareek and S.K. Jain for the Intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J. The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 29th March 1979 of the Allahabad High Court\n\nallowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the State of Uttar Pradesh, there is a Service commonly known as Naib Tehsildars. They have always formed the backbone of the revenue administration in that State. Sixty per cent of the posts of Naib Tehsildars are filled through a competitive examination held by the State Public Service Commission. The remaining posts are filled by promotion. There is another Service in that State known as the Service of Tehsildars.\n\nCent per cent of the posts of Tehsildars are filled by promotion from amongst various sources such as Naib Tehsildars,. Peshkars of the Kumaon Division, Kanungos, Kanungo Inspectors or Instructors and Sadar Kanungos.\n\nRam Gopal Shukla, the respondent, started his service as Kanungo in 1949.\n\nIn due course, he was promoted as Naib Tehsildar. In 1962, he was confirmed as such, and in 1963 he was appointed as Tehsildi:ir in an officiating capacity.\n\nIt appears that a regular selection for the posts of Tehsildars was held in 1966 in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Adheenasth Rajaswa Karyakari (Tehsildar) Sewa Niyamavali, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tehsildar Rules 1966'). Rule 5 of these Rules provides the sources of recruitment to the post of Tehsildar. Rule 6 thereof lays down conditions for eligibility and provides,--\n\n\"For the purposes of recruitment to the Service a selection strictly on merit shall be made from amongst all the permanent Naib Tehsildars, Tehsildars, Peshkars of the Kumaon Division, Kanungo Inspectors or Instructors and Sadar Kanungos, who have put in not less than seven years' service in the aggregate as such or in an equivalent or higher\n\npost in a substantive or officiating capacity on the first day of January of the year in which the selection is made.\"\n\nRule 7 enjoins upon the Parish ad to report by i st of March every year to the Government the number of vacancies in the Service expected during the following calendar year, and then provides that the Governor shall fix the number of appointments to be made.\n\nRule 8 lays down the criterion for selection.\n\nRule 9 prescribes the procedure for selection.\n\nAs this rule is important for the purpose of the present case, it is reproduced in so far as it is relevant,-\n\n\"9. The procedure for selection shall be as follows :\n\n(J) The Parish ad shall draw up, in order of merit, a list of most suitable candidates from amongst those who are eligible for promotion to the posts of Tehsildars. The names in the list shall ordinarily be double the number of substantive vacancies to be filled during the course of the year.\n\n(2) The Parishad shall also draw up, in order of merit, a supplementary list containing names of officials considered suitable for officiating or temporary vacancies expected to occur during the course of the year.\n\n/ (3) The two lists drawn up under clauses (J) & (2) above together with a gradation list prepared under clause (b) of Rule 10, indicating therein the reasons for passing over the seniors, if any and the character rolls of all the eligible officials shall be forwarded by the Parishad to the Commission \"\n\n(4) The Parishad shall thereafter, in consultation with the Commission, fix date, on which a Selection Committee consisting ofshall consider the cases of the eligible candidates whose names are contained in the final lists drawn up by the Commission and interview such of them as are indicated by the\n\nCommission under clause (3) above.\n\n(5) The lists of the names selected by the Committee shall be taken with him by the representative of the Commission\n\nfor placing them before the Commission, and the Commis- A sion, shall thereafter send their final recommendations to the Parishad.\n\n( 6) The Parishad shall draw from the first list received from the Commission under clause (5) above, as many candidates as there are permanent vacancies and will thereafter re-arrange their names in accordance with their seniority in the present service and they will be appointed against the substantive vacancies. The remaining names of the first list and those of the second list will be regarded as forming the 'Select List' to be drawn up in order of merit. The officials will be offered officiating or temporary vacancies in the order in which their names have been arranged in the aforesaid 'Select List' as and when the vacancies occur during the course of the year.\n\nThis 'Select List' will hold good only for one year or until such time a review ; s made at the following selection. (Emphasis supplied)\n\n(7) In case permanent vacancies do not occur for two consecutive years and it becomes necessary to make a selection for temporary or officiating vacancies only, then also the procedure prescribed above will be followed.\"\n\nIn accordance with the aforesaid rules, the Uttar Pradesh Publice Service Commission selected 148 persons for substantive appointment as Tehsildars and their names were shown in a list known as List A.\n\nThe Commission also selected 300 other persons for temporary and officiating appointment as Tehsildars during the coming years and their names figuured in what was called List B.\n\nThe respondent was, however, not selected and consequently his name could not be included in either of the aforesaid two lists, presumably because he had . an adverse entry forming part of the remarks recorded on his work and conduct and had also been shown down below at serial No. 557 in the seniority list of Naib Tehsildars in the year 1956. Thoug;1 the adverse entry was expunged in the year 1969 and his seniority was also re-fixed at serial No. 216 on 6th of October 1970, as there was no selection after 1966, his name could not be included in either of the two lists.\n\nHe has, however, no grievance on that account.\n\nSubsequently, the State Government made the Uttar Pradesh H Promotion by Selection in Consultatioa with Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'the\n\nA 1970 Rules'). These rules govern various Services, to be more specific 29 U.P. Services including the Service of Tehsildars. The purpose of these rules obviously was to standardise the procedure for promotion and make it uniform in respect of all such Services.\n\nThe procedure laid down in the 1970 Rules for promotion as Tehsildar was not substantially different from that laid down in the B Tehsildar Rules 1966.\n\nThe respondent, therefore, did not feel aggrieved even by the introduction of the 1970 Rules.\n\nHis grievance started only with the introduction of rules 7-A and 7-B to the 1970 Rules by notification No.42/4/1966-Apptt. 3 dated 4th of July 1972.\n\nAs the question to be decided in this case is about the vires of rules 7-A and 7-B, it willbe appropriate to read them at this stage,- c\n\n\"7-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, but subject to the proviso to rule 18, the names of candidates on the Select List appointed in temporary or officiating vacancies prior to the date of issue of this notification, shall be rearranged in order of seniority.\"\n\n\"7-B. The candidates of of the Select List as rearranged in accordance with rule 7-A shall be appointed against substantive vacancies in preference to any candidate selected in accordance with the provisions of these rules.\"\n\nThe complaint of the respond_ent was foat the aforesaid new rules 7-A and 7-B were discriminatory and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, in as much as the candidate in the Select List of 1966 were to be appointed against substantive vacancies in preference to any candidate selected in accordanc~ with the provisions of the 1970 Rules and unless the candidates in the list were exhausted, other eligible candidates were not to be considered for promotion so that their chances of promotion would be deferred to an undated future.\n\nThe further grievance of the respondent was to the following effect.\n\nThe Select List was to hold good only for one year or until such time a review was mlde at the following selection. Thus, the life of the Select List of 1966 was for one year only on the expiry of which it died its natural death. In this view of the legal position, the appointment of Tehsildars from the Select List of 1966 after the expiry of a year from the date of its operation was illegal on the face of it.\n\nOn the strength of Rule 7-A and rule 7B, no selection was to be held unless 300 persons included in List B were absorbed.\n\nThe respondent challenged the vires of rules 7-A and 7-B by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High\n\nCourt of Allahabad. That petition was allowed in part and rules 7-A and 7-B were declared ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in the impugned judgment.\n\nShri Dixit, appearing for the State has contended that a mere chance of promotion is not a conition of service giving rise to a fundamental right. We are afraid this contention is irrelevant • to the decision of this case.\n\nThe precise grievance of the respondent has been that he had a fundamental right of being considered for promotion when others similarly situated were so considered and that if he was not considered in a situation like that, he was oiscriminated against and was denied equality of opportunity. This grievance, if factually correct, must be held to be well-founded.\n\nIt was next contended by Shri Dixit that the candidates covered by rule 7-A are a class by themselves, that the classification is a reasonable classification and that as the respondent does not satisfy the requirements of rule 7-A, he cannot claim that any infraction of Article 14 or 16 bas taken place.\n\nAccording to Shri Dixit, two conditions are necessary to bring a person within the fold of that rule: : (!) the candidate's name must have been included in the Select List; and (2) he must have been appointed in a temporary or officiating vacancy prior to the date of issue of the notification of 4th July 1972. The respondent did not satisfy these requirements and therefore did not fall within the purview of rule 7-A.\n\nRule 7-B gives perference to the candidates in the Select List as rearranged in accordance with rule 7-A, which, according to Shri Dixit, was based on a reasonable cla11sification and therefore the respondent can have no grievance. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on Reserve Bank of India v.\n\nC.S. Rajoppan Nair and others,(1) State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and others,(') Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and others,(3) and Ganga Ram and others v. Union of India and others.(4 ) In C.S. Rajappan Nair (supra), the classification of a group of employess who had officiated in a particular capacity as a different class, treating them differently from others who had not the opportunity to function as such, was held to be an intelligible differentia which can stand the test of equality provided by Article 16 of the\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1977 (I) Kere la 398.\n\n\nConstitution. In Triloki Nath Khosa (supra), persons appointed directly and by promotion had integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers. The question arose whether for the purpose of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, they could be classified on the basis of educational qualification. It was held by this Court that the rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders did not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ln Ramesh Prasad 9' Singh (supra), this Court, dealing with principle of equality under Articles 14 and 16, observed,-\n\n\"The doctrine of equality before law and equal protection of laws and equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and promotion enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination is attracted only when equals are treated as unequals or where unequals are treated as equals. The guarantee of equality does not imply that the same rules should be made applicable in spite of differences in their circumstances and conditions. Although Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution forbid hositle discrimination, they do not forbid reasonable classification and equality of opportunity in matters of promotion -means equality as between members of the same class of employees and not equality between members of separate independent classes.\n\nEquality is for equals, that is, who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment but the guarantee enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be carried beyond the point which is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court.\"\n\nIn Ganga Ram (supra), dealing with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, this Court again held,-\n\n\"Mere production of inequality is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition because every classification is likely in some degree to produce some inequality.\n\nThe classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically H complete. The matter has to be considered in a practical way without whittling down the equality clause. The classification must however be founded on intelligible differentia\n\nwhich on rational grounds distinguishes persons grouped together from those left out, and it must bear a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved.\"\n\nThere is no dispute with the principles of law laid down in the aforesaid cases.\n\nBy now, the principles of classification are wellsettled and need not be repeated. The question is of application of those principles to the facts of the present case.\n\nThe only basis for grouping the 300 persons in one category is that they were included in the Select List of 1966 and that they were officiating.\n\nThe respondent in the instant case could not be selected in the selection of 1966 on account of an adverse entry which, as stated earlier, was subsequently expunged.\n\nHis position in the seniority list was also corrected but because no selection took place after 1966 the respondent could not be included in the list for no fault of his.\n\nIf there had bfen a selection and the list had been revised ewry year as is the 1equireme11t of the rules, the respondent, and like him many others, would have been included in the list.\n\nFor example, some candidates who had not completed seven years could not be eligible for promotion and could not be included in the Select List of 1966 but after a lapse of time they became eligible and they might have been selected if selection had taken place.\n\nBut, the door for promotion had been fo reclosed for the respondent and many others like him by rules 7-A and 7-B for no fault of theirs.\n\nIn this connection reference may be made to the objection of the Public Service Commission and the letter of the Secretary of the Board of Revenue, to show that it would take about 24 years to absorb 300 persons included in List B.\n\nThe Secretary, Board of Revenue, vide his letter No. 14708/T.N.T.-59-A/70 dated 30th of January J 973, to the Secretary, Government Revenue Department (filed as Annexure II to the counter-affidavit), recommended that the List B may not be enforced.\n\nIn so far as it is pertrnent for the present purpose, it reads,--\n\n\"On the basis of the selection in the year 1966, the\n\nList 'B' was prepared for 300 names. During this period all G the candidates of list 'B' are working. So long as all these candidates are not absorbed in the regular vacancies, the question of second selection does not arise till then.\n\nOnly 56 vacancies have occurred after the selection of 1966.\n\nAccording to this the average vacancies in a year are at H I 0, with the result, it will take 24 years to exhaust the above list. Till then no selection is possible.\"\n\nIn the circumstances, the Secretary requested the Government to take steps to recommend to the Public Service Commission to make the next selection of Tehsildars without any further delay.\n\nThe objections of the Secretary, Board of Revenue, were similar to the objections raised by the Public Service Commission.\n\nThese letters and objections poiat out unmistakably that the selection was unnecessarily postponed only to accommodate the 300 persons included in the Select List of 1966. There appears to be no rational basis for such a departure from the ordinary operation of the 1970 Rules which envisaged the preparation of a new li£every year and for singling out one particular list for according preferential treatment to the persons whose names were contained therein.\n\nThe classification in this case therefore cannot be said to be a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia having a nexus to the object sought to be achieved.\n\nIt is, however, contended for the State that the selection could not take place for all these long years because of a stay order passed by the High Court in petitions filed by some candidates challenging the Tehsildar Rules 1966.\n\nThis has been refuted by Shri S.N.\n\nKacker and a finding recorded by the High Court makes out that there was no order staying the holding of selection.\n\nAll that was stayed was the confirmation of the officers promoted to the posts of Tehsildars. It is therefore not correct that selection could no, take place because of a stay order from the High Court.\n\nAs a second limb of this argument, it was contended on behalf of the State that the Government was the sole judge of the administrative necessities and there being no rule to the contrary, the Government could hold selection according to the need and no exception can be taken to the power of the State.\n\nThere is no denying the fact that the rules regulating the conditions of service are within the executive\"'power of the State or its legislative power under the proviso to Article 309 but even so, such rules have to be reasonable, fair and not grossly unjust, if they are to survive the test of Articles 14 ati.d 16 of the Constitution. A rule which contemplates that unless the list of 300 persons is exhausted no other person can be selected, obviously is unjust and it deprives other persons in the same situation of the opportunity of being considered for promotion.\n\n\"\"\"1\n\nIt was next contended for the State that the declaration of rules 7-A and 7-B as ultra vires the Constitution would affect not only the incumbents of one Service but of 29 Services and a fairly large number of persons would be affected in that situation, that the respondent did not implead any of those persons likely to be affected in the various Services, that in any case, at least the Naib Tehsildars or other persons who have been promoted as Tehsildars and who are likely to be affected by the declaration of rules 7-A and 7-B as ultra vires should have been impleaded as parties and that in the absence of those parties, the writ petition was not maintainable and should have been dismissed by High Court on that score.\n\nShri S.N. Kacker appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, has contended that no such plea was taken on behalf of the State before the High Court and that, therefore, it cannot be permitted to take up a new plea for the first time before this Court.\n\nElaborating the point, Shri Kacker urged that if such a plea had been taken before the -High Court, the respondent would have impleaded all those persons as parties and filled up the lacuna, if any, and that if the State is permitted to take up such a plea for the first time before this Court, it would seriously prejudice the case of the respondent.\n\nAlternatively, it was contended that the respondent is aggrieved by the ameildment of the 1970 Rlues by the 1972 notification which introduced rules 7-A and 7-B, that the respondent has challenged the vires of rules 7-A and 7-B and only the State is .a necessary party who has already been impleaded, and that at the most, those pusons who are likely to be affected in case the said rules are declared ultra vires, may be proper parties but are not necessary parties.\n\nHe sought to take support for his contention from B. Gopalaiah v.\n\nGovernment of Andhra Pradesh,(1) J.S.\n\nSachdev & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.,(') and General Manager, South Central Railway, Secundrabad & Anr. v. A. V.R.\n\nSiddhanti and Ors.(3) In Gopalaiah' s case dealing with a situation as in the present case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held,-\n\n\"This is not a case of discrimination of individual against individual.\n\nThis is a case where a whole class of citizens have been discriminated against and the court cannot refuse to give relief to them on the ground that the\n\n(!) A.LR. 1969 A.P. 204.\n\n(2) l.L.R. (1973) II Delhi 392.\n\n\nclass of persons who will be benefited as a result of the discrimination are not before the Court.\n\nThe person who complains of discrimination cannot be expected to search the country for all persons who are likely to be benefited by its discriminatory policy. Of course, if the discrimination is in favour of an individual against an individual different considerations might arise. But this is not such a case.\n\nIn my opinion, where a scheme formulated by the Government is attacked on the ground of its being discriminatory the position is precisely the same as if a statute is attacked as being discriminatory and it can never be an answer to such an attack that persons likely to be benefited by a discriminatory statute should be brought before the Court before the statute is struck down.\"\n\nIn J.S. Sachdev' s case (supra), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court endorsed the view taken in Goplaiah's case (supra). In South Central Railway's case (supra), a similar objection taken before the Supreme Court was repelled on two grounds, firstly, because this point was not canvassed in the lower courts, and secondly, because the employees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re-adjustment of the petitioner's seniority were at the most proper parties and not necessary parties and their non-joinder could not be fatal to the writ petition.\n\nIn view of the law laid down in South Central Railway's cave (supra), the State cannot be permitted to take up a new plea which was not taken before the High Court.\n\nShri B.P. Sharma had moved an application (C.M.P. No.4905/\n\n80) for permission to intervene in the appeal on the ground that he was vitally interested in the outcome of the instant appeal which would have a great bearing upon the claim petition pending before the Service Tribunal, Lucknow. This application was ordered to be listed at th.: time of the hearing of thisa ppeal.\n\nHe also moved an application (C.M.P.No. 11949/80) for modification of the stay order dated 23rd of April 1980 in the appeal filed by the State, so as to govern other cases:affected by rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 Rules, as amended by the 1972 notification. Later on, he realised that such an application could not be moved on behalf of an intervener, anc! the'refore, instead of pursuing this application, he\n\nfiled Writ Petition No. 3806 of 1980, which has been dealt with A separately. Both these applications are, therefore, dismissed.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we find no error in the impugned judgment. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM GOPAL SHUKLA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM GOPAL SHUKLA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April JO, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER\n\nRAM GOPAL SHUKLA\n\nApril JO, 1981\n\n(A.D. KOSHAL AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.J\n\nUttar Pradesh Promotion by Selection in Consultation with Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1970, Rules 7A and 7B-Whether the rules are discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 396, "end_char": 409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "New plea-New plea cannot be allowed at the time of hearing of the appeal in the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Sadar Kanungos", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Peshkars of the Kumaon Division, Kanungos, Kanungo Inspectors or Instructors and Sadar Kanungos."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Adheenasth Rajaswa Karyakari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 702, "end_char": 744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selection for the posts of Tehsildars in the State of U.P. was to be made by promotion from amongst various sources such as Naib Tehsildars, Peshkars of the Kumaon Division, Kanungos, Kanungo Inspectors or Instructors and Sadar Kanungos as per the procedure laid down in rules known as Uttar Pradesh Adheenasth Rajaswa Karyakari (Tehsildar) Sewa Niyamavali, 1966."}}, {"text": "Sewa Niyamavali, 1966", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 757, "end_char": 778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selection for the posts of Tehsildars in the State of U.P. was to be made by promotion from amongst various sources such as Naib Tehsildars, Peshkars of the Kumaon Division, Kanungos, Kanungo Inspectors or Instructors and Sadar Kanungos as per the procedure laid down in rules known as Uttar Pradesh Adheenasth Rajaswa Karyakari (Tehsildar) Sewa Niyamavali, 1966.", "canonical_name": "Sewa Niyamavali, 1966"}}, {"text": "4th July, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1903, "end_char": 1917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42/4/196:-Appointment, 3 dated 4th July, 1972 two new rules were introduced, namely, Rules 7A and 7B, in the 1970 Rules."}}, {"text": "6th October, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3452, "end_char": 3469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the adverse entry was expunged in the year 1969 and his seniority was also re-fixed at serial number 216 on 6th October, 1970, since there was no selection after 1966, his name could not be included in either of the two lists even thereafter."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent challenged the vires of Rules 7A and 7B by filing a petition uuder Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4702, "end_char": 4714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6399, "end_char": 6424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objection taken by the Public Service Commission and the letter of the Secretary of the Board of Revenue addressed to the Government indicating that it would take about 24 years to absorb 300 persons included in List-B and, therefore, recommending that the list may not be enforced would point out unmistakably that the selection was unnecessarily postponed only to accommodate the 300 persons included in the Select List of 1966."}}, {"text": "[1974] 1 S.C.R. 771", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7156, "end_char": 7175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 S.C.R. 481", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7303, "end_char": 7322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8128, "end_char": 8156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "CIVL MISCELLANEOUS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8361, "end_char": 8379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND\n\nCIVL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION Nos."}}, {"text": "G.N. Dixit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8422, "end_char": 8432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Dixit, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and H.R. Bhardwaj for the A Appellants."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8439, "end_char": 8453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Dixit, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and H.R. Bhardwaj for the A Appellants."}}, {"text": "H.R. Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8458, "end_char": 8471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Dixit, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and H.R. Bhardwaj for the A Appellants."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8495, "end_char": 8506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kackar, K.K. Mohan, Rajiv Datta and A.S. Pandit for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "S.N.\n\nKacker"}}, {"text": "K.K. Mohan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8508, "end_char": 8518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kackar, K.K. Mohan, Rajiv Datta and A.S. Pandit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Rajiv Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8520, "end_char": 8531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kackar, K.K. Mohan, Rajiv Datta and A.S. Pandit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A.S. Pandit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8536, "end_char": 8547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kackar, K.K. Mohan, Rajiv Datta and A.S. Pandit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A.N. Pareek", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8569, "end_char": 8580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.N. Pareek and S.K. Jain for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "S.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8585, "end_char": 8594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.N. Pareek and S.K. Jain for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8660, "end_char": 8665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J. The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 29th March 1979 of the Allahabad High Court\n\nallowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8816, "end_char": 8827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8866, "end_char": 8879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the State of Uttar Pradesh, there is a Service commonly known as Naib Tehsildars."}}, {"text": "State Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9121, "end_char": 9152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sixty per cent of the posts of Naib Tehsildars are filled through a competitive examination held by the State Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Kumaon Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9411, "end_char": 9426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Peshkars of the Kumaon Division, Kanungos, Kanungo Inspectors or Instructors and Sadar Kanungos."}}, {"text": "Ram Gopal Shukla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9493, "end_char": 9509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Gopal Shukla, the respondent, started his service as Kanungo in 1949.", "canonical_name": "RAM GOPAL SHUKLA"}}, {"text": "Sewa Niyamavali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9885, "end_char": 9900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that a regular selection for the posts of Tehsildars was held in 1966 in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Adheenasth Rajaswa Karyakari (Tehsildar) Sewa Niyamavali, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tehsildar Rules 1966').", "canonical_name": "Sewa Niyamavali, 1966"}}, {"text": "Tehsildar Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9940, "end_char": 9960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Publice Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13590, "end_char": 13630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the aforesaid rules, the Uttar Pradesh Publice Service Commission selected 148 persons for substantive appointment as Tehsildars and their names were shown in a list known as List A.\n\nThe Commission also selected 300 other persons for temporary and officiating appointment as Tehsildars during the coming years and their names figuured in what was called List B.\n\nThe respondent was, however, not selected and consequently his name could not be included in either of the aforesaid two lists, presumably because he had ."}}, {"text": "6th of October 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14388, "end_char": 14407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "216 on 6th of October 1970, as there was no selection after 1966, his name could not be included in either of the two lists."}}, {"text": "4th of July 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15388, "end_char": 15404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 dated 4th of July 1972."}}, {"text": "Article 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16167, "end_char": 16184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17292, "end_char": 17303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High\n\nCourt of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17331, "end_char": 17355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent challenged the vires of rules 7-A and 7-B by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High\n\nCourt of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17439, "end_char": 17457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17510, "end_char": 17515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Dixit, appearing for the State has contended that a mere chance of promotion is not a conition of service giving rise to a fundamental right."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18366, "end_char": 18376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th July 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18698, "end_char": 18711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the candidate's name must have been included in the Select List; and (2) he must have been appointed in a temporary or officiating vacancy prior to the date of issue of the notification of 4th July 1972."}}, {"text": "C.S. Rajappan Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19351, "end_char": 19369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on Reserve Bank of India v.\n\nC.S. Rajoppan Nair and others,(1) State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and others,(') Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and others,(3) and Ganga Ram and others v. Union of India and others.(4 ) In C.S. Rajappan Nair (supra), the classification of a group of employess who had officiated in a particular capacity as a different class, treating them differently from others who had not the opportunity to function as such, was held to be an intelligible differentia which can stand the test of equality provided by Article 16 of the\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1977 (I) Kere la 398."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19667, "end_char": 19677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Triloki Nath Khosa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19738, "end_char": 19756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Triloki Nath Khosa (supra), persons appointed directly and by promotion had integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20184, "end_char": 20202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramesh Prasad 9' Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20227, "end_char": 20249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln Ramesh Prasad 9' Singh (supra), this Court, dealing with principle of equality under Articles 14 and 16, observed,-\n\n\"The doctrine of equality before law and equal protection of laws and equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and promotion enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination is attracted only when equals are treated as unequals or where unequals are treated as equals."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20312, "end_char": 20330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20493, "end_char": 20511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20850, "end_char": 20868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21281, "end_char": 21299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganga Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21422, "end_char": 21431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ganga Ram (supra), dealing with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, this Court again held,-\n\n\"Mere production of inequality is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition because every classification is likely in some degree to produce some inequality."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21454, "end_char": 21472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th of January J 973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23748, "end_char": 23769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14708/T.N.T.-59-A/70 dated 30th of January J 973, to the Secretary, Government Revenue Department (filed as Annexure II to the counter-affidavit), recommended that the List B may not be enforced."}}, {"text": "S.N.\n\nKacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25721, "end_char": 25733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has been refuted by Shri S.N.\n\nKacker and a finding recorded by the High Court makes out that there was no order staying the holding of selection.", "canonical_name": "S.N.\n\nKacker"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26525, "end_char": 26536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26648, "end_char": 26659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27665, "end_char": 27676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S.N. Kacker appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, has contended that no such plea was taken on behalf of the State before the High Court and that, therefore, it cannot be permitted to take up a new plea for the first time before this Court.", "canonical_name": "S.N.\n\nKacker"}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27946, "end_char": 27952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Elaborating the point, Shri Kacker urged that if such a plea had been taken before the -High Court, the respondent would have impleaded all those persons as parties and filled up the lacuna, if any, and that if the State is permitted to take up such a plea for the first time before this Court, it would seriously prejudice the case of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Gopalaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28997, "end_char": 29006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. A. V.R.\n\nSiddhanti and Ors.(3) In Gopalaiah' s case dealing with a situation as in the present case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held,-\n\n\"This is not a case of discrimination of individual against individual.", "canonical_name": "Gopalaiah"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29068, "end_char": 29093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. A. V.R.\n\nSiddhanti and Ors.(3) In Gopalaiah' s case dealing with a situation as in the present case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held,-\n\n\"This is not a case of discrimination of individual against individual."}}, {"text": "J.S. Sachdev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30190, "end_char": 30202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In J.S. Sachdev' s case (supra), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court endorsed the view taken in Goplaiah's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30244, "end_char": 30260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In J.S. Sachdev' s case (supra), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court endorsed the view taken in Goplaiah's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Goplaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30288, "end_char": 30296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In J.S. Sachdev' s case (supra), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court endorsed the view taken in Goplaiah's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Gopalaiah"}}, {"text": "South Central Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30316, "end_char": 30337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In South Central Railway's case (supra), a similar objection taken before the Supreme Court was repelled on two grounds, firstly, because this point was not canvassed in the lower courts, and secondly, because the employees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re-adjustment of the petitioner's seniority were at the most proper parties and not necessary parties and their non-joinder could not be fatal to the writ petition."}}, {"text": "South Central Railway's cave", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30785, "end_char": 30813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the law laid down in South Central Railway's cave (supra), the State cannot be permitted to take up a new plea which was not taken before the High Court."}}, {"text": "B.P. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30924, "end_char": 30935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri B.P. Sharma had moved an application (C.M.P. No.4905/\n\n80) for permission to intervene in the appeal on the ground that he was vitally interested in the outcome of the instant appeal which would have a great bearing upon the claim petition pending before the Service Tribunal, Lucknow."}}, {"text": "Service Tribunal, Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31183, "end_char": 31208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri B.P. Sharma had moved an application (C.M.P. No.4905/\n\n80) for permission to intervene in the appeal on the ground that he was vitally interested in the outcome of the instant appeal which would have a great bearing upon the claim petition pending before the Service Tribunal, Lucknow."}}, {"text": "23rd of April 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31388, "end_char": 31406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11949/80) for modification of the stay order dated 23rd of April 1980 in the appeal filed by the State, so as to govern other cases:affected by rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 Rules, as amended by the 1972 notification."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_46_54_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "GENERAL GOVT. SERVANTS CO-OPERATIVE\n\nHOUSING SOCIETY LTD., AGRA\n\nWAHAB UDDIN & ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nMarrh 2, 1981\n\n[R.S. PATHAK, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nLand Acquisition Act-Sections 4, 5A and 6--Land acquired for a company- Part Vil of the Act, if attracted-Requirement of rule 4 of Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules 1963-Ifmandator)~\"Person interested\"-Meaning of.\n\nThe land in dispute originaly belonged to a person who had migrated to Pakistan. After acquiring the lessee rights in the land under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 the Central Government sold these rights by auction. The first respondent purchased a plot of land and a sale certificate was issued to him. The respondent, however, could not get possessi'On of the land as a result of litigation resorted to by the person in possession of the land. Jn the meantime the State Government filed a suit against the Custodian of Evacuee Property and the auction purchasers for possession; but the suit and later appeal were dismissed.\n\nBefore the respondent obtained possession of the land a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquistion Act was issued seeking to acquire the land for construction of residential houses for the members of the appellant society.\n\nHaving had no knowledge of the notification the respondent did not file any objection under section SA.\n\nAfter the issue of notification under section 6 of the Act proceedings relating to determination of compensation for the lands were started. A notice was served on the respondent under section 9(3) of the Act 1 calling upon him to prefer his claim for compensation.\n\nAllowing the respondent's petition impugning the action of the Government the High Court held that the State Government could acquire the land only after complying with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 and this not having been done there was a breach of the principle of natural justice and that secondly the respondent was a \"person interested\" within the meaning of section 3(b) of the Act.\n\nOn the question whether the respondent was a 'person interested' and whether the notification issued under section 6 was valid.\n\nHELD : The expression \"person interested\" is defined in section 3(b) as including all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of acquisition of land under the Act.\n\nThat the first respondent had interest in the land in question is warranted by the following circumstances : (i) a sale certi ficate had been issued to him after he purchased the land in auction sale; (ii) the Collector knew that he had purchased the land for he had himself filed a suit for ejectment against him from the land and that the suit was dismissed and the. appeal against that order was also dismissed; (iii) the Collector called upon the respondent to prefer his claim under section 9(3) of the Act which showed that\n\nthe Collector had admitted the first respondent's interest in the land ; and A\n\n(iv) before the High Court the Collector had not denied the respondent's right to compensation. Therefore, the first respondent was a \"person_ interested\" within the meaning of section 3(b). [50 F-H)\n\n2. The notification under section 6 is invalid for non-compliance with rule 4 of the Rules.\n\n(54 G]\n\nThe appellant society is a \"company\" within the meaning of section 3(e) of the Act. When the land was acquired for the purpose of a company, Part VII of the Act is attracted and the provisions of that Chapter have to be followed.\n\nRule 4 is mandaiory and unless the directions enjoined by this rule are complied with the notification under section 6 would be invalid. Its compliance precedes the notification under section.4 as well as compliance of section 6 of the Act.\n\n(51 F-G]\n\nIn the instant case on receipt of the notice under section 9(3) the respondent objected to the acquisition on the grounds that the land or lessee rights having been acquired by the Central Government under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 could not be acquired by the State Government, and that the mandatory procedure for acquisition of land for private companies had not been followed. No inquiry report had been submitted by the Collector. The report submitted was under section 5A and not under rule 4. '.\\here had therefore been a failure of justice.\n\n[54 C-F)\n\nThe appellant's contention that the first respondent's claim was barred by limitation under sections 45(f) and 180 of the Tenancy Act, has no force because there is no evidence to show that the requirements of the section have been satisfied. That apart, this is a mixed question of fact and law requiring investigation into facts. Since it had not been taken before the High Court but\n\nsought to be urged for the first time in thi~ Court, it cannot be allowed to be E urged in an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. (50 C-D)\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2085 of 1978 and 7-8 of 1979.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18.5. 1977 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W. Nos. 5061/73, 5063/73. and 5080/73.\n\nG.C. Lal, D.B. Vohra and O.P. Tewari for the Appellants in all the Appeals.\n\nProhir Mitra for R.I in CAs. 2085/78, 8/79 and RR 1-2 in CA 7/79.\n\nG. N. Dixit, and Sabha Dikshit for RR. 2 to 4 in CA 2085/78 RR 2-4 in CA 8/79 and RR 3&5 in CA 7/79.\n\nE.C. AggarW{[/a for R.4 in CA 7/79 and R. 3 in CA 8/79.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J. The above appeals arise. out of land acquisi- H tion proceedings and involve similar questions of fact and the same\n\nA question of law.\n\nThis common judgment, therefore, will dispose of all the three appeals. It will be sufficient if we refer to the material facts of Civil Appeal No. 2085 of l 978 only.\n\nThe land involved, belonged to one Imam Khan as an occupancy tenant. Before the partition of India, he migrated to Pakistan, whereafter his rights in the lands were declared evacuee property.\n\nSubsequently, in pursuance of a notification issued under.\n\nSection 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, the Central Government acquired the. lessee rights.\n\nAs a result of the notification, these rights vested in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. The Central Government thereafter sold these rights by auctions in August/September 1962.\n\nThe first Respondent purchased a plot of land for a sum of Rs. 21,700.\n\nHe deposited the entire amount with the Managing Officer, Evacuee Property, Agra. A sale certificate was issued to him on September 12, 1962.\n\nIt appears that one Ramlal Lamba was in the possessi on of the ']and in question. He was asked by the Managing Officer, Evacuee Property, to vacate the land, and deliver possession to the first respondent. Instead of delivering possession of the land to the first respondent Lamba, filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court at Delhi.\n\nThe Writ Petition was dismissed on 4.12.69. He then filed an appeal which was also dismissed on 2.2.70. He then filed a suit in the Court of the Munsiff Agra, for restraining the Managing Officer, Evacuee Property, from interfering in his possession.\n\nThus the first respondent could not get possession of the land.\n\nAfter the auction sale, the State of U. P. (Respondent No. 2 herein) filed a suit under Section 171 of U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 (hereinafter 'the Tenancy Act') against the Custodian of the Evacuee Property, and the four auction purchasers including the first respondent, for possession.\n\nThis suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, Ist Class, on 24.3.69 on the ground that it was not maintainable. An appeal was filed.\n\nThis was also dismissed on 24.10.70.\n\nThus before the petitioner could obtain possession of the. land, the Collector of Agra (Respondent No.3 herein) issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Aquisition Act (hereinafter 'the Act'} on March I, 1970, notifying that the plots in dispute '(and several other plots) were intended to be acquired by the State Government for construction of residential houses for the members of the General\n\nServants~· Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra. the appellant\n\nbefore us.\n\nThe first respondent did not have any knowledge or in- A formation of the said notification under Section 4 of the Act and so he did not, as he could not, file any objection under section SA of the Act. The notification under section 4 was followed by a notification under section 6 of the Act on May 4, 1973.\n\nAfter the said notifications, proceedings relating to determination of compensation for the lands were started. In that connection the first Respondent was served with a notice under section 9(3) of the Act, calling upon him to prefer his claim for compensation.\n\nThereupon the first Respondent filed objections, but before the objections were disposed of he filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad.\n\nThe High Court allowed the writ petition and struck down the notification dated 5th May 1973, under Section 6 of the Act. The High Court held that as the acquisition was made by the State Government for the benefit of a Co-operative Society, it could do so only after complying with the provisions of Chapter VU of the Act, and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter called 'the rules'), but as the State Government did not do so, there was a breach of the principle of natural justice.\n\nRepelling the argument of the appellant to the contrary, the High Court also held that the first respondent was a 'person interested' within the meaning of section 3 (b) of the Act.\n\nRespondents No. 2, 3 and 4 who are co-respondents appearing through Mr. Dikshit before us have supported the case of the appellant.\n\nThe first question for determination is whether the first respondent is not a 'person interested' within the meaning of section 3(b) of the L.A. Act and as such he had no locus standi to file the writ petition before the High Court, as contended by the appellant.\n\nSection 3 (b) of the Act is i11 the following terms (material portions only) :\n\n\"3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context :-\n\n(a) ........ .\n\n(b) the expression \"person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made_on account\n\nof the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an ease- H ment affecting the land.\"\n\nIn support of the argument the appellant refers to section 45 (f) and section 180 of the Tenancy Act, 1939. Clause (f) of section 45 provides that the interest of the tenant shall be extinguished where the tenant has been deprived of possession and his right to recover possession is barred by limitation. The limitation provided is for a period of twelve years, for a suit for ejectment of a person occupying the land without title and for damages-if the land is contiguous to any other land lawfully occupied by such other person-(a) if such, person has, at the commencement of the Tenancy Act, occupied the land for more than six years, the period runs from the time the land holders first knew of the unauthorised occupation. In any other case the period of limitation is six years. This point which has been urged for the first time before us is a mixed question of fact and law. It does not appear to have been taken before the High Court.\n\nA mixed question of law and fact needing investigation into facts cannot be allowed to be urged for the first time in an appeal by special leave under Art. 135 of the Constitution.\n\nD It is true that admittedly the first respondent was out of possession at the relevant time but there is no evidence before us to show whether or not the land in question was contiguous to any other land occupied by the person who is in possession and that his possession had been lawful. We a_re therefore not in a position to accept the submission of the appellant that the first respondent's claim was barred by limitation.\n\nOn the contrary there is ample evidence before us to show that the first respondent had interes\\ in the land in question.\n\nWe come to this conclusion from the following circumstances :\n\n(I) A sale certificate had been issued to the first respondent after the purchase of the land in auctioa sale held in 1912; (2) the Collector, Agra, knew that the first respondent had purchased the land in auction, for he had himself filed a suit for ejectment from the land in question under section 171 of the Tenancy Act against the first respondent, and that the suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector Jst Class, on 24th March, J 969; the appeal preferred against the said order had also been dismissed by the Commissioner on the 27th of October, 1970; (3) the Colle.i:; tor issued notice under section 9 (3) of the Act calling upon the first respondent to prefer his claim, if any for compensation of the land acquired. (This amounts to an admission of the first respondent's interest in the land by the Collector) and (4) that in the counter affidavit filed by the Collector, in reply to the affidavit filed by the first rerpondent before the High Court\n\nthe claim of the petitioner to get compensation for the rights acquired A by the Government was not denied by the appellant.\n\nWe therefore agree with the High Court that the first respondent was a 'person interested' within the meaning of clause (b) of section 3 of the Act.\n\nThe next point urged before us by the appellants is that the B first respondent in fact filed objection which was iriquired into and he was given an opportunity o( being heard. The High Court, therefore, it is contended, was not right in holding that thre was a breach of the principle of natural justice. In our opinion, the real question, as urged by the first respondent, is not whether there has been any violation of any principle of natural justice but wheth'er Rule 4 of C the Rules has been complied with by the Collector.\n\nSub-section (!) of Section 4 of the Act provides that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose a notificatio!l to that effect shall be published in the official gazette and that he shall also cause a public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at D convenient places in the said locality.\n\nSection 5A of the Act provides that any person interested in any land which has been notified under sub-section ( l) of section 4, as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days (twenty-one days according E to the U.P. amendment) after the issue of the notification object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality as the case may be.\n\nUnder section 3 (e), the expression 'Company', inter alia, includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 or any other law relating to co-operative society F for the time being in force in any State. The appellant-The General Govt. Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra,-is a Company. The appellant has not contended to the contrary. It is also not disputed that when land is acquired for the purpose of a company, Part VII of the Act is attracted and the provisions of that chapter have to be followed.\n\nRule 4 of the Rules which is material and falls for our interpretation runs thus :\n\n\"4. Appropriate Government to be satisfied with regard to certain matters before initiating acquisition proceedings.- H (I) Whenever a Company makes an application to the appropriate Government for acquisition of any land, that Govern- . ment shall direct the Collector to submit a report to it on the following matters, namely :-\n\n(i) that the Company has made its best endeavour to find out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition;\n\n(ii) that the Company has made all reasonable efforts to get\n\nsuchlands by negotiation with the persons interested therein on payment of reasonable price and such efforts have failed;\n\n(iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the purpose;\n\n(iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive;\n\n(v) that the Company is in a position to utilise land expeditiously; and\n\n(vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agricultural land, that no alternative suitable site can be found so as to avoid acquisition of that land.\n\n\"'-.\n\n(2) The Collector shall, after giving the Company a \"easonable opportunity to make any representation in this\n\n•ehalf, hold an enquiry into the matters referred to in subrule (I) and while holding such enquiry he shall,-\n\n(i) in any case where the land proposed to be acquired is agricultural land, consult the Senior Agricultural Officer of the district whether or not such land is good agricultural land;\n\n(ii) determine, having regard to the provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the Act, the approximate amount of compensation likely to be payable in respect of the land which in the opinion of the Collector, should be acquired for the Company ; and\n\n(iii) ascertain whether the Company offered a reasonable price (not being less than the compensation so determined), to the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired.\n\nExplanation :-For the purpose of this rule \"good agricultural land\" means any land which, considering the level of agricultural production and the crop pattern of the area in which\n\nit is situated, is of average or above average productivity and A includes a garden or grove land.\n\n(3) As soon as may be after holding the enquiry under sub-rule (2), the Collector shall submit a report to the appropriate Government and a copy of the same shall be forwarded by that Government to the Committee.\n\n(4) No declaration shall be made by the appropriate Government under section 6 of the Act unless-\n\n(i) the appropriate Government has consulted the Committee and has considered the report submitted under this rule and the report, if any submitted under section 5A of the Act; and\n\n(ii) the agreement under section 41 of the Act has been executed by the Company.'\n\nSub-rule (I) requires the Government to direct the Collector to submit a report to it on the matters enumerated in clauses (i) to (vi) of the sub-rule (1) which is for the benefit of the Company. The purpose is to avoid acquisition of land not suitable for a Compan}'.\n\nClause (ii) of sub-rule (1) requires that the Company has to make all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation with the person interested therein on payment of reasonable prices and that such efforts have failed. The purpose of clause (ii) seems to be to avoid unnecessary land acquisition proceedings and payment of exorbitant prices. The purpose of clauses (iii), (iv) and (v) is obvious. The purpose of clause (vi) is to avoid acquisition of good agricultural land, when other alternative land is available for the purpose. Subrule 2 of rule 4 requires the Collector to give reasonable opportunity to the Company so that the Collector may hold an inquiry into the matters referred in sub-rule (1).\n\nThe Collector has to coll!ply with Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-rule 2 during the course of the inquiry under sub-rule (I). The Collector under sub-rule 3 then has to send a copy of his report of the inquiry to the appropriate Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule 3 for the purpose of advising the Government in relation to acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, the duty of the Committee being to advise the Government on all matters relating to or arising out of acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act (Sub-rule (5) of Rule 3). No declaration shall be made by the\n\nappropriate Government under section 6 of the Act unless the Committee has been consulted by the Government and has considered the report submitted by the Collector under section SA of the Act. In addition, under clause (ii) of sub-rule (4) of rule 4, the Company has to execute an agreement under section 41 of the Act.\n\nThe above consideration shows that rule 4 is mandatory ; its compliance is no idle formality, unless the directions enjoined by rule 4 are complied with,. the notification under section 6 will be invalid.\n\nA consideration of rule 4 also shows that its compliance precedes the notification under section 4 as well as compliance of section 6 of the Act.\n\n8. In the instant case, as stated earlier, the first respondent on receipt of the notice under section 9(3) of the Act submitted a representation. After the representation, a brief written note of the arguments was also supplied (Annexure 6).\n\nThe first respondent's objections, inter alia against the acquisition of the land were : (I) that the land being that of the Government cannot be legally acquired ; (2) that the land or lessee rights having been once acquired by the Central Government under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 19S4, it cannot be acquired by the State Government; and (3) that the proceedings fqr the acquisition of the land for the appellant were illegal as the mandatory procedure for acquisition of land for private companies has not been followed.\n\nIt was also stated in the representation that no efforts to purchase the rights of the first respondent by negotiation were made. The inquiry report submitted by Collector does not show that he applied .his mind to the provisions of rule 4. as stated above, or to the objections of the first respondent. In fact there was no report under rule 4. The report that was submitted was one under section SA of the Act.\n\nWe have examined this aspect of the matter to see that although the enquiry was belated and not in accordance with law, there has been no failure of justice. In our opinion there has been failure of justice.\n\nAgreeing with the finding of the High Court, although for different reasons, we hold that the notification under section 6 is invalid for non-compliance of rule 4 of the Rules.\n\nAs a result we dismiss the appeals with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "GENERAL GOVT. SERVANTS CO-OPERATIVE\n\nHOUSING SOCIETY LTD.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "General Govt. Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra,-is", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WAHAB UDDIN & ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WAHABUDDIN & ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 4, 5A and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Land acquired for a company- Part Vil of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land acquired for a company- Part Vil of the Act", "statute": "Land acquired for a company- Part Vil of the Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After acquiring the lessee rights in the land under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 the Central Government sold these rights by auction."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land acquired for a company- Part Vil of the Act", "statute": "Land acquired for a company- Part Vil of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1438, "end_char": 1447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1585, "end_char": 1597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2092, "end_char": 2104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2225, "end_char": 2234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2303, "end_char": 2315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2927, "end_char": 2939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3277, "end_char": 3286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3411, "end_char": 3423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part VII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3493, "end_char": 3512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3692, "end_char": 3701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3886, "end_char": 3898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4360, "end_char": 4370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 45(f) and 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4545, "end_char": 4567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1977 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W. Nos."}}, {"text": "G.C. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5231, "end_char": 5239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C. Lal, D.B. Vohra and O.P. Tewari for the Appellants in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "D.B. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C. Lal, D.B. Vohra and O.P. Tewari for the Appellants in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "O.P. Tewari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C. Lal, D.B. Vohra and O.P. Tewari for the Appellants in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "Prohir Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5308, "end_char": 5320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prohir Mitra for R.I in CAs."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dixit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5375, "end_char": 5386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dixit, and Sabha Dikshit for RR."}}, {"text": "E.C. AggarW{[/a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E.C. AggarW{[/a for R.4 in CA 7/79 and R. 3 in CA 8/79."}}, {"text": "Imam Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The land involved, belonged to one Imam Khan as an occupancy tenant."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5995, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the partition of India, he migrated to Pakistan, whereafter his rights in the lands were declared evacuee property."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6017, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the partition of India, he migrated to Pakistan, whereafter his rights in the lands were declared evacuee property."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 12, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6681, "end_char": 6699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A sale certificate was issued to him on September 12, 1962."}}, {"text": "Ramlal Lamba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6722, "end_char": 6734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one Ramlal Lamba was in the possessi on of the ']and in question."}}, {"text": "Lamba", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6977, "end_char": 6982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instead of delivering possession of the land to the first respondent Lamba, filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court at Delhi."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7012, "end_char": 7023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7051, "end_char": 7077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instead of delivering possession of the land to the first respondent Lamba, filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court at Delhi."}}, {"text": "4.12.69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7115, "end_char": 7122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Writ Petition was dismissed on 4.12.69."}}, {"text": "2.2.70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then filed an appeal which was also dismissed on 2.2.70."}}, {"text": "Munsiff Agra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7225, "end_char": 7237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then filed a suit in the Court of the Munsiff Agra, for restraining the Managing Officer, Evacuee Property, from interfering in his possession."}}, {"text": "State of U. P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the auction sale, the State of U. P. (Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7506, "end_char": 7523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "24.3.69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7750, "end_char": 7757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, Ist Class, on 24.3.69 on the ground that it was not maintainable."}}, {"text": "24.10.70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7851, "end_char": 7859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was also dismissed on 24.10.70."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7944, "end_char": 7948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "land, the Collector of Agra (Respondent No.3 herein) issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Aquisition Act (hereinafter 'the Act'} on March I, 1970, notifying that the plots in dispute '(and several other plots) were intended to be acquired by the State Government for construction of residential houses for the members of the General\n\nServants~· Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8002, "end_char": 8011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "March I, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8066, "end_char": 8079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "land, the Collector of Agra (Respondent No.3 herein) issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Aquisition Act (hereinafter 'the Act'} on March I, 1970, notifying that the plots in dispute '(and several other plots) were intended to be acquired by the State Government for construction of residential houses for the members of the General\n\nServants~· Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8445, "end_char": 8454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8573, "end_char": 8582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8620, "end_char": 8629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 4, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8644, "end_char": 8655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification under section 4 was followed by a notification under section 6 of the Act on May 4, 1973."}}, {"text": "section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8841, "end_char": 8853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the first Respondent filed objections, but before the objections were disposed of he filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "5th May 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9156, "end_char": 9168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court allowed the writ petition and struck down the notification dated 5th May 1973, under Section 6 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9176, "end_char": 9185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter VU of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9377, "end_char": 9398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9739, "end_char": 9748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VU of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VU of the Act"}}, {"text": "Dikshit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9838, "end_char": 9845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, 3 and 4 who are co-respondents appearing through Mr. Dikshit before us have supported the case of the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10019, "end_char": 10031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VU of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VU of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10164, "end_char": 10173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VU of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VU of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10672, "end_char": 10682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10710, "end_char": 10727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10743, "end_char": 10753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11719, "end_char": 11727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12658, "end_char": 12669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th March, J 969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12792, "end_char": 12809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We come to this conclusion from the following circumstances :\n\n(I) A sale certificate had been issued to the first respondent after the purchase of the land in auctioa sale held in 1912; (2) the Collector, Agra, knew that the first respondent had purchased the land in auction, for he had himself filed a suit for ejectment from the land in question under section 171 of the Tenancy Act against the first respondent, and that the suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector Jst Class, on 24th March, J 969; the appeal preferred against the said order had also been dismissed by the Commissioner on the 27th of October, 1970; (3) the Colle.i:; tor issued notice under section 9 (3) of the Act calling upon the first respondent to prefer his claim, if any for compensation of the land acquired. ("}}, {"text": "27th of October, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12906, "end_char": 12927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We come to this conclusion from the following circumstances :\n\n(I) A sale certificate had been issued to the first respondent after the purchase of the land in auctioa sale held in 1912; (2) the Collector, Agra, knew that the first respondent had purchased the land in auction, for he had himself filed a suit for ejectment from the land in question under section 171 of the Tenancy Act against the first respondent, and that the suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector Jst Class, on 24th March, J 969; the appeal preferred against the said order had also been dismissed by the Commissioner on the 27th of October, 1970; (3) the Colle.i:; tor issued notice under section 9 (3) of the Act calling upon the first respondent to prefer his claim, if any for compensation of the land acquired. ("}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12971, "end_char": 12980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13586, "end_char": 13595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14160, "end_char": 14169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14544, "end_char": 14554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14664, "end_char": 14673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14960, "end_char": 14969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15053, "end_char": 15085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15137, "end_char": 15169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "General Govt. Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra,-is", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15282, "end_char": 15348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant-The General Govt.", "canonical_name": "General Govt. Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra,-is"}}, {"text": "Part VII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15490, "end_char": 15509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17153, "end_char": 17171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18094, "end_char": 18103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18278, "end_char": 18288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18331, "end_char": 18341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20083, "end_char": 20092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule", "statute": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule"}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20352, "end_char": 20362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule", "statute": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20554, "end_char": 20563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule", "statute": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20671, "end_char": 20680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule", "statute": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20706, "end_char": 20715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule", "statute": "Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule"}}, {"text": "section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20824, "end_char": 20836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22288, "end_char": 22297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_474_488_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "GOKARAJU RANGARAJU ETC.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nApril 15, 1981\n\n[ 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, JJ. ]\n\nDe facto doctrine-Nature and scope of-Appointment of District Judge declared void-Judgment rer.dered by him, whether becomes void.\n\nInterpretation of statutes-Abundans cautela non nocet when applied-Legislature, whethr makes superfluous legislation.\n\nThe appellants in both the appeals were convicted of certain offences by two[District Judges.' By the time the appeals went up for hearing to the High Court, the appointment of the two District Judges was quashed by this Court as being in violation of Article 233 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appellants contended before the High Court that having regard to the fact that the Supreme Court had quashed the appointment of District Judges, the judgments rendered by them in these tw.o cases became void. The High Court, rejecting the contention, held that since the District Judges held office under lawful authority, the judgments rendered by them during the tenure of their office were valid and that in any event the validity of the judgments could not be questioned in collateral proceedings.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that trial by a Sessions Judge appointed in violation of Article 233 was not a trial by a Sessions Judge duly appointed to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Sessions under section 9, Cr.P.C.\n\nand that the appellants' liberty was being taken a way otherwise than in accordance with the procedure established by law and that the Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 1966 would be a surplusage if the de facto doctrine was applied to judgments rendered by persons appointed as District Judges contrary to the provisions of Article 233 of the Constitution. ·\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : The l\\\\O Judges who gave the judgments in the two cases were not usurpers or intruders but were persons who discharged the functions and duties of Judges under colour of lawful authority. So long as an office is validily created it matters not that the incumbent was not validily appointed. A person appointed to a post of Sessions Judge would be exercising jurisdiction in the\n\nG. RANGARAJU V. ANDHRA PRADESH 475\n\nCourt of Session and his judgments and orders would be those of that court and would continue to be valid notwithstanding that his appointment to such court might be declared invalid. On that account alone it cannot be said that the procedure prescribed hy law had not been followed. [487 E-F]\n\nMi/wardv. Thatsher [1787] 2 T. R. 81 @ 87, Seaddling v. Lorant [1851] 3 HLC 418, re. James (An Insolvent) [1977] 2 W.L.R. I, Norton v. Shelby County [1886] !18 US 425-30 Law Ed. 178; referred to.\n\nThe doctrine of de facto envisages that acts performed de facto by the officers within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding as if they were the acts of officers de jure. [478 HJ\n\nThe de facto doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical expedience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and protection of public and private interest. It avoids endless confusion and needless chaos. An illegal appointment may be set aside and a proper appointment may be made but the acts of those who hold office de facto are not so easily undone. They may have lasting repercussions and confusing sequels if attempted to be undone. [ 479 B]\n\nPu/in Behari v. King Emperor [1912] 15 Cal Law Journal 517@ 574, Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. AIR 1976 A.P. 193 ; referred to.\n\nA defective appointment of a de facto judge cannot be permitted to be\n\nquestioned in a litigation between two private litigants. If this were not so, so E soon as a Judge pronounces a judgment litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment was void because the judge was no judge. To question a Judge's appointment in an appeal against his judgment is such a collateral attack. [485 B-C]\n\nThe de facto doctrine saves acts done by a Judge whose appointment has later been declared void, from being invalidated.\n\nThe doctrine is recog- F nised in Article 71(2) (which declares that acts done by the President in the exercise of his powers shall not be invalidated by reason of the election being declared void) and section 107(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (which provides that acts or a person participating as member of Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be declared invalid by reason of his election being declared void). The doctrine, therefore, is no stranger to the Constitution and the laws. (485 E-F] G\n\nThe Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 1966 is an instance where the de facto doctrine was applied to remove and taint of illegality being attributed to the judgments or orders passed by District Judges appointed before 1966 otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Articles 233 and 235 of the Constitution and which appointments were declared invalid by this Court in ff Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., [1967] l SCR 77. (485 HJ\n\nIt is not a necessary inference from the Twentieth Amendment that but for that amendment the judgments, decrees etc. of those District Judges would have been void. As a general rule Parliament may be presumed not to make superfluous legislation. But this presumption is not a strong presumption in that it is not uncommon to !ind statutes containing provisions introduced because abundans cautela non nocet (there is no harm in being cautious). (486 C-D]\n\nThe statutory reiteration of the Jaw, a clear judicial pronouncement on a subject notwithstanding, only leads to the inference that the statute making body, though mindful of the real state of the law, was acting under the influence of excessive caution.\n\nThe Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 1966 is one such instance. [ 486 E-F]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 5th December, 1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 816 of 1974 (Criminal Revision Petition No. 732 of 1974).\n\nAND\n\nCriminal Appeal Nos. 315 and 316 of 1976.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th April, 1976 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 310 & 311of1975.\n\nP. Govindan Nair and A. Subha Rao for the Appellant in Cr!.\n\nA. No. 234/76.\n\nM. N. Phadke, and B. Kanta Rao for the Appellant in Cr!. A.\n\nNos. 315 & 316 of 1976.\n\nG. N. Rao for the Respondent in all the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nWhat is the effect of the declaration by the Supreme Court that the appointment of an Additional Sessions Judge was invalid o; i, judgments pronounced by the Judge prior to such declaration is the question for consideration in these criminal appeals.\n\nThe question may seem to be short and simple H but it cannot be answered without enquiry and research. An answer, on first impression, may be 'a judgment by a judge who is not a judge is no judgment' a simple, sophisticated answer.\n\nBut it appears\n\nsecond thoughts are necessary. What is to happen to titles settled, declarations made, rules issued, injunctions and decrees granted and even executed ? What is to happen to sentences imposed ? Are convicted offenders to be set at liberty and to be tried again ? Are acquitted accused to be arrested and tried again ? Public Policy\n\nis clearly involved.\n\nAnd, in the tangled web of human affairs, law must recognise some consequences as relevant, not on grounds of pure logic but for reasons of practical necessity. To clear the confusion and settle the chaos, judges have invented the de faeto doctrine, which we shall presently examine. de facto doctrine is thus a doctrine of necessity and public policy.\n\nCrl. A. No. 234 of 1976 arises out of a proceeding under S.6A of the Essential Commodities Act, by which the District Revenue Officer West Godavari, Andhra Pradesh, ordered the confiscation of qs. 203. 74 kgs. of paddy and qs. 302.25 kgs. of rice. The appellant, Gokaraju Rangaraju, preferred an appeal under S. 6C of the Essential Commodities Act to the Court of Session, West Godavari.\n\nThe appeal was heard by Shri G. Anjappa, Additional Sessions Judge and was rejected.\n\nThe appellant preferred a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Criminal Appeal Nos. 315 and 316 of 1976 arise out of Sessions Case No. 12 of 1975 in the Court of Session, Guntur Division' The case was heard and the judgment was pronounced by Shri Raman Raj Saxena, II Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur. The convicted accused preferred appeals to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. By the time the Criminal Revision case filed by Gokaraju Rangaraju and the Criminal Appeals filed by the appellants in Crl. Appeals Nos. 315 and 316 of 1976 came up for hearing before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, this Court by its judgment dated 2nd September 1975 quashed the appointment of Shri G. Anjappa, Shri Raman Raj Saxena and two others as District Judges Grade II, on the ground that their appointment was in violation of the provisions of Art. 233 of the Constitution. Thereupon a point was raised in the Criminal Revision case as well as in the Criminal\n\nAppeals that the judgments , rendered by Shri Anjappa and Shri\n\nRaman Raj Saxena were void and required to be set aside. -The High Court overruled the point raised by the present appellants and held that though the appointment of Shri Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena as District Judges Gr. H was invalid, yet they were not mere usurpers but had held office under lawful authority and therefore, the judgments rendered by them were valid and could not be questioned in collateral proceedings. The present\n\nappeals have been preferred by special leave granted by this Court.\n\nIn Criminal Appeals Nos. 315 and 316 of 1976, however, the special leave granted by this Court was limited by the order granting leave to the question whether the judgments rendered by Sessions Judges were void where their appointment as Sessions_ Judges was subsequently declared illegal. ' --shri Govindan Nayar learned counsel for the appellants in Cr!. A. No. 234 of 1976 and Shri Phadke, learned counsel for the apJ'ellants in Cr!. Appeals Nos. 315 & 316 of 1976, argued before us that the judgments rendered by Shri Anjappa and Sbri Raman Raj Saxena were void as they were never duly appointed as District Judges.\n\nIt was _urged that there \\Vas no need for them to question the appointment of Shri Anjappa or Shri Raman Raj Saxena as their appointment bad already be_en quashed by the Supreme Court.\n\nIt was saidJhat the de facto doctrine was based on public policy and necessity and that in the present case neither public policy or necessity required that the judgments should not be set aside. No inconvenience would be caused by ordering a rehearing of the appeals or a retrial of the accused. It was also urged that the attack, if any, on the appointment of Shri Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj was not a collateral attack. It was. submitted that a question of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage in a criminal case and a trial by a Sessions Judge who was appointed in violation of Art. 233 was not a trial by a Sessions Judge duly appointed to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Session under S. 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIt was argued that the de facto doctrine was not an absolute doc- • trine. , It was subject to certain limitations. One such limitation was that imposed by Art. 233 of the Constitution. A person\n\n-~-----, appointed as a District Judge contrary to the provisions of Art. 233\n\nwas no judge and his judgments were no judgments. It was submitied that the 20th Amendment of the Constitution would be a\n\n__ surplusage if the de facto doctrine was to b-e applied to judgments rendered by persons appointed as District Judges contrary to the provisions of Art. 233 of the Constitution. It was also suggested that the Fundamental Right of the _appellants under Art. 21 of the Constitution was violated as their liberty was being taken away otherwise than in accordance with the procedure established by law. ------\n\nWe are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned\n\ncunsel for the appellants. The doctrine is now well established that \"the acts of the Officers de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public\n\n::,, '\n\nor third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding, as if they were the acts of officers de jure\" (Pulin Behari\n\nv. King Emperor)(1).\n\nAs one of us had occasion to point out earlier \"the doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical expedience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the protection of public and private interest. It avoids endless confusion and needless chaos.\n\nAn illegal appointment may be set aside and a proper appointment may be made, but the acts of those who hold office de facto are not so easily undone and may have lasting repercussions and confusing sequels if attempted to be undone.\n\nHence the de facto doctrine\" (vide Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.(2)\n\nc In Pu/in Behari v. King Emperor, (Supra) Sir Ashutosh Mukerjee J. \\ noticed that in England the de facto doctrine was recognised from the earliest times. The first of the reported cases where the doctrine received judicial recognition was the case of Abbe of Fountaine decided in 1431. Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee noticed that even by 1431 D the de facto doctrine appeared to be quite well known and, after 1431, the doctri11e was again and again reiterated by English Judges.\n\nIn Milward v. Thatcher( 3), Buller J. said :\n\n\"The question whether the judges below be properly judges or not, can never be determined, it is sufficient if they be judges de facto.\n\nSuppose a person were even criminally convicted in a Court of Record, and the Recorder of such Court were not duly elected, the conviction would still be good in law, he being the judge de farto\".\n\nIn Seaddling v. Lorant(4), the question arose whether a rate for the relief of the poor was rendered invalid by the circumstance that some of the vestry men who made it were vestry men def acto ' and not de ju re.\n\nThe Lord Chancellor observed as follows :\n\nWith regard to the competency of the vestry men, who G were vestry men de facto, but not vestry men de jure, to make the rate, your Lordships will see at once the impor-\n\n(!) [1912] 15 Cal Law Journal 517@ 574.\n\n(2) AIR 1976 A.P. 193\n\n(3) [1787] 2 T.R. 81@ 87.\n\n(4) [1851] 3 HLC 418.\n\ntance of that objection, when you consider how many public officers and persons there are who were charged with very important duties, and whose title to the office on the part of the public cannot be ascertained at the time. You will at once see to what it would lead if the validity of their acts, when in such office, depended upon the propriety of their election. It might tend, if doubts were cast upon them, to consequences of the most destructive kind. It would create uncertainty with respect to the obedience to public officers and it might also lead to persons, instead of resorting to ordinary legal remedies to set right anything done by the officers, taking the law int9 their own hands\".\n\nSome interesting observations were made by the Court of Appeal in England in re James (An Insolvent).(1) Though the learned Judges constituting the Court of Appeal differed on the principal question that arose before them namely whether \"the High Court of Rhodesia\" was a British Court, there did not appear to be any difference of opinion on the question of the effect of the invalidity of the appointment of a judge on the judgments pronounced by him. Lord Denning M. R., characteristically, said : \"He sits in the seat of a judge.\n\nHe wears the robes of a judge.\n\nHe holds the office of a judge. May be he was not validly appointed. But, still, he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent ......... so long as the man holds the office and exercises it duly and in accordance with law, his orders are not a nullity. If they are erroneous they may be upset on appeal. But if not erroneous they should be upheld\".\n\nLord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court. Observations made in the last case were extracted and they were :\n\n\"Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions ...... The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid on grounds of public policy, and for the protection of those having official business to transact.\"\n\n(!) [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1.\n\nScarman LJ who differed from Lord Denning on the question whether the High Court of Rhodesia was a British Court appeared to approve the view of Lord Denning M. R. in regard to the de facto doctrine. He said :\n\n\"He (Lord Denning) invokes the doctrine of recognition of the de facto judge, and the doctrine of implied mandate or necessity.\n\nI agree with much of the thinking that lies behind his judgment. I do think that in an appropriate case our courts will recognise the validity of judicial acts, even though they be the acts of a judge not lawfully appointed or derive their authority from an unlawful government.\n\nBut it is a fallacy to conclude that, because in certain circumstances our Courts would recognise as valid the judicial acts of an unlawful court or a de facto judge, therefore, the Court thus recognised is a British Court\".\n\nThe de facto doctrine has received judicial recognition in the United States of America also. In State v. Gardner (Cases on Constitutional Law by Mc. Gonvey and Howard Third Edition 102) the question arose whether the offer of a bribe to a City Commissioner whose appointment was unconstitutional was an offence.\n\nBroadbury, J. said.\n\n\"We think that principle of public policy, declared by the English Courts three centuries ago, which gave validity .to the official acts of persons who intruded themselves into an office to which they had not been legally appointed, is as applicable to the conditions now presented as they were to the conditions that then confronted the English Judiciary.\n\nWe are not required to find a name by which officers are to be known, who have acted under a statute that has subsequently been declared unconstitutional, though we think such officers might aptly be called de facto officers.\"\n\nIn Norton v. Shelby Cou11ty(1), Field, J., observed as follows :\n\n\"The doctrine which gives validity to acts of officers de facto whatever defects there may be in the legality of their appointment or election is founded upon considerations of policy and necessity, for the protection of the pub-\n\n(I) [1886] 118 US 425-36 Law Ed 171.\n\nlie and individuals whose interests may be affected thereby.\n\nOffices are created for the benefit of the public, and private parties are not permitted to inquire into the title of persons clothed with the evidence of such offices and in apparent possession of their powers and functions.\n\nFor the good order and peace of society their authority is to be respected and obeyed until in some regular mode prescribed by law their title is investigated and determined.\n\nIt is manifest that endless confusion would result, if in every proceeding before such officers their title could be called in question.\"\n\nIn Cooley's 'Constitutional Limitations', Eighth Edition, Volume Up. I 355, it is said,\n\n\"An officer de facto is one who by some colour or right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs its duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact.\n\nHis colour of right may come from an election or appointment made by some officer or body having colourable but no actual right to make it; or made in such disregard of legal requirements as to be ineffectual in law; or made to fill the place of an officer illegally removed or made in favour of a party not having the legal qualifications; or it may come from public acquie.scence in the qualifications; or it may come from public acquiescence in the officer holding without performing the precedent conditions, or holding over under claim of right after his legal right has been terminated; or possibly from public acquiescence alone when accompanied by such circumstances of official reputation as are calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke official action on the supposition that the person claiming the office is what he assumes to be.\n\nAn intruder is one who attempts to perform tbe duties of an office without authority of law, and without the support of public acquiescence.\n\nNo one is under obligation to recognise or respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in security of private rights, the acts of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for\n\nG. RANGARAJU v. ANDERA PRADESH (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 483\n\nthe purpose by the State or by .some one claiming the office de jure, or except when the person himself attempts to build up some right, or claim some privilege or emolument, by reason of being the officer which he claims to be.\n\nIn all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties.\n\nThere is an important principle, which finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally.\"\n\nIn Black on judgments it is said:\n\n\"A person may be entitled to his designation although he is not a true and rightful incumbent of the office, yet he is no mere usurper but holds it under colour of lawful authority.\n\nAnd there can be no question that judgments rendered and other acts performed by such a person who is ineligible to a judgeship but who has nevertheless been duly appointed, and who exercises the power and duties of tl•e office is a de f:1cto judge, and his acts are valid until he is properly removed.\"\n\n The de fi1cto doctrine has been recognised by Indian Courts also. Jn Pu/in Behari v, King Emperor, Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J after tracing the history of the doctrine in England observed as follows :\n\n\"The substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where these interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers.\n\nThe doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large.\n\nIndeed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his or their pleasure, to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the Government of the State and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various\n\npowers on the ground of. irregular existence or defective title, insubordination and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged.\n\nFor the good order and peace of society, their authority must be upheld until in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and determined.\"\n\nB In P. S. Menon v. State of Kera/a and Ors.(1) a Full Bench of\n\nthe Kerala High Court consisting of P. Govindan Nair, K.K. Mathew and T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, JJ said about the de.facto doctrine :\n\n\"This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individual involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law.\n\nBut although these officers are not offiers de jure they are by virtue of the particular circumstances, officers, in fact, whose acts, public policy requires should be considered valid\".\n\nIn the judgment under appeal Kuppuswami and Muktadar, JJ observed :\n\n\"Logically speaking if a person who has no authority to do so functions as a judge and disposes of a case the judgment rendered by him ought to be considered as void and illegal, but in view of the considerable inconvenience which would be caused to the . public in holding as void judgments rendered by judges and other public officers whose title to the office may be found to be defective at a later date. Courts in a number of countries have, from ancient times evolved a principle of law that under certain conditions, the acts of a judge or officer not legally competent may acquire validity''.\n\nJ A judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfu11y, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de\n\n(1) AIR 1970 Kerala 165@ 170.\n\njure.\n\nSuch is the de facto doctrine, '!Jorn of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless .mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the judge except as a judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring . in issue and litigate upon the title of a judge to his office. Otherwise so soon as a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no judge. A judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion.\n\nHence the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments. To question a judge's appointment in an appeal against the judgment is, of course, such a collateral attack.\n\nWe do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel that the de facto doctrine is subject to the limitation that the defect in the title of the judge to the office should not be one traceable to the violation of a constitutional provision. The contravention of a constitutional provision may invalidate an appointment but we are not concerned with that. We are concerned with the effect of the invalidation upon the acts done by the judge whose appointment has been invalidated. The de facto doctrine saves such Acts. The de facto doctrine is not a stranger to the Constitution -or to the Parliament and the Legislatures of the States.\n\nArt. 71 (2) of the Constitution provides !hat acts done by the President or Vice President of India in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office shall not be invalidated by reason of the election of a person as President or Vice President being declared void.\n\nSo also Sec. I 07(2) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 (Act 43 of 1951) provides that acts and proceedings in which a person has participated as a Member of Parliament or a Member of the Legislature of a State shall not be invalidated by reason of the . election of such person being declared to be void.\n\nThere are innumerable other Parliamentary and State Legislative enactments which are replete with such provisions. The Tw1<ntieth Amendment of the Constitution is an instance where the de facto doctrine was applied by the Constituent body to remove any suspicion or taint of illegality or invalidity that may be argued to have attached itself to judgment, decrees sentences or orders passed or made by certain District Judges appointed before 1966, otherwise than in accordance with the provision of Art. 233 and Art 235 of\n\n& the Constitution. The Twentieth Amendment was the consequence of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandra Mohan v. Stale of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.(1)., that appointments of District Judges made otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Arts. 233 and 235 were invalid. As such appointments had been made in many States, in order to preempt mushroom litigation springing up all over the country, it was apparently thought desirable that the precise position should be stated by the Constituent body by amending the Constitution.\n\nShri Phadke, learned counsel for the appellants,· argued that the constituen~ body could not be imputed with the intention of making superfluous amendments to the Constitution.\n\nShri Phadke invited us to say that it was a necessary inference from the Twentieth Amendment of the Constitution that, but for the amendment, the judgments, decrees etc. of the District Judges appointed otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Art. 233 would be void.\n\nWe do not think that the inference suggested by Shri Phadke is a necessary inference. It is true that a> a general rule the Parliament may be presumed not to make superfluous legislation.\n\nThe presumption is not a strong presumption and statutes are full of provisions introduced because abundans cautela non nocet (there is no harm in being cautious).\n\nWhen judiciai pronouncements have already declared the law on the subject, the statutory reiteration of the law with reference to the particular cases does not lead to the necessary inference that the law declared by the judicial pronouncements was not thought to apply to the particular cases but may also lead to the inference that the statute-making body was mindful of the real state of the law but was acting under the influence of excessive caution and so to silence the voices of doubting Thomases by declaring the law declared by judicial pronouncements to be applicable also to the particular cases.\n\nIn Chandra Mohan's case (Supra) this Court held that appointments of District Judges made otherwise than in accordance with Art. 233 of the Constitution were invalid.\n\nSuch appointments had been made in Uttar Pradesh and a few other States.\n\nDoubts had been cast upon the validity of the judgments, decrees etc. pronounced by those District Judges and large litigation had cropped up.\n\nIt was to clear those doubts and not to alter the law that the Twentieth Amendment of the Constitution was made.\n\nThis is clear from the statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill which wa5 passed as Constitution (20th Amendment) Act.\n\n1966. The statement said :\n\n(I) [1967] 1 SCR 77.\n\nG. RANGARAJU v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chinnapp'.l Reddy, J.) 487\n\n\"Appointments of District Judges in Uttar Pradesh and a few other States have been rendered invalid and ille gal by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court on the ground that such appointments were not made in accordance with the provisions of Art. 233 of the Constitution ......\n\nAs a result of these judgments, a serious situation has arisen because doubt has been thrown on the validity of the judgments, decrees, orders and sentences passed or made by these District Judges and a number of Writ Petitions and other cases have already been filed challenging their validity.\n\nThe functioning of the District Courts in Uttar Pradesh has practically come to a stand-still. It is, therefore, urgently necessary to validate the judgments, decrees, orders and sentences passed or made heretofore by all such District Judges in those States .......... \"\n\nIn our view, the de facto doctrine furnishes an answer to the submissions of Shri Phadke based on Sec. 9 Criminal Procedure Code and Art. 21 of the Constitution. The judges who rejected the appeal in one case and convicted the accused in the other case were not mere usurpers or intruders but were persons who discharged the functions and duties of judges under colour of lawful authority. We are concerned with the office that the judges purported to hold. We are not concerned with the particular incumbents of the office.\n\nSo long as the office was validly created, it matters not that the incumbent was not validly appointed.\n\nA person appointed as a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, would be exercising jurisdiction in the Court of Session, and his judgments and orders would be those of the Court of Session. They would continue to be valid as the judgments and orders, of the Court of Session,\n\nnotwithstanding that his appointment to such Court might be declared invalid. On that account alone, it can never be said that the procedure prescribed by law has not been followed. It would be a different matter if the constitution of the Court itself is under challenge. We are not concerned with such situation in the instant cases. We, therefore, find no force in any of the submissions of the learned counsel.\n\nShri Govindan Nair attempted to argue that the confiscation\n\nwas not justified on the merits. We find no reason to interfere with H\n\nthe concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower Courts. Shri Phadke requested us to widen the scope of the appeals and to permit him to canvas the correctness of the convictions and sentences also.\n\nWe declined to do so. All the appeals are dismissed.\n\nP.B.R Appeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "GOKARAJU RANGARAJU ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOKARAJU RANGARAJU ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nApril 15, 1981\n\n[ 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 627, "end_char": 638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 748, "end_char": 761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants contended before the High Court that having regard to the fact that the Supreme Court had quashed the appointment of District Judges, the judgments rendered by them in these tw.o cases became void."}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1266, "end_char": 1277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1383, "end_char": 1392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1394, "end_char": 1400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Article 71(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4227, "end_char": 4240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 107(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4395, "end_char": 4409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4521, "end_char": 4531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The doctrine is recog- F nised in Article 71(2) (which declares that acts done by the President in the exercise of his powers shall not be invalidated by reason of the election being declared void) and section 107(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (which provides that acts or a person participating as member of Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be declared invalid by reason of his election being declared void)."}}, {"text": "Articles 233 and 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5002, "end_char": 5022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6435, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and A. Subha Rao for the Appellant in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "P. Govindan Nair"}}, {"text": "A. Subha Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6456, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and A. Subha Rao for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke, and B. Kanta Rao for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "B. Kanta Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke, and B. Kanta Rao for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "G. N. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6598, "end_char": 6607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Rao for the Respondent in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "S.6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7980, "end_char": 7984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7992, "end_char": 8017, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8072, "end_char": 8086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "234 of 1976 arises out of a proceeding under S.6A of the Essential Commodities Act, by which the District Revenue Officer West Godavari, Andhra Pradesh, ordered the confiscation of qs."}}, {"text": "Gokaraju Rangaraju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8186, "end_char": 8204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Gokaraju Rangaraju, preferred an appeal under S. 6C of the Essential Commodities Act to the Court of Session, West Godavari.", "canonical_name": "GOKARAJU RANGARAJU ETC"}}, {"text": "S. 6C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8232, "end_char": 8237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8245, "end_char": 8270, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court of Session, West Godavari", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8278, "end_char": 8309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Gokaraju Rangaraju, preferred an appeal under S. 6C of the Essential Commodities Act to the Court of Session, West Godavari."}}, {"text": "G. Anjappa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8341, "end_char": 8351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by Shri G. Anjappa, Additional Sessions Judge and was rejected.", "canonical_name": "G. Anjappa"}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8462, "end_char": 8490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Court of Session, Guntur Division", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8582, "end_char": 8615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 of 1975 in the Court of Session, Guntur Division' The case was heard and the judgment was pronounced by Shri Raman Raj Saxena, II Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur."}}, {"text": "Raman Raj Saxena", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8676, "end_char": 8692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 of 1975 in the Court of Session, Guntur Division' The case was heard and the judgment was pronounced by Shri Raman Raj Saxena, II Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur.", "canonical_name": "Raman Raj Saxena"}}, {"text": "Gokaraju Rangaraju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8857, "end_char": 8875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the time the Criminal Revision case filed by Gokaraju Rangaraju and the Criminal Appeals filed by the appellants in Crl.", "canonical_name": "GOKARAJU RANGARAJU ETC"}}, {"text": "2nd September 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9060, "end_char": 9078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 and 316 of 1976 came up for hearing before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, this Court by its judgment dated 2nd September 1975 quashed the appointment of Shri G. Anjappa, Shri Raman Raj Saxena and two others as District Judges Grade II, on the ground that their appointment was in violation of the provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9264, "end_char": 9272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anjappa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon a point was raised in the Criminal Revision case as well as in the Criminal\n\nAppeals that the judgments , rendered by Shri Anjappa and Shri\n\nRaman Raj Saxena were void and required to be set aside.", "canonical_name": "G. Anjappa"}}, {"text": "Anjappa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9616, "end_char": 9623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-The High Court overruled the point raised by the present appellants and held that though the appointment of Shri Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj Saxena as District Judges Gr.", "canonical_name": "G. Anjappa"}}, {"text": "Govindan Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10256, "end_char": 10270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--shri Govindan Nayar learned counsel for the appellants in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "Govindan Nayar"}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10342, "end_char": 10348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "234 of 1976 and Shri Phadke, learned counsel for the apJ'ellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Raman Raj Saxena", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10496, "end_char": 10512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 & 316 of 1976, argued before us that the judgments rendered by Shri Anjappa and Sbri Raman Raj Saxena were void as they were never duly appointed as District Judges.", "canonical_name": "Raman Raj Saxena"}}, {"text": "Raman Raj Saxena", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10677, "end_char": 10693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that there \\Vas no need for them to question the appointment of Shri Anjappa or Shri Raman Raj Saxena as their appointment bad already been quashed by the Supreme Court.", "canonical_name": "Raman Raj Saxena"}}, {"text": "Raman Raj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11148, "end_char": 11157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also urged that the attack, if any, on the appointment of Shri Anjappa and Shri Raman Raj was not a collateral attack.", "canonical_name": "Raman Raj Saxena"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11351, "end_char": 11359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11464, "end_char": 11468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11476, "end_char": 11502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11661, "end_char": 11669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11770, "end_char": 11778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12053, "end_char": 12061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12157, "end_char": 12164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sir Ashutosh Mukerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13425, "end_char": 13446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the de facto doctrine\" (vide Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.(2)\n\nc In Pu/in Behari v. King Emperor, (Supra) Sir Ashutosh Mukerjee J. \\ noticed that in England the de facto doctrine was recognised from the earliest times."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the de facto doctrine\" (vide Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.(2)\n\nc In Pu/in Behari v. King Emperor, (Supra) Sir Ashutosh Mukerjee J. \\ noticed that in England the de facto doctrine was recognised from the earliest times."}}, {"text": "Ashutosh Mookerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13674, "end_char": 13692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee noticed that even by 1431 D the de facto doctrine appeared to be quite well known and, after 1431, the doctri11e was again and again reiterated by English Judges.", "canonical_name": "Ashutosh Mookerjee"}}, {"text": "Buller", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13885, "end_char": 13891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Milward v. Thatcher( 3), Buller J. said :\n\n\"The question whether the judges below be properly judges or not, can never be determined, it is sufficient if they be judges de facto."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rhodesia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15726, "end_char": 15748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some interesting observations were made by the Court of Appeal in England in re James (An Insolvent).(1) Though the learned Judges constituting the Court of Appeal differed on the principal question that arose before them namely whether \"the High Court of Rhodesia\" was a British Court, there did not appear to be any difference of opinion on the question of the effect of the invalidity of the appointment of a judge on the judgments pronounced by him."}}, {"text": "Denning M. R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15943, "end_char": 15956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning M. R., characteristically, said : \"He sits in the seat of a judge.", "canonical_name": "Denning M. R."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16430, "end_char": 16437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court.", "canonical_name": "Denning M. R."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Connecticut", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16516, "end_char": 16544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Aldridge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16549, "end_char": 16557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "New Zealand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16592, "end_char": 16603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16647, "end_char": 16674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Scarman LJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17187, "end_char": 17197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Scarman LJ who differed from Lord Denning on the question whether the High Court of Rhodesia was a British Court appeared to approve the view of Lord Denning M. R. in regard to the de facto doctrine."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17221, "end_char": 17228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Scarman LJ who differed from Lord Denning on the question whether the High Court of Rhodesia was a British Court appeared to approve the view of Lord Denning M. R. in regard to the de facto doctrine.", "canonical_name": "Denning M. R."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18096, "end_char": 18120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The de facto doctrine has received judicial recognition in the United States of America also."}}, {"text": "Mc. Gonvey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18179, "end_char": 18189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State v. Gardner (Cases on Constitutional Law by Mc."}}, {"text": "Broadbury", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18347, "end_char": 18356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Broadbury, J. said."}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19896, "end_char": 19902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Cooley's 'Constitutional Limitations', Eighth Edition, Volume Up."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21633, "end_char": 21648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But for the sake of order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in security of private rights, the acts of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for\n\nG. RANGARAJU v. ANDERA PRADESH (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 483\n\nthe purpose by the State or by .some one claiming the office de jure, or except when the person himself attempts to build up some right, or claim some privilege or emolument, by reason of being the officer which he claims to be."}}, {"text": "Ashutosh Mookerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22940, "end_char": 22958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Pu/in Behari v, King Emperor, Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J after tracing the history of the doctrine in England observed as follows :\n\n\"The substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where these interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers.", "canonical_name": "Ashutosh Mookerjee"}}, {"text": "Government of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23650, "end_char": 23673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his or their pleasure, to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the Government of the State and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various\n\npowers on the ground of."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24101, "end_char": 24118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B In P. S. Menon v. State of Kera/a and Ors.(1) a Full Bench of\n\nthe Kerala High Court consisting of P. Govindan Nair, K.K. Mathew and T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, JJ said about the de.facto doctrine :\n\n\"This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individual involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law."}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24133, "end_char": 24149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B In P. S. Menon v. State of Kera/a and Ors.(1) a Full Bench of\n\nthe Kerala High Court consisting of P. Govindan Nair, K.K. Mathew and T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, JJ said about the de.facto doctrine :\n\n\"This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individual involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law.", "canonical_name": "P. Govindan Nair"}}, {"text": "K.K. Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24151, "end_char": 24162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B In P. S. Menon v. State of Kera/a and Ors.(1) a Full Bench of\n\nthe Kerala High Court consisting of P. Govindan Nair, K.K. Mathew and T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, JJ said about the de.facto doctrine :\n\n\"This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individual involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law."}}, {"text": "T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24167, "end_char": 24191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B In P. S. Menon v. State of Kera/a and Ors.(1) a Full Bench of\n\nthe Kerala High Court consisting of P. Govindan Nair, K.K. Mathew and T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, JJ said about the de.facto doctrine :\n\n\"This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individual involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law."}}, {"text": "Kuppuswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24694, "end_char": 24704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment under appeal Kuppuswami and Muktadar, JJ observed :\n\n\"Logically speaking if a person who has no authority to do so functions as a judge and disposes of a case the judgment rendered by him ought to be considered as void and illegal, but in view of the considerable inconvenience which would be caused to the ."}}, {"text": "Muktadar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24709, "end_char": 24717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment under appeal Kuppuswami and Muktadar, JJ observed :\n\n\"Logically speaking if a person who has no authority to do so functions as a judge and disposes of a case the judgment rendered by him ought to be considered as void and illegal, but in view of the considerable inconvenience which would be caused to the ."}}, {"text": "Art. 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27519, "end_char": 27526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27613, "end_char": 27618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hat acts done by the President or Vice President of India in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office shall not be invalidated by reason of the election of a person as President or Vice President being declared void."}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27834, "end_char": 27871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28623, "end_char": 28631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act 1951"}}, {"text": "Art 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28636, "end_char": 28643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act 1951"}}, {"text": "Arts. 233 and 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28900, "end_char": 28917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29625, "end_char": 29633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandra Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30617, "end_char": 30630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Chandra Mohan's case (Supra) this Court held that appointments of District Judges made otherwise than in accordance with Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30738, "end_char": 30746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30817, "end_char": 30830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such appointments had been made in Uttar Pradesh and a few other States."}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 SCR 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31279, "end_char": 31294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31600, "end_char": 31608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32305, "end_char": 32311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32312, "end_char": 32335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32340, "end_char": 32347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Govindan Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33568, "end_char": 33581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Govindan Nair attempted to argue that the confiscation\n\nwas not justified on the merits.", "canonical_name": "Govindan Nayar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_489_503_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI\n\nFEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS OF\n\nCOMMERCE & INDUSTRIES, NEW DELHI\n\nApril 15, 1981\n\n[R.S. PATHAK, A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act 1961, S. 52(15) and IJ(J)(a)-'Charitable object'-Object of general public utility-' Not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit'- Meaning of-Primary or dominant purpose of trust or institution to be charitable-\n\n'Purpose' oftrust-'Powers' conferred on trustees for carrying out the purpose- C Distinction between.\n\nThe respondent assessee an existing company under the Companies Act, 1956 had neither any share capital nor distributed any dividend to its members and its entire income was expended for fulfilment of its objects, which were the premotion.. protection and development of trade, commerce and industry in\n\nIn~ D\n\nDuring the assessment year 1962-63, the relevant accounting year for which the year ended December 31, 1961 the assessee submitted a return showing its total income as 'nil' claiming that all its income was exempt under section ll(l)(a) read with Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act.\n\nDuring the assessment year, the assessee held the Indian Trade Fair at New Delhi and derived receipts from rent for space allotted, temporary stalls and storage and realised deposit E and advances from the participants for hotel accommodation. In the relevant accounting year, the Conference of the Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Cooperation, was sponsored by the assessee and for organising the Conference, the assessee received from the Government Rs. 3 lakhs as grant-in-aid and after meet ing the expenses, was left with a balance of Rs. 2 lakhs. It also received income by sale of books, fee forarbitration etc. The balance sheet for the accounting year indicated that it had an excess of income over expenditure under the head F 'income'.\n\nThe contention of the assessee before the Income Tax Officer was that the activities carried on by the Federation were not were not motive of earning profits, but that they were carried on with the object of promotion, protection and development of trade, commerce and industry in India and abroad, and therefore the income derived by the assessee was exempt under S. l l(l)(a).\n\nThe Income Tax Officer, held that the decision of this Court in the Andhra Chamber of Commerce's case [1965] 1 S.C.R. 565 was no longer good law due to the addition of the words 'not involving the carrying on any activity for profit' in the definition of 'cliaritable purpose' in Section 2(15) of the Act which qualify the fourth head of charity viz. 'any other object of general public utility' and, H therefore, must be read subject to the additional statutory requirement that the\n\nA object of general public utility should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit, and accordingly raised a demand.\n\nOn appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed with the view of the Income Tax Officer and held that the activities carried on by the assessee were not profit-oriented and, therefore, its income was exempt.\n\nThe Department appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, and the Appellate Tribunal upheld the view of the Appellate Assisstant Commissioner and held that the dominant object with which the Federation was constituted being a charitable purpose viz., promotion, protection and development of trade, commerce and industry, there being no motive to earn profits, it was not engaged in any activity in the nature of business or trade, and, if, any income arose from such activity, it was only incidental or ancillary to the dominant object for the welfare and common good of the country's trade, commerce and industry.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-Tax applied to the Appellate Tribunal to make a reference to the High Court under sub-section (I) of section 256 of the Act, but in view of the conflict in the decisions of the High Courts on the construction of the expression 'charitable purpose' as defined in section 2(15) of the Act the Tribunal made a reference to this Court under Section 257.\n\nOn the question whether the words 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit' in the definition of 'charitable purpose' contained in section 2(15) of the Act, govern the word 'advancement' and not the words 'object of general public utility'.\n\nHELD : [By the Court]\n\nThe reference must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the asseesee, in the view of the majority opinion in A.id!. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers, [1980) 1 S.C.R. 77. [492 F]\n\n[Per A .P. Sen, J.]\n\nI. The majority view in the Surat Art Silk case was that the condition that the purpose should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit would be satisfied if profitmaking is not the real object. The theory of dominant or primary object of the trust, has, therefore, been treated to be the determining factor, even in regard to the fourth head of charity, viz. advancement of any other object of general public utility, so as to make the carrying on of business activity merely ancillary or incidental to the main object. This doctrine of dominant or primary object holds the field till there is a change of law. [496 C-D, 497 FJ\n\n2. The majority decision had the effect of neutralising the radical changes brought about by Parliament in the system of taxation of income and profits of charities, with particular reference to \"object of general public utility\" to prevent tax evasion, by diversion of business profits to charities. It is the vagueness of-the fourth head of charity \"any other object of general public utility\" that impelled\n\nC.l.T. v. FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS 491\n\nParliament to insert the restrictive words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\". [ 496 G-497 A]\n\n3. It was clearly inconsistent with the settled principles to hold that i( the dominant or primary object of a trust was 'charity' under the fourth head 'any other object of general public utility', it was permissible for such an obiect of general public utility to augment its income by engaging in trading or commercial activities. [497 BJ\n\nWhen the Government did not accept the recommendation of the Direct Taxes Laws Committee in Chapter 2 for the deletion of the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\"' occurring in Section 2(15) of the Act, it was impermissible for the Court by a process of judicial construction to achieve the same result. [ 496 F]\n\n5. In the instant case, activities of the assessee in regard to holding Qf the Indian Trade Fair and sponsoring of the Conference of the Afro-Asian Organisation in the relevant accounting year were for the advancement of the dominant object and purpose of the trust, viz. promotion, protection and development of trade, commerce and industry in India. The income derived from such activities was therefore exempt under S. ll(l)(a) read with S. 2(15) of the Act.\n\n[ 497 G-498 A]\n\nThere is a distinction between the \"purpose\" of a trust and the \"power conferred upon the trustees• as incidental to the carrying out of the purpose. If the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institute is charitable, any other object which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose, would not prevent the trust or the institution being a valid charity. [498 G, 499 A]\n\n[Per Venkataramiah, J.]\n\n1. It is open to the Legislature to give encourage!llent to objects which it considers to be laudable by means of fiscal exemptions.\n\nAt the same time, it takes care to enact fresh provisions from time to time to suppress any mischief which may have resulted from the misuse of existing law. Parliament deliberately\n\nstepped in by adding the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for F profit\" in the definition of 'charitable purpoe' in section 2(15) of the Act, when the tax exemptions available to charitable and religious trusts came to be misused by some for the unworthy purposes of tax avoidance. The law had been so re structured to prevent allergy to taxation masquerading as charity. The law was thus designed by Parliament to prevent this misuse of tax exemption in the name of charity. [500 F-H]\n\nThis Court has enlarged the meaning \"charitable purpose\" in Section 2(15) beyond what it legitimately should mean in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association's case. It has virtually wiped off the restrictive words \"not involving the carrying on or any activity for profit\" occurring in S. 2(15), thereby defeating the very object and purpose of the legislation. It is not the func\n\ntion of a court of law to give the words a strained and unnatural meaning.\n\nH Judicial attitudes cannot be formed iu isolation from legislatiw r recesses,\n\nparticularly, in connection with tax avoidance provisions. [500 D, SOJA, 50()EJ\n\nModern legislation has changed in pattern re-casting provisions of taxation with very wide language, while at the same time dealing in much more detail with some areas of law. Judges while responding to general trend~ of law, but also reacting; to the form of modern tax legislation, must be prepared to take account of the context and purpo5es or the change brought about. (501 E]\n\nGreenberg v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1972] _ A.C. 109 (HL) referred to.\n\n4. When the Government had not accepted the recommendation of the Direct Taxes Laws Committee in Chapter 2 for the deletion of the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\", by suitable legislation, it was impermissible by a process of judicial construction to achieve the same result.\n\n. [501 Bl\n\n5. People who are truly charitable do not think of the tax benefits while making charities. Even the poor who do not pay income tax can be charitable and their charities are made at great personal inconvenience. Charitable persons are not amongst the tax payers only.\n\n[502 H-503 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSOICTJON : Tax Reference Case No. 17 of 1975.\n\nUnder section 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench in Reference Application No. 92/DEL/71-72 arising out of LT.A. No. 1339/DEL/68-69.\n\nB.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nA.K. Sanghi and Narayan Netter for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nPATHAK, J. In view of the majority opinion of this Court in Addit:'onal Commissioner f!f Income-tax, Gujarat v.\n\nSurat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures,(1) the reference must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.\n\nSEN, J.\n\nThis direct reference under s. 257 of the Income tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Ddhi Bench 'B' at the instance of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi U, New Delhi raises the much vexed question as to whether the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" in the definition of 'charitable purpose' contained ins. 2 (15) of the Act, govern the word 'advancement' and not the words 'object of general public utility .\n\n(1) (1980] 121 I.T.R. l-[1980] 1 S C.R. 77.\n\nC.I.T. v. FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Sen, J) 493\n\nThe facts giving rise to the reference are as follows : The A Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi-hereinafter referred to as 'the assessee'--is an existing company under the Companies Act, 1956. It was registered under s. 26 of that Act and permitted to omit the word 'Limited' from its name.\n\nIt has neither any share capital 1lor does it distribute any dividends to its members. The entire income is expended for the fulfilment of B its object.\n\nThe main object of the assessee is the promotion protection and <, ievelopment of trade, commerce and industry in India.\n\nThe main objects for which the Federation has come into existence are set out in cl. 3 of the Memorandum of Association which, insofar as material, reads :\n\n3.(a) To promote Indian business in matters of inland and foreign trade, transport, industry and manufactures, finance and all other economic subjects and to encourage Indian banking, shipping and insurance.\n\nWhile cl.3(a) defines the primary purpose of the trust, i.e. to promote trade and industry which undoubtedly being an object of general public utility engaged in carrying on activities without . any profit motive, the subsidiary objects set out in sub-els. (b) to (z2) of cl.3 are merely incidental or ancillary thereof.\n\nDuring the assessment year 1962-63, the relevant accounting year for which was the year ended December 31, 1961 the assessee submitted a return showing its total income as 'nil' cla; ming that all its income was exempt under s. ll(l)(a) read withs. 2(15) of the Act.\n\nDuring the assessment year in question, the assessee held the Indian Trade Fair at New Delhi and derived receipts totalling Rs. 75,18,548 from rent for space allotted, temporary stalls and storage. It also received Rs. 20,750 by sale of season tickets and Rs. 3,94,143 by daily gate tickets. It realised deposits and advance~ from the participants for hotel accommodation, In the relevent accounting year, the Conference of the Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Cooperation, sponsored by the assessee, was held at New Delhi. For organising the Conference, the assessee received Rs. 3,00,000 from the Government -0f India as grant-in-aid and after meeting the expenses, was left with a balance of Rs. 2, 17,346.38, Further, the assessee received Rs. 265.50 as the share of profits on the sale of a book on Company Law, Rs. 5,371.82 as fee for arbitration.\n\nIt. realised advances from its members for arbitration amounting to Rs. 20,000 from out of which a balance of Rs. 299.18 was left. The balance-sheet for the\n\nA accounting year shows that the assessee had in excess income of R.s.2,291.71 over the expenditure under the head 'income'.\n\nThe contention of the assessee before the Income Tax officer was that the activities carried on by the Federation were not with the motive of earning profits, but they were carried on with the object of promotion, protection and development of tra<!_e, commerce and industry in India and abroad.\n\nIts contention was that the dominant object for which the Federation was constituted was for promotion, protection and development of the country's trade, commerce and industry and the activities carried on during the assessment year in question, namely, the holding of the Indian Trade Fair and of sponsoring the Conference of the Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Cooperation were incidental or ancillary to the main 0bject, and, therefore, the income. derived therefrom was exempt under s. 11 (!)(a) of the Act. Reliance in support of this contention was placed on the decision of tLis Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Andhra Clumber of Commerce(1).\n\nIn the immediately preceding assessment years 1960-61and 1961-62, the income of the assessee'was treated as exempt from tax under s. 4(3) (i) of the Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe Income Tax officer, however, felt that the decision of this Court in the Andlira Chhmber of Commerce's case (supra) was no longer good law due to the addition of the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" in the definition of 'charitable purpose' in s. 2(15) of the Act which qualify the fourth head or' charity, vil .. \"any other object of general public utility\", and, therefore, must be read subject to the additional statutory requirement that the object of general public utility should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit.\n\nHe accordingly raised a demand of Rs. 49,818 on a total income' of Rs. 84,430 on appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed with the view of the Income Tax Officer and held that the activities carried on by the assessee were not profiit-oriented and, therefore, its income was exempt. The Commissioner of Income-tax appealed to the Appellate Tribunal without any success.\n\nThe Tribunal upheld the view of the Appellate Assistant Commis; ioner and held that the dominant object with which the Federation was constituted being a charitble purpose, viz., promotion, !protection and development of trade, commerce and industry, there being no motive to earn profits, it was not engaged; in any activity in the nature of business or trade, and, if any\n\n(!) [1964] 55 I.T.R. 722 (S.C.)-[1965] 1 SCR 565.\n\nc. J. T. v. FEDEARATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (&n, J.) 495\n\nincome arose from such activity, it was only incidental or ancillary to the dominant object for the welfare and common good of the country's trade, commerce and industry.\n\nThereupon, the Commissioner of Income Tax applied to the Appellate Tribunal to make a reference to the High Court under sub-s.(i) of s.256 of the Act, but the Tribunal, in view of the conflict in the decisions of the High Courts on the construction of the expression 'charitable purpose' as defined in s. 2( 15) of the Act, has made a reference of the following questions to this Court under s. 257 of the Act, for its opinion, namely :\n\n1. Whether having regard to the definition of charitable purpose as contained in Section 2( 15) read with Sections 11 ( 1) and 11 (4), charging sections and sections dealing with computation of income, the assessee was liable to be taxed in respect of)ncome relating to assessment year 1962-63 ?\n\n2, Whether on the facts and in 1he circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in, holding that the income earned by the assessee woull! not come within the provisions of Section 2(15) read with Section 11 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 and the onus that this profit was not exempt from tax would be on the Revenue.?\n\nWhether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the purpose of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry was advancement of objects of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit ?\n\nThere had been a sharp conflict of opinion between the different High courts as to the construction of the ten crucial words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" qualifying the fourth head of charity \"advancement of any other object of general public utility\". This Court resolved the conflict in the Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshan Trust v.\n\nC./.T.(1) and the Indian Chambers of Commerce v. C./. T. (2) by holding that the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" govern the word \"advancement\" and observed that if the advancement or attainment of the object involves an activity for profit, tax exemption would not be available.\n\n(I) [1975] 10! I.T.R. 234\n\n(2) [1975] IOI I.T.R. 796\n\nUnfortunately for the Revenue, the Court has, in a five-Judges Bench, by a majority of 4 to 1, in Addi. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures' Association (1) reversed these two decisions in the Loka Shikshan Trust's case and the Indian Chambers of Commerce's case (supra). The Court has approved of the observations of Beg, J. in his separate but concurring judgment in the Loka Shikshan Trust's case that \"if the profits must necessarily feed charitable purpose under the terms of the trust, the mere fact that the activities of the trust yield profit will not alter the charitable character of the trust.\" In other words, the majority view in the Surat Art SJk' s case (supra) was that the condition that the purpose should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit would be satisfied if profit-making is not the real object. The theory of dominant or primary object of the trust has, therefore, been treated to be the determining factor, even in regard to the fourth head of charity, viz., the advancement of any other object of general public utility, so as to make the carrying on of business activity merely ancillary or incidental to the main object.\n\nOne should have thought that the correct way to approach this question of interpretation was to give the words used by Parliament their ordinary meaning in the English language and if, consistently :with the ordinary meaning, there was a choice between two alternative interpretations, then to prefer the construction that maintains a reasonable and consistent scheme of taxation without distorting the language.\n\nWhen the Government did not accept the recommendation of the Direct Taxes Laws Committee in Chapter 2 (Interim Report, December, 1977) for the deletion of the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" occurring in s. 2( 15) of the Act, the Court has by a process of judicial construction achieved the same result.\n\nWhatever reservations one may have regarding the correctness of this interpretation of the exclusionary clause in the definition of charitable purpose in s. 2(15) of the Act, there can be no doubt that the majority decision in the Surat Art Silk's case (supra) is binding on us.\n\nWith respect, I venture to say that the majority decision has the effect of neutralising the radical changes brought about by Parliament in the system of taxation of income and profits of charities, with particular reference to \"objects of general public utility\" to prevent tax evasion, by diversion of business profits to\n\n(I) [1980] 121 l.T.R. l.\n\nC.I.T. v. FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Sen, J.) 497\n\ncharities. It is the vagueness of the fourth head of charity \"any A other object of general public utility\" that impelled Parliament to insert the restrictive words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\". In my minority opinion in the Surat Art Silk's case (supra) I had endeavoured to give reasons why the correctness of the majority decision was open to question. There is no point in traversing the same ground over again. It was clearly 8 inconsistent with the settled principles to hold that if the dominant or primary object of a trust was 'charity' under the fourth head 'any other object of general public utility', it was permissible for such an object of general public utility, to augment its income . by engaging in trading or commercial activities.\n\nIn retrospect it _seems that it would have been better for Parliament to have deleted the fourth head of \"any other object of general public utility\" from the ambit of the definition of 'charitable purpose' while enacting s. 2(15) of the Act rather than inserted the\n\nwords \"not involving the carrying on of any other activity for profiit\", therby creating all this legal conundrum. In England, the 0 Radcliffe Commission on Taxation gf Profits and lncome(1) recommended in 1955 that for purposes of taxation, charity should be restricted t0 relief of poverty, advancement of education and advancement of religion and that the fourth category mentioned in the dictum of Lord Macnaghten, namely, \"trusts for other purposes 'beneficial to the community ' should be cut out entirely.\n\nThe majorty in the Surat Art Silk's case (supra) has evolved the doctrine of dominant or primary object and there is little that we can do about it.\n\nFaced with this difficulty, learned counsel for the Revenue advanced no submissions with regard to the questions referred and indeed, in view of the majority decision in the Surat Art Silk's case (supra) the answers to the questions are self-evident. The. d.octrine of dominant or primary object must, as laid down in the Surat Art Silk's case, holds the field till there is a change i11 the law.\n\nUndoubtedly, the activities of the assessee in regard to holding of the Indian Trade Fair and sponsoring of the Conference of the Afro-\n\nAsian Organisation . in the relevant accounting year were for the advancement of the dominant object and purpose of the trust, viz.,\n\n(I) Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income (Cmd 9474,\n\n1955) Part I, Chap. 7.\n\nAn earlier commission on income tax, the\n\nColwyn Commission, had similarly sough to narrow down the concept H of 'charitable' within the context of taxation (Cmd 615, 1920, Part III,\n\nSec. XIV).\n\npromotion, protection and development ,.of trade, commerce and industry in India.\n\nLearned Counsel for revenue with his usual fairness, conceded that the income derived by the assessee from such activities was exempt under s.ll(J)(a) read with s.2(15) of the Act.\n\nIt was, however, urged that the objects set out in sub-els. (v),\n\n(zl) and (z2) of cl.3 of the Memorandum of Association of the Federation were not incidental or ancillary to the ,,; nain object of the trust. The relevant sub-clauses are set out below :\n\n(v) To establish and support or aid the establishment and support of associations, institutions, funds, trusts and convenience, calculated to benefit employees of the Federation or the dependents or connections of such persons, and grant pension and_ allowances, and to make payments:towards insurance, and to subscribe or guarantee money for charitable or benevolent objects or for any exhibition for any public, general, useful object.\n\n(zl) To establish a Trust or Trusts and/or appoint Trustees thereof from time to time and vest the funds,, or the surplus income or any property of the Federatio11 in the Trustees who shall hold and deal with the funds, 'surplus income or property in such manner as the committee may decide.\n\n(z2) To undertake and execute any Trusts the undertaking of which may seem to the Federation desirable either gratuitously or otherwise.\n\nThe contention advanced cannot be accepted, for the reason that no such point was ever raised at any stage of. the proceedins,\n\nmuch less before the Appellate Tribunal. Even otherwise, there appears to be no substance in the contention. There is a distinction between the _\"purpose\" of a trust and the \"powers\" conferred upon the trustees as incidental to the carrying out of purpose. For instance cl.3(v) enables the establishment and support of associations, institutions, funds,\" trusts and convenience calculated to benefit the employees and their dependents, for nuking provisions for grant of pension and allowances etc. The framing of such employee benefit schemes is essential and necessary for the proper functioning of the organisation and is incidental to the carrying out of the purpose for\n\nC.l.T. v. FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Venkataramiah, J.) 499\n\nwhich it is constituted, I refrain from expressing any opinion whether or not the employees constitute a \"section of the public\".\n\nFor, if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, any other objct which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose, would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid !charity. Likewise, cls.3(zl) and (z2) which permit the establishment of a trust or trusts, appointment of trustees thereof from time to time and the vesting of funds or surplus income or any property of the assessee in the trustees, are nothing but powers conferred on them for the proper financial management of the affairs of the trust which are incidental or ancillary to the main purpose of the trust. The contention must, therefore, fail.\n\nIn the result, the reference under s.257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi-B, New Delhi, must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother A.P. Sen, J. and I respectfully agree with. his reasoning and conclusion. I share with him my doubts about the correctness of the decision in Additional Commissioner of Income tax, Gujarat v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association.(') I would like to say a few words of my own on the subject.\n\nThere can be no objection to a person spending his money on charity.\n\nBut can he be charitable at the expense of others? This is a question which necessarily arises when we read section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 11 as it stands now grants exemption from payment of tax on any income, which would have otherwise been taxable, provided ( 1) the property yielding income is held under trust or such other legal obligation which is brought into existence by an act of party and not by an act of law, (2) the purpose of the trust is charitable which may enure to the benefit of the public or a section of the public and (3) the other conditions prescribed by the Act are satisfied. It means that if there is a diversion of property or income earning apparatus by an act of party into a charitable trust and the prescribed conditions are satisfied, the income derived from it (including the portion which would have gone t<J the public exchequer but for the trust) may be spent by a person in charge of the\n\n\naffairs of the trust on objects indicated in the trust which is a creature of its author. In effect what does it mean? It means that the author of the trust is able to divert by his own will to a purpose of his own choice, though charitable, a large part of the income which would have been, but for the trust, at the disposal of the Legislature which alone has the power over the national exchequer.\n\nWhatever may have been the position in those days when the State was just a police State performing minimum functions of Government, today when the State is a welfare State would it be right either morally or constitutionally to allow amounts which should legitimately form part of the revenue of the State to be dealt with by non-Governmental agencies administering trusts is a question which requires examination in an appropriate case.\n\nThis, however, is a larger question which, if logically pursued, may justify total deletion of the exemption accorded in the case of charitable and religious trustee.\n\nBut even as the provisions now stand, I feel that while construing them, this Court has enlarged the meaning of \"charitable purpose\" in section 2 (15) beyond what it legitimately should mean in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Associations' case (supra).\n\nI would like to adopt the words in the dissenting judgment of my learned brother A.P. Sen J. in the S!i!'at Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association's case (supra) :\n\n. \"The judicial attitudes cannot be formed in isolation from legislative processes, particularly, in connection with tax avoidance provisions.\"\n\nIt is true that it is open to the Legislature to give encourage ment to objects which it considers to be laudable by means of fiscal exemptions. At the same time it takes care to enact fresh provisions from time to time to suppress any mischief which may have resulted from the misuse of existing law. Parliament deliberately stepped in by adding the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" in the definition of charitable purpose in section 2 (15) of the Act, when the tax exemptions available to charitable and religious trusts came to be misused by some for the unworthy purposes of tax avoidance. The law had been so re-structured to p'revent allergy to taxation masquerading as charity.\n\nThe law was thus designed by Parliament to prevent this misuse of tax exemption in the name of charity. The majority decision in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manu- . facturers' Association's case (supra), if I may say so without meaning\n\nC.I.T. 1'. FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Venkatc1ramiah, J.) 501.\n\nany disrespect, has virtually wiped off the restrictive. words \"not\n\ninvolving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" occurring in section 2(15), thereby defeating the very object and purpose of the legislation. It is not the function of a court of law to give the words a strained and unnatural meaning.\n\nWhen the Government had not accepted the recommendation of the Direct Taxes Laws Committee in Chapter 2 (Interim Report, December, J 977) for the deletion of the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\", by suitable legislation, it was impermissible for this Court by a process of judicial construction to achieve the same result. If I may adopt the words of Lord Reid in Greenberg v. /RC(1) quoted in the minority decision in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association's case (supra) displaying the court's concern about the prevailing attitude of tax statutes :\n\n\" \" \"Parliament is very properly determined to prevent this kind of tax evasion and, if the courts find it impossible to give very wide meanings to general phrases, the only alternative may be for Parliament to do as some other countries have done, and introduce legislation of a more sweeping character ... ''\n\nModern legislation has changed in pattern towards re-casting provisions of taxation with very wide language, while at the same time dealing in much more detail with some areas of law. Judges, while responding to general trends of law, but also reacting to the form of modern tax legislation, must be prepared to take account of the _context and purposes of the change brought about.\n\nIt is relevant to refer to one other aspect arising out of an observation made in the course of the majority judgment in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacture1 s' Association's case (supra) suggesting that the area of exemption under Indian law is much wider than what is available under English law.\n\nThe relevant part of the majority judgment reads :\n\n\"The definition of \"charitable purpse\" in Indian Law thus goes much further than the definition of charity to be derived from the English cases, because it specifically includes medical relief and embraces all objects of general public utility. In English Law it is not enough that\n\n(I\\ (1972] A.C. l09(H.L.)\n\na purpose falls within one of the four divisions of charity set out in Lord Macnaghten's classification. It must also be within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth if it is to be regarded as charitable.\n\nThere is no such limitation so far as Indian Law is concerned even if a purpose is not within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, it would be charitable if it falls within the definition of \"charitable purpose\" given in the Statute.\n\nEvery object of general public utility would, therefore, be charitable under the Indian Law, subject only to the condition imposed by the restrictive words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" added in the present Act. It is on account of this basic difference between the Indian and English Law of charity that Lord Wright uttered a word of caution in All India Spinners' Association v. Commissioner of Income-tax (12 I.T.R. 482) against blind adherence to English decisions on the subject. The definition of \"charitable purpose\" in the Indian Statute must be construed according to the language used there and against the background of Indian life.\"\n\nIf Indian life should be a true guide for the determination of questions arising in court, then we should go back to our ancient treatises to find out the true meaning of charity which may be either dana or utsarga.\n\nIn the case of dana the donor gives up his ownership over a thing, makes another the owner of it and cannot thereafter use it nor has he any control over it.\n\nWhen a man makes an utsarga, he no doubt gives up his ownership but gives up the thing for the benefit of all. Opinion is, however, divided whether as a member of the public he can also use a thing thus dedicated for the public. But in any event, he would no longer have any control over the thing dedicated.\n\nHow many of the so called charitable trusts satisfy the rigours of the Indian concept of charity? Are there any measures by which misuse of funds belonging to charities can be effectively checked?\n\nIt is wrong to think that all springs of charity in India will dry up if true effect is given to section 2 (15) of the Act in accordance with the minority judgment in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association's case (supra). People who are truly charitable do not think of the tax benefits while making charities. One must realise\n\nC.I.T. v FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Venkataramiah, J.) 503\n\nthat even the poor who do not pay income tax can be charitable and their charities made at great personal inconvenience are commendable indeed. One need not go in search of charitable persons amongst the tax payers only. Still the majority view has got to be followed now.\n\nN.V.K.", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS OF\n\nCOMMERCE & INDUSTRIES, NEW DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRIES, NEW DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI\n\nFEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS OF\n\nCOMMERCE & INDUSTRIES, NEW DELHI\n\nApril 15, 1981\n\n[R.S. PATHAK, A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 173, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 52(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197, "end_char": 206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act 1961"}}, {"text": "respondent assessee an existing company under the Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1077, "end_char": 1090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The respondent assessee an existing company under the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "The respondent assessee an existing company under the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the assessment year, the assessee held the Indian Trade Fair at New Delhi and derived receipts from rent for space allotted, temporary stalls and storage and realised deposit E and advances from the participants for hotel accommodation."}}, {"text": "Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Cooperation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1414, "end_char": 1462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the relevant accounting year, the Conference of the Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Cooperation, was sponsored by the assessee and for organising the Conference, the assessee received from the Government Rs."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2148, "end_char": 2153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the assessee before the Income Tax Officer was that the activities carried on by the Federation were not were not motive of earning profits, but that they were carried on with the object of promotion, protection and development of trade, commerce and industry in India and abroad, and therefore the income derived by the assessee was exempt under S. l l(l)(a)."}}, {"text": "Andhra Chamber of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2315, "end_char": 2341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Officer, held that the decision of this Court in the Andhra Chamber of Commerce's case [1965] 1 S.C.R. 565 was no longer good law due to the addition of the words 'not involving the carrying on any activity for profit' in the definition of 'cliaritable purpose' in Section 2(15) of the Act which qualify the fourth head of charity viz. '"}}, {"text": "[1965] 1 S.C.R. 565", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2527, "end_char": 2540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-Tax", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3713, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income-Tax applied to the Appellate Tribunal to make a reference to the High Court under sub-section (I) of section 256 of the Act, but in view of the conflict in the decisions of the High Courts on the construction of the expression 'charitable purpose' as defined in section 2(15) of the Act the Tribunal made a reference to this Court under Section 257.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI"}}, {"text": "section 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3837, "end_char": 3848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4073, "end_char": 4084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4235, "end_char": 4248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1980) 1 S.C.R. 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A .P. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4597, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "492 F]\n\n[Per A .P. Sen, J.]\n\nI. The majority view in the Surat Art Silk case was that the condition that the purpose should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit would be satisfied if profitmaking is not the real object."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5350, "end_char": 5360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority decision had the effect of neutralising the radical changes brought about by Parliament in the system of taxation of income and profits of charities, with particular reference to \"object of general public utility\" to prevent tax evasion, by diversion of business profits to charities."}}, {"text": "Section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6380, "end_char": 6393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6958, "end_char": 6966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7404, "end_char": 7417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "498 G, 499 A]\n\n[Per Venkataramiah, J.]\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Venkatc1ramiah"}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7877, "end_char": 7890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8308, "end_char": 8321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8369, "end_char": 8415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 F-H]\n\nThis Court has enlarged the meaning \"charitable purpose\" in Section 2(15) beyond what it legitimately should mean in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association's case."}}, {"text": "S. 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8545, "end_char": 8553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSOICTJON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9945, "end_char": 9973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[502 H-503 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSOICTJON : Tax Reference Case No."}}, {"text": "section 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10018, "end_char": 10029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10037, "end_char": 10057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B.B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10197, "end_char": 10207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10217, "end_char": 10230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10251, "end_char": 10262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sanghi and Narayan Netter for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Narayan Netter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10267, "end_char": 10281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sanghi and Narayan Netter for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10345, "end_char": 10351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nPATHAK, J. In view of the majority opinion of this Court in Addit:'onal Commissioner f!f Income-tax, Gujarat v.\n\nSurat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures,(1) the reference must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee."}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures,(1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nPATHAK, J. In view of the majority opinion of this Court in Addit:'onal Commissioner f!f Income-tax, Gujarat v.\n\nSurat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures,(1) the reference must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J.\n\nThis direct reference under s. 257 of the Income tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Ddhi Bench 'B' at the instance of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi U, New Delhi raises the much vexed question as to whether the words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" in the definition of 'charitable purpose' contained ins."}}, {"text": "s. 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10616, "end_char": 10622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10630, "end_char": 10650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 1 S C.R. 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11116, "end_char": 11134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11251, "end_char": 11318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.I.T. v. FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Sen, J) 493\n\nThe facts giving rise to the reference are as follows : The A Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi-hereinafter referred to as 'the assessee'--is an existing company under the Companies Act, 1956."}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11395, "end_char": 11414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11440, "end_char": 11445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11872, "end_char": 11877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "cl.3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12163, "end_char": 12170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "cl.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12429, "end_char": 12433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13832, "end_char": 13835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14680, "end_char": 14685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14980, "end_char": 14987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14999, "end_char": 15019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15302, "end_char": 15310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income-tax appealed to the Appellate Tribunal without any success.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI"}}, {"text": "[1965] 1 SCR 565", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16393, "end_char": 16409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16774, "end_char": 16779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2( 15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16943, "end_char": 16952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17033, "end_char": 17039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2( 15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17160, "end_char": 17174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17185, "end_char": 17196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17560, "end_char": 17573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17584, "end_char": 17594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17602, "end_char": 17622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17782, "end_char": 17836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the purpose of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry was advancement of objects of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit ?"}}, {"text": "Loka Shikshan Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18899, "end_char": 18918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures' Association (1) reversed these two decisions in the Loka Shikshan Trust's case and the Indian Chambers of Commerce's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Indian Chambers of Commerce's", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18934, "end_char": 18963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures' Association (1) reversed these two decisions in the Loka Shikshan Trust's case and the Indian Chambers of Commerce's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19024, "end_char": 19027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court has approved of the observations of Beg, J. in his separate but concurring judgment in the Loka Shikshan Trust's case that \"if the profits must necessarily feed charitable purpose under the terms of the trust, the mere fact that the activities of the trust yield profit will not alter the charitable character of the trust.\""}}, {"text": "Surat Art SJk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19354, "end_char": 19367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the majority view in the Surat Art SJk' s case (supra) was that the condition that the purpose should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit would be satisfied if profit-making is not the real object.", "canonical_name": "Surat Art Silk"}}, {"text": "s. 2( 15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20528, "end_char": 20537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20783, "end_char": 20791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20860, "end_char": 20874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever reservations one may have regarding the correctness of this interpretation of the exclusionary clause in the definition of charitable purpose in s. 2(15) of the Act, there can be no doubt that the majority decision in the Surat Art Silk's case (supra) is binding on us.", "canonical_name": "Surat Art Silk"}}, {"text": "s. 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22320, "end_char": 22328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22484, "end_char": 22491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, the 0 Radcliffe Commission on Taxation gf Profits and lncome(1) recommended in 1955 that for purposes of taxation, charity should be restricted t0 relief of poverty, advancement of education and advancement of religion and that the fourth category mentioned in the dictum of Lord Macnaghten, namely, \"trusts for other purposes 'beneficial to the community ' should be cut out entirely."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22773, "end_char": 22783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, the 0 Radcliffe Commission on Taxation gf Profits and lncome(1) recommended in 1955 that for purposes of taxation, charity should be restricted t0 relief of poverty, advancement of education and advancement of religion and that the fourth category mentioned in the dictum of Lord Macnaghten, namely, \"trusts for other purposes 'beneficial to the community ' should be cut out entirely."}}, {"text": "s.2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24234, "end_char": 24241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24338, "end_char": 24342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl.3(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25778, "end_char": 25785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27096, "end_char": 27101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27109, "end_char": 27129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi-B, New Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27142, "end_char": 27191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, the reference under s.257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi-B, New Delhi, must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27299, "end_char": 27312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATARAMIAH, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother A.P. Sen, J. and I respectfully agree with.", "canonical_name": "Venkatc1ramiah"}}, {"text": "A.P. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27397, "end_char": 27405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATARAMIAH, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother A.P. Sen, J. and I respectfully agree with.", "canonical_name": "A.P. SEN"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27878, "end_char": 27888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27896, "end_char": 27916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27918, "end_char": 27928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29863, "end_char": 29872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Associations", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29925, "end_char": 29973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But even as the provisions now stand, I feel that while construing them, this Court has enlarged the meaning of \"charitable purpose\" in section 2 (15) beyond what it legitimately should mean in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Associations' case (supra)."}}, {"text": "S!i!'at Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association's", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30090, "end_char": 30141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I would like to adopt the words in the dissenting judgment of my learned brother A.P. Sen J. in the S!i!'at Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association's case (supra) :\n\n. \""}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30762, "end_char": 30771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk Cloth Manu- . facturers' Association's", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31154, "end_char": 31207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority decision in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manu- ."}}, {"text": "FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31266, "end_char": 31295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Venkatc1ramiah, J.) 501."}}, {"text": "Venkatc1ramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31297, "end_char": 31311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS (Venkatc1ramiah, J.) 501.", "canonical_name": "Venkatc1ramiah"}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31459, "end_char": 31472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32085, "end_char": 32132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If I may adopt the words of Lord Reid in Greenberg v. /RC(1) quoted in the minority decision in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association's case (supra) displaying the court's concern about the prevailing attitude of tax statutes :\n\n\" \" \"Parliament is very properly determined to prevent this kind of tax evasion and, if the courts find it impossible to give very wide meanings to general phrases, the only alternative may be for Parliament to do as some other countries have done, and introduce legislation of a more sweeping character ... ''\n\nModern legislation has changed in pattern towards re-casting provisions of taxation with very wide language, while at the same time dealing in much more detail with some areas of law."}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacture1 s' Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33049, "end_char": 33097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is relevant to refer to one other aspect arising out of an observation made in the course of the majority judgment in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacture1 s' Association's case (supra) suggesting that the area of exemption under Indian law is much wider than what is available under English law."}}, {"text": "Elizabeth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33979, "end_char": 33988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no such limitation so far as Indian Law is concerned even if a purpose is not within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, it would be charitable if it falls within the definition of \"charitable purpose\" given in the Statute."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34433, "end_char": 34439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is on account of this basic difference between the Indian and English Law of charity that Lord Wright uttered a word of caution in All India Spinners' Association v. Commissioner of Income-tax (12 I.T.R. 482) against blind adherence to English decisions on the subject."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35750, "end_char": 35759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_504_508_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nSMT. KALKI & ANR.\n\nApril 15, 1981\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BA~ARUL !SLAM, JJ.J\n\nCo11stit11tio11 of India, Article J36-S11pre111e Co11rt will interfere in any matter to prel'ent the miscarriage of justice.\n\nMaterial discrepancies in the evidence, explained.\n\nWords and phrases-Whether the word \"related\"' means \"interested\"'.\n\nRespondent Kalki alias Kali and her husband Amara (along with four other co-accused) were charged, convicted under section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment. While Kalki was also convicted and sentenced under section 148 I.P.C. for two years' rigorous fmprisonment, the other five accussed were convicted and sentenced under section 147 I.P.C. for rigorous imprisonment for a period of one and a half years.\n\nIn appeal the High Court of Rajasthan D acquitted all of them on the grounds (i) that P.W. I, the widow of the deceased \"is ........ a highly interested witness, inasmuch as, she is the wife of the deceased and there was an enmity between the deceased and the accused on account of the dispute about the agricultural land\" and (ii) \"that there are material discrepancies in her statement\".\n\nThis Court granted special leave to appeal only against Kalki and her E husband and refused it as against the four.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. It is true that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court normally does not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the High Court. But when it appears that the findings of facts arrived at F are bordering on perversity and have resulted in miscarriage of justice, the Court will not decline to quash such findings to prevent miscarriage of justice.\n\n[507 F-G]\n\nMaterial discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. In the depositions of witnesses there are always some G normal discrepancies however honest and truthful the witnesses may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. There are no material discrepancies in the evidence of P.W. I so as to reject the evidence in its entirety.\n\n[507 D-E]\n\n3. \"Related\" is not equivalent to \"interested\". A witness may be called \"interested\" only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a\n\nRAJASTHAN v. KALK! (Baharul Islam J.) 505\n\nlitigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished.\n\nA A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be \"interested\". In the instant case, P.W. 1 had no interest in protecting the real culprit, and falsely implicating the respondents. (507 A-BJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Crirpinai Appeal No. 543 of 1976. B\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the llth May 1975 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Jail Appeal Nos. 277, 413 to 416 and 918 of 1971.\n\nBadri Das Sharma for the Appellant.\n\n' Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL IsLAM, J. This appeal by special leave on behalf of the State of Rajasthan is directed against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court acquitting the two respondents, Shrimati Kalki alias Kali and her husband, 'Amara (alongwith four other coaccused).\n\nRespondent Kalki was convicted under Section 302 and Section 148 of the Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life and for rigorous imprisonment for two years, respectively. The five other accused persons including respondent, Amara, were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 and under Section 14 7 of the Penal Code, and each of them was sentenced to imprisoment for life and to one and a half years rigorous imprisonment respectively.\n\nThe material facts of the prosecution case were that there was a land dispute between Nimba (P.W.6) father of the deceased, Poona, on the one hand, and respondent Amara and the members of his family, on the other.\n\nOn July 17, 1970 at about sunset the accused persons of whom respondent Kalki was armed with an axe and respondent, Amara with a dharia, came to the house of the deceased.\n\nAt th11t time the deceased was inside his hut with hls wife Mooli (P.W.l). Amara called Poona. Poona came out followed by his wife Mooli, when he was knocked down by Amara and Rama whereupon Kalki gave him blow with the axe on the neck. Poona met with instantaneous death. Mooli (P.W.l) raised an outcry when Geli, mother of the deceased (P.W.2) who had been at some distance from the hut came running to the place of occurrence and saw the assailants leaving the place.\n\nNimba lodged a report at the police station at Nana.\n\nPolice registered a case. In due course the case was sent to, and tried by, the Session Judge who convicted and sentenced the six accused persons including the two respondents as stated above.\n\n4. This Court granted special leave to appeal only against the two respondents and refused it as against the other four. The question before us is whether the two respondents or any of them caused the death of Poona. There is no dispute that Poona met a homicidal death.\n\nThe High Court has set aside the Order of conviction and sentence passed by the Session Judge on the grounds (1) that P.W.I the widow of the deceased \"is ... a highly interested witness, in as much as, she is the wife of the deceased and there was an enmity between the deceased and the accused on account of the dispute about the agricultural land\", and (2) \"that there are material dis crepancies in her statement\".\n\nWe have been led through the evidence of P. W. l, the only eye witness in the case, of P.W.2, Geli, who says that she saw the respon dents leaving the place of occurrence with the weapons in their hands, and of P.W.5 the Medical Officer, who held the Post-Mortem exami nation on the deceased. His evidence fully supports the evidence of P.W.l, who deposed that respondent Kalki gave a blow on the neck of the deceased with an axe. P. W. 5 found one incised wound measuring 5\" x 2\" x 4\" on the lateral side of the left side of neck.\n\nOn a perusal of the evidence of these withesses, we do not have the least doubt in our mind that it was respondent Kalki who gave an axe blow on the neck of the deceased and that respondent Amara came along with his wife with a dharia with the common intention of causing the death of Poona. In fact it was he who called out Poona from inside the hut, and felled down and facilitated the murder of Poona by his wife, Kalki.\n\n5. As mentioned above the High Court has declined to rely on the evidence of P. W.1 on two grounds : (!) she was a \"highly interested\" witness because she \"is the wife of the deceased\", and (2) there were discrepancies in her evidence.\n\nWith respect, in our opinion, both the grounds are invalid. For, in the circumstances of the case, she was the only and most natural witness; she was the only person present in the hut with the deceased at the time of the occurrence, and the only person who saw the occurrence. True, it is she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot be called an 'interested'\n\nRAJASTHAN v. KALK! ( Baharul I slam J) 507\n\nwitness.\n\nShe is related to the deceased. 'Related' is not equivalent to 'interested'.\n\nA witness may be called 'interested' only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be 'interested'. In the instant case P. W.l had no interest in protecting the real culprit, and falsely implicating the respondents.\n\nThe second ground on which the High Court refused to place reliar; ce on the -evidence of P. W. 1 was that there were \"material discrepancies\". As indicated above we have perused the evidence of P.W.J. We have not found any \"material discrepancies\" in her evidence.\n\nThe discrepancies referred to by the High Court are, in our opinion, minor, insignificant, natural and not 'material'.\n\nThe discrepancies are with regard to as to which accused \"pressed the deceased and at which part of the body to the ground and sat on which part of the body; with regard to whether the respondent Kalki gave the axe blow to the deceased while the latter was standing or lying on the ground, and whether the blow was given from the side of the head or from the side of the legs.\n\nIn the depositions of witnesses there are always some normal discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be.\n\nThese discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like.\n\nMaterial discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. As indicated above we have n0t found any material discrepancies in the evidence of the P. W. I.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appeal involved only appreciation of evidenc~ and this Court may not interfere with the findings of facts resulting from appreciation of evidence. It is true that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court normally does not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the High Court. But when it appears that the findings of facts arrived at are bordering on perversity and result in miscarriage of justice, this Court will not decline to quash such findings to prevent the miscarriage of justice.\n\n8. In our opinion the guilt of the two respondents has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonabie doubt and their acquittal resulted in grave miscarriage of justice.\n\nA In the result we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned High Court and convict respondent Kalki alias Kali under section 302 of the Penal Code and respondent, Amara, under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, and sentence each of them to suffer imprisonment for life.\n\nB The appeal is allowed.\n\nThe respondents are said to be on bail. They shall surrender forthwith to serve out their sentences.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KALKI & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALKI & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 15, 1981\n\n(0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Kalki alias Kali and her husband Amara (along with four other co-accused) were charged, convicted under section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment.", "canonical_name": "Amara"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 471, "end_char": 482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 483, "end_char": 488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kalki", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 532, "end_char": 537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While Kalki was also convicted and sentenced under section 148 I.P.C. for two years' rigorous fmprisonment, the other five accussed were convicted and sentenced under section 147 I.P.C. for rigorous imprisonment for a period of one and a half years.", "canonical_name": "Kalki"}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 589, "end_char": 594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 693, "end_char": 704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 705, "end_char": 710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan D", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 791, "end_char": 816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal the High Court of Rajasthan D acquitted all of them on the grounds (i) that P.W. I, the widow of the deceased \"is ........ a highly interested witness, inasmuch as, she is the wife of the deceased and there was an enmity between the deceased and the accused on account of the dispute about the agricultural land\" and (ii) \"that there are material discrepancies in her statement\"."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1364, "end_char": 1375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1400, "end_char": 1413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court normally does not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the High Court."}}, {"text": "Baharul Islam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2448, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Baharul Islam", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Badri Das Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3050, "end_char": 3066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Das Sharma for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Dalveer Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3089, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "BAHARUL IsLAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL IsLAM, J. This appeal by special leave on behalf of the State of Rajasthan is directed against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court acquitting the two respondents, Shrimati Kalki alias Kali and her husband, 'Amara (alongwith four other coaccused).", "canonical_name": "Baharul Islam"}}, {"text": "Kalki", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Kalki was convicted under Section 302 and Section 148 of the Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life and for rigorous imprisonment for two years, respectively.", "canonical_name": "Kalki"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3469, "end_char": 3480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3485, "end_char": 3496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3504, "end_char": 3514, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Amara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five other accused persons including respondent, Amara, were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 and under Section 14 7 of the Penal Code, and each of them was sentenced to imprisoment for life and to one and a half years rigorous imprisonment respectively.", "canonical_name": "Amara"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3694, "end_char": 3705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3716, "end_char": 3727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3738, "end_char": 3748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3758, "end_char": 3768, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nimba", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts of the prosecution case were that there was a land dispute between Nimba (P.W.6) father of the deceased, Poona, on the one hand, and respondent Amara and the members of his family, on the other."}}, {"text": "July 17, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 17, 1970 at about sunset the accused persons of whom respondent Kalki was armed with an axe and respondent, Amara with a dharia, came to the house of the deceased."}}, {"text": "Mooli", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4338, "end_char": 4343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At th11t time the deceased was inside his hut with hls wife Mooli (P.W.l)."}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amara called Poona."}}, {"text": "Mooli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Poona came out followed by his wife Mooli, when he was knocked down by Amara and Rama whereupon Kalki gave him blow with the axe on the neck."}}, {"text": "Rama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4454, "end_char": 4458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Poona came out followed by his wife Mooli, when he was knocked down by Amara and Rama whereupon Kalki gave him blow with the axe on the neck."}}, {"text": "Geli", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mooli (P.W.l) raised an outcry when Geli, mother of the deceased (P.W.2) who had been at some distance from the hut came running to the place of occurrence and saw the assailants leaving the place."}}, {"text": "Nimba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nimba lodged a report at the police station at Nana."}}, {"text": "Nana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4797, "end_char": 4801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nimba lodged a report at the police station at Nana."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9326, "end_char": 9337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9974, "end_char": 9985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9993, "end_char": 10003, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10033, "end_char": 10044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10055, "end_char": 10065, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10255, "end_char": 10261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_509_511_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "RAFIQ & ANR.\n\nMUNSHILAL & ANR.\n\nApril 16, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nProcedure-Litigant entrusted appeal to an advocate-Advocate failed to appear in Court at hearing-Appeal dismissed-Litigant, whether entitled to have the appeal restored for hearing.\n\nCosts-Appeal dismissed on account of absence of advocate at hearing- Costs, if could be recovered from Advocate.\n\nOn knowing that the High Court had dismissed his appeal on the ground that his Advocate was not present in the Court when the matter was taken up for hearing the appellant moved an application for the recall of the order dismissing the appeal and for permission to participate in the hearing of the appeal. The High Court rejected this application stating that no satisfactory explanation had been furnished by the Advocate for his slackness in filing the affidavit for nearly 15 days after it was drafted.\n\nOn the question whether the litigant is entitled to have his case reheard by the High Court.\n\nHELD : It is not proper that an innocent litigant, after doing everything E in his power to effectively participate in his proceedings by entrusting his case to the Advocate, should be made to suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his agent. For whatever reason the Advocate might have absented himself from the Court, the innocent litigant could not be allowed to suffer injustice for the fault of his Advocate. [511 Bl\n\nThe respondent's costs should be recovered from the Advocate who F absented himself from Court. [511 D]\n\n[The Court directed the appeal to be restored to its original position in the High Court and heard.]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1415 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 7th January 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.\n\nApplication No. 113 of 1981 in Second Appeal No. 1484 of 1973.\n\nO.P. Rana, M. Qamaruddin and Mrs. M. Qamaruddin for the Appellants.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nA.K. Sanghi for Respondent No. I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivere, d by\n\nDESAI, J. Special leave granted.\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nWe have heard Mr. 0. P. Rana, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondent.\n\nThe High Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the present appellant in the absence of the learned counsel for the appellant.\n\nWhen the appellant became aware of the fact that his appeal had been disposed of in the absence of his advocate, he moved an application in the High Court to recall the order dismissing his appeal and permit him to participate in the hearing of the appeal.\n\nThis application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that though the application was prepared and drafted and an affidavit was sworn on 29th October, 1980, the same was not presented to the court till November 12, 1980 and that there is no satisfactory explanation for this slackness on the part of the learned advocate who was requested to file the application.\n\nThe disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things.\n\nThe party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court's procedure.\n\nAfter engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. Maybe he is better informed on this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss.\n\nEven if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may iscourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute.\n\nWhat is the fault of the party who having done everything in his\n\nRAFIQ v. MUNSHILAL (Desui, J.) 511\n\npower and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one wh::i would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is w:1ether it is propr that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter.\n\nWe say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order.\n\nWe direct that the appeal be restored to its orginal number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the c::>sts of the respondent here.\n\nAs we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs.200/- should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr.A.K.Sanghi.\n\nAppeal allowed to the extent indicated with costs in the manner E indicated.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 15, "entities": [{"text": "RAFIQ & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAFIQ & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNSHILAL & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNSHILAL & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 16, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 46, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 16, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "O.P. Rana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1889, "end_char": 1898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Rana, M. Qamaruddin and Mrs. M. Qamaruddin for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "M. Qamaruddin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1900, "end_char": 1913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Rana, M. Qamaruddin and Mrs. M. Qamaruddin for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1981, "end_char": 1992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nA.K. Sanghi for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2062, "end_char": 2067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivere, d by\n\nDESAI, J. Special leave granted."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2131, "end_char": 2141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nWe have heard Mr. 0."}}, {"text": "29th October, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2770, "end_char": 2788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that though the application was prepared and drafted and an affidavit was sworn on 29th October, 1980, the same was not presented to the court till November 12, 1980 and that there is no satisfactory explanation for this slackness on the part of the learned advocate who was requested to file the application."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2835, "end_char": 2852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that though the application was prepared and drafted and an affidavit was sworn on 29th October, 1980, the same was not presented to the court till November 12, 1980 and that there is no satisfactory explanation for this slackness on the part of the learned advocate who was requested to file the application."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4029, "end_char": 4040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4084, "end_char": 4107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench."}}, {"text": "A.K.Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6059, "end_char": 6069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr.A.K.Sanghi.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Sanghi"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_512_517_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "KULJEET SINGH @ RANGA\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ANR.\n\nApril 21, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J., A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Article 32-No material furnished for justifying the reduction of the death sentence-Dismissed.\n\nThe petitioner, alongwlth ar.other accused was convicted by the Additional Session Judge for the murder of two young children and sentenced to death. Their conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions filed by them against their conviction and sentence were dismissed by this Court. By this Writ Petition the petitioner asked for re-appraisal of his case and reconsideration of the death sentence imposed upon him,\n\nDismissing the ~Writ Petition and upholding the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner once again,\n\nHELD : I. The answers given by the petitioner furnished no material a all for justifying the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life.\n\n[515 E-F]\n\n2. The Sessions Court and the High Court were right in comin~ to the conclusion that the two accused were guilty of the offence of which they were charged.\n\nThere is voluminous evidence of unimpeachable character which establishes his complicity in the mu rd er. The evidence regarding the theft of the Fiat Car, the blood group of the accused, the manner of the arrest and the recovery of incriminating weapons at their instance leave not even the slightest doubt that it was they who committed the murders. [514 D, 515 D-E]\n\n3. It is true that the murder of the two particular children was not preplanned.\n\nBut that was because the accused did not know that they would hit upon those particular children that evening. What is important is that the accused had made all the preparations for committing the murder. The plan was that they would offer a lift to some young children, try to extort ransom from their parents by kidnapping them and do the children to death in the event of any impediment arising in the execution of their plan. The impediments here were the uncommon courage of the brave little children who did not make an abject surrender to their destiny and the fact which emerged during their molestation that their father was a mere government servant whose salary was too small to permit the payment of a handsome ransom. (515 G-H, 516 A-Cl\n\n4. The accused trapped the children like helpless mice. The children got into the car but could not get out of it. In the boot of the car were kept formidable weapons which were ultimately used for committing the murder. In addition, the accused carried sharp weapons with them. The author of the injury on the boy was clearly the petitioner since his hands were more free than those of his co-accused who was at the wheel. The strategy to which they\n\nKULJEET SINGH V. UNION 513\n\nadhered to the last without contrition of any kink was so deep laid. Their A inhuma'nity defies all belief and description. [516 E-F]\n\n5. The case of the petitioner can not be 'separated from that of his co-accused. The petitioner was an active participator in the whole episode and but for his willing cooperation, his co-accused could never have succeeded in his design. Many atrocities were committed, many falsehood uttered, many escapades achieved and many an evidence concealed or destroyed by them. The petitioner's B part in carrying out the nefarious plan is no less significant than that of his co-accused and he is no less guilty than him. There is no room for treating the one differently from the other. [517 A-CJ\n\n6. The survival of an orderly society demands !he extinction of persons like the accused who are a menace to social order and security. They ar~ professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society. [516 G-H]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petit10n No. 539 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)\n\nR.K. Garg, D.K. Garg and R.C. Kaushik for the Petitioner.\n\nM.K. BanarjPe, Addi!. Sol. Genl. and A. Subhashini for Respondent No. I.\n\nN.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J.\n\nKuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus, the petitioner herein, was convicted along with one Jasbir Singh alias Billa, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for various offences in connection with the murder of two young children, Geeta Chopra and her brother Sanjay. The two accused were sentenced to death for the offence under section 302 read with section 34 of the\n\nPenal Code andfto varying terms of imprisonment under sections 363, 365, 366 and 376 read with section 34 of the Code. Tl1e order of conviction and sentence, including the sentence of death, was confirmed by the Delhi High Court by its judgment dated November 16, 1979 whereupon the two accused filed Special Leave Petitions 562 and 1739 of 1980 in this Court, challenging their conviction and sentence.\n\nThose Special Leave Petitions were dismissed on December 8, 1980\n\nby a Bench of this Court consisting of Justice 0., Chinappa Reddy, Justice Baharul Islam and one of us the Chief Justice. By this writ Petition, the petioner virtually asks for the re-appraisal of his case and a reconsideration of the dismissal of his Special Leave Petition.\n\nA The thrust of the petition is against the sentence of death imposed on the petitioner.\n\nBy an order dated February 24, 1981 the learned Chamber Judge, Justice A.C. Gupta, had stayed the execution of the death sentence pending disposal of the Writ Petition. By an order dated B March 23, 1981 we had directed that the petitioner should be produced on March 30 in the Chief Justice's Chamber and that the execution of the death sentence should be stayed until further orders.\n\nThe petitioner was accordingly produced before us in the presence of his counsel, Shri R.K. Garg.\n\nCounsel for the Union of India and the Delhi Administration were also present. We questioned .\n\nC the petitioner on matters bearing, as we thought, on the question of sentence.\n\nWe will refer tci the result of that somewhat unusual exercise a little later.\n\nFirst, regarding the conviction itself. There is voluminous evidence of unimpeachable character which establishes conclusively the complicity of the petitioner in the murder of Geeta and Sanjay.\n\nDr.\n\nM.S. Nanda (PW 56) gave a lift to Geeta and Sanjay from Dhaula Kuan to Go! Dak-khana. Bhagwan Das (PW 6), wh0 was going along on a scooter, rang up the Police Control Room at 6.44 p.m. saying that a woman was shouting \"Bachao, Bachao\" in a Fiat Car and that he saw a scuJfle going on between the woman and the driver on one hand and between the boy and the person sitting next to the driver on the other.\n\nThe man sitting next to the driver was the petitioner himself.\n\nThe information given by Bhagwan Das was reduced into writing by the police officer, the report being ex. PW 61A. Bhagwan Das had mentioned over the telephone that the number of the car was HRK 8930 but it was wrongly taken down as MRK 8930.\n\nInderject Singh (PW 9), another public-spirited citizen like Bhagwan Das, who works in the Delhi Develop; nent Authority as a Junior Engineer, chased the Fiat Car on his scooter, since he heard the shrieks of a girl coming from the Fiat Car and saw the boy and the girl fighting with the two men who were sitting on the front seat.\n\nAs he was chasing the car, the boy was showing to him his bleeding shoulder through the back wind screen of the car. lnderjeet Singh chased the car over some distance, but whereas he was bound by the traffic rules and had to stop at the red traffic signal, the Fiat car had the liberty to jump the signal and speed away.\n\nAfter the light turned green, Inderjeet Singl1 resumed his chase but could not find the car.\n\nHe therefore went straight to the Rajinder Nagar Police Station and lodged his report, Ex. PW-9A.\n\nHe told\n\nthe police that he saw a scuffle between the boy and the girl who A were seated on the back seat on one hand and the iwo men who were seated on the front seat in a Fiat car, HRK 8930.\n\nThe police felt obsessed by their notorious difficulty that the offence was noncongnizable and tiiat the incident had taken place in an area which was not within the \"territorial jurisdiction ' of the Police Station.\n\nInderjeet Singh had to persuade the Police do the needful by impres- B sing upon them that he had come to lodge the report purely on humanitarian grounds. Inderjeet Singh lodged his report at 6.45 P.M and strangely, the Rajinder Nagar Pvlice Station slept over the report for more than an hour.\n\nAt 10. 15 P.M. the petitioner and his companion Billa visited C the Willingdon Hospital because Billa had a cut injury on his head.\n\nThe features of the skiagrams taken by Sadhu Ram (PW 21) of Billa's skull are indentical with those of the skiagrams taken by Satish Aggarwal (PW 19) of his skull after bis arrest.\n\nThe fingerprints on the X-ray slip, which were taken on the night of the incident when the accused went to the Willingdon Hospital, are also D proved to be of Billa's. In addition to these tell-tale pieces of evidence for collecting which due credit must be given to the police, the evidence , regarding the theft of the Fiat car, the blood-group of the accused, the manner of their arrest and the recovery of incriminating weapons at their instance leave not the slightest doubt that it is they who committed the murder of Sanjay and Geeta.\n\nThe Sessions E Court and the High Court were therefore right in coming to the conclusion that the two accused are guilty of the offences of which they are charged.\n\nOn the question of sentence, the answers given by the petitioner when we questioned him on the 30th March, furnish no F material at all for justifying the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe petitioner is an unmarried man and appears to have no dependents.\n\nHis father is gainfully employed and his mother, according .to him, used to work as a nurse in a hospital. The petitioner has submitted to us a written application saying that he bears an unblemished past and is not a professional G criminal.\n\nWe have given our anxious consideration to the question as to whether the imposition of the death sentence should be reviewed, but we are unable to find any reason for doing so.\n\nIt is true that the H murder of the two pc.rticufar children was not pre-planned.\n\nBut that \\\\as because the accused did not know that they would hit\n\nupon those particular children that evening.\n\nWhat is important is that the accused bad made all the preparations for committing the murder of a person or persons whom they would apparently oblige by offering a lift. The plan which they had batched was that they would offer a lift to some children, try to extort reason from their parents by kidnapping them and do the children to death in the event of any impediments arising in the execution of their plan.\n\nThe imediments here were the uncommon courage of the brave little children who did not make an abject surrender to their Destiny and the stark fact which emerged during their molestation that their father was a mere government servant whose salary was too small to permit the payment of a handsome ransom.\n\nWe have not the slightest doubt that the death of the Chopra children was caused by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning which bears a professional stamp. The murder was most certainly not committed on the spur of the moment as a result of some irresistible impulse which can be said to have overtaken the accused at the crucial momeat.\n\nIn other words, there was a planned motivation behind the crime though the accused had no personal motive to commit the murder of these two children.\n\nAny two children would have been good enough for them.\n\nThe accused had loosened the handles of the doors of the car so that they should fall down when the children, after getting into the car, close the doors behind them.\n\nBy this process it was ensured that the children would get into a trap like helpless mice.\n\nThey got into the car but could not get out of it.\n\nIn the boot of the car were kept formidable weapons which were ultimately used for committing the murder of the children. In addition, the accused carried sharp weapons with them which explains the injury caused to Sanjay in the car itself. The author of that injury was clearly the petitioner since his hands were more free than those of Billa who was on the wheel. The injured children were taken to a park in order apparently to lull them into a false sense of security.\n\nThe true purpose of doing so was to let the dusk fall so that the most dastardly act could be committed under the cover of darkness.\n\nSo deep-laid was the strategy to which they adhered to the last without contrition of any kind.\n\nTheir inhumanity defies all belief and description.\n\nThe survival of an orderly society demands the ex:inction of the life of persons like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and ecurity. They are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society.\n\nThe case of the petitioner cannot be separated from that of A Billa. The two sail in the same boat and must stand or fall together.\n\nThe petitioner was an active participator in the who!~ expisode and but for his willing cooperation, Billa could never have succeeded in his design.\n\nIn fact, the petitioner was in the company of Billa right from the moment that the children entered their car until they themselves, Ranga and Billa, entered the military compartment and B were arrested. In between many atrocities were committed, many falsehoods uttered, many escapades achieved and many an evidence concealed or destoryed.\n\nThe petitioner's part in carrying out the nefarious plan is no less significant than that of Billa and he is no less guilty than him.\n\nThere is no room for treating the one differently from the other. They were hand in glove with each other.\n\nWe, therefore, vacate the stay orders 'in regard to the execution of the death sentence imposed on the petitioner and once again uphold the death sentence imposed upon him.\n\nWe hope that the President will dispose of the mercy petition stated to have been filed by the petitioner as expeditio.usly as he finds his. convenience.\n\nThe writ is accordingly dismissed.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "KULJEET SINGH @ RANGA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KULJEET SINGH @ RANGA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 21, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 21, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J., A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cl\n\n4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2320, "end_char": 2325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, D.K. Garg and R.C. Kaushik for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Garg"}}, {"text": "D.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, D.K. Garg and R.C. Kaushik for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Garg"}}, {"text": "R.C. Kaushik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, D.K. Garg and R.C. Kaushik for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M.K. BanarjPe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3974, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. BanarjPe, Addi!."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4011, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and A. Subhashini for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "N.C. Talukdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4048, "end_char": 4061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nN.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4066, "end_char": 4077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nN.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4145, "end_char": 4156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J.\n\nKuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus, the petitioner herein, was convicted along with one Jasbir Singh alias Billa, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for various offences in connection with the murder of two young children, Geeta Chopra and her brother Sanjay."}}, {"text": "Kuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4165, "end_char": 4195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J.\n\nKuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus, the petitioner herein, was convicted along with one Jasbir Singh alias Billa, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for various offences in connection with the murder of two young children, Geeta Chopra and her brother Sanjay."}}, {"text": "Jasbir Singh alias Billa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4249, "end_char": 4273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J.\n\nKuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus, the petitioner herein, was convicted along with one Jasbir Singh alias Billa, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for various offences in connection with the murder of two young children, Geeta Chopra and her brother Sanjay."}}, {"text": "Geeta Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4397, "end_char": 4409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J.\n\nKuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus, the petitioner herein, was convicted along with one Jasbir Singh alias Billa, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for various offences in connection with the murder of two young children, Geeta Chopra and her brother Sanjay."}}, {"text": "Sanjay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4426, "end_char": 4432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J.\n\nKuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus, the petitioner herein, was convicted along with one Jasbir Singh alias Billa, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for various offences in connection with the murder of two young children, Geeta Chopra and her brother Sanjay."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4518, "end_char": 4528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4547, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 363, 365, 366 and 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4591, "end_char": 4621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4632, "end_char": 4642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4749, "end_char": 4765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl1e order of conviction and sentence, including the sentence of death, was confirmed by the Delhi High Court by its judgment dated November 16, 1979 whereupon the two accused filed Special Leave Petitions 562 and 1739 of 1980 in this Court, challenging their conviction and sentence."}}, {"text": "November 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl1e order of conviction and sentence, including the sentence of death, was confirmed by the Delhi High Court by its judgment dated November 16, 1979 whereupon the two accused filed Special Leave Petitions 562 and 1739 of 1980 in this Court, challenging their conviction and sentence."}}, {"text": "December 8, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4990, "end_char": 5006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those Special Leave Petitions were dismissed on December 8, 1980\n\nby a Bench of this Court consisting of Justice 0.,"}}, {"text": "Chinappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5059, "end_char": 5073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chinappa Reddy, Justice Baharul Islam and one of us the Chief Justice."}}, {"text": "Baharul Islam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5083, "end_char": 5096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chinappa Reddy, Justice Baharul Islam and one of us the Chief Justice.", "canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ."}}, {"text": "February 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5393, "end_char": 5410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated February 24, 1981 the learned Chamber Judge, Justice A.C. Gupta, had stayed the execution of the death sentence pending disposal of the Writ Petition."}}, {"text": "A.C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated February 24, 1981 the learned Chamber Judge, Justice A.C. Gupta, had stayed the execution of the death sentence pending disposal of the Writ Petition."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was accordingly produced before us in the presence of his counsel, Shri R.K. Garg.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Garg"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the Union of India and the Delhi Administration were also present."}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5900, "end_char": 5920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the Union of India and the Delhi Administration were also present."}}, {"text": "Geeta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6296, "end_char": 6301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is voluminous evidence of unimpeachable character which establishes conclusively the complicity of the petitioner in the murder of Geeta and Sanjay."}}, {"text": "M.S. Nanda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6320, "end_char": 6330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.\n\nM.S. Nanda (PW 56) gave a lift to Geeta and Sanjay from Dhaula Kuan to Go!"}}, {"text": "Dhaula Kuan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6376, "end_char": 6387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.\n\nM.S. Nanda (PW 56) gave a lift to Geeta and Sanjay from Dhaula Kuan to Go!"}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Das (PW 6), wh0 was going along on a scooter, rang up the Police Control Room at 6.44 p.m. saying that a woman was shouting \"Bachao, Bachao\" in a Fiat Car and that he saw a scuJfle going on between the woman and the driver on one hand and between the boy and the person sitting next to the driver on the other."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6815, "end_char": 6826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The information given by Bhagwan Das was reduced into writing by the police officer, the report being ex."}}, {"text": "Inderject Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7033, "end_char": 7048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inderject Singh (PW 9), another public-spirited citizen like Bhagwan Das, who works in the Delhi Develop; nent Authority as a Junior Engineer, chased the Fiat Car on his scooter, since he heard the shrieks of a girl coming from the Fiat Car and saw the boy and the girl fighting with the two men who were sitting on the front seat."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7124, "end_char": 7129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inderject Singh (PW 9), another public-spirited citizen like Bhagwan Das, who works in the Delhi Develop; nent Authority as a Junior Engineer, chased the Fiat Car on his scooter, since he heard the shrieks of a girl coming from the Fiat Car and saw the boy and the girl fighting with the two men who were sitting on the front seat."}}, {"text": "lnderjeet Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7483, "end_char": 7498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lnderjeet Singh chased the car over some distance, but whereas he was bound by the traffic rules and had to stop at the red traffic signal, the Fiat car had the liberty to jump the signal and speed away.", "canonical_name": "Inderjeet Singl1"}}, {"text": "Inderjeet Singl1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7718, "end_char": 7734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the light turned green, Inderjeet Singl1 resumed his chase but could not find the car.", "canonical_name": "Inderjeet Singl1"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Nagar Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7816, "end_char": 7845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He therefore went straight to the Rajinder Nagar Police Station and lodged his report, Ex."}}, {"text": "Inderjeet Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8293, "end_char": 8308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inderjeet Singh had to persuade the Police do the needful by impres- B sing upon them that he had come to lodge the report purely on humanitarian grounds.", "canonical_name": "Inderjeet Singl1"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Nagar Pvlice Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8513, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inderjeet Singh lodged his report at 6.45 P.M and strangely, the Rajinder Nagar Pvlice Station slept over the report for more than an hour."}}, {"text": "Billa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8637, "end_char": 8642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 P.M. the petitioner and his companion Billa visited C the Willingdon Hospital because Billa had a cut injury on his head.", "canonical_name": "A Billa"}}, {"text": "Willingdon Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8657, "end_char": 8676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 P.M. the petitioner and his companion Billa visited C the Willingdon Hospital because Billa had a cut injury on his head."}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The features of the skiagrams taken by Sadhu Ram (PW 21) of Billa's skull are indentical with those of the skiagrams taken by Satish Aggarwal (PW 19) of his skull after bis arrest."}}, {"text": "Satish Aggarwal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8848, "end_char": 8863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The features of the skiagrams taken by Sadhu Ram (PW 21) of Billa's skull are indentical with those of the skiagrams taken by Satish Aggarwal (PW 19) of his skull after bis arrest."}}, {"text": "Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11293, "end_char": 11299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have not the slightest doubt that the death of the Chopra children was caused by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning which bears a professional stamp."}}, {"text": "Ranga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12967, "end_char": 12972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The survival of an orderly society demands the ex:inction of the life of persons like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and ecurity."}}, {"text": "A Billa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13220, "end_char": 13227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the petitioner cannot be separated from that of A Billa.", "canonical_name": "A Billa"}}, {"text": "N.K.A.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14393, "end_char": 14399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.K.A.\n\nPetition dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_518_535_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "MOHAN LAL\n\nMANAGEMENT OF\n\nM/S BHARAT ELECTRONICS LTD.\n\nApril 21, 1981\n\n[ A. C. GUPTA AND D.A. DESAI, JJ. ]\n\nRetrenchment-Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act-Whether termination of the services of a workman who has put in 240 working days within a period of one year amounts ro retrenchment and whether for non-compliance with the provisions of section 25F the termination of service is ab initio void-Sections 25A and 25B, scope of-Effect of terminqtion of service which is ab initio void and inoperative, explained.\n\nThe appellant was employed with the respondent as Salesman at its Delhi Sales Depot on a salary of Rs. 520/- per month from 8th December, J 973. His service was abruptly terminated by letter dated 12th October, 1974 with effect from 19th October, 1974.· Consequent upon his termination, an industrial dispute was raised and referred to the Labour Court, Delhi, on 24th April, 1976.\n\nThe Labour Court, on evaluation of evidence both oral and documentary, held that the termination of the service was in accordance with the standing orders justifying the removal of the employee on unsuccessful probation during the initial or extended period of probation and, therefore, .the termination would not constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) read with section 25 F of the Industrial Dispute Act. The Labour Court accordingly held that the termination was neither illegal nor improper nor unjustified and the claim of the appellant was negatived. Hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The termination of service of the appellant was ab initio void and inoperative. His case not being covered by any of the excepted or excluded categories referred to under section 2(oo) and he has rendered continuous service for one year, the termination of his service would constitute retrenchment. The pre-condition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied in this case and therefore he will be entitled to all benefits including back wages etc.\n\n(534F G, 535-C-D)\n\n2. Where the termination is illegal especially where thre is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workmen concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court had held H that before granting reinstatement the court must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement or to award compesantion.\n\nMOHANLAL V. BHARAT ELECTRONICS 519\n\nHere, no case has been made out for departure from the normally accepted A approach of the courts in the field of social justice: (535A C)\n\nRuby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chopra (P.P.), (1970) 2 Labour Law Journal, 63 and Hindustan Steel Ltd., Rourke/av. A.K. Roy and Others, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 343, referred to.\n\n3:1.\n\nNiceties and semantics apart, termination by the employer of the B service of a workman for any reason whatsoever in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself. The excepted or excluded cases are where termination is by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, voluntary retirement of the workman, retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment betwen the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf, and termination of the service of a workman C on the ground of continued illhealth. (524 E-F)\n\n3:2. It was not open to the Labour Court to record a finding that the service of the appellant was terminated during the period of probation on account of his unsatisfactory work which did not improve in spite of repeated warnings when there was not even a whisper of any period of probation in the appointment order or in the rules. The termination of service being, for a reason other than the excepted category, it would indisputably be retrenchment within .the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act. (523 G-H, 524A, 525Z)\n\nPipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, [1956] S.C.R. 172; Hariprasad Shivshankar :Jhukla v, A. D. Divikar, [1957] S.C.R. 121; State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. [1960] 2\n\n\n4. Before a workman can complain of retrenchment being not in consonance with section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, he has to show that he F has been in continuous service for not less than one year under that employer who has retrenched him from service. (529 C)\n\n5:1. The language employed in sub-sections (I) and (2) of section 25B does not admit of any dichotomy, namely, (a) sub-section (1) providing for uninterrupted service and (b) sub-section (2) comprehending a case where the workman is in continuous service.\n\nSub-sections (I) and (2) introduce a deeming fiction as to in what circumstances a workman could be said to be in continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A. (530 G H) ·\n\n5:2.\n\nSub-section (1) provides deetning fiction in that where a workman is in service for a certain period for that period even if service is interrupted on\n\naccount of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not ff illegal or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the\n\npart of the workman. Sub-section (I) mandates that interruptions therein indicated are to be ignored meaning thereby that on account of such cessation an interrupted service shall be deemed to be uninterrupted and such uninterrupted service shall for the purposes of Chapter V-A be deemed to be continuous service. (530H, 531A, C-D)\n\n5:3. Sub-section (2) incorporates another deeming fiction for an entirely different situation. It is not necessary for the purposes of sub-section (2) (a) that the workman should be in service for a period of one year. If he is in service for a period of one year and that if that service is continuous service within the meaning of sub-section (1) his case would be governed by sub-section (1) and his case need not be covered by sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) envisages a situation not governed by sub-section (1). And sub-section (2) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months counting backwards and just proceeding the relevant date beini: date of retrenchment. .\n\n(531D-E. 532A-B)\n\nBoth on principle and on precedent section 25B(2) comprehends the situation where workman is not in employment for a period of 12 calendar months but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date that is the date of retrenchment, if he has, he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and Chapter V-A. In the instant case, the appellant's case indisputably falls within section 25 B(2) (a) and he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of Chapter V-A. (534B-D)\n\n\nSurendra Kumar and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum Labour Court, New Delhi and Another, [1981] l S.C.R. 789 followed.\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 364 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated the 31st May, J 980 of the Additional Labour Court, Delhi in Industrial l.D. No. 62 of 1976.\n\nV. M. Tarku11de, Hemani Sharma and P. H. Parekh for the Appellant.\n\nS. Markendaya for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThe appellant Mohan Lal was employed with the respondent M/s .Bharat Electronics Limited as Salesman at its Delhi\n\nSales Depot on a salary of Rs. 520 per month from 8th December, A 1973.\n\nHis service was abruptly terminated by letter dated 12th October 1974 with effect from 19th October, 1974. Consequent upon this termination, an industrial dispute was raised and the Delhi Administration, by its order dated 24th April, 1976 referred the following dispute to the Labour Court, Delhi for adjudication :\n\n\"Whether the terminaticn of services of Shri Mohan Lal is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?\"\n\n' As the respondent management at one stage failed to participate in the proceedings, the reference was heard ex-parte and the Labour Court made an award on 2nd May, 1977 directing re-instatement of the appellant with continuity of service and full back wages at the rate of Rs. 520 per month from the date of termination till re-instatement. Subsequently, respondent moved for setting aside the ex-parte award and seeking permission to participate in the proceedings, which motion was granted. The respondent inter alia contended that the appellant was a salesman appointed on probation for six months and subsequently on the expiry of the initial period, the period of probation was extended upto 8th Sept., 1974 and on the expiry of this extended period of probation, his service was terminated by letter dated 12th October, 1974, as he was not found suitable for the post to which he was appointed.\n\nThe Labour Court, on evaluation of evidence both oral and documentary, held that the termination of the service was in accordance with the standing orders justifying the removal of the employee on unsuccessful probation during the initial or extended period of probation; and therefore the termination in this case, according to the Labour Court, would not constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 2( oo) read with section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act.\n\nAccordingly it was held that the termination was neither illegal nor improperno r unjustified and the claim of the appellant was negatived.\n\nHence, this appeal by special leave.\n\nThe only point for determination is whether even in the circumstances, as pleaded by the respondent termination of service of the appellant would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of the expression as defined in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 ('Act' for short) ? If the answer is in affirmative, the consequential question will have to be answered whether in view of\n\nthe admitted position that the mandatory pre-condition prescribed by section 25F for a valid retrenchment having not been satisfied, the appellant would be entitled to re-instatement with' back wages or as contended by Mr. Markandey in the special facts of this case, the Court should not direct re-instatement but award compensation in lieu of re-instatement.\n\nAn apparent contradiction which stares in the eye on the stand taken by the respondent is overlooked by the Labour Court which has resulted in the' miscarriage of justice.\n\nIn this context the facts as alleged by the respondent may be taken as true.\n\nSays the respondent, that the appellant was appointed by order dated July 21, 1973.\n\nThe relevant portion of 1 he order of which notice may be taken is paragraph 2.\n\nIt reads as under :\n\n\"This appointment will be temporary in the first instance but is likely to be made permanent.\"\n\nParagraph 4 refers to the consequences of a temorary appointment, namely, that the service would be terminable without notice and without any compensation in lieu of notice on either side. Paragraph 6 provides that the employment of the appellant shall be governed by rules, regulations and standing orders of the company then in force and which may be amended, altered or extended from time to time and the acceptance of the offer carries with it the necessary agreement to obey all such rules, regulations and standing orders.\n\nThere is not even a whisper of any period of probation prescribed for the appointment nor any suggestion that there are some rules which govern appointment of the appellant which would initially be on probation.\n\nThus, the appointment was temporary in the first instance and there was an in!ler indication that it was likely to be made permanent.\n\nEven if this promise of likely to be made permanent is ignored, indubitably the appointment was temporary.\n\nThe respondent, however, says that note 3 at the foot of the appointment order intimates to the appellant that in the event of his permanent appointment the temporary service put in by him will be counted as part of probationary period of service as required under the rules.\n\nThis consequence would follow in the event of permanent appointment being offered and this is clear from the language employed in note 3.\n\nIn this case no permanent appointment having been offered, the consequence set out in note 3 could not have emerged. Assuming, however, that this note incorporates all the necessary rules and regulations in the contract of employment, it was incumbent upon\n\nI )\n\nthe respondent to show that even when appointment is not shown to be on probation in the order of appointment, in view of the rules governing the contract of employment there shall always be a period of probation for every appointee. Witness Bawdekar who appeared on behalf of the respondent stated in his evidence that the appellant was appointed as a probationary salesman.\n\nEven according to him prescribed period of probation was six months. He then stated that by the letter dated July JO, 1974, respondent informed the appellant that his service should have been terminated on the expiry of initial period of probation, i.e. on June 8, 1974. However, as a special case the probation period was extended upto September 8, 1974.\n\nNo rule was pointed out to us enabling the respondent to extend the initial period of probation. Assuming even then that such was the power of the respondent, on September 9, 1974, the period of probation having not been further extended nor termination of service having been ordered during or at the end of the probationary period on the ground of unsuitability, the consequence in law is that either he would be a temporary employee or a permanent employee as per the rules governing the contract of employment between the appellant and the respondent.\n\nAdmittedly his service was terminated by letter dated October 12, 1974, with effect from October 19, 1974. It is not the case of the respondent that there was any further extention of the probationary period.\n\nThus, if the initial appointment which was described as temporary is treated on probation, even according to the respondent the period of probation was six months, it expired on June 8, 1974. Even if by the letter dated July 10, 1974, the period of probation was said to have been extended, on its own terms it expired on September 8, 1974.\n\nThe service of the appellant was terminated with effect from October 19,\n\n1974. What was the nature and character of service of the appellant from September 8, 1974 when the extended period of probation expired and termination of his service on October 19, 1974? He was unquestionably not on probation. He was either temporary or permanent but not a probationer. How is it open then to the Labour Court to record a finding that the service of the appellant was terminated during the period of probation on account of his unsatisfactory work which did not improve in spite of repeated warnings? The Labour Court concluded that notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was not shown to have been placed on probation in the initial appointment letter but in view of the subsequent orders there was a period of probation prescribed for the appellant and that his service was terminated during the extended period of\n\nprobation. This is gross error apparent on the face of the record which, if not interfered with, would result in miscarriage of justice.\n\nIf on October 19, 1974, the appellant was not on probation and assuming maximum in favour of the respondent that he was a temporary employee, could termination of his service, even according to the respondent, not as and by way of punishment but a discharge of a temporary servant, constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(00), is the core question.\n\nSection 2(oo) reads as under:\n\n\"2(oo) \"retrenchment\" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-\n\n(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or\n\n(b) retirement of the workman on reaching-the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or\n\n(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.\"\n\nNiceties and semantics apart, terination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself. The excepted or excluded cases are where termination is by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, voluntary retirement of the workman, retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf, and termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. It is not the case of the respondent that termination in the instant case was a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. If such a position were adopted, the termination would be ab initio void for violation of principle of natural justice or for not following the procedure prescribed for imposing punishment. It is not even suggested that this was a case of voluntary retirement or retirement on reaching the age of superannuation or absence on account of continued ill-health. The case does not fall under any of the excepted categories. There is thus termination of\n\n\nservice for a reason other than the excepted category. It would indisputably be retrenchment within the meaning of the word as defined in the Act. It is not necessary to dilate on the point nor to refer to the earlier decisions of this Court in vit:w of the later two pronouncements of this Court to both of which one of us was a party. A passing reference to the earliest judgment which was the sheet an ch cir till the later pronouncements may not be out of place.\n\nIn Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divikar(1), after referring to Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union(\"), a Constitution Bench of this Court quoted with approval the following passage from the aforementioned case :\n\n\"But retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is being continued but that a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as surplusage and the termination of services of all the workmen as a result of the closure of the business cannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment.\"\n\nThis observation was made in the context of the closure of an undertaking and being conscious of this position, the question of the correct interpretation of the definition of the expression 'retrenchment' in section 2(oo) of the Act was left open. Reverting to that question, the view was reaffirmed but let it be remembered that the\n\ntwo appeals which were heard together in Shukla's case were cases E of closure, one Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and another Shri Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda With specific reference to those cases, in State Bank of India v.\n\nN. Sundara Money,(3) Krishna Iyer J. speaking for a three judges bench, interpreted the expression 'termination ...... for any reason whatsover' as under:\n\n\"A break-down of s. 2(oo) unmisrakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. 'Termination ... for any reason whatsoever' are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So, the sole question is-- has the employee's service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive.\n\nA termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the running out of the stipulated term.\n\nTo pro-\n\n(I) [1957] S.C.R. 121.\n\n(2) [1956] S.C.R. 872.\n\n\nSUPRME COURT REPORTS\n\n\ntect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of terminatiOn by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced.\n\nMay be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of section 25F and section 2(00) .. Without speculating on possibilities, we may agree that 'retrenchment' is no longer terra incognito but area covered by an expansive definition. It means 'to end, conclude, cease'. In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days-automatically may be, but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from section 25F(b) is inferable from the proviso to section 25F(l).\n\nTrue, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract section 25F and automatic extinguishment of service by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient.\"\n\nIt would be advantageous to refer to the facts of that case to appreciate the interpretation placed by this Court on the relevant section. State Bank of India appointed the respondent by an order of appointment which incorporated the two relevant terms relied upon by the Bank at the hearing of the case.\n\nThey were : (i) the appointment is purely a temporary one for a period of 9 days but may be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the Bank's discretion; (ii) the employment, unless terminated earlier, will automatically cease at the expiry of. the period i.e. 18.I 1.1972. It is in the context of these facts that the Court held that where the termination was to be automatically effective by a certain date as set out in the order of appointment it would nontheless be a retrenchment within the meaning section 2(oo) and in the absence of strict compliance with the requirements of section 25F, termination was held to be invalid.\n\nContinuing this line of approach, in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v.\n\nThe Presiding officer, Labour Court, Orissa and Ors.,_(1) a bench of three judges examined the specific contention that the decision in\n\nSundara Money's case runs counter to the construction placed on H that section by a Constitution Bench and, therefore, the decision is\n\n(I) [1977] S.C.R. 586.\n\nper incuriam. This Court analysed in detail Shukla' s case and Sundara\n\nMoney's case and ultimately held that the Court did not find anything in Shukla' s case which is inconsistent with what has been held in Sundara Money's case.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion it was observed that in Shukla' s case the question arose in the context of closure of the whole of the undertaking while in Hindustan Steel's case and Sundara ltfoney's case the question was not examined in the context of closure of whole undertaking but individual termination of service of some employees and it was held to constitute retrenchment within the meaning of the expression.\n\nThis question again cropped up in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala(1).\n\nRejecting the contention for reconsideration of Sundara Money's case on the ground that it conflicted with a Constitution Bench decision in Shukla' s case and adopting the ratio in Hindustan Steel's case that there was nothing in the two aforementioned decisions which is inconsistent with each other and taking note of the decision in Ddhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukerjee(') wherein this Court had held that striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the management was termination of service which was retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(00), the Court held that discharge of the workman on the ground that she had not passed the test which would enable her to obtain confirmation was retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) and, therefore, the requirements of section 25F had to be complied with. It was pointed out that since the decision in Shukla' s case, the Parliament stepped in and introduced section 25FF and section 25FFF by providing that compensation shall be payable to workman in case of transfer or closure of the undertaking, as if the workmen had been retrenched.\n\nThe effect of the amendment was noticed as that every case of termination of service by act of employer even if such termination was as a consequence of transfer or closure of the undertaking was to be treated as 'retrenchment' for the purposes of notice, compensation, etc.\n\nThe Court concluded as under :\n\n\"Whatever doubts might have existed before Parliament enacted sections 25FF and 25FFF about the width of section 25F there cannot be any doubt that the expression 'termination of service for any reason whatsoever' now covers every kind of termination of service except those not\n\n\n(2) [1978] 1.S.C.R. 591\n\nexpressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as sections 25FF and 25FFF.\"\n\nReverting to the facts of this case, termination of service of the appellant does not fall within any of the excepted, or to be precise, excluded categories.\n\nUndoubtedly therefore the termination would constitute retrenchment and by a catena of decisions it is well settled that where pre-requisite for valid retrenchment as laid down in section 25F has not been complied with, retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void. In State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors.,(1) this Court held that failure to comply with the requirement of section 25F which prescribes a condition precedent for a valid retrenchment renders the order of retrenchment invalid and inoperative.\n\nIn other words, it does not bring about a cessation of service of the workman and the workman continues to be in service. This was not even seriously controverted before us.\n\nIt was, however, urged that section 25F is not attracted in this case for an entirely different reason. Mr. Markendaya contended that before section 25F is invoked, the condition of eligibility for a workman to complain of invalid retrenchment must be satisfied.\n\nAccording to him unless the workman has put in continuous service for not less than one year his case would not be govern(;!d by section 25F. That is substantially correct because the relevant provision of section 25F provides as under :\n\n\"25F. \"No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until:-\n\n(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;\n\nProvided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the terminal ion of service;\n\n(1) [1960) 2 S.C.R. 866 at 872,\n\n(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent of fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and\n\n(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate government by notification in the Official Gazette).\"\n\nBefore a workman can complain of retrenchment being not in conso nance with section 25F, he has to show that he has been in continuous service for not less than one year under that employer who has retrl':nched him from service.\n\nSection 25B is the dictionary clause for the expression 'continuous'. It reads as under ;\n\n\"25B (I) a workman shall be paid to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;\n\n(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (I) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-\n\n(a) for a period of of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to he made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-\n\n(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and\n\n(ii) two hundred and forty days. in any other case;\n\nSU~REME COURT REPORTS [ 1981] 3 s.c.R.\n\n(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made has actually worked under the employer for not less than-\n\n(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and\n\n(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.\n\nExplanation-J<'or the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which-\n\n(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement <'r\n\nas permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)\n\nAct, 1946, or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;\n\n(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;\n\n. (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and\n\n(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.\n\nMr. Markendaya contended that clauses (I) and (2) of section 25B provide for two different contingencies and that none of the G clauses is satisfied by the appellant.\n\nHe contended that sub. section (I) provides for uninterrupted service and sub-section (2) comprehends a case where 'the workman is not in continuous service.\n\nThe language employed in sub-sections (I) and (2) does not admit of this dichotomy.\n\nSub-seciions (I) and (2) introduce a deeming H fiction .as to in what circumstances a workman could be said to be in continuous service for the purposes of Chapter VA.\n\nSub-section\n\n(1) provides a deeming fiction in that where a workman is in service\n\nfor a certain period he shall be deem.ed to be' in continuous service for that period even if service is interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a l0ckout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman.\n\nSituations such as sickness, autho rised leave, an accident, a strike not illegal, a lockout or a cessation of work would ipso facto interrupt a service.\n\nThese interruptions have to be ignored to treat the workman in uninterrupted service and such service interrupted on account of the aforementioned causes which would be deemed to be uninterrupted would be continuous service for the period for which the workman has been in service.\n\nIn industrial employment or for that matter in any service, sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lockout and a cessation of work not due to any fault on the part of the workman, are known hazards and there are bound to be interrup tions on that account.\n\nSub-section (I) mandates that interruptions therein indicated are to be ignored meaning thereby that on account of such cessation an interrupted service shall be deemed to be un interrupted and such uninterrupted service shall for the purposes of Chapter VA be deemed to be continuous service. That is only one part of the fiction.\n\nSub-section (2) incorporates . another deeming fiction for an entirely different situation. It comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of subsection (!) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer for a period of one year or six months, as the case may be, if the .workman during the period of 12 calendar months just preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under that employer for not less than 240 days. Sub-section\n\n(2) specifically comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service as per the deeming fiction indicating in subsection (I) for a period of one year or six months. In such a case he is deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if he satisfies the conditions in clause (a) of sub-section (2).\n\nThe conditions are that commencing the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, in case of retrenchment the date of retrenchment, if in a period of 12 calendar months just preceding such date the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purposes of Chapter VA. It is not necessary for the purposes of sub-section (2) (a) that the workman should be in service\n\nfor a period of one year. If he is in service for a period of one year and that if that service is continous service within the meaning of sub-section (1) his case would be governed by sub-section (I) and his case need not be covered by sub-section (2).\n\nSub-section (2) envisages a situation not governed by sub-section (!). And sub-section (2) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.\n\nIn other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in sub-section 2(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant date, i.e., the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained, move backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the period of 12 months, the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively answered in favour of the workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in sub-section 2(a) it will have to be assumed that the workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification enacted in section 25F. On a pure grammatical construction the contention that even for invoking sub-section (2) of section 25B the workman must be shown to be in continuous service for a period of one year would render sub-section (2) otiose and socially beneficial legislation would receive a set back by this impermissible assumption. The contention must first be negatived on a pure grammatical construction of sub-section (2). And in any event, even if there be any such thing in favour of the construction, it must be negatived on the ground that it would render sub-section (2) otiose. The language of sub-section\n\n(2) is so clear and unambiguous that no precedent is necessary to justify the interpretation we have placed on it. But as Mr.Markandaya referred to some authorities, we will briefly notice them.\n\nIn Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen(1), referring to section 25B as it then stood read with section 2(eee) which defined continuous service, this Court held as under:\n\n\"The position therefore is that during a period of employment for less than 11 calendar months these two\n\n\npersons worked for more than 240 days. In our opinion that would not satisfy the requirement of section 25B.\n\nBefore a workman can be considered to have completed one year of continuous service in an industry it must be shown first that he was employed for a period of not less than 12 calendar months and, next that during those 12 calendar months had worked for not less than 240 days. Where, as in the present case, the workmen have not at all been employed for a period of 12 calendar months it becomes unnecessary to examine whether the actual days of work numbered 240 days or more. For, in any case, the requirements of section 25B would not be satisfied by the mere fact of the number of working days being not less than 240 days.''\n\nIf section 25B had not been amended, the interpretation which it received in the aforementioned case would be binding on us. However, section 25B and section 2(eee) have been the subject-matter of amendment by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1964.\n\nSection 2(eee) was deleted and section 25B was amended. Prior to its amendment by the 1964 amendment Act, section 25B read as under:\n\n\"For the purposes of ss. 25C and 25F a workman who during the period of 12 calendar months has actually worked in an industry for not less than 240 days, shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service in the industry.\"\n\nWe have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr.(1), Chinnappa Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stomping Works (P) Ltd. case, held as under :\n\n\"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a workman who has actually worked under the employer for not less\n\n(1) [1981] I S.C.R. 789.\n\nthan 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether. or not he has in fact been in such continuous service for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year.\"\n\nIn a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2).\n\nTherefore, both on principle and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a workman is not in employment for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has, he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and Chapter VA.\n\nReverting to the facts of this case, admittedly the appellant was employed and was on duty from December 8, 1973 to October 19, 1974 when his service was terminated.\n\nThe relevant date will be the date of termination of service, i.e. October 19, 1974. Commencing from that date and counting backwards, admittedly he had rendered service for a period of 240 days within a period of 12 months and, indisputably, therefore, his case falls within section 25B(2) (a) and he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of Chapter VA.\n\nAppellant has thus satisfied both the eligibility qualifications prescribed in section 25F for claiming retrenchment compensation.\n\nHe has satisfactorily established that his case is not covered by any of the excepted or excluded categories and he has rendered continuous service for one year.\n\nTherefore, termination of his service would constitute retrenchment. As pre-condition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied the termination of service is ab initio void, invalid and inoperative. He must, therefore, be deemed to b~ in continuous service.\n\nThe last submission was that looking to the record of the appellant this Court should not grant reinstatement but award com- H pensation. If the termination of service is ab initio void and inoperative, there is no question of granting reinstatement because there is no cessation of service and a mere declaration follows that\n\nhe continues to be in service with all consequential benefits.\n\nUndoubtedly, in some decisions of this Court such as\"Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chopra (P. P.),{1) and Hindustan Steel Ltd.\n\nRourke/a v. A. K. Roy and Others(2) it was held that the Court before granting reinstatement must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement 'or to award compensation. But there is a catena of decisions which rule that where the termination is illegal especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workman concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits.\n\nNo case is made out for departure from this normally accepted approach of the Courts in the field of social justice and we do not propose to depart in. the case.\n\nAccordingly, this appeal is allowed and the Award of the Labour Court dated May 31, 1980, is set aside. We hold that the termination of service of the appellant was ab initio void and inoperative and a declaration is made that he continues to be in service with all consequential benefits, namely, back wages in full and other benefits, if any. However, as the Award is to be made . by the Labour Court, we remit the case to the Labour Court to make an appropriate Award in the light of the findings of this Court. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant in this Court quantified at Rs. 2000 within four weeks from the date of this judgment and the costs in the Labour Court have to be quantified by the Labour Court.\n\nS.R.\n\n(!) [1970] 1 L.L.J., 63\n\n(2) [1970] 3 S.C, R. 343 ..\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 119, "entities": [{"text": "LAL\n\nMANAGEMENT OF\n\nM/S BHARAT ELECTRONICS LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGEMENT OF M/S BHARAT ELECTRONICS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 21, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 21, 1981\n\n[ A. C. GUPTA AND D.A. DESAI, JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 25A and 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 409, "end_char": 429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th December, J 973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 650, "end_char": 669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "520/- per month from 8th December, J 973."}}, {"text": "12th October, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His service was abruptly terminated by letter dated 12th October, 1974 with effect from 19th October, 1974.·"}}, {"text": "19th October, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 759, "end_char": 777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His service was abruptly terminated by letter dated 12th October, 1974 with effect from 19th October, 1974.·"}}, {"text": "Labour Court, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequent upon his termination, an industrial dispute was raised and referred to the Labour Court, Delhi, on 24th April, 1976."}}, {"text": "24th April, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 890, "end_char": 906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequent upon his termination, an industrial dispute was raised and referred to the Labour Court, Delhi, on 24th April, 1976."}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1269, "end_char": 1282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1293, "end_char": 1303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2335, "end_char": 2348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court had held H that before granting reinstatement the court must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement or to award compesantion."}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.C.R. 343", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2837, "end_char": 2856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2995, "end_char": 3008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4023, "end_char": 4036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4396, "end_char": 4407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4646, "end_char": 4657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6633, "end_char": 6647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7124, "end_char": 7134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7392, "end_char": 7420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarku11de", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7593, "end_char": 7608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarku11de, Hemani Sharma and P. H. Parekh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Hemani Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7610, "end_char": 7623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarku11de, Hemani Sharma and P. H. Parekh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7628, "end_char": 7640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarku11de, Hemani Sharma and P. H. Parekh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Markendaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7661, "end_char": 7674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markendaya for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. Markendaya"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7740, "end_char": 7745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThe appellant Mohan Lal was employed with the respondent M/s .Bharat Electronics Limited as Salesman at its Delhi\n\nSales Depot on a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7765, "end_char": 7774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThe appellant Mohan Lal was employed with the respondent M/s .Bharat Electronics Limited as Salesman at its Delhi\n\nSales Depot on a salary of Rs.", "canonical_name": "MOHAN LAL"}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8302, "end_char": 8311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequent upon this termination, an industrial dispute was raised and the Delhi Administration, by its order dated 24th April, 1976 referred the following dispute to the Labour Court, Delhi for adjudication :\n\n\"Whether the terminaticn of services of Shri Mohan Lal is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?\"", "canonical_name": "MOHAN LAL"}}, {"text": "2nd May, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8593, "end_char": 8606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' As the respondent management at one stage failed to participate in the proceedings, the reference was heard ex-parte and the Labour Court made an award on 2nd May, 1977 directing re-instatement of the appellant with continuity of service and full back wages at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "8th Sept., 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9135, "end_char": 9150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent inter alia contended that the appellant was a salesman appointed on probation for six months and subsequently on the expiry of the initial period, the period of probation was extended upto 8th Sept., 1974 and on the expiry of this extended period of probation, his service was terminated by letter dated 12th October, 1974, as he was not found suitable for the post to which he was appointed."}}, {"text": "section 2( oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9743, "end_char": 9757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9768, "end_char": 9779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Dispute Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10232, "end_char": 10260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10455, "end_char": 10466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Markandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10609, "end_char": 10618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the answer is in affirmative, the consequential question will have to be answered whether in view of\n\nthe admitted position that the mandatory pre-condition prescribed by section 25F for a valid retrenchment having not been satisfied, the appellant would be entitled to re-instatement with' back wages or as contended by Mr. Markandey in the special facts of this case, the Court should not direct re-instatement but award compensation in lieu of re-instatement.", "canonical_name": "S. Markendaya"}}, {"text": "July 21, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11068, "end_char": 11081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Says the respondent, that the appellant was appointed by order dated July 21, 1973."}}, {"text": "Bawdekar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13189, "end_char": 13197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Witness Bawdekar who appeared on behalf of the respondent stated in his evidence that the appellant was appointed as a probationary salesman."}}, {"text": "July JO, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13433, "end_char": 13446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then stated that by the letter dated July JO, 1974, respondent informed the appellant that his service should have been terminated on the expiry of initial period of probation, i.e. on June 8, 1974."}}, {"text": "June 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13581, "end_char": 13593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then stated that by the letter dated July JO, 1974, respondent informed the appellant that his service should have been terminated on the expiry of initial period of probation, i.e. on June 8, 1974."}}, {"text": "September 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13661, "end_char": 13678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, as a special case the probation period was extended upto September 8, 1974."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13843, "end_char": 13860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming even then that such was the power of the respondent, on September 9, 1974, the period of probation having not been further extended nor termination of service having been ordered during or at the end of the probationary period on the ground of unsuitability, the consequence in law is that either he would be a temporary employee or a permanent employee as per the rules governing the contract of employment between the appellant and the respondent."}}, {"text": "October 12, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14292, "end_char": 14308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly his service was terminated by letter dated October 12, 1974, with effect from October 19, 1974."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14327, "end_char": 14343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly his service was terminated by letter dated October 12, 1974, with effect from October 19, 1974."}}, {"text": "July 10, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14668, "end_char": 14681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if by the letter dated July 10, 1974, the period of probation was said to have been extended, on its own terms it expired on September 8, 1974."}}, {"text": "October 19,\n\n1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14851, "end_char": 14868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The service of the appellant was terminated with effect from October 19,\n\n1974."}}, {"text": "section 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16172, "end_char": 16185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16210, "end_char": 16223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19218, "end_char": 19231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19386, "end_char": 19392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reverting to that question, the view was reaffirmed but let it be remembered that the\n\ntwo appeals which were heard together in Shukla's case were cases E of closure, one Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and another Shri Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda With specific reference to those cases, in State Bank of India v.\n\nN. Sundara Money,(3) Krishna Iyer J. speaking for a three judges bench, interpreted the expression 'termination ...... for any reason whatsover' as under:\n\n\"A break-down of s. 2(oo) unmisrakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. '"}}, {"text": "Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19429, "end_char": 19461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reverting to that question, the view was reaffirmed but let it be remembered that the\n\ntwo appeals which were heard together in Shukla's case were cases E of closure, one Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and another Shri Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda With specific reference to those cases, in State Bank of India v.\n\nN. Sundara Money,(3) Krishna Iyer J. speaking for a three judges bench, interpreted the expression 'termination ...... for any reason whatsover' as under:\n\n\"A break-down of s. 2(oo) unmisrakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. '"}}, {"text": "Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19480, "end_char": 19504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reverting to that question, the view was reaffirmed but let it be remembered that the\n\ntwo appeals which were heard together in Shukla's case were cases E of closure, one Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and another Shri Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda With specific reference to those cases, in State Bank of India v.\n\nN. Sundara Money,(3) Krishna Iyer J. speaking for a three judges bench, interpreted the expression 'termination ...... for any reason whatsover' as under:\n\n\"A break-down of s. 2(oo) unmisrakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. '"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19593, "end_char": 19605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reverting to that question, the view was reaffirmed but let it be remembered that the\n\ntwo appeals which were heard together in Shukla's case were cases E of closure, one Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and another Shri Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda With specific reference to those cases, in State Bank of India v.\n\nN. Sundara Money,(3) Krishna Iyer J. speaking for a three judges bench, interpreted the expression 'termination ...... for any reason whatsover' as under:\n\n\"A break-down of s. 2(oo) unmisrakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. '"}}, {"text": "s. 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19745, "end_char": 19753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20616, "end_char": 20627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20632, "end_char": 20645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21062, "end_char": 21076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21110, "end_char": 21124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21297, "end_char": 21308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21533, "end_char": 21552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State Bank of India appointed the respondent by an order of appointment which incorporated the two relevant terms relied upon by the Bank at the hearing of the case."}}, {"text": "18.I 1.1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21983, "end_char": 21994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the period i.e. 18.I 1.1972."}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22227, "end_char": 22240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22306, "end_char": 22317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sundara Money", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22555, "end_char": 22568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",_(1) a bench of three judges examined the specific contention that the decision in\n\nSundara Money's case runs counter to the construction placed on H that section by a Constitution Bench and, therefore, the decision is\n\n(I) [1977] S.C.R. 586.", "canonical_name": "Sundara ltfoney"}}, {"text": "Sundara\n\nMoney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22778, "end_char": 22792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court analysed in detail Shukla' s case and Sundara\n\nMoney's case and ultimately held that the Court did not find anything in Shukla' s case which is inconsistent with what has been held in Sundara Money's case.", "canonical_name": "Sundara ltfoney"}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23100, "end_char": 23115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reaching this conclusion it was observed that in Shukla' s case the question arose in the context of closure of the whole of the undertaking while in Hindustan Steel's case and Sundara ltfoney's case the question was not examined in the context of closure of whole undertaking but individual termination of service of some employees and it was held to constitute retrenchment within the meaning of the expression."}}, {"text": "Sundara ltfoney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23127, "end_char": 23142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reaching this conclusion it was observed that in Shukla' s case the question arose in the context of closure of the whole of the undertaking while in Hindustan Steel's case and Sundara ltfoney's case the question was not examined in the context of closure of whole undertaking but individual termination of service of some employees and it was held to constitute retrenchment within the meaning of the expression.", "canonical_name": "Sundara ltfoney"}}, {"text": "Sundara Money", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23491, "end_char": 23504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the contention for reconsideration of Sundara Money's case on the ground that it conflicted with a Constitution Bench decision in Shukla' s case and adopting the ratio in Hindustan Steel's case that there was nothing in the two aforementioned decisions which is inconsistent with each other and taking note of the decision in Ddhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukerjee(') wherein this Court had held that striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the management was termination of service which was retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(00), the Court held that discharge of the workman on the ground that she had not passed the test which would enable her to obtain confirmation was retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) and, therefore, the requirements of section 25F had to be complied with."}}, {"text": "section 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24013, "end_char": 24026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24205, "end_char": 24218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24255, "end_char": 24266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24358, "end_char": 24368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that since the decision in Shukla' s case, the Parliament stepped in and introduced section 25FF and section 25FFF by providing that compensation shall be payable to workman in case of transfer or closure of the undertaking, as if the workmen had been retrenched."}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24395, "end_char": 24406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24412, "end_char": 24423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24946, "end_char": 24958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24989, "end_char": 25000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25252, "end_char": 25264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25618, "end_char": 25629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25862, "end_char": 25873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26201, "end_char": 26212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Markendaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26281, "end_char": 26291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Markendaya contended that before section 25F is invoked, the condition of eligibility for a workman to complain of invalid retrenchment must be satisfied.", "canonical_name": "S. Markendaya"}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26314, "end_char": 26325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26566, "end_char": 26577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26643, "end_char": 26654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960) 2 S.C.R. 866", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27225, "end_char": 27244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27746, "end_char": 27757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27900, "end_char": 27911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30100, "end_char": 30111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34221, "end_char": 34233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34718, "end_char": 34730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34886, "end_char": 34897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34991, "end_char": 35002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Markandaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35622, "end_char": 35632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as Mr.Markandaya referred to some authorities, we will briefly notice them.", "canonical_name": "S. Markendaya"}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35769, "end_char": 35780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(eee)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35808, "end_char": 35822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36087, "end_char": 36098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36618, "end_char": 36629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36736, "end_char": 36747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36867, "end_char": 36878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(eee)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36883, "end_char": 36897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(eee)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36991, "end_char": 37005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37022, "end_char": 37033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37097, "end_char": 37108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 25C and 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37146, "end_char": 37161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37389, "end_char": 37400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37675, "end_char": 37690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr.(1), Chinnappa Reddy."}}, {"text": "Sur Enamel and Stomping Works (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37758, "end_char": 37796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stomping Works (P) Ltd. case, held as under :\n\n\"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a workman who has actually worked under the employer for not less\n\n(1) [1981] I S.C.R. 789."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38412, "end_char": 38418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2)."}}, {"text": "section 25B(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38457, "end_char": 38471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38541, "end_char": 38555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38934, "end_char": 38945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 8, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39059, "end_char": 39075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reverting to the facts of this case, admittedly the appellant was employed and was on duty from December 8, 1973 to October 19, 1974 when his service was terminated."}}, {"text": "section 25B(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39406, "end_char": 39420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39612, "end_char": 39623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 31, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41382, "end_char": 41394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the Award of the Labour Court dated May 31, 1980, is set aside."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_536_541_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "R.K. GARG, ADVOCATE\n\nSTATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH\n\nApril 22, 1981\n\n(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C. ], AND A.P. SEN, J.)\n\nContempt of Courts A.ct 1971, Ss.2, 15 and 19-Adilocate appearing in case-- Throwing shoe at presiding Judge-Guilty of contempt of Court-Punished with imprisonment and fine.\n\nLegal Profession-Professional ethics and cultured conduct-Results of violation of.\n\nThe appellant a practising Advocate appeared for the petitioner in a petition under the Rent Act. When the case was called out for hearing, the Judge noticed that the petitioner had not paid the process fee, as a result of which the summons could not be issued to the respondent. The Judge, proceeded to dismiss the petition under Order IX Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. Taking umbrage at the dismissal of the petition the appellant hurled his shoe at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder. The Judge intending to proceed under Section 228 of the Penal Code issued a warrant of arrest against '.the appellant. The appellant evaded the warrant and successfully managed to prevent proceedings being taken by the Judge for the contempt of his Court. The Judge thereupon made a reference to the High Court under Section '15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.\n\nBefore the High Court the appellant did not dispute that he hurled a shoe at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying that he acted under an irresistible impulse generated by the provocative language used by the Judge. The High Court being satisfied, that the appellant was making a false allegation that the Judge had used abusive language against him and that he had given an untrue version of the very genesis of the incident, held the appellant guilty of contemptf of Court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200/-.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was pleaded that the appellant evidently lost his balance and whether or not there was any justification for it, he acted under the impulse of grave passion for which he had been sufficiently punished by the publicity which the incident had received and the notoriety which he had invited for himself and as the appellant was genuinely repentent for his conduct he should be enlarged on a mere admonition.\n\nAllowing the appeal in part,\n\nHELD : 1. (i) The sentence of simple imprisonment for six months is reduced to a period of one month and the fine for Rs. 200 /- is enhanced to Rs. 1000/-.\n\n__ .....,..--\n\nR.K. GARG V. HIMACHAL .PRADESH 537\n\nThe fine if recovered shall be paid over to the Legal Aid Society functioning in A the State. [540 GJ\n\n(ii) The appellant is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a practising lawyer. He hurled his shoe at the Judge in order to overawe him and to bully him into accepting his submission that the case should not be dismissed under Order IX Rule 2 C.P.C.. The appellant did his best or worst to see that the petition was not dismissed for non-payment of process fee and finding that 8 the Judge was not willing to accept his argument, he took out his shoe in show of his physical prowess. [540 C]\n\n(iii) The appellant's behaviour is condemned. It is most reprehensible remembering that, as a practising lawyer he is an officer of the Court. [540 D]\n\n(iv) A long sentence of imprisonment is not imposed on the appellant since be has tendered an unconditional apology to this Court and to the trial Judge.\n\nThe appellant is deeply regretful and genuinely contrite. He has suffered enough in mind and reputation and no greater purpose is going to be served by subjecting him to a long bodily suffering. [540 E, F]\n\n2. (i) The argument or the appellant's counsel in the High Court that : \"better part of discretion is to ignore it instead of fanning it. It is a tussl betwe tn legal profession and judiciary\", is as much to be regretted as the conduct of the appellant before the trial Judge. [541A-B]\n\n(ii) The Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the mechanism, which administers justice to the people. A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a Court room. But Members of the Bar will do well to remember that flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without which no democracy can survive. [541 E, Fl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Contempt Appeal No. 19 of 1981.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 17th November, 1980 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court at Simla in Contempt Petition (Cr!.) No. 7 of 1980. '\n\n V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant.\n\nL. N. Sinha, A, ttorney General for the Respondent (Registrar, High Court) ·\n\nK. Parasaran, Soli. General and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent (State of H. P.)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nI CHANDRACHUD, C. J. This is an appeal under sec. 19(1)b of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, (\"the Act'',) against the judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated November 17, 1980 in Contempt Case (Criminal) No. 7 of 1980, whereby the appellant was sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200.\n\nThe appellant practises as an Advocate at Solan which is a district place in the State of Himachal Pradesh. It appears that only one court generally sits at Solan which is that of the Senior Sub- Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate. The learned Judge, who presides over that Court, also exercises the powers of a Rent Controller and of the Court of Small Causes. On June 18, 1980, Shri Kuldip Chand Sud, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court, was hearing a petition under the Rent Act in which the petitioner was represented by the appellant. When the case was called out for hearing, the learned Judge noticed that the petitioner had not paid the process fee, as a result of which the summons could not be issued to the respondent. The Judge therefore proceeded to dismiss the petition under Order 9, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nTaking umbrage at the dismissal of the petition, the appellant hurled his shoe at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder. The Judge asked his Orderly to take the appellant in custody but the appellant slipped away. The Judge evidently wanted to proceed under sectior 228 of the Penal Code for which purpose he issued a warrant of arrest against the appellant. The appellant successfully evaded the warrant and managed to prevent proceedings being taken by the Judge for the contempt of his court. The Judge then made a reference to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh under section 15(2) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court issued notice to the appellant enclosing therewith a copy of the reference made by the Judge.\n\nThe appellant did not dispute in the High Court that he hurled a shoe at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying that he acted under an irresistible impulse generated by the provocative language used by the Judge.\n\nThe appellant's version is like this :\n\nOn the previous date of hearing, the Judge had directed the appellant to pay fresh process fee and to supply the address of the respondent to the Rent Act petition. The appellant informed the Judge that he was unable to comply\n\n\nR.K. GARG v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) . 539\n\nwith that order since the respondent had been admitted to a hospital and had since left the hospital. The house in which the respondent lived was locked. The Judge then declared that he proposed to take action under Order 9 Rule 2 of the, Civil Procedure Code. The appellant asked the Judge to record his statement as to why he was unable to pay the process fee and supply the address of the respondent. Instead of recording the appellant's statement, the Judge remarked : \"You rascal, I will set you right\".\n\nThe appellant protested at the abusive language used by the Judge, but the Judge retorted 1 \"I repeat what I said\".\n\nThe appellant thereafter lost control over himself and under the \"extreme heat of moment and passion, his hand fell on his shoe\" which he threw towards the dais. Many persons were present in the court who witnessed the incident. After hurling the shoe at the dais, the appellant took off his coat and tie and told the court : \"An unfortunate incident has happened. Do you want to take any action (against me ?\n\nI surrender\". Upon this the Judge remarked : , \"You scoundrel get out of my court\". The appellant thereafter left the court room.\n\nThe High Court had called for the comments of the Judge on the version of the appellant, from which it was satisfied that the appellant was making a false allegation that the Judge had used abusive E language against him. The High Court also held that the appellant . had given an untrue version of the very genesis of the incident since the Judge had not given any direction for furnishing the complete address of the respondent before him.\n\nMany technical contentions were raised in the High Court, one of them being that section 10 of the Act was a bar to the High Court taking cognizance of the matter. It is unnecessary to go into that question or into .various other matters raised in the High Court on behalf of the appellant since, Shri V. M. Tarkunde and Shri S. S.\n\nRay who appear on behalf of the appellant, stated before us that the appellant did not desire to take a contentious attitude. It was stated on behalf of the appellant that he was prepared to tender an unconditional written apology to this Court and to produce evidence before us of his havi:ig tendered a similar apology to the trial court.\n\nSuch apologies have been duly tendered.\n\nLearned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant appealed to us in all their persuation that in view of the fact that the appellant\n\n' B\n\nwas genuinely repentant for his conduct, he should be enlarged on a mere admonition. Counsel plead that the appellant evidently lost his balance and whether or not there was any justification for it, he acted under the impulse of giave passion for whichhe has been sufficiently punished by the publicity which the incident has received and the notoriety which he has invited for himself.\n\nWe had made it clear to the learned counsel at the very time when they -conveyed to us the willingness of the appellant to apologise that we offer no promise or inducement that if the appellant apologises we will take a lenient view of the matter.\n\nIn our opinion the appellant is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a practising lawyer. He hurled his shoe at the Judge in order evidently to overawe him and to bully him into accepting his submission that the case should not be dismissed under Order 9 Rule 2, C.P.C. The appellant did his best or worst to. see that the petition was not dismissed for non-payment of process fee and finding that the Judge was not willing to accept his argument, he took out his ; hoe in show of his physical prowess.\n\nWe cannot adequately condemn the appellant's behaviour which strikes us as most reprehensible, remembering that, as a practising lawyer, he is an officer of the court. Such\n\nincidents can easily multiply considering the devaluation of respect for all authority, whether in law, education or politics.\n\nWe do not, however, propose to impose a long sentence of imprisonment on the appellant, since he has tendered an unconditional apology to this Court and to learned trial Judge. The appellant was present in our Court at the time when his appeal was argued and though, on such occasions, histrionics cannot entirely be ruled out, we did form an impression, backed by our small little experience of life and its affairs, that the appellant is deeply regretful and genuinely contrite. He has suffered enough in mind and reputation and no greater purpose is going to be served by subjecting him to a long bodily suffering.\n\nAccordingly, we reduce the sentence of six months to a period of one month, enhance the fine from Rs. 200 to Rs. I 000 and direct that the fine, if recovered, shall be paid over to a Legal Aid Society, if any, functioning in the State of Himachal Pradesh.\n\nThe High Court will decide which society should get the money, if there is more than one such society, of which there is precious little likelihood. Order accordingly.\n\nH We will be failing in our duty if before parting with the case we did not. draw attention to what the appellant's counsel Shri\n\nR.K. GARG v. HJMACHAL PRADESH (Chandrachud, c. J.) 541\n\nBhagirath Das said in the High Court during the course of his argu-.\n\nA. ments.\n\nShri Bhagirath Das told the learned Judges of the High· Court:\n\n\"Better part of discretion is to ignore it instead of fanning it. It is a tussel between legal profession and judiciary\". (emphasis supplied since it must have been placed).\n\nThis part of the argument of the appellant's counsel in the High Court is as much to be regretted as the conduct of the appellant before the learned trial Judge.\n\nDiscretion is undoubtedly the better part of valour but we did not know, until we read the argument advanced by the appellant's counsel in the High Court, that the better part of discretion is to ignore that a practising advocate had hurled a shoe at a Judge.\n\nWe are also unable to understand how the High Court was \"fanning': the incident by taking cognizance of, it, which it was its clear duty to do. It makes sorry reading that\n\n\"a tussel between legal profession and judiciary\" should find its culmination in a member of that noble profession throwing a shoe. at a Judge.\n\nThose who are informed of the question and think deeply upon it entertain no doubt that the Bar and the Bench are an inte• gral part of the same mechanism which administers justice to the people. Many members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar a.nd. their past association is a source of inspiration and pride to them.\n\nIt ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestion\"- ably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A discourteous~\n\nJudge is like an ill-timed instrument' in the setting of a courtroom. : But members of the Bar will do well to reme111ber that such flagrant: violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result , in the ultimate destruction of. a system without which no democracy ·\n\ncan survive.\n\nAll this, of course, is said without meaning any disrespect to Shri Bhagirath Das. Not he, but what he said, is the cause of this comment.\n\nN.V.K. , Appeai p; rtly allowed. ·", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "K. GARG, ADVOCATE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.K. GARG, ADVOCATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. GARG, ADVOCATE\n\nSTATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH\n\nApril 22, 1981\n\n(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C. ], AND A.P. SEN, J.)\n\nContempt of Courts A.ct 1971, Ss.2, 15 and 19-Adilocate appearing in case-- Throwing shoe at presiding Judge-Guilty of contempt of Court-Punished with imprisonment and fine."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ss.2, 15 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order IX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order IX Rule", "statute": "Order IX Rule"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 931, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1204, "end_char": 1232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2833, "end_char": 2838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "S.S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4533, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4564, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G Kapil Sibbal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4579, "end_char": 4593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C. M. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4595, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "L. K. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4611, "end_char": 4623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4644, "end_char": 4655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, A, ttorney General for the Respondent (Registrar, High Court) ·\n\nK. Parasaran, Soli."}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4722, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, A, ttorney General for the Respondent (Registrar, High Court) ·\n\nK. Parasaran, Soli."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4759, "end_char": 4772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent (State of H. P.)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nI CHANDRACHUD, C. J. This is an appeal under sec."}}, {"text": "I CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4854, "end_char": 4867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent (State of H. P.)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nI CHANDRACHUD, C. J. This is an appeal under sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4918, "end_char": 4945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4989, "end_char": 5019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(1)b of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, (\"the Act'',) against the judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated November 17, 1980 in Contempt Case (Criminal) No."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5275, "end_char": 5291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant practises as an Advocate at Solan which is a district place in the State of Himachal Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Solan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that only one court generally sits at Solan which is that of the Senior Sub- Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate."}}, {"text": "June 18, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5551, "end_char": 5564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 18, 1980, Shri Kuldip Chand Sud, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court, was hearing a petition under the Rent Act in which the petitioner was represented by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Kuldip Chand Sud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5571, "end_char": 5587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 18, 1980, Shri Kuldip Chand Sud, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court, was hearing a petition under the Rent Act in which the petitioner was represented by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Order 9, Rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5983, "end_char": 5998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6308, "end_char": 6318, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6603, "end_char": 6616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7503, "end_char": 7517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7526, "end_char": 7546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8980, "end_char": 8990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary to go into that question or into .various other matters raised in the High Court on behalf of the appellant since, Shri V. M. Tarkunde and Shri S. S.\n\nRay who appear on behalf of the appellant, stated before us that the appellant did not desire to take a contentious attitude.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "S. S.\n\nRay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary to go into that question or into .various other matters raised in the High Court on behalf of the appellant since, Shri V. M. Tarkunde and Shri S. S.\n\nRay who appear on behalf of the appellant, stated before us that the appellant did not desire to take a contentious attitude."}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10653, "end_char": 10667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10669, "end_char": 10674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhagirath Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12443, "end_char": 12456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "draw attention to what the appellant's counsel Shri\n\nR.K. GARG v. HJMACHAL PRADESH (Chandrachud, c. J.) 541\n\nBhagirath Das said in the High Court during the course of his argu-."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14472, "end_char": 14478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K. , Appeai p; rtly allowed. ·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_542_552_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "C. I. T. BOMBAY\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF INDIA\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF GUJARAT\n\nApril 22, 1981\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1961, section 2(15) and 11-Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, are bodies intended to advance any object of general public utility falling within section 2( 15) for purposes of section 11 of the Act.\n\nThe income derived by the Bar Council of Maharashtra from securities (interest) and other income by way of enrolment fees during the accounting periods relevant to the assessment years 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 was subjected to tax by the Income Tax Officer. Since the Central Government had accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of section 10(23A) during the jpendency of the appeal before the Tribunal by a notification dated August 5, 1966 with effect from December 28, 1961, the Tribunal held that the assessee Council was entitled to exemption under section 10(23A) in respect of its income by way of enrolment fees. The Tribunal remanded the case oack to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and directed him to dispose of the case by examining the question as to the purpose for which the securities were held by the assessee Council. It observed that if the said securities were held for educational purpose or for any other charitable purpose then the exemption under section 11 would be admissible to the extent available under the law. The High Court, on a reference made at the instance of the assessee-Council, answered the question : ''Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee--Council could be taken to be a body intended to advance any object of general public utility falling within section 2(15) for purposes of section 11 of the Act ?\" in favour of the assessee and hence the appeals by Revenue after obtaining special leave from the Court.\n\nDismissing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. Having regard to the Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the nature of the various obligatory functions including the one under clause (d) enjoined upon every State Bar Council under section 6(1) of the Advocates Act, it is elear that the primary or dominant purpose of an institution like the assessee- Council is the advancement of the object of general public utility within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and as such the income from securities held by the assessee--Council would be exempt from any tax liability under section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. [551 E-G]\n\nC.I.T. V. BAR COUNCIL 543\n\n2. If the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution was A charitable any other object which by itself might not be charitable but which was merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid charity. The restrictive words \"not involving the carrying on any activity for profit\" in section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, qualify\" object\" and not the advancement or accomplishment thereof. In other words, the true meaning of the restrictive words is that when the purpose of a trust or institution was the advancement B of an object of general public utility it was that object of general public utility and not its accomplishment or carrying out which must not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit. Here, admittedly, the State Bar Councils are not indulging in any activity for profit and hence the question of applying the restrictive words in s.2(15) does not arise. [547 C-F, 548 G-H]\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce, 55 ITR 722; Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, 121 ITR 2, reiterated.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2115 to 2117of1980.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 8 the August, 1978 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 142 of 1969.\n\nS. C. Manchanda and A. Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nV. N. Ganpule and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Respondent.\n\nV. N. Ganpule for Intervener No. I.\n\nS. C. Patel for Intervener No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. These appeals by special leave raise the question : \"whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee-Council could be taken to be a body intended to advance any object of general public utility falling within s. 2(15) for purposes of s. 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ?\"\n\nThe facts giving rise to the aforesaid question may briefly be stated. The respondent assessee-Bar Council of Maharashtrais a body corporate established under the Advocate's Act, 1961\n\n(Act 25 of 1961) which came into force on December 28, 1961.\n\nH During the accounting periods relevant to the assessment years 1962-63, 1963-64 and 1964-65 the assessee derived income from\n\nHsecurities (interest) and other income by way of enrolment fees particulars whereof, are as follows :\n\n-· Assessment year Interest on securities Other Income\n\n1962-63 Rs. 3,779 Rs. 28,035\n\n1963-64 Rs. 8,629 Rs, 3,04,103\n\n1964-65 Rs. 9,356 Rs. 96,322\n\nThe Income Tax Officer subjected to tax the income from both the sources for all the three years. In appeals preferred fo the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it was contended by ihe assessee that its other income by enrolment fees was exempt under s. I 0 (23A) and interest on securities was exempt from tax under s. 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner negatived the exemption claimed under s. 10(23A) in the absence. of the Central Government's notification according appr9val to the association and with regard to the claim for exemption in respect of the interest on securities he held that it was not established that the securities were held on trust for any charitable purpose. He took the view that the main object of the assessee-Council was to benefit the legal profession (its Members) and, therefore, the object was not one of general public utility. Accordingly he confirmed the assessment orders for the three years.\n\nThe matter was carried in further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and since by that time the Central Government had accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of s. 10. (23A) by a notification dated August 5, 1966 with effect from December 28, 1961, the Tribunal held that the assessee-Council was entitled to exemption under s. I 0(23A) in respect of its income by way of enrolment fees.\n\nIn regard to the income by way of interest on the. securities the Tribunal observed that the character of the body holding the securities was not by itself decisive, that safeguarding. the rights, privileges and interest of advocates on its roll 9ould not be said to be an object of general public utility, that the real question to be considered under s. 11 was whether the securities were held for any charitable purpose or .not and the tribunal found that there was no evidence or material on record touching this aspect.\n\nIt, therefore, remanded the case back to the Appellate Assistant.\n\nCommissioner and directed him to dispose of the case by exam_ining the question as to the purpose for which the securities were held by\n\nthe assessee-Council. It observed that if the said securities were held for educational purpose or for any other charitable purpose then the exemption under s. 11 would be admissible to the extent available under the law; At the instance of the assessee- Council the question set out at the commencement of this judgment was referred to the High Court for its decision under s. 256( I) of the Act. The High Court took the view that having regard to the obligatory functions enjoined upon a State Bar Council under s.6 of the Advocate' s Act the assessee-Council could be regarded as a body constituted for general public utility and that the entire income of the body would be exempt from tax under s.11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.\n\nIn its view the advancement of any object beneficial to the public or a section of the public as distinct from an individual or a group of individuals would be a charitable purpose as defined in s.2 (15) of the Income Tax Act and in this view of the matter the High Court answered the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. It is this view of the High Court that is being challenged by the Revenue before us in these appeals.\n\nIn support of the appeals counsel for the Revenue sought to raise two contentions. First, he urged that the relief claimed under s.11 was ruled out by reason of relief having been obtained by the assessee-Council in respect of its mcome from enrolment fees under s.10 (23A) of the Act. According to him s.10 (23A), while exempting from tax any income of an association or institution established in India having as its object the control, supervision, regulation and encouragement of the profession of law, medicine, accountancy and any other profession as the Central Government may specify, has expressly excluded from exemption such association's or institution's income chargeable under the head \"interest on securities\" or \"Income from house properties\" or \"any income received in rendering any specific service\", etc., and, therefore, what has been expressly excluded from exemption under this provision could not be or was not intended to be exempt under s.11 of the Act. In other words, the assessee-Council's claim for exemption in respect of interest on securities under s.11 was ruled out by reason of s.10(23A) of the Act.\n\nSecondly, counsel contended that on merits the High Court's view that the assessee-Council was a body constituted for advancement of an object of general public utility was erroneous inasmuch as it was a body established principally for the purpose of safeguarding the rights, privileges and interest of the advocates on its roll and since such objective merely served to benefit the members\n\nA of the profession it was no charitable purpose as defined by s.2 (15) for purposes of s.11 qf the Act. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance on some English decisions.\n\nAt the out set it may be stated that we were not inclined to permit counsel for the Revenue to urge his first contention as in our view the Revenue must be deemed to have given up the same. We may point out that precisely this very contention was raised by the Revenue before the Tribunal and was negatived by it. The Tribunal on a detailed analysis of the concerned provisions took the view that the two provisions were not mutually exclusive but operated under different circumstances, that s.11 was relatively wider in its scope and ambit, that while s.10 (23A) granted absolute exemption in respect of particular types of income s.11 imposed certain conditions for the exemption but such exemption was available for all sources and there was nothing inherently improbable or inconceivable about the two provisions operating simultaneously and as such the claim for exemption under s. I I was available to the assessee-Council provided it satisfied all the -requirements of that provision. We may point out that there are other allied provisions like for instance sub-s. (23C) in s.l 0 which clearly indicate that the Legislature did not intend to rule out s. I I when exemption was claimable under such specific provisions of s. I 0. It was after negativing the contention in this manner that the Tribunal went on to consider the claim for exemption made by the assessee-Council under s.11 but on merits found that there was no material or evidence on record to show whether or not the securities were held by the assessee-Council for any of charitable purposes and, therefore, it remanded the case. The remand order was never challenged by the Revenue by seeking a reference on the ground that a remand was unnecessary because s.11 was ruled out by reason of exemption having been obtained by the assessee-Council under s.10 (23A) of the Act nor was any such contention raised when reference was sought by the assessee-Council nor when the matter was being argued . in the High Court. In these circumstances it is clear to us that the Revenue acquiesced in the view taken by the Tribunal that the claim for exemption under s.1 I of the Act could not be said to be ruled out by reason of the provisions of s.10 (23A).\n\nWe, therefore, proceed to deal with the second contention which was principally argued before us in these appeals.\n\nUnder s.11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, subject to the conditions therein specified, income derived from property held\n\nunder trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes to the extent to which such income is applied to such purposes in India is exempt from the tax liability under the Act and s.2 (15) gives an inclusive definition of the expression \"charitable purpose\" thus :\n\n\"Charitable purpose\" includes relief of the poor, education,\n\nmedical relief and the advancement of any other object of iJ genernl public utility not involving the carrying on any activity for profit.\n\nIt may be noticed that whereas any object of general public utility was include:! in the definition of \"Charitable purpose\" in the 1922 Act, the present definition has inserted the restrictive words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit\" which qualify or govern the last head of charitable purpose. In Commissioner of lncome Tax, Madras v.\n\nAndhra Chamber of Commerce(1)--a case decided by this Court under the 1922 Act where the restrictive words were absent-this Court laid down that if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution was charitable, any other object which by itself might not be charitable but which was merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid charity. After the addition of the restrictive words in the definition in the 1961 Act, this Court in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association(') affirmed that the aforesaid test of primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution still holds good, that the restrictive words qualify \"object\" and not the advancement or accomplishment thereof and that the true meaning of the restrictive words was that when the purpose of a trust or institution was the advancement of an object of general public utility it was that object of general puplic utility and not its accomplishment or carrying out which must not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit.\n\nAnd applying these tests trading bodies like Andlw1 Chamber of Commerce and Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association have been held to be institutions constituted with a view to advance an object of general public utility because their primary or dominant purpose was to promote and protect industry, trade and commerce either generally or in certain commodities, even though some benefit through some of their activities did accrue to their members which\n\n(1) 55 ITR 722. (2)\n\n121 ITR 1.\n\nwas regarded as incidental and this Court held that the income derived from diverse sources by these institutions (rental income from property in the case of Andhm Chamber of Commerce and income from annual subscriptions collected from its members and commission of a certain per centage of the value of licences for import of foreign yarn and quotas for purchase of indigenous yarn obtained by the assessee from its members in the case of Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association was exempt from tax liability under s.11 of the Act. Reliance on English decisions would not be of much avail because the definition of charitable purposes as given in our Act since it embraces 'any other object of general public utility' goes further than the definition of charity to be derived from the English cases. Under English Jaw of charity a trust is charitable only if it is within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth ( 43 Eliz. ch. 4) and alJ objects of general public utility are not necessarily charitable, some may or some may not be, depending upon whether they falJ within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth.\n\nUnder our definition every object of general public utility would be charitable subject only to the condition imposed by the restrictive words inserted in the 1961 Act.\n\nIt is because of this basic difference between Indian Law and English Law of charity that Lord Wright in Aff India Spinners' Assn. v. CJT(1) utterred a warning against blind adherence to English decisions o.n the subject thus : \"The Indian Act gives a clear and succinct definition which must be construed according to its actual language and meaning. English decisions have no binding authority on its construction and though they may sometimes afford help or guidance, cannot relieve the Indian Courts from their responsibility of applying the language of the Act to the particular circumstances that emerge under conditions of Indian life.\"\n\nHaving regard to the aforesaid manner in which the definition of \"charitable purpose\" given in s.2 (15) has been interpreted by this Court the question that arises for considenation in these appeals is whether the securities, interest from which is sought to be exempted from tax liability, were held by the assessee-Council on trust wholly for a charitable purpose, namely, for the advancement of an object of general public utility?\n\nAdmittedly the assessee- Council is not indulging in any activity for profit and hence the aspect of considering the applicability of the restrictive words does not arise and the answer to the question must depend upon the\n\n(1) 12 t.T.R. 482 (PC).\n\nnature or character of the functions and activities which the assessee- Council can undertake under the Advocates Act, 1961 for it is clear that it cannot go beyond what is prescribed by that Act.\n\n' The Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961 shows that it was enacted with a view to amend and consolidate the law relating to\n\nlegal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils B and an All India Bar. Under s.3 of the Act Bar Councils are constituted for various States and the assessee-Council happens to be a State Bar Council for Maharashtra. Section 4 provides that every Bar Council shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovabie and to contract, and may by the name by which it is known sue or be sued. Section 6 is the material provision which sets out both obligatory as well as optional functions of every State Bar Council and so far as is material runs thus :\n\n\"6. (I) The functions of a State Bar Council shall be-\n\n(a) to admit persons as advocates on its roll;\n\n(b) to prepare and maintain such roll;\n\n(c) to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll;\n\n( d) to safeguard the rights, privileges and inte- E rests of .advocates on its roll;\n\n(e) to promote and support law reform;\n\n(ee) to conduct seminars and organise talks on legal topics by eminent jurists and publish journals and papers of legal interest;\n\n(eee) to organise legal aid to the poor in the prescribed manner;\n\n(f) to manage and invest the funds of the Bar Council;\n\n(g) to provide for the election of its members;\n\n(h) to perform all other functions conferred on it by or under this Act;\n\n(i) to do all other things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions.\n\n(2) A State Bar Council may constitute one or more funds in the prescribed manner for the purpose of-\n\n(a) giving financial assistance to organise welfare schemes for the indigent, disabled or other advocates;\n\n(b) g1vmg legal aid or advice in accordance with the rules made in this behalf.\"\n\nSections 9, 9A and 10 of the Act provide for the constitution of various committees for the purposes mentioned therein.\n\nSection 15 confers power on the Bar Council to make rules to carry out the purposes of this Chapter.\n\nThe rest of the provisions of the Act are not material for the purpose of the issue under consideration.\n\nCounsel for the Revenue contended that the primary object or purpose with which the Bar Council of a State is constituted is to benefit the members of the legal profession inasmuch as under s.6 (I)\n\n(d) it is an obligatory function of the State Bar Council to safeguard the rights privileges and interests of the advocates on its roll and that other functions like promotion of law reform, conducting law seminars etc. are incidental objects and the benefit to the public is remote or indirect or incidental and, therefore, the assessee-Council could not be regarded as a body intended to advance the object of general public utility. It is impossible to accept this contention.\n\nIt is clear that sub-s. ( 1) lays down the obligatory functions while\n\nsub'.s. (2) indicates what are the optional or discretionary functions that could be undertaken by the State Bar Council and from amongst the obligatory functions it will be wrong to pick out one and say it is the primary or dominant object or purpose.\n\nAll the clauses of sub-s. (I) will have to be considered in light of the main objective sought to be achieved as indicated in the Preamble. The functions mentioned in els. (a) and (b) of sub-s. (l), namely, to admit persons as advocates on its roll and to prepare and maintain such roll, are clearly regulatory in character intended to ensure that persons with requisite qualifications who are fit and otherwise proper to be advocates are available for being engaged by the litigating public; the function pnscribed in cl. (c) has been enjoined upon avowedly with the objective of protecting the litigating public from unscrupulous professionals by taking them to task for any misconduct on\n\ntheir part; it is also one of the obligatory functions of a State Bar Council to promote and support measures for law reform as also to conduct law seminars and organise talks on legal topics by eminent jurists, obviously wifh a view to educate the general public, the function prescribed by cl. (eee) is obviously charitable in nature, the same being to organise legal aid to the poor. Amongst these various obligatory functions one under cl. (d) is to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of the advocates on its roll and it is difficult to regard it as a primary or dominant function or purpose for which the body is constituted.\n\nEven this function apart from securing speedy discharge of obligations by the litigants to the lawyers ensu'res maintenance of high professional standards and independence of the .\n\nBar which are necessary in. the performance of their duties to the society. In other words, the domimant purpose of a State Bar Council as reflected by the various obligatory functions is to ensure quality service of competent lawyers. to the litigating public, to spread legal literacy, promote Jaw reforms and provide legal assistance to the poor while the benefit accruing to the lawyermembers is incidental. It is true that sub-s. (2) provides that a State Bar Council may constitute one or more funds for the purpose of giving financial assistance to organise welfare schemes for the indigent, disabled or other advocates; but it is an optional or discretionary function to be undertaken by the Council.\n\nApart from that, admittedly the assessee-Council has not so far constituted any such fund for the purpose specified in the instant case.\n\nAs and when such a fund is constituted a question may arise for consideration and the C.rnrt m1y have to decide whether the function so undertaken by a State Bar Council has become the dominant purpose for which that Council is operating. Having regard to the Preamble of the Act and the nature of the various obligatory functions including the one under cl. (d} enjoined upon every State Bar Council under s.6 (l) of the Act, it is clear that the primary or dominant purpose of an institution like the assessee-Council is the advancement of the object of general public utility within the meaning of s.2 (15) of the Act, and as such the income from securities held by the assessee-Council would be exempt from any tax liability under s.11 of the Act.\n\nHaving come to the aforesaid conclusion on applying the\n\nlangage of our Act to the nature of functions undertaken by a State Bar Council under the Advocates Act 1961 it is truly unnecessary to deal with the English decisions cited during the course of\n\narguments.\n\nHowever, we might indicate that in two cases (Royal College of Surgeons case(1) and the General Medical Council's) case(2) on an analysis of the functions undertaken by the two concerned institutions under the Statutes and Charter$ governing them the Court came to the conclusion that the institutions were not constituted for charitable purpose but they were more of professional institutions, the approach being to find out whether the objects satisfied the limited concept of charity within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth. In the other two cases (The\n\nYorkshire Agricultural Society's case(3) and The Institute of Civil Engineers' case(4) the Court took the view that both the institutions were constituted for charitable purposes entitled the exemption under s.37 (I) (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1918, and the benefits accruning to the members were regarded as incidental.\n\nIn the result we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in answering the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\n(I) 3 T.C. 173. (2)\n\n13 T.C. 819. (3)\n\n13 T.C. 58. (4)\n\nI 6 T.C. 158.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "I. T. BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C.I.T. BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF INDIA\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA BAR COUNCIL OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. I. T. BOMBAY\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF INDIA\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF GUJARAT\n\nApril 22, 1981\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(15) and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2( 15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350, "end_char": 364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381, "end_char": 391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The income derived by the Bar Council of Maharashtra from securities (interest) and other income by way of enrolment fees during the accounting periods relevant to the assessment years 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 was subjected to tax by the Income Tax Officer."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 674, "end_char": 692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the Central Government had accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of section 10(23A) during the jpendency of the appeal before the Tribunal by a notification dated August 5, 1966 with effect from December 28, 1961, the Tribunal held that the assessee Council was entitled to exemption under section 10(23A) in respect of its income by way of enrolment fees."}}, {"text": "section 10(23A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 750, "end_char": 765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "August 5, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 845, "end_char": 859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the Central Government had accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of section 10(23A) during the jpendency of the appeal before the Tribunal by a notification dated August 5, 1966 with effect from December 28, 1961, the Tribunal held that the assessee Council was entitled to exemption under section 10(23A) in respect of its income by way of enrolment fees."}}, {"text": "December 28, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 877, "end_char": 894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the Central Government had accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of section 10(23A) during the jpendency of the appeal before the Tribunal by a notification dated August 5, 1966 with effect from December 28, 1961, the Tribunal held that the assessee Council was entitled to exemption under section 10(23A) in respect of its income by way of enrolment fees."}}, {"text": "section 10(23A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 972, "end_char": 987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Whether the Bar Councils constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1394, "end_char": 1404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1748, "end_char": 1761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1778, "end_char": 1788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1954, "end_char": 2010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2141, "end_char": 2153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2161, "end_char": 2174, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2507, "end_char": 2517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2525, "end_char": 2545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2955, "end_char": 2968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2976, "end_char": 2996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3537, "end_char": 3544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3781, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "S. C. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4000, "end_char": 4015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda and A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4020, "end_char": 4033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda and A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. N. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4054, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Veena Devi Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. C. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4153, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nS. C. Patel for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. These appeals by special leave raise the question : \"whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee-Council could be taken to be a body intended to advance any object of general public utility falling within s. 2(15) for purposes of s. 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ?\""}}, {"text": "s. 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4480, "end_char": 4488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4505, "end_char": 4510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4518, "end_char": 4538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Maharashtrais", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent assessee-Bar Council of Maharashtrais a body corporate established under the Advocate's Act, 1961\n\n(Act 25 of 1961) which came into force on December 28, 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5485, "end_char": 5490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5498, "end_char": 5518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(23A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6184, "end_char": 6213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was carried in further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and since by that time the Central Government had accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of s. 10. ("}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6898, "end_char": 6903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7432, "end_char": 7437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 256( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7650, "end_char": 7660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7974, "end_char": 7978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7986, "end_char": 8006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8204, "end_char": 8207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8579, "end_char": 8583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8713, "end_char": 8717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8753, "end_char": 8757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to him s.10 (23A), while exempting from tax any income of an association or institution established in India having as its object the control, supervision, regulation and encouragement of the profession of law, medicine, accountancy and any other profession as the Central Government may specify, has expressly excluded from exemption such association's or institution's income chargeable under the head \"interest on securities\" or \"Income from house properties\" or \"any income received in rendering any specific service\", etc.,"}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9412, "end_char": 9416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9531, "end_char": 9535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(23A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9563, "end_char": 9572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10042, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10067, "end_char": 10071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10659, "end_char": 10663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10720, "end_char": 10724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10799, "end_char": 10803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11555, "end_char": 11559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11898, "end_char": 11902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11991, "end_char": 11995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12294, "end_char": 12297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12376, "end_char": 12380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12511, "end_char": 12515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12523, "end_char": 12543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12804, "end_char": 12807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Andlw1 Chamber of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14641, "end_char": 14667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And applying these tests trading bodies like Andlw1 Chamber of Commerce and Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association have been held to be institutions constituted with a view to advance an object of general public utility because their primary or dominant purpose was to promote and protect industry, trade and commerce either generally or in certain commodities, even though some benefit through some of their activities did accrue to their members which\n\n(1) 55 ITR 722. ("}}, {"text": "Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14672, "end_char": 14718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And applying these tests trading bodies like Andlw1 Chamber of Commerce and Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association have been held to be institutions constituted with a view to advance an object of general public utility because their primary or dominant purpose was to promote and protect industry, trade and commerce either generally or in certain commodities, even though some benefit through some of their activities did accrue to their members which\n\n(1) 55 ITR 722. ("}}, {"text": "Andhm Chamber of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15250, "end_char": 15275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was regarded as incidental and this Court held that the income derived from diverse sources by these institutions (rental income from property in the case of Andhm Chamber of Commerce and income from annual subscriptions collected from its members and commission of a certain per centage of the value of licences for import of foreign yarn and quotas for purchase of indigenous yarn obtained by the assessee from its members in the case of Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association was exempt from tax liability under s.11 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15615, "end_char": 15619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Elizabeth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16247, "end_char": 16256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) and alJ objects of general public utility are not necessarily charitable, some may or some may not be, depending upon whether they falJ within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16524, "end_char": 16530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is because of this basic difference between Indian Law and English Law of charity that Lord Wright in Aff India Spinners' Assn."}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17169, "end_char": 17172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Council can undertake under the Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17831, "end_char": 17882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17963, "end_char": 17998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18185, "end_char": 18188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "The Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18311, "end_char": 18322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s.3 of the Act Bar Councils are constituted for various States and the assessee-Council happens to be a State Bar Council for Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18324, "end_char": 18333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "The Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18580, "end_char": 18589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "The Preamble of the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Sections 9, 9A and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19846, "end_char": 19867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19967, "end_char": 19977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20365, "end_char": 20368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21029, "end_char": 21046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) indicates what are the optional or discretionary functions that could be undertaken by the State Bar Council and from amongst the obligatory functions it will be wrong to pick out one and say it is the primary or dominant object or purpose."}}, {"text": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23785, "end_char": 23825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23953, "end_char": 23956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Act", "statute": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Act"}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24147, "end_char": 24150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Act", "statute": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Act"}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24281, "end_char": 24285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Act", "statute": "Having regard to the Preamble of the Act"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24446, "end_char": 24459, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Royal College of Surgeons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24610, "end_char": 24635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, we might indicate that in two cases (Royal College of Surgeons case(1) and the General Medical Council's) case(2) on an analysis of the functions undertaken by the two concerned institutions under the Statutes and Charter$ governing them the Court came to the conclusion that the institutions were not constituted for charitable purpose but they were more of professional institutions, the approach being to find out whether the objects satisfied the limited concept of charity within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth."}}, {"text": "Institute of Civil Engineers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25191, "end_char": 25219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the other two cases (The\n\nYorkshire Agricultural Society's case(3) and The Institute of Civil Engineers' case(4) the Court took the view that both the institutions were constituted for charitable purposes entitled the exemption under s.37 (I) (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1918, and the benefits accruning to the members were regarded as incidental."}}, {"text": "s.37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25350, "end_char": 25354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25370, "end_char": 25390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_553_563_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "BIBI RAHMANI KHATOON & ORS.\n\nHARKOO GOPE & ORS.\n\nApril 22, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J\n\nBihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956- Section 4(1}(c}-Scope of-Section provides that, without prejudice to rights of parties all pending proceedings at any stage before any court in respect of lands\n\ntaken up for consolidation shall abate-Plaintiffs\" suit for declaration of title decreed-Notification issued when appeal pending before High Court-Effect of notification-Whether judgment and decree of trial court would abate.\n\nSection 4(1)(c) of the the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation AC!, 1956 provides that upon the issue of a notification under section 3(1) of the Act every proceeding pending before any court or authority, whether of the first instance or of appeal shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated. The proviso to the section enacts that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of persons affected to agitate the right in dispute before the appropriate consolidation authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The State Government issued a notification under section 3(1) of the Act.\n\nThe plaintiffs' (appellants herein) suit for a declaration of their title and for recovery of possession of agricultural lands bearing khata Nos. 458 and 459 against defendants (respondents herein and three other defendants) was decreed by the trial court. Defandant No. 7 claimed interest in Khata No. 458 only while the other defendants I to 4 claimed interest in Khata No. 459. On appeal the Additional District Judge affirmed the decree of the trial court. Defendant No. 7 died when the first appeal was pending before the District Judge. Neither his legal representatives nor any one claiming under him were substituted nor was an appeal preferred by any of them to the High Court.\n\n!'efore the High Court the defendants I to 4 submitted that the work of consolidation of holdings in respect of the lands in dispute having been taken up by the concerned authorities consequent on the issue ol a notification under section 3 of the Act the appeal would abate by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Act. Accepting the contention the High Court held that the appeal abated and set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below in respect of both Khatas 458 and 459.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants-plaintiffs that (I) even if the second appeal abated in respect of Khata No. 459 the High Court could not set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court as well as of the first appellate court both of which became final and (2) in any event, on the\n\ndeath of defendant No. 7 during the pendency of the first appeal, his legal representatives having not been substituted, his appeal abated and none of the present respondents had any interest in the property.\n\nTherefore, the High Court was in error in setting aside the decree of the trial court in so far as that property was concerned.\n\nDismissing the appeal in part,\n\nThe effect of a notification issued under Section 3 of the Act bringing a land in dispute in a civil proceeding under a scheme of consolidation is that the proceedings pending in thecivil court either at the stage of trial, appeal or revision would come to naught. The High Court was right in holding that the second appeal abated in respect of Khata No. 459 and that the judgment and decree of the trial court and the first appellate court stood abated along with those proceedings. [562 G H]\n\nWhen a scheme of consolidation is undertaken, the Act provides for adjudicating of claims by the authorities under the Act. In order to permit them to pursue adjudication of rival claims unhampered by any proceedings in civil courts a wholesome provision is made that pending proceedings involving claims to land at whatever stage they might be, should abate. To avoid conflict between rival jurisdictions the Act provides that such proceedings should be examined exclusively by the authorities under the Act.\n\nProvision has been made for abatement. of pending proceedings as well. [558 F-G]\n\nThe concept of abatement known to civil law is that if a party to a proceeding dies either in the course of trial or appeal or revision and the right to sue survives, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party would have to be substituted, failure to do which would result in abatement of the proceedings. If a party to an appeal or revision dies and if the appeal or revision abates it will have no impact on the judgment, decree or order against which the appeal or revision is preferreds. Such judgment, decree or order under appeal or revision would become final. [559 B-D]\n\nBut the abatement contemplated by section 4 of the Act is of a different kind. If the concept of abatement as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure is imported into this case, it would do irreparable harm to the parties. For example, if an appeal abates rendering either the judgment of the trial court or the judgment in the first appeal final and binding the consolidation authorities would also be bound by it and the party whose appeal or revision abated would lose the chance of persuading the appellate or revisional authority to accept its case which may result in interfering with or setting aside the judgment etc. ir, appeal. That this could not be the intention of section 4 is manifest from the proviso to clause (c) of section 4. By virtue of the proviso no one would stand to suffer on account of abatement because a special forum is carved out for adjudication of the rights of parties. [5S9 E-G]\n\nfl Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh and Ors. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 95, Chattar Singh and Ors. v. Thakur Prasad Singh, A.I.R. 1975 SC 1499, and Satyanarayan.\n\nPrasad and Ors. v. State of Bi har and Anr., A.LR. 1980 SC 2051; referred to.\n\n-\"'\\\n\nBIBI RAHMANI v. HARKOO GOPE (Desai, J.) 555\n\nThe High Court was in error in holding that the judgment and decree in respect of Khata No. 458 also abated. Defendant No. 7 claimed separate, specific and exclusive right in respect of that Khata. On his death his legal representatives having not been substituted, his appeal abated. His legal representatives did not prefer an appeal to the High Court. The appellants' title in respect of Khata 458 therefore became established under the decree of the trial court. The abatement of the second appeal will have no impact on the appellants to Khata No. 458. (562 C-E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION of 1981.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1359\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th August, 1979 of the Patna High Court in Second Appeal No. 697 of 1974.\n\nB.P. Singh for the Appellants.\n\nS.K. Mehta for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nMst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and others filed Title Suit No. 3/70 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge I, Gaya for declaration of their title and for recovery of possession of agricultural !ands admeasurlng 4 acres 29 gunthas comprised in two holdings bearing khata nos. 458 (nakdi) and 459 (Bhouli) in Touzi No. 7535 situated in village Parsain. The defendants in the suit were the present respondents and three others defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 7.\n\nOne Brahmadeo was defendant 7 claiming an interest in khata no. 458 on the basis of a sale deed executed on March 3 l, 1959, by one Deonandan Singh who was defendant 5 in the trial court. It must be made distinctly clear that Brahmadeo claimed interest in khata no. 458 while the present respondents Claimed interest in khata no. 459 only. The trial court decreed the suit declaring that the plaintiffs were the owners of both the khatas and were entitled to recover possession of the same.\n\nTitle Appeal No. 7/74 was preferred in the court of the Distt.\n\nJudge, Gaya, and it was heard by the learned Fourth Addi. District Judge as per his judgment and decree dated July 12, 1974. The learned Addi. District Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree of the trial {; Ourt.\n\nPresent respondents alone preferred Second Appeal No. 697/74 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna. It must be specificafly\n\nA mentioned that neither defendant 7 Brahmadeo who died pending the appeal before the District Court and whose legal representatives were not impleaded, nor anyone claiming under him either came to be substituted in the appeal pending in the District Court nor any of them preferred appeal to the High Court.\n\nThis has some relevance to the disposal of the appeal before us and, therefore, it has B been categorically set out.\n\nHarkoo Gope and three others who claimed interest in khata no. 459 only, preferred second appeal against the dismissal of their appeal by the learned Distt. Judge.\n\nWhen the Second Appeal No. 697/74 was pending in the High Court, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellants (respondents in this Court) on November 16, 1978, drawing attention of the Court to a notification under s.3 of the Bibar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 ('Act' for short) and further intimating to the Court that the village in which the disputed khatas were situated was taken up for consolidation of holdings and, therefore, the appeal pending in the High Court would abate in view of the provision contained in s. 4 of the Act.\n\nThe High Court accepted the submission and disposed of the appeal by its order dated August 18, 1979, the operative portion of which reads as under :\n\n\"The appeal abates and the judgments and decrees of both the courts below are hereby set aside as having abated\".\n\nOriginal plaintiffs having been dissatisfied by the order of the High Court not only abating the second appeal preferred by the respondents but also setting aside the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court as having abated, have preferred this appeal by special leave.\n\nShri B.P. Singh, learned counsel who appeared for the appellants contended that even if the Second Appeal abates by virtue of the provision contained in s. 4, on issue of a notification under s. 3 of the Act, the High Court cannot set aside the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court as according to him when an appeal abates the judgment and decree of the court\n\nagainst which the appeal is preferred becomes final.\n\nThe second contention of the learned counsel is that in any view of the matter as the present respondents had no interest in khata no. 458 and as Brahmadeo on sale to him by Deonandan Singh alone claimed interest 'in khata no. 458 and since the death of Brahmadeo when the\n\nBIBI RAHMANI v. HARKOO GOPE (Desai, J.) 557\n\nfirst appeal was pending and his heirs and legal rpresentatives having not been substituted, the appeal qua him in respect of khata no. 458 had abated and the present respondents could not have preferred appeal in respect of khata no. 458 and, therefore, the High Court could not have set aside the decree in respect of khata no. 458.\n\nSection 3 of the Act confers power on the State Government to make a declaration of its intention to frame a scheme for consolidation of holdings.\n\nWhen the State Government entertains an intention to make a scheme for consolidation of holdings in a given village, it has to issue a notification declaring its intention to make a scheme for the consolidation of holdings in the specified area.\n\nSection 4 provides that upon the publication of a notification under sub-s. (I) of s. 3, the consequences enumerated in s. 4 shall ensue.\n\nOne such consequence is as set out in sub-clause (c) which reads as under:-\n\n\"4. Effect of notification under section 3( I) of the D Act-\n\nUpon tl, le publication of the notification under subsection (I) of section 3 in the official Gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the E notification till the close of the consolidation operations ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely:-\n\n(c) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights of interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under . this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or pro- . ceeding is pending, stand abated\".\n\nThere are as many as 5 provisos to clause (c) of s. 4 but only one is material which reads as under :\n\n\"Provided further that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder\".\n\nPresent appeal arises out of a suit filed by the present appellants, who were plaintiffs, for a declaration of their title and consequential relief of possession meaning that it was a suit concerning agricultural land to which title was claimed and disputed.\n\nThis suit was pending in Second Appeal at the instance of the respondents when the notification under s. 3 {I) came to be issued.\n\nAccordingly, s. 4 (c) would be attracted and the necessary consequence statutorily prescribed, must ensue.\n\nTherefore, it is incontrovertible that the second appeal would abate.\n\nShri Singh, learned counsel for the appellants does not dispute this legal consequence.\n\nThe grievance of Shri Singh is that the High Court while making an order declaring that the second appeal has abated, was in error in setting aside the judgments and decrees of the trial court as well as of the first appellate court which were in favour of the present appellants on the ground that those proceedings have also abated. At first blush this argument is very attractive but if accepted it has a potentiality of doing irreparable harm.\n\n\\\\!hen a scheme of consolidation is undertaken, the Act provides for adjudication of various claims to land involved in consolidation by the authorities set up under the Act.\n\nIn order to permit the authorities to pursue adjudication of rival claims to land unhampered by any proceedings in civil courts, a wholesome provision was made that the pending proceedings involving claims to land in the hierarchy of civil courts, may be in the trial court, appeal or revision, should abate.\n\nThis provision was made with a view to ensuring unhampered adjudication of claims to land before the authorities under the Consolidation Act without being obstructed by proceedings in civil courts or without being hampered or impeded by decisions of the civil courts in the course of consolidation of holdings. In order to avoid conflict consequent upon rival jurisdictions the legislature provided that the proceedings involving the claims to land put in consolidation should be exclusively examined\n\n> .\n\nBIB1 RAHMANI v. HARKOO GOPE (Desai, J.) 559\n\nby the authorities under the Consolidation Act and all rival jurisdiction would be closed.\n\nSimultaneously it was necessary to deal with the pending proceedings and that is why the provision for abatement of such proceedings.\n\nThe concept of abatement is known to civil law. If a party to a proceeding either in the trial court or any appeal or revision dies and the right to sue survives or a claim has to be answered, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party would have to be substituted and failure to do so would result in abatement of proceedings.\n\nNow, if the party to a suit dies and the abatement takes place, the suit would abate. If a party to an appeal or revision dies and either the appeal or revision abates, it will have no impact on the judgment, decree or order against which the appeal or revision is preferred. In fact, such judgment, decree . or order under appeal or revision would become final.\n\nSuch is not the scheme of abatement as conceived by s. 4 of the Act.\n\nHere, if the abatement as is conceptually understood in the Code of Civil Procedure is imported, it will do irreparable harm. To illustrate, if an appeal abates rendering either the trial court judgment or the judgment in first appeal final and binding; the consolidation authorities would also be bound by it and the party whose appeal or revision abated would lose its chance of persuading the appellate or revisional authority to accept its case which may result in interfering with or setting aside the judgment, order or decree in appeal.\n\nSuch was not and could not be the intention of s. 4.\n\nThis becomes manifestly clear from the proviso to clause (c) of s. 4 extracted hereinabove which shows that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the person affected to agitate the rights or interest in dispute in the suit or proceeding before the appropriate consolidation authorities under a'ld in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nNo one would, therefore, stand to suffer on account of the abatement because there is a special forum carved out for adjudication of the rights which were involved in proceedings which would abate as a consequence of the notification under s. 3. If the construction as canvassed for were to be adopted it would result in irreparable harm and would be counter-productive. The consolidation work would be wholly hampered and a party whose appeal is pending would lose the chance of convincing the appellate court which, if successful, would turn the tables against the other party in whose favour the judgment, decree or order would become final on abatement of the appeal. Therefore, the legislature intended that not\n\nonly the appeal or revision would a bate but the judgment, order or decree against which the appeal is pending would also become nonest as they would also abate and this would leave consolidation authority free to adjudicate the claims of title or other rights or interest in land involved in consolidation.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in not only holding that the second appeal pending before it abated but also the judgment and decree of the trial court and first appellate court would stand abated along with those proceedings. We reach this conclusion on the language of ss. 3 and 4 and the scheme of the Act but the view which we are taking is also borne out by some decisions though in none of th em this position was directly canvassed.\n\nIn Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh & Ors.,(1) this Court examined the effect of a provision in pari materia in a parallel statute, namely, s. 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 ('U. P. Act' for short). Section 5 provided for the consequences of a declaration of intention to prepare a scheme for consolidation of holdings made under s. 4.\n\nAs the section stood prior to its amendment in 1966, it did not provide for abatement of proceedings pending in civil courts at the commencement of consolidation proceedings.\n\nBy the Amending Act 21 of 1966, s. 5 was amended introducing sub-s. (2)(a) to provide for abatement of pending proceedings. This section is in pari materio with s. 4 (c) of Act. At the time of the issue of the notification an appeal by special leave was pending in this Court and a notice of motion was taken out requesting the Court to pass an order abating the appeal after taking note of sub-s. (2)(a) introduced by the Amending Act of 1966.\n\nAfter negativing the contention challenging the constitutional validity of the Amending Act, this Court held that the suit out of which the appeal came to the Court would stand abated in view of sub-s. (2) (a) introduced in s. 5.\n\nThe emphasis is that not only would the appeal pending in this Court abate but the suit as a whole abated. True it is that no contention was taken whether only the appeal would abate keeping the judgment under appeal intact or the suit as a whole would abate, but the observation of this Court will clearly indicate that in the opinion of this Court the suit as such would abate rendering the appeal pending before this Court infructuous. This decision in Ram Adhar Singh's case supra was\n\n\nBIBI RAHMANI v. HARKOO GOOPE (Desai, J.) 561\n\nin terms followed in Chattar Singh & Ors. v. Thakur Prasad Singh(1).\n\nThe appeal in Chattar Singh\"s case related to a suit which had a reference to a claim to the land in respect of which a notification was issued under the UP. Act as amended by Act 21 of 1966.\n\nThe notification was issued when the appeal was pending before this Court. The appellants moved for passing an order of abatement.\n\nGranting the motion, this Court held that tl, e suit and the appeals stood abated, leaving it open to the parties to work out the rights before the appropraiate authorities under the U. P. Act.\n\nBoth the aforementioned decisions were noticed in Satyanarayan Prasad Sah and others v. State of Bihar and another. (2) In that case upon the issue of a notification under s. 3 of the Act at a time when the matter was pending in the High Court an order was made under s. 4 (c) abating the proceeding as also the suit from which the proceeding arose.\n\nWrit Petitions were filed in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the constitutional validity of s. 4 of the Act as being violative of Arts. I 4 and 19 of the Constitution. After repelling the challenge to the vires of s. 4. this Court affirming the decisions in Ram Adhar Singh and Chattar Singh' s case (supra) held that maybe that the High Court should not have nullified the decree of the trial court but should have merely declared that the proceeding stood abated which this Court understood to mean that the civil proceeding comes to a naught.\n\nIn other words, the proceedings from its commencement abate and no decision in the proceeding at any stage would have any impact on the adjudication of claims by the parties under the Act.\n\nAccordingly, both on principle and precedent it is crystal clear that where a notification is issued bringing the land involved in a dispute in the civil proceeding under a scheme of consolidation the proceedings pending in the civil court either in the trial court, appeal or revision, shall abate as a consequence ensuing upon the issue of a notification and the effect of abatement would be that the civil proceeding as a whole would come to a naught. Therefore, the order of the High Court impugned in this appeal is legal and valid so far as it not only directed abatement of the appeal pending before the High Court but also abating the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court because the entire civil proceeding came to naught.\n\n(1) A.LR. 1975 S.C 1-499.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1980 S.C. 2051.\n\nThe next contention of Shri Singh was that the Hight Court ought not to have nullified the decree with regard to khata no. 458 in which Brahmadeo and Deonandan Singh, defendants 7 and 5 respectively, alone were interested and the present respondents had no interest in khata no. 458. Learned counsel who appeared for the respondents conceded that the present respondents have no interest in khata no. 458. It also transpires that Brahmadeo claimed interest in khata 110. 458 alleging that he had purchased the land involved in the khata from Deonandan Singh, defendant 5. The suit proceeded ex-parte against defendants 5 and 6 and Brahmadeo, defendant 7 contested the suit in respect of khata no. 458.\n\nThe trial court negatived the contention of defendant 7 Brahmadeo and accepted . plaintiff's title. Defendant 7 Brahmadeo along with other defendants preferred an appeal to the District Court. When the appeal was pending in the District Court, Brahmadeo, the appellant died.\n\nHis legal representatives were not substituted. Since defendant 7 Brahmadeo as appellant claimed separate, specific and exclusive right to khata no.~458, on his death his legal representatives ought to have been substituted. He was the appellant. No one was substituted on his behalf. Obviously, therefore, the appeal preferred by Brahmadeo abated. It may also be made clear that legal representatives of Brahmadeo have not preferred second appeal.\n\nSecond Appeal was preferred by the present respondents who claimed. interest in khata no. 459 only.\n\nAccordingly, when the appeal preferred by the present respondents abated, it only abated with reference to khata no.· 459 and in no case it would have any impact on the title of present appellants which became established under a:decree of the trial court which became final on the appeal of Brahmadeo having abated before the notification under s. 3, and it could not at all be dealt with by the High Court. To that extent this appeal wlll have to be allowed and an appropriate modification would have to be made.\n\nAccordingly, this appeal succeeds in part. Proceedings with. regard to khata no. 459 (Bhouli) in Touzi 7535, village Parsaia were rightly abated by the High Court and the civil proceedin: with regard to khata no. 459 as a whole would abate leaving the parties to get their rights adjudicated before the authorities under the Act.\n\nThe title of the appellants declared by the trial court in respect of kbata no. 458 (nakdi) has become unchallenieable at the hands of Brahmadeo or anyone claiming throuih him and the\n\n, i... ..\n\nBIBI RAHMANI v. HARKOO GOOPE (Desai, J.) 563\n\nabatement of the second appeal will have no impact on the title of the appellants to khata no. 458. The declaration made by the trial court in respect of khata no. 458 is restored.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nP. B. R.\n\nAppeals allowed in part.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "BIBI RAHMANI KHATOON & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIBI RAHMANI KHATOON & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARKOO GOPE & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARKOO GOPE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 22, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J\n\nBihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956- Section 4(1}(c}-Scope of-Section provides that, without prejudice to rights of parties all pending proceedings at any stage before any court in respect of lands\n\ntaken up for consolidation shall abate-Plaintiffs\" suit for declaration of title decreed-Notification issued when appeal pending before High Court-Effect of notification-Whether judgment and decree of trial court would abate."}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 720, "end_char": 732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956", "statute": "Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1269, "end_char": 1281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2214, "end_char": 2223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2289, "end_char": 2298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3215, "end_char": 3224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To avoid conflict between rival jurisdictions the Act provides that such proceedings should be examined exclusively by the authorities under the Act", "statute": "To avoid conflict between rival jurisdictions the Act provides that such proceedings should be examined exclusively by the authorities under the Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 5006, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S.C.R. 95", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5817, "end_char": 5835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Satyanarayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5909, "end_char": 5921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Thakur Prasad Singh, A.I.R. 1975 SC 1499, and Satyanarayan."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1359\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th August, 1979 of the Patna High Court in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6824, "end_char": 6834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.P. Singh for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "B.P. Singh"}}, {"text": "S.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6856, "end_char": 6866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Mehta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nMst."}}, {"text": "Bibi Rahmani Khatoon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6949, "end_char": 6969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and others filed Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "BIBI RAHMANI KHATOON & ORS"}}, {"text": "Additional Subordinate Judge I, Gaya", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3/70 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge I, Gaya for declaration of their title and for recovery of possession of agricultural !"}}, {"text": "Brahmadeo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7406, "end_char": 7415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Brahmadeo was defendant 7 claiming an interest in khata no.", "canonical_name": "Brahmadeo"}}, {"text": "March 3 l, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7510, "end_char": 7525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "458 on the basis of a sale deed executed on March 3 l, 1959, by one Deonandan Singh who was defendant 5 in the trial court."}}, {"text": "Deonandan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7534, "end_char": 7549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "458 on the basis of a sale deed executed on March 3 l, 1959, by one Deonandan Singh who was defendant 5 in the trial court.", "canonical_name": "Deonandan Singh"}}, {"text": "Brahmadeo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7628, "end_char": 7637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be made distinctly clear that Brahmadeo claimed interest in khata no.", "canonical_name": "Brahmadeo"}}, {"text": "July 12, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8068, "end_char": 8081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "District Judge as per his judgment and decree dated July 12, 1974."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8252, "end_char": 8285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "697/74 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna."}}, {"text": "Harkoo Gope", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8740, "end_char": 8751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harkoo Gope and three others who claimed interest in khata no.", "canonical_name": "HARKOO GOPE & ORS"}}, {"text": "November 16, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9052, "end_char": 9069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "697/74 was pending in the High Court, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellants (respondents in this Court) on November 16, 1978, drawing attention of the Court to a notification under s.3 of the Bibar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 ('Act' for short) and further intimating to the Court that the village in which the disputed khatas were situated was taken up for consolidation of holdings and, therefore, the appeal pending in the High Court would abate in view of the provision contained in s. 4 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9126, "end_char": 9129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bibar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9137, "end_char": 9210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9471, "end_char": 9475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bibar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Bibar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "August 18, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9574, "end_char": 9589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted the submission and disposed of the appeal by its order dated August 18, 1979, the operative portion of which reads as under :\n\n\"The appeal abates and the judgments and decrees of both the courts below are hereby set aside as having abated\"."}}, {"text": "B.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10062, "end_char": 10072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri B.P. Singh, learned counsel who appeared for the appellants contended that even if the Second Appeal abates by virtue of the provision contained in s. 4, on issue of a notification under s. 3 of the Act, the High Court cannot set aside the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court as according to him when an appeal abates the judgment and decree of the court\n\nagainst which the appeal is preferred becomes final.", "canonical_name": "B.P. Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10210, "end_char": 10214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bibar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Bibar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10249, "end_char": 10253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11162, "end_char": 11171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11557, "end_char": 11566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11640, "end_char": 11644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11677, "end_char": 11681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11806, "end_char": 11819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11903, "end_char": 11912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12766, "end_char": 12770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13500, "end_char": 13504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13713, "end_char": 13718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Singh, learned counsel for the appellants does not dispute this legal consequence."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16271, "end_char": 16275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16345, "end_char": 16372, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16881, "end_char": 16885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16952, "end_char": 16956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17493, "end_char": 17497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18571, "end_char": 18582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18881, "end_char": 18885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18893, "end_char": 18942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18968, "end_char": 18977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19099, "end_char": 19103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19314, "end_char": 19318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19443, "end_char": 19447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "After negativing the contention challenging the constitutional validity of the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19728, "end_char": 19819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19952, "end_char": 19956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After negativing the contention challenging the constitutional validity of the Amending Act", "statute": "After negativing the contention challenging the constitutional validity of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Ram Adhar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20415, "end_char": 20430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision in Ram Adhar Singh's case supra was\n\nBIBI RAHMANI v. HARKOO GOOPE (Desai, J.) 561\n\nin terms followed in Chattar Singh & Ors."}}, {"text": "Chattar Singh\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20580, "end_char": 20595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal in Chattar Singh\"s case related to a suit which had a reference to a claim to the land in respect of which a notification was issued under the UP.", "canonical_name": "Chattar Singh\"s"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21258, "end_char": 21262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21354, "end_char": 21358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21483, "end_char": 21493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21557, "end_char": 21561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21679, "end_char": 21683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chattar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21743, "end_char": 21756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court affirming the decisions in Ram Adhar Singh and Chattar Singh' s case (supra) held that maybe that the High Court should not have nullified the decree of the trial court but should have merely declared that the proceeding stood abated which this Court understood to mean that the civil proceeding comes to a naught.", "canonical_name": "Chattar Singh\"s"}}, {"text": "Brahmadeo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23159, "end_char": 23168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "458 in which Brahmadeo and Deonandan Singh, defendants 7 and 5 respectively, alone were interested and the present respondents had no interest in khata no.", "canonical_name": "Brahmadeo"}}, {"text": "Deonandan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23173, "end_char": 23188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "458 in which Brahmadeo and Deonandan Singh, defendants 7 and 5 respectively, alone were interested and the present respondents had no interest in khata no.", "canonical_name": "Deonandan Singh"}}, {"text": "District Court, Brahmadeo", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23954, "end_char": 23979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the appeal was pending in the District Court, Brahmadeo, the appellant died."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24899, "end_char": 24903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parsaia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25186, "end_char": 25193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "459 (Bhouli) in Touzi 7535, village Parsaia were rightly abated by the High Court and the civil proceedin: with regard to khata no."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_55_67_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "(EX) CAPT. RANDHIR SINGH DHULL\n\nS. D. BHAMBRI & OTHERS\n\nMarch 2, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Tahsildari Rules 1932, Rules 5 and II and Standing Order Na. 12 of 1909, Part A, Para 4(1) and Punjab Emergency (Concession) Rules 1965, Rules 2 and 4(ii)-Class 'A' Tahsildar-Recruitment-Candidates initially 'accepted' and thereafter 'appointed'-Seniority-Determined by date of substantive appointment in the post-Military service rendered by a candidate-Concession in seniority-When admissible.\n\nStanding Order No. 12 of 1909 (Part A) provides for.two classes of Tahsildar candidates (1) class 'A' (or direct) and (2) class 'B'. Para 4 (1) of the Standing Order read with the Punjab Tahsildari Rules 1932 provides that candidates are required to undergo training for a period of three years in the case of class 'A' direct recruits. In addition to the completion of training a candidate is required to pass a qualifying departmental examination before he is eligible to be appornted to the post of Tahsildar, temporary or permanent.\n\nInitially, a tahsildar candidate is not enrolled against any post, nor is he appointed against any vacancy but is appointed against vacancies after completing the training and passing the examination held. After appointment to the post of tahsildar, the officer has to be on probation for a period of two years under Rule\n\n10 of the Tahsildari Rules. Rule 11 provides that the seniority of members of the service shall be determined by the date of substantive appointment in the post.\n\nThe Punjab Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 provides by sub-rule (ii) of Rule 4 that the period of 'military service' shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the seniority of a person who has rendered military service.\n\nThe petitioner in his writ petition contended, that he appeared in the class 'A' Tahsildar candidate Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch) Services Examination 1972-73 and was accepted as 'A' Class Tahsil<lar candidate on September 13, 1974 and joined the civil post with effect from September 26, 1974. After completing the training he was appointed to the post on January 3, 1978. He approached respondent No. 1 under Rule 4(1) and (ii) of the Punjab Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 and requested that the military service rendered by him from 1963 to 1974 except for the P.eriod from July 2, 1968 to October 13, 1968 be tagged on to his services with effect from September 26, 1974 for the purpose of his seniority, increments, promotion, pensions etc. and that respondent No. l did not give this facility though it was accorded to other respondents, and that the promotion of respondents Nos. 3 to 18 who were junior to him had violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe first respondent claimed that the petitioner was accepted as class 'A' Tahsildar candidate on 13th September, 1974 and that he had qualified himself\n\nA for the post of Tahsildar after he had completed the prescribed training and successfully qualified in the departmental examination and that he was appointed as Tahsildar by the order dated January 3, 1978. As the petitioner had been in service in the Armed Forces from April 29, 1963 to January 10, 1968 on which day termination of the Emergency was declared, the petitioner was given the benefit of the service and his seniority was fixed as on May 26, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4, sub-clause (ii) read with Rule 2 of the Punjab B Emergency (Concession) Rules 1965.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD : 1. The petitioner was not appointed to but accepted as a candidate for the post of Tahsildar. [63 D]\n\nIn the instant case a perusal of the letter of appointment Annexure P-S alongwith sub-rules 2 and 3 of Rules S and 11 of the Tahsildari Rules shows that the petitioner was merely accepted as a candidate for the post of Tahsildar. It is mentioned therein that the terms and conditions of the service namely training, passing of departmental examination, and probation are to be governed by the Tahsildari Rules and Standing Order No. 12 as amended from time to time. A candidate had to fulfil the said terms and conditions mentioned before his appointment to the post of Tahsildar. [62 H-63 D]\n\nThe petitioner's substantive appointment was by order dated January 3,\n\n1978. It is clear from the said order that the substantive appointment of the petitioner cannot be before the said date. [63 E, 64 F]\n\n3. The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July 1, 1968 and again from October 31, 1968 to September 22, 1974 was not during the operation of emergency. The petitioner's service from October 31, 1969 to September 22, 1974 was not as an \"enrolled or commissioned service in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces.\" During this period the petitioner had been allowed the benefit of service rendered by him in the Army for the period from April 29, 1963 to January 10, 1968 by the order dated December 14, 1978 of the Financial Commissioner. [ 66 C]\n\nThe petitioner has not been able to point out that any of the respondent Nos. 3 to 18 was given seniority from the date of acceptance. In fact none of them was accepted alongwith him by letter dated September 13, 1974. [67A]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1099 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, P. C. Bhartari, K. S. Tiwari, Arvind Kumar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Appellant.\n\nK. G. Bhagat and M. N. Shroff for Respondents I & 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL !SLAM, J. the Constitution of India.\n\nThis is an application under Art. 32 of The Petitioner, Ex.-Capt. Randhir Singh\n\nDhull prays that the military services rendered by him from 1963 to A 1974 (except for the period during 1968 from 2.7.68 to 13.10.1968)\n\nbe tagged to his services with effect from 26.9.1974 for the purpose of his seniority, increments, promotion, pensions etc., and for a direction to respondent no. l, the State of Haryana, to promote him to the Haryana Civil Service (Emergency Branch) on the basis of the seniority claimed with effect from the date mentioned above.\n\nHis B grievance is that respondents no. 3 to 18 who were junior to him had been promoted and put above him. The impugned action of respondent no. I, according to the petitioner, has violated Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ·\n\nThis case has a chequered career. The material facts may be stated in a short compass.\n\nThe petitioner is an ex-army personnel, his rank having been Captain. He served during the period of Emergency from 29-4-1963 to 1-7-1968 and also during the period of Emergency from 31.10.1969 to 22.9.1974, the total period of service thus having been 10 years, . one month and 23 days before his . appointment t-0 the present post he is now holding.\n\nThe respondent no. 1 through the Haryana Public. Service Commission by an advertisement called for applications that a combined competitive examination for recruitment to, inter alia, \"A Class Tahsildar (Apprentices) wouH.l be held by the Haryana Public Service Commission at Chandigarh in March, 1973 in accordance with the rules contained in the Punjab Public Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930. The petitioner appeared in the said examination and was successful and as a result he was appointed to present post of Tahsildar Class II post............ against reserved post/service for ex-services.\"\n\nThere is a set of rules called the Punjab Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter 'the Emergency Concession Rules').\n\nAccording to the petitioner he joined civil post on 26.9.74 and under Rule 4(i) & (ii) of the aforesaid Rules and the administrative instructions his services arc required to be counted immediately on his joining the Civil post namely with effect from 26.9.1974, tagging the period of military services to the present post.\n\nBut as respondent no. 1 did not do so, he sent several representations to respondent no. I to give him the benefit of seniority, promotion, increment etc. according to the said set of Rules. The petitioner alleges that while respondent no. I did not tag the petitioner's period of military service towards his seniority; promotion and increment. respondent no. J gave similar facilities to Capt. Phu! Singh, Kewal Singh, Indraj Singh,\n\nH. R. Kapur and other respondents. His further allegation is that\n\nA while he has been deprived of his dues mentioned above, respondent nos. 3 to 18, who were junior to him were promoted to be put above him.\n\nAs the respondent no. I did not favourably react to the representations made by the petitioner, he filed a Writ Petition, being B W. P. No. 1398/77,, in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana but he withdrew it on a promise made by the Counsel of respondent no. I.\n\nBut as respondent no. I did not keep the promise he filed an application for review of the order made in W. P. No. 1398 of 1977. The petition for review was rejected but he was permitted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to file a fresh application.\n\nHe then C filed CWP No. 3584 of 1977 which was dismissed in August, 1978 by a single Judge of the said High Court. The petitioner filed Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of the single Judge.\n\nThe Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed. The petitioner then filed a special leave petition before this Court. The special leave petition was also dismissed. He then filed an application for review before this Court.\n\nD The application for review was also dismissed in limine.' The petitioner then filed an application before the single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for the review of his judgment but it was dismissed in April, 1979. Against that order a special leave petition, being S.L.P. (Civil) No. 4475ef1979, was filed before this Court.\n\nThe Special Leave Petition was allowed to be withdrawn by this E Court with liberty to the petitioner to file a Regular Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by. Order dated 27.8.79. The , petitioner has thus filed the present writ application.\n\nRespondent No. I (hereinafter 'the respondent') has filed a counter affidavit.\n\nThe contention of the respondent is that by F Annexure P. 5 the petitioner was not appointed to the post of Tahsildar but he was accepted as a Tahsildar candidate.\n\nIn other words, the Respondent's contention is that the petitioner was accepted as an Apprentice for appointment to the post of Tahsildar after he qualified in the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) and Allied Services Examination held by the Haryana Public Service Commission G in 1972-1973 in accordance with the rules in force for selection of 'A' class Tahsildar-apprentices.\n\nAccording to the respondent the petitioner was accepted by the Financial Commissioner, Haryana, as a candidate, for the post of Tahsildar in the State of Haryana on 13th September, 1974 as per Annexure P. 5.\n\nThe respondent has H explained the procedure. The procedure is that candidates for the post of Tahsildar ate required under para 4(1) of the Standing Order No. 12 (hereinafter 'the Standing Order') issued by the Financial\n\n. \"\"r\n\nCommissioners read with Rule 5 of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules 1932, (hereinafter 'the Tahsildari Rules') to undergo training for a period of three years in the case of directly recruited candidates categorised as 'A' Class. In the case of candidates recruited otherwise are categorised as 'B' class candidates; the training period is fixed by the Financial Commissioner keeping in view candidates', experience and qualification. In addition to the completion of training, candidates are required to pass certain qualifying departmental examination before he is eligible to be appointed to the post of Tahsildar, temporary or permanent. Initially the tahsildar candidates are not enrolled against any post, nor are they appointed against any vacancy but they are appointed against vacancies after they have completed the training and passing the examination held.\n\nAfter appointment to the post of Tahsildar the Officer has to be on probation for a period of two years under Rule 10 of the Tahsildari Rules.\n\nAccording to the respondent the petitioner was accepted as Class 'A' Tahsildar candidate/apprentice on 13th September, 1974. The petitioner qualified himself for the post of Tahsildar after he had completed the prescribed traiTJ ing and successfully qualified in the departmental examination and he along with 6 others was appointed as Tahsildar in the post of Tahsildar by Order dated 3rd January 1978.\n\nThe respondent's case is that 'as the petitioner had been in service in Armed Forces from April 29, 1963 to January 10, 1968 on which date termination of the Emergency was declared under Art. 352 of the Constitution with effect from 26th October, 1962, the petitioner was given the benefit of the sery_ice and his seniority was fixed as on 27th May 1973 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4(ii) read with Rule 2 of the Emergency Concession Rules, 1965 (Annexure 'B').\n\nThe decision of this case depends primarily on the true and correct interpretation of the document, Annexure P-5 :\n\n(i) Whether it is a letter of appointment of the petitioner to the post of Tahsildar, as claimed by the petitioner, or\n\n(ii) Whether it is a letter of acceptance of the candidature of the petitioner to the post Lof Tahsildar, as contended by the respondent.\n\nThe material portion of document H Annexure p.5 reads :\n\n\"From\n\nThe Financial Commissioner & Secretary to Government, Haryana, Revenue Department.\n\nI. Shri Raj Kumar Aggarwal... .............. .\n\nShri Amarnath Ichhpujani ................. :\n\nShri Ashok Kumar Visistha .............. .\n\nShri Kamal Kumar Gupta .. .............. ..\n\nShri Hard hull Singh Bhole ................. .\n\nShri Randhir Singh Dhull (Petitioner)\n\n7. Shri Nepal Singh Tanwar ................. .\n\nMemo No. 3896-E-II-74/30535\n\nChandigarh, dated the 13th September, 1974\n\n• Subject ; Acceptance of class 'A' Tahsildar candidate Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch) ad other services examinations 1972-73.\n\nThe Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates.\n\nThe acceptance of Sarvshri Ashok Kumar Vasistha and Hardhul Singh Bhole is subject to verification of their charac- ter and antecedents.\n\nThe interse seniority of the above candidates will be communicated to them later.\n\n3. The arrangements for their training will be made by the Commissioners, Ambala and Hissar Division, who are being asked to communicate the programme of training to them. They are allotted to the Commissioners, Ambala and Hissar Division for training as under :\n\nCOMMISSIONER,\n\nCOMMISSIONER,\n\nAMBALA DIV.\n\nHISSAR DIV.\n\nI. Shri Raj Kumar I. Shri Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta\n\nShri Amarnath 2.\n\nShri Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole\n\nShri Randhir 3.\n\nShri Ashok Kumar Vasistha\n\nShri Nepal Singh Tanwar\n\nThe terms and conditions of their service, training, passing of departmental examination, probation etc. will be governed by the Punjab Tahsildari Rules, 1932 and the Financial Commissioner's Standing Order No. 12 as amended from time to time.\n\nDuring the period of their training they shall draw pay at the rate of the minimum of the time scale of the post of Tahsildar of Rs. 350-25-500-30-650-800 viz. Rs. 350/-\n\nP.M.\n\nThey are requested to intimate their Home Districts and the districts in which they have property to the Commissioner of Divisions to whom they have been allotted for imparting training, and this department,\n\nThe receipt of this communication may please be acknowledged.\n\nSd/- Deputy Secretary Revenue, Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Haryana and Revenue Department.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nAnnexure P-5 is based on the Standing Order, and the Tahsildari Rules. The Standing Order, inter alia, says that the H rules for the appointment, removal and discipline of Tahsildars and Naib Tahsi!dars are contained in the Tahsildari Rules.\n\nA Part A of the Standing Order speaks of two classes of Tahsildar:\n\n(I) Class A (or direct) candidates and (2) Class B candidates.\n\nThe relevant provisions of Rule 5 of Tahsildari Rules may be extracted;\n\n\"5 (1) No person shall be directly appointed to the service unless in the case of appointment to the post of\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\nTahsildar, he is graduate of a recognised university\n\n(2) No person shall be appointed directly or by transfer to the service or promoted from the post of Naib Tahsildar to that of Tahsildar unless he shall have become qualified by passing the examination or undergoing the training prescribed from time to time in the Standing Orders of the Financial Commissioners.\n\n(3) No person shall be appointed directly or by transfer to the service unless he has been accepted as a candidate in the case of Tahsildar by the Financial Commissioners and in the case of Naib Tahsildar by the Commissioner under the conditions prescribed from time to time in the Standing Orders of the Financial Commissioners\".\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nRule 11 speaks of the seniority of service and need be F quoted :\n\n\"11. The seniority of members of the service shall in so far as any post is concerned be determined by the date of substantive appointment in the post ............ \"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\n'Service' has been defined in the Tahsildari Rules as :\n\n\"Service means the Punjab Service of Tahsildars and Nail>.\n\nTahsildars\".\n\nH 8.\n\nA perusal of the letter as per Annexure P. 5 alongwith sub-rules 2 and 3 of rule 5 and rule 11 of the Tahsildari Rules clearly\n\nshow that by letter Annexure P. 5 the petitioner was merely accepted as a candidate for the post of Tahsildar. Annexure P. 5 itself has mentioned the terms and conditions of the service namely training, passing of departmental examination and probation to be governed by the Tahsildari Rules and Standing Order No. 12 as amended from time to time. A candidate had to fulfil the terms and conditions named in the letter before his appointment to the post of Tahsildar. The terms and conditions were :\n\n(i) to undergo a period of training\n\n(ii) to pass a departmental examination.\n\n(iii) to undergo a period of probation, etc.\n\nFulfilments of thes_e terms and conditions by a candidate were conditions precedent to his appointment. Annexure P. 5 has nowhere mentioned that the petitioner was appointed as a Tahsildar.\n\nWe therefore have no hesitation in holding that he was not appointed to, but accepted as candidate for, the post of Tahsildar, by Annexure P. 5.\n\nRule 11 lays down that the seniority of the members of the service shall be determined by the date of the substantive _ appointment in the post. The petitioner's substantive appointment was vi de order dated 3. I. 78. (Annexure A to the Counter Affidavit) which reads as :\n\n\"Subject: Declaration of 'A' Class Tahsildar candidate (under training as Naib Tahsildar) as qualified for the post of Tahsildar.\n\nIn Exercise of the powers vested in him vide para 6 of the Financial Commissioners Standing Order No. 12, the Financial Commissioner, Revenue is pleased to declare the following 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates as qualified for the post of Tahsildar ;\n\nShri Amar Nath Ichbpujani, under training as Naib Tabsildar, Tbanesar.\n\nShri Ashok Vasbisitha, under Training as Naib Tahsildar, Gurgaon.\n\nShri Kamal Kumar_ Gupta, under training as Naib Tahsildar, Rohtak.\n\nShri Hardhul Singh Bhole, under training as Naib Tahsildar, Mohindergarh.\n\nShri Randhir Singh Dhull, under training as Naib Tahsildar working as Tahsildar, Kalka, under local arrangement.\n\nShri Nepal Singh Tanwar, under training as Naib Tahsildar, Rawal.\n\nConsequent upon the declaration of the above 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates as qualified for the post of Tahsildar, they are appointed as Tahsildars. The orders about their deployment against the posts of Tahsildars are being issued separately. Their appointment as Tahsildar shall take effect from the date they assume charge of those posts. Their appointment as Tahsildars will be governed by the Punjab Tahsildari Rules, 1932, and the Financial Commissioners Standing Order No. 12, as amended from time to time.\n\nThe declaration of Shri Hardhul Singh Bhole (sl. no. 4 above) as qualified for the post of Tahsildar and his consequent appointment as such, is subject to the condition that he should qualify the tahsildar's examination in Urdu paper within 6 months from the d.ate of issue of this letter.\n\nSd/- Deputy Secretary to Govt., Haryana.\n\nRevenue Department.\".\n\n(emphas'is added)\n\nFrom Annexure A, it is clear that the date of the substantive r appointment of the petitioner cannot be before 3.1.78.\n\n10. Standing Order No. 12 of 1909 (Part A), as stated above, mentions two classes of \"Tahsildar candidates\":\n\n(i) Class A (or G direct) and (ii) Class B.\n\nWe are not concerned with class B tahsildar. Class A (or direct) candidates, according to Order No. 12, \"must belong to families of tried loyalty and distinguished services, and must be of good social status and influence in the country or members of a class the introduction of which into the public H service it is considered desirable especially to encourage ......... \"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nThe petitioner submits that Standing Order No. 12 which is a part of the Tahsildari Rules does not survive the Constitution. We do not feel called upon to decide this point in this case as the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the point for two reasons :-\n\n(i) The basis of the petitioner's case . all throughout, at all\n\nstages, was Annexure P. 5 based on the Tahsildari Rules B and Standing Order No. 12.\n\nEven now he does not claim his appointment on any other basis ; ·\n\n(ii) Secondly, if the Tahsildari Rules and the Standing Order No. 12 are held to be ultra vires, the letter of acceptance (or letter of appointment as the petitioner erronously calls it) which was issued under the provisions of the said Rules, will disappear and the petitioner will have no legs to stand on.\n\n11. Rule 11 of the Tahsildari Rules has been quoted above.\n\nIt provides for the seniority of the members of the service.\n\nIt is tO D be determined by the date of the substantive appointment in the\n\npost.\n\nThe petitioner however claims that he is entitled to get the benefit of his service in the army during the Emergency, under the provisions of the Emergency (Concession) Rules ; E\n\nSub-rule (ii) of Rule 4 of the Emergency Concession Rules reads :\n\n\"4 (ii) Seniority :-The period of military service mentioned in Clause (i) shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the seniority of a person who has rendered military service.\"\n\nMilitary service is defined in rule 2 thus :\n\n\"For the purpose of these rules, the expression \"military service\" means the service rendered by a person, who had been enrolled or commissioned during the period of operation of the proclamation of emergency made by the President under Art. 352 of the Constitution of India on the 26th October, 1962 in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces (including the service as a Warrant Officer) during the period of the said Emergency or such other service as may hereafter be declared as military service for the purpose of these rules. Any period\n\nA of military training followed by military service shall also be reckoned as military service.\n\nA perusal of the rule quoted above shows that the Concession in seniority is admissible (i) in respect of military services rendered during the operation of emergency only and not for any military services after the termination of emergency and (ii) only if the service in the military is as \"enrolled or commissioned service in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces.\" The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July I, 1968 and again from 31.10.1968 to 22.9.1974 was not during the operation of emergency in question.\n\nFurther\n\nth~ petitioner's service from October 31, 1969 to September 22, 1974 was not as an \"enrolled or commissioned service in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces.\" During this period the petitioner has been allowed the benefit of seniority under the Emergency Concession Rules by Order dated 14.12.78 of the Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Haryana in the following terms :\n\n\"In pursuance of provisions of rule 4 (i) and (ii) of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 issued vide Punjab Government Notification No. GSR-160.\n\nConst/Art. 309/65, dated the 20th July 1965 as amended vide Haryana Govt. Notification No. GSR-182/Const. Art. 309/ Amd (2)-76, dated the 4th August, 1976.\n\nShri Randhir Singh Dhull, 'a' Class Tahsildar is allowed the benefit of service rendered by him in the Army during the National Emergency as an Emergency Commissioned Officer for the period from 29th April 1963 to 10th January, 1968 towards seniority and his seniority is fixed immediately below Shri Jaswant Singh Rajput among the 'A' class Tahsildars. His date of appointment as Tahsildar will be 27th May 1973.\n\n2. Further his pay is fixed at Rs. 450/- P.M. in the scale of Rs. 350-25-500/30-650/30-800 with effect from 8.2.78 (his actual date of appointment to the post of Tahsildar) and his' next increment raising his pay to Rs. 475/-P. M. is 1.2.79.\n\nHe will not be entitled to any arrears of pay as a result of the above fixation prior to 8.2.1978.\n\n3. The above period of Army Service shall count for pension only after Shri Dhull has deposited the bonus or gratuity received by him from military authorities.\n\n12, The petitioner has not been able to point out that any of the respondents No. 3 to 18 were given seniority from the date of acceptance. Jn fact none of them was accepted alongwith him by letter dated 13.9.74.\n\n13. The petitioner's further grievance is that the military service of the Captain K. Phool Singh, Captain Khem Singh Lathar, Shri Inder Singh, Captain A. R. Kohar and Captain B. K, Batra mentioned in para 8 of the petition have been counted for the benefit of their seniority etc.\n\nThe petitioner's grievance is baseless.\n\nTheir cases were different.\n\nNone of them was given the benefit of his service from the date he joined as a 'Candidate'.\n\nThe respondent in the counter affidavit asserts that not a single ex-army service Tahsildar Candidate has been allowed the benefit of mili.ary service from the date of acceptance as class 'A' Tahsildar candidate.\n\n14. The petitioner has not been able to make out any case of discrimination and violation of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe. petition has no merit and is dismissed.\n\nWe however leave the D parties to bear their own costs.\n\n15.\n\nMr. Bhagat, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent, submitted that the Writ Petition was barred by res iudicata and in support of his subrr.ission he cited a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1970 S. C. 898.\n\nWe need not examine the submi- E ssion for two reasons :\n\n(i) We have decided the case on merit against the petitioner and (ii) the petitioner obtained permission of this Court to file a Writ Petition vide Order 5.9.79 in S. L. P. No. 4475 of 1979 (Annexure P. I)\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPl!tition dismissed.", "total_entities": 114, "entities": [{"text": "EX) CAPT. RANDHIR SINGH DHULL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "(EX) CAPT. RANDHIR SINGH DHULL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. D. BHAMBRI & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. D. BHAMBRI & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 2, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RANDHIR SINGH DHULL\n\nS. D. BHAMBRI & OTHERS\n\nMarch 2, 1981\n\n[R. S. PATHAK, 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Tahsildari Rules 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Standing Order read with the Punjab Tahsildari Rules 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 685, "end_char": 742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 13, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in his writ petition contended, that he appeared in the class 'A' Tahsildar candidate Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch) Services Examination 1972-73 and was accepted as 'A' Class Tahsil<lar candidate on September 13, 1974 and joined the civil post with effect from September 26, 1974."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2093, "end_char": 2111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in his writ petition contended, that he appeared in the class 'A' Tahsildar candidate Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch) Services Examination 1972-73 and was accepted as 'A' Class Tahsil<lar candidate on September 13, 1974 and joined the civil post with effect from September 26, 1974."}}, {"text": "January 3, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After completing the training he was appointed to the post on January 3, 1978."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2399, "end_char": 2411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 under Rule 4(1) and (ii) of the Punjab Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 and requested that the military service rendered by him from 1963 to 1974 except for the P.eriod from July 2, 1968 to October 13, 1968 be tagged on to his services with effect from September 26, 1974 for the purpose of his seniority, increments, promotion, pensions etc."}}, {"text": "October 13, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2415, "end_char": 2431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 under Rule 4(1) and (ii) of the Punjab Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 and requested that the military service rendered by him from 1963 to 1974 except for the P.eriod from July 2, 1968 to October 13, 1968 be tagged on to his services with effect from September 26, 1974 for the purpose of his seniority, increments, promotion, pensions etc."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2753, "end_char": 2771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "13th September, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2892, "end_char": 2912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent claimed that the petitioner was accepted as class 'A' Tahsildar candidate on 13th September, 1974 and that he had qualified himself\n\nA for the post of Tahsildar after he had completed the prescribed training and successfully qualified in the departmental examination and that he was appointed as Tahsildar by the order dated January 3, 1978."}}, {"text": "April 29, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3220, "end_char": 3234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the petitioner had been in service in the Armed Forces from April 29, 1963 to January 10, 1968 on which day termination of the Emergency was declared, the petitioner was given the benefit of the service and his seniority was fixed as on May 26, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4, sub-clause (ii) read with Rule 2 of the Punjab B Emergency (Concession) Rules 1965."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3238, "end_char": 3254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the petitioner had been in service in the Armed Forces from April 29, 1963 to January 10, 1968 on which day termination of the Emergency was declared, the petitioner was given the benefit of the service and his seniority was fixed as on May 26, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4, sub-clause (ii) read with Rule 2 of the Punjab B Emergency (Concession) Rules 1965."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3397, "end_char": 3409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the petitioner had been in service in the Armed Forces from April 29, 1963 to January 10, 1968 on which day termination of the Emergency was declared, the petitioner was given the benefit of the service and his seniority was fixed as on May 26, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4, sub-clause (ii) read with Rule 2 of the Punjab B Emergency (Concession) Rules 1965."}}, {"text": "January 3,\n\n1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "62 H-63 D]\n\nThe petitioner's substantive appointment was by order dated January 3,\n\n1978."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4523, "end_char": 4539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July 1, 1968 and again from October 31, 1968 to September 22, 1974 was not during the operation of emergency."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July 1, 1968 and again from October 31, 1968 to September 22, 1974 was not during the operation of emergency."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July 1, 1968 and again from October 31, 1968 to September 22, 1974 was not during the operation of emergency."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4591, "end_char": 4609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July 1, 1968 and again from October 31, 1968 to September 22, 1974 was not during the operation of emergency."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's service from October 31, 1969 to September 22, 1974 was not as an \"enrolled or commissioned service in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces.\""}}, {"text": "December 14, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During this period the petitioner had been allowed the benefit of service rendered by him in the Army for the period from April 29, 1963 to January 10, 1968 by the order dated December 14, 1978 of the Financial Commissioner. ["}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, P. C. Bhartari, K. S. Tiwari, Arvind Kumar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5393, "end_char": 5407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, P. C. Bhartari, K. S. Tiwari, Arvind Kumar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. S. Tiwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5409, "end_char": 5421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, P. C. Bhartari, K. S. Tiwari, Arvind Kumar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Arvind Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5423, "end_char": 5435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, P. C. Bhartari, K. S. Tiwari, Arvind Kumar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Arvind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, P. C. Bhartari, K. S. Tiwari, Arvind Kumar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. G. Bhagat and M. N. Shroff for Respondents I & 2."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5495, "end_char": 5507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. G. Bhagat and M. N. Shroff for Respondents I & 2."}}, {"text": "BAHARUL !", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5576, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL !"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5598, "end_char": 5619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5651, "end_char": 5658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6365, "end_char": 6380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "29-4-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6609, "end_char": 6618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He served during the period of Emergency from 29-4-1963 to 1-7-1968 and also during the period of Emergency from 31.10.1969 to 22.9.1974, the total period of service thus having been 10 years, ."}}, {"text": "1-7-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6622, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He served during the period of Emergency from 29-4-1963 to 1-7-1968 and also during the period of Emergency from 31.10.1969 to 22.9.1974, the total period of service thus having been 10 years, ."}}, {"text": "31.10.1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6676, "end_char": 6686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He served during the period of Emergency from 29-4-1963 to 1-7-1968 and also during the period of Emergency from 31.10.1969 to 22.9.1974, the total period of service thus having been 10 years, ."}}, {"text": "22.9.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6690, "end_char": 6699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He served during the period of Emergency from 29-4-1963 to 1-7-1968 and also during the period of Emergency from 31.10.1969 to 22.9.1974, the total period of service thus having been 10 years, ."}}, {"text": "Haryana Public. Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6879, "end_char": 6913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 through the Haryana Public."}}, {"text": "Haryana Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7085, "end_char": 7118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Service Commission by an advertisement called for applications that a combined competitive examination for recruitment to, inter alia, \"A Class Tahsildar (Apprentices) wouH.l be held by the Haryana Public Service Commission at Chandigarh in March, 1973 in accordance with the rules contained in the Punjab Public Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7122, "end_char": 7132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Service Commission by an advertisement called for applications that a combined competitive examination for recruitment to, inter alia, \"A Class Tahsildar (Apprentices) wouH.l be held by the Haryana Public Service Commission at Chandigarh in March, 1973 in accordance with the rules contained in the Punjab Public Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930."}}, {"text": "26.9.74", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7630, "end_char": 7637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner he joined civil post on 26.9.74 and under Rule 4(i) & (ii) of the aforesaid Rules and the administrative instructions his services arc required to be counted immediately on his joining the Civil post namely with effect from 26.9.1974, tagging the period of military services to the present post."}}, {"text": "26.9.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7830, "end_char": 7839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner he joined civil post on 26.9.74 and under Rule 4(i) & (ii) of the aforesaid Rules and the administrative instructions his services arc required to be counted immediately on his joining the Civil post namely with effect from 26.9.1974, tagging the period of military services to the present post."}}, {"text": "Phu! Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8299, "end_char": 8309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Phu!"}}, {"text": "Kewal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8311, "end_char": 8322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, Kewal Singh, Indraj Singh,\n\nH. R. Kapur and other respondents."}}, {"text": "Indraj Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, Kewal Singh, Indraj Singh,\n\nH. R. Kapur and other respondents.", "canonical_name": "Indraj Singh"}}, {"text": "H. R. Kapur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8339, "end_char": 8350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, Kewal Singh, Indraj Singh,\n\nH. R. Kapur and other respondents."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8705, "end_char": 8737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1398/77,, in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana but he withdrew it on a promise made by the Counsel of respondent no."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 9985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "27.8.79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10022, "end_char": 10029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Order dated 27.8.79."}}, {"text": "Haryana Public Service Commission G", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10588, "end_char": 10623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the Respondent's contention is that the petitioner was accepted as an Apprentice for appointment to the post of Tahsildar after he qualified in the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) and Allied Services Examination held by the Haryana Public Service Commission G in 1972-1973 in accordance with the rules in force for selection of 'A' class Tahsildar-apprentices."}}, {"text": "Punjab Tahsildari Rules 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11203, "end_char": 11231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3rd January 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12559, "end_char": 12575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner qualified himself for the post of Tahsildar after he had completed the prescribed traiTJ ing and successfully qualified in the departmental examination and he along with 6 others was appointed as Tahsildar in the post of Tahsildar by Order dated 3rd January 1978."}}, {"text": "Art. 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12765, "end_char": 12773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After appointment to the post of Tahsildar the Officer has to be on probation for a period of two years under Rule", "statute": "After appointment to the post of Tahsildar the Officer has to be on probation for a period of two years under Rule"}}, {"text": "27th May 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12918, "end_char": 12931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "352 of the Constitution with effect from 26th October, 1962, the petitioner was given the benefit of the sery_ice and his seniority was fixed as on 27th May 1973 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4(ii) read with Rule 2 of the Emergency Concession Rules, 1965 (Annexure 'B')."}}, {"text": "Emergency Concession Rules, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13004, "end_char": 13036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raj Kumar Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13585, "end_char": 13603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Shri Raj Kumar Aggarwal... .............. .", "canonical_name": "Raj Kumar Aggarwal"}}, {"text": "Amarnath Ichhpujani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13630, "end_char": 13649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Amarnath Ichhpujani ................. :\n\nShri Ashok Kumar Visistha .............. .", "canonical_name": "Amar Nath Ichhpujimi"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar Visistha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13676, "end_char": 13696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Amarnath Ichhpujani ................. :\n\nShri Ashok Kumar Visistha .............. .", "canonical_name": "Ashok Kumar Visistha"}}, {"text": "Kamal Kumar Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13720, "end_char": 13737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kamal Kumar Gupta .. .............. ..\n\nShri Hard hull Singh Bhole ................. .", "canonical_name": "Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta"}}, {"text": "Hard hull Singh Bhole", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13765, "end_char": 13786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kamal Kumar Gupta .. .............. ..\n\nShri Hard hull Singh Bhole ................. .", "canonical_name": "Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole"}}, {"text": "Randhir Singh Dhull", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13813, "end_char": 13832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Randhir Singh Dhull (Petitioner)\n\n7.", "canonical_name": "Randhir Singh Dhull"}}, {"text": "Nepal Singh Tanwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13855, "end_char": 13873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nepal Singh Tanwar ................. .", "canonical_name": "Nepal Singh Tan war"}}, {"text": "Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14111, "end_char": 14150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates."}}, {"text": "Raj Kumar Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14181, "end_char": 14199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates.", "canonical_name": "Raj Kumar Aggarwal"}}, {"text": "Amar Nath Ichhpujimi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14201, "end_char": 14221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates.", "canonical_name": "Amar Nath Ichhpujimi"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar Vasistha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14223, "end_char": 14243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Kumar Visistha"}}, {"text": "Kamal Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14245, "end_char": 14256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates."}}, {"text": "Hardhul Singh Hhole", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14258, "end_char": 14277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates.", "canonical_name": "Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole"}}, {"text": "Randhir Singh Dhull", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14279, "end_char": 14298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates.", "canonical_name": "Randhir Singh Dhull"}}, {"text": "Nepal Singh Tan war", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14303, "end_char": 14322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Haryana is pleased to accept Sarvshri Raj Kumar Aggarwal, Amar Nath Ichhpujimi, Ashok Kumar Vasistha, Kamal Gupta, Hardhul Singh Hhole, Randhir Singh Dhull and Nepal Singh Tan war as 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates.", "canonical_name": "Nepal Singh Tan war"}}, {"text": "Hardhul Singh Bhole", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14411, "end_char": 14430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The acceptance of Sarvshri Ashok Kumar Vasistha and Hardhul Singh Bhole is subject to verification of their charac- ter and antecedents.", "canonical_name": "Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole"}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14654, "end_char": 14660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arrangements for their training will be made by the Commissioners, Ambala and Hissar Division, who are being asked to communicate the programme of training to them."}}, {"text": "Raj Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14908, "end_char": 14917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Shri Raj Kumar I. Shri Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta\n\nShri Amarnath 2.", "canonical_name": "Raj Kumar Aggarwal"}}, {"text": "Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14926, "end_char": 14952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Shri Raj Kumar I. Shri Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta\n\nShri Amarnath 2.", "canonical_name": "Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta"}}, {"text": "Amarnath 2", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14959, "end_char": 14969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Shri Raj Kumar I. Shri Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta\n\nShri Amarnath 2."}}, {"text": "Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14977, "end_char": 15007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole\n\nShri Randhir 3.", "canonical_name": "Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole"}}, {"text": "Randhir 3", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15014, "end_char": 15023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole\n\nShri Randhir 3."}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar Vasistha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15031, "end_char": 15051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Kumar Vasistha\n\nShri Nepal Singh Tanwar\n\nThe terms and conditions of their service, training, passing of departmental examination, probation etc.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Kumar Visistha"}}, {"text": "Nepal Singh Tanwar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15058, "end_char": 15076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Kumar Vasistha\n\nShri Nepal Singh Tanwar\n\nThe terms and conditions of their service, training, passing of departmental examination, probation etc.", "canonical_name": "Nepal Singh Tan war"}}, {"text": "Punjab Tahsildari Rules, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Naib Tahsildar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17033, "end_char": 17047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) No person shall be appointed directly or by transfer to the service unless he has been accepted as a candidate in the case of Tahsildar by the Financial Commissioners and in the case of Naib Tahsildar by the Commissioner under the conditions prescribed from time to time in the Standing Orders of the Financial Commissioners\"."}}, {"text": "3. I. 78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18881, "end_char": 18889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's substantive appointment was vi de order dated 3."}}, {"text": "Amar Nath Ichbpujani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19334, "end_char": 19354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12, the Financial Commissioner, Revenue is pleased to declare the following 'A' Class Tahsildar candidates as qualified for the post of Tahsildar ;\n\nShri Amar Nath Ichbpujani, under training as Naib Tabsildar, Tbanesar.", "canonical_name": "Amar Nath Ichhpujimi"}}, {"text": "Ashok Vasbisitha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19406, "end_char": 19422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Vasbisitha, under Training as Naib Tahsildar, Gurgaon."}}, {"text": "Kamal Kumar_ Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kamal Kumar_ Gupta, under training as Naib Tahsildar, Rohtak.", "canonical_name": "Kamal Kumar Aggarwal Gupta"}}, {"text": "Hardhul Singh Bhole", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19541, "end_char": 19560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardhul Singh Bhole, under training as Naib Tahsildar, Mohindergarh.", "canonical_name": "Hardhul Singh Ichhpujani Bhole"}}, {"text": "Their appointment as Tahsildars will be governed by the Punjab Tahsildari Rules, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20135, "end_char": 20220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3.1.78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20794, "end_char": 20800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(emphas'is added)\n\nFrom Annexure A, it is clear that the date of the substantive r appointment of the petitioner cannot be before 3.1.78."}}, {"text": "Art. 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23078, "end_char": 23086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23094, "end_char": 23115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th October, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23123, "end_char": 23141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "352 of the Constitution of India on the 26th October, 1962 in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces (including the service as a Warrant Officer) during the period of the said Emergency or such other service as may hereafter be declared as military service for the purpose of these rules."}}, {"text": "Indian Armed Forces", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23851, "end_char": 23870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal of the rule quoted above shows that the Concession in seniority is admissible (i) in respect of military services rendered during the operation of emergency only and not for any military services after the termination of emergency and (ii) only if the service in the military is as \"enrolled or commissioned service in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces.\""}}, {"text": "July I, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23937, "end_char": 23949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July I, 1968 and again from 31.10.1968 to 22.9.1974 was not during the operation of emergency in question."}}, {"text": "31.10.1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23965, "end_char": 23975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The military service of the petitioner from January 11, 1962 to July I, 1968 and again from 31.10.1968 to 22.9.1974 was not during the operation of emergency in question."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24620, "end_char": 24628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "During this period the petitioner has been allowed the benefit of seniority under the Emergency Concession Rules", "statute": "During this period the petitioner has been allowed the benefit of seniority under the Emergency Concession Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24720, "end_char": 24728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "During this period the petitioner has been allowed the benefit of seniority under the Emergency Concession Rules", "statute": "During this period the petitioner has been allowed the benefit of seniority under the Emergency Concession Rules"}}, {"text": "29th April 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24966, "end_char": 24981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Randhir Singh Dhull, 'a' Class Tahsildar is allowed the benefit of service rendered by him in the Army during the National Emergency as an Emergency Commissioned Officer for the period from 29th April 1963 to 10th January, 1968 towards seniority and his seniority is fixed immediately below Shri Jaswant Singh Rajput among the 'A' class Tahsildars."}}, {"text": "10th January, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24985, "end_char": 25003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Randhir Singh Dhull, 'a' Class Tahsildar is allowed the benefit of service rendered by him in the Army during the National Emergency as an Emergency Commissioned Officer for the period from 29th April 1963 to 10th January, 1968 towards seniority and his seniority is fixed immediately below Shri Jaswant Singh Rajput among the 'A' class Tahsildars."}}, {"text": "Jaswant Singh Rajput", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25072, "end_char": 25092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Randhir Singh Dhull, 'a' Class Tahsildar is allowed the benefit of service rendered by him in the Army during the National Emergency as an Emergency Commissioned Officer for the period from 29th April 1963 to 10th January, 1968 towards seniority and his seniority is fixed immediately below Shri Jaswant Singh Rajput among the 'A' class Tahsildars."}}, {"text": "1.2.79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25420, "end_char": 25426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "475/-P. M. is 1.2.79."}}, {"text": "8.2.1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25518, "end_char": 25526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He will not be entitled to any arrears of pay as a result of the above fixation prior to 8.2.1978."}}, {"text": "Dhull", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25605, "end_char": 25610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above period of Army Service shall count for pension only after Shri Dhull has deposited the bonus or gratuity received by him from military authorities."}}, {"text": "13.9.74", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25895, "end_char": 25902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn fact none of them was accepted alongwith him by letter dated 13.9.74."}}, {"text": "K. Phool", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25988, "end_char": 25996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's further grievance is that the military service of the Captain K. Phool Singh, Captain Khem Singh Lathar, Shri Inder Singh, Captain A. R. Kohar and Captain B. K, Batra mentioned in para 8 of the petition have been counted for the benefit of their seniority etc."}}, {"text": "Khem Singh Lathar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26012, "end_char": 26029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's further grievance is that the military service of the Captain K. Phool Singh, Captain Khem Singh Lathar, Shri Inder Singh, Captain A. R. Kohar and Captain B. K, Batra mentioned in para 8 of the petition have been counted for the benefit of their seniority etc."}}, {"text": "Inder Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26036, "end_char": 26047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's further grievance is that the military service of the Captain K. Phool Singh, Captain Khem Singh Lathar, Shri Inder Singh, Captain A. R. Kohar and Captain B. K, Batra mentioned in para 8 of the petition have been counted for the benefit of their seniority etc.", "canonical_name": "Indraj Singh"}}, {"text": "A. R. Kohar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26057, "end_char": 26068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's further grievance is that the military service of the Captain K. Phool Singh, Captain Khem Singh Lathar, Shri Inder Singh, Captain A. R. Kohar and Captain B. K, Batra mentioned in para 8 of the petition have been counted for the benefit of their seniority etc."}}, {"text": "B. K, Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26081, "end_char": 26092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's further grievance is that the military service of the Captain K. Phool Singh, Captain Khem Singh Lathar, Shri Inder Singh, Captain A. R. Kohar and Captain B. K, Batra mentioned in para 8 of the petition have been counted for the benefit of their seniority etc."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26658, "end_char": 26673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26808, "end_char": 26814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhagat, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent, submitted that the Writ Petition was barred by res iudicata and in support of his subrr.ission he cited a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1970 S. C. 898."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_564_575_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "GANGA SARAN AND SONS PVT. LTD.\n\nCALCUTTA\n\nINCOME TAX OFFICER & ORS.\n\nApril 23, 1981\n\n[P.N. BHAGWATI, AND E.S. VENKATARAMlAH, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax Act 1961, S. 147-lncome Tax-Escaped assessment-Duty of assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that .vear-Meaning of.\n\nDirector in sole charge of management of business of assessee-Paid remuneration for services-Utilisation of the remuneration by director-Assessee whether under ob/i!{ation to .disclose to the Income Tax Officer in the course of its assessment.\n\nThe assessee was incorporated as a Private Limited Company in March, 1947 with G as its Managing Director and it took over the business of the trading company carried on by 'D' in Delhi. D was the brother-in-law of G and was placed in charge of the management of the business of the Delhi Branch of the assessee and he was paid a salary of Rs. JOOJ per month, commission at the rate of I per cent on the sales of the Delhi Branch and bonus equivalent to three months salary.\n\nThe assessments of the assessee for the years 1949-50 to 1959-60 were finalised on the b1Sis of the decisions of the Income-Tax Tribunal and the amounts paid to the Managing Director and the other Directors including D by way of salary, commission and bonus were allowed in full as permissible deductions and so was the interest paid on the credit balances in their respective accounts.\n\nOn the 28th March, 1968, the Income Tax Officer issued a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking to reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60 on the ground that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment at the time of the original assessment. The Income Tax Officer, however, did not state the reasons which had led to the belief that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment by reason of omis- £ion or failure to disclose material facts nor did he give any reasons though requested by the assessec.\n\nThe assessee's writ petition challenging the validity of the notice was allowed by a Single Judge and the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer was quaiihed. It was held that there was no omission or fa ii ure on the part of the\n\nGANGA SARAN V. I.T.O. 565\n\nassessee to disclose material facts relating to his assessment and that there A was no reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment at the time of the original assessment by reason of wrong allowance of the remuneration paid to D as a permissible deduction.\n\nThe Division Bench allowed the appeal, holding that the Income Tax Officer had reason to believe that the remuneration paid to D had been wrongly allowed as a permissible deduction by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts and the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer was justified.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : 1. (i) Neither of the two conditions necessary for attracting the applicability of Section 147(a), was satisfied. The notice issued by the Income C Tax Officer is therefore without jurisdiction. [574 G]\n\n(ii) It is not possible to sustain the conclusion that the assessee omitted or failed to disclose fully and truly any material facts relating to his assessment.\n\n[574 F]\n\n2. (i) Before the Income Tax Officer can assume jurisdiction to issue D notice under Section 147(a), two distinct conditions must be satisfied. First, he must have reason to believe that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment and secondly, he must have reason to believe that such escapement is by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. If either of these conditions is not fulfilled, the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer would be without Jurisdiction. [571 F] E\n\n(ii) The important words under Section 147(a) are \"has reason to believe\" and these words are stronger than the words \"is satisfied.\". The belief entertained by the Income Tax Officer must not be arbitrary or irrational. It must be reasonable or in other words it must be based on reasons which are relevant and material. The Court, cannot investigate into the adequacy or sufficiency of the reasons which have weighed with the Income Tax Officer, in coming to the belief, but the Court can examine whether the reasons are rele.vant and have a bearing on the matters in regard to which he is required to entertain the belief before he can issue notice under Section 147(a). If there is no rational and intelligible nexus between the reasons and the belief, so that, on such reasons, no one properly instructed on facts and law could reasonably entertain the belief, the conclusion would be inescapable that the Income Tax Officer could not have reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment and such escapement was by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and the notice issued by him would be liable to be struck down as invalid. [571 G-57.2 CJ\n\n3. Even a close relative who is in management and charge of a business on a full time basis is entitled to be paid rem.uneration and, in fact, it would be wholly unreasonable to expect him to work free of charge. [573 Cl\n\nIn the instant case D was the brother-in-law of G the Managing Director of the assessee but this circumstance cannot lead to an inference that the payment of remuneration to D who was solely managing and looking after the business of the Delhi Bench of the assessee was sham and bogus. There is nothing unusual in D giving a loan to his brother-in-law, the Managing Director or making gifts to the son, wife and daughter-in-law of the Managing Director who were his close relatives. Any inference that the payment of remuneration to D was sham and bogus cannot be drawn merely from the manner in which he expended the amount of remuneration received by him, particularly when the persons to whom he gave a loan and made gifts were his close relatives.\n\n( 573 E-574 BJ\n\n4. The statements of account of D with the assessee for the relevant accounting year as also the previous years were with the Income Tax Officer at the time of the original assessment and these statements of account clearly showed that out of the amount of remuneration credited to his account, he had made gifts to the sons of G on 31st July, 1957 and given a loan to G on the 25th August, 1958 and the Income Tax Officer was fully aware that G was the Managing Director of the assessee. The assessee could not therefore be said to be under an obligation to disclose to the Income Tax Officer in the course of its assessment as to how the director who was in sole charge of the management of the business of the assessee, and who was being paid remuneration for the services rendered by him to the assessee, had utilised the amount of remuneration received by him. [574 C-F] ..\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1146 of 1973.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the !st, June 1972 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 150 of 1971 arising out of Matter No. 262 of 1968.\n\nDebi Pal, A.K. Verma and K.J. John for the Appellant.\n\nV.S. Desai, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhash:\"ni for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This appeal by certificate is directed against an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta allowing an appeal against a decision of a Single Judge which quashed and set aside a notice dated 28th March 1968 issued by the Income Tax Officer under section 148 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking to reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal are a little important and they may be briefly stated as follows.\n\nPrior to March 1947, one Deo Datt Sharma carried on business in Delhi in the name of Sharma Trading Company. The business was quite a prosperous one and the record shows that Deo Datt Sharma was making an average profit of about Rs. 36,000 per year.\n\nIn March 1947, the assessee was incoroporated as a private limited company with Ganga Saran Sharma as its managing director and it took over the business of Sharma Trading Company as a going concern in consideration of allotment of 1703 shares in the share capital of the assessee to Deo Datt Shrama. The share capital of the assessee consisted of 8500 shares out of which 1703 shares were allotted to Deo Datt Sharma, ~5 shares were held by Ganga Saran Sharma and 3500 shares, by a company called Narendra Trading Company controlled by Ganga Saran Sharma and his wife. It may be pointed out at this stage that Deo Datt Sharma was the brother-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma. When business of Deo Datt Sharma was taken over by the assessee, Deo Datt Sharma was appointed Director of the assessee along with two other persons.\n\nDeo Datt Sharma was placed in charge of management of the business of Delhi Branch of the assessee and\n\n0he was paid a salary of Rs. 1000 per month, commission at the rate of I per cent on the sales of the Delhi Branch and bonus equivalent to three months' salary. Ganga Saran Sharma .and the other two directors were also paid salary, commission and bonus but it is not necessary to set out the quantum of the emoluments paid to them, because in this appeal we are concerned only with the emoluments paid to Deo Datt Sharma and not with the emoluments paid to other directors.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer while assessing the assessee to tax for the assessment year 1949-50 disallowed the claim of the assessee for deduction in respect of payments made to the managing director and other directors on account of commission and bonus. On appeal by the assessee the Appellate Assistant Comviissioner disagreed with the view taken by the Income Tax Officer and allowed the entire amount paid to the managing director and other directors by way of commission and bonus.\n\nSo far as Deo Datt Sharma is concerned, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner observed that having regard to the fact that this very business was carried on by Deo Datt Sharma prior to its taking over by the assessee and it was a prosperous business earning on an average ab:lut Rs. 36,000 per ye!lr and after taking over of the business by the assessee, Deo Datt Sharma continued to be in sole management of the\n\n568 SUPREME COURT REPO!lTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R\n\nbusiness of the Delhi Branch, the aggregate amount paid to him could not at all be regarded as excessive and was allowable as a permissible deduction.\n\nThus the entire amount paid by the assessee to the managing director and other directors was allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as a deduction in computing the taxable income of the assessee.\n\nThe assessee had thereafter n 0 difficulty in claiming deduction of the amount paid to the managing director and other directors on account of salary, commission and bonus, but again in the assessment year 1956-57, the Income Tax Officer disallowed a substantial portion of the remuneration paid to the managing director and the assessment made by the Income Tax Officer was confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and in further appeal by the Income Tax Tribunal.\n\nThis led to the making of a reference and the High Court answered the question referred to it in favour of the assessee and held that the disallowance of a portion of the remuneration paid to the managing director was not justified. While making the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58, the Income Tax Officer once again disallowed a part of the remuneration paid to the managing director as also the amounts of interest paid to the directors on the balances lying to the credit of their respective accounts with the assessee on account of undrawn remuneration.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal held that the interest paid to the directors on the balances lying to the credit o( their respective accounts was an allowable expenditure but he sustained the disal!owance of a portion of the remuneration paid to the managing director. The assessee thereupon preferred a further appeal to the Tribunal and after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the remuneration paid to the managing director as also to the other directors was not at all excessive and no portion of it could justifiably be disallowed. The result was that not only was the remuneration paid to the managing director and the other directors allowed in full as a permissible deduction but also the amount of interest paid on the credit balances in their respective accounts was allowed to be deducted as a permissible expenditure. Obviously, and this could not be disputed on behalf of the Revenue, the accounts of the managing .director and other directors including Deo Datt Sharma showing the amount of remuneration credited and the withdrawals debited in each year were produced before the Income Tax Officer and he was aware that only a very small amount was withdrawn by Deo Datt Sharma out of the remuneration credited in his account~ The\n\nGA)IGA SARAJ\\I v. l.T.O. (Bhagwati, J.) 569\n\nrecord also shows that on a querry made by the Income Tax Officer the assessee furnished inter alia the assessment file number of Deo Datt Sharma who was being assessed in Delhi. The assessment for the assessment year 1958-59 also followed the same course upto the stage of appeal before the Income Tax Tribunal and ultimately the amount of interest paid to the directors on the credit balances in their respective accounts was allowed as a permissible deduction to the assessee.\n\nThe assessment of the assessee for the subsequent year 1959-60 was thereafter completed on the basis of the decision of the Income Tax Tribunal for the two earlier assessment years and the amounts paid to the managing director and other directors including Deo Datt Sharama by way of salary, comission and bonus were allowed in full as permissible deductions and so was the interest paid on the credit balances in their respective accounts. ·\n\nOn 28th March, 1968 the Income Tax Officer issued a notice under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking to reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60 on the ground that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment at the time of the original assessment.\n\nSince a period of four years had already elapsed from the close of the assessment year 1959-60 and no notice could be issued under section 147 (b), it was obvious that the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer was based on section 147 (a), and it could be justified only if it could be shown that the Income Tax Officer had reason to believe that, by reason of omission or failure on the part of assessee to disclose any material facts, the income of the assessee had escaped assessment.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer however did not indicate in the notice as to what were the reasons which had led hi111 to believe that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure to disclose material facts nor did he give any reasons though requested by the assessee to do so. The assessee thereupon preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the validity of the notice on the ground that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose any material facts at the time of the original assessment and that in 11.ny event, there was no reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment by reason of such omission or failure.\n\nThe writ petition was admitted and rule was issued by a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. The Income Tax Officer, possibly on service of the rule, addressed a letter dated 19th June 1968 to the assessee stating that\n\nA the notice was issued by him because he had reason to believe that the payment of remuneration to Deo Datt Sharma was bogus and false.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer also stated in the affidavit filed by him in reply to the writ petition that after the assessment of the assessee was completed for the assessment years upto 1963-64, the Income Tax Officer came to learn that Deo Datt Sharma was the B brother-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma, managing director and that Deo Datt Sharma had disposed of the income received by him by way of remuneration from the assessee, in the following manner :\n\nI. On 31st July 1957 he made a gift to\n\nShri Narendra Sharma son of Shri Ganga Saran Sharma, Managing Director of the Company.\n\nRs. 12,550.00\n\nOn 25th August 1958 he made a loan to Ganga Saran Sharma.\n\nRs. 2,25,000.00\n\nTotal 2,37,550.00\n\nand thereafter, out of the amount lying to his credit in the account with the assessee, he had made the following gifts :\n\nOn 5th December 1960 gift to Brahma Devi wife of Ganga Saran Sharma Rs. 1,0l,101.00\n\nOn 21st December 1960 gift to lndu Sharma daughter-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma Rs. 15,101.00\n\nOn 26th December 1961 gift to Hemlata Sharma daughter-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma.\n\nRs. 50,101.00\n\nThe Income Tax Officer stated that out of the total amount of remuneration of Rs. 3,51,000 received by Deo Datt Sharma during the period upto 31st March 1962, he had paid tax in the sum of about Rs. 65,000/- and spent a total sum of Rs. 2,37,550 on account of gifts and loan as aforesaid and the withdrawals made by him for his own purposes thus did not amount to more than Rs. 4000 per year. These facts, according to lhe Income Tax Officer, showed\n\nthat the remuneration paid to Deo Datt Sharma was not genuine and was sham and bogus and the amount of such remuneration alleged to have been paid to Deo Datt Sharma was wrongly allowed as a permissible deduction and hence the assessment of the assessee was liable to be reopened by issue of a notice under section 147 (a).\n\nThe learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court who heard the writ petition took the view that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose any material facts relating to 'his assessment and that in any event; there was no reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment at the time of the original assessment by reason of wrong allowance of the remuneration paid to Deo Datt Sharma as a permissible deduction.\n\nThe writ petition was accordingly allowed by him and the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer was quashed and set aside. The Income Tax Officer thereupon preferred an appeal before a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench allowed the appeal, holding that the Income Tax Officer had reason to believe that the amount of remuneration paid to Deo Datt Sharma had been wrongly allowed as a permissible deduction by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts set out above and the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer was justified. The assessee thereupon preferred the present appeal in this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness from the High Court of Calcutta.\n\nIt is well settled as a result of several decisions of this Court that two distinct conditions must be satisfied before the Income Tax Officer can assume jurisdiction to issue notice under section 147 (a).\n\nFirst, he must have reason to believe that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment and secondly, he must have reason to believe that such escapement is by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. If either of these conditions is not fulfilled, the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer would be without jurisdiction. The important words under section 147 (a) are \"has reason to believe\" and these words are stronger than the words \"is satisfied\".\n\nThe belief entertained by the Income Tax Officer must not be arbitrary or irrational. It must be reasonable or in other words it must be based on reasons which are relevant and material. The Court, of course, cannot investigate into the adequacy or sufficiency of the reasons which\n\nhave weighed with the Income Tax Officer in coming to the belief, but the Court can certainly examine whether the reasons are relevant and have a bearing on the matters in regard to which he is required to entertain the belief before he can issue notice under section 147 (a).\n\nIt there is no rational and intelligible nexus between the reasons and the belief, so that, on such reasons, no one properly instructed on facts and law could reasonably entertain the belief, the conclusion would be inescapable that the Income Tax Officer could not have reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment and such escapement was by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and the notice issued by him would be .liable to he struck down as invalid.\n\nNow here on the facts as admitted or found it is clear that Deo Datt Sharma was carrying on the same business prior to the incorporation of the assessee as a private limited company and this business was yielding him an average profit of about Rs. 36000 per year.\n\nWhen the assessee, on incorporation, took over the business as a going concern from Deo Datt Sharma it appointed Deo Datt Sharma as a director and placed him in sole charge of the management of the Delhi Branch of the business. In fact, it could not be disputed on behalf of the Revenue that Deo Datt Sharma was looking after the business of the Delhi Branch of the assessee in the same manner in which he was doing when he was sole proprietor of the business and for this work done by him, Deo Datt Sharma\n\nwas paid salary at the rate of Rs. 1000 per month, commission at the rate of one per cent on the sales of the Delhi Branch and bonus equivalent of three months' salary. The amount of remuneration paid to Deo Datt Sharma was thus not without consideratfon; in fact, it was paid for valuable services rendered by Deo Datt Sharma\n\nin solely managing the business of the Delhi Branch of the assessee.\n\nNow once it is conceded that Deo Datt Sharma was in sole charge and management of the business of the Delhi Branch of the assessee and was rendering full time service to the assessee in that capacity, it is difficult to see ho~ any one could reasonably come to the belief that the payment of remuneration made to him was sham and bogus. Surely, the Income Tax Officer could not expect Deo Datt\n\nSharma to devote his full time and energy to the business of the Delhi Branch of the assessee without any remuneration whatsoever.\n\nThe actual remuneration paid to Deo Datt Sharma was in fact found to be genuine and reasonable by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner\n\n\nwhile disposing of the appeal of the assessee for the assessment year 1949-50 as also by the Income Tax Tribunal while disposing of the appeal for the assessment year 1957-58. It is true that Deo Datt Sharma was the brother-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma, the managing director of the assessee, but this circumstance cannot by any stretch of imagination lead to an inference that the payment of remuneration to Deo Datt Sharma who was solely managing and looking after the business of the Delhi Branch of the assessee was sham and bogus. Even a close relative who is in management and charge of a business on a full time basis is entitled to be paid remuneration and, in fact, it would be wholly unreasonable to expect him to work free of charge.\n\nThe Revenue, however, relied strongly on the fact that out of the total amount of remuneration of Rs. 3,51,000 received by Deo Datt Sharma and credited to his account with the assessee, he had not withdrawn more than Rs. 4,000 per year for himself and an aggregate sum of Rs. 2,37,550 was expended by him in giving a loan to Ganga Saran Sharma and making gifts to the son, wife and daughters-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma on diverse dates between 31st July, 1957 and 26th December 1961. We fail to see how this fact can lend itself to the inference that the payment of remuneration to Deo Datt Sharma was bogus and not genuine.\n\nIt is an admitted fact that Deo Datt Sharma was the brother-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma and there is nothing unusual in Deo Datt Sharma giving a loan to Ganga Saran Sharma or making gift to the son, wife and daughters-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma who were his close relatives. It is indeed difficult to appreciate how any inference can reasonably be drawn that the payment of remuneration to Deo Datt Sharma was sham and bogus merely from the manner in which he expended the amount of remuneration received by him, particularly when the persons to whom he gave a loan and made gifts were his close relatives. It is possible that Deo Datt Sharma had other financial resources apart from the remuneration derived by him from the assessee and he therefore decided to give a loan and make gifts to his close _relatives out of the remuneration received by him for valuable services rendered to the assessee.\n\nIn fact, if he had no other financial resources, it is extremely difficult - one might say, almost impossible-to believe that he worked for the assessee and managed and looked after the business of the Delhi Branch on a full time basis without any remuneration or in any event on a\n\npaltry remuneration of Rs. 4,000 per year when the managing director and other directors who were working like him were getting much more from the assessee and as the proprietor of the business prior to its taking over by the assessee, he was earning an average profit of about Rs. 36,000/- per year.\n\nWe are clearly of the view that on these facts the Income Tax Officer could have no reason to believe that the payment of remuneration to Deo Datt Sharma was sham and bogus and that the amount of remuneration paid to him was wrongly allowed as a permissible deduction.\n\nWe may point out that, in fact, the statement of account of Deo Datt Sharma with the assessee for the relevant accounting year as also the previous years were with the Income Tax Officer at the time of the original assessment and these statements of account clearly showed that out of the amount of remuneration credited to his account, he had made a gift of Rs. 12,550 to the son of Ganga Saran Sharma on 31st July 1957 and given a loan of Rs.2,25,000 to Ganga Saran Sharma on 25th August, 1958 and the Income Tax\n\nOfficer was fully aware that Ganga Saran Sharma was the managing director of the assessee. It is possible and we may assume it in favour of the Revenue, that the subsequent gifts made by Deo Datt\n\nSharma to the wife and daughters-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma were not disclosed to the Income Tax Officer at the time of the original assessment, but these gifts being subsequent to the relevant accounting year, the assessee was not bound to disclose the same to the Income Tax Officer.\n\nMoreover, it is difficult to appreciate how tle assessee could be said to be under an obligation to disclose to the Income Tax Officer in the course of its assessment as to how a director who was in sole charge of the management of the business of the assessee and who was being paid remuneration for the services rendered by him to assessee, had utilised the amount of remuneration received by bim.\n\nWe do not think it possible to sustain the conclusion that the assessee omitted or failed to disclose fully and truly any material facts relating to his assessment.\n\nWe must in the circumstances hold that neither of the two conditions necessary for attracting the applicability of section l 47{a) was satisfied in the present case and the notice issued by the Income Tax Office.r must be held to be without jurisdiction.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bnch and restore that of the learned single Judge quashing\n\n--y\n\nGANGA SARAN v. l.T.O.(Bhagwa(i, J.) 575\n\nand setting aside the notice dated 28th March 1968 issued by the A Income Tax Officer against the assessee.\n\nThe Revenue will pay the costs of the assessee throughout.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "GANGA SARAN AND SONS PVT. LTD.\n\nCALCUTTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GANGA SARAN SONS PVT. LTD. CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INCOME TAX OFFICER & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INCOME TAX OFFICER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 23, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 23, 1981\n\n[P.N. BHAGWATI, AND E.S. VENKATARAMlAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 735, "end_char": 740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee was incorporated as a Private Limited Company in March, 1947 with G as its Managing Director and it took over the business of the trading company carried on by 'D' in Delhi."}}, {"text": "28th March, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1426, "end_char": 1442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th March, 1968, the Income Tax Officer issued a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking to reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60 on the ground that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment at the time of the original assessment."}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1489, "end_char": 1500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1508, "end_char": 1528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3007, "end_char": 3021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3384, "end_char": 3398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3912, "end_char": 3926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4539, "end_char": 4553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st July, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statements of account of D with the assessee for the relevant accounting year as also the previous years were with the Income Tax Officer at the time of the original assessment and these statements of account clearly showed that out of the amount of remuneration credited to his account, he had made gifts to the sons of G on 31st July, 1957 and given a loan to G on the 25th August, 1958 and the Income Tax Officer was fully aware that G was the Managing Director of the assessee."}}, {"text": "25th August, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statements of account of D with the assessee for the relevant accounting year as also the previous years were with the Income Tax Officer at the time of the original assessment and these statements of account clearly showed that out of the amount of remuneration credited to his account, he had made gifts to the sons of G on 31st July, 1957 and given a loan to G on the 25th August, 1958 and the Income Tax Officer was fully aware that G was the Managing Director of the assessee."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7132, "end_char": 7151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st, June 1972 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A.K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debi Pal, A.K. Verma and K.J. John for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K.J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7243, "end_char": 7252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debi Pal, A.K. Verma and K.J. John for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V.S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7273, "end_char": 7283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhash:\"ni for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Champat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhash:\"ni for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhash:\"ni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7306, "end_char": 7320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhash:\"ni for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7387, "end_char": 7395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This appeal by certificate is directed against an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta allowing an appeal against a decision of a Single Judge which quashed and set aside a notice dated 28th March 1968 issued by the Income Tax Officer under section 148 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking to reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60."}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7667, "end_char": 7678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7686, "end_char": 7713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Deo Datt Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7925, "end_char": 7940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to March 1947, one Deo Datt Sharma carried on business in Delhi in the name of Sharma Trading Company.", "canonical_name": "Deo Datt Sharama"}}, {"text": "Sharma Trading Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7985, "end_char": 8007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to March 1947, one Deo Datt Sharma carried on business in Delhi in the name of Sharma Trading Company."}}, {"text": "Ganga Saran Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8231, "end_char": 8249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In March 1947, the assessee was incoroporated as a private limited company with Ganga Saran Sharma as its managing director and it took over the business of Sharma Trading Company as a going concern in consideration of allotment of 1703 shares in the share capital of the assessee to Deo Datt Shrama."}}, {"text": "Deo Datt Shrama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8435, "end_char": 8450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In March 1947, the assessee was incoroporated as a private limited company with Ganga Saran Sharma as its managing director and it took over the business of Sharma Trading Company as a going concern in consideration of allotment of 1703 shares in the share capital of the assessee to Deo Datt Shrama.", "canonical_name": "Deo Datt Sharama"}}, {"text": "Narendra Trading Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8649, "end_char": 8673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share capital of the assessee consisted of 8500 shares out of which 1703 shares were allotted to Deo Datt Sharma, ~5 shares were held by Ganga Saran Sharma and 3500 shares, by a company called Narendra Trading Company controlled by Ganga Saran Sharma and his wife."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11317, "end_char": 11336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee had thereafter n 0 difficulty in claiming deduction of the amount paid to the managing director and other directors on account of salary, commission and bonus, but again in the assessment year 1956-57, the Income Tax Officer disallowed a substantial portion of the remuneration paid to the managing director and the assessment made by the Income Tax Officer was confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and in further appeal by the Income Tax Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Deo Datt Sharama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14016, "end_char": 14032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessment of the assessee for the subsequent year 1959-60 was thereafter completed on the basis of the decision of the Income Tax Tribunal for the two earlier assessment years and the amounts paid to the managing director and other directors including Deo Datt Sharama by way of salary, comission and bonus were allowed in full as permissible deductions and so was the interest paid on the credit balances in their respective accounts. ·", "canonical_name": "Deo Datt Sharama"}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14268, "end_char": 14279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14287, "end_char": 14307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14630, "end_char": 14641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14724, "end_char": 14735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15353, "end_char": 15375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee thereupon preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the validity of the notice on the ground that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose any material facts at the time of the original assessment and that in 11.ny event, there was no reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment by reason of such omission or failure."}}, {"text": "31st July 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16547, "end_char": 16561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Officer also stated in the affidavit filed by him in reply to the writ petition that after the assessment of the assessee was completed for the assessment years upto 1963-64, the Income Tax Officer came to learn that Deo Datt Sharma was the B brother-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma, managing director and that Deo Datt Sharma had disposed of the income received by him by way of remuneration from the assessee, in the following manner :\n\nI. On 31st July 1957 he made a gift to\n\nShri Narendra Sharma son of Shri Ganga Saran Sharma, Managing Director of the Company."}}, {"text": "Narendra Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16586, "end_char": 16601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Officer also stated in the affidavit filed by him in reply to the writ petition that after the assessment of the assessee was completed for the assessment years upto 1963-64, the Income Tax Officer came to learn that Deo Datt Sharma was the B brother-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma, managing director and that Deo Datt Sharma had disposed of the income received by him by way of remuneration from the assessee, in the following manner :\n\nI. On 31st July 1957 he made a gift to\n\nShri Narendra Sharma son of Shri Ganga Saran Sharma, Managing Director of the Company."}}, {"text": "Brahma Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16931, "end_char": 16942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,25,000.00\n\nTotal 2,37,550.00\n\nand thereafter, out of the amount lying to his credit in the account with the assessee, he had made the following gifts :\n\nOn 5th December 1960 gift to Brahma Devi wife of Ganga Saran Sharma Rs."}}, {"text": "lndu Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17017, "end_char": 17028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,0l,101.00\n\nOn 21st December 1960 gift to lndu Sharma daughter-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma Rs."}}, {"text": "Hemlata Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17112, "end_char": 17126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,101.00\n\nOn 26th December 1961 gift to Hemlata Sharma daughter-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma."}}, {"text": "31st March 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17324, "end_char": 17339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,51,000 received by Deo Datt Sharma during the period upto 31st March 1962, he had paid tax in the sum of about Rs."}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17940, "end_char": 17951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19407, "end_char": 19418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19878, "end_char": 19889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20526, "end_char": 20537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deo Datt\n\nSharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22669, "end_char": 22685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surely, the Income Tax Officer could not expect Deo Datt\n\nSharma to devote his full time and energy to the business of the Delhi Branch of the assessee without any remuneration whatsoever.", "canonical_name": "Deo Datt Sharama"}}, {"text": "26th December 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24160, "end_char": 24178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,37,550 was expended by him in giving a loan to Ganga Saran Sharma and making gifts to the son, wife and daughters-in-law of Ganga Saran Sharma on diverse dates between 31st July, 1957 and 26th December 1961."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_576_589_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY & ORS.\n\nPRAYAG DASS AGARWAL\n\nApril 23, 1981\n\n[ R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nEstate Duty Act, 1953-Section 52, scope of-Whether under section 52 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the Central Government is bound to accept in satisfaction of the whole or any part of the duty payable under the Act at such price as C may be agreed upon between the Central Government and the person accountable for estate duty any property passing on the death of the deceased when an application is made for that purpose by such person.\n\nOn the death of his father which took place on September 29, 1964 the respondent filed a statement of account under the Estate Duty Act of the estate passing on the:death of the deceased. The estate duty payable in respect of the estate in question was determined at Rs. 3,37,543.40 by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Allahabad, by his order dated November 30, 1970. When the appeal filed against the said order was still pending, the respondent made an application under section 52(1) of the Act on February 16, 1971 to the Central Board of Direct Taxes offering one of the items of property passing on the death of the deceased, namely, premises No. 1, Phaphamau Road, Allahabad, whose principal value had been determined at fRs. 2,53,625 in part payment of the balance of estate duty which was still payable by him under the order of assessment. The said offer was not accepted by the Central Board of Direct Taxes but the appellant hernin wrote to the respondent stating that the respondent could pay the 'arrears of estate duty payable by him in monthly instalments of Rs. '10,000 each beginning from October 29, 1971 subject to payment of interest @ 9% per annum on the arrears outstanding. Thereupon the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad requesting the High Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India to consider the application made by him under section 52(1) on its merits, to negotiate and settle the price of the property offered by him in settlement of part of duty payable by him and to give credit to the extent of the price so determined under the Act.\n\nThe High Court held that if the accountable person exercised the option to pay the estate duty by transferring property, the Central Government could not refuse to accept the offer and insist upon payment by another mode when there was agreement about the price between it and the accountable person. The High Court, however, held that it was not necessary to decide the question whether it was open to the Central Government to refuse the offer of property on a ground other than the price as the impugned order had not disclosed any reason at all for rejecting the offer. Accordingly, the High Court directed the respondents before it to dispose of the application afresh in accordance with law.\n\nHence the appeal after obtaining special leave of the Court.\n\nAffirming the High Courfs directions, the Court\n\nASTT. CONTROLER ESTATE V. PRAYAG DASS 577\n\nHELD; 1:1.\n\nWhat section 52(1) of the Estate Duty Act does is to set forth one more mode in which estate duty may be recovered. It is a provision made specially for the recovery of estate duty. It enables the Government to recover the duty in accordance with that mode. The other statutory modes prescribed under section 51 and specified in the Rules are those where recourse by the accountable obliges the Revenue to accept the payment made in any of those modes and to treat it, by compulsion of statute, as satisfaction of the dues.\n\nThe peculiarity of the mode provided under section 52(1) is that while recourse to it by the accountable person does not automatically imply satisfaction of the dues, there is the duty cast on the Revenue to consider the application by the accountable person offering an item of property as a mode for satisfying the dues. The Government must consider the application on its merits and in the exercise of sound administrative judgment. [587 F-H, 588 A]\n\n1:2. Ordinarily in every contract for the purchase of property there are two stages. (il In the first stage, there is complete freedom to l'the parties to decide whether one should enter into negotiations with the other at all and in that regard the law takes no account of the reason of any party for not choosing to entertain the proposal for sale made by the other however arbitrary, illogical or irrelevant the reason may be. (ii) The second stage follows the entertaining of the proposal and the actual negotiations between the parties which may or may not fructify in a contract. Section 52(1) is concerned with the first stage, and differs in this from the complete freedom to entertain the proposal in that the proposal made under section 52(1) by the accountable' person must be considered by the Central Government and any decision taken by it on that question must proceed on considerations which are relevant and bonafide. The price of the property is, however, left to be determined by agreement in the event of the Government deciding to accept the offer made by the accountable person.\n\nThis forms part of the second stage. [588 A-DJ\n\n1 :3.\n\nThe Estate Duty Act is a fiscal statute principally intended to levy and collect estate duty which when coilected has to be disbursed in accordance with Part XU of the Constitution. It is not a law providing for acquisition of a property forming part of the estate of the deceased. Section 52 is in the nature of an enabling provision which authorises the Central Government to accept a property in lieu of estate duty payable subject to the conditions mentioned in it. It is true that even enabling words in a statute which confer a discretionary power may have to be interpreted as compulsory where they amount to words clearly intended to effectuate a legal right.\n\nBut ordinarily such words are permissive only. [585 F, 586 C-D)\n\nIn the instant case, the very fact that there is a need for an agreement upon the price of the property between the Central Government and the accountable person makes the power of the Central Government under section 52(1) of the Act discretionary and permissive. Any other meaning may lead to impractical and incongruous result. [586 D-E)\n\nI ;4. On a plain construction of section 52 of the Act the Central Government may at its discretion either accept th' property offered under section 52 or may not if the circumstances so wa_rrant. The accountable person cannot claim\n\nA that the Central Government is bound to accept such property. The power of the Central Government under section 52 is purely administrative and discretionary.\n\nTherefore, the said power should be exercised subject to the same limitations which govern all such administrative and discretionary powers. The Central Government or the authority which is competent to take a decision should exercise its discretion bonafide and in good faith by addressing itself to the matter before it and should not allow itself to be influenced by extraneous and B irrelevant considerations. The question should not be disposed of in an arbitrary or capricious way. In this case, the Court can only ask the authority concerned to exercise the discretion vested in it but it cannot be asked to exercise it in a particular way. [587 A-B, D-F]\n\nChe/la Rama Bhupal Reddy v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Anr., [1977) 108 I.T.R. 695 Andhra Pradesh, approved.\n\n2. In the instant case, the High Court was right in holding that it had not been shown that the competent authority had properly exercised its discretion.\n\nThe Board proceeded on the assumption that its discretion was unfettered even by considerations relevant to administrative law and did not probe into the question of the availability of liquid cash in the hands of the respondent to pay tee estate duty and the averment of the respondent that the entire liquid cash had been invested in business. [588 E, H, 589 A] ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. !843 of 1974.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated . the 6th September, 1972 of the Allahabad High Court iu Civil Misc .\n\n. E Writ No. 27 of 1972.\n\nS.C. Manchanda, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants.\n\nPramod Swarup for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal by special kave is whether under section 52 of the Estate Duty Act, 19 53 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the Central Government is bound to accept in satisfaction of the whole or any part of the duty payable under the Act at such price as may be agreed upon between the Central Government and the person accountable for estate duty any property passing on the death of the deceased when an application is made for that purpose by such person.\n\nOn the death of Lala Beni Madho Agarwal which took place on September 29,1964 his son Prayag Dass Agarwal, the respondent\n\nherein filed a statement of account under the Act of the estate passing on the death of the deceased. The estate duty payable in respect of the estate in question was determined at Rs. 3,37,543.40 by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Allahabad by his order dated November 30, 1970. When the appeal filed against the said order was still pendi.ng, the respondent made an application under section 52(1) ofthe Act on February 15, 1971 to the Central Board of Direct Taxes offering one of the items of property passing on the death of the deceased, namely premises No. l, phaphamau Road, Allahabad, whose principal value had been determined by the Assistant Controller at Rs. 2,53,655 in part payment of the balance of estate duty which was still payable by him under the order of assessment.\n\nThe said application elicited a cryptic reply dated September 16, 1971 from the Under Secretary of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, the relevant part of which read as follows :-\n\n•;1 am directed to refer to your petition dated 16.2.1971 on the subject mentioned above and to say that your offer is not acceptable.\" , /\n\nThe Assistant Controller, however, wrote to the respondent on October 21,1971 stating that the respondent could pay the arrears of estate duty payable by him in monthly instalments of Rs. 10,000 each beginning from October 29, 1971 subject to payment of interest @ 9% per annum on the arrears outstanding.\n\nThereupon the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court . of Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Assistant Controller, the Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Union of India requesting the High Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India to consider the application made by him under section 52(1) on its merits, to negotiate and se.ttle the.price of the property offered by him in settlement of part of duty payable by him and to give credit to the extent of the price so determined under the Act. The respondent contended inter alia that section 52 of the Act conferred a right on an accountable per.ion, if he chose to do so, to offer an item of property passing on the death of the deceased in respect of whose estate, duty was payable under the Act in discharge of the whole or part of such duty and that it imposed a reciprocal obligation on the Central Government to accept such property and-. adjust its price as may be agreed upon between the Central Government and the accountable person towards the duty payable. He further contended that the Central Government had no right to reflise to accept the offer so made by the accountable person and that he\n\n•..\n\nhaving made the offer to pay the duty by transfer of the property in question he could not be compelled to pay the duty to the extent of its price.\n\nHe, therefore prayed for the issue of appropriate direction -~ to the Central Government to comply with section 52 of the Act 1 accordingly.\n\nOn behalf of the Union Government it was inter alia urged that it was not bound to accept an offer made under section 52(1) of any property and it was within the discretion of the Union Government to reject the offer.\n\nThe High Court held that if the accountable person exercised the option to pay the estate duty by transferring property, the Central Government could not refuse to accept the offer and insist upon payment by another mode when there was agreement about the price between it and the accountable person. It, however, held that it was not necessary to decide the question whether it was open to the Central Government to refuse the offer of property on a ground other than the price as the impugned order had not disclosed any reason at all for rejecting the offer.\n\nAccordingly the High Court directed the Union Government and the Central Board of Direct Taxes to dispose of the application of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law. This appeal is filed against the said decision of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nSection 5(1) of the Act provides that in the case of every person dying after the commencement of the Act there shall, save as expressly provided in the Act, be levied and paid upon the principal value ascertained as per the relevant provisions of the Act of all property, settled or not settled, including agricultural land situate in the territories which immediately before November 1, 1956 were comprised in the States in the First Schedule to the Act which passes on the death of such person, a duty called 'estate duty' at the rates fixed in accordance with section 35 of the Act. The rates of estate duty are set out in the Second Schedule to fie Act. The principal value of the property liable for estate duty has to be ascertained in accordance with the provisions in Part V of the Act. The estate duty levied under the Act can be collected as per provisions in Part VII of the Act.\n\nSection 51 of the Act states that estate duty may be collected by such means and in such manner as the Central Board of Direct Taxes may prescribe. Rule 18 of the Estate Duty Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') made by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of\n\nysection 85 of the Act deals with payment of estate duty. That Rule provides inter alia that payment of any duty may be made by delivery of a cheque on a scheduled bank or by a bank draft issued by a scheduled bank or by depositing the amount of duty in the Government Treasury or by adjustment of any refund of income-tax, excess profits tax, business profits tax or excess profits tax deposit.\n\nSection 52 of the Act as it was originally enacted provided that the Board might prescribe that Government securities could be accepted in payment of estate duty on such items as it thought fit.\n\nWhen it was suggested that a provision corresponding to section 56(1) of the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 as it stood at the time when the Act was enacted could be introduced into the Act, it was not accepted by the Indian Finance Minister. Section 49 of the British Finance Act 1946 (9 & IO Geo 6 C. 64) provided that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue could accept any property under -section 56-of the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 in satisfaction or part satisfaction of any estate duty and amendedthe latter Act accordingly. Section 56(1) of British Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910 which was again amended by the British Finance Act of 1949 read thus:\n\n\"56(1) The Commissioners may, if they think fit, on the application of any person liable to pay estate duty or settlement estate duty accept in satisfaction of the whole or any\n\npart of such duty any such real (including leasehold) property E as may be agreed upon between the Commissoners and that person.''\n\nThe legal position in the United Kingdom as it existed in 1965 in so far as transfer of real and leasehold property in payment of estate duty is concerned 'is summarized in Dymond's Death Duties (14th Editii>n) at pages 720-721 th us :\n\n\"D-Transfer of Property in Payment of Duty : -\n\n(1) Real and leasehold property:-\n\nBys. 56(1) of the Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910, as extended and amended by s. 49 of the Finance Act, 1946 (which applies to deaths at any time) and the Finance Act, 1946 (which applies to deaths at any time) and the Finance Act, 1949, Sched. XI, Pt. IV the Commsisioner's may, if they think fit, on the application of any person liable to pay any Death Duties, accept in satisfaction of the\n\nwhole or part of such duty any such real (including leasehold) property as may be agreed upon between the Commissioners and the accountable person.\n\nThe Commissioners have the right to accept foreign real or leashold property, but they are scarcely likely to do so.\n\nThe property accepted need not itself be liable to duty. It may be accepted in satisfaction of duty on any property, real or personal. No Stamp Duty is to be payable on the transfer of such property (Finance 1909-10) Act, 1910, s. 56(2). The disposition of any property accepted by the Commissioners is provided for by ss. 50 and 51 of the Finance Act, 1946, under which the Treasury may direct that the land be transferred direct to a body of persons (e.g. the National Trust) or to trustees for such a body, etc,. instead of to the Commissioners, and the duty receivable by the latter may be paid out of the National Land Fund established by s. 48 of the Act. It is within the discretion of the Commissioners whether they will accept property under this provision, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget statement for 1946 said that he expected the power (which hitherto had not in practice been used) to operate on a substantial scale in the future : it is understood that seventy properties had been taken over up to the 31st March, 1963.\n\nHe referred also to the National Trust and the Youth Hostels Association as examples of the bodies not established for profit, and having for their object \"the provision, improvement or preservation of amenities enjoyed, or to be enjoyed, by the public or the acquisition of Ian ' 1\n\nc, 2 used by the public\" to which the land may be L.:isferred. Particulars of properties accepted are givc;1 in the Con nissioner's Annual Reports.\n\nThere is no provision for the tran fer of land by a person other than the accountable persCJ.1, and the acquisition price cannot exceed the amount of the duty.\n\nThe Commissioners' powers extend to the acquisition of foreign immovable property, but are scarcely likely to be exercised in respect of it.\"\n\nThe position in the United Kingdom appears to be more or Jess the same even after the former estate duty was replaced by the new tax known as capital transfer tax by the British Finance Act\n\n--__,,,.,,-.\n\n1975 (vide section 22 of the Finance Act 1975). The relevant part A of paragraph 17 of Schedule 4 to that Act reads thus :\n\n. \"17 (I) The Board may, if they think fit on the application of any person liable to pay tax, accept in satisfaction of the whole or any part of it any property to which this paragaph applies.\n\n(2) This paragraph applies to any such land as may be agreed upon between the Board and the person liable to pay tax.\n\n(3) This paragraph also applies to any objects which are or have been kept in any building-\n\n(a) If the Board have determined to accept or have accepted that building in satisfaction or part satisfaction of tax or estate duty, or ............ \" (See Halsbury's Statutes of England (Third Edition) Vol. 45 at page 1870).\n\nSection 52 of the Act was substituted by a new section 52 by the Direct Taxes (Amendment) Act, 1964. The new section reads thus:\n\n\"52. Payment of duty by transfer of property-\n\n(!) The Central Government may, on an application of the person accountable for estate duty, accept in satisfaction of the whole or any part of such duty any property passing on the death of the deceased at such price as may be agreed upon between the Central Government and that person, and thereupon such person shall deliver possession of the property to such authority as may be specified by that Government in this behalf.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, on the date the possession\n\nof the property is delivered to the authority under sub- G section (1) -\n\n(i) the property shall vest in the Central Government; and\n\n(ii) the Central Government shall, where necessary, intimate the registering authority concerned accordingly ;\n\nand the authority shall administer the property in such manner as the Central Government may direct.\n\n(3) Where the price referred to in sub-section (1) exceeds the aggregate of the amounts due under this Act in respect of the estate of the deceased, the excess shall be applied in the following order to the payment of any tax, penalty, interest or other amount -\n\n(i) which the legal representative of the deceased is liable to pay in respect of the income, expenditure or wealth of, or gift made by, the deceased under any of the Acts referred to in clause (c) of section 2 of the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 ;\n\n(ii) which the executor is liable to pay under any of the Acts aforesaid in respect of the estate of the deceased for the period of the administration of the estate ;\n\n(iii) which the person beneficially entitled to the property in question is liable to pay under any of those Acts ;\n\nand the balace, if any, shall be paid to the accountable person.\"\n\nIn the Notes on Clauses annexed to the Bill which ultimately became the Direct Tax (Amendment). Act 1964, it was stated :\n\n\"Sub-clause (b} seeks to substitute the provisions of section 52 of the Estate Duty Act by a new provision, enabling the Central Government to accept at an agreed price, the assets comprised in an estate passing on the death of the deceased towards payment of the estate duty, if the accountable person so offers.\n\nProvision is also made that any balance of the price left after satisfying the amounts due under the Estate Duty Act will be adjusted against amounts due under the other Direct Taxes Act from the deceased, his estate and the accountable person beneficially . entjtled to the asset in question in that order.\"\n\nLet us now analyse section 52 qf the Act. A proceeding under section 52 does not commence until an application is made by the person accountable for estate duty. It is entirely at his option whether a property passing on the death of the deceased should be transferred so that its price can be adjusted towards payment of the es_tate duty.\n\nThe Central Government cannot compel him to do so.\n\nWhen the accountable person voluntarily applies to the Central\n\n\nGovernment, the section says that the Central Government 'may' accept the property offered in satisfaction of the estate duty at such price as may be agreed upon between it and the accountable person.\n\nSection 52 of the Act does not say that the Central Government shat I do so but it may do so. The question in this case is whether the Central Government is bound to do so. We shall revert to this question later on. Then the price of the property has to be agreed upon between the Central Government and the accountable person.\n\nThe price so agreed upon should naturally relate to the date on which agreement takes place and it cannot certainly be the principal value of the property determined in the estate duty proceedings.\n\nThis provision may '.perhaps indirectly act as a deterrent against excessive valuation of the property in the estate duty proceedings because when the question of determination of its price under section 52 of the Ac-t arises there ought not to be a wide disparity between the principal value determined in the estate duty proceedings and what is offered by the Central Government as the price under section 52.\n\nWhen once the price is agreed upon, then the accountable person is bound to deliver possession of the property to such authority as may be specified by the Central Government. On such delivery the property vests in the Central Government without any further formality.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 52 of the Act provides that where the price agreed upon exceeds the amount due as estate duty, the excess amount shall be applied to the payment of any tax penalty, interest or other amount payable in the order mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) thereof. If after adjusting all such dues, any balance still remains, such balance shall be paid to the accountable person.\n\nThe Act is a fiscal statute principally intended to levy and collect estate duty which when collected has to be disbursed in accordance with Part XII of the Constitution. It is not a law providing for acquisition of a property forming part of the estate of the deceased. Part VII of the Act in which sections 51 and 52 occur only provides the machinery for collection of the duty. Whereas section 51 of the Act authorises the Board to prescribe the means and manner in which the estate duty may be collected, section 52 gives the option to the accountable person to offer a property passing on the death of the deceased so that its price may be adjusted towards the payment of the estate duty.\n\nRule 18 of the Rules made by the Board pursuant to section 51 enables the accountable person to discharge his liability in one or more ways mentioned therein and there the Central Government is left with no choice\n\nabout them.- Payment of duty in any of the said ways discharges the liability of the accountable person under the Act. Section 52 of the Act however, appears to be an alternative mode by which such liability can be discharged but it has some distinguishing features.\n\nIndisputably the price of the property offered thereunder has to be agreed upon between the Central Government and the accountable person which introduces an element of consensus into the proceeding.\n\nBut the point on which the parties are at issue in this case is whether the Central Government is bound to accept a property offered by the accountable person under section 52 and initiate proceedings to settle its price by negotiation. The language of the statute prima facie does not compel the Central Government to do so.\n\nThe section is in the nature of an enabling provision which authorises the Central Government to accept a property in lieu of estate duty payable subject to the conditions mentioned in it. It is true that even enabling words in a statute which confer a discretionary power may have to be interpreted as compulsory where they amount to words clearly intended to ; effectuate a legal right. But ordinarily such words are permissive only. In the instant case the very fact there is a need for an agreement upon the price of the property between the Central Government and the accountable person makes the power of the Central Government under section 52(1) of the Act discretionary and permissive. Any other meaning may lead to impractical and incongruous result. The Central Government cannot be compelled to accept the properties in discharge of the estate duty when no agreement is possible on its price, and when law does not provide for a machinary to determine the price when there is no agreement. The history of the corresponding legislation in the United Kingdom and the language of section 52 read with the 'Notes on clauses' attached to the relevant Bill extracted above suggest that the Central Government has the option either to accept or reject the offer made by an accountable person under section 52. This has to be so having regard to the administrative difficulties involved in the matter.\n\nAs mentioned earlier, the Act is a fiscal statute intended to collect duty and not to acquire property. If section 52 of the Act is held to be mandatory then the Central Government will be obliged to acquire properties in several parts of India where it may not find any use for them and spend money on their management and upkeep and arrange for their disposal.\n\nThe cost of administration involved in the Act in that case possibly may be much more than the duty realisable under the Act. Further if such is the construction to be placed then what happens if the price of the property offered is more than the duty payable ?\n\nThen in every such case, the Government would be compelled to acquire property by paying\n\nto the accountable person the amount which is in excess of the duty and other sums payable under section 52(2)(i)to(iii) even when it does not need such property.\n\nSurely such could not have been the intention of the Parliament. We are of the view that on a plain construction of section 52 of the Act, the Central Government may at its discretion either accept the property offered under section 52 or may not if the circumstances so warrant. The accountable person cannot claim that the Central Government is bound to accept to such property. The power of the Central Government under section 52 is purely administrative and discretionary. The High Court was in error in holding that if an assessee wanted to pay the estate duty by transferring property, the Government could not refuse to accept the offer and insist upon payment by another mode, provided there was agreement on the price of the property between the Government and the assessee.\n\nWhen once it is held that the power of the Government under section 52 of the Act is administrative and discretionary, it follows that the said power should be exercised subject to the same limitation which govern all suchadministrative and discretionary powers.\n\nThe Central Government or the authority which is competent to take a decision should exercise its discretion bona fide and in good faith by addressing itself to the matter before it and should not allow itself to be influenced by extraneous and irrelevant considerations.\n\nThe question should not be disposed of in an arbitrary or capricious way.\n\nIn this case, the Court can only ask the authority concerned to exercise the discretion vested in it but it cannot be asked to exercise it in a particular way.\n\nOn this question we approve the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chella Rama Bhupal Reddy v.\n\nCentral Board of Direct Taxes & Anr.(1)\n\nThe true legal position may be summarised thus.\n\nWhat section 52(1) does is to set forth one more mode in which estate duty may be recovered. It is a provision made specially for the recovery of estate duty. It enables the Government to recover the duty in accordance v.ith that mode.\n\nThe other statutory modes prescribed under section 51 and specified in the Rules are those where recourse by the accountable person obliges the Revenue to accept the payment made in any of those modes and to treat it, by compulsion of statute, as satisfaction of the dues.\n\nThe peculiarity of the mode provided under section 52(1) is that while recourse to it by the accountable person does not automatically imply satisfaction of the\n\n(!) [1977] 108 I.T.R. 695.\n\nHdues, there is the duty cast on the Revenue to consider the application by the accountable person offering an item of property as a mode for satisfying the dues. The Government must consider the application on its merits and in the exercise of sound administrative judgment. Ordinarily in every contract for the purchase of property there are two stages. (I) In the first stage, there is complete freedom to the parties to decide whether one should enter into negotiations with the other at all and in that regard the law takes no account of. reason of any party for not choosing to entertain the proposal for sale made by the other however arbitrary, illogical or irrelevant the reason may be. (2) The second stage follows the entertaining of the proposal and the actual negotiations between the parties which may or may not fructify in a contract.\n\nSection 52(1) now under consideration is concerned with the first stage, and differs in this from the complete freedom to entertain the proposal in that the proposal made under section 52( I) by the accountable person must be considered by the Central Government and any decision taken by it on that question must proceed on considerations which are relevant and bona fide. The price of the property is, however, left to be determined by agreement in the event of the Government deciding to accept the offer made by the accountable person.\n\nThis forms part of the second stage.\n\nIn the instant case, the High Court was, however, right in holding that it had not been shown that the competent authority had properly exercised its discretion. In the counter affidavit filed\n\nby the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, some reasons were given in support of the decision of the Board. That counter affidavit is of no use for the deponent could not speak on behalf of the Central Government or the Board. In the counter affidavit of Balbir Singh, Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes and Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, two principal grounds were mentioned for rejecting the offer•one, that the Central Govrrnment was not bound to accept the offer and two, that it had been snown that \"the cash in hand, cash in bank, book debts, business profits, rent and share of the deceased in the firm of Ramnarain Lal Beni Madho amounted to Rs. 4,57,462 which amount was more than sufficient to pay the entire estate duty demand\". On the other hand the respondent contended in his reply affidavit that he had no liquid cash to pay the estate duty as it had been invested in business.\n\nBut there appears to have been no further probe into the question. It is also obvious that the Board proceeded on the assumption that its discretio!l was unfettered even by considerations relevant to administrative\n\nlaw.\n\nIn these circumstances, we feel that there was no proper A exercise of the discretion by the Board.\n\ny We, therefore, affirm the direction issued by the High Court but subject to the observations made above and direct the Board to dispose of the application afresh in accordance with law.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly disposed of.\n\nNo costs.\n\nV.D.K.", "total_entities": 112, "entities": [{"text": "ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRAYAG DASS AGARWAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRAYAG DASS AGARWAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 23, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PRAYAG DASS AGARWAL\n\nApril 23, 1981\n\n[ R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 227, "end_char": 245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Estate Duty Act, 1953-Section 52, scope of-Whether under section 52 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the Central Government is bound to accept in satisfaction of the whole or any part of the duty payable under the Act at such price as C may be agreed upon between the Central Government and the person accountable for estate duty any property passing on the death of the deceased when an application is made for that purpose by such person."}}, {"text": "29, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of his father which took place on September 29, 1964 the respondent filed a statement of account under the Estate Duty Act of the estate passing on the:death of the deceased."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 891, "end_char": 900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,37,543.40 by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Allahabad, by his order dated November 30, 1970."}}, {"text": "November 30, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,37,543.40 by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Allahabad, by his order dated November 30, 1970."}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1045, "end_char": 1058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "February 16, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1073, "end_char": 1090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the appeal filed against the said order was still pending, the respondent made an application under section 52(1) of the Act on February 16, 1971 to the Central Board of Direct Taxes offering one of the items of property passing on the death of the deceased, namely, premises No."}}, {"text": "Central Board of Direct Taxes", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1461, "end_char": 1490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said offer was not accepted by the Central Board of Direct Taxes but the appellant hernin wrote to the respondent stating that the respondent could pay the 'arrears of estate duty payable by him in monthly instalments of Rs. '"}}, {"text": "October 29, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1679, "end_char": 1695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,000 each beginning from October 29, 1971 subject to payment of interest @ 9% per annum on the arrears outstanding."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1828, "end_char": 1851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad requesting the High Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India to consider the application made by him under section 52(1) on its merits, to negotiate and settle the price of the property offered by him in settlement of part of duty payable by him and to give credit to the extent of the price so determined under the Act."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1927, "end_char": 1941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad requesting the High Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India to consider the application made by him under section 52(1) on its merits, to negotiate and settle the price of the property offered by him in settlement of part of duty payable by him and to give credit to the extent of the price so determined under the Act."}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1988, "end_char": 2001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3073, "end_char": 3086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3369, "end_char": 3379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3636, "end_char": 3649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4633, "end_char": 4646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4786, "end_char": 4799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5486, "end_char": 5496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6313, "end_char": 6323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.C. Manchanda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8198, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Champat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8214, "end_char": 8225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8235, "end_char": 8248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8270, "end_char": 8283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pramod Swarup for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8349, "end_char": 8362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal by special kave is whether under section 52 of the Estate Duty Act, 19 53 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the Central Government is bound to accept in satisfaction of the whole or any part of the duty payable under the Act at such price as may be agreed upon between the Central Government and the person accountable for estate duty any property passing on the death of the deceased when an application is made for that purpose by such person."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8459, "end_char": 8469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lala Beni Madho Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8892, "end_char": 8915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Lala Beni Madho Agarwal which took place on September 29,1964 his son Prayag Dass Agarwal, the respondent\n\nherein filed a statement of account under the Act of the estate passing on the death of the deceased."}}, {"text": "Prayag Dass Agarwal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8962, "end_char": 8981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Lala Beni Madho Agarwal which took place on September 29,1964 his son Prayag Dass Agarwal, the respondent\n\nherein filed a statement of account under the Act of the estate passing on the death of the deceased.", "canonical_name": "PRAYAG DASS AGARWAL"}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9394, "end_char": 9407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court . of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10484, "end_char": 10509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court ."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10516, "end_char": 10527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10775, "end_char": 10788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11031, "end_char": 11041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11913, "end_char": 11923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12061, "end_char": 12074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12978, "end_char": 12989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13012, "end_char": 13024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13389, "end_char": 13405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5(1) of the Act provides that in the case of every person dying after the commencement of the Act there shall, save as expressly provided in the Act, be levied and paid upon the principal value ascertained as per the relevant provisions of the Act of all property, settled or not settled, including agricultural land situate in the territories which immediately before November 1, 1956 were comprised in the States in the First Schedule to the Act which passes on the death of such person, a duty called 'estate duty' at the rates fixed in accordance with section 35 of the Act."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13442, "end_char": 13456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13576, "end_char": 13586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13643, "end_char": 13658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13905, "end_char": 13915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14229, "end_char": 14239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14625, "end_char": 14635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14877, "end_char": 14890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15060, "end_char": 15070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Finance Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15078, "end_char": 15102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British Finance Act 1946", "statute": "the British Finance Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15347, "end_char": 15360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British Finance Act 1946", "statute": "the British Finance Act 1946"}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15807, "end_char": 15821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legal position in the United Kingdom as it existed in 1965 in so far as transfer of real and leasehold property in payment of estate duty is concerned 'is summarized in Dymond's Death Duties (14th Editii>n) at pages 720-721 th us :\n\n\"D-Transfer of Property in Payment of Duty : -\n\n(1) Real and leasehold property:-\n\nBys."}}, {"text": "Dymond", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15954, "end_char": 15960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legal position in the United Kingdom as it existed in 1965 in so far as transfer of real and leasehold property in payment of estate duty is concerned 'is summarized in Dymond's Death Duties (14th Editii>n) at pages 720-721 th us :\n\n\"D-Transfer of Property in Payment of Duty : -\n\n(1) Real and leasehold property:-\n\nBys."}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16175, "end_char": 16180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16188, "end_char": 16205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16252, "end_char": 16269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16316, "end_char": 16333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 56(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16987, "end_char": 16995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1949", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "ss. 50 and 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17078, "end_char": 17091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1949", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17099, "end_char": 17116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17403, "end_char": 17408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1946", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17795, "end_char": 17811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is within the discretion of the Commissioners whether they will accept property under this provision, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget statement for 1946 said that he expected the power (which hitherto had not in practice been used) to operate on a substantial scale in the future : it is understood that seventy properties had been taken over up to the 31st March, 1963."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18767, "end_char": 18777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act 1975", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18785, "end_char": 18801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18843, "end_char": 18853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act 1975", "statute": "the Finance Act 1975"}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19515, "end_char": 19525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act 1975", "statute": "the Finance Act 1975"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19562, "end_char": 19572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act 1975", "statute": "the Finance Act 1975"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21047, "end_char": 21056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21064, "end_char": 21099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21632, "end_char": 21642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963", "statute": "the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22222, "end_char": 22232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22264, "end_char": 22274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22863, "end_char": 22873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23587, "end_char": 23597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23791, "end_char": 23801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24093, "end_char": 24103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part VII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24742, "end_char": 24761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 51 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24771, "end_char": 24789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24860, "end_char": 24870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24980, "end_char": 24990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25217, "end_char": 25227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25500, "end_char": 25510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26015, "end_char": 26025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26817, "end_char": 26830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27266, "end_char": 27276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27480, "end_char": 27490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27691, "end_char": 27701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27823, "end_char": 27828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If section 52 of the Act is held to be mandatory then the Central Government will be obliged to acquire properties in several parts of India where it may not find any use for them and spend money on their management and upkeep and arrange for their disposal."}}, {"text": "section 52(2)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28398, "end_char": 28414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28518, "end_char": 28528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surely such could not have been the intention of the Parliament."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28581, "end_char": 28591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28690, "end_char": 28700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28888, "end_char": 28898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29311, "end_char": 29321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30072, "end_char": 30097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this question we approve the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chella Rama Bhupal Reddy v.\n\nCentral Board of Direct Taxes & Anr.(1)\n\nThe true legal position may be summarised thus."}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30225, "end_char": 30238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30500, "end_char": 30510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30774, "end_char": 30787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31773, "end_char": 31786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31950, "end_char": 31964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32802, "end_char": 32814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter affidavit of Balbir Singh, Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes and Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, two principal grounds were mentioned for rejecting the offer•one, that the Central Govrrnment was not bound to accept the offer and two, that it had been snown that \"the cash in hand, cash in bank, book debts, business profits, rent and share of the deceased in the firm of Ramnarain Lal Beni Madho amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32885, "end_char": 32904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter affidavit of Balbir Singh, Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes and Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, two principal grounds were mentioned for rejecting the offer•one, that the Central Govrrnment was not bound to accept the offer and two, that it had been snown that \"the cash in hand, cash in bank, book debts, business profits, rent and share of the deceased in the firm of Ramnarain Lal Beni Madho amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "Central Govrrnment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32981, "end_char": 32999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter affidavit of Balbir Singh, Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes and Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, two principal grounds were mentioned for rejecting the offer•one, that the Central Govrrnment was not bound to accept the offer and two, that it had been snown that \"the cash in hand, cash in bank, book debts, business profits, rent and share of the deceased in the firm of Ramnarain Lal Beni Madho amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "Ramnarain Lal Beni Madho", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33180, "end_char": 33204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter affidavit of Balbir Singh, Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes and Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, two principal grounds were mentioned for rejecting the offer•one, that the Central Govrrnment was not bound to accept the offer and two, that it had been snown that \"the cash in hand, cash in bank, book debts, business profits, rent and share of the deceased in the firm of Ramnarain Lal Beni Madho amounted to Rs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_590_604_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "LAJPAT RAJ AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS\n\nApril 24, 1981\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Security of Land Tenures Act (JO of 1953) Ss. 5, 5A and 5-B and Punjab Security of Land Tenure Rules 1956 Rule 4 and Form E-lntimation by landlord in Form £-Whether amounts to selection of permissible area under S,. 5-B(l)-\n\nPrescribed authori1y whether can after the same.\n\nRespondent No. 3, a displaced J)erson from Pakistan, was allotted more than 60 standard acres of land. Out of this land he made an oral gift of some land in lieu of maintenance to his wife, respondent No. 4, who sold that land to the appellants.\n\nD In the proceedings for declaration of the surplus area of the land owned by\n\nrespondent No. 3 the Special Collector included the land sold to the appellants in the \"select area\" of Respondent No. 3, The appeal of Respondent No. 3 to the Commissioner was dismissed as time-barred and this order was upheld in revision by the Financial Commissioner.\n\nA single Judge dismissed his petition under Article 226. In appeal, a Division Bench held that the order of the Special Collector, directing a variation in the reservation made by respondent No. 3 without his consent was not only contrary to the povisions of the Act but was without jurisdiction and a nullity in as much as the Act vested no power of such variation in the Collector.\n\nJn the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant, that : (I) the admission to the effect that responden.t No. 3 had intimated his reserved area in Form E to the Collector before gifting the land to his wife was made before the High Court on behalf of the appellants on the basis of some misconception on the part of their counsel, that actually no such reservation was ever made and that the admission could at best be interpreted to mean that respondent No. 3 had sent an intimation in Form E to the Special Collector detailing therein the area selected by him as his permissible ar.::a in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 5-B of the Act, and (2) If no reservation was made by respondent No. 3 the whole basis of the impugned judgment falls and the Collector would have jurisdiction to amend the permissible area of respondent No. 3 by way of adjustment of the equities arising in favour of the appellants.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : Jn assuming that respondent No. 3 had intimated his reservation \"in pursuance of sub-sction (I) of section 5, the High Court was in error\n\n)ry\n\n}. ..\n\n,• --\n\nLAJPAT RAl V. PUNJAB 591\n\nand the case had to be decided on the basis of the factual position that respondent No. 3 had failed to make any reservation under that sub-section but that he had made a selection in Form E in pursuance of the provision.s of sub-section (I) of section 5-B. [600 H-601A]\n\nThe inclusion of the land in question in the surplus area of respondent No. 3 does not effect the right of ownership of the appellants. [604 A]\n\n1. (a) Reservation of land was envisaged only in section 5(1) of the Act and had to be intimated within six months from the date of its commencement i.e. on or before the 15th October, 1953. [599 El\n\n(b) No provision was ever made in the Act or the rules framed thereunder\n\nfor a reservation of land by a land-owner who had failed to send an intimation C thereof on or before the 15th October, 1953. [599 F]\n\n(c) What was provided by section 5-B was, that a landowner who had not exercised the right of reservation under the Act could select his permissible area and send intimation thereof in Form E to the prescribed authority within a period of six months from the 11th December, 1957 i. e. on or before 11th May, 1958. 'Reservation' was something different from the 'Selection' of permissible area, The two terms were not only not synonymous but were mutually eKclusive. 'Selection' of permissible area was allowed only to a landlord who had not eKercised his right of 'reservation'. [599 G-600 A]\n\n(d) Form E was meant only for intimation of selection of permissible area under sub-section (I) of section 5B and not for reservation under sub-section (1)\n\nof section 5 which could be made only through an intimation in the Form in E Annexure \"B\" to the 1953 Rules. [600 BJ\n\n2.(a) 'Surplus area' is arrived at by excluding the reserved area from the total area of a land-owner in case a reservation has been made by him lawfully. (Clauses (4) and (5-a) of section 2.) [601 C]\n\n(b) Where no area has been lawfully reserved by the land-owner, surplus area is worked out under section 5B or 5C. [601 DJ\n\n(c) Under section 5, the landowner is entitled to reserve out of the entire land held by him in the State as landowner, any parcel or parcels not exceeding the permissible area by intimating his selection in the prescribed form to the Patwari of the estates, etc. In doing so he is legally bound to include in his reserved area such land as conforms to the description of any of the 6 categories covered by clauses (a) to (f) of the proviso to sub-section (I) of section 5. [601E]\n\n(d) Once a reservation has been intimated within 6 months from the date\n\nof commencement of the Act, it cannot be varied either by act of parties or by operation of law, except with the written consent of tenant affected by such H variation. [601 F]\n\n(e) If a land-owner has failed to reserve land in accordance with the provisions of section 5 he has another chance to select his permissible area within 6 months from the commencement of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures (Amendment) Act, 19.i7. [601 G]\n\n(f) The prescribed authority is given the power to select the permissible area of a landowner under sub-section (2) of section 5-B but the mandatory B condition attached to the exercise of that power is that it shall b~ resorted to only if the landowner has failed to select his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of that section. In other words, if the concerned land-owner has already selected his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 5-B, sub-section (2) of that section does not come into play at all and there is no occasion for the exercise by the prescribed authority of the po11<er. of selection. [602 A-C) c\n\nIn the instant case Respondent No. 3 had made a selection of his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (I) of section 5-B, a selection whichthe prescribed authority had no power to vary either under sub-section (2) of section 5-B or under any other provisions of the Act. The order of the Special Collector dated March 30, 1962 was therefore passed without jurisdiction and was a nullity. [602 D-E]\n\nGurucharan Singh and Ors. v. Prithi Singh and Ors. [1974] I S.C.C. 138, distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1981-N of 1970.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 21st May 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 195 of 1966.\n\nG.L. Sanghi, :s.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the Appellants.\n\nO.P. Sharma and M.S. Dhillon for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment dated May 21, 1970 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana accepting a Letters Patent Appeal and holding that in view of the provisions of sections 5, 5-A and 5-B of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the concerned Collector had no jurisdiction to vary the reserved area of a land-owner by including therein the lands sold by him to others.\n\n.'(\n\nLAJPAT RAI v. PUNJAB (Kasha[, J.) 593\n\nMost of the relevant facts are undisputed and may be briefly stated thus. Sadh Singh, respondent No. 3, who is a displaced person from Pakistan, was allotted more than 60 standard acres of land in village Karyam, Tehsil Nawanshehar, District Jullundut, in lieu of the land left by him in Pakistan. He also owned a little more than I standard acre of land in village Surwind, Tehsil Patti, District Amritsar. About 3 years after the Act came into force, i.e., on March 9, 1956, respondent No. 3 made an oral gift of some of his land in lieu of maintenance to his wife Nirmal Kaur, respondent No. 4, who entered into an agreement dated January 21, 1957 with the three appellants for sale to them of the land gifted to her, against a consideration of Rs. 4200.\n\nThe land covered by the gift was mutated in favour of respondent No. 4 on April 17, 1957 and she conveyed the same to the three appellants by a registered sale-deed dated August 8, 1957.\n\nThe agreement mentioned above as well as the sale deed following it were attested by respondent No. 3 as a marginal witness.\n\nThe proceedings for declaration of the surplus area out of the land owned by respondent No. 3 were initiated by the Collector on June 20, 1958.\n\nThey passed through various stages before the Collector and in appeal before the Commissioner.\n\nUltimately the Special Collector, Punjab, declared the surplus area of respondent No. 3 after hearing him and the appellants, through an order dated March 30, 1962, and while doing so, he included the land sold to the appellants by respondent No. 4 in the \"select area\" of respondent No. 3, as prayed for by the appellants. The order was based on some rulings of the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, to the effect that all sales for valuable consideration effected by a land-owner after the enforcement of the Act should be included in his \"select area\". Respondent No. 3 unsuccessfully challenged the order in an appeal which was dismissed by the Commissioner as time-barred. The order of the Commissioner was upheld in revision by the Financial Commissioner.\n\nIt was then that respon- #dent No. 3 knocked at the door of the High Court through a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge on the ground that the order of the Special Collector had become final by reason of the appeal taken against it being time-barred. The learned Judge observed that respondent No. 3 was not entitled to any relief in exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under the said article in view of the fact that he had failed to pursue diligently the remedy of appeal which was open to him.\n\nA In the appeal which respondent No. 3 filed under clause IO of\n\nthe Letters Patent, the Division Bench observed :\n\n\"In accordance with section 5 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, the appellant intimated his reserved area in form E to the Collector before making the gift in favour of his wife. This fact is not so stated in the pleadings, but the counsel of both the parties admit this fact to be so\".\n\nand after referring to the provisions of sections 5, 5-A and 5-B of the Act concluded :\n\n\"The Collector has no jurisdiction to vary the reserved area of a landowner by including the land sold by him to others in his reserved area.\n\nUnder section 5 of the Act, the only jurisdiction with the Collector is to find out whether the reservation has been made in accordance with the directions contained in that section but the Collector has no jurisdiction to include an area in the reserved area of a landowner which is not covered by any of the clauses\n\n(a) to (f) of the proviso to section 5 of the Act.\"\n\nIn coming to this conclusion. the Division Bench relied upon three decisions of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana rendered by other Division Benches and reported as Bhagat Gobind Singh\n\nv. Punjab State and Others, (1) State of Punjab and others v. Shamsher Singh and others, (2) and Mota Singh v. Fina11cial Commissionfr Punjab and if others. (3) An argument raised before it on behalf of the present appellants that the order of the Collector made in contravention of section 5 of the Act could at best be treated as an illegal order and not one passed without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity, was repelled.\n\nIn this connection, reliance was placed by the Division Bench on three judgments of this Court, namely, Ne mi Chand Jain v.\n\nFinancial Commissioner Punjab, (4) Smt.\n\nKaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal, (5) and Bahadur Singh v. Muni ' Subrat Dass, another, (6).\n\nIn the result, the Division Bench held\n\n(1) I.L.R. [1963] I Punjab 500.\n\n(2) [1966] P.L.J. 16. (3)\n\n[1980] P.L.J. 338.\n\n(4) [1963] P.L.J. 137. (5)\n\n[1969] 2 SCR 1048\n\n[6] [1969] 2 SCR 432.\n\nLAJPAT RAJ v. PUNJAB (Kasha/, J.) 595\n\nthat the order of the Special Collector dated March 30, 1962, directing a variation in the reservation made by respondent No. 3 without his consent was not only contrary to the provisions of the Act but was without jurisdiction and a nullity in as much as the Act vested no power of such variation in the Collector. It further held that a pettion under article 226 of the Constitution of India by respondent No. 3 with the prayer that the order of the Special Collector dated March 30, 1962, be quashed was competent, even though he had not exhausted his remedies of appeal and revision.\n\nIn the above premises, the Division Bench accepted the Letters Patent Appeal and set aside the order of the Special Collector dated March 30, 1962, as also those orders which followed and confirmed it, and directed the Collector to declare the surplus area of respondent No. 3 after excluding therefrom the area reserved by him as his permissible area.\n\nMr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellants, has raised the following contentions before us : D\n\n(a) The admission to the effect that respondent No. 3 had intimated his reserved area in Form E to the Collector before gifting the land to his wife was made before the High Court on behalf of the appellants on the basis of some misconception on the part of their counsel.\n\nActually no such reservation was ever made and the admission could at best be interpreted to mean that respondent No. 3 had sent an intimation in Form E to the Special Collector detailing therein the area selected by him as his permissible area in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section ( 1) of section 5-B of the Act.\n\n(b) If no reservation was made by respondent No. 3 the whole basis of the impugned judgment falls and the Collector would have jurisdiction to amend the permissible area of respondent No. 3 by way of adjustment of the equities arising in favour of the appellants.\n\nAfter hearing Mr. Sanghi we find force in contention (a) but none in contention (b), as we shall presently show.\n\nWe may\n\nA mention here that respondent No. 3 has remained up-represented before 11s in spite of service.\n\nFor a proper consideration of the two contentions, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act as they originally stood, the amendments made thereto in the year 1957 and the rules B framed thereunder from time to time.\n\nThe Act was enforced on the 15th April 1953.\n\nOn that date section 5 thereof comprised 5 sub-sections of which sub-sections_ ( 4) and (5) were omitted in the year 1953 itself. Sub-sections (I) and (3) of that section are relevant and are reproduced below : c\n\n\"5. (I) Any reservation before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect, and subject to the provisions of sections 3 and 4 any landowner who owns land in excess of the permissible area may reserve out of the entire land held by him in the State of Punjab as landowner, any parcel or parcels not exceeding the permissible area by intimating his selection in the prescribed form and manner to the patwari of the estate in which the land reserved is situate or to such other authority as may be prescribed :\n\n\"Provided that in making this reservation he shall include his areas owned in the following order :\n\n(a) area held in a Co-operative Garden Colony,\n\n(b) area under self-cultivation at the commencement of this Act other than the reserved area,\n\n(c) reserved area excluding the area under a jhundimar tenant or a tenant who has been in continuous occupation for 20 years or more immediately before such reservation,\n\n(d) area or share in a Co-operative Farming Society,\n\n(e) any other area owned by him,\n\n(f) area under a jhundimar tenant\".\n\n\"(3) A landowner shall be entitled to intimate a reservation within six months from the date of commence-\n\nLAJPAT RAI v. PUNJAB (Koshal, J.) 597\n\nment of this Act, and no reservation so intimated shall be varied subsequently whether by act of parties or by operation of law, save with the consent in writing of the tenant affected by such variation or until such time as the right to eject such tenant otherwise accrues under the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nThe term 'reserved area' was defined in clause ( 4) of section 2 thus:\n\n'(4) \"Reserved area\" means the area lawfully reserved under the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 (Act XXII of 1950), as amended by President's Act, V of I 951, hereinafter referred to as the \"I 950 Act\" or under this Act.'\n\nThe Act as originally framed did not contain any provision for the determination of what is now known as \"surplus area\" a\n\nterm which was introduced into the Act for the first time in 1955 D through the addition of clause (5-a) to section 2.\n\nOn the 19th May 1953 were promulgated the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, I 953 (for short, the I 953 Rules),· under rule 3 of which a landowner had to notify his reservation to the Patwari of the concerned estate in pursuance of the provisions of E sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act. in the Form designated as\n\n~- Annexure \"B\" to those Rules.\n\nOn the 27th April 1956 were promulgated the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, I 956 (hereinafter referred to as the 1956 Rules). It was by rule 4 thereof that Form E was for the first time prescribed. That rule stated :\n\n\"4. Where a landowner has not reserved the area permitted for self-cultivation, he will, at the same time as he submits the declarations prescribed in rule 3 above, intimate, in writing, to the Patwari/Patwaris of the Circle/ Circles in which his lands are situated, the land/lands selected by him for self-cultivation. This intimation shall be in Form E.\"\n\nThis rule clearly indicates that a landowner was given the H right to select an area for self-cultivation only in case he had not reserved such area on or before the 15th October, 1953.\n\nA Sections 5-A and 5-B were added to the Act in the year 1957\n\nwith effect from I Ith December 1957 by means of Punjab Act No. 46 of 1957. They state:\n\nSection 5-A\n\n\"Every land-owner or tenant. who owns or holds land in excess of the permissible area and where land is situated in more than one Patwar Circle, shall furnish, within a period of six months from the commencement of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures (Amendment) Act, 1957, a declaration supported by an affidavit in respect of the land owned or held by him in such form and manner and to such authority as may be prescribed.\"\n\nSection 5-B\n\n\"(!) A land-owner who has not exercised his right of reservation under this Act, may select his permissible area and intimate the selection to the prescribed authority within the period specified in section 5-A and in such form and manner as may be prescribed :\n\n\"Provided that a land-owner who is required to furnish a declaration under section 5-A shall intimate his selection along with that declaration.\n\n\"(2) If a land-owner fails to select his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (!), the prescribed authority may, subject to the provisions of section 5-C, select the parcel or parcels of lands which such person is entitled to retain under the provisions of this Act :\n\n\"Provided that the prescribed authority shall not make the selection without giving the land-owner concerned an opportunity of being heard\".\n\nSimultaneously the definition of 'surplus area' contained in clause (5-a) of section 2 of the Act was amended to read thus:\n\n-'\"'\\\n\nLAJPAT RAJ v. PUNJAB (Koshal, J.) 599\n\n'(5-a) \"Surplus Area\" means the area other than A the reserved area, and, where no area has been reserved, the area in excess of the permissible area selected under section 5-B or the area which is deemed to be surplus area under sub-section (I) of section 5-C and includes the area in excess of the permissible area selected under section 19-B, but it will not include a tenant's permissible area :\n\n'Provided that it will include the reserved area, or part thereof, where such area or part has not been brought under self-cultivation within six months of reserving the same or getting possession thereof after ejecting a tenant from it, whichever is later, or if the landowner admits a new tenant, within three years of the expiry of the said six months.'\n\nIn consequence of these additions rule 4 of the 1956 Rules was also amended so as to contain a provision that an intimation D under section 5-B (I) of the Act shall be furnished by a landowner in Form E.\n\nIn relation to contention (a) the following propositions emerge from the various provisions of law just above set out :\n\n(i) Reservation of land was envisaged only in section 5 ( 1) of the Act and had to be intimated within six months from the date of commencement of that Act, i.e., on or before the 15th October 1953.\n\n(ii) No provision was ever made in the Act or the rules framed thereunder for a reservation of land by a landowner who had failed to send an intimation thereof on or before the 15th October 1953.\n\n(iii) What was provided by section 5-B was, inter alia,\n\nthat a landowner who had not exercised the right G of reservation under the Act could select his permissible area and send intimation thereof in Form E to the prescribed authority within a period of six months from the 11th December, 1957, i.e .. 0n or before !Ith May, 1958.\n\nReserva- IJ lion' was something different from the 'Selection'\n\nof permissible area. The two terms were not only not synonymous but were mutually exclusive. 'Selection' of permissible area was allowed only to a landlord who had not exercised his right of 'reservation'\n\n(iv) Form E was meant only for intimation of selection of permissible area under sub-section (I) of section 5-B and not for reservation under subsection (I) of section 5 which could be made only through an intimation in the Form in Annexure \"B\" to the 1953 Rules.\n\nThe propositions just above enunciated bring out incongruity from which the admission made before the High Court suffers.\n\nThere could be no reservation in Form E by respondent No. 3. If he send an intimation in that Form it could only be about a selection of his permissible area under sub-section (I) of section 5-B. That this was really so clearly appears from the following observation made in the order of the Special Collector dated 2nd March 1961 :\n\n\"The counsel for the owner argued that area sold was not included in Form E filed before the Special Collector and that he was not prepared to include it in the select area of 50 S.A. to which he is entitled\".\n\nThe order from which this observation has been extracted was set aside by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, on the 8th January, 1962 when the case was remanded to the Special Collector for a fresh decision after hearing the three appellants as well as respondents Nos. 3 & 4.\n\nThe Special Collector then heard all these parties and passed his order dated the 30th March 1962 which also unmistakebly indicates that the intimation given by respondent No. 3 to the Special Collector was not in respect of any reservation but covered only a selection of the permissible area. Reference in this connection may be made to the fact that twice in that order the Special Collector used the term \"select area\" in relation to the lands which respondent No. 3 could be allowed to retain in his possession.\n\nJn assuming (on the basis of the admission made at the bar) H that respondent No. 3 had intimated his reservation in pursuance of sub-s((tion (J) o.f section 5, the High Court was thus in error and\n\nLAJPAT RAI v. PUNJAB (Koshal, J.) 601\n\nthe case has to be decided on the basis of the factual position that respondent No. 3 had failed to make any reservation under that subsection but that he has made a selection in Form E in pursuanceof the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 5-B.\n\nContention (a) raised by Mr. Sanghi is, therefore, accepted in full.\n\nWe now proceed to consider contention (b) in the light of B the provisions above extracted, a bare reading of which leads to the following conclusions in relation to that contention :\n\n(a) 'Surplus area' is arrived at by excluding the reserved area from the total area of a land-owner in case a reservation has been made by him lawfully. (Clauses\n\n(4) and (5-a) of section 2.)\n\n(b) Where no area has been lawfully reserved by the landowner, surplus area is worked out under section 5-B or\n\n5-C.\n\n(c) Under section 5, the landowner is entitled to reserve out of the entire land held by him in the State of Punjab as landowner, any parcel or parcels not exceeding the permissible area by intimating his selection in the prescribed form and manner to the patwari of the estate, etc.\n\nIn doing so he is legally bound to include in his reserved area such land as conform to the description of any of the 6 categories covered by clauses (a) to (f) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 5.\n\n(d) Once a reservation has been intimated within 6 months from the date of commencement of the Act, it cannot be varied either by act ofparties or by operation of law, except with the written consent of the tenant affected by such variation.\n\n(e) If a land-owner has failed to reserve land in accordance with the provisions of section 5, he has another chance to select his permissible area within six months from the commencement of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures (Amendment) Act (Punjab Act No. 46 of J 957) in the prescribed manner.\n\n(f) The prescribed authority is given the power to select the permissible area of a landowner under sub-section\n\n(2) of section 5-B but the mandatory condition attached to the exercise of that power is-that it shall be resorted to only if the landowner has failed to select his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (I) of that section. In other words, if the concerned land-owner has already selected his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (I) of section 5-B, sub-section (2) of that section does not come into play at all and there is no occasion for the exercise by the prescribed authority of the power of selection.\n\nThese conclusions further lead to the inference that if the prescribed authority (in this case the Special Collector) exercises the power of selection in a situation to which sub-section 5-B is not attracted, his order would be without jurisdiction and a nullity and that is precisely what has happened in this case.\n\nAs held by us earlier, respondent No. 3 had made a selection of his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section\n\n5. B a selection which the prescribed authority had no power to vary either under sub-section (2) of section 5-B or under any other provisions of the Act. The order of the Special Collector dated March 30, 1962 must, therefore, be held to have been passed without jurisdiction and, therefore, to be a nullity.\n\n9. In support of the proposition that the order of the Special Collector did not suffer from lack of jurisdiction, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the following observations in Gurcharan Singh and Others v. Prithi Singh and Others, (1j wherein this Court defined the scope of powers of the Collector while acting under sub-section (2) of section 5-B of the Act:\n\n\"While it is true that a landowner who fails to reserve or select his permissible area within the prescribed period, cannot exercise that right subsequently, and thereafter it is for the Collector to determine the defaulter's permissible and surplus areas, in exercising this power under section 5-B, the Collector has to act judicially. He is bound to give notice to the landowner, and the transferees from him,\n\n(1) [1974) I s.c.c. 138.\n\nLAJPAT RAI v. PUNJAB (Kasha/, J.) 603\n\nif known. Thereafter he has to hear the parties who appear, and to take into consideration their representations and then pass such order as may be just. In so exercising his discretion, the Collector ma>', subject to the adjusment\n\nof equities on both sides, incluoe the transferred area m the 'permissible area' or the 'surplus area' of the landowner.\n\nThus, in the process the Collector is not to ignore altogether the wishes of the landowner.\n\nHe may accept them to the extent they are consistent with the equities of the case\".\n\nIt is urged on the authority of these observations that the Collector has in all cases the power to alter the particulars of an area reserved or selected by a landowner so as to bring it in conformity with any equities that may arise in the attendant circumstances. This proposition is wholly unacceptable to us for the simple reason that in Gurcharan Singh's case (supra), the landowner had made neither a reservation nor a selection of his permissible a'rea within the prescribed period, so that sub-section (2) of section 5-B was undoubtedly attracted to his case. The observations above extracted were obviously confined to a case of that type, and have nothing to do with a. situation where the landowner concerned has selected his permissible area in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 5-B so that there is no occasion for the prescribed authority to exercise his powers under sub-section (2) of that section.\n\nGurcharn Singh' s case, therefore, is of no assistance at all to the case of the appellants.\n\n10.\n\nNor do we see how any equities arise in favour of the appellants, such as would entitle them to have . the land in question included in the permissible area of respondent No. 3. It is not their case that any representation to the effect that land would be so included was made to them by either respondent No. 3 or respondent No. 4 .Furthermore they must be credited with full knowledge of the extent of the land owned by respondent No. 3 and of the consequences flowing therefrom in view of the provisions of the Act. Thus they acquired the land with their eyes open and subject to all the liabilities and defects from which it suffered in the hands of their transferor (and also their transferor's transferor).\n\nIn the absence of word of mouth of respondent No. 3 or his conduct to the contrary; they cannot now be heard to say that if respondent No. 3 exercises a right of selection of his permissible area which the Act confers on him, that right must be modified to suit their convenience.\n\nIn this connection we may also mention that the inclusion of the land in question in the surplus area of respondent No. 3 does not affect the right of ownership of the appellants. Of course the result of such inclusion would certainly be that the concerned authorities would be enabled to settle tenants on the land as permitted by the Act-and that is a risk which the appellants must be deemed to have bought with the land.\n\n11. For the reasons stated we dismiss the appeal but with no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 117, "entities": [{"text": "LAJPAT RAJ AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAJPAT RAJ AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAJPAT RAJ AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS\n\nApril 24, 1981\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL !"}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 5, 5A and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act", "statute": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenure Rules 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1029, "end_char": 1040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenure Rules 1956", "statute": "Punjab Security of Land Tenure Rules 1956"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2034, "end_char": 2043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LAJPAT RAl V. PUNJAB", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",• --\n\nLAJPAT RAl V. PUNJAB 591\n\nand the case had to be decided on the basis of the factual position that respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3008, "end_char": 3020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th October, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a) Reservation of land was envisaged only in section 5(1) of the Act and had to be intimated within six months from the date of its commencement i.e. on or before the 15th October, 1953. ["}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3393, "end_char": 3402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11th December, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3627, "end_char": 3646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "599 F]\n\n(c) What was provided by section 5-B was, that a landowner who had not exercised the right of reservation under the Act could select his permissible area and send intimation thereof in Form E to the prescribed authority within a period of six months from the 11th December, 1957 i. e. on or before 11th May, 1958. '"}}, {"text": "11th May, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "599 F]\n\n(c) What was provided by section 5-B was, that a landowner who had not exercised the right of reservation under the Act could select his permissible area and send intimation thereof in Form E to the prescribed authority within a period of six months from the 11th December, 1957 i. e. on or before 11th May, 1958. '"}}, {"text": "section 5B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4122, "end_char": 4131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4418, "end_char": 4427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4536, "end_char": 4546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5026, "end_char": 5035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5380, "end_char": 5389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6061, "end_char": 6070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 30, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6591, "end_char": 6605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the Special Collector dated March 30, 1962 was therefore passed without jurisdiction and was a nullity. ["}}, {"text": "Gurucharan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6678, "end_char": 6694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "602 D-E]\n\nGurucharan Singh and Ors.", "canonical_name": "Gurucharan Singh"}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6962, "end_char": 6973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, :s.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6978, "end_char": 6986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, :s.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P.N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 6997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, :s.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "M.K. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7002, "end_char": 7010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, :s.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "O.P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7032, "end_char": 7043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Sharma and M.S. Dhillon for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M.S. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Sharma and M.S. Dhillon for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment dated May 21, 1970 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana accepting a Letters Patent Appeal and holding that in view of the provisions of sections 5, 5-A and 5-B of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the concerned Collector had no jurisdiction to vary the reserved area of a land-owner by including therein the lands sold by him to others."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7244, "end_char": 7276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment dated May 21, 1970 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana accepting a Letters Patent Appeal and holding that in view of the provisions of sections 5, 5-A and 5-B of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the concerned Collector had no jurisdiction to vary the reserved area of a land-owner by including therein the lands sold by him to others."}}, {"text": "sections 5, 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7357, "end_char": 7370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7388, "end_char": 7429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sadh Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7727, "end_char": 7737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadh Singh, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7788, "end_char": 7796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, who is a displaced person from Pakistan, was allotted more than 60 standard acres of land in village Karyam, Tehsil Nawanshehar, District Jullundut, in lieu of the land left by him in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Karyam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7858, "end_char": 7864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, who is a displaced person from Pakistan, was allotted more than 60 standard acres of land in village Karyam, Tehsil Nawanshehar, District Jullundut, in lieu of the land left by him in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Nawanshehar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7873, "end_char": 7884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, who is a displaced person from Pakistan, was allotted more than 60 standard acres of land in village Karyam, Tehsil Nawanshehar, District Jullundut, in lieu of the land left by him in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Jullundut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7895, "end_char": 7904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, who is a displaced person from Pakistan, was allotted more than 60 standard acres of land in village Karyam, Tehsil Nawanshehar, District Jullundut, in lieu of the land left by him in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Surwind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8019, "end_char": 8026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also owned a little more than I standard acre of land in village Surwind, Tehsil Patti, District Amritsar."}}, {"text": "Patti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8035, "end_char": 8040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also owned a little more than I standard acre of land in village Surwind, Tehsil Patti, District Amritsar."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8051, "end_char": 8059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also owned a little more than I standard acre of land in village Surwind, Tehsil Patti, District Amritsar."}}, {"text": "March 9, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8115, "end_char": 8128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About 3 years after the Act came into force, i.e., on March 9, 1956, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Nirmal Kaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8220, "end_char": 8231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 made an oral gift of some of his land in lieu of maintenance to his wife Nirmal Kaur, respondent No."}}, {"text": "January 21, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8287, "end_char": 8303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, who entered into an agreement dated January 21, 1957 with the three appellants for sale to them of the land gifted to her, against a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 17, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8486, "end_char": 8500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 on April 17, 1957 and she conveyed the same to the three appellants by a registered sale-deed dated August 8, 1957."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8583, "end_char": 8597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 on April 17, 1957 and she conveyed the same to the three appellants by a registered sale-deed dated August 8, 1957."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8855, "end_char": 8868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 were initiated by the Collector on June 20, 1958."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9001, "end_char": 9007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately the Special Collector, Punjab, declared the surplus area of respondent No."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9828, "end_char": 9839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9847, "end_char": 9868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10455, "end_char": 10464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10472, "end_char": 10513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5, 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10977, "end_char": 10986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11319, "end_char": 11328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11815, "end_char": 11824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 1048", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12366, "end_char": 12383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 432", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12389, "end_char": 12405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12800, "end_char": 12811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12819, "end_char": 12840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13394, "end_char": 13400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellants, has raised the following contentions before us : D\n\n(a) The admission to the effect that respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th April 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act was enforced on the 15th April 1953."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14866, "end_char": 14875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15188, "end_char": 15204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15321, "end_char": 15336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) Any reservation before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect, and subject to the provisions of sections 3 and 4 any landowner who owns land in excess of the permissible area may reserve out of the entire land held by him in the State of Punjab as landowner, any parcel or parcels not exceeding the permissible area by intimating his selection in the prescribed form and manner to the patwari of the estate in which the land reserved is situate or to such other authority as may be prescribed :\n\n\"Provided that in making this reservation he shall include his areas owned in the following order :\n\n(a) area held in a Co-operative Garden Colony,\n\n(b) area under self-cultivation at the commencement of this Act other than the reserved area,\n\n(c) reserved area excluding the area under a jhundimar tenant or a tenant who has been in continuous occupation for 20 years or more immediately before such reservation,\n\n(d) area or share in a Co-operative Farming Society,\n\n(e) any other area owned by him,\n\n(f) area under a jhundimar tenant\"."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16639, "end_char": 16648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17124, "end_char": 17133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th May 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17143, "end_char": 17156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 19th May 1953 were promulgated the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, I 953 (for short, the I 953 Rules),· under rule 3 of which a landowner had to notify his reservation to the Patwari of the concerned estate in pursuance of the provisions of E sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17412, "end_char": 17421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th April 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17501, "end_char": 17516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th April 1956 were promulgated the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, I 956 (hereinafter referred to as the 1956 Rules)."}}, {"text": "Sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18267, "end_char": 18277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18417, "end_char": 18426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18858, "end_char": 18867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19070, "end_char": 19079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19209, "end_char": 19218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19451, "end_char": 19460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19797, "end_char": 19806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20056, "end_char": 20065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20140, "end_char": 20149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20223, "end_char": 20233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20782, "end_char": 20791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21022, "end_char": 21031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21400, "end_char": 21409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22077, "end_char": 22086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22137, "end_char": 22146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22548, "end_char": 22557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd March 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22681, "end_char": 22695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If he send an intimation in that Form it could only be about a selection of his permissible area under sub-section (I) of section 5-B. That this was really so clearly appears from the following observation made in the order of the Special Collector dated 2nd March 1961 :\n\n\"The counsel for the owner argued that area sold was not included in Form E filed before the Special Collector and that he was not prepared to include it in the select area of 50 S.A. to which he is entitled\"."}}, {"text": "Jullundur Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23002, "end_char": 23020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order from which this observation has been extracted was set aside by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, on the 8th January, 1962 when the case was remanded to the Special Collector for a fresh decision after hearing the three appellants as well as respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "8th January, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23029, "end_char": 23046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order from which this observation has been extracted was set aside by the Commissioner, Jullundur Division, on the 8th January, 1962 when the case was remanded to the Special Collector for a fresh decision after hearing the three appellants as well as respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "30th March 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23273, "end_char": 23288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Collector then heard all these parties and passed his order dated the 30th March 1962 which also unmistakebly indicates that the intimation given by respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23859, "end_char": 23868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24185, "end_char": 24194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24634, "end_char": 24643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24743, "end_char": 24752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24775, "end_char": 24784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25248, "end_char": 25257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25587, "end_char": 25596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25922, "end_char": 25931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26309, "end_char": 26318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26662, "end_char": 26671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26942, "end_char": 26952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27052, "end_char": 27061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27619, "end_char": 27628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27932, "end_char": 27941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurcharan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28999, "end_char": 29014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This proposition is wholly unacceptable to us for the simple reason that in Gurcharan Singh's case (supra), the landowner had made neither a reservation nor a selection of his permissible a'rea within the prescribed period, so that sub-section (2) of section 5-B was undoubtedly attracted to his case.", "canonical_name": "Gurucharan Singh"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29174, "end_char": 29183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29467, "end_char": 29476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurcharn Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29600, "end_char": 29614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurcharn Singh' s case, therefore, is of no assistance at all to the case of the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Gurucharan Singh"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31202, "end_char": 31208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_605_626_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "HASMAT RAJ & ANR.\n\nRAGHUNATH PRASAD\n\nApril 28, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\nMadhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Scope of section 12( I) (f)-Bonafide requirement under section 12(1}(f}-Landlord filing two eviction suits and acquiring possession of a major portion of the suit premises through an eviction order passed in one of them-Whether this acquisition amounts to the landlord \"has a reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned\" within the meaning of section 12(I)(f) of the Act-Noticing of such event subsequent to the passing of the decreefor eviction in the other eviction suit, whether a must by the Court- P.ropriety of refusal of leave to amend the written statement under order VT rule 17 Civil Procedure Code by the High Court.\n\nThe respondent-landlord filed two eviction suits for recovery of possession of a non-residential building which were in occupation of a finn Goraldas Parmanand and the appellant-tenant.\n\nThe portion occupied by.the appellant including the frontage was 7 'x221. In the view of the fact that the landlord obtained eviction order against the firm Goraldas Parmanand on the ground th at the building was required for the purPose of reconstruction and repairs and also for bona fide requirement, in the later eviction suit filed aainst the appellant, in para 4 of the plaint the landlord stated that he was in possession of a major portion of the non-residential building which he obtained from the firm M/s. Goraldas Parmanand, The appellant contested the eviction suit filed against him on the ground,\n\n(a) that the premises was not in dilapidated condition and did not, therefore,\n\n~ need reconstruction and repairs and (b) that the landlord in view of his own admission in the plaint at para 4 has a reasonable suitable non-residential accommodation of his own and therefore cannot claim his eviction under section (12)(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.\n\nThe trial court rejected the tenant's pleas and passed an eviction order. In appeal the first appellate court, while confirming the finding of the trial court that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required re-construction and repairs, held that even though the landlord obtained a decree against the firm Goraldas Parmanand, he had not got actual possession, as the litigation was still pending and, therefore, the plaintiff's requirements of the whole building was established.\n\nIn the second appeal before the High' Court, an application under Order VI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure, was made praying for an amendment to the written statement alleging that the firm Goraldas Parmanand has vacated the entire portion of the premises in his possession and the plaintiff-landlord has obtained actual possession of a major portion of the building and if this aspect was taken into consideration the plaintiff-landlord would not be entitled to a decree for eviction under section 12(1 )(f) of the Act. The High Court rejected\n\nthe application observing that the adjoining portion occupied by-firm Goraldas Parmanand was vacated by the firm as for back as in the year 1972 and, therefore, the application for amendment filed 3·1/2 years after the filing of the [second appeal must be rejected. Further it was of the view that the definition of \"tenant\" in the Madhya Pradesh Act would not enable a tenant, though in possession but against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made, to invite the court to take notice of events subsequent to the passing of the decree for eviction by the trial court. The High Court, accordingly confirmed the decree for eviction. hence, the appeal by the tenant after obtaining special leave of the Court.\n\n..... •\n\n• • Allowing the appeal and remanding the matter to the first appellate court Z\" with directions, the Court\n\nHELD : I. Before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings require that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Any amount of proof offered without pleadings is generally of no relevance. In order to be able to seek eviction of a tenant under section 12(1l(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommoaation Control Act, 1961, the landlord has to allege and establish (i) that he bona fide requires the accommodation let to the tenant for non-residential purposes for the purpose of continuing or starting his business and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or the town concerned. The burden to establish both the requirements of section 12(1)(f) is squarely on the landlord. [610 H, 611 A, 612 D and F]\n\n2. The application under Order VI Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, in view of the averments in the written statement is wholly superfluous. However, in view of the pleadings in the instant case, it must be granted because \"the burden of proof of establishing that the landlord was not in possession of a reasonably suitable accommodation in the same town was on the plaintiff\" it was wrongly rejected by the High Court on untenable ground that the defendant-appellant was guilty of delay and !aches ignoring incontrovertible admitted position which would non-suit the respondent-plaintiff. [613 E-G]\n\n3:1. The definition of expression \"tenant\" in the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 excludes from its operation a person in possession against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made.\n\nThe decree means the decree of the final court. This is so because once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal is a continuation of suit. (615 C, 616 BJ\n\n3:2. When an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. During the prog ress and passage of proceeding from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff. the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. The tenant is entitled to show that the need or requirement no more exists by pointing out such subsequent events, to the court including the appellate court. Otherwise the landlord would\n\n---~\n\n•I • . '\n\n~: ...\n\n:. ·~\n\nHASMAT RAJ V. RAGHUNATH 607\n\nderive an unfair advantage, and it would be against the spirit -or intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry, In such a situation it would be incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events. But the tenant can be precluded from so. contending when decree or order for eviction has become final. [616 C-G]\n\nPasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and. General Traders, [1975] 3 B S.C.R. 958, followed.\n\nTaramal v. Laxman Sewak and Ors., 1971 Madhya Pradesh Law Journal p. 888, overruled.\n\n3:3. In the instant case ; (i) relying on the admission of the plaintiff himself that be bas in his possession a shop admeasuring 18 1x90/ plus 7'x68' forming part of the same building and his failure to state that the space with 18' frontage is neither suitable nor reasonably suitable nor sufficient for starting his business as Chemist and Druggist, the plaintiff's suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in section 12(1 )(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Act must fail ;\n\n(ii) the finding of the courts below that the respondent requires possession of the whole of the building including the one occupied by the tenant for starting his business as Chemist and Druggist as also for bis residence is vitiated beyond repair. The observation of the High Court that the remaining portion of the premises would be used by the landlord for his residence and even though the portion utilised for the purpose of running the business would be smaller compared to the one to be utilised for the residence it would still not be violative of sub-section (7) of section 12 because such a composite user would not radically change the purpose for which the accommodation was let, is contrary to records and pleadings. (618 B-C, D-F, 619 B-C]\n\n4:1. In order to obtain possession under section 12(1)(h) of the Madhya Pradesh Act the landlord has to establish his bona fide requirement of the accommodation in possession of the tenant for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and must further show that such building or re-building or alterations cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. If the landlord succeeds in his prayer for possession on the ground mentioned in section 12(l)(h), it would. be necessary for the court to give appropriate directions under section 18 of the Act.\n\n[619 F-G, 621 BC]\n\n4:2. Here, as the matter has not been examined from this angle by any court, even though the litigation is pending for a long time, the case requires to be remanded to the first appellate court to ascertain : (i) whether the landlord is interested in re-constructing that portion of the building which is .in possession of the tenant as demised premises ; (ii) whether the landlord would be in a position to reconstruct foe building in his possession without thetenant being required to vacate the demised premises and (iii) if the first two queries are answered in favour of the landlord, what should be the appropriate directions to be given in favour of the tenant as enjoined by section 18 of the Act.\n\n[621 C-F]\n\nA Per Pathak, J. (Concurring)\n\nI. In a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes the contrary the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of, either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority. Here, the High Court should have allowed the application B for amendment of the written statement under Order VI Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. [624 E-F]\n\n2. Before the need for peronal residence can be held proved, several considerations need to be proved under section 12(1)(e) of the Act. The omission to draw the attention of the High Court to the fact that the need for ipersonal residence was never pleaded in the plaint led the High Court to fall into error in taking this element into account. [625 B-C]\n\nPer Contra:\n\n3:1. In the instant case, it is clear from the concurrent findings of the courts below that (a) the respondent has made out his case under section 12 (l)(h) of the Act that he requires the building including the portion occupied by n the appellants for the re-construction of the front portion and repairs to the rear portion and that necessitates that the appellants vacate their accommodation and (b) the respondent needs a portion of the building for starting the business of a medicine shop. [625 E-G]\n\n3:2. Whether or not the shop should be located in the front portion of the building and what should be the dimensions of the proposed Chemist and E Druggist shop will tum on the evidence adduced by the parties in that behalf,\n\n Giving a finding on this point, in the circumstances of thii case, is pre-eminently a task to be entrusted to a subordinate court. The questions for consideration by the appellate court are : (i) what should be the location of the shop and what should be the dimensions in the matter and (ii) availability of [the benefit under section 18 of the Act to the appellants. [625 D-E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1108 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 17th April 1976 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 113 of 1969.\n\nS.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellants.\n\nP.P. Juneja for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nA tenant m; ider a decree of eviction is the appellant. in this appeal by special leave.\n\nRespondent landlord filed a suit for recovery of possession of premises being a small shop admeasuring 7' X 22' forming part of a big non-residential building situated in Sadar Bazar, Bilaspur town in Madhya Pradesh on two grounds, to wit : (i) that he (landlord) intended to open a medicine shop and he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation for the same in the town ; and (ii) that he\n\n(landlord) required the suit building for the purpose of reconstruction and repairs which could not be carried out unless it was vacated by the defendant. The tenant resisted the suit pointing out that the landlord on his own admission as set out in plaint para 4 was in possession of a major portion of a non-residential building of which he acquired possession from the firm of Goraldas Parmanand which accommodation was sufficient for starting the business of Chemists and Druggists shop. It was also contended that the building was not in a dilapidated condition and did not need reconstruction and repairs.\n\nThe trial court recorded a finding that the building was in a dilapidated condition and reconstruction of it was essential and the D landlord had sufficient funds to undertake reconstruction.\n\nOn the question of personal requirement of plaintiff to start a medicine shop, the trial court recorded a finding that in the front pJrtion .of building landlord would start his business as Chemists and Druggists and the rear of the building would be utilized by him for his residence. It was further held that as the landlord's requirement was a composite one in that he wanted to reconstruct the building and then use the whole of it for himself, therefore, the tenant was not entitled to be inducted in the reconstructed building which he would have been entitled to claim under section 18 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ('Act' for short).\n\nAn appeal by the tenant to the District Court elicited in para 20 a finding that though the landlord was studying he might choose his career for business after he completed his education and he had got Rs. 8,000 in a fixed deposit account in a bank and even though\n\nhe obtained a decree against the firm of M(s. Goral Parmanand he G had not got actual possession as the litigation was still pending and, therefore, the plaintiff's requirement of the whole building was established. The finding that the house was in dilapidated condition and required reconstruction was affirmed.\n\nWhen the matter reached the High Court in second appeal by the tenant an application under Order VI, rule 17, Code of Civil\n\nProcedure, was made praying for an amendment to the written statement alleging that the firm Goraldas Parmanand has vacated the whole of the remaining portion of the building excluding the premises in possession of the tenant measuring T x 22' and that the plaintiff has obtained actual possession of the same and if this aspect was taken into consideration the plaintiff landlord would not be entitled to a decree for eviction under s. 12(l}(f) of the Act The High Court rejected the application observing that the adjoining portion occupied by firm Goraldas Parmanand was vacated by the firm as far back as in the year 1972 and therefore the application for amendment filed 3! years after the filing of the appeal must be rejected on the ground of delay and !aches. Further, despite the judgment of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders,(1) the High Court felt considerable hesitation in faking note of this event subsequent to the passing of the decree for eviction by the trial court because of its earlier decision in Taramal v. Laxaman Sewak\n\nand Ors (2) in which it was held that the di; finition of 'tenant' in the Act would not enable a tenant, though in possession but against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made, to invite the Court to take notice of events subsequent to the passing of the the decree for eviction by the trial court. The decision of this Court was distinguished on the ground that the definition of the expression 'tenant' in Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, was somewhat different and was wide enough to include such persons.\n\nThe High Court accordingly rejected the application and dismissed the second appeal confirming the decree for eviction.\n\nSection 12(l}(f) under which eviction of the tenant is sought by the landlord reads as under :-\n\n\"that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.\"\n\nIn order to be able to seek eviction of a tenant under s. 12(1)(f) the landlord has not only to establish that he bona fide requires the\n\n(1) [1975] 3 S.C.R. 958.\n\n(2) 1971 M.P. Law Journal 888.\n\naccommodation let to the tenant for non-residential purposes for the purpose of continuing or starting his busines but he must further show that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or the town concerned.\n\nThe landlord in this case seeks eviction of the tenant from a building let for non-residential purpose. He can obtain possession either for continuing or starting his business.\n\nHe was a student at the relevant time. He appeared to have completed his education thereafter. It is stated in the plaint unambiguously that he wanted to start business by opening a medicine shop. In other words, he wanted to start a Chemist and Druggist shop.\n\nHe must, therefore, show that he has not got in his possession a reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the town of Bilaspur.\n\nThe suit building, as earlier observed, is in the city of Bilaspur and situated in Sadar Bazar, obviously a business locality. Respondent:landlord claims to be the owner of the whole building.\n\nThe suit premises in possession of the tenant in which he is carrying on a small kirana shop admittedly admeasures 7' frontage on the main road and 22' in depth.\n\nIn other words it is 7' x 22'.\n\nThe whole building of which demised premises form a small part appears to be having a frontage of 28'. 3' passage has to be excluded. The premises in possession of the tenant has a frontage of 7'.\n\nThe length of the building or what is styled as depth was given out to us as 90' by learned counsel for respondent-landlord. 18' frontage with 90' depth was thus in possession of firm Goraldas Parmanand.\n\nRespondent landlord had also initiated proceedings for obtaining possession of the premises occupied by firm Goraldas Parmanand on the same ground, namely, that he wanted to start his business of Chemists and Druggists in the building.\n\nThe question is whether the premises occupied by firm\n\nGoraldas Parmanand has been vacated by the firm. If the answer G is in affirmative, the respondent landlord has thus obtained vacant possession of the whole of the premises occupied by firm Goraldas Parmanand. Looking to the map annexed to the plaint and the evidence led in the case and the dimensions of the premises stated at the hearing of this appeal the area vacated by the previous H tenant would be 18' x 90' plus portion at the back of the premises occupied by the present appellant which would be 7' x 68' and it\n\nA has come in possession of the respondent. The last question would be if landlord obtained vacant possession subsequent to the decree passed against the present appellant tenant by the Trial Court, whether the subsequent event could be noticed by the court for moulding the decree against the present appellant tenant.\n\nSection 12 starts with a non-obstante clause thereby curtailing the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant which he might have under any other law and the right of eviction is made subject to the overriding provision of section 12. It is thus an enabling section. In order to avail of the benefit conferred by section 12 to seek eviction of the tenant the landlord must satisfy the essential ingredients of the section. The landlord in this case seeks eviction of the tenant under section 12(l)(f). He must, therefore, establish (i) that he requires bona fide possession of a building let for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business; and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. The burden to establish both the requirements of section 12(l)(f) is squarely on the landlord. And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings require that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue.\n\nOrdinarily, therefore, when a landlord seeks eviction under section 12( I )(f) the court after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings must frame two issues namely (i) whether the plaintiff landlord proves that he bona fide requires possession of a building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business, and (ii) whether he proves that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. With out elaborating we must notice a well established proposition that any amount of proof offered without pleadings is generally of no relevance.\n\nTurning to the pleadings in this case the plaintiff in para 6 of the plaint has stated as under :-\n\n\"The plaintiff intends to start his own business in the said building after the said reconstruction. He intends to open a medicine shop therein. The plaintiff bona fide requires the suit house for the above purpose. He has no other suitable accommodation for the same in the town.\"\n\nThe cryptic averment is that the plaintiff has not got any other reasonably suitable accommodation in the same town.\n\nHowever,\n\n- _.._ __\n\nin para 4 of the plaint it is stated 'that the major portion of the building is in occupation of the firm Goraldas Parmanand and the plaintiff has already obtained a decree for its eviction therefrom'.\n\nThe defendant in his written statement has in term stated that the defendant is in possession of a small portion of the building, the remaining prtion of which was in possession of firm M/s. Goraldas Parmanand. In para 6 of the written statement it is further stated that on his own admission, the plaintiff has got a suitable alternative accommodation being the premises for which a decree of eviction is obtained for doing business and which is more than sufficient for his requirement. The learned Trial Judge framed Issue No. 2(a) on the question whether the plaintiff landlord had no other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city. While recording finding on this issue the cryptic observation in para 19 of the judgment is that the plaintiff is a student and he has no other accommodation for starting his own business. There is not the slightest reference to the decree admittedly obtained by the plaintiff against firm M/s. Goraldas Parmanand which firm was carrying on business in a portion of the building which the plaintiff himself has described as the major portion of the building, the suit premises being a small portion of the whole building. In the first appeal this contention is disposed of by observing that the alternative accommodation which the defendant has pleaded in his written statement is under litigation and therefore it cannot be treated as available to the plaintiff.'\n\nIn the second appeal in the High Court the defendant appellant moved an application under Order VI Rule 17 for amendment of the written statement for elaborating what was already stated that not only the decree obtained by the plaintiff against the adjoining tenant of the same building namely firm of M/s. Goraldas Parmanand has become final but the plaintiff in execution of the decree way back in I 972 obtained actual possession of the whole of area occupied by that firm and that forms major portion of the whole building. This application, though, in our opinion, to be whoily superflous in view of the pleadings hereinbefore set out and in view of the fact that the burden of proof of establishing that the landlord was not in possession of a reasonably suitable accommodation in the same town was on the plaintiff was rejected on untenable ground that the defendant appellant was guilty of delay and !aches.\n\nThis application for amendent deserves to be granted, and we grant the same.\n\nWhat is its impact ? Even while rejecting the application the High Court in terms observed in para 4 of its judgment as under:-\n\n'Adjoining portion was vacated by firm Goraldas Parmanand as far back as in the year 1972'.\n\nThe High Court thus had before it a fact beyond dispute and beyond controversy that the major portion of the building was vacated by the adjoining tenant way back in 1972.\n\nThis was an uncontroverted fact.\n\nTherefore remand on this point is an exercise in futility because the fact alleged in the application for amendment is admitted. After rejecting the application on wholly untenable ground the High Court in 1976 affirmed the finding wholly contrary to record as available at that stage that the plaintiff landlord had no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city even though on landlord's own admission he had acquired vacant possession of a major portion of the building let for non-residential purpose as far back as 1972.\n\nIn the course of hearing we were repeatedly told that the finding of facts are sacrosanct. The finding of fact ignoring incontrovertible admitted position which would non-suit the plaintiff if upheld would be travesty of justice. The burden being on the plaintiff to show that he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation for carrying on the business which he wanted to start in the suit premises, it was for the plaintiff to show that he had not acquired possession from firm Goraldas Parmanand.\n\nAlternatively the plaintiff should have shown that the said adjacent accommodation was not reasonably suitable for the business he wanted to start.\n\nHe has done neither.\n\nOn the contrary plaintiff has admittedly adopted a position in the plaint that he not only wanted suit premises but also the adjoining premises of which he had obtained possession for starting his business. In such a situation i the High Court had kept in view that the plaintiff had already with him viz. possession of a building having 18' frontage on the main road and 90' depth plus portion at the back of the suit premise~ in his possession it would have to come to an affirmative conclusion that the plaintiff had sufficient accommodation for starting his business as a Chemists and Druggists. It was no where pointed out by the plaintiff that the shop of Chemists and Druggists or a medicine shop would require frontage of more than 18'. 18' frontage on a main road in a city like Bilaspur is sufficiently attractive and accommodating. The depth of the shop as given out to us being 90' ; therefore landlord has now in his possession shop admeasuring 18' X 90' plus the area of 7' X 90' at the back of the suit premises being part of the same buildin.g.\n\nWould this not provide more than ample accommodation _to the plaintiff to start his business as a Chemists and Druggists ? Not one\n\nword has been said that the accommodation which is already in possession of the plaintiff is neither suitable nor reasonably suitable nor sufficient for starting his business. In fact the very stand of plaintiff landlord as accepted by the High Court that some portion at the back would be utilised by landlord for residence would affirmatively establish that landlord has more than enough vacant accommodation in possession for starting his business.\n\nThe difficulty which the High Court experienced was whether a tenant under a decree of eviction could invite the Court to take into consideration the events .subsequent to passing of the decree which if noticed would non-suit the landlord.\n\nThe definition of expression 'tenant' in the Act excludes from its operation a person in possession against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made.\n\nThe High Court referred to its earlier judgment in Taramal's case wherein it was held that the protection to a statutory tenant lapsed with the passing of a decree and such a person had no right to bring on record new circumstances which were not in existence at the date of the passing of the decree.\n\nThis approach wholly overlooks the scheme of the Rent Restriction Act. The M.P. Act enables a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant and obtain possession under various circumstances set out in section\n\n12. If a Ian dlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession.\n\nHe is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action.\n\nBut that is not sufficient.\n\nThis requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like\n\nthe Rent Registration Act. If the landlord is able to show his G requirement when the action is commenced and the requirement continued till the date of the decree of the Trial Court and thereafter during the pendency of the appeal by the tenant if the landlord comes in possession of the premises sufficient to satisfy his requirement, on the view taken by the High Court, the tenant should be able H to show that the subsequent events disentitled the plaintiff, on the only ground that here is tenant against whom a decree or order for\n\nA eviction has been passed and no additional evidence was admissible to take note of subsequent events.\n\nWhen a statutory right of appeal is conferred against the decree or the order and once in exercise of the right an appeal is preferred the decree or order ceases to be final.\n\nWhat the definition of 'tenant' excludes from its operation is the person against whom the decree or order for eviction is made and B the decree or order has become final in the sense that it is not open to further adjudication by a court or heirarachy of courts. An appeal is a continuation of suit. Therefore a tenant against whom a decree for eviction is passed by Trial Court does not lose protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. Therefore it is indisputable that the C decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred the appeal being a continuation of suit, landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show\n\nthat the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same.\n\nOtherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage.\n\nAn illustration would clarify what we want to convey. A landlord was in a position to show he needed possession of demised premises on the date of the suit as well as on the date of the decree of the trial court. When the matter was pending in appeal at the instance of the tenant, the landlord built a house or bungalow which would fully satisfy his requirement. If this subsequent event is taken into consideration, the landlord would have to be non-suited. Can the court shut its eyes and evict the tenant ?\n\nSuch is neither the spirit nor intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry. Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non suit the plaintiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. This position is no more in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra) where Justice Krishna Iyer speeking for the Court observed as under :-\n\n\"We affiirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy clain; ed by the party just and meaningfully as\n\nalso legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautions cognisance of events and development subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously observed.\"\n\nIn order to fully evaluate the law laid down in the aforementioned extracted passage it is worthwhile to give the background of facts in which it was made. The appellant landlord in that case was the owner of a large building which was leased out in separate portions to several tenants. One of such tenants was the respondent. The landlord wanted to start a business in automobile spares and claimed eviction of the respondent under the Rent Restriction Act being Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.\n\nThe petition was resisted and the Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The appeal of the landlord failed. But in revision the High Court chose to remand the case to the appellate authority and the appellate authority in turn remitted the case to the Trial Court for fresh disposal in accordance with certain directions. The landlord preferred a revison petition against the order of remand by the first appellate court. The High Court dismissed the action of the landlord taking cognisance of a sub\n\nsequent event namely that the landlord acquired possession of a reasonable suitable non-residential building in the same town. In appeal to this Court it was seriously contended that it was improper for the High Court to take into consideration the subsequent events and this contention was negatived inter alia on the ground in the passage extracted above. Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events.\n\nHe can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final. In view of the decision in Pasupuleti's case (supra) the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in TartJmal' s case\n\nmust be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of 'tenant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh\n\nA Act.\n\nTherefore, the High Court was in error in declining to take this subsequent event which was admittedly put forth in the plaint itself into consideration.\n\nThe landlord wants to start his business as Chemists and Druggists. On his own admission he has in his possession a. shop admeasuring 18' x 90' plus 7' x 68' forming part of the same building the remaining small portion of 7' x 22 is occupied by the tenant.\n\nThe landlord has not stated that so much space with 18' frontage is not reasonably suitable for starting his business as Chemist and Druggist. In that view of the matter the plaintiff's suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in section 12(l)(f) must fail and this is being done by not disturbing any finding of fact but relying upon the admission of the plaintiff himself.\n\nThere is an err0r apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as when the High Court was faced with a dilemma whether the landlord required the whole of the building including demised premises now. in possession of the appellant tenant for starting his business of Chemists and Druggists and when the High Court had before it an indisputable fact that the respondent landlord has obtained vacant possession of a major portion of the building which was in possession of firm M/s. Goraldas Parmanand, was it necessary for him to have any additional accommodation ? The High Court got over this dilemma by observing and by affirming the finding of the subordinate courts that the remaining portion of the premises would be used by the landlord for his residence and even though the portion utilised for the purpose of running the buisness would be smaller compared to the one to be utilized for the residence it would still not be violative of sub-section (7) of sec. 12 because such a composite user would not radically .change the purpose for which the accommodation was Jet.\n\nThis finding is contrary to record and pleadings.\n\nMinutely scanning the plaint presented by the landlord there is not the slightest suggestion that he needs any accommodation for his residence.\n\nHe has not even stated whether at present he is residing in some place of his own though he claimed to be residing in the same town.\n\nHe does not say whether he is under any obligation to surender that premises.\n\nSection 12(l)(e) specifically provides for a landlord obtainiHg possession of a building Jet for residential purposes if he bona fide requires the same for his own use and occupation.\n\nBut there is an additional condition he must fulfil namely he must further show that he has rio other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in, his\n\noccupation in the city or town concerned. Utter silence of the landlord on this point would be a compelling circumstance for the court not to go in search for some imaginary requirement of the landlord of accommodation for his residence. In the context of these facts the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court committed a manifest error apparent on the record by upholding the plaintiff's case by awarding possession also on the ground neither pleaded nor suggested. The landlord must have been quite aware that he cannot obtain possession of any accommodation for his residence. Therefore, the finding of the High Court and courts subordinate to it that the respondent-landlord requires possession of the whole of the building including the one occupied by the tenant for starting his business as Chemists and Druggists as also for his residence is vitiated beyond repair. Once impermissible approach to the facts of the case on hand is avoided although facts found by the Courts are accepted as sacrosanct yet in view of the!incontrovertible position that emerges from the evidence itself that the landlord has acquired major portion of the building in which he can start his business as Chemists and Druggists he is not entitled to an inch of an extra space under section 12(1)(f) of the Act.\n\nRespondent landlord also sought possession on the ground set out in section 12(I)(h) which reads as under :-\n\n\"that the accommodation is required bona fide by the E landlord for the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alternations and that such building or re-building or alterations cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated.\"\n\nIn order to obtain possession under section l 2(l)(h) the landlord again .has to establish his bona fide requirement of the accommodation in possession of the tenant for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and must further show that such building or re-building or alterations cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. The case of the landlord on this point is that he wants possession of the whole of the building including the suit premises and he has Rs. 8,000 in a fixed deposit account and that as the building is in a dilapidated condition, he would reconstruct the same and use it for himself both for residence and starting his business.\n\nIf landlord acquires possession under section 12(l)(h), section\n\nA 18 imposes corresponding obligation which reads as under_;,-\n\n\"18.\n\nRecovery of possession for repairs and rebuilding and re-entry.-(1) In making any order on the grounds specified in clause (g) or clause (h) of sub-section (I) of Sec. 12, the Court shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and, if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the before election in the order and specify therein the date on or which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building, as the case may be.\"\n\nThe courts declined to grant any relief to .the tenant under section 18 on the ground that as the landlord's requirement is a composite one, the tenant is not entitled to be reinducted in the building that may be reconstructed by the landlord after obtaining possession of the same.\n\nNow once it is held that the landlord is not entitled to possession for his residence and he has more than enough accommodation in his possession for carrying on his business, the composite requirement disappears.\n\nLandlord's case will, therefore. have to be exclusively examined in the context of section 12(I)(h).\n\nTwo contentions were urged on behalf of the appellant to negative the case of the landlord in this behalf; one that the building is not in a dilapidated condition and secondly it can be repaired without vacating the premises. As all the courts have concurrently found that the building is. in a dilapidated condition, this finding is entitled to respect and it is not proper for us to interfere with the same. The question would however be whether the landlord wants to reconstruct the demised portion of the premises even though he is not entitled to acquire possession of the same for his use and that he would be under an obligation to reinduct the tenant after its construction. The further question is whether the landlord is interested in reconstructing the whole building. It was alternatively contended that no attempt is made to find out whether the landlord would be in a position to reconstruct that part of the building which has come in his possession once he is not in a position to acquire possession of the demised premises for his own use.\n\nThis situation calls for a fresh examination of the case of the landlord under section 12(1)(h). If landlord is to be awarded possession under section 12(l)(h1 on the footing that, that is the only ground on which he can seek possession, it will have to be found out after giving oppor-\n\n.......\n\n...\n\ntunity to the landlord to prove whether he is interested in re-building that portion of the building which is occupied by the appellant and further the court should give necessary direction under section 18. In that event the court will have also to ascertain whether the portion which is now in possession of the landlord and which he may be interested in reconstructing can be reconstructed without the tenant vacating the demised premises. As the whole foundation of the landlord's case of composite requirement disappears tho matter has to be examined afresh on the footing that the landlord has come to the court for possession under section 12(l)(h) only and if he succeeds in his prayer for possession on the ground mentioned in section 12(l)(h) it would be necessary for the court to give appro priate direction under section 18 of the Act. As the matter has not been examined from this angle by any Court it has become inevitable, even though the litigation is pending for a long time, to remit the case for examination of this aspect. The question is whether the remand should be to the first appellate court or to the trial court. As the first appellate court is the fact finding court, in our opinion it would be appropriate for us to remit the case, after setting aside the decree of the first appellate court as well as the High Court, to the first appellate court to ascertain :-\n\n(i) Whether the landlord is interested in reconstructing that portion of the building which is in possession of\n\nthe tenant as demised premises ; E\n\n(ii) Whether the landlord would be in a position to reconstruct the building in his possession without the tenant being required to vacate the demised premises ; and\n\n(iii) if the first two queries are answered in favour of the landlord, what should be the appropriate directions to be given in favour of the tenant as enjoined by S. 18 ?\n\nAccordingly, this appeal is allowed and the decree of eviction made by the trial court and confirmed by the 1st appellate court and\n\nalso by the High Court is set aside.\n\nThe prayer of the landlord for G possession under section 12(l)(f) is negatived as he is not entitled to recover possession on the ground mentioned in section 12(l)(f). The matter is remanded to the 1st Appelate Court for the limited purposes set out in the just preceding paragraph. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nPATHAK J.\n\nThis is tenant's appeal by special leave against the\n\njudgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh arising out of a suit for ejectment.\n\nThe suit was filed by the respondent, Raghunath Prasad. He claimed to be the owner of a building in Sadar Bazar, Bilaspur.\n\nOne portion of the building was occupied by a firm Goraldas Permanand. According to the plaint, the entire building was in a dilapidated condition and the plaintiff intended to reconstruct the front portion of the building and to effect major repairs in the rear portion. In order to do so it was said to be necessary that the defendants should vacate the the accommodation. In regard to the other portion, the plaintiff stated that he had obtained a decree for ejectment against Goraldas Parmanand. The plaintiff also alleged that he intended to start the business of a medicine shop and for that purpose he required the accommodation occupied by the defendants as it faced the main road in Sadar Bazar, and that he had no other suitable accommodation in the town for such business.\n\nThe suit was resisted by the defendants, and a number of pleas were taken. In particular it was denied that the accommodation occupied by them was dilapidated and that it was bona fide required by the plaintiff. It was claimed that in view of the decree for ejectment against Goraldas Parmanand the plaintiff had suitable E alternative accommodation for his proposed business.\n\nThe trial court found that the entire building, including the accommodation occupied by the defendants, needed reconstruction and repairs, and that for the purpose of his projected business the plaintiff had bona fide need of the accommodation held by the defendants. It was observed that the accommodation occupied by Goraldas Parmanand was still under litigation as an appeal was pending in the case. Holding that the grounds under section 12(1)\n\n(f) and 12(1)(h) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act were made out, the suit was decreed for ejectment.\n\nThe defendants preferred an appeal, and the first appellate court while dismissing the appeal maintained the findings of the trial court and upheld the order of ejectment.\n\nA second appeal by the defendants was dismissed by the High Court on 17th April, 1976.\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal the defendants moved an application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to amend their written statement\n\nHASMAT RAJ v. RAGHUNATH (Pathak, J.) 623\n\nby adding the plea that the plaintiff had secured vacant possession of the adjoining portion of the building from Goraldas Parmanand in the year 1972, and that the case should be remanded for deciding whether the accommodation acquired was reasonably suitable for starting a medicine shop, the purpose for which the plaintiff said he required the accommodation held by the defendants. The High Court rejected the application observing that it had been moved three and a half years after the event had taken place, that it was not made bona fide but was intended merely to gain time and would result in grave injustice to the plaintiff. The High Court also observed that even if the amendment was allowed it would not affect the decision of the case, because as the plaintiff's need extended to entire building his securing vacant possession of one part would not conclude the matter. It was pointed out that the plaintiff intended to reconstruct the entire portion of the building including the . accommodation occupied by the defendants, as well as effect major repairs to the rear portion of the building. In place of the shop of the defondants with a frontage of 7' and a depth of 22' and the adjoining shop with a frontage of 10' and a depth of 90', the plaintiff inteµded to demolish the front portion of both the shops and to reconstruct the building with a new shop having a wide frontage of 22' and a depth of 7', and to reside in. the rear portion of the bµilding.\n\nThe High Court added that residence in the rear portion of the accommodation would not alter the nature of the accommodation as the residence would be incidental to the main purpose of carrying on the medicine business in the front portion of the building.\n\nThe defendants having obtained special leave from this Court this appeal is now before us.\n\nAs analysis of the plaint shows tbat the ejectment of the appellants was sought on two grounds. The respondent intended to reconstruct the front portion of the dilapidated building and to repair the rear portion and according to him this required the appellants to vacate the accommodation occupied by them. That clearly is the ground envisaged by s. 12(I)(h), Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. That ground stood on its own. The respondent also intended to open a medicine shop in the front portion of the building, and he pleaded that he had no other accommodation for the purpose.\n\nThat brings into play s. 12(1)(f) of the Act. The plea shows that as the dilapidated building required reconstruction and repairs, the respondent indended to avail of the opportunity to so effect the structural alterations as to accommodate a medicine\n\nshop which he planned to start as a business in the premises.\n\nThis latter ground arose as a sequal to the first. If the first ground was made out, the appellants would have to vacate the portion held by them, and if that had been the only ground the court would automatically be called upon to consider s. 18 of the Act, which entitles the tenant at his option to be reinstated in a portion of the reconstructed building. There was the further ground that the respondent proposed to start his own business in the front portion of the building, and the finding of the High Court that the respondent wanted the rear portion of the building for his personal residence.\n\nThe subordinate courts were influenced by the consideration that although the respondent had obtained a decree for ejectment against Goraldas Parmanand, the case continued to be the subject of litigation and therefore it could not be said that the respondent was in possession of alternative accommodation. However, while the second appeal was pending in the High Court the appellants applied for amendment of their written statement to include the plea that the respondent had meanwhile obtained possession from Goraldas Parmanand. The High Court declined to permit the amendment. In doing so, it seems to me that the High Court erred. It was an essential part of the appellants' defence from the outset that the portion let out to Goraldas Permanand constituted suitable alternative accommodation, and therefore they should not be ejected. It is immaterial that the amendment was sought more than three years after possession of the portion had passed to the respondent.\n\nThe High Court was bound to take the fact into consideration because, as is well settled now, in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes Ito the contrary the requirement mus( continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority. That position, to my mind, is indisputable. The High Court should have allowed the amendment. The High Court, alternatively observed that the respondent wanted to accommodate his shop in the front portion of the building and therefore, of necessity, he would require the portion occupied by the appellants.\n\nThat conclusion is based on the findings rendered by the courts below, which findings the High Court respected as findings of fact.\n\nBut the High Court failed to note that both the courts below had proceeded on the assumption that the adjoining portion occupied by Goraldas Parmanand was not immediately available on account of litigation.\n\nIt is for that reason that permitting the amendment sought by the\n\nHASMAT RAJ v. RAGHUNATH (Pathak, J.) 625\n\nappellants became relevant and, indeed, imperative. If the respondent has obtained possession of that portion, and that does not seem to be disputed, it becomes a serious question for decision whether the repondent needs the front portion of the building for his medicine shop and, if so, according to dimensions proposed by him, In the consideration of that question the element of the respondent's need for the rear portion of the building for, his personal residence must be ignored. That need was never pleaded in the plaint and, as will be seen from s. 12(I)(e) of the Act, several considerations need to be satisfied before the need can be held proved. This aspect of the matter was apparantly not brought to the notice of the High Court and therefore it fell into the error of tking this element into account.\n\nMy brother Desai has in his judgment held that the respondent can accommodate his medicine shop in the portion vacated by Goraldas Parmanand and he has indicated the dimensions of the shop which appear reasonable to him. With great respect I am unable to concur with what he has said. Whether or not the shop should be located in the front portion of the building and what should be its dimensions will turn on the evidence adduced by the parties in that behalf. The original record of the suit is not before us, and without knowledge of the state of the evidence I would refrain from a finding on the point. Indeed, it seems to me in the circumstances of this case to be pre-eminently a task to be entrusted to a subordinate court.\n\nTpe position which then emerges is this.\n\nThe respondent has made out his case under s. 12( I)(h) of the Act that he requites the building, including the portion occupied by the appellants, for recon struction of the front portion and repairs to the rear portion, and that necessitates that the appellants vacate their accommodation.\n\nThis matter is concluded by the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the trial court and the first appellate court. It is also concluded by concurrent findings of fact that the respondent needs a portion of the building for starting the business of a medicine shop. What should be the location of the shop and what its dimensions is a matter which remains for decision. And there is the further question of considering the availablity of s. 18 of the Act to the appellants.\n\nBoth these questions, I think, should be left to the first appellate court.\n\nAccordingly, I allow the the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and of the first appellate court and remand\n\nthe case to the latter court for permitting the appellants to amend their written statement and allowing the parties to lead such evidence as is consequentially called for, and thereafter to decide the case afresh in the light of the observations made above.\n\nI would leave the parties to bear their costs.\n\nS, R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n-\\ --", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "HASMAT RAJ & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HASMAT RAJ & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUNATH PRASAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUNATH PRASAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 28, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 51, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAGHUNATH PRASAD\n\nApril 28, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\nMadhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Scope of section 12( I) (f)-Bonafide requirement under section 12(1}(f}-Landlord filing two eviction suits and acquiring possession of a major portion of the suit premises through an eviction order passed in one of them-Whether this acquisition amounts to the landlord \"has a reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned\" within the meaning of section 12(I)(f) of the Act-Noticing of such event subsequent to the passing of the decreefor eviction in the other eviction suit, whether a must by the Court- P.ropriety of refusal of leave to amend the written statement under order VT rule 17 Civil Procedure Code by the High Court."}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Goraldas Parmanand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1553, "end_char": 1571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view of the fact that the landlord obtained eviction order against the firm Goraldas Parmanand on the ground th at the building was required for the purPose of reconstruction and repairs and also for bona fide requirement, in the later eviction suit filed aainst the appellant, in para 4 of the plaint the landlord stated that he was in possession of a major portion of the non-residential building which he obtained from the firm M/s. Goraldas Parmanand, The appellant contested the eviction suit filed against him on the ground,\n\n(a) that the premises was not in dilapidated condition and did not, therefore,\n\n~ need reconstruction and repairs and (b) that the landlord in view of his own admission in the plaint at para 4 has a reasonable suitable non-residential accommodation of his own and therefore cannot claim his eviction under section (12)(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.", "canonical_name": "Goraldas Parmanand"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1981, "end_char": 2027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Goraldas Parmanand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2350, "end_char": 2368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal the first appellate court, while confirming the finding of the trial court that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required re-construction and repairs, held that even though the landlord obtained a decree against the firm Goraldas Parmanand, he had not got actual possession, as the litigation was still pending and, therefore, the plaintiff's requirements of the whole building was established.", "canonical_name": "Goraldas Parmanand"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2633, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 12(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3018, "end_char": 3035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Goraldas Parmanand", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3143, "end_char": 3161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court rejected\n\nthe application observing that the adjoining portion occupied by-firm Goraldas Parmanand was vacated by the firm as for back as in the year 1972 and, therefore, the application for amendment filed 3·1/2 years after the filing of the [second appeal must be rejected."}}, {"text": "section 12(1l(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4228, "end_char": 4244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommoaation Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4252, "end_char": 4298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4685, "end_char": 4701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Accommoaation Control Act, 1961", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Accommoaation Control Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4803, "end_char": 4823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5409, "end_char": 5455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "HASMAT RAJ V. RAGHUNATH 607", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6492, "end_char": 6519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nHASMAT RAJ V. RAGHUNATH 607\n\nderive an unfair advantage, and it would be against the spirit -or intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry, In such a situation it would be incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events."}}, {"text": "Rent Restriction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6602, "end_char": 6622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7582, "end_char": 7599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Restriction Act", "statute": "Rent Restriction Act"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(1)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8436, "end_char": 8452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(l)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8900, "end_char": 8916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8992, "end_char": 9002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9718, "end_char": 9728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A Per Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9753, "end_char": 9765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[621 C-F]\n\nA Per Pathak, J. (Concurring)\n\nI. In a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes the contrary the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of, either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10241, "end_char": 10261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10382, "end_char": 10398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10784, "end_char": 10794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11708, "end_char": 11718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.K. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11969, "end_char": 11979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P.N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11981, "end_char": 11990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "E.M.S. Anam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11995, "end_char": 12006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P.P. Juneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12028, "end_char": 12039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.P. Juneja for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12101, "end_char": 12106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nA tenant m; ider a decree of eviction is the appellant.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Bilaspur town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12386, "end_char": 12399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent landlord filed a suit for recovery of possession of premises being a small shop admeasuring 7' X 22' forming part of a big non-residential building situated in Sadar Bazar, Bilaspur town in Madhya Pradesh on two grounds, to wit : (i) that he (landlord) intended to open a medicine shop and he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation for the same in the town ; and (ii) that he\n\n(landlord) required the suit building for the purpose of reconstruction and repairs which could not be carried out unless it was vacated by the defendant."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12403, "end_char": 12417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent landlord filed a suit for recovery of possession of premises being a small shop admeasuring 7' X 22' forming part of a big non-residential building situated in Sadar Bazar, Bilaspur town in Madhya Pradesh on two grounds, to wit : (i) that he (landlord) intended to open a medicine shop and he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation for the same in the town ; and (ii) that he\n\n(landlord) required the suit building for the purpose of reconstruction and repairs which could not be carried out unless it was vacated by the defendant."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13986, "end_char": 13996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14004, "end_char": 14050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Goral Parmanand", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14383, "end_char": 14398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Goral Parmanand he G had not got actual possession as the litigation was still pending and, therefore, the plaintiff's requirement of the whole building was established."}}, {"text": "s. 12(l}(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15211, "end_char": 15222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16330, "end_char": 16347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12(l}(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16539, "end_char": 16555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1960", "statute": "Control Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17148, "end_char": 17159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1960", "statute": "Control Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 S.C.R. 958", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17235, "end_char": 17254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bilaspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18174, "end_char": 18182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He must, therefore, show that he has not got in his possession a reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the town of Bilaspur."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20114, "end_char": 20124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20348, "end_char": 20358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20438, "end_char": 20448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20609, "end_char": 20625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20975, "end_char": 20991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12( I )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21262, "end_char": 21280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taramal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28787, "end_char": 28794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court referred to its earlier judgment in Taramal's case wherein it was held that the protection to a statutory tenant lapsed with the passing of a decree and such a person had no right to bring on record new circumstances which were not in existence at the date of the passing of the decree."}}, {"text": "section\n\n12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29232, "end_char": 29243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rent Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30038, "end_char": 30059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32653, "end_char": 32731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33257, "end_char": 33281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position is no more in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra) where Justice Krishna Iyer speeking for the Court observed as under :-\n\n\"We affiirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy clain; ed by the party just and meaningfully as\n\nalso legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautions cognisance of events and development subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously observed.\""}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33304, "end_char": 33316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position is no more in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra) where Justice Krishna Iyer speeking for the Court observed as under :-\n\n\"We affiirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy clain; ed by the party just and meaningfully as\n\nalso legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautions cognisance of events and development subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously observed.\""}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34269, "end_char": 34286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pasupuleti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35895, "end_char": 35905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the decision in Pasupuleti's case (supra) the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in TartJmal' s case\n\nmust be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of 'tenant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh\n\nA Act."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35941, "end_char": 35966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the decision in Pasupuleti's case (supra) the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in TartJmal' s case\n\nmust be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of 'tenant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh\n\nA Act."}}, {"text": "TartJmal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35970, "end_char": 35978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the decision in Pasupuleti's case (supra) the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in TartJmal' s case\n\nmust be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of 'tenant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh\n\nA Act."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36165, "end_char": 36179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the decision in Pasupuleti's case (supra) the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in TartJmal' s case\n\nmust be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of 'tenant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh\n\nA Act."}}, {"text": "section 12(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36834, "end_char": 36850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37940, "end_char": 37947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38465, "end_char": 38481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(1)(f)", "label": 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"end_char": 46453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK J.\n\nThis is tenant's appeal by special leave against the\n\njudgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh arising out of a suit for ejectment."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46530, "end_char": 46546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was filed by the respondent, Raghunath Prasad.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUNATH PRASAD"}}, {"text": "Goraldas Permanand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46667, "end_char": 46685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One portion of the building was occupied by a firm Goraldas Permanand.", "canonical_name": "Goraldas Parmanand"}}, {"text": "section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48213, "end_char": 48226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th April, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48587, "end_char": 48603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second appeal by 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{"document_id": "1981_3_627_646_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SEWAKRAM SOBHANI\n\nR.K. KARANJIA, CHIEF EDITOR,\n\nWEEKLY BLITZ & ORS.\n\nMay 1, 1981\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nPenal Code-Section 499-Ninth exception-Scope of-Respondent made imputations regarding character of appellant in an article published in his journal purporting to be based on confidential report of a high official of State Government- Government claimed privilege in regard to report-Magistrate proceeded to record plea of accused without seeing report-Government wuived privilege before High\n\nCourt-In revision High Court held te news item justified on the basis of report- High Court, whether competent to quash the order of Magistrate.\n\nA news item published in the Blitz weekly of which the respondent was the Editor, stated that the appellant enticed a female detenu who alongwith him, D was detained in the Central Jail under the Maintenance of Internal Security 'Act and that she had conceived through him and that on getting released on parole she had had the pregnancy terminated. It was further stated that a confidential enquiry conducted by a senior officer of the Home Department revealed that it was the appellant who was responsible for the detenu's pregnancy.·\n\nOn release from jail the appellant lodged a criminal complaint against the E respondent. Before the Magistrate the respondent prayed that the report of the Enquiry Officer be sent for. But the report could not be obtained because the\n\nState Government claimed privilege in respect of that report. When the Magistrate proceeded to record the plea of the accused under section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent requested that his plea be recorded only after the enquiry report was produced; but the Magistrate rejected the request.\n\nThe respondent thereupon filed a revision before the High Court for setting aside the order of the Magistrate. Waiving privilege the State Government produced a copy of the enquiry report before the High Court.\n\nA single Judge of the High Court quashed the proceedings on the view that the respondent's case clearly fell within the ambit of the ninth exception to section 499, I.P.C. because, ccording to him, the publication had been made honestly in the belief of its truth and also upon reasonable ground for such belief, after the exercise of such means to verify its truth as would be taken by a man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances.\n\nOn the question whether the High Court was right in quashing the order of H the Magistrate, remanding the case to the Magistrate.\n\nA (Per majority : Chinnappa Reddy and A.P. Sen JJ-Baharul Islam J dissenting)\n\nHELD : The order passed by the High Court should be set aside. The Magistrate should record the plea of the accused under section 251 Cr. P.C. and thereafter proceed with the trial according to law.\n\n(Per Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\nTo attract the ninth exception to section 499, I.P.C. the imputations must be shown to have been made (1) in good faith and (2) for the protection of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. The insistence of the section is upon the exercise of due care and attention. The standard of care and attention must depend on the circumstances of an individual case, the nature of imputation, the need and the opportunity for verification and so on.\n\nIn every case it is a question of fact to be decided on its particular facts and circumstances. [631 A-Bl\n\nHarbhajan Stngh v. State of Punjab, [1965] 3 SCR 235 @ 244, Chaman Lal\n\nv. The State of Punjab [1970] 3 SCR 913 @ 916 and 918.\n\nSeveral questior>s may arise for consideration depending on the stand taken by the accused at the trial and how the complainant proposed to demolish the defence. In the instant case the stage for deciding these questions had not arrived yet. Answers to such questions, even before the plea of the accused was recorded, could only be a priori conclusions. [632 HJ\n\nThe respondent; s prayer before the High Court was to quash the Magistrate's order and not to quash the complaint itself as the High Court has done. But that was only a technical defect which need not be taken seriously in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution where the Court is concerned with substantial justice and not with shadow puppetry. [630 G]\n\n(Per A.P. Sen /.}\n\nThe order of the High Court quashing the prosecution under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wholly perverse and had resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. The High Court has pre-judged the whole issue without a trial of the accused persons. The matter was at the state of recording the pleas of the accused under section 251 Cr. P.C. The circumstances brought out clearly showed that .the respondent was prima facie guilty of defamation punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code unless covered by one of the exceptions of section 499 Indian Penal Code. [635 E-F]\n\nThe burden to prove that his case would come within the ninth exception to section 499, namely, that the imputation was in good faith and was for the protection of.the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good was on the respondent. All that the respondent prayed for was that the Magistrate should not proceed to record his plea under section 251 Cr. P.C. without persuing the enquiry report. There was no application for quashing the prosecution itself. [636 F; 637 CJ\n\nSEWAKRAM V. R.K. KARANJIA 629\n\nThe enquiry report in respect of which the Government claimed privilege had by itself no evidentiary value. The contents of that report could not be made use of unless the facts were proved by evidence aliunde. The report being per se defamatory, it was for the accused to plead the ninth exception in defence and discharge the burden of proving good faith which implies the exercise of due care and caution and to show that the attack on the character of the appellant was for the public good. [637 E; G; HJ\n\n Sukro Mahto v. Basdeo Kumar Mahto and Anr. [1971] Supp. SCR 329 at 332, Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab [1965] 3 SCR 235, Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab [1970] 3 SCR 913, referred to.\n\nThe High Court appears to be labouring under an impression that journalists enioyed some kind of special privilege. Journalists are in no better position than any other person. Even the truth of an allegation does not permit a justification under the first exception unless it is proved to be in the public good, The question whether or not it was for public good is a question of fact like any other relevant fact in issue. If they make assertions of facts as opposed to comments on them, they must either justify these assertions or in the limited cases specified in the ninth exception, show that the attack on the character of another was for the public good or that it was made in good faith. [638 G-H]\n\nDr. N.B. Khare v. M.R. Masani and Ors., ILR 1943 Nag. 347, Arnold v.\n\nD King Emperor LR (1913-14) 41 Ind. App. 149 at 169, referred to.\n\n(Per Baharu/ /slum J.)\n\nThe Court did not commit any error in quashing the appellant's complaint.\n\n[646 E] The High Court's judgment justifies the factual submission of the respon- E dents that their application wa~ under section 482 as wen as under sections 397 and 401 of Cr. P.C. and that they claimed and canvassed the protection under the ninth exception to section 499, I.P.C. The omission in the prayer portion of a petition, particularly in a criminal case, is not fatal. The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, can always grant suitable relief justified by law as wen as facts and circumstances of a particular case. [641 H; 642 DJ\n\nThe definition of \"good faith\" which is couched in negative terms indicates that lack of good faith has been' made a part of the offence which the prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt. On the other Iland, proof by the accused of the report to be an authentic document is enough. It would create a doubt in the mind of the Court as to the Jack of \"good faith\" on the part of the accused. [644 F-G]\n\nIf on a complaint made by a citizen aneging laxity in the observance of jail rules, if the report submitted by a high Government official on the basis of an enquiry conducted by him was for public good and if the respondents had reasons to believe its contents to the true, they will be protected under the ninth exception even if the burden of proof of good faith is on the accused. Good faith need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. [645 BJ\n\nThe report of the enquiry officer was exhaustive, reasoned and was based on evidence. The report leads one to believe the imputations. If that be so, it\n\n630 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA cannot be said that the respondents published the report or its summary without due care and attention. This establishes good faith under the ninth exception to section 499. Therefore, the publication obviously was for public good. [646 B-C]\n\nIn the instant case even if the findings of the report be proved to be false, the respondents would be protected. Sending back the case to the Magistrate would be an exercise in futility and abuse of the process of the criminal court B as the High Court has pointed out. [646 D-E]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 543-545 of 1979.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 15th April, 1978 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision No. 701/77, 105/78 & 103/78 respectively.\n\nH.K. Puri for the Appellant.\n\nR.K. Garg, Sunil Kumar Jain and V.J. Era for Respondents Nos. 1, 2, 5 & 6.\n\nS.K. Gambhir and Vijay Mansaria for the State.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. I agree with my brother A.P. Sen that the order passed by the High Court should be set aside and that the Magistrate should be directed to record the plea of the accused under Sec. 251 Criminal Procedure Code and, thereafter, to proceed with the trial according to law.\n\nThe facts leading to these appeals have been stated in the judgments of both my brethren A.P. Sen and Baharul Islam and it is unnecessary for me to state them over again.\n\nThe prayer in the application before the High Court was merely to quash the order dated November 30, 1977 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal and not to quash the complaint itself as the High Court has done.\n\nBut, that was only a technical defect and we do not take serious notice of it in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution where we are very naturally concerned with substantial justice and not with shadow puppetry. The position now is this : The news item in the Blitz under the caption 'MISA Rape in Bhopal Jail' undoubtedly contained serious imputations against the character and conduct of the complainant. In order to attract the 9th Exception to Sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code, the imputations must be shown to have been made (1) in good\n\n-~ -1---\n\nSBWAKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 631\n\nfaith, and (2) for the protection of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. 'Good Faith' is defined, in a negative fashion, by Sec. 52 Indian Penal Code as follows: \"Nothing is said to be done or believed in 'Good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention\". The insistence is upon the exercise of due care and attention. Recklessness and negligence are ruled out by . the very nature of the definition. The standard of care and attention .must depend on the circumstances of the individual case, the nature of the imputation, the need and the opportunity for verification, the situation and context in which the imputation was made, the position of the person making the imputation, and a variety of other factors. Good faith, therefore is a matter for evidence. It is a question of fact to be decided on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. So too the question whether an imputation was made for the public good. In fact the _1st Exception of Sec. 499 Indian Penal Code expressly states \"Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact\". 'Public Good' like 'Good faith' is a matter for evidence and not conjecture.\n\nIn Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1) this Court observed (at p. 244):\n\n\"Thus, it would be clear that in deciding whether an accused person acted in good faith under the Ninth Exception, it is not possible to lay down any rigid rule or test.\n\nIt would be a question to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case ... what is the nature of the imputation made; under what circumstances did it come to be made; what is the status of the person who makes the imputation; was there any malice in his mind when he made the said imputation; did he make any enquiry before he made it; are there reasons to accept his story that he acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that fthe imputation was true? These and other considerations would be relevant in deciding the plea of good faith made by an accused person who Claims the benefit of the Ninth Exception\".\n\nAgain in Chaman Lal v. The State of Punjab (2) this Court said (at p. 916):\n\n(I) [1965] 3 S.C.R. 235 @244.\n\n\n''In order to establish good faith and bona fide it has to be seen first the circumstance under which the letter was written or words were uttered; secondly, whether there was any malice; thirdly, whether the appellant made any enquiry before he made the allegations; fourthly, whether there are reasons to accept the version that he acted with care and caution and finally whether there is preponderance of probability that the appellant acted in good faith\".\n\nLater the Court said (at p. 918):\n\n\"Good faith requires care and caution and prudence in the background of context and circumstances. The position of the person making the imputation will regulate the standard of the person making the imputation will regulate the standard of care and caution\".\n\nSeveral questions arise for consideration if the Ninth Exception is to be applied to the facts of the present case. Was the Article published after exercising due care and attention? Did the author of the article satisfy himself that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the imputations made by him were true? Did he act with reasonable care and a sense of responsibility and propriety?\n\nWas the article based entirely on the report of the Deputy Secretary\n\nor was there any other material before the author? What steps did the author take to satisfy himself about the authenticity of the report and its contents? Were the imputations made rashly without any attempt at verification? Was the imputation the result of any personal ill will or malice which the author bore towards the complainant? Was it the result of any ill will or malice which the author bore towards the political group to which the complainant belonged?\n\nWas -the article merely intended to malign and scandalise the complainant or the party to which he belonged? Was the article intended to expose the rottenness of a jail administration which permitted free sexual approaches between male and female detenus? Was the article intended to expose the despicable character of persons who were passing off as saintly leaders?\n\nWas the article merely intended to provide salacious reading material for readers who had a peculiar taste for scandals? These and several other questions may arise for consideration, depending on the stand taken by the accused at the trial and how the complainant proposes to demolish the defence.\n\nSurely the stage for deciding these questions has not arrived yet.\n\nAnswers to these questions at this stage, even before the plea of the\n\nSEWAKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA (Sen, J.) 633\n\naccused is recorded can only be a priori conclusions. 'Good faith' A 'public good' are, as we said, questions of fact and matters for evidence. So, the trial must go on.\n\nSEN, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated April 15, 1978 quashing the prosecution of the respondent, R.K. Karanjiya, Chief Editor, Blitz, for an offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code for publication of a news-item in that paper which was per se defamatory, on the ground that he was protected under Ninth Exception to s. 499 of the Code.\n\nDuring the period of Emergency the appellant, who is a senior lawyer practising at Bhopal, was placed under .detention under s.3 (I) (a) (ii) o(the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 and was lodged in the Central Jail, Bhopal. There were several other detenus belonging to the opposition parties lodged along with him in the same jail, including three lady detenus, viz., Smt. Uma Shukla,\n\nSmt. Ramkali Misra, Advocate and Smt. Savitha Bajpai, later State Minister, Public Works Department. The husband of Smt. Uma Shukla, a practising advccate at Bhopal, was not detained. Smt. Shukla was released on parole for a week between June 10 and 18, 1976.\n\nOn her return to the jail it was found that she had conceived. She was examined on July 30, 1976, by a lady doctor, Dr. (Mrs) N.C.\n\nSrivstava, Woman Asst. Surgeon and the pregnancy was reported to be six weeks old. Smt. Shukla was again released on parole in the month of August 1976 and on August 24, 1976, she got the pregnancy terminated by Dr. (Mrs) Upadhayay at the Zanana Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal with the written consent of her husband under s.3 of the Medical (Termination of Pregnancy) Act, 1976.\n\nWhile the order of detention of the appellant was still in operation, there was an ex parte confidential enquiry held. by Shri S.R. Sharma, I.A.S. Deputy Secretary (Home) Government of Madhya Pradesh, into the circumstances leading to the pregnancy of Smt. Shukla. The Enquiry Officer by his report dated November 3, 1976, apparently held that the pregnancy was due to illicit relations between the appellant and SJ1?.t. Shukla, during their detention in the Central Jail.\n\nOn December 25, 1976, the Blitz, in its three editions in English, Hindi and Urdu simultaneously flashed a summary of the report and the story as given out was that (i) there was a mixing of male and female detenus in the Central Jail, Bhopal,\n\n(ii) the appellant had the opportunity and access to mix with Smt.\n\nShukla freely, and (iii) Smt. Shukla became pregnant through the\n\nA appellant. The news-item was per se defamatory. It is somewhat surprising that the Enquiry Report, which was a document of highly confidential nature, should have found its way to the Press.\n\nWith the revocation -of Emergency, the appellant along with the other political detenus was released from detention. On his release, the appellant lodged a criminal complaint for defamation against the respondent, R.K. Karanjia.\n\nThe respondent, on appearing before the Magistrate, moved an application under s. 91 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying that the report of the Enquiry Officer be sent for as it was likely to be lost or destroyed. On August 23, 1976 the learned Magistrate allowed the app)ication and directed that ther eport with the concerned file be produced. The State Government, however, did not comply with the direction and by an application dated December 31, 1977, claimed privilege in respect of the Enquiry Report which still awaited consideration. On October 29, 1977 when the case was fixed for recording the plea of the accused under s. 251 of the Code, the respondent moved an application stating that the plea should be recorded only after the Enquiry Report was produced. The learned Magistrate by his order dated November 30, 1977, rejected the said application of the respondent as to the summoning of the records and directed the accused persons to appear in person or through counsel for explaining to them the substance of the accusation and also .for recording their pleas.\n\nThereafter, the respondent filed a rev1S1on before the High Court under s.397 of the Code for setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate and alternatively under s. 482 of the Code, if it were held to be an interlocutory order. The revision was heard by a learned Single Judge and it appears that the Government Advocate made available a copy of the Enquiry Report for the perusal of the learned Judge. The learned Judge by his order dated April 15, 1978, quashed the proceedings on the ground that the respondent's case \"clearly falls within the ambit of exception 9 of section 499 of the Indian Penal Code\". In reaching that conclusion, he observed that \"it would be abuse of the process of the court if the trial is allowed to proceed which ultimately would turn out to be a vexatious\n\nproceeding\". . The reasoning advanced by him was as follows:\n\nThe real question to ask is, did the applicants publish the report for public good, in public interest and in good faith?\n\nMy answer is in the affirmative.\n\nIt was a publication\n\nSEW AKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA (Sen, J.) 635\n\nof a report for the , welfare of the society.\n\nA public institution like prison had to be maintained in rigid discipline; the rules did not permit mixing of male prisoners with female prisoners and yet the report said the prison authorities connived at such a thing, a matter which was bound to arouse resentment and condemnation. The balance of public benefit lay in its publicity rather than in hushing up the whole episode. Further, there was good faith in the publication. The source on which the publishers acted was the proper source on which they were entitled to act and they did so with care and circumspection.\n\nThe report further shows that the publication had been honestly made in the belief of its truth and also upon reasonable ground for such a belief, after the exercise of such means to verify its truth as would be taken by a man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances.\n\n{emphasis added)\n\nIt is somewhat strange that the learned Judge should have made D public the contents of a document in respect of which the State Government claimed privilege.\n\nThe order recorded by the High Court quashing the prosecution under s.482 of the Code is wholly perverse and has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice. The High Court has pre-judged the whole issue without a trial of the accused persons. The matter was at the stage of recording the plea of the accused persons under s. 251 of the Code. The requirements of s. 251 are still to be complied with. The learned Magistrate had to ascertain whether the respondent pleads guilty to the charge or demands to be tried. The circumstances brought out clearly show that the respondent was prima facie guilty of defamation punishable under s. 500 of the Code unless he pleads one of the exceptions to s. 499 of the Code. The offending article which is per se defamatory, is as follows:\n\nMISA RAPE IN BHOPAL JATL (By Blitz Correspondent).\n\nBlitz: A shocking sex scandal involving a top RSS leader of M.P. was discussed at a secret meeting of Jan Sangh MLAs and MPs here recently. The alleged escapades of 55 years old Sewakram Sobhani. a close confidant of RSS Chief Bhausaheb Devras. with the young wife of another RSS man in the Bhopal Central Jail, where both were detained under MISA, have rocked RSS Jan Sangh circles of the State.\n\nAccording to a report submitted to the State Government by a Deputy Secretary in the Home Deptt. who inquired into the grfaly affair, Sobhani was reportedly responsible for making Mrs. Uma Shukla, 22 year old wife of a lawyer Yogesh Shukla, pregnant.\n\n/.bortion?\n\nWhen this was discovered she was quietly released on parole and, at her own request, taken for abortion to the Sultania Zanana Hospital. After discharge she refused to rejoin her husband but stayed during the remaining 'period of her parole in the hide-out of the 'total-revolutionaries' in the Professor's Colony. She returned to jail later and was transferred to the Hoshangabad Jail, while Sobhani was sent to the Raipur Central Jail.\n\nThe Official report throws light on how Sobhani allegedly enticed Mrs. Shukla with the help of a high official of the Bhopal Central Jail despite a ban on contacts between male and female detenus. The jail official, himself a close sympathiser of the RSS allowed Sobhani to meet her frequently in his office and their love sessions were in his anteroom. Yogesh Shukla has made a representation to the State Government alleging that Sobhani had committed adultery with his wife and demanded action against the jail authorities for permitting a \"rape\" of his wife.\n\nIt is for the respondent to plead that he was protected under Ninth Exception to s. 499 of the Code. The burden, such as it is, to prove that his case would come within that exception is on him.\n\nThe ingredients of the Ninth Exception are that ( 1) the imputation must be made in good faith, and (2) the imputation must be for the protection of the interests of the person making it or any other person or tor the public good.\n\nWe are completely at a loss to understand the reasons which impelled the High Court to quash the proceedings. The respondent, in his revision directed against the order of the learned Magistrate dated November 30, 1977, asserted in paragraph 5 that the case pre-eminently a fit case for quashing the impugned order either in the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or in the exercise of its inherent powers under s. 482 of the Code to prevent the abuse of\n\n~'\n\n- -+---..\n\n• SBWAKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA (Sen; J.) 637\n\nthe process of law and to secure the ends of justice. The prayer A made in the revision was in these terms:\n\nThe applicants pray that the impugned order be quashed and the learned Magistrate be directed to persue the report which he has sent for under section 91, Criminal Pro. Code and pass suitable orders according to law.\n\nAll that the respondent wanted is that learned Magistrate should not proceed to record the plea of the accused persons under s. 251 of the Code without perusing the Enquiry Report under s. 91 of the Code. There was no application made before the High Court under s. 482 of the Code for quashing the prosecution itself.\n\nThe averment contained in paragraph 4 that the Blitz only published a concise summary from the findings reached by the Deputy Secretary (Home) who was the Enquiry Officer appointed by the Government and, therefore, it was the duty of the learned Magistrate, to go through the report for himself and hold that no accusation had been made and the question of explaining it to the accused did not arise and the proceedings were liable to be dropped because no ingredients constituting an offence under s. 500 of the Code had been made out, must be read in conjunction with paragraph 5 and in support of the limited prayer made in revision. This cannot be construed as invoking the High Court's powers under s. 482 of the Code for quashing the whole proceedings.\n\nWe have considerable doubt about the propriety of the High Court making use of the Enquiry Report which has no evidentiary value and in respect of which the Government claimed privilege.\n\nThe application made by the Government claiming privilege still awaited consideration.\n\nWhile the Government claimed privilege at one stage, it appears to have waived the claim and produced the Enquiry Report and made the contents public. There was no factual basis for the observations made by the High Court underlined by me, except the Enquiry Report. The contents of the Enquiry Report cannot be made use of unless the facts are proved by evidence aliunde. There is also nothing on record to show that the accused persons made any enquiry of their own into the truth or other•wise of the allegations or exercised due care and caution for bringing the case under the Ninth Exception. The Enquiry Report cannot by itself fill in the lacunae.\n\nA bare perusal of the offending article in Blitz shows that it H is per se defamatory. There can be no doubt that the imputation\n\nmade would lower the appellant in the estimation of others.\n\nIt suggested that he was a man devoid of character and gave vent to his unbridled passion. It is equally defamatory of Smt. Shukla in that she was alleged to be a lady of easy virtue. We need not dilate on the matter any further. It is for the accused to plead Ninth Exception in defence and discharge the burden to prove good faith which implies the exercise of due care and caution and to show that the attack on the character of the appellant was for the public good.\n\nIn Sukro Mahto v. Basdeo Kumar Mahto & Anr (1) this Court observed:\n\nThe ingredients of the Ninth Exception are first that the imputation must be made in good faith; secondly, the imputation must be for protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. Good faith is a question of fact.\n\nSo is protection of the interest of the person making it. Public good is also a question of fact. ·\n\nAfter referring to the two earlier decisions in Harbhajan Singh v.\n\nState of Punjab (2) and Chaman Lal v. State of Punjf, b (3) the Court held that there must be evidence showing that the accused acted with due care and caution. \"He has to establish as a fact that he made enquiry before he made the imputation and he has to give reasons and facts to indicate that he acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that the imputation was correct.\n\nThe proof of the truth of the statement is not an element of the Ninth Exception as of the First Exception to s. 499. In the Ninth Exception the person making the imputation has to substantiate that his enquiry was attended with due care and attention and he was thus satisfied that the imputation was true.\"\n\nThe High Court appears to be labouring under an impression that journalists enjoyed some kind of special privilege, and have greater freedom than others to make any imputations or allegations, G sufficient to ruin the reputation of a citizen.\n\nWe hasten to add that journalists are in no better position than any other person. Even\n\nthe truth of an allegation does not permit a justification under First Exception unless it is proved to be in the public good. The question\n\n(1) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 329 at 332.\n\n\nSEW AKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA ( Baharul Islam, J.) 639\n\nwhether or not it was for public good is a question of fact like any A other relevant fact in issue. If they make assertions of facts as opposed to comments on them, they must either justify these assertions or, in the limited cases specified in the Ninth Exception, show that the attack on the character of another was for the public good, or that it was made in good faith: per Vivian Bose, J. in Dr. N.B. Khare\n\nv. M.R. Masani and Ors. (1) B\n\nAs the matter is of great public importance, it would, perhaps, be better to quote the well-known passage of Lord Shaw in Arnold\n\nv. King Emperor (2)\n\nThe freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but, apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher.\n\nThe responsibilities which attach to this power in the dissemination of printed matter may, and in the case of a conscientious journalist do, make him more careful: but the range of his assertions, his criticisms, or his comments, is as wide as, and no wider than, that of any other subject.\n\nNo privilege attaches to his position.\n\nFor these reasons, we must set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct the Magistrate to record the plea of the accused persons under s. 251 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and thereafter, to proceed with the trial according to law.\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J. Had there been no subsequent development after the impugned judgment of the High Court, 1 could have persuaded myself to agree to the order proposed by my Brother Sen, J., but after the Inquiry Report bas been released by the Government and placed before us I regret my inability to agree to the order of sending back the case to the Magistrate as proposed by my Brother, and proceed to give my own judgment.\n\n2. The facts material for the purpose of disposal of these appeals may be stated thus : During the peried of Emergency between June 1975 and March 1976 the appellant, Shri Sewakram Sobhani, an advocate, was one of the detenus under the Main-\n\n(!) ILR 1943 Nag. 347,\n\n(2) LR (1913-14) 41 Ind.App. 149 at l 69,\n\ntenance of Internal Security Act, 1976 (hereinafter 'MISA') and lodged in the Bhopal Central Jail.\n\nThere were also three women detenus including Smt. Uma Shukla and Smt. Ramkali Mishra, Advocate. The husband of Smt. Uma Shukla was a practising advocate at Bhopal. He was not a detenu.\n\nSmt. Uma Shukla became pregnant while in detention in the aforesaid Central Jail and abortion was carried out in the month of August, 1976 in the Zanana Hamidi Hospital to relieve her of the pregnancy. This circumstance created an uproar and an inquiry into . the affairs had to be held by Shri S.R. Sharma, Dy. Secretary (Home), Government of Madhya Pradesh, (hereinafter 'Sharma') who submitted his report dated 7.10.1976 to the Government.\n\nRespondent No. 1 is the Chief Editor of the Blitz and respondent No. 5 was, at the relevant time, Bhopal Correspondent of the Blitz.\n\nRespondents 2, 3 and 4 are persons connected with the Blitz Weekly publication. The Blitz weekly is published in three languages, viz., English, Hindi and Urdu. The Blitz weekly dated 25.12.76 published a news item purported to be a summary of the report submitted by Sharma in its Urdu and Hindi editions.\n\nThe appellant took exception to the publication and filed a criminal case for defamation against the respondents under Sections 500 and 501 of the Penal Code. The Magistrate issued processes to the respondents. The respondents appeared before the Magistrate and made an application on 23.8.77 under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter 'the Code') requesting the court, before arriving at a conclusion whether it should proceed further with the case or not, to call for (a) the original Enquiry Report submitted by Sharma on 7.10.76; (b) the statement of witnesses recorded by Sharma, (c) the original complaint; and (d) documents of the jail Department including letters from the Government to the Department (Vide para 4 of Annexure D to the Special Leave Petition). The Magistrate called for the original Inquiry Report dated 7.10.76 submitted by Sharma to the Government, and then posted the case for production of the said records by the Government and recording the plea of the respondents.\n\nThe Government failed to produce the inquiry report before the Magistrate whereupon the Magistrate issued a notice to the Government to show cause as to why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them., The Magistrate, however, did not wait for the receipt of the report and wanted to record the plea of respondents.\n\nSEW AKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA (Baharul Islam, J.) 641\n\nThe respondents then filed an application before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code. It was alleged by the respondents that the Deputy Home Secretary in his report came to the following conclusions :\n\n(1) There was free mixing of male and female prisoners in the Bhopal Central Jail ;\n\n(2) Shri Sewakram Sobhani had opportunity and also availed of the opportunity and mixed very freely with Smt. Uma Shukla ; and\n\n(3) Smt. .Uma Shukla became pregnant through Shri Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani.\n\n4. It may be mentioned that the Government later. on produced the inquiry report before. the High Court but claimed privilege. The learned High Court presumably perused the report D before passing the impugned order. It may also be mentioned that although the Government claimed privilege in respect of the report at that time, it appears, they subsequently, after the impugned order of the High Court, waived the claim of privilege, and released the inquiry report; for, in fact, a copy of the report has been annexed and is available in the paper book of these appeals before E -.a, us as Annexure 'A'.\n\nThe submission of the appellants is that the impugned order of the High Court is beyond its revisional jurisdiction. The submission is that the respondents prayed for quashing the order of the Magistrate proceeding to record their plea before the inquiry report was produced by the Government, but the High Court has wrongly quashed the complaint itself.\n\nOn the other hand the reply of the respondent is that although there was no specific prayer in the petition, the petition was also made for quashing the criminal case under Section 500/501 of the Penal Code pending before the Magistrate. The respondents' submission is that they are not guilty for the impugned publication in view of Exception 9 to Section 499 of the Penal Code.\n\nA perusal of the respondents' petition before the High ff Court and its impugned judgment justifies the factual submission of the respondents, namely, that their application before the High\n\nA Court (Copy Annexure C) was under Section 482 as well as Sections 397 and 401 of the Code, and that the respondents claimed and canvassed the protection under the Ninth Exception of Section 499 of the Penal Code. For, para 6 of the Judgment of the High Court reads :\n\n\"The applicants feeling aggrieved have come to this Court for quashing the complaint, since they contend that the publication would squarely fall within exception 9 of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe applicants further contend that the report of the Deputy Secretary (Home) is the document on the basis of which the reporting was done and unless that is got produced and inspected, the defence of exception 9 cannot be made out ......\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\nThe omission in the prayer portion of a petition of a part of the claim, particularly in a criminal case, is not fatal.\n\nThe High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can always grant suitable relief justified by law as well as facts and circumstances of a particular case.\n\nThat a part, Article 136 of the Constitution of India gives wide powers to the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. The power is d; scretionary and therefore to be sparingly exercised. This power is to be exercised to meet ends of justice, to enhance justice and remove miscarriage of justice in a particular case. It does not exercise such powers for academic reasons but for practical purposes.\n\nThe High Court in the impugned order has held that G \"it would be abuse of the process of the court if the trial is allowed to proceed or alternatively to turn out to be vexatious proceeding\" and therefore quashed the complaint. Such an order would be warranted under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the merit of the case before the High Court justified it.\n\nWe have therefore to examine whether the respondents' case falls H within the ambit of the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code as held by the High Court.\n\nSEW AKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA (Baharul Islam, J.) 643\n\nThe appellant has not submitted before us that the A summary of the report published in the Blitz is not a correct summary of the Inquiry Report. The copy of the Report, Annexure A, shows that a complaint was received from one Shri Krishsan Gopal Maheshari, advocate, alleging certain objectionable activities and misconduct on the part of the appellant and Shrimati Uma Shukla.\n\nAnnexure A also shows that the Inquiry Officer Sharma, examined B several witnesses including Shri Yogesh Shukla, husband of Smt.\n\nUma Shukla.\n\nPara 4 of the report reads :-\n\n\"The following points are in dispute :\n\n(a) whether as alleged by the complainant there was free mixing of female members with male members detained under MISA;\n\n(b) in case (a) is in the affirmative, whether Shri Sewakram D Sobhani had an opportunity to mix freely with Smt.\n\nUma Shukla;\n\n(c) in case (a) and (b) are in the affirmative when, how and through whom Smt. Uma Shukla a MISA detenu conceived\".\n\nHis findings are\n\n\"(a) There was a free mixing of male and female prisoners in the Bhopal Central Jail;\n\n(b) Shri Sewakram Sobhani had opportunity and also availed of opportunity and mixed very freely v. ith Smt.\n\nUma Shukla;\n\n(c) Smt. Uma Shukla became pregnant through Shri\n\nSewakram Sobhani\".\n\nIt, therefore, appears that the impugned publication is a correct summary of the report and no submisson has been made to the contrary by the appellant before us.\n\nI 0.\n\nThe only question is whether the publication falls within\n\nthe Ninth Exception to sction 499 of the Penal Code, as claimed H by the.respondents.\n\nA Before we do that, we must not be oblivious of the fact that the Inquiry Report in question was a privileged document; it is now an unprivileged open document as indicated above. The High Court proceeded on the footing that if the document is not produced to be utilized by the accused, the benefit would go to him.\n\n11. Section 499 defines •defamation'. It is as follows :-\n\n\"S. 499. Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said. except in the cases hereinafter defame that person\".\n\nThe Ninth Exception reads:\n\n\"It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.,.\n\nThe Ninth Exception requires, inter alia, that the imputation made must be in good faith for the public good.\n\n12. 'Good faith' has been defined in Section 52 of the Penal Code as:\n\n\"52. Nothing is said to be done or believed in \"good faith\" which is done or believed without due care and\n\nattention\",\n\nThe definition is expressed in negative terms. Normally proof of an exception lies on the person who claims it; but the definition of the expression \"good faith\" indicates that lack of good faith has been made a part of the offence which the prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand the mere proof by the accused of the report to be an authentic document is enough; it will create a doubt in the mind of the Court as to the lack of \"good faith\" on the part of the accused.\n\n13. The inquiry was made and the report prepared by a highly responsible officer and submitted to the Government. It was in pursuance of a complaint made by one of the citizens pointing\n\nSEWAKRAM v. R.K. KARAN1lA {Baharul Islam, J.) 645\n\nout laxity in observance of jail rules and highly objectionable practices of some of the prisoners and seeking improvement in jail administration. The object was to see improved conditions, and maintenance of certain standard of moral conduct by prisoners, in jail. If the complaint and the consequent inquiry report be for public good, and the respondents had reasons to believe its contents to be true, they will be protected under the Ninth Exception. Even if the burden of proof of 'good faith' be on the accused 'good faith' need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Once this is done, whether the publication was for public good would be a matter of inference.\n\n14. The Dy. Secretary (Home) examined Shri Bhandari, Editor of Prach who was a MISA detenu as witness No. I, complainant Maheshwari as witness No. 2, Smt. Ramkali Mishra, an advocate, and a member of Jana Sangha, another MISA detenu, as witness No. 4, Dr. Hamid Quireshi, another MISA detenu as witness No. 6, Shri Ramesh Chand Shrivastava an 'independent' witness as witness No. 7, and Shri Yogesh Shukla, husband of Smt. Uma Shukla as witness No. 3.\n\nMost of the said witnesses, it appears, were the party colleagues of the appellant and his co-MISA detenus. I must not be understood to suggest the contents of the inquiry report are true; it is an exparte inquiry report; it might be the result of political rivalry, as alleged by the appellant, but i1: appears that political rivalry, if any, was between the members of the appellant's party and not between the party in power and party in opposition.\n\nl 5.\n\nThe comment of Mr. Sharma on the evidence of witness No. 3 is as follows :\n\n\"Shri Yogesh Shukla witness No. 3 has categorically stated that he had no connection with his wife and that she became pregnant through Shri Sobhani, Advocate and got the child aborted. It is worth consideration as to why the husband will come up with such an open allegation against his own wife, unless there be no very strong reasons for such a conviction. Normally, no husband, even though his wife may have conceived through somebody else will like to see his name being scandalised.\n\nShri Yogesh Shukla witness No. 3 is an advocate, quite an educated person and we can safely presume that he knowa the consequences of his statement and also their legal and moral implications on his profession.\n\nSuch an open scandalous statement against\n\nhis own wife could not but be a result of very strong abhoration or an outcome of utter desperation. It could also be an expression of a naked truth.\"\n\nThe entire report is exhaustive, reasoned and based on evidence.\n\n16. A perusal of the report will normally lead one to believe the imputations. If that be so, it cannot be said that the respondents published the report or its summary without due care and attention.\n\nThis establishes 'good faith' as required by the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code.\n\nFrom what has been stated above, the publication obviously appears to be for public good.\n\n17.\n\nThe appellant submitted that he wanted an opportunity to clear himself of the imputations made against him by adducing evidence before the Magistrate to establish the falsity of the imputations made in the publication. We are not concerned with the truth or falsity of the imputations published. Even if the findings _in the report be proved to be false, the respondents will. be protected.\n\nSending back the case to the Magistrate to record the respondents' plea after the perusal of the Inquiry Report will, in my opinion, be an exercise in futility and abuse of the process of the criminal court.\n\nThe appellant may seek his remedy, if any, in the Civil Court. The learned High Court, therefore, in my opinion committed no error in quashing the complaint.\n\n18. The appeal is dismissed.\n\nORDER\n\nIn view of majority judgments, the appeals are allowed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 174, "entities": [{"text": "SEWAKRAM SOBHANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. KARANJIA, CHIEF EDITOR,\n\nWEEKLY BLITZ & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.K. KARANJIA, CHIEF EDITOR, WEEKLY BLITZ & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. 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Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9478, "end_char": 9487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.K. Puri for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, Sunil Kumar Jain and V.J. Era for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9519, "end_char": 9535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, Sunil Kumar Jain and V.J. Era for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "V.J. Era", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9540, "end_char": 9548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, Sunil Kumar Jain and V.J. Era for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S.K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9584, "end_char": 9596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Gambhir and Vijay Mansaria for the State."}}, {"text": "Vijay Mansaria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9601, "end_char": 9615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Gambhir and Vijay Mansaria for the State."}}, {"text": "Sec. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9868, "end_char": 9876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9877, "end_char": 9900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Baharul Islam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10065, "end_char": 10078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading to these appeals have been stated in the judgments of both my brethren A.P. 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This appeal, by special leave, is directed against an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated April 15, 1978 quashing the prosecution of the respondent, R.K. Karanjiya, Chief Editor, Blitz, for an offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code for publication of a news-item in that paper which was per se defamatory, on the ground that he was protected under Ninth Exception to s. 499 of the Code.", "canonical_name": "SEN"}}, {"text": "April 15, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15984, "end_char": 15998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated April 15, 1978 quashing the prosecution of the respondent, R.K. Karanjiya, Chief Editor, Blitz, for an offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code for publication of a news-item in that paper which was per se defamatory, on the ground that he was protected under Ninth Exception to s. 499 of the Code."}}, {"text": "R.K. Karanjiya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16043, "end_char": 16057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated April 15, 1978 quashing the prosecution of the respondent, R.K. Karanjiya, Chief Editor, Blitz, for an offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code for publication of a news-item in that paper which was per se defamatory, on the ground that he was protected under Ninth Exception to s. 499 of the Code.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Karanjiya"}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16101, "end_char": 16107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16115, "end_char": 16132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16268, "end_char": 16274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16372, "end_char": 16378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the period of Emergency the appellant, who is a senior lawyer practising at Bhopal, was placed under .detention under s.3 (I) (a) (ii) o(the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 and was lodged in the Central Jail, Bhopal."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16414, "end_char": 16417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16437, "end_char": 16479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uma Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16674, "end_char": 16684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uma Shukla,\n\nSmt.", "canonical_name": ".Uma Shukla"}}, {"text": "Ramkali Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16692, "end_char": 16705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramkali Misra, Advocate and Smt.", "canonical_name": "Ramkali Mishra"}}, {"text": "Savitha Bajpai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16725, "end_char": 16739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Savitha Bajpai, later State Minister, Public Works Department."}}, {"text": "Uma Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16808, "end_char": 16818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uma Shukla, a practising advccate at Bhopal, was not detained.", "canonical_name": ".Uma Shukla"}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16876, "end_char": 16882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shukla was released on parole for a week between June 10 and 18, 1976."}}, {"text": "June 10 and 18, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16925, "end_char": 16945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shukla was released on parole for a week between June 10 and 18, 1976."}}, {"text": "N.C.\n\nSrivstava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17074, "end_char": 17089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was examined on July 30, 1976, by a lady doctor, Dr. (Mrs) N.C.\n\nSrivstava, Woman Asst."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17239, "end_char": 17254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shukla was again released on parole in the month of August 1976 and on August 24, 1976, she got the pregnancy terminated by Dr. (Mrs) Upadhayay at the Zanana Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal with the written consent of her husband under s.3 of the Medical (Termination of Pregnancy) Act, 1976."}}, {"text": "Upadhayay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17302, "end_char": 17311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shukla was again released on parole in the month of August 1976 and on August 24, 1976, she got the pregnancy terminated by Dr. (Mrs) Upadhayay at the Zanana Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal with the written consent of her husband under s.3 of the Medical (Termination of Pregnancy) Act, 1976."}}, {"text": "Zanana Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17319, "end_char": 17350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shukla was again released on parole in the month of August 1976 and on August 24, 1976, she got the pregnancy terminated by Dr. (Mrs) Upadhayay at the Zanana Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal with the written consent of her husband under s.3 of the Medical (Termination of Pregnancy) Act, 1976."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17397, "end_char": 17400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "S.R. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17582, "end_char": 17593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Shri S.R. Sharma, I.A.S. Deputy Secretary (Home) Government of Madhya Pradesh, into the circumstances leading to the pregnancy of Smt."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17626, "end_char": 17654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Shri S.R. Sharma, I.A.S. Deputy Secretary (Home) Government of Madhya Pradesh, into the circumstances leading to the pregnancy of Smt."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17760, "end_char": 17776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Enquiry Officer by his report dated November 3, 1976, apparently held that the pregnancy was due to illicit relations between the appellant and SJ1?.t."}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17876, "end_char": 17882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shukla, during their detention in the Central Jail."}}, {"text": "December 25, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17932, "end_char": 17949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 25, 1976, the Blitz, in its three editions in English, Hindi and Urdu simultaneously flashed a summary of the report and the story as given out was that (i) there was a mixing of male and female detenus in the Central Jail, Bhopal,\n\n(ii) the appellant had the opportunity and access to mix with Smt."}}, {"text": "R.K. Karanjia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18716, "end_char": 18729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his release, the appellant lodged a criminal complaint for defamation against the respondent, R.K. Karanjia.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Karanjiya"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18811, "end_char": 18816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 23, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18966, "end_char": 18981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 23, 1976 the learned Magistrate allowed the app)ication and directed that ther eport with the concerned file be produced."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19188, "end_char": 19205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government, however, did not comply with the direction and by an application dated December 31, 1977, claimed privilege in respect of the Enquiry Report which still awaited consideration."}}, {"text": "October 29, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19296, "end_char": 19312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 29, 1977 when the case was fixed for recording the plea of the accused under s. 251 of the Code, the 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 22307, "end_char": 22313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22347, "end_char": 22353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22617, "end_char": 22623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22678, "end_char": 22684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22918, "end_char": 22927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blitz: A shocking sex scandal involving a top RSS leader of M.P. was discussed at a secret meeting of Jan Sangh MLAs and MPs here recently.", "canonical_name": "Jana Sangha"}}, {"text": "Sewakram Sobhani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22994, "end_char": 23010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The alleged escapades of 55 years old Sewakram Sobhani.", "canonical_name": "Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani"}}, {"text": "Bhausaheb Devras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23043, "end_char": 23059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a close confidant of RSS Chief Bhausaheb Devras."}}, {"text": "Bhopal Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23107, "end_char": 23126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with the young wife of another RSS man in the Bhopal Central Jail, where both were detained under MISA, have rocked RSS Jan Sangh circles of the State."}}, {"text": "RSS Jan Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23177, "end_char": 23190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with the young wife of another RSS man in the Bhopal Central Jail, where both were detained under MISA, have rocked RSS Jan Sangh circles of the State."}}, {"text": "Sobhani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23348, "end_char": 23355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who inquired into the grfaly affair, Sobhani was reportedly responsible for making Mrs. Uma Shukla, 22 year old wife of a lawyer Yogesh Shukla, pregnant."}}, {"text": "Yogesh Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23440, "end_char": 23453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who inquired into the grfaly affair, Sobhani was reportedly responsible for making Mrs. Uma Shukla, 22 year old wife of a lawyer Yogesh Shukla, pregnant."}}, {"text": "Sultania Zanana Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23589, "end_char": 23613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this was discovered she was quietly released on parole and, at her own request, taken for abortion to the Sultania Zanana Hospital."}}, {"text": "Hoshangabad Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23847, "end_char": 23863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She returned to jail later and was transferred to the Hoshangabad Jail, while Sobhani was sent to the Raipur Central Jail."}}, {"text": "Raipur Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23895, "end_char": 23914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She returned to jail later and was transferred to the Hoshangabad Jail, while Sobhani was sent to the Raipur Central Jail."}}, {"text": "RSS", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24168, "end_char": 24171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The jail official, himself a close sympathiser of the RSS allowed Sobhani to meet her frequently in his office and their love sessions were in his anteroom."}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24562, "end_char": 24568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25328, "end_char": 25334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25682, "end_char": 25692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25882, "end_char": 25888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25943, "end_char": 25948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26020, "end_char": 26026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26576, "end_char": 26582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26781, "end_char": 26787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29434, "end_char": 29440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30579, "end_char": 30590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If they make assertions of facts as opposed to comments on them, they must either justify these assertions or, in the limited cases specified in the Ninth Exception, show that the attack on the character of another was for the public good, or that it was made in good faith: per Vivian Bose, J. in Dr. N.B. Khare\n\nv. M.R. Masani and Ors. ("}}, {"text": "N.B. Khare", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30602, "end_char": 30612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If they make assertions of facts as opposed to comments on them, they must either justify these assertions or, in the limited cases specified in the Ninth Exception, show that the attack on the character of another was for the public good, or that it was made in good faith: per Vivian Bose, J. in Dr. N.B. Khare\n\nv. M.R. Masani and Ors. ("}}, {"text": "Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30759, "end_char": 30763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) B\n\nAs the matter is of great public importance, it would, perhaps, be better to quote the well-known passage of Lord Shaw in Arnold\n\nv. King Emperor (2)\n\nThe freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but, apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher."}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31510, "end_char": 31516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31524, "end_char": 31553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31796, "end_char": 31799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BAHARUL ISLAM, J. Had there been no subsequent development after the impugned judgment of the High Court, 1 could have persuaded myself to agree to the order proposed by my Brother Sen, J., but after the Inquiry Report bas been released by the Government and placed before us I regret my inability to agree to the order of sending back the case to the Magistrate as proposed by my Brother, and proceed to give my own judgment.", "canonical_name": "SEN"}}, {"text": "Internal Security Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32364, "end_char": 32391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramkali Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32524, "end_char": 32538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramkali Mishra, Advocate.", "canonical_name": "Ramkali Mishra"}}, {"text": "Uma Shukla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32645, "end_char": 32655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uma Shukla became pregnant while in detention in the aforesaid Central Jail and abortion was carried out in the month of August, 1976 in the Zanana Hamidi Hospital to relieve her of the pregnancy.", "canonical_name": ".Uma Shukla"}}, {"text": "Zanana Hamidi Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32786, "end_char": 32808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uma Shukla became pregnant while in detention in the aforesaid Central Jail and abortion was carried out in the month of August, 1976 in the Zanana Hamidi Hospital to relieve her of the pregnancy."}}, {"text": "25.12.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33402, "end_char": 33410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Blitz weekly dated 25.12.76 published a news item purported to be a summary of the report submitted by Sharma in its Urdu and Hindi editions."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33486, "end_char": 33492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Blitz weekly dated 25.12.76 published a news item purported to be a summary of the report submitted by Sharma in its Urdu and Hindi editions."}}, {"text": "Sections 500 and 501", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33645, "end_char": 33665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33673, "end_char": 33683, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "23.8.77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33811, "end_char": 33818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents appeared before the Magistrate and made an application on 23.8.77 under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter 'the Code') requesting the court, before arriving at a conclusion whether it should proceed further with the case or not, to call for (a) the original Enquiry Report submitted by Sharma on 7.10.76; (b) the statement of witnesses recorded by Sharma, (c) the original complaint; and (d) documents of the jail Department including letters from the Government to the Department (Vide para 4 of Annexure D to the Special Leave Petition)."}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33825, "end_char": 33835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33843, "end_char": 33875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "7.10.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34076, "end_char": 34083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents appeared before the Magistrate and made an application on 23.8.77 under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter 'the Code') requesting the court, before arriving at a conclusion whether it should proceed further with the case or not, to call for (a) the original Enquiry Report submitted by Sharma on 7.10.76; (b) the statement of witnesses recorded by Sharma, (c) the original complaint; and (d) documents of the jail Department including letters from the Government to the Department (Vide para 4 of Annexure D to the Special Leave Petition)."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34986, "end_char": 35014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEW AKRAM v. R.K. KARANJIA (Baharul Islam, J.) 641\n\nThe respondents then filed an application before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code."}}, {"text": "Section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35021, "end_char": 35032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35047, "end_char": 35058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Uma Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35410, "end_char": 35421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Uma Shukla became pregnant through Shri Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani.", "canonical_name": ".Uma Shukla"}}, {"text": "Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35451, "end_char": 35469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Uma Shukla became pregnant through Shri Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani.", "canonical_name": "Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani"}}, {"text": "Section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36607, "end_char": 36618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36630, "end_char": 36640, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36783, "end_char": 36794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36802, "end_char": 36812, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37042, "end_char": 37053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 397 and 401", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37065, "end_char": 37085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37190, "end_char": 37201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37209, "end_char": 37219, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37444, "end_char": 37455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37463, "end_char": 37480, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38029, "end_char": 38040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38048, "end_char": 38069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38095, "end_char": 38108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That a part, Article 136 of the Constitution of India gives wide powers to the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India."}}, {"text": "Section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38842, "end_char": 38853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38861, "end_char": 38887, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39060, "end_char": 39071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39079, "end_char": 39089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Krishsan Gopal Maheshari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39402, "end_char": 39426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The copy of the Report, Annexure A, shows that a complaint was received from one Shri Krishsan Gopal Maheshari, advocate, alleging certain objectionable activities and misconduct on the part of the appellant and Shrimati Uma Shukla."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Uma Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39528, "end_char": 39547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The copy of the Report, Annexure A, shows that a complaint was received from one Shri Krishsan Gopal Maheshari, advocate, alleging certain objectionable activities and misconduct on the part of the appellant and Shrimati Uma Shukla."}}, {"text": "Yogesh Shukla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 39649, "end_char": 39662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Annexure A also shows that the Inquiry Officer Sharma, examined B several witnesses including Shri Yogesh Shukla, husband of Smt."}}, {"text": "Sewakram D Sobhani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39939, "end_char": 39957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Para 4 of the report reads :-\n\n\"The following points are in dispute :\n\n(a) whether as alleged by the complainant there was free mixing of female members with male members detained under MISA;\n\n(b) in case (a) is in the affirmative, whether Shri Sewakram D Sobhani had an opportunity to mix freely with Smt.", "canonical_name": "Sewak\n\nRam Sobhani"}}, {"text": "Uma Shukla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40002, "end_char": 40012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uma Shukla;\n\n(c) in case (a) and (b) are in the affirmative when, how and through whom Smt.", "canonical_name": ".Uma Shukla"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40699, "end_char": 40709, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41068, "end_char": 41079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41124, "end_char": 41130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41880, "end_char": 41890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41898, "end_char": 41908, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhandari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43491, "end_char": 43499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary (Home) examined Shri Bhandari, Editor of Prach who was a MISA detenu as witness No."}}, {"text": "Maheshwari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43569, "end_char": 43579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, complainant Maheshwari as witness No."}}, {"text": "Ramkali Mishra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43603, "end_char": 43617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramkali Mishra, an advocate, and a member of Jana Sangha, another MISA detenu, as witness No."}}, {"text": "Jana Sangha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43648, "end_char": 43659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramkali Mishra, an advocate, and a member of Jana Sangha, another MISA detenu, as witness No.", "canonical_name": "Jana Sangha"}}, {"text": "Hamid Quireshi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43704, "end_char": 43718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, Dr. Hamid Quireshi, another MISA detenu as witness No."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Chand Shrivastava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43763, "end_char": 43787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6, Shri Ramesh Chand Shrivastava an 'independent' witness as witness No."}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45670, "end_char": 45681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45689, "end_char": 45699, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_647_657_EN", "year": 1981, "text": ", F ·-\n\nMST. L.M.S. UMMU SALBBMA\n\nB.B. GUJARAL & ANR.\n\nMay 4, 1981\n\n( 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND\n\nBAHARUL !SLAM, JJ. ]\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities~Act\n\n1974, S.3(1).\n\nDetention under-Delay in disposal of representation-Whether vitiates detention.\n\nDetaining Authority-Failure to consider prosecution under the ordinarvJicriminal /aw-Whether voids order of detention.\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Art. 22(5)-Detaining authoritv-Failure of- To furnish copy of document to which reference is made in grounds of detention-\n\nWhether fatal to order of detention. ·\n\nIndian Evidence Act 1872, Ss. 16andI14-Detenu alleging despatch of communicatian under certificate of posting-Detaining authority contending non-receipt-\n\nCourt whether compelled to draw a presumpiion that communication reached the E addressee.\n\nOn August 6, 1980 the car in which the detenu was travelling was intercepted by Customs Officers and on a search of the car, wrist watches of foreign origin and semi-precious stones valued at Rs.2.95 lakhs were found ingeniously concealed in the panelling of the front doors and the cavity between the petrol tank and the steel plate covering the petrol tank. The goods were seized by the Customs Officers alongwith the Car. On 7.8.1980 the detenu was interrogated and a statement was recorded which incriminated himself and others. He was taken before the Magistrate on 8.8. 19d0 and was remanded to custody. On 12.8.1980 he was granted bail. On 14.8.80 the detenu was stated to have sent a communication addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs, in which, according to him, he retracted from the statement made by him on 7.8.80 and claimed that\n\nthe statement.had been obtained by torturing him.\n\nOn 31.10.80. the first respondent made an order of preventive detention against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange\n\nand Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974. The order of detention and the grounds of detention were served on 2.2.81, as the detenu was avoiding service and arrest. The detenu made a representation on 4.2.81, whih was rejected by H the detaining authority, the first respondent on 19.2.1981. ·\n\n648 SUPREME COURT R.l!PORTS\n\n[ 1981} 3 S.C.R.\n\nIn the writ petition to this Court it was contended on behalf of detenu : (1) that as material documents viz. record of investigation revealing the trunk telephone calls and the record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into the jeep owned by the brother of the detenu, upon which reliance was placed in the order of detention were not supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention, the detenu was thereby prevented from making an effective representation and denied the Fundamen ta! Right guaranteed under Article 22(5). (2) The detaining authority was under obligation to supply alongwith the grounds, copies of all documents to which reference was made in the grounds irrespective of whether such documents were not relied upon in making the order of detention. (3). Although the detenu had retracted from his alleged original statement dated 7.8.80 long before the order of detention was made, the fact of such retraction was not considered by the detaining authority (4). There was considerable delay in the disposal of the representation by the detaining authority and this was sufficient to vitiate the detention, (5). The detaining authority did not apply his mind to the representation which made an express reference to the retraction. (6). The detaining authority had failed to consider the question whether a prosecution under the ordinary criminal law would not suffice to prevent the detenu from indulging in the alleged activities and whether preventive detention was necessary in the circumstances of the case.\n\nDismissing the petition the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. (i) A perusal of the grounds of detention reveal that neither the record of Trunk Calls nor the record of investigation relating to the petrol put into the jeep were in any manner relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention. [652 CJ\n\n(ii) The reference to the reord of trunk calls was made for the purpose of verifying the trunk call which was received in the premises when the customs officers were there. The reference to the record of investigation relating to the petrol put into the jeep was to refute the statement of the detenu's brother that the jeep was not used during the previous year and was in the garage. [651 G, 651 E, 653 DJ\n\n2. (i) The Constitutional requirement of Article 22(5) is insistence that basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction must be communicated to the detenu so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. Every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is, made in the grounds of detention is not an infringment of Art. 22 (5), fatal to the order of detention. It is only a failure to furnish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the detaining authority making it difficult for the detenu to make an effective representation that amounts to violation of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(5), [652 H-653 BJ\n\n2. (ii) It is unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference may be made in the course of narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention.\n\n[653C}\n\n~.-\"\n\n--~-\n\nL.M.S.U. SALl!BMA v. B.B. GUJARAL 649\n\nSmt. Sha/ini Soni v. Union of India and Ors.AIR 1981 SC 431, lechu Devi A Choraria v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1983, Khudiram Das v. The State Q/\n\nWest Bengal, [1975) 2 SCR 832 @ 848, 849, referred to.\n\nIn the instant case the two documents cannot be said to be documents which were relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention.\n\nTherefore, the detenu could not properly complain that he was prevented from making an effective representation. There was no violation of the right guaran• teed by Art. 22 of the Constitution. [653 D]\n\n3(i). If the detenu was serious in his request that his retraction should be considered by the detaining authority while considering his representation one would expect him to send a copy of the letter of retraction alongwith his represen\n\ntalion instead of a copy of the certificate of posting. [ 654 A]\n\n(ii) The Certificate of posting might lead to a presumption tethat a letr addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs was posted on 14.8.1980 and in due course reached the addressee. But, that is only a permissible and not an inevitable presumption. [654 BJ\n\n(iii) Neither Section 16 nor section 114 of the Evidence Act compels the\n\nCourt to draw a presumption that a letter proved to be posted has reached the D addressee. The presumption may or may not be drawn. On the facts and circumstances of a case, the Court may refuse to draw the presumption. [654 F)\n\nIn the instant case, the alleged letter of retraction was only a myth. No such letter of retraction was posted as claimed by the detenu. [654 E, G]\n\n4. The representation made by the detenu has to be considered by the detaining authority with utmost expedition but the time imperative can never be absolute. or obsessive. The occasional observations made by this Court that each day's delay in the dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu. Law deals with the facts of life. In law, as in life, there are no invariable absolutes. Neither life nor law can be reduced to mere. but despotic formulae. [655 B-C]\n\nPritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India and Ors. A. I. R. 1981 SC 92, Shanker Raju Shelly v. Union af India, W. P. 640 of 1980 decided on 26.6.80, Francis Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1005, referred to.\n\nIn the instant case the representation was despatched on 5.2.1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on 13.2.1981. It was put up before the detaining authority on 19.2.81 and disposed of that very day. The detaining authority was not available from 13th to 16th as he had gone abroad.\n\nHe returned on 16th and considered the matter on 19th. There has not been any unaccontable or unreasonable delay in the disposal of the representation by the detaining authority. [655 D-G]\n\n5. The note file shows that the detaining authority also considered the\n\nquestion whether the alleged letter of retraction was posted. [656 BJ\n\nA reading of the entire counter-affidavit makes it clear that in the opinion of the detajning authority prosecution or no prosecution, the only effective way of preventing the detenu from engaging himself in objectionable activities was to detain him. [656 G-H]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1745 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and MiH A. Subhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. In this application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, we are concerned with the question of the legality of the detention of Jahaubar Moulana under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974.\n\nOn August 6, 1980, a car in which the detenu Jahaubar Moulana was travelling was intercepted by Customs Officers near Perumber-Kandigal diversion road on Tiruchirappalli- Madras G.S.T. Road. On a search of the car, 768 Wrist watches of foreign origin and l 560 semi-precious stones were found ingeniously concealed in the panelling of the front doors and the cavity between the petrol tank and the steel plate covering the petrol tank.\n\nThe goods which were valued at Rs. 2,95,188 were seized by the Customs Officers alongwith the car.\n\nOn 7.8.80 the detenu, Jahaubar Moulana, was interrogated and a statement was recorded which incriminated himself and others.\n\nHe was taken before the Magistrate on 8.8.80 and was remanded to custody.\n\nHe was granted interim bail on 12.8.80 and the bail was finally confirmed on 16.8.80.\n\nOn 14.8.80 the detenu claims to have sent a communi cation addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Cuddalore, in which, according to him, he retracted from the statement made by him on 7.8.80 and claimed that the earlier statement had been obtained from him by torturing him.\n\nAccording to the case of t'he detenu this communication was sent by him under Certificate of posting. Subsequently, on 31.10.80, Shri B.B. Gujral, Additional Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance made an order\n\nof preventive detention against the detenu Jahaubar Moulana under S. 3 (I) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention\n\nof Smuggling Activities Act. The order of detention and the grounds of detention were served on Jahaubar Moulana on 2.2.8 I. According to the respondent they could not be served earlier as Jahaubar Moulana \\vas not available and was avoiding service and arrest.\n\nThe detenu made a representation on 4.2.81.\n\nThe representation was rejected by the detaining authority, Shri\n\nB.B. Gujral on 19.2.81.\n\nShri Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the detenu urged that material documents upon which reliance was placed in the order cf detention were net supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention and the detenu was thereby prevented from making an effective representation.\n\nHe was thus denied the Fundamental Right afforded to him under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. The two documents which according to Mr. Jethmalani were not supplied to the detenu were (l) record of investigation revealing the trunk telephone calls booked from Telephone No. 315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No. TMC 1850 owned by Shri Shamsuddin, brother of the detenu.\n\nIn paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned when premises No. 66, Malayappan St. Mannady, Madras was being searched on 7.8.80, a telephone call was received at telephone No. 27115 which was in the premises, from telephone No. 315 Kila Karai enquiring about the arrival of the detenu.\n\nThe information about the call was verified with reference to the record of trunk calls and it was found that on the various dated mentioned trunk calls had been booked from telephone No. 315 at Kila Karai to telephone No. 27115 at Madras.\n\nThe reference to the record of trunk calls was made for the purpose of verifying the trunk call which was received on 7.8.80 at telephone No. 27115 in the premises No. 66 Malayappan Street when the Customs Officers were there.\n\nAfter carefully perusing the grounds of detention we find it impossible to hold that the record of trunk calls was one of the documents upon which the detaining authority had relied in making the order of detention.\n\nThe reference in the grounds of detention to the petrol put into Jeep No. TMC 1850 was made in the following circumstances.\n\nParagraph 5 of the grounds of detention refers to a statement made by the detenu's brother Shamsuddin on 20.9.80 in which he stated that his Jeep No. TMC 1850 has not been used during the previous years and that it was kept locked up in a garage. Paragraph 5 then recites that the investigation showed that during the period between\n\n1.6.80 and 5.8.80, on as many as 36 occasions petrol had been put into the jeep at various petrol pumps.\n\nHere again we are unable to say, on a perusal of the grounds of detention, that the record of investigation relating to the petrol put into the jeep was in any manner relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention.\n\nShri Jethmalani's submission was that the detaining authority was under an obligation to supply alongwith the grounds, copies of all documents to which reference was made in the grounds irrespective of whether sucl:i documents were or were not relied upon in making the order of detention.\n\nHe submitted that the very fact that the documents were mentioned in the grounds established that the documents were relied upon in making the order of detention.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the submission of Shri Jethmalani. True, it was observed in some cases that copies of documents to which reference was made in the grounds must be supplied to the detenu as part of the grounds (vide Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India & Ors.).(1) But these observations must be read in the context in which they were made.\n\nIn Shalini Soni' s case, for example, the observations were made immediately after stating that \"grounds\" in Art. 22 (5) did not mean mere factual inferences but meant factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences.\n\nIn lcchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India(') the Court observed :\n\n''It is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention.\"\n\nThe stress was upon the words \"relied upon\". In Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bcnga/(3) the Constitutional requirement of Art. 22 (5) was stated as insistence that basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite\n\n(I) AIR 1981 SC 431.\n\n(2) AIR 1980 SC 1983.\n\n(3) [1975] 2 SCR 832@ 848, 849.\n\nsatisfaction leading to the making of the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. It is, therefore, clear that every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made in the grounds of detention is not an infrin3me:lt of Art. 22 (5), fatal to the order of detention.\n\nIt is only failure to for.1ish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the detaining authority, making it difficult for the detenu to make an elfective representation, that amounts to a violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Art. 22 (5).\n\nIn our view it is unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing rf erec~ may be made in the course of narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention.\n\nIn the case before us we are satisfied that such wer~ the two documents, copies of which were not furnished to the detenu.\n\nWe are satisfied that the documents cannot be said to be documents which were relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention.\n\nTherefore, the detenu could not properly complain that he was prevented from making an effective representation. There was no violation of the right guaranteed by Art. 22 of the Constitution.\n\nThe next submission of the learned counsel for the detenu was that although the detenu had retracted from his alleged original statement dated 7.8.80 long before the order of detention was made, the fact of such retraction was not considered by the detaining authority before making the order of detention. The plain and simple answer of the respondents was that there was no such retraction as claimed by the detenu. According to the detenu as soon as he was released on bail, on 14.8.80, he addressed a letter to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Cuddaiore, retracting from his former statement. This communication was sent under Certificate of Posting, a photostat copy of which was produced before us. In support of the claim that he 'had retracted from his former statement and had communicated the retraction under Certificate of Posting, the detenu invited our attention to the reply sent by him to the show cause notice issued by Collector of Customs under the Customs Act, and to the representation made by him to the detaining authority, in both of which he made a reference to the alleged retraction. One curious feature which we must notice is that the detenu sent to the detaining authority alongwith his representation a photostat copy of the Certificate of Posting but carefully refrained from sending a copy of the letter of retraction\n\nitself.\n\nThis is indeed extraordinary. If the detenu was serious in his request that his retraction should be considered by the detaining authority while considering his representation one would expect him to send a copy of the letter of retraction alongwith his representation instead of a copy of the certificate of posting.\n\nOne cannot help a suspicion that evidence was being brought into existence to support the assertion that a letter of retraction was sent on 14.8.80.\n\nThe detaining authority has stated in the counter that no such letter dated 14.8.80 was received by the Assistant Collector of Customs.\n\nThe entire file has been produced before us and on a perusal of the file we find that a thorough search was made, not once but several times, to find out if such a letter was received in the office of the Assistant Collector of Customs, Cuddalore but no such letter coul.d be traced.\n\nThe learned counsel urged that the detaining authority was not competent to state that the Assistant Collector of Customs had not received such a letter and that it was for the Asstt. Collector to say so.\n\nThere is no force in this submission. The file produced before us shows that the Asstt.\n\nCollector of Customs had informed the detaining authority and the Collector of Customs that he had made a thorough search for the letter said to have been written on 14.8.80 and that no such letter had been received in his office.\n\nWe are satisfied that the alleged letter of retraction was only a myth.\n\nThe certificate of posting might lead to a presumption that a letter addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs was posted on 14.8.1980 and in due course reached the addressee. But, that is only a permissible and not an inevitable presumption.\n\nNeither Section 16 nor Section 114 of the Evidence Act compels the Court to draw a presumption. The presumption may or may not be drawn.\n\nOn the facts and circumstances of a case, the Court may refuse to draw the presumption. On the other hand the presumption may be drawn initially but on a consideration of the evidence the Court may hold the presumption rebutted and may arrive at the conclusion that no letter was received by the addressee or that no letter was ever despatched as claimed.\n\nAfter all, there have been cases in the past, though rare, where postal certificates and even postal seals have been manufactured. In the circumstances of the present case, circumstances to which we have already referred, we are satisfied that no such letter of retraction was posted as claimed by the detenu.\n\nAnother submission of the learned counsel was that there was considerable delay in the disposal of the representation by the\n\nc:taining authority and this was sufficient to vitiate the detention.\n\nL.M.S.U. SALEEMA v. B.B. G_UIARAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 655\n\nThe learned counsel submitted that the detaining authority was under an obligation to adequately explain each day's delay and our attention was invited to the decisions in Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India & Others (1) and in Shanker Raju Shetty v. Union of India (2).\n\nWe do not doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition but as observed by one of us in Francis Coralie Mullin v. W.C.\n\nKhambra.(') \"The time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive''. The occasional observations made by this Court that each day's delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu.\n\nLaw deals with the facts of life.\n\nIn law, as in life, there are no invarible absolutes.\n\nNeither life nor law can be reduced to mere but despotic formulae.\n\nConsidered in that light, can it be said that there was an unreasonable delay in the present case? The representation was despatched on 5 .2.1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on 13.2.1981.\n\nApparently it was in postal transitJrom 5th to 13th. It was put up before the detaining authority on 19.2.1981 and disposed of that very day.\n\nFrom the records produced before us we notice that the detaining authority, Shri B.B.\n\nGujral, was not available from 13th to 1 <ith as he had gone abroad.\n\nHe returned on 16th and considered the matter on 19th. The learned counsel for the detenu urged that the absence of the detaining authority from India cannot be allowed to violate the fundamental right of the detenu to have his representation considered with the utmost expedition. We agree that in such cases appropriate arrangements must be made for considering the detenu's representation. Apparently, it was not thought necessary in the present case as Shri Gujral was returning on 16th, that is, within a few days.\n\nAfter the 16th the delay, was for a period of three days only. It can hardly be described as delay though one wishes there was no room even for that little complaint. We are of the view that there has not been any unaccountable or unreasonable delay in the disposa1 of the representation by the detaining authority.\n\nThe learned counsel for the detenu further submitted that the detaining authority did not apply his mind to the representation.\n\n(1) AIR J 981 SC 92.\n\n(2) W.P. No.640 of 1980 decided on 26.6.80.\n\n\nHe argued that the representation made express reference to the retraction and yet the detaining authority did not enquire or send for the retraction which admittedly was not available with him. We have already found that no letter of retraction was sent to the Assistant Collector of Customs.\n\nA perusal of the note file shows that the detaining authority also considered the question whether the alleged letter of retraction was posted. In the circumstances we are unable to hold that there was non-application of mind by the detaining authority.\n\nShri Jethmalani then submitted that the detaining authority had failed to consider the question whether a prosecution under the ordinary criminal law would not suffice to prevent the detenu from indulging in the alleged activities and whether preventive detention was necessary in the circumstances of the case.\n\nReliance was placed upon the observations made by this Court in Kanchanfal Maneklal Chokshi v. The Stute of Gujurat & Ors. (1) In the counter affidavit filed by the detaining authority, Shri B.B. Gujaral, it has been stated:\n\n\"Having regard to the nature of the activities in which the detenu was engaged and after having applied my mind very carefully to all the facts and circumstances of the case and the material placed before me, I arrived at the subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain Shri Jahaubar Moulana for preventing him from engaging in transporting smuggled goods. The adjudication of the case under the Customs Act and prosecution of the detenu are entirely on a different footing.\n\nI say that the detention order was passed by me with due care and after careful consideration of all the materials placed before me\".\n\nThe deponent may not have stated in express words that when he made the order of detention he also considered the question whether a prosecution under the ordinary criminal law would not meet the situation and would not be sufficient to prevent Jahaubar Moulana from engaging himself in the objectionable activities.\n\nBut a reading of the entire counter affidavit makes it clear that in the opinion of the detaining authority, prosecution or no prosecution, the only effective way of preventing Jahaubar Moulana from engaging himself in objectionable activities was to detain him.\n\n(l) (1980] 1 S.C.R. 54.\n\nSome other grounds were mentioned by the learned counsel A for the detenu but they were not pressed before us. In the result the Writ Petition is dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "MST. L.M.S. UMMU SALBBMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MST. L.M.S. UMMU SALBBMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B.B. GUJARAL & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B.B. GUJARAL & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act", "statute": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 419, "end_char": 440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 637, "end_char": 643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act 1872", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act 1872"}}, {"text": "August 6, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 860, "end_char": 874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 6, 1980 the car in which the detenu was travelling was intercepted by Customs Officers and on a search of the car, wrist watches of foreign origin and semi-precious stones valued at Rs.2.95 lakhs were found ingeniously concealed in the panelling of the front doors and the cavity between the petrol tank and the steel plate covering the petrol tank."}}, {"text": "7.8.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1285, "end_char": 1293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7.8.1980 the detenu was interrogated and a statement was recorded which incriminated himself and others."}}, {"text": "8.8. 19d0", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1428, "end_char": 1437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was taken before the Magistrate on 8.8."}}, {"text": "12.8.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1470, "end_char": 1479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12.8.1980 he was granted bail."}}, {"text": "14.8.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1504, "end_char": 1511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14.8.80 the detenu was stated to have sent a communication addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs, in which, according to him, he retracted from the statement made by him on 7.8.80 and claimed that\n\nthe statement.had been obtained by torturing him."}}, {"text": "7.8.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1687, "end_char": 1693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14.8.80 the detenu was stated to have sent a communication addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs, in which, according to him, he retracted from the statement made by him on 7.8.80 and claimed that\n\nthe statement.had been obtained by torturing him."}}, {"text": "31.10.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1766, "end_char": 1774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31.10.80."}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1860, "end_char": 1872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2.2.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2030, "end_char": 2036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of detention and the grounds of detention were served on 2.2.81, as the detenu was avoiding service and arrest."}}, {"text": "4.2.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2121, "end_char": 2127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu made a representation on 4.2.81, whih was rejected by H the detaining authority, the first respondent on 19.2.1981. ·"}}, {"text": "19.2.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2201, "end_char": 2210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu made a representation on 4.2.81, whih was rejected by H the detaining authority, the first respondent on 19.2.1981. ·"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange\n\nand Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "statute": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange\n\nand Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4580, "end_char": 4593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5283, "end_char": 5296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AIR 1981 SC 431", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5650, "end_char": 5665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 1983", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975) 2 SCR 832", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5769, "end_char": 5785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6131, "end_char": 6138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "14.8.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6611, "end_char": 6620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "654 A]\n\n(ii) The Certificate of posting might lead to a presumption tethat a letr addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs was posted on 14.8.1980 and in due course reached the addressee."}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6752, "end_char": 6762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6767, "end_char": 6778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26.6.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7998, "end_char": 8005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. I. R. 1981 SC 92, Shanker Raju Shelly v. Union af India, W. P. 640 of 1980 decided on 26.6.80, Francis Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1005, referred to."}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 S.C.R. 1005", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8047, "end_char": 8067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5.2.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8140, "end_char": 8148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case the representation was despatched on 5.2.1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on 13.2.1981."}}, {"text": "13.2.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8210, "end_char": 8219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case the representation was despatched on 5.2.1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on 13.2.1981."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9052, "end_char": 9062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9070, "end_char": 9091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9095, "end_char": 9109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9119, "end_char": 9134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "M.M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9156, "end_char": 9173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader and MiH A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "MiH A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9178, "end_char": 9195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader and MiH A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9453, "end_char": 9534, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9708, "end_char": 9714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 6, 1980, a car in which the detenu Jahaubar Moulana was travelling was intercepted by Customs Officers near Perumber-Kandigal diversion road on Tiruchirappalli- Madras G.S.T. Road."}}, {"text": "8.8.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10238, "end_char": 10244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was taken before the Magistrate on 8.8.80 and was remanded to custody."}}, {"text": "12.8.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10306, "end_char": 10313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was granted interim bail on 12.8.80 and the bail was finally confirmed on 16.8.80."}}, {"text": "16.8.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10352, "end_char": 10359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was granted interim bail on 12.8.80 and the bail was finally confirmed on 16.8.80."}}, {"text": "Cuddalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10470, "end_char": 10479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14.8.80 the detenu claims to have sent a communi cation addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Cuddalore, in which, according to him, he retracted from the statement made by him on 7.8.80 and claimed that the earlier statement had been obtained from him by torturing him."}}, {"text": "B.B. Gujral", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10782, "end_char": 10793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on 31.10.80, Shri B.B. Gujral, Additional Secretary to the Govt.", "canonical_name": "B.B. GUJARAL & ANR"}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10940, "end_char": 10944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2.2.8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11121, "end_char": 11126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of detention and the grounds of detention were served on Jahaubar Moulana on 2.2.8 I. According to the respondent they could not be served earlier as Jahaubar Moulana \\vas not available and was avoiding service and arrest."}}, {"text": "B.B. Gujral", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11379, "end_char": 11390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was rejected by the detaining authority, Shri\n\nB.B. Gujral on 19.2.81.", "canonical_name": "B.B. GUJARAL & ANR"}}, {"text": "19.2.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11394, "end_char": 11401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was rejected by the detaining authority, Shri\n\nB.B. Gujral on 19.2.81."}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11409, "end_char": 11423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the detenu urged that material documents upon which reliance was placed in the order cf detention were net supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention and the detenu was thereby prevented from making an effective representation.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11753, "end_char": 11760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11827, "end_char": 11837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two documents which according to Mr. Jethmalani were not supplied to the detenu were (l) record of investigation revealing the trunk telephone calls booked from Telephone No."}}, {"text": "15.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12017, "end_char": 12024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No."}}, {"text": "18.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12026, "end_char": 12033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No."}}, {"text": "24.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12035, "end_char": 12042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No."}}, {"text": "26.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12044, "end_char": 12051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No."}}, {"text": "27.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12053, "end_char": 12060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No."}}, {"text": "29.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12062, "end_char": 12069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No."}}, {"text": "6.8.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12071, "end_char": 12077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai totelephone No.27115 at Madras on 15.7.80, 18.7.80, 24.7.80, 26.7.80, 27.7.80, 29.7.80, 6.8.80, and 7.8.80; and (2) record of investigation relating to the petrol which was put into Jeep No."}}, {"text": "Shamsuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12197, "end_char": 12207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TMC 1850 owned by Shri Shamsuddin, brother of the detenu."}}, {"text": "Kila Karai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12728, "end_char": 12738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 at Kila Karai to telephone No."}}, {"text": "20.9.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13449, "end_char": 13456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 5 of the grounds of detention refers to a statement made by the detenu's brother Shamsuddin on 20.9.80 in which he stated that his Jeep No."}}, {"text": "1.6.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13678, "end_char": 13684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 5 then recites that the investigation showed that during the period between\n\n1.6.80 and 5.8.80, on as many as 36 occasions petrol had been put into the jeep at various petrol pumps."}}, {"text": "5.8.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13689, "end_char": 13695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 5 then recites that the investigation showed that during the period between\n\n1.6.80 and 5.8.80, on as many as 36 occasions petrol had been put into the jeep at various petrol pumps."}}, {"text": "Shalini Soni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shalini Soni' s case, for example, the observations were made immediately after stating that \"grounds\" in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14941, "end_char": 14948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15485, "end_char": 15492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AIR 1981 SC 431", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15630, "end_char": 15645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 1983", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15652, "end_char": 15668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 832", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15675, "end_char": 15691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16067, "end_char": 16074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16358, "end_char": 16365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17048, "end_char": 17055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cuddaiore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17629, "end_char": 17638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the detenu as soon as he was released on bail, on 14.8.80, he addressed a letter to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Cuddaiore, retracting from his former statement."}}, {"text": "Collector of Customs under the Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18018, "end_char": 18060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20191, "end_char": 20201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20206, "end_char": 20217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21221, "end_char": 21236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.M.S.U. SALEEMA v. B.B. G_UIARAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 655\n\nThe learned counsel submitted that the detaining authority was under an obligation to adequately explain each day's delay and our attention was invited to the decisions in Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India & Others (1) and in Shanker Raju Shetty v. Union of India (2)."}}, {"text": ".2.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22414, "end_char": 22421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was despatched on 5 .2.1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on 13.2.1981."}}, {"text": "B.B.\n\nGujral", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22719, "end_char": 22731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the records produced before us we notice that the detaining authority, Shri B.B.\n\nGujral, was not available from 13th to 1 <ith as he had gone abroad.", "canonical_name": "B.B. GUJARAL & ANR"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22940, "end_char": 22945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the detenu urged that the absence of the detaining authority from India cannot be allowed to violate the fundamental right of the detenu to have his representation considered with the utmost expedition."}}, {"text": "Gujral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23257, "end_char": 23263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apparently, it was not thought necessary in the present case as Shri Gujral was returning on 16th, that is, within a few days."}}, {"text": "B.B. Gujaral", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24884, "end_char": 24896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) In the counter affidavit filed by the detaining authority, Shri B.B. Gujaral, it has been stated:\n\n\"Having regard to the nature of the activities in which the detenu was engaged and after having applied my mind very carefully to all the facts and circumstances of the case and the material placed before me, I arrived at the subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain Shri Jahaubar Moulana for preventing him from engaging in transporting smuggled goods.", "canonical_name": "B.B. GUJARAL & ANR"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25327, "end_char": 25338, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1980] 1 S.C.R. 54", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26128, "end_char": 26146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26307, "end_char": 26313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_658_661_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "GOKUL PARASHRAM PATIL\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nMay 4, 1981\n\n[ A. D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, , JJ. ]\n\nConviction under s. 302 Penal Code b2se-l on sole injury on non-vital part-If injury caused by the assailant was not intended to cause dearh clause thirdly of s.30 Penal Code will not be attracted and the conviction and sentence should be under Part I! of sertion 304 Penal Code.\n\nThe appellant attacked one Ania with a knife giving the latter a single blow above the left clavicle where it caused a muscle-deep incised wound having the dimensions 1-1/4\" x 1 /3\". The autopsy surgeon, while certifying the existence of that wound, also found that the superior venacava had been cut, the damage so caused being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The sessions court convicted the appellant of an offence under section 301 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The High Court confirmed the conviction and the sentence in appeal. Hence, the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal in part and substituting a conviction under Part II of section 304 and sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment, the Court.\n\nHELD : I. To attract clause thirdly of section 300 of the Penal Code and also illustration (c) appended thereto the injury in quesiion needs satisfy only two testsnamely, (a) the injury must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and (b) such injury must have been intended to heve been caused by the culprit. [661 A-BJ •\n\n2. In the present case, the solitary blow given by the appellant to the deceased was on the left clavicle a non-vital part-and tte appellant cannot be said to know that the superior venacava would be cut as a result of that wound.\n\nEven a medical man perhaps may not have been able to judge the location of the superior venacava with any precision of that type. The fact that the venacava was cut must, therefore, be ascribed to a non-intentional or accidental circumstance. Therefore, it cannot by said to have been intended by the appellant. [660 A-Cl\n\nVirsa Singh v. Srate of Punjab, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 465, referred to.\n\nHarjinder Singh v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 867 and Laxman A Kalu Nikalje v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1390, followed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICATION: Criminal Appeal No. 512 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated B the 8th September, 1980 of .the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 1980.\n\nV.N. Ganpule, A.B. Lal and Mrs.\n\nV.D. Khanna for the Petitioner.\n\n~ 0.P. Rana and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The appellant has been convicted of an offence\n\nunder section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to D as the Code) for causing the death of one Anita, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the trial court as well as in appeal by the High Court.\n\n2. The case of the prosecution was that the appellant attacked the deceased with a knife giving the latter a single blow above the E left clavicle where it caused a muscle-deep incised wound having the dimension 1-1/4\" x 1/3\". The autopsy surgeon, while certifying the existence of that wound, also found that the superior venacava had been cut, the damage so caused being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\n3. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the case does not fall within the ambit of section 302 of the Code and that the two courts below erred in relying on Virsa Singh v.\n\nState of Punjab. (1) The gist of the dictum of this Court in that case is that if an injury is held to have been intended by the assailant and is further found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it would attract clause thirdly of section 300 of the Code and that, therefore, its author would be liable to punishment under section 302 thereof. The question thus is whether the\n\n(I) A.T.R. 1958 S.C. 465\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\nparticular injury which was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, in the present case, was an injury intended by the appellant. Our answer to the question is an emphatic no.\n\nThe solitary blow given by the appellant to the deceased was on the left clavicle ; a non-vital part - and it would be too much to say that the appellant knew that the superior venacava would be cut as a result of that wound. Even a medical man perhaps may not have been able to judge the location of the superior venacava with any precision of that type. The fact that the venacava was cut must, therefore, be ascribed to a non-intentional or accidental circumstance. This was precisely the view taken in Harjinder Singh\n\nv. Delhi Administration, (1) by Sikri, J., and in Laxman Kalu Nikalje\n\nv. The State of Maharashtra, (2) by Hidayatullah, C.J. In the former of these cases, the injury in question was a stab wound on the left thigh which had cut the femoral artery and vessels.\n\nIn the latter, the damage caused consisted of a cut in the auxiliary artery and veins. In each of the two cases it was held that although the injury which was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death had resulted from a blow with a sharp-edged weapon, the same could not be said to have been intended, that the only injury which could be regarded as intentional was the superficial wound resulting directly from the blow, that the assailant could not be held guilty of an offence under section 302 of the Code and that he was, on the other hand, guilty of a lesser offence falling under part II of section 304 thereof.\n\nMr. Rana, learned counsel for the State has drawn our attention to illustration (c) appended to section 300 of the Code and has contended on the basis thereof that the culpable act F attributed to the appellant is covered thereby. The illustration may be extracted :\n\n\"(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary G course of nature. Z dies _in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death' .\n\n(!) A.l.R. 1968 S.C. 867.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1968 s.c. 1390.\n\nThe proposition propounded by Mr. Rana is that the illustra- 'tion, which is obviously relatable to clause thirdly of the section, postulates that the injury in question need satisfy only two tests to attract the provisions of that clause and that those tests are :\n\n(i) The injury must by sufficient in the ordinary course of B nature to cause death.\n\n(ii) Such injury must have been intended to have been caused by the culprit.\n\nThere is no quarrel with this proposition but then the injury which was found to be sufficient in the ordinary .course of nature to cause death in the present case does not satisfy test (ii) because, as already pointed out, it cannot be said to have been intended by the appellant. The illustration, therefore, does not advance the cause of the State.\n\n5. Following the dicta in the two earlier decisions of this Court which have been cited above, we partially accept the appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant for an offence under section 302 of the Code and substitute thereof one under part II of section 304 thereof. In consequence he shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for 5 years which punishment, in our opinion, will meet the ends of justice in the circumstances of the case. The judgment of the High Court is modified accordingly.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 36, "entities": [{"text": "GOKUL PARASHRAM PATIL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOKUL PARASHRAM PATIL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 4, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOKUL PARASHRAM PATIL\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nMay 4, 1981\n\n[ A. D. KOSHAL AND BAHARUL ISLAM, , JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, , JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 135, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260, "end_char": 264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 275, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 369, "end_char": 379, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 409, "end_char": 413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant attacked one Ania with a knife giving the latter a single blow above the left clavicle where it caused a muscle-deep incised wound having the dimensions 1-1/4\" x 1 /3\".", "canonical_name": "Anita"}}, {"text": "section 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 834, "end_char": 845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 853, "end_char": 863, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1202, "end_char": 1213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1221, "end_char": 1231, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "V.N. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2498, "end_char": 2510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.N. Ganpule, A.B. Lal and Mrs.\n\nV.D. Khanna for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "A.B. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2512, "end_char": 2520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.N. Ganpule, A.B. Lal and Mrs.\n\nV.D. Khanna for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "V.D. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2531, "end_char": 2542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.N. Ganpule, A.B. Lal and Mrs.\n\nV.D. Khanna for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "0.P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2566, "end_char": 2575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ 0.P. Rana and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2580, "end_char": 2591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ 0.P. Rana and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2657, "end_char": 2663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The appellant has been convicted of an offence\n\nunder section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to D as the Code) for causing the death of one Anita, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the trial court as well as in appeal by the High Court."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2722, "end_char": 2733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2758, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Anita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2828, "end_char": 2833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The appellant has been convicted of an offence\n\nunder section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to D as the Code) for causing the death of one Anita, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the trial court as well as in appeal by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Anita"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3480, "end_char": 3491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3923, "end_char": 3934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4808, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was precisely the view taken in Harjinder Singh\n\nv. Delhi Administration, (1) by Sikri, J., and in Laxman Kalu Nikalje\n\nv. The State of Maharashtra, (2) by Hidayatullah, C.J. In the former of these cases, the injury in question was a stab wound on the left thigh which had cut the femoral artery and vessels."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4883, "end_char": 4895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was precisely the view taken in Harjinder Singh\n\nv. Delhi Administration, (1) by Sikri, J., and in Laxman Kalu Nikalje\n\nv. The State of Maharashtra, (2) by Hidayatullah, C.J. In the former of these cases, the injury in question was a stab wound on the left thigh which had cut the femoral artery and vessels."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rana, learned counsel for the State has drawn our attention to illustration (c) appended to section 300 of the Code and has contended on the basis thereof that the culpable act F attributed to the appellant is covered thereby."}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5783, "end_char": 5794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7222, "end_char": 7233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7290, "end_char": 7301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_662_674_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER\n\nBISHWANATH TEA CO. LTD.\n\nMay, 5, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Article 226-Contractual obligations cannot be enforced by the writ jurisdiction-A company, being a juristic Person is not entitled to any of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19-Assam Land and Revenue Regulation-Settlement Rule 37,-Scope of-Interpretation of clause 2\n\nPart IV of Indenture lease.\n\nRespondent Tea Company took on lease land N.C. Tezalpatty No. 1 from the then Government. The lease was to b~ exploited for cultivation and raising tea garden, and was subject to conditions set out therein and generally to Assam Land and Revenue Regulation and the rules made thereunder. The respondent company sought permission from the appellant to cut 7,000 cubic feet of timber from Grant N.C. Tezalpatty No. 1 for utilising the same for building of staff and labourers' house as per clause 2 of Part IV of the lease dated 27-9-1932 and Rule 37 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations. Since the timber was required by the company for use in Partabghur and Dekorai tea estates which were outside Tezalpatty No. 1, the appellant demanded full royalty on timber cut, felled and removed. The company paid an amount of Rs. 7069.37 Paisc under protest and later filed a petition under Article -226 of the Constitution in the Assam High Court, praying for refund of the amount and for a mandamus directing the appellant for issuing permits without insisting on payment of royalty whenever timber was to be cut from the leased area for the purposes connected with the exploitation of the grant.\n\nThe preliminary objection raised by the appellant that since the right claimed by the respondent flowed from the contract of lease such contractual right can only be enforced in civil court and .therefore cannot be gone into under Article 226 was rejected by the Assam High Court. On merits, the High Court further held that as the grant of N.C. Tezalpatty No. 1 was in favour of the respondent, the company was entitled to cut, fell and remove timber from that grant area for its use covered either by the same area or in other tea gardens which a re outside the grant. The High Court made the rule nisi absolute and hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The Writ Petition on the allegation of infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, at the instance of respondent company alone was not maintainable for the reasons that : (a) a juristic person such as a corporation is not entitled to any of the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 and here the respondent is a company incorporated under the Companies Act ; (b) Article 19(l)(g) guaranteed the fundamental freedom to a\n\nDIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER V. BISHWANATH TEA CO. 663\n\ncitizen and the respondent being a company is not a citizen and (c) the shareholders of a company alone can complain of infringement of their fundamental rights. [669 E-H, 670 A-CJ\n\nTata Engineering and Locomotive Co. v. State of Bihar, [1950] S.C.R. 869 ; State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commercial Tax Officer, Vishakhapatnam, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 99 and Benuott Coleman and Co. and Other\n\n\n2:1. It is undoubtedly true that the High Court can entertain in its extraordinary jurisdiction a petition to issue any of the prerogative writs for any other purpose. But such writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a Corporation where there is a denial of equality before law or equal protection of Jaw. The Corporation can also file a writ petition for enforcement of a right under a statute. Here, the relief claimed by the respondent was referable to nothing else but the terms of lease, namely, clause 2 Part IV. The fact that this term is a mere reproduction of proviso to Rule 37 of Assam Land and Revenue Local Rate Regulation but that by itself is not sufficient to contnd that what the respondent was doing was enforcing a statutory provision. The validity of regulations is not challenged. Therefore, the demand for royalty is supported by law. [670 C-F]\n\n2:2. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if the contract is capable of being specifically performed, or the party may sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable by the Civil Court. The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not ordinarily entertain a petition either for specific performance or for recovering damages. A right\n\nto relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a civil court where a suit E for specific performance of contract or for damages could be filed. Here, this was a suit for refund of a royalty alleged to be unauthorisedly recovered and that could hardly be entertained in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. [670 F-G, 671 A-G, 672 A]\n\n\nWoodcrafts Assam v. Chief Conservator of Forests, Assam, AIR 1971 Assam p. 92, approved.\n\n3:1. Upon a true construction of clause 2 Part IV of indenture Of lease, ihe respondent company was not entitled to remove timber without payment of royalty. The specific provision is that the grant is for a purpose of cultivation G and raising tea garden and that from the area covered by the grant, if timber is felled for purpose connected with the grant itself, namely, cultivation and raising tea garden in that area, then alone the benefit of removal of timber without payment of royalty can be availed of. [673 G-H., 674 A]\n\n3:2. In order to obtain relief, namely to cut and remove timber from lease H area for purpose connected with exploitation, of .the grant the company must show that the timber is being felled and cut from an area covered by the lease in\n\nwhich clause 2 finds its place and that such timber is being removed for a purpose connected with the exploitation of grant. To be more specific, following facts will have to be proved for obtaining relief : (i) the area covered by the grant ;\n\n(ii) felling of the trees from the area covered by the grant ; (iii) use to which the felled timber was to be put to; (iv) such use will have to be one connected with the exploitation of the grant and (v) meaning of the exploitation of the grant, when controverted these aspects will have to he proved by relevance. And that was the situation when return was filed by the present appellant in the High Court.\n\n[672 G-H, 673 A-D]\n\nClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 218 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated C the 10th September, 1968 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule No. 56.of 1967.\n\nS.K. Nandy for the Appellant.\n\nS.N. Chowdhary for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThi~ appeal by special leave arises out of a writ petition filed by the respondent Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., in the Assam and Nagaland High Court questioning the action of the appellant, the Divisional Forest Officer, Darrang Division, of re covering Rs. 7069.37 p. as royalty for cutting and felling trees from Tezalpatty grant No. I held under lease dated September 27, 1932, and for a mandamus directing the appellant to issue permits without insisting upon payment of royalty for the trees cut and felled from the area under lease.\n\nRespondent Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. ('Company' for short), took on lease land admeasuring 1107.26 acres from the Government.\n\nThe lease was executed between the Company and the Secretary of the State for India. The lease in the first instance was for a period of 15 years commencing from April I, 1932. The lease was to be exploited for cultivation and raising tea garden.\n\nThe lease was subject to conditions set out therein and generally to Assam Land and Revenue Regulation and the rules made thereunder.\n\nOn February 15, 1966, manager of the Company approached the appellant seeking permission to cut 7000 cubic feet of timber from Grant N.C. Tezalpatty No. I of Nagshankar Mouza, for utilising the same for building of staff and labourer's houses.\n\nBy the reply dated April 4, 1966, the appellant noted that the timber was to be\n\nDIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER v. BJSHWANATH TEA co. (Desai, J.) 665\n\ncut for constructing houses in Partabghur and Dekorai Tea Estates and that it was necessary to ascertain whether any of the aforementioned two Tea estates was situated within the grant evidenced by lease of N.C. Tezalpatty No. I. It was made clear that if it was not so, full royalty will be payable by the company for cutting, felling and removing timber. The manager by his letter dated April 23, 1966, informed the appellant that as the lessee is Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., it can cut and fell timber from any of its leased area to be utilised for its purposes in any other division. Therefore, the manager suggested that the permit must be issued without insisting on payment of royalty. The appellant by his letter dated May 12, 1966, informed the manager that as the timber was required for use in Partabghur and Dekorai tea estates which were not within N.C. Tezalpatty Grant No. 1 of Nagshankar Mouza from which timber was to be felled and cut, full royalty will be payable on timber so cut and removed because it was to be utilised for the purpose un connected with the grant. For this assertion the appellant relied upon a portion of clause (2) of Part IV of the lease deed dated September 27, 1932.\n\nCorrespondence further ensued between the parties and ultimately the respondent company paid an amount of Rs. 7069.37; p. as and by way of royalty under protest and then filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court alleging that upon a true construction of the relevant clause of the grant as also proviso to Rule 37 of the Settlement Rules as the timber was required for the purpose connected with the exploitation of the grant, the company as lessee was entitled to cut and remove timber without payment of royalty and, therefore, the recovery of royalty being unsupported by law, the appellant was liable to refund the same. The company also prayed for a mandamus directing the present appellant who was respondent in the High Court for issuing permits without insisting on payment of royalty whenever timber was to be cut from the leased area for the purposes connected with the exploitation of the grant.\n\nThe appellant filed his return to the rule issued by the High Court. A preliminary objection was raised that the right claimed by the respondent flowed from the contract of lease and such contractual rights and obligations can only be enforced in civil court.\n\nIt was contended that apart from the fact that interpretation of the contract of lease is generally not undertaken by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, it was further con tended that even if interpretation of the relevant clause of the lease as alleged on behalf the respondent finds favour with\n\nthe court, yet facts will have to be investigated before any refund could be ordered or a blanket injunction could be granted for all times to come against the appellant from performing his duty, namely, of granting permit and recovering royalty.\n\nThe High Court overruled the preliminary objection observing that the court was not called upon to decide any complicated question of fact and the question for decision before the Court was whether the company was entitled to enforcement of its legal right under the proviso to rule 37 of Settlement Rules. The Court further observed that even though part of the proviso to rule 37 of the Settlement Rules was incorporated in the lease itself, nonetheless what the Court had to consider was the interpretation of a statutory rule and that is the function of the Court under Article 226. On\n\nmerits the High Court held that as the grant N.C. Tezalpatty No. I was in favour of M/s. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., the company was entitled to cut and fell timber from N.C. Tezalpatty grant area for its use in other tea gardens, namely, Partabghur and Dekorai and even if the latter two gardens were outside N.C. Tezalpatty Grant No. I, yet they being under the ownership and magement of the company, felling of trees from the area of one grant for utilisation at other places would fall within the second part of the proviso to rule 37 in that the felling and removal of timber was for use not unconnected with the exploitation of the grant and, therefore, the company was entitled to fell and remove timber in the aforesaid situation without payment of royalty.\n\nIn accordance with this finding the High Court made the rule absolute, directed refund of the amount paid under protest and issued a mandamus directing the appellant to issue permits to the respondent company without payment of royalty for removal of timber from Tezalpatty Grant No. 1 for use in tea garden of Dekorai division for exploitation of tea plantation.\n\nHence this appeal by special leave.\n\nUnquestionably, the rights and obligations between the parties to this appeal are governed by the terms of the lease dated September 27, 1932. Specifically the respondent who was a petitioner in the High Court claimed the right to relief under Clause 2 of Part IV of the indenture of lease which reads as under :\n\n\"2. The lessee shall pay to the lessor as provided by rules\n\nfor the time being in force under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation for all timber (if any) on the\n\ndemised lands cut down, removed or utilised by the lessee during the period of the lease.\n\nTimber valuation at reduced rates estimated at Rs. 12472.7 (Rupees Twelve thousand four hundred and seventy-two and annas seven only) was credited into the treasury by Challan Nos. 43 dated the 24.2.32 The lessee shall be liable to pay timber valuation at full rates on all timber sold or removed for sale and on all timber removed for use unconnected with exploitation of the grant during the period of his lease or renewed lease.\"\n\nAccording to the respondent, it would be entitled to remove timber cut and felled from the leased area without liability to pay royalty for its own use irrespective of the fact whether such timber was to be used outside the leased area, because such use would be in connection with the exploitation of the grant and there is such a reservation in the grant evidenced by the lease. True it is that if the timber is felled and removed for purpose connected with the exploitation of the grant, there would be no liability to pay the royalty. Such a positive right is claimed from a negative covenant in the lease. Clause 2 provides that the lessee had paid timber valuation at the reduced rate at Rs. 12472.7 on 24-2-32 The lessee according to the respondent would be liable to pay timber valuation at full rates on all timber sold or removed for sale on all timber removed for use unconnected with exploitation of the grant during the period of the lease or renewed lease.\n\nThe implication of the negative covenant would be that if timber is removed from the leased area connected with the exploitation of grant, there would be no liability to pay royalty on such timber. The respondent claimed to remove timber without the liability to pay royalty in exercise of the right reserved under Cl. 2 thus interpretated. In para 5 of the Writ Petitton filed by by the respondent in the High Court, a reference has been made to the aforementioned term in the lease deed. It was further stated that the respondent paid the royalty under protest which it was not liable to pay as the timber was urgently required for the purpose of the business of the Company in connection with the grant. These averments in the petition would show that the respondent claimed the right to remove timber without the obligation to pay royalty as flowing from the grant evidenced by the lease.\n\nAnticipating a possible contention about the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain\n\n' H\n\niIa writ petition for enforcement of contractual obligation, the respondent contended that the levy of royalty had no authority of law and that this was an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the respondent to carry on its trade. This camouflage of contending that the levy of royalty was not supported by law and that this was an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade successfully persuaded the High Court to entertain the petition.\n\nShorn of all embellishment the relief claimed by the respondent was referable to nothing else but the term of the lease viz. Cl. 2 Part IV.\n\nMaybe, that this term .is a mere reproduction of proviso to Rule 37 of Assam Land and Revenue and Local Rates Regu lations, but that by itself is not sufficient to contend that what the respondent was doing was enforcing a statutory provision. Proviso to Rule 37 is an enabling provision. The relevant portion of the proviso reads as under :\n\n\"Provided that if any person taking up land for special cultivation is unwilling to pay the full royalty valuation of the timber as estimated, he shall have the option of paying a reduced valuation representing only the profit which is likely to derive from the use of the timber for the purposes connected with the exploitation of the grant. If he exercises such option, he shall be liable to pay royalty at full rates on all timber sold, bartered, mortgaged, given or otherwise, transferred or removed for transfer and on all timber removed for use unconnected with the exploitation of the grant during the period of his lease or renewed lease.\"\n\nA bare perusal of clause 2 of Part IV of the indenture of lease extracted hereinbefore and the proviso to Rule 37 would at a glance show that the proviso enables a grantee to take benefit of it by fulfilling certain conditions namely by paying a reduced valuation representing only the profit which it is likely to derive from the use of timber for purposes connected with the exploitation of the grant.\n\nIt is thus an enabling provision and the grantor of the lease may permit this option to be enjoyed by the grantee.\n\nBut whether that has been done or not is always a question of fact. If the precondition is satisfied, the benefit can be taken. That again is a matter to be worked out by the parties to the indenture of lease. In fact, clause 2 of the indenture of lease would show that the respondent grantee paid Rs. 124727/- being timber valuation at reduced rates. The respondent having made the payment, whereupon the grantor of the lease agreed that the grantee will have to pay timber valuation at full rates on all timber sold or removed for sale and on all timber removed for use unconnected with exploitation of the grant during the period of his lease or renewed lease but the grantee will not have to pay royalty for timber felled and removed for purpose connected with the grant. It thus can be demonstrably established that the respondent was trying to enforce through the writ petition the right to remove timber without the liability to pay royalty not under the proviso to Rule 37 which was merely an enabling provision, but the specific term of lease agreed to between the parties. Proviso to Rule 37 may not be incorporated in an indenture of lease. If incorporated after fulfilling pre-condition it becomes a term of lease. The High Court, 'in our opinion, therefore, was in error in posing a question to itself as to whether the applicant (respondent herein) was entitled to the enforcement of legal right under the proviso to Rule 37 of the Settlement Rules.\n\nThe camouflage successfully worked, but once this cloak is removed, it unmistakably, transpires that the respondent was trying to claim benefit of clause 2 of the lease having fulfilled its pre-condition and obtaining the inclusion of its latter part in the contract of lease. The question, therefore, really is whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the writ jurisdiction?\n\nHow dangerous it is, can be demonstrably established in this case.\n\nBut we would first address ourselves to the question of law.\n\nArt. 226 confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the High Court to issue high prerogative writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose.\n\nUndoubtedly, the respondent contended that its fundamental right under Art. 19(1) (g) to carry on trade has been vi\"olated.\n\nThe High Court overlookd the well-settled legal position that a juristic person such as a Corporation is not entitled to any of the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19. The respondent was the sole petitioner in the High Court. It is a company incorporated under the Companies Act.\n\nThe fundamental right claimed under Art. 19 (!)\n\n(g) is to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. The respondent (company) contended that it had a right to carry on its trade or business of cultivating and raising a tea garden and as part of it to cut timber and remove the same from the leased area without the payment of royalty and that insistence upon payment of royalty unsupported by law is an unreasonable restriction. denying the fundamental right guaranteed. to the respondent.\n\nArt.\n\n19 (1) (g) guarantees the fundamental freedom to a citizen. The respondent not being a citizen was not entitled to complain of breach or violation of fundamental right under Art. 19 (l) (g). [See State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commercial Tax Officer, Vishakhapatnam (1) and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. v. State of Bihar (2).] However, the shareholders of a company can complain of infringement of their fundamental rights [See Bennett Coleman & Co. and Others v. Union of India and Others] (3). Such is not the case pleaded. Therefore the writ petition on the allegation of infringement of fundamental right under Art. 19 (I) (g) at the instance of respondent company alone was not maintainable.\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that High Court can entertain in its extraordinary jurisdiction a petition to issue any of the prerogative writs for any other purpose.\n\nBut such writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a Corporation where there is a denial of equality before law or equal protection of law. The Corporation can also file a writ petition for enforcement of a right under a statute. As pointed out earlier, the respondent (Company) was merely trying to enforce a contractual obligation. To clear the ground let it be stated that obligation to pay royalty for timber cut and felled and removed is prescribed by the relevant regulations. The validity of regulations is not challenged. Therefore, the demand for royalty is unsupported by law.\n\nWhat the respondent claims is an exception that in view of a certain term in the indenture of lease, to wit, Clause 2, the appellant is not entitled to demand and collect royalty from the respondent.\n\nThis is nothing but enforcement of a term of a contract of lease.\n\nHence, the question whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.\n\nOrdinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed, or the party may sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable by the Civil Court. The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not entertain a petition either for specific performance of contract or for recovering damages. A right to relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a .civil court where a suit for specific performance of contract or for damages could be\n\n(I) (1964] 4 S.C R. 99.\n\n(2) [1950l S.C.R. 869.\n\n(3) [1973 2 S.C.R. 757.\n\nfiled.\n\nThis is so well settled that no authority is needed. However, we may refer to a recent decision bearing on the subject. In Har Shankar and Ors. etc. etc. v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and Ors.(1), the petitioners offered their bids in the auctions held for granting licences for the sale of liquor. Subsequently, the petitioners moved to invalidate the auctions challenging the power of the Financial Commissioner to grant liquor iicence. Rejecting this contention, Chandrachud J., as he than was speaking for the Constitution Bench at page 263 observed as under :\n\n\"Those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens of the contract along with its benefits. The powers of the Financial Commissioner to grant liquor licences by auction and to collect licence fees through the medium of auctions cannot by writ petitions be questioned by those who, had their venture succeeded, would have relied upon those very powers to found a legal claim. Reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract could ever have a binding force.\"\n\nAgain at page 265 there is a pertinent observation which may be extracted.\n\n\"Analysing the situation here, a concluded contract must be held to have come into existence between the parties. The appellants have displayed ingenuity in their search for invalidating circumstances but a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations.\"\n\nThis apart, it also appears that in a later decision, the Assam High Court itself took an exactly opposite view in almost idential circum stances.\n\nIn Woodcrafts Assam v. Chief Conservator of Forests, Assam,(2) a writ petition was filed challenging the revision of rates of royalty for two different periods.\n\nRejecting this petition as not maintainable, a Division Bench of the High Court held that the complaint of the petitioner is that there is violation of his rights under the contract and that such violation of contractual obligation cannot be remedied by a writ petition.\n\nThat exactly is the position in the case before us.. Therefore, the High :court was in error in entertaining the writ petition and it should have berm dismissed at the threshold.\n\n(1) (1975] 3 S.C.R. 254.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1971 Assam 92.\n\nIn substance, this was a suit for refund of a royalty alleged to be unathorisedly recovered and that could hardly be entertained in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.\n\nAs the High Court has also disposed of the case on merits after overruling the preliminary objection, it is but meet that we may examine the case on merits and that itself would demonstrably show the dangerous course adopted by the High Court in examining rights and obligations claimed under the contract without proper or adequate material or evidence to reach a conclusion, more so when the petition raised disputed questions of facts which needed investigation.\n\nRespondent No. 1 had entered into a lease dated September 27, 1932 with the Secretary of State for India. Part Ir of the lease describes the land leased to the respondent.\n\nThe description is as under;\n\nN. C. Tengalbasti Village in Sootea Mauza in the Tezpur Sadar Sub-Division of Darrang District.\n\nBlock No. 1 Field No. 2-1804 B. 4 K-12L, Block No. 2 Field No. 3-1544 B. 2 K-13L.\n\nTotal-] I 07.26 Acres on 3349 B. 2K-5L\n\nThis land was taken on lease for cultivation and raising tea garden.\n\nUnder the relevant Clause 2 above, the lessee was to pay timber valuation on full rate for all timber sold or removed for sale and on all timber removed for use unconnected with exploitation of the grant during the period of lease or renewed lease. From this negative covenant in the indenture of lease, the respondent says that where timber is cut and felled and removed for a purpose or use connected with the exploitation of grant during the period of lease or renewed lease, royalty shall not be payable.\n\nAssuming the respondent is right in its construction of Clause 2 of the indenture of lease, in order to obtain relief, namely, to cut and remove timber from the leased area for purpose connected with the exploitation of the grant, it must show that the timber is being felled and cut from an area covered by the lease in which Clause 2 finds its place and that such timber is being removed for a purpose connected with the exploitation of the grant. To be more specific, following facts will have to proved for obtaining relief :\n\n(i) The area covered by the grant.\n\n(ii) Felling of the trees from the area covered by the A grant.\n\n(iii) Use to which the felled timber was to be put to •.\n\n(iv) Such use will have to be one connected with the exploitation of the grant.\n\n{v) What is meant by the exploitation of the grant?\n\nCould these facts be assumed without evidence? Was the High Court justified in observing that it was called upon to decide complicated questions of facts ? Some averments in the petition were disputed. The appellant contended that Clause 2 of 1he indenture of lease only means that if there is some use of timber which is being felled and removed from the area covered by the grant for the purpose connected with the exploitation of that very grant, then and only then the relief can be claimed und-::r Clause 2.\n\nThe High Court found as a fact that the timber was sought to be removed for the purpose of constructing quarters for the workmen employed in Partabghur Garden situated in Dekorai Division.\n\nAdmittedly, this Partabghur Garden is not situated in Tezalpatty Village.\n\nAt any rate, Partabghur Garden where the houses for the workmen were to be constructed was situated outside the area covered by the grant, as also outside the Revenue Division in which the leased area is located. The High Court got over this difficulty by observing that the grant being in favour of an incorporated company, it can cut and remove timber from leased area for use at any place which is owned, managed or controlled by the company and it is immaterial whether one is directly connected with the other or not. If the timber is being felled from the area of one grant to be used at some other place where the Company is carrying on its operation, the benefit of the remJval of timber without payment of royalty would be available to the Company anywhere in the world. To stretch this logic a little further, it would mean that if the respondent (Company) is to set up a tea garden outside India, it can as well cut and remove timber from N.C. Tezalpatty, Grant No. 1 in Assam to the place outside India without the obligation to pay royalty. The fallacy underlying the approach of the High Court becomes selfevident. It is immaterial that the grantee was the Company. The\n\nspecific provision is that the grant is for a purpose of cultivation and raising tea garden and that from the area covered by the grant, if timber is felled for purpose connected with the grant itself, namely, cultivation and raising tea garden in that area then alone benefit of removal of timber without payment of royalty can be\n\navailed of. It is admitted that Partabghur Tea Garden is outside the area covered by the grant, in fact in an altogether different division. In such a situation upon a true construction of Clause 2, Part IV of indenture of lease, the respondent Company was not entitled to remove timber without payment of royalty. Therefore, even on merits, the High Court was in error in granting relief.\n\nAccordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed with costs throughout.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed. '", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BISHWANATH TEA CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May, 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May, 5, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 300, "end_char": 310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation-Settlement Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 311, "end_char": 360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation-Settlement Rule", "statute": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation-Settlement Rule"}}, {"text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 919, "end_char": 927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation", "statute": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation"}}, {"text": "27-9-1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 958, "end_char": 967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 for utilising the same for building of staff and labourers' house as per clause 2 of Part IV of the lease dated 27-9-1932 and Rule 37 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations."}}, {"text": "Partabghur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1079, "end_char": 1089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the timber was required by the company for use in Partabghur and Dekorai tea estates which were outside Tezalpatty No."}}, {"text": "Tezalpatty", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1133, "end_char": 1143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the timber was required by the company for use in Partabghur and Dekorai tea estates which were outside Tezalpatty No."}}, {"text": "Assam High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7069.37 Paisc under protest and later filed a petition under Article -226 of the Constitution in the Assam High Court, praying for refund of the amount and for a mandamus directing the appellant for issuing permits without insisting on payment of royalty whenever timber was to be cut from the leased area for the purposes connected with the exploitation of the grant."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1857, "end_char": 1868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N.C. Tezalpatty", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1967, "end_char": 1982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On merits, the High Court further held that as the grant of N.C. Tezalpatty No."}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2401, "end_char": 2417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2624, "end_char": 2634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2695, "end_char": 2708, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2715, "end_char": 2731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1964] 4 S.C.R. 99", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3783, "end_char": 3791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assam Land and Revenue Local Rate Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5094, "end_char": 5102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5836, "end_char": 5844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.K. Nandy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6720, "end_char": 6730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Nandy for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S.N. Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Chowdhary for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6831, "end_char": 6836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThi~ appeal by special leave arises out of a writ petition filed by the respondent Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., in the Assam and Nagaland High Court questioning the action of the appellant, the Divisional Forest Officer, Darrang Division, of re covering Rs."}}, {"text": "Assam and Nagaland High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6957, "end_char": 6986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nThi~ appeal by special leave arises out of a writ petition filed by the respondent Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., in the Assam and Nagaland High Court questioning the action of the appellant, the Divisional Forest Officer, Darrang Division, of re covering Rs."}}, {"text": "Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. ('Company' for short), took on lease land admeasuring 1107.26 acres from the Government.", "canonical_name": "Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7581, "end_char": 7586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease was executed between the Company and the Secretary of the State for India."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7889, "end_char": 7906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 15, 1966, manager of the Company approached the appellant seeking permission to cut 7000 cubic feet of timber from Grant N.C. Tezalpatty No."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8150, "end_char": 8163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the reply dated April 4, 1966, the appellant noted that the timber was to be\n\nDIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER v. BJSHWANATH TEA co. (Desai, J.) 665\n\ncut for constructing houses in Partabghur and Dekorai Tea Estates and that it was necessary to ascertain whether any of the aforementioned two Tea estates was situated within the grant evidenced by lease of N.C. Tezalpatty No."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8666, "end_char": 8680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The manager by his letter dated April 23, 1966, informed the appellant that as the lessee is Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., it can cut and fell timber from any of its leased area to be utilised for its purposes in any other division."}}, {"text": "Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8727, "end_char": 8750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The manager by his letter dated April 23, 1966, informed the appellant that as the lessee is Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., it can cut and fell timber from any of its leased area to be utilised for its purposes in any other division."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9001, "end_char": 9013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant by his letter dated May 12, 1966, informed the manager that as the timber was required for use in Partabghur and Dekorai tea estates which were not within N.C. Tezalpatty Grant No."}}, {"text": "Dekorai tea estates", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9094, "end_char": 9113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant by his letter dated May 12, 1966, informed the manager that as the timber was required for use in Partabghur and Dekorai tea estates which were not within N.C. Tezalpatty Grant No."}}, {"text": "N.C. Tezalpatty Grant No. 1", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9136, "end_char": 9163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant by his letter dated May 12, 1966, informed the manager that as the timber was required for use in Partabghur and Dekorai tea estates which were not within N.C. Tezalpatty Grant No."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9465, "end_char": 9483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this assertion the appellant relied upon a portion of clause (2) of Part IV of the lease deed dated September 27, 1932."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9679, "end_char": 9690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10871, "end_char": 10882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11851, "end_char": 11862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dekorai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12119, "end_char": 12126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I was in favour of M/s. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., the company was entitled to cut and fell timber from N.C. Tezalpatty grant area for its use in other tea gardens, namely, Partabghur and Dekorai and even if the latter two gardens were outside N.C. Tezalpatty Grant No."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13278, "end_char": 13286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24.2.32", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13798, "end_char": 13805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43 dated the 24.2.32 The lessee shall be liable to pay timber valuation at full rates on all timber sold or removed for sale and on all timber removed for use unconnected with exploitation of the grant during the period of his lease or renewed lease.\""}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14649, "end_char": 14657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24-2-32", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12472.7 on 24-2-32 The lessee according to the respondent would be liable to pay timber valuation at full rates on all timber sold or removed for sale on all timber removed for use unconnected with exploitation of the grant during the period of the lease or renewed lease."}}, {"text": "Cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15325, "end_char": 15330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16606, "end_char": 16611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17632, "end_char": 17640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part IV of the indenture of lease extracted hereinbefore and the proviso to Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17644, "end_char": 17724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18354, "end_char": 18362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IV of the indenture of lease extracted hereinbefore and the proviso to Rule", "statute": "Part IV of the indenture of lease extracted hereinbefore and the proviso to Rule"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19747, "end_char": 19755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20121, "end_char": 20129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20355, "end_char": 20365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20564, "end_char": 20571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20670, "end_char": 20683, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20722, "end_char": 20729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21206, "end_char": 21214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21386, "end_char": 21393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21851, "end_char": 21858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22841, "end_char": 22849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1964] 4 S.C R. 99", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23720, "end_char": 23738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1973 2 S.C.R. 757", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23769, "end_char": 23787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24281, "end_char": 24292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting this contention, Chandrachud J., as he than was speaking for the Constitution Bench at page 263 observed as under :\n\n\"Those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens of the contract along with its benefits."}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24329, "end_char": 24347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting this contention, Chandrachud J., as he than was speaking for the Constitution Bench at page 263 observed as under :\n\n\"Those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens of the contract along with its benefits."}}, {"text": "(1975] 3 S.C.R. 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26146, "end_char": 26165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sootea Mauza", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27079, "end_char": 27091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The description is as under;\n\nN. C. Tengalbasti Village in Sootea Mauza in the Tezpur Sadar Sub-Division of Darrang District."}}, {"text": "Tezpur Sadar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27099, "end_char": 27111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The description is as under;\n\nN. C. Tengalbasti Village in Sootea Mauza in the Tezpur Sadar Sub-Division of Darrang District."}}, {"text": "Darrang District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27128, "end_char": 27144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The description is as under;\n\nN. C. Tengalbasti Village in Sootea Mauza in the Tezpur Sadar Sub-Division of Darrang District."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27359, "end_char": 27367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27906, "end_char": 27914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28177, "end_char": 28185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28905, "end_char": 28913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29177, "end_char": 29185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dekorai Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29359, "end_char": 29375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court found as a fact that the timber was sought to be removed for the purpose of constructing quarters for the workmen employed in Partabghur Garden situated in Dekorai Division."}}, {"text": "Tezalpatty Village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29432, "end_char": 29450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, this Partabghur Garden is not situated in Tezalpatty Village."}}, {"text": "Partabghur Garden", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29466, "end_char": 29483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At any rate, Partabghur Garden where the houses for the workmen were to be constructed was situated outside the area covered by the grant, as also outside the Revenue Division in which the leased area is located."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30435, "end_char": 30440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in Assam to the place outside India without the obligation to pay royalty."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31160, "end_char": 31168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_675_685_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nv •\n\n. WASUDEO RAMCHANDRA KAIDALWAR\n\nMay 6, 1981\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]\n\nPrevention of Corruption Act, 1947-Section 5(2) read with section 5(1}(e)- Scope of.\n\nJnterpretation-\"assets disproportionate to the known sources of income\" meaning of.\n\nEvidence-Burden of proof under section 5(2) read with section 5(l}(e)-On whom lies.\n\nThe respondent was a Range Forest Officer on a monthly salary of Rs. 515.\n\nIn a search conducted by an officer of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Rs. 26 thousand-odd in cash, savings bank accounts in the names of himself, his wife and children, national savings certificates, postal saving certificates, gold and silver oranments, sale deeds of certain properties in the name of his wife, sister-inlaw and brother-in-law aggregating in all to over Rs. 79 thousand were discovered from his house. On the allegation that he was found in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income he was charged with offence punishable under section 5(2) read with section 5(J)(e) of the Prevention of Corrouption Act, 1947.\n\nThe respondent pleaded that he led a frugal life and that secondly much of the property found in his house belonged to his father-in-law. He added that his father-in-Jaw was a pairokar of a Zamindar in the area, that two sisters of his father-in-Jaw were the kept mistresses of the Zamindar, and the Zamindar gave large amounts of cash and presents most of which were passed on to his fatherin-Jaw. At the time of his death, his father-in-law entrusted his minor daughter and son to his care and instructed that his property should be divided among his three children equally and that therefore he was holding the property merely as a custodian.\n\nRejecting the plea of the respondent a Special Judge convicted and sentenced him under section 5(2) read with section 5(I)(e) of the Act.\n\nOn appeal a single Judge of the High Court acquitted him holding that the prosecution had failed to discharge the burden of disproving all possible sources of the respondent's income, that it was not possible to exclude the probability that the property found in his possession could be the property left by his fatherin-law, and that mere possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources\n\nof income would not be sufficient to bring home the guilt under section 5(1)(e) H unless the prosecution further excluded all possible sources of income. The High Court was also of the view that the changes brought a bout by the Anti-\n\nCorruption Laws (Amen.!ment) Act, 1964 had the effect ofJimiting the presumption of guilt arising under section 4(1) of the Act to an offence of criminal misconduct speified i~ _section S(J)(a) and (b) and not to that in section 5(1){e).\n\nHELD: , The COnstrution , placed by the High Court on sectiori S(l)(e) was wrong in that it overlooked the fact that, by the use of the words \"for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily acquit\", a burden is cast on the accused. '\n\n[680 BJ -- '. ,·,.\n\nSection 5(3) which now stood deleted, did not create an offence separate from the one created by /section 5(1) bu( only raised a presumptioii of criminal mis conduct if he or any person on his behalf was in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income which he cou1d not siitisfactoriJy accoUnt. OnCe the prosecution proves this fact the burden shifts on to the accused to prove the source of acquisition of such assets. [681 F-G]\n\n• ,.\n\nTh~ Cxpr~Ssi-on \"knowil sourCes Or inome\" in the context of the section means \"sources known to the prosecution''.\n\nSecondly~ the onus placed on the accused under the section was not to prove his innocence beyond reasonable d_oubt bUt orily· to establish a preponderarice of probability: To eradicate th_e widespread corruption fn ·-public serviceS the legislature:· dispeD.sed with. the Tule of evidence under section 5(3) and made possession b:Y a public sCrvaflt of assets disproportionaie to his income as one of the si>ecies of offences cif criminal misconduct by iriserting Clause (e) in section 5(1). [682 A-C] r.-.·-· - -· ;· .. . .''\n\n- , ' . ·,_ -- . . . . . , -\n\n- The meaning.to be assi£:ned. to the expression ~'known sources of income~' 1 occurring in section 5(t)(e) must be the sam~ as was given to that expression ia, - Section 5(3) before its repeal, that is,· \"sources known to the prosecution\".\" So -also the same meaning must be given to the words \"for which a public servant) is unable to satisfactorily account 0 occurring in section 5(l)(e).' When clause (e)\n\n.- uses the words .\"if the public servant is unable to. satisfactorily account'~-- it is\n\niIDPlied thai the hui-den fs ori sUch public servant io -account for the soU_fceS for. the .aCqulsition Of asSetS disproportionate to his iOcoine. :The lligh Court Wa:s;~ thefefore; ill error in h0Iding that a_ public servant Charge'd for 1'3.ving . iQ. his-; ppSsessioii.assets dispropcir1ionate tO his income for which he cannot satisfactorily\n\n..,.., _ acC:cuni cOuld not be convicted or ail offence under scction_5(2) read with :section\n\n5(l)e) Utlless the p_ros~ution disioeS all possible sources of income.' [682 D-F]_;-\n\n.Sajjan Singh vc State of Punjab [1964] 4 S.C.R. 630 and V.D. Jhagan v. State of U.P. [1966] 3 S.C.R. 736, referred to.\n\n/ .\n\nThe expression \"burden of proof\" has two distinct meanings: (I) the legal burden, that is, the burden of establishing the guilt and (2) the evidential burden, that is~ the burden of leading evidence. Notwithstanding the general rule that the burden of proof lies exclusively upon the prosecution, in the case of certain Offeiices. the burden of proving a particular fact in issue rriay be laid bY law upon: the accused. This burden is not so onerous as that which lies ori the prosecution aDct is discharged by proof of a balanceof probabilities. To substantiate the charge of CriIDioal misconduct under section 5(2) read with sectiOn 5(1)(e) the\n\nprosecution must' prove (1) that the accused was a public st!rVant; (2) thC-· nature -and extent of the pecuniary resources or property in r1is possession,\n\n(3) his kno\\vn sources of income, i.e. known to the prOs-ecution.; (4) \"that such\n\n-- ------ - --------------------------....,\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. w. R. KAIDALWAR (Sen, J.) 677\n\nsources or property were disproportionate to his known sources of income.~ .. Once\n\n.'A thes.:: are established, the offence of, criminal misconduct under .. section 5(1) (e) would be cOniPlete. The burden then shifts to the accuSed to substantially acCOunt for possession by.'birll of assets disproportionate to his income. :_The exiCilt 3:nd nature of burden of proof resting-upon the public sefvant canno{-be higher thin\n\nestablishing his case by a preponderance of probability. [683 A-E] . • . ' . - - .-:; . ' ~· .\n\nIn the inst.int case' ihe High Couft. has placd i~ inipossible . burdn. On ·:the prosecutioti tb.disprove au possible sources of incOme Which-were -withilt thesPCcial knowledge of-thC accus::d. The prosecution cannot in the nature of things. be expected to know the affairs Of a public servant found in possession of resources er property disp_fopOrtiOnate.to his krlowil. sources._of income that is his sal.iry, because these are matters specially within his knowledge. within 'the meaning or , section 106 oftheEidence Act. -· ' ·\n\n-The phrase \"burden of proof\" in section 106 of Evidence Act is clearly used in th_e secondary sense, namely the duty of introducing evidence. The nature and.extent of the burden\" cast On th'e.accused is well settled. The accused is not bourid to prove his innocence beyond all reasonable doubt. AU that he need d.o is t~ bring out a preponderance of probability.· [684 B] ··/\n\n• ; ;.-, • ; •. ' ... \\. . !. • ~\n\nB --:;:\n\no~ the proved circumstances ther~ W3.s-a'preponderance of probability 'that _D the property found in the respondent's house could be the property left by' his ;_! • . fath~_r-in-Iaw. ere is overwhe; Iming evidencre on. recod' that, the 'respondent's father-in-law was a man.of affiuent circumstances, being a paiorkar of a Zamindar and that lie hid 3.mas:Sed considerable wealth~ more so because his two sisters were the kept mistresses of the Zamiridaf .. On the death of the Zamindar his f<ithei-- inlaw stayed with the ri:sp-Ondent. Also, 'the respondent\"s father had a Jiquof shOp besides forest contr3.cts. The f'°vidence led in the case was sufficieilt to create '.£. _ a doubt Whether :the respondent was in possession :of assets disproportionate to his known sOur<; eS of income. On the other hand there is preponderance of probabilit:Y that-the-prperty in his possession belonged not to him, but io his father-in law. [684 D-H]\n\n',,, CRIMINAL-APPELLATB JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No: zi1 of-1976.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 9th April, 1975 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench), Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No. 134of ,1971.\n\nM.C. Bhandare and R.N. Poddar for the Appellant. •\n\nP. Govindan Nair, K. Ramavtar. and K.R. Choudhury for the Respondent. ·,\n\nThe J udgmeni of!he Court was delivered by . . '. -.' ' ' . ' . ' .•. , . ,)\n\n. SEN~ J.' this appear,\n\nTj:ie State Gcive; nment of Maharashtra has preferred by special . leave, against the . judgment of th~\n\nBombay High Court, reversing the judgment and sentence of the Special Judge, Chandrapur and acquitting the respondent of an offence under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(I)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act').\n\nThe respondent, Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, was a Range Forest Officer, drawing a salary of Rs. 515 per month. On September 21, 1969, PW 71, Patwardhan, Inspector, Anti-Corruption Bureau under authorisation from the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bombay, carried out search and seizure at the residential house of the respondent. The Inspector made a recovery of Rs. 26,870 in cash from an almirah, savings bank accounts in the names of the respondent, his wife and children totalling to Rs. 12,588.35, national savings certificates worth Rs. 510, postal savings certificates worth Rs. 184.25 in the name of his daughter, Nandini, savings bank deposits with the State Bank of India and the postal savings certicates in the name of his brother-in-law, Narayan, amounting to Rs. 2,279.05, gold and silver ornaments, household effects etc. of the value of Rs. 8,602.50, two sale-deeds in respect of two plots bearing Khasra Nos. 28/lK and 28/!Dh in Chandrapur purchased (I) in the name of his wife, Smt. Sushila for Rs. 5,250 and (2) in the joint names of his wife, Smt. Sushila and his brother-in-law, Narayan for an amount of Rs. 21,210, papers relating to the building of a house at village Gondpipri built in the year 1965 at a cost of Rs. 10,000.\n\nThe petitioner was accordingly put on trial for having committed an offence punishable under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(l)(e) of the Act, being found in possession of assets disproportionate to his income.\n\nThe respondent abjured his guilt and denied the commission of the offence.\n\nHe pleaded that he was leading frugal life and all the property found during the search of his residential house belonged to his father-in-law, Hanumanthu, pairokar of Raja Dharmarao, Zamindar of Aheri Estate.\n\nHe alleged that two of the sisters of his father-in-law were the kept mistresses of Raja Dharmarao and enjoyed special favours from the late Zamindar who bestowed on them large amounts of cash, ornaments etc. They used to visit the house of his father-in-Jaw, Hanumanthu, once or twice a month, and used to keep all their cash, gold and silver ornaments. Hanumanthu owned a grocery shop. He and his father had a liquor shop besides forest contracts.\n\nHanumanthu used to deal in moneylending business. The respondent alleged that his father-in-law deposited an amount of Rs. 30,000 in April 1957, Rs. 10,000/- in August 1957 and Rs. 35,000 in cash and Rs. 1,000 in coins and also 23 tolas of gold in September, 1957 with his wife, Smt. Sushila.\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. w. R. KAIDALWAR (Sen, J.) 679\n\nHe pleaded that his father-in-law died on . March 10, 1958 at his A house leaving behind his son, Narayan and two daughters. Smt.\n\nShakuntala, who on her marriage with the respondent was re-named as Smt. Sushila, and Smt.Sushila, his sister-in-iaw, minor at that time.\n\nHe instructed him to divide the property into three equal shares among his three children. The respondent maintained that he was holding the property merely as a custodian and was not the owner B thereof. .\n\nThe Special Judge, Chandrapur, by his judgment dated 7.6.1971, convicted the respondent for having committed an offience punishable under s.5(2) read with s.(5) ( l )(e) of the Act inasmuch as he was found in possession of property worth Rs. 79,574.70 asagainst his only C known source of income, namely, his total salary in government service amounting to Rs. 44,00J. He held that the respondent had failed to_ account for cash of Rs. 26,870, sale-deeds of the two plots purchased for Rs. 5,250 and Rs. 21,210 in the name of his wife Smt. Sushila and the other jointly in the name of his wife and brother-in-law, Narayan and for the house built at village Gondpipri D at a cost of Rs. 10,000 He held that the acquisition of these immoveable properties was not reasonably attributable to the property left by his father-in-law, Hanumanthu. He also rejected the respon\n\ndent's plea that he was leading a frugal life and, therefore, was able to make a saving of Rs. 15,000 out of his salary income.\n\nHe acoordinly sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and E to pay a fine of Rs. 26,870. He further directed that the two plots at Chandrapur and the house at village Gondpipri be sold and the sale proceeds be forfeited.\n\nOn appeal, a learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the judgment and sentence passed by the learned Special Judge and F acquitted the respondent. The order of acquittal was based principally. on two grounds : (1) The prosecution having failed to discharge the burden of disproving all possible sources of income i.e. failed to account for the properties left by the respondent's father-in-law, Haumanthu, he could not be convicted under s. 5(2) read with s. 5 (l)(e) of the Act, and (2) it was not possible to exclude the probability G that the property found in the respondent's house could be the property left by his father-in-law, Hanumanthu.\n\nIn coming to the conclusion that it did, the High Court was of the view that the changes brought about by theJAnti-Corruption Laws H (Amendment) Act, 1964 had the effect of limiting the presumption of guilt arising under s.4(1) of the Act to offences of criminal misconduct\n\nspecified in ss.5(l}(a) and (b) and not to that in s.S(l)(e). It therefore held that mere possession of disproportionate assets by a public servant to his known sources of income for which he has failed to .account would not be sufficient to bring home the guilt under s.5 (I) (e), unless the prosecution further excludes all possible sources of incow, e. The construction placed by the High Court on the provisions contained in s.5(l)(e) of the Act is obviously wrong. It completely overlooks the fact that the burden is cast on the accused by the use of the words \"for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account\". It is also wrong in distorting the meaning of the expression \"known sources of income\" occurring in s. 5(1)(e), which has a definite legal connotation and which, in the context, must mean \"sources known to the prosecution\".\n\nIt is distressing to find that the High Court has involved itself into a pfocess of evolution of a new theory of law, instead of confining itself to a re-appraisal of the evidence on record which it was entitled to do sitting as a court of appeal against the judgment of conviction. The ort:ler of acquittal recorded by the High Court could still be maintained on a proper evaluation of the facts, as, on the proved circumstances, there was a preponderance of probability that the property . found in the respondent's house could be the property left by his father-in-law, Hanumanthu.\n\nThe legislature deleted s.5(3) of Act which embodied a rule of evidence by s.6 of the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964 and instead, inserted s.5(1)(e) making, possession of disproportionate assets by a public servant, a substantive offence. Section 5(1)(e) of the Act reads :\n\n5.(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct-\n\n(e) if be or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.\n\nOld s.5(3) of the Act was in these terms :\n\n5.(3) In any trial of an offence punishable under subsection(2) the fact that the accused person or any other person on his behalf is in possession, for which the accused\n\n~ '\n\n\"MAHARASHTRA v. w. R. KAIDl\\LWAR (Sen, J.) 681\n\nperson cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuciary resources or property disproportoionate to his known sources of income may be proved, and on such proof the Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the acused person if guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty and his conviction therefor shall not be invalid by reason only that it is -based solely on such presumption.\n\nThree questions arise for our consideration in this appeal, namely : (1) Whether a public servant charged with having dispropor• tionate assets in his possession, for which he cannot satisfactorily account, cannot be convicted of an offence under s. 5(2) read with s.5(l)(e) of the Act unless the prosecution disproves all possible sources of his income (2) If the prosecution establishes that a public servant is in possession of pecuniary resources . or property disproportionate to his known sources of income, whether the\n\nburden to disprove the charge shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for the source of acqusition of s11ch resources or property. and if so, the nature and extent of such burden on the accused.\n\n(3) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, having regard to the fact that the respondent's father-in-law, Hanumanthu was pairokar of Raja Dharmarao, Zamindar of Aheri Estate and left substantial properties, it was not improbable that the properties found in possession of the respondent belonged to his father-intaw.\n\nIt is clear both on authority and principle that s.5(3) which now stands deleted did not create an offence separate from the one created by s.5(1), but intended only to lay down a rule of evidence to raise a presumption of guilt in certain circumstances.\n\nSection 5(1) defines different species of criminal misconduct which can be committed by a public servant and s.5(2) provides that any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to seven years and also shall be liable to fine.\n\nUnder the old s.5(3), a presumption of criminal misconduct could be drawn if such a public servant or any person on his behalf was found to be in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income for which the public servant could not satisfactorily account, Once the prosecution proved that the accused person was possessed of disproportionate assets, the burden was shifted to the accused to prove the source of acquisition of such assets. '\n\nThe provisions of s.5(3) have been subject of judicial interpretation.\n\nFirst the expression \"known sources of income\" in the context of s.5(3) meant \"sources known to the prosecution\". The other principle is equally well-settled.\n\nThe onus placed on the accused under s.5(3) was however, not to prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt, but only to establish a preponderance of probability. These are well->ettled principles : C.S.D. Swamy v. The State(1) Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab(2) and V.D. Jhagan v. State of U.P.(3).\n\nThe legislature thought it fit to dispense with the rule of evidence under s. 5(3) and make the possession of disproportionate assets by a public servant as one of the species of the offence of criminal misconduct by inserting s. 5{l)(e) due to widespread corruption in public services.\n\nThe terms and expressions appearing in s. 5(l)(e) of the Act are the same as those used in the old Section 5(3).\n\nAlthough the two provisions openite in two different fields, the meaning to be assigned to them must be the same. The expression \"known sources of income\" means \"sources known to the prosecution\".\n\nSo also the same meaning must be given to the words \"for which the public servant is unable to satisfactorily account\" occurring in s. 5(!)(e).\n\nNo doubt, s. 4(1) provides for presumption of guilt in cases falling under ss. '(!){a) and (b), but there was, in our opinion, no need to mention s. 5(1)(a) therein.\n\nFor, the reason is obvious. The provision contained in s.5(1)(e) of the Act is a self-contained provision.\n\nThe first part of the Section casts a burden on the prosection and the second on the accused.\n\nWhen s. 5(1)(e) uses the words \"for which the public servant is unable to satisfactorily account\", it is implied that the burden is on such public servant to account for the sources for the acquisition of disproportionate assets.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, was in error in holding that a public servant charged for having disproportionate assets in his possession for which he cannot satisfactorily account, cannot be convict(!d of an offence under s. 5(2) read with s.5(1 )(e) of the Act unless the prosecution disproves all possible sources of income.\n\nThat takes us to the difficult question as to the nature and extent of the burden of proof under s. 5 (I) (e) of the the Act. The expression 'burden of proof' bas two distinct meanings (I) the legal burden. i.e. the burden of establishing the guilt, and (2) the\n\n(1) [1960] l S.C.R. 461.\n\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. w. R. KAJDALWAR (Sen, J.) 683\n\nevidential burden, i.e. the burden of leading evidence. In a criminal J:rial, the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused lies upon the prosecution, and that burden never shifts.\n\nNotwithstanding the general rule that the burden of proof lies exclusively upon the prosecution, in the case of certain offences, the burden of proving a particular fact in issue may be laid by law upon the accused.\n\nThe burden resting on the accused in such cases is, however, not so onerous as that which lies on the prosecution and is discharged by proof of a balance of probabilities. The ingredients of the offence of criminal misconduct under s. 5(2) read with s.5(I)(e) are the possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the known sources of income for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account.\n\nTo substantiate the charge, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. S(l)(e), namely, (!) it must establish that the accused is a public servant, (2) the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property which were found in his possession, (3) it must be proved as to what were his known sources of income i.e. known to the prosecution, and (4) it must prove quite objectively, that such rosources or property found in possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known sources of income. Once these four ingredients are established, the offence of criminal misconduct under s. S(l)(e) is, complete, unless the accused is able to account for such resources or property.\n\nThe burden then shifts to the accussed to satisfactorily account for his possession of disproportionate assets. The extent and nature of burden of proof resting upon the public servant to be found in possession of disproportionate assets under s. 5( I)( e) cannot be higher than the test laid by the Court in Jahgan's case (supra), i.e. to establish his case by a preponderance of probability. That test was laid down by the court following the dictum of Viscount Sankey, L.C. in Wooimington v. Director of Public Prosecutions(1). The High Court has placed an impossible burden on the prosecution to disprove all possible sources of income which were within the special knowledge of the accused. As laid down in Swamy's case (supra), the prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of a public servant found in possession of resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income i.e. his salary. Those will be matters specially within the knowledge of the public servant within the meaning of s.106 of the Evidence Act, 1872.\n\nSection 106 reads :\n\n(I) [1935] A.C. 462.\n\ns. 106. when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.\n\nIn this connection, the phrase the burden of proof is clearly used in the secondary sense namely, the duty of introducing evidence. The nature and extent of the burden cast on the accused is well settled.\n\nThe accused is not bound to prove his innocence beyond all reasonable doubt. All that he need do is to bring out a preponderence of probability.\n\nSuch being the law, the question whether or not the respondent had established a preponderance of probability is a matter relating to appreciation of evidence. 0 n a consideration of the evidence adduced by the respondent, the High Court has taken the view that it is not possible to exclude the possibility that the property found in possession of the respondent belonged to his father-in-law, Hanumanthu.\n\nWe have been taken through the evidence and we cannot say that the finding reached by the High Court is either mainfestly wrong or perverse.\n\nMaybe, this Court, on a reappraisal of the evidence, could have come to a contrary conclusion. That, however, is hardly a ground for interference with an order of acquittal. There are no compelling reasons to interfere with the order of acquittal, particularly when there is overwhelming evidence Jed by the respondent showing that his father-in-law, Hanumanthu, was a man of affiuent circumstances.\n\nThere is no denying fact that Hanumanthu was the pairokar of Raja Dharmarao Zamindar of Aheri Estate and by his close association with the Zamindar, had amassed considerable wealth.\n\nMore so, because two of his sisters were the kept mistresses of the Zamindar and amply provided for.\n\nIt appears that after the death of Raja Dharmarao, Hanumanthu took up his residence with his elder daughter, Smt. Sushila, who was married to the respondent. To substantiate his plea in defence, the respondent examined as many as 12 witnesses including himself as AW 12, his sister-in-law, Smt. Sushila (AW 11), Dr. Chandrasekhar Merekar (AW 6), Shri V.N. Swamy, Advocate, Chandrapur (AW 8).\n\nWe cannot brush aside the unimeachable testimony of Shri V.N.\n\nSwamy, AW 8, who was a leading advocate of Chandrapur and Member of Lok Sabha, and Dr. Chandrasekhar Merekar, AW 6, Medical Practitioner of Chandrapur, who attended on Hanumanthu at the time of his death. Both these witnesses have unequivocally stated that when Hanumanthu died at the respondents leaving his two minor children, Smt. Sushila and Narayan to the care of the respondent and his wife, Smt.Sushila; he told them that he\n\nMAHARASHTRA JI. W.R. KAILALWAR (Sen, J.) 685\n\nwas leaving properties worth Rs. 70 to 80 thousand comprising cash ornaments, jewellery etc., and expressed a desire that the same be divided equally among, his three children, the two daughters and son.\n\nShri Swamy testified to the fact that he was handling all the litigation of Raja Dharamrao, Zamindar of Aheri Estate who had an yearly income of Rs. 6 to 8 lakhs because the Zamindar had rich forests.\n\nHe tells us that he knew Hanumanthu well because he was the pairoku of Raja Dharmarao, that Hanumanthu enjoyed great confidence of the Zamindar and had free access to him because his two sisters were the kept mistresses of the Zamindar. His evidence shows that the ladies were well provided for and whenever they visited Hanumanthu they used to hand over their cash, ornaments and jewellery to him for safe custody.\n\nHis evidence also shows that Hanumanthu was a man of affluence and that Ii.e and his father had a liquor shop besides forest constracts.\n\nHanumanthu also used to deal in money-lending business. The respondent has also placed on record dccuments showing that Hanumanthu was a man of substantial means. To add to the difficulty of the prosecution, Smt. Sushila; AW l l, sister-in-law of the respondent has come and deposed that all the property belonged to her father.\n\nAll this evidence is sufficient to create a doubt as to whether the respondent was in possession of disproportionate assets.\n\nThere\n\nis certainly a preponderance of probability that the property found E in the possession of the respondent did not belong to him but belonged to his father-in-law, Hanumanthu.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 117, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WASUDEO RAMCHANDRA KAIDALWAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WASUDEO RAMCHANDRA KAIDALWAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WASUDEO RAMCHANDRA KAIDALWAR\n\nMay 6, 1981\n\n[0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5(1}(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5(l}(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1028, "end_char": 1040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5(J)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corrouption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1074, "end_char": 1109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846, "end_char": 1858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corrouption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corrouption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5(I)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1869, "end_char": 1884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corrouption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corrouption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2638, "end_char": 2650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3032, "end_char": 3044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(t)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4285, "end_char": 4300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4356, "end_char": 4368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n5(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 4 S.C.R. 630", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5254, "end_char": 5273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 736", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5307, "end_char": 5326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5951, "end_char": 5963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7414, "end_char": 7425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8976, "end_char": 8989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. Bhandare and R.N. Poddar for the Appellant. •"}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8994, "end_char": 9005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. Bhandare and R.N. Poddar for the Appellant. •"}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9028, "end_char": 9044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair, K. Ramavtar."}}, {"text": "K. Ramavtar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9046, "end_char": 9057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair, K. Ramavtar."}}, {"text": "K.R. Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9063, "end_char": 9077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and K.R. Choudhury for the Respondent. ·,"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "judgment of th~\n\nBombay High Court, reversing the judgment and sentence of the Special Judge, Chandrapur and acquitting the respondent of an offence under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(I)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act')."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9448, "end_char": 9455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(I)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9466, "end_char": 9476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9484, "end_char": 9518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9568, "end_char": 9596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, was a Range Forest Officer, drawing a salary of Rs.", "canonical_name": "WASUDEO RAMCHANDRA KAIDALWAR"}}, {"text": "September 21, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9668, "end_char": 9686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1969, PW 71, Patwardhan, Inspector, Anti-Corruption Bureau under authorisation from the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bombay, carried out search and seizure at the residential house of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Patwardhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9695, "end_char": 9705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1969, PW 71, Patwardhan, Inspector, Anti-Corruption Bureau under authorisation from the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bombay, carried out search and seizure at the residential house of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Nandini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10179, "end_char": 10186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "184.25 in the name of his daughter, Nandini, savings bank deposits with the State Bank of India and the postal savings certicates in the name of his brother-in-law, Narayan, amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "State Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10219, "end_char": 10238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "184.25 in the name of his daughter, Nandini, savings bank deposits with the State Bank of India and the postal savings certicates in the name of his brother-in-law, Narayan, amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10308, "end_char": 10315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "184.25 in the name of his daughter, Nandini, savings bank deposits with the State Bank of India and the postal savings certicates in the name of his brother-in-law, Narayan, amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "Chandrapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10503, "end_char": 10513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28/lK and 28/!Dh in Chandrapur purchased (I) in the name of his wife, Smt."}}, {"text": "Sushila", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushila for Rs."}}, {"text": "Gondpipri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21,210, papers relating to the building of a house at village Gondpipri built in the year 1965 at a cost of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10900, "end_char": 10907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10918, "end_char": 10928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Dharmarao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11381, "end_char": 11395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He alleged that two of the sisters of his father-in-law were the kept mistresses of Raja Dharmarao and enjoyed special favours from the late Zamindar who bestowed on them large amounts of cash, ornaments etc.", "canonical_name": "Raja Dharmarao Zamindar"}}, {"text": "Zamindar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11438, "end_char": 11446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He alleged that two of the sisters of his father-in-law were the kept mistresses of Raja Dharmarao and enjoyed special favours from the late Zamindar who bestowed on them large amounts of cash, ornaments etc."}}, {"text": "Hanumanthu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11557, "end_char": 11567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They used to visit the house of his father-in-Jaw, Hanumanthu, once or twice a month, and used to keep all their cash, gold and silver ornaments."}}, {"text": "Hanumanthu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11652, "end_char": 11662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hanumanthu owned a grocery shop.", "canonical_name": "Hanumanthu"}}, {"text": "Hanumanthu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11748, "end_char": 11758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hanumanthu used to deal in moneylending business.", "canonical_name": "Hanumanthu"}}, {"text": "Shakuntala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12219, "end_char": 12229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shakuntala, who on her marriage with the respondent was re-named as Smt."}}, {"text": "Special Judge, Chandrapur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12570, "end_char": 12595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Judge, Chandrapur, by his judgment dated 7.6.1971, convicted the respondent for having committed an offience punishable under s.5(2) read with s.(5) ( l )(e) of the Act inasmuch as he was found in possession of property worth Rs."}}, {"text": "7.6.1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12619, "end_char": 12627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Judge, Chandrapur, by his judgment dated 7.6.1971, convicted the respondent for having committed an offience punishable under s.5(2) read with s.(5) ( l )(e) of the Act inasmuch as he was found in possession of property worth Rs."}}, {"text": "s.5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12704, "end_char": 12710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gondpipri D", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13223, "end_char": 13234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushila and the other jointly in the name of his wife and brother-in-law, Narayan and for the house built at village Gondpipri D at a cost of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14254, "end_char": 14261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14272, "end_char": 14276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14686, "end_char": 14692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss.5(l}(a)", "label": "PROVISION", 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20578, "end_char": 20590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(!)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20923, "end_char": 20933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20946, "end_char": 20953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21082, "end_char": 21092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21158, "end_char": 21167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21311, "end_char": 21321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21756, "end_char": 21763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5(1 )(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21774, "end_char": 21784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21959, "end_char": 21963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22870, "end_char": 22877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5(I)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22888, "end_char": 22897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5( I)( e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24035, "end_char": 24047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jahgan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24100, "end_char": 24106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The extent and nature of burden of proof resting upon the public servant to be found in possession of disproportionate assets under s. 5( I)( e) cannot be higher than the test laid by the Court in Jahgan's case (supra), i.e. to establish his case by a preponderance of probability."}}, {"text": "Viscount Sankey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24246, "end_char": 24261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That test was laid down by the court following the dictum of Viscount Sankey, L.C. in Wooimington v. Director of Public Prosecutions(1)."}}, {"text": "Swamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24503, "end_char": 24508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As laid down in Swamy's case (supra), the prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of a public servant found in possession of resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income i.e. his salary."}}, {"text": "s.106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24838, "end_char": 24843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24851, "end_char": 24869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24872, "end_char": 24883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24915, "end_char": 24921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Hanumanthu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26366, "end_char": 26376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no denying fact that Hanumanthu was the pairokar of Raja Dharmarao Zamindar of Aheri Estate and by his close association with the Zamindar, had amassed considerable wealth.", "canonical_name": "Hanumanthu"}}, {"text": "Raja Dharmarao Zamindar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26397, "end_char": 26420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no denying fact that Hanumanthu was the pairokar of Raja Dharmarao Zamindar of Aheri Estate and by his close association with the Zamindar, had amassed considerable wealth.", "canonical_name": "Raja Dharmarao Zamindar"}}, {"text": "Sushila", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26916, "end_char": 26923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushila (AW 11), Dr. Chandrasekhar Merekar (AW 6), Shri V.N. Swamy, Advocate, Chandrapur (AW 8)."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhar Merekar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26937, "end_char": 26958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushila (AW 11), Dr. Chandrasekhar Merekar (AW 6), Shri V.N. Swamy, Advocate, Chandrapur (AW 8)."}}, {"text": "V.N. Swamy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26972, "end_char": 26982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushila (AW 11), Dr. Chandrasekhar Merekar (AW 6), Shri V.N. Swamy, Advocate, Chandrapur (AW 8)."}}, {"text": "V.N.\n\nSwamy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27071, "end_char": 27082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We cannot brush aside the unimeachable testimony of Shri V.N.\n\nSwamy, AW 8, who was a leading advocate of Chandrapur and Member of Lok Sabha, and Dr. Chandrasekhar Merekar, AW 6, Medical Practitioner of Chandrapur, who attended on Hanumanthu at the time of his death."}}, {"text": "Chandrapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27120, "end_char": 27130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We cannot brush aside the unimeachable testimony of Shri V.N.\n\nSwamy, AW 8, who was a leading advocate of Chandrapur and Member of Lok Sabha, and Dr. Chandrasekhar Merekar, AW 6, Medical Practitioner of Chandrapur, who attended on Hanumanthu at the time of his death."}}, {"text": "W.R. KAILALWAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27526, "end_char": 27540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W.R. KAILALWAR (Sen, J.) 685\n\nwas leaving properties worth Rs."}}, {"text": "Raja Dharamrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27837, "end_char": 27851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Swamy testified to the fact that he was handling all the litigation of Raja Dharamrao, Zamindar of Aheri Estate who had an yearly income of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Raja Dharmarao Zamindar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_686_697_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.\n\nAJUDHIA NATH AND ANR.\n\nMay 7, 1981\n\n[ D.A. DESAI A.D. KOSHAL AND R.B. MISRA, JJ. ]\n\nPunjab Excise Act and Rules made thereunder-Principle of natural justice of giving opportunity to be heard does not come into play when the demand is merely for payment of a sum becoming d11e under the conditions of the licence.\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Entry 51 of List IT of Schedule VII read with section 31 of the Punjab Excise Act-Still-head duty is neither a duty of excise nor can be regarded as a tax of any kind whatsoever.\n\nCondition 8 of the licence to run liquor vends in various parts of Punjab during the financial year 1965-66 laid down: (i) the licencee shall lift each month D the proportionate qtiota for the month fixed for his vends or deposit still-head duty realisable thereof (ii) Any deficiency in the amount of still-head duty realisable from the lifting of the full proportionate quota due to the short lifting of the quota by the licencee or non-deposit of the still-head duty may be realised from the amount of security deposited by the licencee at the time of grant of licence; (iii) the resultant deficiency in the amount of security shall be made good by the licencee within seven days of such adjustment and (iv) if there is short lift- E ing of proportionate quota or short deposit of still-head duty continues for two consecutive months or the licencee fails to make up the deficiency in the amount of security within the prescribed period of seven days. his licence may be cancelled in addition to the recovery of still-head duty.\n\nRespondent Ajudhia Nath who was granted the necessary licences under the relevant provisions of the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder, was unable to lift the minimum quota of country liquor and also failed to deposit the still-head duty which became payable by him under condition No. 8.\n\nOn an application made by him claiming relief in the matter of payment of sums which bad fallen due, such relief wae granted to him in part by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, on the ground that the liquor trade was badly affected by reason of the movement of population in the border area of Punjab on account of the hostilities which broke out between India and Pakistan in the month of September 1965. Not satisfied with the relief so granted Ajudhia Nath filed two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana claiming, inter alia, that still-head duty was an excise duty which could be levied only on manufacture of goods and which he was not liable to pay by reason of the admitted fact he was not a manufacturer of Liquor and that he was not given the opportunity of being heard in the matter covered by the applications claiming relief. The petitions were allowed and the Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the State wore dismissed. Hence the appeals by special leave.\n\nPUNJAB V. AJUDHIANATH 687\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The demand for the short-fall in still-head duty was based on the terms of a binding contract and it sought to enforce the liabilities arising out of mutually agreed conditions of auction. Such a demand could not be equated with a notice requiring the liquor vendor to show cause why his licence should not be cancelled. Although an opportunity of being heard has to be given to a liquor vendor when his licence is sought to be cancelled, the same principle of natural justice does not come into play when the demand is merely for payment of a sum becoming due under the conditions subject to which the licence was granted. (691 G-H, 692A, E-F]\n\nHar Shankar and others v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner and others [1973] 3 SCR 254; Shyam Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2045; State of Punjab v. Mu/kh Raj and Co., AIR 1977 SC 1550 and The State of Punjab v.\n\nBalbir Singh and others, AIR 1977 SC 1717, followed.\n\n2 : 1. A combined reading of Entry 51 of List II of Schedule VII to the\n\nConstitution of India and section 31 of the Punjab Excise Act no doubt makes\n\nit clear that a duty of excise on alcohalic liquors meant for human consumption D cannot be recovered from a person unless any one of the three clauses of section 31 covers his business activities. (693 C-D, 694A]\n\n2 : 2. Still-head duty is not a duty of excise in view of the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that the short fall in still-head duty represents nothing but sums recoverable from the licencees under a contract which was entered into by them with their eyes open and that they cannot be 'E allowed to have the best of both the worids by exploiting the contract so long as it suits them and by repudiating it if and when it does not work to their advantage. [694 B-C]\n\nHar Shankar and others v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner and others, [1973] 3 SCR 254; State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh and others, AIR 1977 SC 1717, applied. .F\n\n2 : 3. Condition No. 8 of the licence does not involve the imposition of a duty of excise but makes provision only for recovery of sums becoming due under a contract. The licencees are not connc.cted in any manner whatsoever with the manufacture of alcohdic liquor and there was, therefore, no question at all of levying a duty of excise on their operations which were confined merely to the sale of liquor manufacturd by others and which, therefore, commenced only G ajler the process of manufacture was completely over. [696 E-G]\n\nM/s. Bhajan Lal Saran Singh & Co. v. State of Punjab and others, 1967 Current Law.Journal (Punjab and Haryana) 450; State of M.P. v. Firm Goppu/al, [1976] 2 SCR 1041; Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad and othe-s v. Ram Kumar and others, (1976] 3 sec 540, distinguished.\n\n3 : I. On the facts of this case still-head duty cannot be regarded as a tax of some other kind nor can the question whether it does amount to such a tax\n\n(for levying which the State. lacks authority) be allowed to be raised since it was never raised at any earlier stage and its con, ideration is b.ound to work prejudice to the cause of the appellants. Further there is no impediment in the way of the demand being regarded as the enforcement of an obligation arising under the contracts which the Jicencees had entered into and exploited so long as the same worked to their advantage and which were fully permissible under subsection (3) of section 34 of the Punjab Excise Act. [696 H, 697 A-Bl\n\n3: 2. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Punjab Excise Act allows impositions of conditions on grant of the licences in addition to the pay-. ment of the licence fees which is a matter covered by clause (a). Condition No. 8 is, therefore, fully enforceable and there is no reason why still-head duty l. should be regarded as a tax of any kind whatsoever. [697 D-E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1665 and 1666 of 1970.\n\nFrom the order dated the 25th July, 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in LP A Nos. 230 & 240 of 1968.\n\nM.S. Dhillon for the Appellant in both the appeals.\n\nTirath Singh Munjraf, G.K. Arora, S.S. Munjra! and Gautam Bannerjee for the Respondents in both the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by E KosHAL J. By this judgmentwe shall dispose of Civil Appeals.\n\nNos. 1665 and 1C66 of 1970 in which common questions of law have arisen for determination by this Court.\n\nThe facts leading to the two appeals are un-disputed and may be briefly stated thus. Licences to run liquor vends in various parts of Punjab during the financial year 1965-66 were sold by public auction shortly before the 1st April, 1965.\n\nAuctions were held at numerous places subject to identical conditions which were supplied to the bidders in writing.\n\nCondition No. 8 which i~ material for our purposes is reproduced below:\n\n\"That the licencee shall lift each month the proportionate quota for the month fixed for his vend (s) or deposit still-head duty realisable thereon. In the event of any deficiency in the amount of still-head duty realisable from the lifting of the full proportionate quota due to the short lifting of the quota by the Iicencee or non-deposit of the amount of the still-head duty, the saicl deficiency may be realised from the amount of security deposited by\n\nPUNJAB v. AJUDH!ANATH (Kasha!, J.) 689\n\nhim at the time of grant of licence. The resulting defi- A ciency in the amount of security shal(be made good by)he licencee within 7 days of such adjustment. In case the short lifting of proportionate qu')ta or short deposit of still-head duty continues for two consecutive months or the licencee fails to make up the deficiency in the amount of security within the prescribed period of 7 days, his licence may be B cancelled in addition to the recovery of deficiency in stillhead duty.\"\n\nAjudhia Nath who figures as respondent No. 1 in each of the two appeals and who carries on business of selling country liquor either in his own name or in the name and style of M/s.\n\nC Ajudhia Nath Bal Mukand (a business concern arrayed as respondent No. 2 in Civil Appeal No. 1665 of 1970) was the highest bidder for the auctions pertaining to 5 villages situated in the district of Amritsar and a cou pie of villages in Ferozepur district. Accordingly the auctions were sancti0ned in his favour D and he was granted the necessary licences under the relevant provisions of the Punjab Excise Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the rules framed thereunder.\n\nThe licencee started his liquour selling business in the said seven villages on the !st April, 1965. By the close of the financial year 1965-66, however, he was unable to lift the minimum quota of country liquor and also failed to deposit the still-head duty which became payable by him under condition No. 8 above extracted.\n\nHe made applications claiming relief in the matter of payment of sums which had fallen due and such relief was granted to him in part by the Excise & Taxation Commissioner, Punjab,, on the ground that sales of country liquor had been adversely affected by reason of the movement of population in the border areas of Punjab on account of the hostilities which broke out between India and Pakistan in the month of September 1965. Not satisfied with the relief so granted Ajudhia, nath filed two petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana claiming, inter alia, that still-head duty was an excise duty which could be levied only on manufacture of goods and which he was not liable to pay by reason of the admitted fact that he was not a manufacturer of liquor. A grouse was also made by him of the fact that the applications claiming relief had been decided without affording to him an opportunity of being heard. One of those petitions (Civil Writ Petition No. 2034 of 1966) related to\n\nvends functioning in the two villages of Ferozepur District, while the other (Civil 'writ Petition Nos 2035 of 1966) covered the 5 vends located in the 5 villages of Amritsar District. The petitions were allowed by a single order dated the 9th May, 1967 passed by D.K. Mahajan, J., on the sole ground that a similar petition (Civil Writ Petition\n\nNo. 2021 of 1966) had been allowed by Gurdev Singh, J., on the 27th March, 1966. The proceedings for the recovery of the shortfall in the deposit of still-head duty by Ajudhia Nath which had been initiated by the State of Punjab and its concerned officers (appellants Nos. I to 4 in each of the appeals before us) were quashed and the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab (appellant No. 2 in both the appeals) was directed to dispose of the \"cases\"\n\nof the respondents \"in accordance with law after hearing the petitioners\". D.K. Mahajan, J., adopted all the reasons on which Gurdev\n\nSingh, J., had based his order above mentioned.\n\nLetters Patent Appeals preferred by the 4 appellants to the Division Bench of the High Court were summarily dismissed by Mehar Singh and Tuli, JJ., for the reason that a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of Gurdev Singh, J., above mentioned had met the same fate.\n\nIt is against the judgment of 'the Division Bench (which is dated the 29th August, 1969) that each of the appeals before us has been filed.\n\nMr. Dhillon, learned counsel for the appellants had drawn our attention to The State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh and Others,(1) which reversed the judgment of Gurdev Singh, J., mentioned above and has contended that the very basis of the impugned judgment has consequently fallen to the ground. The contention is correct.\n\nAs pointed out in Balbir Singh' s case (supra) the judgment of Gurdev Singh, J., in Civil Writ Petition No. 2021 of 1966 had proceeded merely on the ground that the petitioner-firm therein had not beeen given an opportunity of being heard in relation to the demand notice issued to it for payment of the still-head duty on the entire minimum quantity. of liquor which that firm was requrred to lift under the licence.\n\nIn differing with the view\n\n(I) A.LR. 1977 SC 1717.\n\nPUNJAB v. AJUDHIANATH (Kasha/, J.) 691\n\nexpressed by Gurdev Singh, J., this Court made a reference to the A following observations of Chandrachud, J., (as he then was) in Har Shanker and Others v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner and Others(1) which was followed in Shyam Lal v. Stare of Punjab(2)\n\n\"The announcement of conditions governing the auc tions was in the nature of an invitation to an offer to those who were interested in the sale of country liquor. The bids given in the auctions were offers made by prospective vendors to the Government.\n\nThe Government's acceptance of those bids was the acceptance of willing offers made to it.\n\nOn such acceptance, the contract between the bidders and the Government became concluded and a binding agreement came into existence between them.\n\nThe successful bidders were then granted licences evidencing the terms of contract between them and the Government, under which they became entitled to sell liquor. The licencees exploited the respective licences for a portion of the period of their currency, presumably in expectation of a profit.\n\nCommercial considerations may have revealed an error of judgment in the initial assessment of profitability of the adventure but that is a normal incident of the trading transactions.\n\nThose who contract with open eyes must accept the burde11s of the contract along with its benefits.\n\nThe powers of the Financial Commissioner to grant liquor licences by auction and to collect licence fees through the medium of auctions cannot by writ petitions be questioned by those who, had their venture succeeded, would have relied upon those very powers to found a legal claim.\n\nReciprocal rights and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract could ever have a binding force.\"\n\nand concluded that the demand for the short-fall in still-head duty was based on the term of a binding contract and that it sought to enforce the liabilities arising out of mutually agreed conditions of auction.\n\nSuch a demand, in the opinion of this\n\n(I) (1973] 3 SCR 254.\n\n(2) A.LR. (1976] SC 2045.\n\nCourt, could not be equated with a notice requiring the liquor vendor to show cause why his licence should not be cancelled. In making this distinction this Court further relied upon State of\n\nPunjab v. Mulkh Raj and Co.(1) wherein it was observed:-\n\n\"It was also held there that a cancellation of the licence under section 36 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, had to take place quasi-judicially after due service of the notice on the Iicencee to show cause why it should not be cancelled.\n\nAlthough, the merits of the last mentioned proposition need not be examined by us as it rests on a sound footing, yet, we find it difficult to uphold the order that the demand for a sum of Rs. 36,636 . On account of short-fall should also be quashed on account of non-compliance with rules of natural justice in cancelling the licence in proceedings under section 36 of the Act.\n\nWe think that the two liabilities were erroneously considered by the High Court to be inextricably linked up .............................................. .\n\nWe do not think that, even if the respondent ought to have been given a hearing before cancelling the licence, this would dispense with his liability to deposit the amount of balance of the licence fee or invalidate the notice of demand for it.\"\n\nThus, the proposition is by now well-settled that although an opportunity of being heard has to be given to a liquor vendor when his licence is sought to be cancelled, the same principle of natural justice does not come into play when the demand is merely for payment of a sum becoming due under the conditions subject to which the licence was granted, and this proposition fully covers these appeals. The demands for payment of the amount of the still head duty which had become due under the contracts accepted by the respondents and had remained unpaid were demands arising under condition No. 8 above extracted and had, therefore, resulted from the terms of those contracts. No question of elfording to the respondents any opportunity of being heard thus arises and the impugned judgment, is, therefore, liable to be reversed.\n\n(I) A.LR. 1977 SC 1550.\n\nPUNJAB v. AJUDHIANATH (Koshal, J.) 693\n\nFaced with the above situation, Shri Munjral, learned A eounsel for the respondents, raised the following two contentions:\n\n(a) Still-head duty is a duty of excise which could only be levied on a manufacturer and not on a mere vendor of goods manufactured by others.\n\n(b) If the still-head duty mentioned in condition No. 8 above extracted cannot be regarded as a duty of excise, it nevertheless amoants to a tax of some other kind for levying which the State lacks authority.\n\nReliance in connection with contention (a) is placed on Entry 51 of List II forming part of Schedule VII to the Constitu~ tion of India and on section 31 of the Punjab Excise Act.\n\nThe relevant portions of these provisions state :\n\nEntry 51\n\n\"Duties of Excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the State and countervailing duties at the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India :-\n\n(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; ........ .\n\nSection 31\n\n\"An excise duty or a countervailing duty, as the case may be, at such rate or rates as the State Government shall direct, may be imposed, either generally or for any specified local area, on any exci>able article-\n\n(a) imported, exported or transported in accordance with the provisions of section 16 ; or\n\n(b) manufactured or cultivated under any licence granted under section 20 ; or\n\n(c) manufactured in any distillery established, or any distillery or brewery licenced under section 21 ; ...\n\nThese provisions leave no room for doubt that a duty of excise on alcoholic liquors meant for human consumption cannot be recovered from the respondents because none of the 3 clauses of section 31 covers their business activities.\n\nBut then the first part of contention (a) that still-head duty is a duty of excise cannot be accepted in view of the dicta in Har Shankar and others v. The Dy.\n\nExcise & Taxation Commissioner and others (supra) and The State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh and others (supra) to the effect that the shortfall in still-head duty represents nothing but sums recoverable by the appe!lants under the terms of a contract which was entered into by the respondents with their eyes open and that the latter cannot be allowed to have the best of both the worlds by exploiting the contract so long as it suits them and by repudiating it if and when it does not work to their advantage.\n\nShri M unjral has vehemently contended that still-head duty is only another name for excise duty inasmuch as it is nothing more or less than a duty leviable on the manufacture of alcoholic liquor. For this proposition he places reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in M/s. Ehajan Lal Saran Singh & Co. v. The State of Punjab and others (1) the approval of that judgment by this Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1042 and 1043 of 1968 decided on 21st August, 1972, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Firm Gappulal etc. (') and Excise Commissioner, U.P.,\n\nAllahabad and others v. Ram Kumar and others (3). These authorities, however, are of no help to him because, in every one of them, the still-head duty which was mentioned in the condition corresponding to condition No. 8 in the present case was either expressly stated to be an excise duty or was assumed to be a duty of that character.\n\nIn faCt, in the case of M/s. Bhajan Lal Saran Singh it was conceded on behalf of the State before the High Court that still-head duty was an excise duty and that is why the nature of the charge as excise duty was taken for granted before the High Court as well as in this Court.\n\nNo question was either raised or decided as to whether it could at all be regarded ':ls an excise duty. However, in later cases, namely, Har Shankar and others v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner and others, (supra) and The State of Punjab\n\nv. Balbir Singh and others (supra) the demand for still-head duty recoverable under condition No. 8 above extracted was specifically.\n\nH (I) 1967 Current Law Journal (Pb of Haryana) 460.\n\n(2) [1976] 2S.C.R. 1041. (3) [t976J 3 sec 540.\n\n...\n\nPUNJAB v. AJUDHIANATH (Koshal, J.) 695\n\nheld to be a demand for money which had become due under an obligation created by terms of the contract. It is too late in the day, therefore, for Shri Munjral to contend that such a demand should be considered as one covering excise duty.\n\nHe, however, relies on the following passage in Har Shankar and others v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner and others (supra) :\n\n\"The second decision on which the appellants laid stress was rendered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (C.W. No. 1376 of 1961 decided on March 12, 1968). The argument is that this decision is based on the earlier decision.of the High Court in Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab (C.W. No. 538 of 1966 decided on February 6, 1967), that the decision in Bhajan Lal's case was confirmed in appeal by this Court (C.A. Nos. 1042 and 1043 of 1968 decided on August 21, 1972), that there is no material difference between the rules and the procedure adopted in the instantcases and those which were struck down in Bhajan Lal's case and therefore, the rules and the procedure followed herein must also be struck down for the same reasons.\n\nThis argument overlooks the significant difference between the rules struck down in Bhajan Lal' s case and in Jagc Ram's case and the amended Rules now in force. Under the old Rule 36 (23-A) still-head duty which was admittedly in the nature of excise duty was payable by the licencee even on quota not lifted by him. The Rule and Condition No. 8 founded on it were therofore struck down in Bhajan Lal's. case as being beyond the scope of entry 51 of List II, the taxable event under the impugned Rule being the sale and not the manufacturer of liquor. Rule 36 was amended on March 31, 1967 in order to meet the Judgment in Bhajan Lal's case but the High Court found in Jage Ram's case that even under the amended Rule, still-head duty which was in the nature of excise duty was payable on unlifted quota of liquor.\n\nThe position obtaining under the Rules as amended on March 22, 1968 which are relevant for our purposes is in principle different as the still-head duty is now only 0. 64 paise as against Rs. 17.60 per litre which was in force under the old Rules and excise duty as such is no longer payable on unlijted quota.\n\nThe principle governing the decisions in Bhajan Lal' s\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.IL\n\ncase and loge Ram's case cannot, therefore, opp!)' any longer\".\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nSpecial stress has been laid by Shri M unjral on the underlined portion of the passage above extracted and it is contended by him that the judgments in the cases of Jage Ram and Bhajcn Lc.I wern neither disapproved nor dissented from but were merely distinguished in Hor Shankar's case, that while pointing out the distinction this Court took it for granted that in those earlier cases the charge of stillhead dutyamounted to an excise duty and that condition No. 8 as obtaining in the present case being identical with the corresponding condition in those cases, it must be held that Har Shankar' s case is an authority for the proposition that the said condition No. 8 seeks to levy nothing lbut excise duty in the form of still-head duty.\n\nA careful'perusal of the passage cited (which appears at first sight to lend colour to the c; ontention) leaves no room for doubt, however, that in deciding Har Shankar's case this Court was not called upon to adjudicate on the .Constitutional propriety of condition No. 8 above extracted, nor with the question as to the nature of the levy covered by that condition.\n\nAll that the Court said was that the corresponding condition in Har Shankar's case was a very different condition which could in no manner be construed to levy an excise duty. Besides, it was pointed out in the passage above quoted that the still-head duty mentioned in the relevant condition in the earlier cases (which was indentical with condition No. 8) was admittedly a duty of excise--a fact to which we have already adverted while holding that condition No. 8 does not involve the imposition of a duty of exercise but makes provision only for recovery of sums becoming due under a contract.\n\nWe may also point out that the respondents are not connected in any manner whatsoever with the manufacture of alcoholic liquor and there was, therefore, no question at all of levying a duty of excise on their operations which were confined merely to the sale of liquor manufactured by others and which, therefore, commenced only after the process of manufacture was completely over.\n\nFor all these reasons, we repel the contention under examination.\n\nContention (b) is also without substance and need not detain us long.\n\nFor one thing, it was never raised at any earlier stage and its consideration is bound to work prejudice to the cause of the appellants.\n\nSecondly, as already pointed out above, there\n\nPUNJAB v. AJUDHIANATH (Kasha!, J.) 697\n\nis no impediment in the way of the demand being regarded as the A enforcement of an obligation arising under the contracts which the respondents had entered into and exploited so long as the same worked to their advantage and which were fully permissible under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Punjab Excise Act. That subsection states :-\n\n\"(3) Every licence, permit or pass granted under this Act shall be granted-\n\n(a) on payment of such fees, if any,\n\n(b) subject to such restrictions and on such conditions,\n\n(c) in such form and containing such particulars,\n\n(d) for such period,\n\nas the Financial Commissioner may direct\".\n\nAccording to Shri Munjral the payment of licence fees is D provided for in the conditions of auction apart from condition No. 8 and, therefore, the latter cannot be regarded as providing for any\n\nthing but the levy of a duty of excise or of some other kind. The argument is fallacious in view of the language of clause (b) of the sub-section just above reproduced. That clause allows the imposition of conditions on the grant of a licence, in addition to the payment E of the licence fees which is a matter covered by clause (a). Condition No. 8 is, therefore, fully enforceable and there is no reason why still-head duty should be regarded as a tax of any kind whatsoever.\n\nFor the reasons stated, both the appeals are accepted and the impugned judgment. which cannot be sustained, is reversed so.\n\nthat both the petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the respondents before the High Court and accepted by it are dismissed.\n\nHowever, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AJUDHIA NATH AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ajudhia Nath Bal Mukand", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 7, 1981\n\n[ D.A. DESAI A.D. KOSHAL AND R.B. MISRA, JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act and Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392, "end_char": 404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 415, "end_char": 425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Condition 8 of the licence to run liquor vends in various parts of Punjab during the financial year 1965-66 laid down: (i) the licencee shall lift each month D the proportionate qtiota for the month fixed for his vends or deposit still-head duty realisable thereof (ii) Any deficiency in the amount of still-head duty realisable from the lifting of the full proportionate quota due to the short lifting of the quota by the licencee or non-deposit of the still-head duty may be realised from the amount of security deposited by the licencee at the time of grant of licence; (iii) the resultant deficiency in the amount of security shall be made good by the licencee within seven days of such adjustment and (iv) if there is short lift- E ing of proportionate quota or short deposit of still-head duty continues for two consecutive months or the licencee fails to make up the deficiency in the amount of security within the prescribed period of seven days."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by him claiming relief in the matter of payment of sums which bad fallen due, such relief wae granted to him in part by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, on the ground that the liquor trade was badly affected by reason of the movement of population in the border area of Punjab on account of the hostilities which broke out between India and Pakistan in the month of September 1965."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by him claiming relief in the matter of payment of sums which bad fallen due, such relief wae granted to him in part by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, on the ground that the liquor trade was badly affected by reason of the movement of population in the border area of Punjab on account of the hostilities which broke out between India and Pakistan in the month of September 1965."}}, {"text": "Ajudhia Nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not satisfied with the relief so granted Ajudhia Nath filed two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana claiming, inter alia, that still-head duty was an excise duty which could be levied only on manufacture of goods and which he was not liable to pay by reason of the admitted fact he was not a manufacturer of Liquor and that he was not given the opportunity of being heard in the matter covered by the applications claiming relief.", "canonical_name": "Ajudhia Nath Bal Mukand"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2385, "end_char": 2396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Respondent Ajudhia Nath who was granted the necessary licences under the relevant provisions of the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules", "statute": "Respondent Ajudhia Nath who was granted the necessary licences under the relevant provisions of the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2428, "end_char": 2460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not satisfied with the relief so granted Ajudhia Nath filed two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana claiming, inter alia, that still-head duty was an excise duty which could be levied only on manufacture of goods and which he was not liable to pay by reason of the admitted fact he was not a manufacturer of Liquor and that he was not given the opportunity of being heard in the matter covered by the applications claiming relief."}}, {"text": "PUNJAB V. AJUDHIANATH", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2926, "end_char": 2947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB V. AJUDHIANATH 687\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD : 1."}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 SCR 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3718, "end_char": 3734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1976 SC 2045", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3766, "end_char": 3782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1977 SC 1550", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3822, "end_char": 3838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1977 SC 1717", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3892, "end_char": 3908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3994, "end_char": 4015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4020, "end_char": 4030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nConstitution of India", "statute": "the\n\nConstitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4227, "end_char": 4237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nConstitution of India", "statute": "the\n\nConstitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Still-head duty is not a duty of excise in view of the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that the short fall in still-head duty represents nothing but sums recoverable from the licencees under a contract which was entered into by them with their eyes open and that they cannot be 'E allowed to have the best of both the worids by exploiting the contract so long as it suits them and by repudiating it if and when it does not work to their advantage. ["}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 SCR 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1977 SC 1717", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4911, "end_char": 4927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 SCR 1041", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5724, "end_char": 5731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6950, "end_char": 6979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the order dated the 25th July, 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in LP A Nos."}}, {"text": "M.S. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7013, "end_char": 7025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.S. Dhillon for the Appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "Tirath Singh Munjraf", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7066, "end_char": 7086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tirath Singh Munjraf, G.K. Arora, S.S. Munjra!"}}, {"text": "G.K. Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tirath Singh Munjraf, G.K. Arora, S.S. Munjra!"}}, {"text": "S.S. Munjra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7100, "end_char": 7111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tirath Singh Munjraf, G.K. Arora, S.S. Munjra!"}}, {"text": "Gautam Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Gautam Bannerjee for the Respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "E KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E KosHAL J. By this judgmentwe shall dispose of Civil Appeals."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7611, "end_char": 7626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Licences to run liquor vends in various parts of Punjab during the financial year 1965-66 were sold by public auction shortly before the 1st April, 1965."}}, {"text": "Ajudhia Nath Bal Mukand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8994, "end_char": 9017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in each of the two appeals and who carries on business of selling country liquor either in his own name or in the name and style of M/s.\n\nC Ajudhia Nath Bal Mukand (a business concern arrayed as respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Ajudhia Nath Bal Mukand"}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1665 of 1970) was the highest bidder for the auctions pertaining to 5 villages situated in the district of Amritsar and a cou pie of villages in Ferozepur district."}}, {"text": "Ferozepur district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9231, "end_char": 9249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1665 of 1970) was the highest bidder for the auctions pertaining to 5 villages situated in the district of Amritsar and a cou pie of villages in Ferozepur district."}}, {"text": "st April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9561, "end_char": 9575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April, 1965."}}, {"text": "Ajudhia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10272, "end_char": 10279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not satisfied with the relief so granted Ajudhia, nath filed two petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana claiming, inter alia, that still-head duty was an excise duty which could be levied only on manufacture of goods and which he was not liable to pay by reason of the admitted fact that he was not a manufacturer of liquor.", "canonical_name": "Ajudhia Nath Bal Mukand"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10312, "end_char": 10323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10331, "end_char": 10352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ferozepur District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10886, "end_char": 10904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2034 of 1966) related to\n\nvends functioning in the two villages of Ferozepur District, while the other (Civil 'writ Petition Nos 2035 of 1966) covered the 5 vends located in the 5 villages of Amritsar District."}}, {"text": "Amritsar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11011, "end_char": 11028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2034 of 1966) related to\n\nvends functioning in the two villages of Ferozepur District, while the other (Civil 'writ Petition Nos 2035 of 1966) covered the 5 vends located in the 5 villages of Amritsar District."}}, {"text": "9th May, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11085, "end_char": 11098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were allowed by a single order dated the 9th May, 1967 passed by D.K. Mahajan, J., on the sole ground that a similar petition (Civil Writ Petition\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "D.K. Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11109, "end_char": 11121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were allowed by a single order dated the 9th May, 1967 passed by D.K. Mahajan, J., on the sole ground that a similar petition (Civil Writ Petition\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11230, "end_char": 11242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2021 of 1966) had been allowed by Gurdev Singh, J., on the 27th March, 1966.", "canonical_name": "Gurdev\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "27th March, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11255, "end_char": 11271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2021 of 1966) had been allowed by Gurdev Singh, J., on the 27th March, 1966."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11405, "end_char": 11420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings for the recovery of the shortfall in the deposit of still-head duty by Ajudhia Nath which had been initiated by the State of Punjab and its concerned officers (appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11527, "end_char": 11567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to 4 in each of the appeals before us) were quashed and the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab (appellant No."}}, {"text": "Gurdev\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11772, "end_char": 11785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.K. Mahajan, J., adopted all the reasons on which Gurdev\n\nSingh, J., had based his order above mentioned.", "canonical_name": "Gurdev\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Mehar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11950, "end_char": 11961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the 4 appellants to the Division Bench of the High Court were summarily dismissed by Mehar Singh and Tuli, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Tuli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11966, "end_char": 11970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the 4 appellants to the Division Bench of the High Court were summarily dismissed by Mehar Singh and Tuli, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Dhillon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12248, "end_char": 12255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dhillon, learned counsel for the appellants had drawn our attention to The State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh and Others,(1) which reversed the judgment of Gurdev Singh, J., mentioned above and has contended that the very basis of the impugned judgment has consequently fallen to the ground."}}, {"text": "Balbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12583, "end_char": 12595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out in Balbir Singh' s case (supra) the judgment of Gurdev Singh, J., in Civil Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13171, "end_char": 13182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB v. AJUDHIANATH (Kasha/, J.) 691\n\nexpressed by Gurdev Singh, J., this Court made a reference to the A following observations of Chandrachud, J., (as he then was) in Har Shanker and Others v. The Dy."}}, {"text": "(1973] 3 SCR 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15210, "end_char": 15226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15572, "end_char": 15582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15590, "end_char": 15613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16101, "end_char": 16111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "statute": "the Punjab Excise Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Munjral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17465, "end_char": 17472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB v. AJUDHIANATH (Koshal, J.) 693\n\nFaced with the above situation, Shri Munjral, learned A eounsel for the respondents, raised the following two contentions:\n\n(a) Still-head duty is a duty of excise which could only be levied on a manufacturer and not on a mere vendor of goods manufactured by others.", "canonical_name": "M unjral"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17998, "end_char": 18010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18049, "end_char": 18059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18402, "end_char": 18412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18704, "end_char": 18714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18784, "end_char": 18794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18893, "end_char": 18903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19097, "end_char": 19107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M unjral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19819, "end_char": 19827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri M unjral has vehemently contended that still-head duty is only another name for excise duty inasmuch as it is nothing more or less than a duty leviable on the manufacture of alcoholic liquor.", "canonical_name": "M unjral"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab & Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20087, "end_char": 20117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this proposition he places reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in M/s. Ehajan Lal Saran Singh & Co. v. The State of Punjab and others (1) the approval of that judgment by this Court in Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "21st August, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20292, "end_char": 20309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1042 and 1043 of 1968 decided on 21st August, 1972, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Firm Gappulal etc. (')"}}, {"text": "Bhajan Lal Saran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20760, "end_char": 20782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In faCt, in the case of M/s. Bhajan Lal Saran Singh it was conceded on behalf of the State before the High Court that still-head duty was an excise duty and that is why the nature of the charge as excise duty was taken for granted before the High Court as well as in this Court."}}, {"text": "sec 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21484, "end_char": 21491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 12, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22091, "end_char": 22105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1376 of 1961 decided on March 12, 1968)."}}, {"text": "February 6, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22260, "end_char": 22276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "538 of 1966 decided on February 6, 1967), that the decision in Bhajan Lal's case was confirmed in appeal by this Court (C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "Bhajan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22300, "end_char": 22310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "538 of 1966 decided on February 6, 1967), that the decision in Bhajan Lal's case was confirmed in appeal by this Court (C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22400, "end_char": 22415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1042 and 1043 of 1968 decided on August 21, 1972), that there is no material difference between the rules and the procedure adopted in the instantcases and those which were struck down in Bhajan Lal's case and therefore, the rules and the procedure followed herein must also be struck down for the same reasons."}}, {"text": "Jagc Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22790, "end_char": 22798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument overlooks the significant difference between the rules struck down in Bhajan Lal' s case and in Jagc Ram's case and the amended Rules now in force.", "canonical_name": "Jagc Ram"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23256, "end_char": 23270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 36 was amended on March 31, 1967 in order to meet the Judgment in Bhajan Lal's case but the High Court found in Jage Ram's case that even under the amended Rule, still-head duty which was in the nature of excise duty was payable on unlifted quota of liquor."}}, {"text": "Jage Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23350, "end_char": 23358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 36 was amended on March 31, 1967 in order to meet the Judgment in Bhajan Lal's case but the High Court found in Jage Ram's case that even under the amended Rule, still-head duty which was in the nature of excise duty was payable on unlifted quota of liquor.", "canonical_name": "Jagc Ram"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.IL", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23865, "end_char": 23903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle governing the decisions in Bhajan Lal' s\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.IL\n\ncase and loge Ram's case cannot, therefore, opp!)'"}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23919, "end_char": 23922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle governing the decisions in Bhajan Lal' s\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.IL\n\ncase and loge Ram's case cannot, therefore, opp!)'"}}, {"text": "Bhajcn Lc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24169, "end_char": 24178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis supplied)\n\nSpecial stress has been laid by Shri M unjral on the underlined portion of the passage above extracted and it is contended by him that the judgments in the cases of Jage Ram and Bhajcn Lc."}}, {"text": "Hor Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24258, "end_char": 24269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I wern neither disapproved nor dissented from but were merely distinguished in Hor Shankar's case, that while pointing out the distinction this Court took it for granted that in those earlier cases the charge of stillhead dutyamounted to an excise duty and that condition No.", "canonical_name": "Hor Shankar"}}, {"text": "Har Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24576, "end_char": 24587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 as obtaining in the present case being identical with the corresponding condition in those cases, it must be held that Har Shankar' s case is an authority for the proposition that the said condition No.", "canonical_name": "Hor Shankar"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26729, "end_char": 26739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27913, "end_char": 27924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27932, "end_char": 27953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28092, "end_char": 28098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeals allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_68_80_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "MOHAMMAD USMAN MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN\n\nMANIYAR & ANR.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nMarch 3, 1981\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL !SLAM JJ.)\n\nExplosive Substances Act, sections 2 and 5-Whether potassium cyanide, mixture of potassium cyanide and sulphur, detonators etc. etc., are 'explosive substances' wtihin the definition of the expression-Whether such recovery in large quantities amounts to \"conscious possession\" within the meaning of section 5- Presumption of knowledge that a particular substance is an explosive substance, when can be made.\n\nGovernment of India, Ministry of Works & Housing and Urban Development Notification No. 3/12/65-PII(IX) dated /st April, 1966, requiring a licence to make or possess the expfossive substances-Possession without such a licence, of the explossive substances is unauthorised.\n\nPenal Code, section 120B-Criminal conspiracy,--Nature of proof.\n\nF.akhruddin, the owner of the shop, known as M. F. Maniyar & Sons, Sholapur, along with his three sons, was tried for offences under section J20B of the Penal Code, section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, section 3 read with section 25 of the Arms Act and section 6(J){a) of the Poisons Act. All the four were convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge, Sholapur, to sentences of different durations under these Acts and also to fine.\n\nThe substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The appeals before the High Court having failed the appellants have come in appeal by special leave to this Court.\n\nDismissing the appeals, the Court while remitting the sentences of fine and reducing the sentences of imprisonment to the periods already undergone by the three living appellants,\n\nHELD : I : J. In order to bring home the offence under. section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, the prosecution has to prove : (i) that the substance in question is explosive substance; (ii) that the accused makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance ; and (iii) that he does so under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is nt doing so for a lawful object. [75D-G]\n\nJ : 2. The burden of proof of the ingredients of section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, is on the prosecution. The moment prosecution has discharged that burden, it shifts to the accused to show that he was making or possessing the explosive substance for a lawful object, if he takes that plea. [75F-G]\n\n2. On a consideration of the evidence of the Explosive Inspector, and other evidence, the substances in question which were recovered from the appe-\n\n....\n\nllants were \"explosive substances\" within the definition of that expression in sec- A tion 2 of the Explosive Substances Act. [76 F G]\n\n3 : l. The factum of the recovery of the said articles from the possession of appellant No. 1 and also the evidence that his three sons, appellants 2 to 4, who were managing and running the shop of M. F. Maniyar and Sons from which the incriminating substances were seized clearly show that all of them were guilty. [76 G-H, 77A]\n\n3 : 2. The several substances seized, not being minute or small in quantity, make it clear that the appellants were in \"conscious possession\" of the substances seized within the meaning of section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. [77A-B]\n\n 3 : 3. The possession of the explosive substances by the appellants were without any authority since the appellants had no licence or authority to make or possess the explosive substances as required by the Government of India, Ministry of Works & Housing and Urban, notification dated 1st April, 1966. The licence possessed by them is dated 3.1-3-1956 which was not in pursuance and in conformity of the said Government notification.\n\n[77G-H]\n\n3 : 4. The knowledge that the particular substance is an explosive substance depends on different circumstances and varies from person to person. Unlike an ignorant man or a child coming across an explosive substance who picks it up out of curiosity not knowing that it is an explosive substance, a person of experience may immediately know that it is an explosive substance. In the instant case, as the appellant had been dealing with the substance in.question for a long time, they certainly knew or at least they shall be presumed to have known what those substances were and for what purpose they were used. The said presumption is further fortified from the fact that a half K.G. of blasting powder/ potassium cyanide was sold to the decoy witness by the appellants. [78E-F, G]\n\n4. For an offence under section .120B of the Penal Code the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetraters expessly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. In this case, the fact that the appellants were possessing and selling explosive substances without a valid licence for a pretty Jong time leads to the inference that they agreed to do and/or cause to be done the said illegal act, for, without such an agreement the act could not have been done for such a long time:[79G-H,80A]\n\nCRJMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTfON : Criminal Appeal Nos. 150/76 and 285 of 1976.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated , 29.1.1976 of the Bombay High Court in Cr. A. 526j73.\n\nS. B. Bhasme, V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V., D. Khanna for the Appellant in Cr. A. 150/76,\n\nU. R. La/it and K. R. Chowdhary for the Appellant in Cr. A. 285/76\n\nA R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents in bth\n\nthe Appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM J. These two appeals arise out of a common judgment and order passed by the High Court of Bombay, Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1976 has been preferred by two appellants, Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter \"Usman\") and Mohammad Taufik Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter 'taufik') and Criminal Appeal No. 285 of 1976 has been preferred by Mohammad Hussain Fakhruddin Maniyar (hereinafter 'Fakhruddin) and Mohammad Rizwan Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter 'Rizwan'). All of them were convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge as follows :\n\n(i) Under Section I20B of the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years, each ;\n\nD (ii) Under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and\n\nsentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years. each, and to pay a fine of Rs. I 000 each, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months, each;\n\n(iii) Under Section 5 (3) (b) of the Explosives Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months, each, and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month, each;\n\n(iv) Under Section 3 read with Section 25(1) (a) of the Arms Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months each ;\n\n(v) Under Section 30 of the Arms Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- each, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two weeks, each ;\n\n(vi) Under Section 6 (!) (a) of the Poisons Act read with Rule 2 of the Rules framed under the said Act and sentenced. to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month, each, and to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- each, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 15 days, each.\n\nThe substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.\n\nH The first two preferred one appeal and. the second two a separate appeal before the High Court. )'he High Court by a common judgment dismissed both the appeals.\n\nHence this appeal before s.\n\n. .,, .\n\n.~·\n\nby special leave.\n\nThis common judgment of ours will dispose of both the appeals .\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal before this Court, appellant, Fakhruddin, died on 10.10.1978. His legal representatives have been brought on record as there are sentences of fine. against\n\nthe deceased appellant.\n\n3. The facts necessary for the purpose of disposal of these appeals may be stated thus:\n\nIn the year 1967 a number of murders were perpetrated by a gang of murderers. During the course of investigation into these offences, potassium cyanide was found to have been used for poisoning the victims. On 11.9.1964, P.W.17, Bendre, P.S.I, who was attached to the local crime branch at Sholapur received an information that the firm known as M.F. Maniyar & Sons was selling potassium chlorate which is a highly explosive substance. He then initiated the work of finding out the persons responsible for the supply of the explosive to the miscreants. He received information that appellant, Fakhruddin, was the owner of the shop known as M.F. Maniyar & Sons, situated at house No. 383, East Mangalwar Peth, Sholapur, and possessed licence for sale and storage of potassium chlorate in House No. 615 in East Mangalwar Peth; Fakhruddin with the assistance of his three sons (appellants 2 to 4) and his servants stored at the place mentioned in their shop situated at house No. 383, East Mangalwar Peth, to persons who did not possess licence to purchase potassium chlorate. P.W. 17 and Sub-inspector Tasgaokar of the local Intelligence Branch proceeded to Mangalwar Peth Police Chowky and called a bogus customer 'Basanna Pujari' by name. He also called the local panchas. He, then, gave a ten rupee currency note to P.W.4.\n\nHe initialled the currency note. He also gave a bag to P.W.4. and told him to buy half k.g. of potassium chlorate from M/s.M.F. Maniyar & Sons. P.W. 4 went to the shop. He found in the shop accused Chandra Kant (since acquitted), who was a servant of Fakhruddin. P.W.5 gave him the ten rupee currency note and asked for half k.g, of potassium chlorate, which he said he needed for blasting purpose. Chandra Kant gave him half k.g of potassium chlorate and returned an amount of Rs. 2.50P.\n\nP .W .4 took the powder in the bag and was returning. Police challenged him and seized the bag. Police interrogated him. He told police in presence of the Panchas that he had purchased the powder which was inside of the bag from M.F. Maniyar and got back Rs. 2.SOP.\n\nP.W.17 searched the cash box in the firm of Fakhruddin and found\n\nthe ten rupee currency note initialled by him. The shop was searched and 220 grams of Black gun powder was found in the show case.\n\nHe then alongwith the panchas went up to the first floor. They found black gun powder there also. They found it to be a mixture of potassium chlorate and sulphate used for fire arms. Samples were sealed and one of them was given to appellant, Fakhruddin. A panchnama, Ex.20, was prepared. P.W.17, thought it necessary to send for an expert to identify the powder. He, therefore, posted some constables at the shop, sealed appellants' godowns in Mangalwar Peth and Shukrawar Peth and made panchnamas, Exhibits 22 and 23. Next morning, he sealed both the 'shops and prepared panchnamas Exhibits 24 and 25.\n\nOn 13th September, he sent the samples to the Explosives Inspector. On the 14th he lodged a complaint at the Jail Road Police Station at Sholapur. Police registered a case anci the P.S.I started investigation. The P.S.I sent for the Drugs Inspector and the Central Excise Inspector. - All of them, then visited the appellants' godowns at Shukarwar Peth at Sholapur. They found the shops in the sealed condition. A search was conducted in the presence of the appellants. The Police Officer and others, having\n\nobseved due formalities, searched the premises. In course of the search they found and seized some powder as per Panchnama, Ex. 27.\n\nSamples of the powder seized were also given to the appellants. After that they went and searched the apJ?ellants' premises in Mangalwar Peth.\n\nNothing incriminating was found there. They, then, returned to the firm M/s. M.F.- Maniyar and searched it. They found and seized some powders as per Panchnama, Ex. 28.\n\nSamples of these powders also were given to the appellants.\n\nOn the same night they found 49 percussion caps on the roof of the adjacent shop and seized them as per Ext. 30.\n\nOn the same night P. S. I., Patil, received a panchnama made by P.S.I., Joshi, (P.W.18) under which detonators had been seized.\n\nActing on an information from P.W.\n\n17. P.W. 18 arrested appellant, Taufik on September 15, 1967.\n\nAppellant, Taufik told the police that he had buried some -detonators in the compound of his bungalow and he would produce them.\n\nAccordingly, he led P.W. 18 to his bungalow which was admittedly in occupation of all the appellants, removed some earth under a mango tree in the premises and took out three tins containing 20 packets of detonators. It was seized under panchnama, Ex. 33. As the detonators were explosive they were not opened. Taufik was arrested and produced before P .W .17.\n\nThe Explosives Inspector was of the opinion that some of the explosives seized were highly explosive. P.W.17, then, with the\n\npermission of the District Superintendent of Police destroyed the A explosives as instructed by the Explosives Inspector.\n\n'r. 4.\n\nDuring the course of investigation from 11.9.1967 to 15.9.1967 the following arms and explosives were seized:-\n\n(!) 200 grams of highly explosive gun powder.\n\n(2) 40 kg. and 150 grams of blasting powder.\n\n(3) 3 kg. and 350 g. of mixture of potassium chlorate and sulphur.\n\n(4) 54 detonators.\n\n(5) 251 caps like contrivances containing prohibited mixture of red arsenic sulphide and chlorate used to act as improvised percussions caps.\n\n(6) 104 kg. and 500 g. of potassium chlorate.\n\n(7) 37.5 kg. of special gelatines.\n\n(8) 300 kg. of sulphur.\n\n(9) 2496c carilpion crackers of prohibited size and containing prohibited mixtures.\n\n(10) 510 grams of potassium cyanide.\n\n(11) About 450 kg. of sulphur.\n\n(12) 217 caps like contrivances of the same description as is the case with item No. S above.\n\n(13) 2500 detonaters.\n\n(14) 27 live cartridges, 12 bores, and\n\n(15) Mixture of sulphur and potassium chlorate 1/2 kg.\n\nOut of these articles, the articles at serial Nos. I to 5 were found in the shop of M/s. M.F. Maniyar & Sons. Articles at serial numbers 6 to 11 were found in the clandestine godown situated at 986, Shukarwar Peth at Sholapur on 15.9.1967.\n\nArticle at serial no. 12 was found on the roof at East Mangalwar Peth, Shukarwar which is adjacent to the shop of M/s.M.F. Maniyar & Sons. Article at serial number I 3 were produced by appellant, Taufik, as stated earlier from the com poi.Ind of their bungalow at I 56A, Railway Lines,\n\nSholapur. Articles at serial number 14 consist of 12 bore cartridges found in the house of accused Abdulla Mandolkar (since acquitted).\n\nThey were alleged to have been delivered by appellant, Fakhruddin, to accused, Fateh Ahmed Phuleri (since acquitted). The article at serial number 15 was the one sold to P.W. 4, Basanna by accused, Chandrakant (since acquitted).\n\n5. Appellant number 1 is the father of appellants 2 to 4. Accused Chandrakant and Fateh Ahmed (both since acquitted) were the servants of Fakhruddin working in the shop.\n\nAccused Abdula Mandolkar (since acquitted) was a relation of Fateh Ahmed. Police after investigation submitted charge-sheet. Eventually the appellants and the three other above named co-accusd were committed to the court of Sessions for trial.\n\nThe allegations against the appellants i.ri substance were that they agreed to do the following illegal acts; (i) to acquire and prepare explosives unauthorisedly and to possess and supply explosives for illegal pruposes; (ii) to acquire and possess sulphur unauthorisedly and to sell the same; (iii) to 'acquire and posses~ and sell gun-powder and cartridges in breach of the conditions of the licence granted under the Arms Act and Explosives Act; (iv) to acquire and stock in clandestine godown andillegally sell potassium chlorate in breach of the conditions of the licence granted under the provisions of the Arms Act; (v) to acquire without licence percussion caps and to sell them illegally; and (vi) to acquire and posssess without licence poison and to sell the same illegally. The changes were also to the above effect.\n\nThe appellants pleaded not guilty. In his statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, appellant, Fakhruddin, additionally stated that he alone managed tlie shop M/s.\n\nM.F. Maniyar & Sons from which the incriminating substances were found.\n\nHe admitted his presence at the place and at the time of the first raid on the 11th September He has also admitted the search and seizure of articles as per Exhibit 28. He has also admitted that potassium cyanide was purchased and possessed by him but he has pleaded that he was told that no licence was necessary for possessing potassium cyanide.\n\n8.!ii\\Mr.Lalit learned Advocate, appeared for appellants no.\n\nH 1 & 2 and Mr. Bhasme, learned Advocate, appeared for appellants 3 & 4. Learned counsel have not challenged the convictions and sentences of the appellants under Section 5(3)(b), Section 3 read\n\nwith Section 25(1)(a), and Section 30 of the Arms)tAct, and under Section 6( !)(a) of the Poison Act read with rule 2 of the rules framed under that Act. They have only challenged. the conviction and sentences under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, and Section 120B of the Penal Code. We are, therefore, called upon to examine the correctness or otherwise of the convictions under Section 5 of .the Explosive Substances Act and Section 120B of the Penal Code.\n\nLet us first consider the conviction under Section 5 of the Explosives Substances Act.\n\nThe Section reads as follows: '\n\n5. \"Any person who makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance, under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or does not have it in his possession or under his control for a lawfol object, shall, unless he can show that he made it or had it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, be punishable with transportation for a term which may extend to fourteen years, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment for a terms which may extend to five years, to which fine may be added\"\n\n10.\n\nIn order to bring home the offence under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, the prosecution has to prove; (i) that the substance in question is explosive substance; (ii) that the accused makes or knowingly has in his possesstion or under his control any explosive substance; and (iii) that be does so under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not doing so for a lawful object.\n\nThe burden of proof of these ingredients is on the prosecution.\n\nThe moment the prosecution has discharged that burden, it shifts to the accused to show that he was making or possessing the explosive. substance for a lawful object, if he takes that plea.\n\n11.\n\nExplosive substance has been defined in section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act. The definition isas follows : ,, .\n\n. l\n\n\"2. In this Act the expression \"explosive substance\" shall be deemed to include any materials for making any explo-: sive substance; also any apparatus, machine, implement or H material used, or intended to be used, or adapted for causing, or aiding in causing, any .explosion in or wit.Ii any explosive\n\nsubstance ; also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement.\"\n\n\"Explosive substance\" has a broader and more comprehensive meaning than the term 'Explosive', 'Explosive substance' includes 'Explosive'. The term 'Explosive' has not been defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word 'Explosive' is 'tending to expand suddenly with loud noise ; 'tending to cause explosfon' (The Concise Oxford Dictionary). In the Explosives Act, the terms 'explosive' has been defined as follows :\n\n\"4. , In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the\n\n1Definitions, subject or context,-\n\n(!) \"explosive\"\n\n(a) means gunpowder, nitro-glycerine, dynamite, guncotton, blasting powders, fulminate of mercury or of other metals, coloured fires and every other substance, whether sim.ilar to those above-mentioned or not, used or manufactured with a view to produce a practical effect by explosion, or a pyrotechnic effect ; and\n\n(b) includes fog-signals, fireworks, fuses, rockets, percussion-caps, detonators, cartridges, ammunition of all descriptions, and every adaptation or preparation of art explosive as above defined ;\"\n\nIt may be mentioned that the definition of 'explosive' under Section 4 was amended later, but we are not concerned with the amendment as the occurrence in the instant case took place before the amendment.\n\nOn a consideration of the evidence of the Explosives Inspector, and other evidence. the Sessions Judge and the High Court have found, in our opinion correctly, that the substances in question were explosive substances within the definition of.the expression.\n\n 12. In the instant case, appellant 1 has admitted, as stated earlier, that these articles were seized from his possession. The\n\nevidene also shows that bis three sons, appellants 2 to 4, used to manage and run the shop M. F. Maniyar & Sons from which the incriminating substance were seized.\n\n13. It was argued by learned counsel that .. possession within the meaning of Section 5 of the Explosive Substances. Act means\n\n. M.U. M.H. MANIAR V. MAHAIHSHfRA (Baharui ls/am, J.) 77\n\n:. 'conscious possession'.\n\nThere can be no doubt about it. The substances seized were not minute or small in quantity. They were in large quantities.\n\nIn fact half k, g. of the incriminating substance was sold to P. W. 4 by an employee of the fim. The detonators were produced by appellant No. 3 from the premises of the Bungalow ()CCupied by all the occupants. . It cannot but, therefore, be held that the .. appellants were in 'conscious possession' of the substance seized.\n\n14. The notification dated !st of April, 1966 published by the Government of India,, Ministry of Works and Housing and Urban Development (Ex. 65) reads as follows :\n\n\"NOTIFICATION''\n\nNo. 3/12/65-PII (IX)-In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 6 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884 ( 4 of 1884),\n\nand in supersession of.the notification of the Government of D India in the later Department of Labour No. M-1217, dated the 9th February 1939, the Central Government is pleased to prohibt the manufacture, possession and importation of any explosive consisting of or containing sulphur or sulphurate in admixture with chlorate or potassium or any other chlorate ;\n\nProvided that this prohibition shall not extend to the manufacture or possession of such explosive :-\n\n(a) in small quantities for scientific purpose;\n\n(b) for the purpose of manufacturing heads of matches ; or\n\n(c) for me in toy amdrces (paper caps for toy pistols).\n\nSd/- P. Rajaratnam Under Secretary to the Government of India\"\n\n-~ G The appellants had no licence or authority to make or possess the explosive substances as required by the above Government notification. The licence possessed by them is dated 31.3.1956 (Exhibit 90) which was not in pursuance and in conformity of the aforesaid Government Notification. The possession of the 'explosive H substances' by the appellants, therefore, were without any authority.\n\n15. Learned counsel for the appellants cited before us\n\n1939 (2) All E. R. 641 in support of his contention. The head note of the report reads :\n\n\"Upon an indictment against an accused for knowingly having in his possession explosive substances, the prosecution has to prove that the accused was in possession of an explosive substance within the Explosive Substances Act, 1883, s. 9, in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable presumption that that possession was not for a lawful object. Proof of knowledge by the accused of the explosive nature of the substance is not essential, nor need any chemical knowledge on the part of the accused be proved.\"\n\nThe appellants have also cited another English decision reported in 1957 (!) All E.R. 665 in which it has been observed :\n\n,; We think that the clear meaning. of the sect.ion is that the person must not only knowingly have in his possession the substance but must know that it is an explosive substance. The section says he must knowingly have in his possession an explosive substance; therefore it does seem that it is an ingredient in the offence that he knew it was an explosive substance.\"\n\nWith respect, the above decisions lay the correct legal proposition. But the question is whether in his case appellants knew that the substances in question were explosive substances. The knowledge whether a particular substance is an explosive substance depends on different circumstances and varies from person to person.\n\nAn ignorant man or a child coming across an explosive substance may pick it up out of curiosity and not knowing that it is an explosive substance. A person of experience may immediately know that it is an explosive substance.\n\nIn the' instant case, the appellants had been dealing with the substances in question for a long time.\n\nThey certainly knew or atleast they shall be presumed to have known what these substances they were and for what purpose they were used. In fact, when P. W. 4 Basanna asked for half k. g. of blasting powder, appellants' servant, accused Chandrakant, immediately supplied the requisite powder to P. W. 4 from the shop. This evidence clearly establishes that the appellants did know the nature and character of the substance. In other words, they knew that. th~ substances.in question were explosive substances. The courts belo..y therefore, were right in holding that an offence under Section 5 qf the Explosive Substances Act was committed.\n\nM.U. M.H. MANIYAR v. MAHARASHTRA (Baharul !slam, J.) 79\n\n16. Learned Counsel submitted that the evidence on record\n\nshos that appellant, Fakhruddin, alone acquired and possessed the substance in question.\n\nThat was the plea of Fakhruddin. It also might be true that Fakhruddin also had acquired the substances but the evidence on record clearly shows that all the appellants were in possession and control of the substances in quest\\on. The submission -0f the appellants has no substance and all the four persons are liable for the offence.\n\n17.\n\nNow to turn to the conviction under Section l 20B of the Penal Code.\n\nSection 120B provides :\n\n\"120B. (I) Whoever is a. party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable ........... .''\n\n.J 'Criminal conspiracy' has been defined under Section 120A of of the Penal Code as follows :\n\n\"120 A.\n\nWhen two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done.-\n\n(I) an illegal act, or\n\n(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy :-\n\n. \"' Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit\n\nan offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some tact besides the agreement is. done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.\n\nExplanation.-It is immaterial whether'the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreeme;1t, or is merely incidental to that object,\"\n\nThe contention of learned counsel is that there is no evidence of agreement of the appellants to do an illegal act.\n\nIt is true that there is no evidence of any express agreement between the appellants to do or cause to be done the illegal act. For an offence under section I 20B, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetraters expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication.\n\nIn this case, the fact that the appellants were possessing and selling explosive substances without a valid licence for a pretty\n\nA long time leads to the inference that they agreed to do and/or cause to be done the said illegal act, for, without such an agreement the act could not have been done for such a long time.\n\n17.\n\nMr. Lalit additionally submitted that appellant No. 2 Rizwan did not do any overt act. He was a mere partner of M/s.\n\nM.F. Maniyar & Sons and as such his conviction has been bad in law. The submission is not correct. For, appellant Rizwan himself in his statement under Section 342, Cr. P. C., has stated \"Myself\n\n(and) accused Nos. 1 and 4 looked after the business of the Firm.\n\nM.F. Maniyar & Sons\". The learned courts below on a consideration of the evidence on record have come to the conclusion that he also occasionally used to work in the firm.\n\nWe do not have valid reason to differ from them.\n\n18.\n\nNow comes the question of sentence. The real man in the entire clandestine trade was appellant no. 1, who is now dead.\n\nThe three other appellants being his sons were merely assisting him.\n\nD We are told that appellant no. 2, Rizwan, has already served bl/2 months of imprisonment and appellants 3 and 4, Usman and Taufik, six months of imprisonment each.\n\nIn our view ends of justice will be met if the sentences of imprisonment are reduced to the periods already undergone by the three living appellants.\n\nIn addition to the sentence of imprisonment there was a fine of Rs. 1000/- eaeh for the offence under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and also sentence of fine against the appellants under Section 5(3) (b) of the Explosives Act. and under Section 30 of the Arms Act. In our opinion, ends of justice will be met if the fine under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act is remitted in case of all the appellants, including appellant No. l, Fakhruddin. With the above modification in the sentence the appeals are dismissed ..\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 145, "entities": [{"text": "MOHAMMAD USMAN MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN\n\nMANIYAR & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD USMAN MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN\n\nMANIYAR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 3, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 84, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nMarch 3, 1981\n\n(0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 2 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Substances Act", "statute": "Explosive Substances Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429, "end_char": 438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Substances Act", "statute": "Explosive Substances Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of India, Ministry of Works & Housing and Urban Development Notification No."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 823, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 825, "end_char": 837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Substances Act", "statute": "Explosive Substances Act"}}, {"text": "F.akhruddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 878, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.akhruddin, the owner of the shop, known as M. F. Maniyar & Sons, Sholapur, along with his three sons, was tried for offences under section J20B of the Penal Code, section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, section 3 read with section 25 of the Arms Act and section 6(J){a) of the Poisons Act.", "canonical_name": "F.akhruddin"}}, {"text": "M. F. Maniyar & Sons, Sholapur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 923, "end_char": 953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.akhruddin, the owner of the shop, known as M. F. Maniyar & Sons, Sholapur, along with his three sons, was tried for offences under section J20B of the Penal Code, section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, section 3 read with section 25 of the Arms Act and section 6(J){a) of the Poisons Act."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1031, "end_char": 1041, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Substances Act", "statute": "Explosive Substances Act"}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1084, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1086, "end_char": 1095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Substances Act", "statute": "Explosive Substances Act"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1106, "end_char": 1116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Substances Act", "statute": "Explosive Substances Act"}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1124, "end_char": 1132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6(J)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Substances Act", "statute": "Explosive Substances Act"}}, {"text": "Poisons Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1171, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1751, "end_char": 1775, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2172, "end_char": 2181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2213, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2688, "end_char": 2712, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. F. Maniyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and also the evidence that his three sons, appellants 2 to 4, who were managing and running the shop of M. F. Maniyar and Sons from which the incriminating substances were seized clearly show that all of them were guilty. [", "canonical_name": "M. F. Maniyar"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3261, "end_char": 3285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ministry of Works & Housing and Urban", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The possession of the explosive substances by the appellants were without any authority since the appellants had no licence or authority to make or possess the explosive substances as required by the Government of India, Ministry of Works & Housing and Urban, notification dated 1st April, 1966."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The possession of the explosive substances by the appellants were without any authority since the appellants had no licence or authority to make or possess the explosive substances as required by the Government of India, Ministry of Works & Housing and Urban, notification dated 1st April, 1966."}}, {"text": "3.1-3-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The licence possessed by them is dated 3.1-3-1956 which was not in pursuance and in conformity of the said Government notification."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4581, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CRJMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTfON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5089, "end_char": 5120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the fact that the appellants were possessing and selling explosive substances without a valid licence for a pretty Jong time leads to the inference that they agreed to do and/or cause to be done the said illegal act, for, without such an agreement the act could not have been done for such a long time:[79G-H,80A]\n\nCRJMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTfON : Criminal Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "S. B. Bhasme", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5284, "end_char": 5296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Bhasme, V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V., D. Khanna for the Appellant in Cr."}}, {"text": "V. N. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5298, "end_char": 5311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Bhasme, V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V., D. Khanna for the Appellant in Cr."}}, {"text": "V., D. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5321, "end_char": 5334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Bhasme, V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V., D. Khanna for the Appellant in Cr."}}, {"text": "U. R. La", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5372, "end_char": 5380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 150/76,\n\nU. R. La/it and K. R. Chowdhary for the Appellant in Cr."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 150/76,\n\nU. R. La/it and K. R. Chowdhary for the Appellant in Cr."}}, {"text": "A R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 285/76\n\nA R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents in bth\n\nthe Appeals."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5461, "end_char": 5473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 285/76\n\nA R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents in bth\n\nthe Appeals."}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5573, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5742, "end_char": 5781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "150 of 1976 has been preferred by two appellants, Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter \"Usman\") and Mohammad Taufik Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter 'taufik') and Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD USMAN MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN\n\nMANIYAR & ANR"}}, {"text": "Mohammad Taufik Mohammad Hussain Maniyar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5808, "end_char": 5848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "150 of 1976 has been preferred by two appellants, Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter \"Usman\") and Mohammad Taufik Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter 'taufik') and Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD USMAN MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN\n\nMANIYAR & ANR"}}, {"text": "Mohammad Hussain Fakhruddin Maniyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "285 of 1976 has been preferred by Mohammad Hussain Fakhruddin Maniyar (hereinafter 'Fakhruddin) and Mohammad Rizwan Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter 'Rizwan')."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Rizwan Mohammad Hussain Maniyar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5996, "end_char": 6036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "285 of 1976 has been preferred by Mohammad Hussain Fakhruddin Maniyar (hereinafter 'Fakhruddin) and Mohammad Rizwan Mohammad Hussain Maniyar (hereinafter 'Rizwan').", "canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD USMAN MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN\n\nMANIYAR & ANR"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6178, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6263, "end_char": 6272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6280, "end_char": 6304, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6509, "end_char": 6523, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6720, "end_char": 6733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6745, "end_char": 6753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6833, "end_char": 6843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6851, "end_char": 6859, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6985, "end_char": 6994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Poisons Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7010, "end_char": 7021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fakhruddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7663, "end_char": 7673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, appellant, Fakhruddin, died on 10.10.1978.", "canonical_name": "F.akhruddin"}}, {"text": "10.10.1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7683, "end_char": 7693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, appellant, Fakhruddin, died on 10.10.1978."}}, {"text": "11.9.1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8114, "end_char": 8123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11.9.1964, P.W.17, Bendre, P.S.I, who was attached to the local crime branch at Sholapur received an information that the firm known as M.F. Maniyar & Sons was selling potassium chlorate which is a highly explosive substance."}}, {"text": "Bendre", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8133, "end_char": 8139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11.9.1964, P.W.17, Bendre, P.S.I, who was attached to the local crime branch at Sholapur received an information that the firm known as M.F. Maniyar & Sons was selling potassium chlorate which is a highly explosive substance."}}, {"text": "Sholapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8194, "end_char": 8202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11.9.1964, P.W.17, Bendre, P.S.I, who was attached to the local crime branch at Sholapur received an information that the firm known as M.F. Maniyar & Sons was selling potassium chlorate which is a highly explosive substance."}}, {"text": "M.F. Maniyar & Sons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8250, "end_char": 8269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11.9.1964, P.W.17, Bendre, P.S.I, who was attached to the local crime branch at Sholapur received an information that the firm known as M.F. Maniyar & Sons was selling potassium chlorate which is a highly explosive substance."}}, {"text": "Tasgaokar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9004, "end_char": 9013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 17 and Sub-inspector Tasgaokar of the local Intelligence Branch proceeded to Mangalwar Peth Police Chowky and called a bogus customer 'Basanna Pujari' by name."}}, {"text": "Mangalwar Peth Police Chowky", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9060, "end_char": 9088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 17 and Sub-inspector Tasgaokar of the local Intelligence Branch proceeded to Mangalwar Peth Police Chowky and called a bogus customer 'Basanna Pujari' by name."}}, {"text": "Basanna Pujari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9118, "end_char": 9132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 17 and Sub-inspector Tasgaokar of the local Intelligence Branch proceeded to Mangalwar Peth Police Chowky and called a bogus customer 'Basanna Pujari' by name."}}, {"text": "Chandra Kant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He found in the shop accused Chandra Kant (since acquitted), who was a servant of Fakhruddin.", "canonical_name": "Chandra Kant"}}, {"text": "Fakhruddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9480, "end_char": 9490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He found in the shop accused Chandra Kant (since acquitted), who was a servant of Fakhruddin.", "canonical_name": "F.akhruddin"}}, {"text": "M.F. Maniyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9948, "end_char": 9960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He told police in presence of the Panchas that he had purchased the powder which was inside of the bag from M.F. Maniyar and got back Rs.", "canonical_name": "M. F. Maniyar"}}, {"text": "P.S.I", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10970, "end_char": 10975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Police registered a case anci the P.S.I started investigation."}}, {"text": "Mangalwar Peth", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11558, "end_char": 11572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After that they went and searched the apJ?ellants' premises in Mangalwar Peth."}}, {"text": "M.F.- Maniyar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11652, "end_char": 11665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They, then, returned to the firm M/s. M.F.- Maniyar and searched it."}}, {"text": "Panchnama", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11725, "end_char": 11734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They found and seized some powders as per Panchnama, Ex."}}, {"text": "P. S. I.,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11938, "end_char": 11947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same night P. S. I., Patil, received a panchnama made by P.S.I., Joshi, (P.W.18) under which detonators had been seized."}}, {"text": "Patil", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11948, "end_char": 11953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same night P. S. I., Patil, received a panchnama made by P.S.I., Joshi, (P.W.18) under which detonators had been seized."}}, {"text": "P.S.I., Joshi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11984, "end_char": 11997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same night P. S. I., Patil, received a panchnama made by P.S.I., Joshi, (P.W.18) under which detonators had been seized."}}, {"text": "Taufik", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12117, "end_char": 12123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 18 arrested appellant, Taufik on September 15, 1967."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12127, "end_char": 12145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 18 arrested appellant, Taufik on September 15, 1967."}}, {"text": "Taufik", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12589, "end_char": 12595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taufik was arrested and produced before P .W .17."}}, {"text": "11.9.1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12937, "end_char": 12946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of investigation from 11.9.1967 to 15.9.1967 the following arms and explosives were seized:-\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "15.9.1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12950, "end_char": 12959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of investigation from 11.9.1967 to 15.9.1967 the following arms and explosives were seized:-\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Shukarwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14122, "end_char": 14131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 was found on the roof at East Mangalwar Peth, Shukarwar which is adjacent to the shop of M/s.M.F. Maniyar & Sons."}}, {"text": "Abdulla Mandolkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14437, "end_char": 14454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Articles at serial number 14 consist of 12 bore cartridges found in the house of accused Abdulla Mandolkar (since acquitted)."}}, {"text": "Fateh Ahmed Phuleri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14554, "end_char": 14573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were alleged to have been delivered by appellant, Fakhruddin, to accused, Fateh Ahmed Phuleri (since acquitted).", "canonical_name": "Fateh Ahmed Phuleri"}}, {"text": "Basanna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14653, "end_char": 14660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The article at serial number 15 was the one sold to P.W. 4, Basanna by accused, Chandrakant (since acquitted)."}}, {"text": "Chandrakant", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14673, "end_char": 14684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The article at serial number 15 was the one sold to P.W. 4, Basanna by accused, Chandrakant (since acquitted)."}}, {"text": "Chandrakant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14771, "end_char": 14782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accused Chandrakant and Fateh Ahmed (both since acquitted) were the servants of Fakhruddin working in the shop.", "canonical_name": "Chandra Kant"}}, {"text": "Fateh Ahmed", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14787, "end_char": 14798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accused Chandrakant and Fateh Ahmed (both since acquitted) were the servants of Fakhruddin working in the shop.", "canonical_name": "Fateh Ahmed Phuleri"}}, {"text": "Fateh Ahmed", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14937, "end_char": 14948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accused Abdula Mandolkar (since acquitted) was a relation of Fateh Ahmed.", "canonical_name": "Fateh Ahmed Phuleri"}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15542, "end_char": 15550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15555, "end_char": 15569, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15735, "end_char": 15743, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16010, "end_char": 16021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16029, "end_char": 16055, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lalit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16569, "end_char": 16574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalit learned Advocate, appeared for appellants no."}}, {"text": "Bhasme", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16638, "end_char": 16644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H 1 & 2 and Mr. Bhasme, learned Advocate, appeared for appellants 3 & 4."}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16785, "end_char": 16800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16802, "end_char": 16811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16823, "end_char": 16839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16845, "end_char": 16855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6( !)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16884, "end_char": 16900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17034, "end_char": 17043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive 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17276, "end_char": 17286, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17332, "end_char": 17341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18049, "end_char": 18058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18066, "end_char": 18090, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18731, "end_char": 18740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18748, "end_char": 18772, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19550, "end_char": 19564, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20314, "end_char": 20323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21091, "end_char": 21100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.U. M.H. MANIAR V. MAHAIHSHfRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21143, "end_char": 21174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.U. M.H. MANIAR V. MAHAIHSHfRA (Baharui ls/am, J.) 77\n\n:. '"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21921, "end_char": 21930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Explosives Act, 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21938, "end_char": 21965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of D India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22028, "end_char": 22049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3/12/65-PII (IX)-In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 6 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884 ( 4 of 1884),\n\nand in supersession of.the notification of the Government of D India in the later Department of Labour No."}}, {"text": "9th February 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22106, "end_char": 22123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M-1217, dated the 9th February 1939, the Central Government is pleased to prohibt the manufacture, possession and importation of any explosive consisting of or containing sulphur or sulphurate in admixture with chlorate or potassium or any other chlorate ;\n\nProvided that this prohibition shall not extend to the manufacture or possession of such explosive :-\n\n(a) in small quantities for scientific purpose;\n\n(b) for the purpose of manufacturing heads of matches ; or\n\n(c) for me in toy amdrces (paper caps for toy pistols)."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22129, "end_char": 22147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M-1217, dated the 9th February 1939, the Central Government is pleased to prohibt the manufacture, possession and importation of any explosive consisting of or containing sulphur or sulphurate in admixture with chlorate or potassium or any other chlorate ;\n\nProvided that this prohibition shall not extend to the manufacture or possession of such explosive :-\n\n(a) in small quantities for scientific purpose;\n\n(b) for the purpose of manufacturing heads of matches ; or\n\n(c) for me in toy amdrces (paper caps for toy pistols)."}}, {"text": "P. Rajaratnam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22620, "end_char": 22633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- P. Rajaratnam Under Secretary to the Government of India\"\n~ G The appellants had no licence or authority to make or possess the explosive substances as required by the above Government notification."}}, {"text": "31.3.1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22860, "end_char": 22869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The licence possessed by them is dated 31.3.1956 (Exhibit 90) which was not in pursuance and in conformity of the aforesaid Government Notification."}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act, 1883", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23423, "end_char": 23453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23455, "end_char": 23459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1883", "statute": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1883"}}, {"text": "Chandrakant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25121, "end_char": 25132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, when P. W. 4 Basanna asked for half k. g. of blasting powder, appellants' servant, accused Chandrakant, immediately supplied the requisite powder to P. W. 4 from the shop.", "canonical_name": "Chandra Kant"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25468, "end_char": 25477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25485, "end_char": 25509, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26130, "end_char": 26140, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26143, "end_char": 26155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 120A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26321, "end_char": 26333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26344, "end_char": 26354, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rizwan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27775, "end_char": 27781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Rizwan did not do any overt act."}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27991, "end_char": 28002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Usman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28635, "end_char": 28640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Rizwan, has already served bl/2 months of imprisonment and appellants 3 and 4, Usman and Taufik, six months of imprisonment each."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28940, "end_char": 28949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28957, "end_char": 28981, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29037, "end_char": 29049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29061, "end_char": 29075, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29087, "end_char": 29097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29105, "end_char": 29113, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29177, "end_char": 29186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29194, "end_char": 29218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_698_828_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "A 698\n\nNEEDLE INDUSTRIES (INDIA) LTD.,\n\n& ORS.\n\nNEEDLE INDUSTRIES NEWEY (INDIA)\n\nHOLDING LTD. & ORS.\n\nMay 7, 1981\n\n[ Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J., P.N. BHAGWATI AND\n\nE.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ. ]\n\nCompanies Act 1956, Ss. 3(1) (iii), 43A, 45, 81, 299(1), 300(1), 397 and _.. 398and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973, Ss. 29(1), (2) and4(a)-Scope and effect of\n\nPrivate company becoming a public company by S. 43A-Reserve Bank directive that holding of the foreign company should be reduced-Reduction effected by issue of new rights shares-Such shares to be offered to all shareholders Indian as well as the holding company-Shares however allotted to onv Indian shareholders-Notice of meeting 'at which allotment made not properly given to holding company-Ho/ding company whether could renounce the offer in favour of the person of its choice-Allotment to Indian shareholder-Whether amounts to oppression.\n\n'Directly or indirectly, concerned in the contract or arrangement'-Effect of- Relationship of friendliness with Director-Lawyer-client relationship with Director-Whether will disqualify a person from acting as Director.\n\nPublic company-Private company-What are-When does a private company become a public company-No exception provided in S. 45 in favour of S. 43A proviso companies-Need for legislative amendment.\n\nPractice and Procedure-Allegation of a mafaji.ie-Examination of-Whether can be on the basis of affidavits and correspondence only.\n\nM/s. Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd. (NHL), the appellant was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a Private Company on 20.7.1949 with its Registered office at Madras and at the time of its incorporation it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries {India) Ltd., Studley, England {NI-Studley). In 1961, NI-Studley entered into an agreement with Newey Bros.\n\nLtd., Birmingham, England (Newey) to invest in the Indian Company. In 1963, NI-Studley and Newey combined to form the Holding Company in England M/s Needle Industries-Newey (India) Holding Ltd., the respondent. The entire share capital of NHL held by NI Studley and Newey was transferred to the Holding Company in which NI-Studley and Newey became equal shares.\n\nN.I.l.L. V. N.I.N.H.L. 699\n\nAs a result of this arrangement, the Holding Company came to acquire A 99.95 per cent of the issued and paid up capital of NIIL. The balance of 0.05 cent, which consisted of six share& being the original nominal shares, was held by Devagnanam the managing director of NHL.\n\nBy virtue of the introduction of section 43A in the Companies Act in 1961, NHL became a public company, since not less than twenty-five per cent of its paid-up share capital was held by a body corporate, the Holding Company.\n\nHowever, under the first proviso to section 43(1) it had the option to retain its articles relating to matters specified in section 3(1)(iii) of the Companies Act.\n\nNIIL did not alter the relevant provisions of its articles after it became a public company within the meaning of section 43A. By 1971 about 40 per cent of the share capital of NHL came to be held by the Indian employees of the company and their relatives and the balance of about 60 per cent remained in the hands of the Holding Company NINIH Ltd.\n\nIn 1972 Coats Paton Ltd. became an almost 100% owner of NI-Studley.\n\nThe position at the beginning of the year 1973 was that 60% (to be exact 59.3%) of the share capital of NHL came to be owned half and half by Coats and NEWEY, the remaining 40% being in the hands of the Indian Group of which 28.5% was held by the Devagnanam's group.\n\nThough NHL was at one time wholly owned by NI-Studley and later by NI Studley and Newey, the affairs were managed ever since 1956 by an entirely Indian Management with Devagnanam as its Chief Executive and Managing Director with effect from the year 1961. The Holding Company which was fomied in 1963 had only one representative on the Board of Directors of\n\nNHL. He was N.T. Sanders, who resided in England and hardly ever attended E the Board Meetings.\n\nThe holding company reposed great confidence in the Indian management which was under the direction and control of Devagnanam.\n\nIn July 1972 Mr. Devagnanam was offered by the office of Managing Director of group of four companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan and his family began to reside in Hong Kong and he cogitated over resigning from his position in NIIL. Coats, on their part were clear that Devagnanam should relinquish his responsibilities in NHL. in view of the time his role in Newey's Far Eastern interests was consuming.\n\nThe Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973, came into force on Junuary 1,\n\n1974. S. 29(1) prohibited non-residents, non-citizens and non-banking companies not incorporated under any Indian law or in which the non-resident interest was more than 40 per cent, from carrying on any activity in Indill of a trading, commercial or Industrial nature except with the general or special permission of the Rese1ve Bank of India. By section 29(2) (a) if such person was engaged in any such activity at the commencement of the Act, he or it had to apply to the Reserve Bank of India, for permission to carry on that activity, within six months of the commencement of the Act or such further period the Reserve Bank may allow. S. 29 (4) (a) imposed a simiiar restriction on such person or company from holding shares in India, of any company referred to lcni ause (b) of section 29(1), without the permission of the Reserve Bank. The\n\nA time for making the application for the requisite permission under section 29 was extended by the Reserve Bank until August 31, 1974.\n\nSince the Holding Company was a non-resident and its interest in NHL exceeded 40% NHL had to apply for the permission of the Reserve Bank under S. 29 (I) FERA for continuing to carry on its business. The Holding Company had also to apply for the permission of the Reserve Bank under S. 29 (4)\n\n(a) FERA for continuing to hold its shares in NHL. ·\n\nNHL appplied to the Reerve Bank for the necessary perm1ss1on on September 3, 1974. By its letter dated May 11, 1976 the Reserve Bank condoned the delay and allowed the application and imposed conditions on NITL that it must bring down the non-rsident interest from 60% to 40% within one year of the receipt of its letter. The Holding Company applied to the Reserve Bank for a Holding Licence under section 29 (4) (a) of FERA, on September 18, 1974; which application was late by 18 days and was still pending with the Reser.ve Bank.\n\nDevagnanam who was residing in Hong Kong obtained a holding licence dated March 5, 1975 from the Reserve Bank in respect of his shares in NHL.\n\nOn receipt of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 11, 1976 NIIL's secretary sent a reply on May 18, 1976 to the Bank confirming the acceptance of the various conditions under which permission was granted to NHL to continue its business. On Angust 11, 1976 the term of Devagnanam's appointment as the Managing Director of NlIL came to an end but in the meeting dated\n\nOctober I, 1976 of NIIL's Board of Directors bis appointment was renewed for a further period of 5 years. On October 20th and 21st, 1976 a meeting took place between the U.K. shareholders and the Indian shareholders of NHL; But the meeting ended in a stalemate because whereas the Holding Company wanted a substantial part of the share capital held by it in excess of 40 per cent to be transferred to Madura Coats an Indian company in which the Holding Company had substantial interest as an Indian shareholder.\n\nDevagnanam. insisted that the existing Indian shareholders of NHL alone had the right under its Articles of Association to take up the shares which the Holding Company was no longer in a position to hold because of the directives issued by the Reserve Bank pursuant to FERA.\n\nAs negotiations were going on between the competing groups regarding the Indianisation of NHL, on April 4, 1977 NHL received a reminder letter dated March 30, 1977 from the Reserve Bank which pointed out that the com pany had not submitted any concrete proposal for reduction of the non-resident interest and asked it to submit its proposal in that behalf without any further delay and that failure to comply with the directive regarding dilution or foreign equity within the stipulated period would be viewed seriously.\n\nH A meeting of NIIL's Board of Directors was held on April 6, 1977. All the directors were present in the meeting with Devagnanam in the chair at the commencement of the proceedings. Mr. C. Doraiswamy, solicitor-partner of\n\nN.I.L. V. N.J.N.I.L. 701\n\nKing and Partridge was one of the directors present at the meeting. He had no A interest in the proposal of lndianisation which the meeting was to discuss. In order to complete the quorum of two independent directors, the other directors apart from C. Doraiswamy being interested in the business of the meeting, Silverston an ex-partner of Doraiswamy's firm of solicitors, was appointed to the board as an additional director under article 97 of the Articles of Association. Silverston chaired the meeting after his appointment as additional director.\n\nThe meeting resolved that the issued capital of NHL be increased by a new issue of 16,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each to be offered as rights shares to the exising shareholders in proportion to the shares held by them. The offer was to be made by a notice specifying the number of shares which each shareholder was entitled to and in case the offer was not accepted within 16 days from the date on which it was made it was to be deemed to have been declined by the concerned shareholder.\n\nIn pursuance to the aforesaid resolution a letter or offer dated April 14, 1977 was prepared. The envelope containing Devagnanam's explanatory' letter dated April 12 (without the copy of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 30, 1977) and the letter of offer dated April 14 were received by the Holding Company on May 2, 1977 in an envelope bearing the Indian postal mark of April 27, 1977. The letter of offer which was sent to one of the Indian shareholders, Manoharan was posted in an envelope which also bore the postal mark of 27th April. The next meeting of the Board was due to be held on May 2, 1977. The Holding Company was thus denied an opportunity to exercise its option whether or not to accept the offer of right shares, assuming that any such option was open to it.\n\nThe meeting of the Boaard of Directors was held an May 2, 1977 as scheduled and in the meting the whole of the new issue consisting of 16,000 rights share was allotted to the Indian shareholders including members of the Manoharan group. Out of these the Devagnanam group was allotted 11,734 shares. After marking the allotment of shares a letter was sent to the Reserve Bank by NHL reporting compliance with the requirements of F.E.R.A. by the issue of 16,000 rights shares and the allotment thereof to the Indian shareholders which resulted in the reduction of the foreign holding to approximately 40% and increased that of the Indian shareholders to almost 60%.\n\nThe Holding Company filed a company petition in the High Court under section 397 and 398 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 alleging that the Indian Directors abused their fiduciary position in the Company by deciding in the meeting of April 6 to issue the rights shares at par and by allotting them exclusively to the Indian shareholders in the meeting of 2nd May, 1977.\n\nIn doing so, they acted ma/a fide and in order to gain an illegal advantage for themselves.\n\nBy deciding to issue the rights shares at par, they conferred a tremendous and illegitimate advantage on the Indian shareholders. Devagnanam delayed deliberately the intimation of the proceedings of the 6th April to the Holding Company. By that means and by the late giving of the notice of the\n\nA meeting of the 2nd May, the Devagnanam group presented a fail uccomp/i to the Holding Company in order to prevent it from exercising its lawful rights.\n\nThe conduct of the Indian directors lacked in probity and fair dealing which the Holding Company was entitled to expect.\n\nThe acting Chief Justice who tried the Company Petition, found several defects and infirmities in the Board's meeting dated May 2, 1977 and being of the view that the average market value of the rights shares was about Rs. 190 per share on the crucial date and that, since the rights shares were issued at par, the Holding Company was deprived unjustly of a sum Rs. 8,54,550 at the rate of Rs. 90 per share on the 9,495 rights shares to which it wa:s entitled.\n\nExercising the power under section 398 (2) of the Companies Act, the learned Judge directed NHL to make good that loss which, could have been avoided by adopting a fairer process of communication with the Holding Company and 'a consequential dialogue' with them in the matter of the issue of rights shares at a premium.\n\nThe Holding Company being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment filed an appeal and NHL filed cross-objections to the decree. The appeal and crossobjections were argued before the Division Bench of the High Court on the basis of affidavits, the correspondence that bad passed between the parties and certain additional documents which were filed before the Appellate Court.\n\nThe Division Bench concluded that the affairs of NIIL were being conducted in a manner oppressive, that is to say burdensome, harsh and wrongful to the Holding Company and held that since the action of the Board of Directors of NHL was taken merely for the purpose of welding the Company into Newey's Far Eastern complex it was just and equitable to wind up the Company. With regard to the cross-objections, the Division Bench held that the injuries suffered by the Holding Company could not be remedied by the award of compensa tion and, therefore, the action of the Board of Directors in issuing the rights\n\nbares bad to be quashed. It accordingly allowed the appeal filed by the Holding Company and dismissed the cross-objections of the appellant and directed that the Board of Directors be suspended and an interim Board consisting of nine directors proposed by the Holding Company be constituted and that the rights issue made on 6th April, 1977 and the. allotment of shares made on 2nd May, 1977 at the Board Meeting be set aside and the Interim Board be directed to make a fresh issue of shares at a premium to the: existing shareholders including the Holding Company which was to have a right of renunciation.\n\nJn the appeals to this Court, on the question whether the decisions taken at the meetings of the Boards of Directors of NIIL on April 6 and May 2, 1977 constitute acts of oppression within the meaning of S. 397 of the Companies Act 1956.\n\nAllowing the appeals.\n\nHELD : I. The charge of oppression rejected after applying to the con• duct of Devagnanam and his group the standard of probity and fairplay, which is expected of partners in a business venture. Not only is the law on his side, but his conduct cannot be characterised as lacking in probity, considering the extremely rigid attitude by Coats. He was driven into a tight corner from which the only escape was to allow the law to have its full play,\n\n. [824 lB-C; G-H]\n\nN.I.l.L. V. N.l.N.H.L. 703\n\n2. Even though the company petition falls and the appeals succeed on the finding that the Holding Company has failed to make out a case of oppression, the court is not powerless to do substantial justice. between the parties and place them, as nearly as it may, in the same position in which they would have been, if the meeting of 2nd May were held in accordance with law. [824 H-825 A]\n\n3. The willingness of the Indian shareholders to pay a premium on the excess holding or the rights shares is a -factor which, to some extent, has gone in their favour on. the question of oppression. Having had the benefit of that stance, they must now make it good. Besides, it is only meet and just that the Indian shareholders, who took the rights shares at par when the value of those shares was much above par, should be asked to pay the difference in order to nullify their unjust and unjutifiable enrichment at the cost of the Holding Company. The Indian shareholders are not asked to pay the premium as a price of oppression. The plea of oppression having been rejected the course being adopted is intended primarily to set right the course of justice.\n\n[825 F-G]\n\n4. Devagnanam, his group and the other Indian share-holders who took the rights shares offered to the Holding Company shall pay, pro rat a, the sum of Rs. 8,54,550 to the Holding Company. The amount shall be paid by them to the holding company from their own funds and not from the funds or assets D of NIIL. [827 A-Bl\n\n5. As a further measure of neutralisation of the benefit which the Indian shareholders received in the meeting of 2nd May, 1977, it is directed that the\n\n16,000 rights shares which were allotted in that meeting to the Indian shareholders will be treated as not qualifying for the payment of dividend for a period of one year commencing from January 1, 1977 the Company's year being the Calendar year. The interim dividend or any further dividend received by the Indian shareholders on the 16,000 rights shares for the year ending December 31, 1977 shall be repaid by them to NHL, which shall distribute the same as if the issue and allotment of the rights shares was not made untill after December 31, 1977. This direction will not be deemed to affect or ever to have affected the exercise of any other rights by the Indian shareholders in respect of the 16,000 rights shars alloted to them. [827 B-D]\n\n6. In order to ensure the smooth functioning of NHL and with a view to ensuring that the directions are complied with expeditiously, it is directed that Shri M.M. Sabharwal who was appointed as a Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors under the orders of this Court dated November 6, 1978 will continue to function as such until December 31, 1982. [827 Fl\n\n7. The Company will take all effective steps to obtain the sanction or permission of the Reserve Bank of India or the Controller of Capital Issues, as the case may be, if it is necessary to obtain such sanction or permission for giving effect to the directions. (827 Gl\n\n8. Devagnanam and his group acted in the best interests of NHL, in the matter of the issue of rights shares and indeed, the Board of Directors followed in the meeting of the 6th April a course which they had no option but to adopt and in doing which, they were solely actuated by the consideration as to what\n\nwas in the interest of the company. The shareholder Directors who were interested in the issue of rights shares neither participated in the discussion of that question nor voted upon it. The two Directors who, forming the requisite quorum, received upon the issue of rights shares were Silverston who, was a disinterested Director and Doraiswamy who, unquestionably, was so.\n\nL792 A-CJ\n\n9. Disinvestment by the Holding Company, as one of the two courses which could be adopted for reducing the non-resident interest in NHL to 40% stood ruled out, on account of the rigid attitude of Coats who, during the period between the Ketty meeting of October 20-21, 1976 and the Birmingham discussions of March 29-31, 1977 clung to their self interest, regardless of the pressure of FERA, the directive of the Reserve Bank of India and their transparent impact on the future of NHL. [792 D-E]\n\n10. Devagnanam and the disinterested Directors, having acted out of legal compulsion precipipated by the obstructive attitude of Coats and their action it being in the larger interest of the company, it is impossible to hold that the resolution passed in the meeting of April 6 for the issue of rights shares at par to the existing shareholders of NHL constituted an act of oppression against the Holding Company. [792 E-F]\n\n11. It puts a severe strain on ones credulity to believe that the letters of offer dated April 14 to the Holding Company, to Rae burn and to M anoharan were posted on the 14th itself but that somehow they rotted in the post office until the 27th on which date they took off simultaneously for their respective destinations. [793 El\n\n12. The purpose behind the planned delay in posting the letters of offer to Raeburn and to the Holding Company, and in posting the notice of the Board's meeting for May 2 to Sanders, was palpably to ensure that no legal proceeding was taken to injunct the holding of the meeting. The object of withholding these important documents, until it was quite late to act upon them, was to present to the Holding Company a fait accompli in the shape of the Board's decision for allotment of rights shares to the existing Indian shareholders.\n\n[794 C-E]\n\n13. In so far as Devagnanam himself is concerned, there is room enough to suspect that he was the part-author of the late postings of important documents, especially since he was the prime actor in the play of NILL's Indianisation. But even in regard to him, it is difficult to carry the case beyond the realm of suspicion and 'room enough' is not the same thing as 'reason enough'.\n\n[795 B-C]\n\n13A. With regard to the impact on the legality of the offer and tht: validity of the meeting of May 2,\n\n(i) It is quite clear from the circumstances that the rights shares offered to the Holding Company could not have been allotted to anyone in the meeting of May 2, for the supposed failure of the Holding Company to communicate its acceptance before April 30. The meeting of May 2, of which the main purpose was to consider 'Allotment' of the rights shares must, therefore, be held to be abortive,\n\n[796 H-797 A]\n\n' , . .,\n\n(ii)\n\nN.I.I.L. V, N.I.N.H.L. 705\n\nThe utter inadequacy of the notice to Sanders in terms of time stares in the face and needs no further argument to justify the finding that the holding of the meeting was illegal, at least in so far as the Holding Company is concerned. It is self-evident that Sanders could not possibly have attended the meeting. There is, therefore, no alternative save to hold that the decision taken in the meeting of May 2 cannot, in the normal circumstances, affect the legal rights of the Holding Company or create any legal obligations against it. [797 D-EJ\n\n13B. The dilution of the non-resident interest in the equity capital of the Company to a level not exceeding 40% \"within a period of 1 (one) year from the date of receipt of\" the letter was of the very essence of the matter. The sane\n\nti on for enforcement of a c, onditional permission to carry on business, where conditions are breached, is the cessation, ipso facto, of the permission itself on the non-performance of the conditions at the time appointed or agreed. When NHL wrote to the Bank on February 4, 1976 binding itself to the performance of certain conditions, it could not be heard to say that the permission will remain in force despite its non-performance of the conditions. Having regard to the provisions of section 29 read with sections 49, 56(1) and (3) and secHon 68 of FERA, the continuance of business after May 17, 1977 by NHL would have been illegal, unles5 the condition of dilution of no11.-resident equity was duly complied with. [799 B; F-HJ\n\n14. By reason of the provisions of section 29(1) and (2) of FERA and the conditional permission granted by the RBI by its letter dated May 11, 1976 the offer of rights shares made by NHL to the Holding Company could riot possibly have been accepted by it. [800 BJ\n\nThe acceptance of the offer of rights shares by the Holding Company would E have resulted in a violation of the provisions of FERA and the directive of the Reserve Bank. No grievance can be made by the Holding Company that since it did not receive the offer in time, it was deprived of an opportunity to accept it. [800 D-GJ\n\n14A.\n\nAn offer of shares undoubtedly creates \"fresh rights\" but, the right which it creates is either to accept the offer or to renounce it; it does not create any interest in the shares in respect of which the offer is made.\n\n[801 BJ\n\nMatha/one v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. [1954] SCR IJ7 referred to.\n\n15(i) Before granting relief in an application under section. 210 of the English Companies Act as under 5ection 397 of the Indian Companies Act the Court has to satisfy itself that to wind up the company will unfairly prejudice the members complaining of oppression, but that otherwise the facts will justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up. The fact that the company is prosperous and makes substantial profits is no obstacle to its being wound up if it is just and equitable to do so. [744 A-B; 775 GJ\n\nSeo/fish Co-op. Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer [1959J A.C. 324, Re Associated Tool lndusiries Ltd. [1964] Argus Law Reports, 75, Ebrahimi v. Westbourne\n\nGalleries Ltd. [ 1973] A.C. 360 (H.L.), Blissett v. Daniel [68] E.R. 1024. Re Yenidge Tobacco Co. [1916] 2 Ch. 426 & Loch v. John Blackwood [1924] A.C. 783 referred to.\n\n(ii) On a true construction of section 397, an unwise, inefficient or careless conduct of a Director in the performance of his duties cannot give rise' to a claim for relief under that section. The person complaining of oppression must show that he has been constrained to submit to a conduct which lacks in probity, conduct which is unfair to him and which causes prejudice to him in the exercise of his legal and proprietary rights as a shareholder. [748 E-G]\n\n(iii) Technicalities cannot be permitted to defeat the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction conferred by section 397 of the Companies Act.\n\nBlissett v. Daniel 68 E.R. 1024 referred to.\n\n16. An isolated act which is contrary to law, may not necessarily and by itself support the inference that the law was violated with a ma/a fide intention or ihat such violation was burdensome, harsh and wrongful. But a series of illegal acts following upon one another can, in the context, lead justifiably to the conclusion that they are a part of the same transaction, of which the object is to cause or commit the oppression of persons against whom those acts are directed. [746 G-747 A]\n\n17. An isolated order passed by a Judge which is contrary to law will not normally sbpport the inference that he is biased, but a series of wrong or illegal orders to the prejudioe of a party are generally accepted as supporting the inferenc~ of a reasonable apprehension that the Judge is biased and that the party E complaining of the orders will not get justice at his hands. [747 B-C]\n\nS.M. Ganpatram v. Sayaji Jubilee Cotton and Jute Mills Co. [1964] 34 Company Cases 830-31 & Elder v. Elder (1952] S.C. 49 referred to.\n\n18. It is generally unsatisfactory to record a finding involving grave consequences to a per son on the basis of affidavits and documents without asking that person to submit to cross-examination. Men may lie but documents will not and often, documents speak louder than words. But a total reliance on the written word, when probity and fairness of conduct are in issue, involves the risk that the person accused of wrongful conduct is denied an opportunity to controvert the inferences _said to arise from the documents.\n\n(754 E-G]\n\nRe Smith and Fawcett Ltd. (1942] l All ER 542, 545; Nana Lal Zaver v. Bombay Life Assurance (1950] SCR 390, 394 Piercy v. Mills (1920] (I) Chancery 77, Hogg v. Cramphorn, (1967] I, Chancery 254. 260; Mills v. Mills [60] CLR 150, 160, Har/owe's Hominees (121] CLR 483, 485 & Howard Smith v. Amphol [1974] A.C. 821, 831 Punt v. Symons (1903] 2 Ch. 506; Franzer v. Whall11y 71 E.R. 361 referred to.\n\nIn the instant case the High Court was right in holding that, having taken up a particular attitude, it was not open to Devagnanam and his group to con-\n\n---.,,.-\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N, H, L. 707\n\ntend that the allegation of ma/a fides could not be examined, on the basis of affidavits and the correspondence only. There is ample material on the record in the form of affidavits correspendence and other documents, on the basis of which proper and necessary inferences can safely and legitimatly be drawn. [755B-Cl\n\nThese docucuments and many more documents were placed on the record mosdy by consent of parties, as the case progressed from stage to stage. That shows that the parties adopted willingly a mode of trial which they found to be most convenient and satisfactory. [756 A-Bl\n\n19. When the dominant motivation is to acquire control of a company, the sparring groups of shareholders try to grab the maximum benefit for themselves. If one decides to stay on in such a company, one must capture its control. If one decides to quit, one must obtain the best price for one's holding, under and over the table, partly in rupees and partly in foreign exchange.\n\nThen, the tax laws and the foreign exchange regulations look on helplessly, because law cannot operate in a vaccum and it is notorious that in such cases evidence is not easy to obtain. [761 G-H; 762Al\n\n20. It is difficult to hold that by the issue of rights shares the Directors of NHL interfered in any manner with the legal rights of the majority. The majority had to disinvest or else to submit to the issue of rights shares in order to comply with the statutory requirements of FERA and the Reserve Bank's directives. Having chosen not to disinvest, an option which was open to them, they did not any longer possess the legal rights to insist that the Directors shall not issue the rights shares. What the Directors did was clearly in the larger interests of the Company and in obedience to their duty to comply with the law of the land. The fact that while discharging that duty they incidentally trenched upon the interests of tbe majority cannot invalidate their action. The conversion of the existing majority into a minority was a consequence of what the Directors were obliged lawfully to do. Such conversion was not the motive force of their action. [782 A-El\n\nHoward Smith Ltd. v. Ampo/ Petroleum Ltd. [1974] A.C. 821, 874, Punt v.\n\nSymons [1903] 2 Ch. 506 & Fraser v. Whalley [71] E.R. 361 Piercy v. Mills [1920]\n\nI Ch. 77, Hogg v. Cramphorn [1967] 1 Ch. 254, 260 referred to\n\n21. (i) The Directors have exercised their power for the purpose of preventing the affairs of the company from being brought to a grinding halt, a consumption devoutly wished for by Coats in the interest f their extensive world-wide business. [784 CJ\n\n(ii) The mere circumstance that the Directors derive benefit as shareholders by reasons of the exercise of their fiduciary power to issue shares, will not vitiate the exercise of that power. [785 El\n\n(iii) The test is whether the issue of shares is simply or solely for the benefit ff of the Directors. If the shares are issued in the largar interest of the\n\nSUPREME COURT EPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.R.\n\ncompany that decision cannot be struck down on the ground that it has incidentally benefited the Directors in their capacity as shareholders, [786 CJ\n\nIn the instant case the Board of Directors did not abuse its fiduciary power in deciding upon the issue of rights shares. [786 DJ\n\nHar/awe's Nominess Pvt.\n\nLid. v, Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Company No. Liability & Anr. (121) CLR 483, 485, Trek Corporal/on Ltd. v.\n\nMiller et al (33) DLR 3d. 288; Nana/al Zaver & Anr. v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd. [1950J SCR 390, 419-429; Hirsche v. Sims [1894) A.C. 654, 660-66!; Gower in Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th Edn. 578 referred to.\n\n22. Under section 287 (2) of the Companies Act, 1956 the quorum for the meeting of the Board of Director was two. There can be no doubt that a quorum of two directors means a quorum of two directors who are competent to transact and vote on the business before the Board. [786 EJ\n\n23. (i) It is wrong to attribute any bias to Silverston for having acted as an adviser to the Indian shareholders in the Ketty meeting. Silverston is by profession a solicitor and legal advisers do not necessarily have a biased attitude to questions on which their advice is sought or tendered. Silverston's alleged personal hostility to Coats cannot, within the meaning of section 300 (I) of the Companies Act, make him person \"directly or indirectly, concerned or interested in the contract E or arrangement\" in the discussion of which he had to participate or upon which he had to vote. [787 E-G]\n\n(ii) The concern or interest of the Director which has to be disclosed at the Board meeting must be in relation to the contract entered or to be entered into by or on behalf of the company. The interest or concern spoken of by sections 299 (1) and 300 (l) cannot be a merely sentimental interest or ideological concern. Therefore, a relationship of friendliness with the Directors who are interested in the contract or arrangement or even the mere fact of a lawyer-client relationship with such directors will not disqualify a person from acting as a Director on the ground of his being, under section 300 (I) as \"interested\" Director.\n\nHowsoever one may stretch the language of section 300 (!) in the interest of purity of company administration, it is next to impossible to bring Silverston's appointment within the framework of that provision. [788 A-CJ\n\nThe argument that Silverston was an interested Director, that therefore his appointment as an Additional Director was invalid and that consequently the H resolution for the issue of rights shares was passed without the necessary quorum of two disinterested Directors has no force. [788 D-E)\n\nN.1.1.L. V. N.I.N.H.L. 709\n\nFirestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., [1971] 41 A Company Case 377 distinguished.\n\n24. Silverston's appointment as an Additional Dire; tor is not open to challenge on the ground of want of agenda on that subject. Section 260 of the Companies Act preserves the power of the Board of Directors to appoint addi tional Directors if such a power is conferred on the Board by the Articles of Association of the Company. Article 97 of NIIL's Articles of Association confers the requiste power on the Board to appoint additional Dire; tors. The occasion to appoint Silverston as an. Additional Director arose only when the picture emerged clearly that the Board would have to consider the only other alternative for reduction of the non-resident holding, namely, the issue of rights shares. It is for this reason that the subject of appointment of an Additional Director could not have, in the state of facts, formed a part of the agenda. [788 F.G; 789 A-Cl\n\n25. (i) The power to issue shares is given primarily to enable capital to bo\n\nraised when it is required for the purposes of the company but that power is not conditioned by such need. That power can be used for other reasons as for example to create a sufficient number of share holders to enable the company to e:tercise statutory powors or to enable it to comply with legal requirements.\n\n[789 D-E]\n\nPunt v. Sym1ns and Co., [1903] 2 Ch. 506 ; Hogg v. Cramphorn, [1967] 1 Ch. 254; Howard Smith v. Amphol, [1974] A.C. 821 •.\n\n(ii) The minutes of the Ketty meeting of October 20-21, 1976 saying that it was agreed that the rights issues, with the Indian shareholders taking up the U.K. members' rights, would be considered provided it was demonstrated by NIIL that \"there is a viable development plan requiring funds that the expected NHL cash flow cannot meet\", cannot also justify the argument that the power of the Company to issue rights shares was, by fagreemont conditioned by the need to raise additional capital for a developmnt plan. (790 H; 791 A]\n\n(iii) In the instant case the rights shares were issued in order to comply with legal requirements which1 apart from being obligatory as the only viable course open to the Directors, was for the benefit of the company since, otherwise, its developmental activities , would have stood frozen as of December 31, 1973. The shares were not issuo d as a part of takeover war between the rival groups of shareholders. [79J BC]\n\n26. It is not true to say, as a statement of law, that Directors have no power to issue shares at par, if their market price is above par. These are primarily matters of policy for the Directors to decide in the exercise of their discretion and no hard and fast rule can be laid down to fetter that discretion.\n\nSuch discretionary powers in company administration are in the nature of fidu ciary powers and must be exercised in faith.\n\nMala fides vitiate the exercise of such discretion. [791 E & G] Hilder and Others v. Dexter [1902] A.C. 474, 480 referred to.\n\n27. The definition of 'private company' and the manner in which a 'public company' is defined (\"public company meami a company which is not a private\n\ncompany\") bear out the argument that these two categories of companies are mutually exclusive. But it is not true to say that between them, they exhaust the universe of companies.\n\nA private company which has become a . public company by reason of S. 43A, may continue to retain in its articles, matters which are specified in S. 3(1)(iii) and the number of its members may be or may at any time be reduced below 7. (810 H; 811 A-Bl\n\n[(i) A section 43A company may include in its articles as part of its structure, provisions relating to restrictions on transfer of shares, limiting the number of its members to 50, and prohibiting an invitatiun to the public to subscribe for shares, which are typical characteristics of a private company. The expression 'public company' in section 3(i)(iv) cannot therefore be equated with a 'private company' which has become a public company by virtue of section 43A.\n\n(811 D-E]\n\n(ii) A section 43A company can still maintain its separate corporate indentity qua debts even if the number of its members is reduced below seven and is not liable to be wound up for that reason. (811 Fl\n\n(iii) A section 43A company can never be incorporated and registered as such under the Companies Act. It is registered as a private company and becomes, by operation of law, a public company. (811 G]\n\n(iv) The three contingencies in which a private company becomes a public company bY virtue of section 43A (mentioned in sub-sections (I), (I A) and (IB) read with the provisions of sub-section (4) of that section) show that it becomes and continues to be a public company so long as the conditions in sub-sections (l), (IA) or (IB) are applicable. The provisos to each of these sections clarify the legislative intent that such companies may retain their registered corporate shell of a private com pany but will be subjected to discipline of public companies. When necessary conditions do not obtain, the legislative device in S. 43A is to permit them to go back into their corporate shell and function once again as private companies, with all the privileges anJ exemptions applicable to private companies. The proviso to each of the sub-sections of S. 43A clearly indicates that although the private company has become a public company by virtue of that section, it is prrmitted to retain the structural characteristics of its origin, its birthmark.\n\n[811 H-812 A-BJ\n\n(v) Section 43A when introduced by Act 65 of 1960 did not adopt the language either of section 43 or of section 44.\n\nUnder section 43 where default is made in complying with the provisions of section 3(l)(iii) a private company shall cease to be entitled to the privileges and exemptions conferred on private companies by or under this Act, and ihis Act shall apply to the company as if it were not a private company. Under section 44 of the Act, where a private company alters its Articles in such manner that they no longer include the provisions, which under section 3(1)(iii) are required to be included in the Articles in order to constitute it a private company, the company \"shall as on the date of the alteration cease to be a private company\". Neither of the\n\n.,,.. .. ,\n\nN.1.1.L. V. N.I.N.H.L. 711\n\nexpresson, namely, \"This Act shall apply to the company as if it were not a private company\" (section 43) nor that the company \"shall ... cease to _be a private company (section 44) is used in section 43A. If a section 43-A company were to be equated in all respects with a public company, that is a company which does not have the characteristics of a private company, Parliament would have used language similar to the one in section 43 or section 44, between which two sections, section 43A was inserted. If the intention was that the rest of the Act was to apply to a section 43A company \"as if it were not a private company\", nothing would have been easier than to adopt that language in section 43A; and if the intention was that a section 43A company would for all purposes \"cease to be a private company'', nothing would have been easier than to adopt that clabguage in section 43A. [812 E-H; 813 A]\n\n(vi) A private company which becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A is not required (o file a prospectus or a statement in lieu of a prospectus.\n\n[813 C]\n\nAfter the Amending Act 65 of 1960 these distinct types of companies occupy a distinct place in the scheme of our Companies Act : (1) private companies\n\n(2) public companies and (3) private companies which have become public D companies by virtue of section 43A, but which continue to include or retain the three characteristics of a private company. Private companies enjoy certain expemptions and privileges which are peculiar to their constitution and nature.\n\nPublic companies are subjected severely to the discipline of the Act. Companies of the third kind like NHL, which become public companies but which continue to include in their articles the three matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of section 3(1)(iii) are also, broadly and generally, subjected to the rigorous discipline of E the Act. They cannot claim the privileges and exemptions to which private companies which are outside section 43A are entitled. And yet, there are certain provisions of the Act which would apply to public companies but not to section 43A companies.\n\n[813 D; 814 A-C]\n\nThere is no difficulty in giving full effect to clauses (a) and (b) of section 81(1) in the case of a company like NIIL, even after it becomes a public company under section 43A. Clause (a) requires that further shares must be offered to the holders of equity shares of the Company in proportion, as nearly as circumstances admit, to the capital paid up on these shares, while clause (b) requires that the offer further shares must be made by a notice spcifying t!rn number of shares offered and limiting the time, not being less than fifteen days from the date of the offer, within which the offer, if not accepted will be deemed to have been declined. [815 H; 816 A-Bl\n\nThe provision contained in clause (c) cannot be construed in a manner which will lead to the negation of the option exercised by the company to retain in its articles the three matters referred to in section 3(1)(iii). Both these are statutory provisions and they are contained in the same statute. They must be harmonised, unless the words of the statute are so plain and unambiguous and the policy of the statute so clear that to harmonise will be doing violence to those wotds and to that policy. The policy of the statute if any-\n\nA thing, points in the direction that the integrity and structure of the section 43-A proviso companies should, as far as possible not be broken up. [817 E-F]\n\nPark v. Royalty Syndicates [191211 K.B. 330 and Re Pool Shipping Co.\n\nLtd.'[1920] 1 Ch. 251 referred to.\n\nPalmer's Company Law 22nd. Vol. I para 12-18 Gower's Company Law 4th End p. 351 referred to.\n\n27. When section 43A was introduced by Act 65 of 1960, the legislature apparently overlooked the need to exempt companies falling under it, read with its first proviso, from the operation of clause (c) ofsec.81(1). That the legislature has overlooked such a need in regard to other matters, in respect of which there can be no controversy, is clear from the provisions of sections 45 and 433( d) of the Companies Act. Undar section 45, if at any time the number of members of a company is reduced, in the case of a public company below seven, or in the case of a private company below two, every member of the company becomes severally liable, under the stated circumstances, for the payment of the whole debt of the company and can be severally sued therefor. No exception has yet been provided for in section 45 in favour of the section 43A-proviso companies, with. the result that a private company having, say, three members which becomes a public company under section 43A and continues to function with the same number of members, will attract the rigour of section 45. Similarly, under section 433(d) such a company woul d automatically incur the liability of being wound up for the same reason.\n\n[818 A-D]\n\nWhile construing the opening words of section 81(1)(c) it has to be remembered that section 43A companies are entitled under the proviso to that section to include provision in their Articles relating to matters specified in section 3(1)(iii). The right of renunciation in favour of any other person is wholly inconsistent with the Articles of a private company. If a private company becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A and retains or continues to include in its Articles matters referred to in section 3(1)(iii) it is difficult to say that the Articles do not provide something which is otherwise than what is provided in clause (c). The right of renunciation in favour of any other person is of the essence of clause (c). On the other hand, the absence of that right is of the essence of the structure of a private company, It must follow, that in all cases in which erstwhile private companies become public companies by virtue of section 43A and retain their old Articles, there would of necessity be a provision in their Articles which is otherwise than what is contained in clause (c). Considered from this point of view, the argument as to whether the word 'provide\" in the opening words of clause (c) means \"provide expressly\" loses its significance. [820 B-D]\n\nIn the context in which a private company becomes a public company under section 43A and by reason of the option available to it under the proviso the word \"provide\" must be understood to mean \"provide expressly or by necessary implication\". The necessary implication of a provision has the same effect and relevance in Jaw as an express provision has, unless the relevance of what is necessarily implied is el\\cluded by the use of clear words. [820 E-F]\n\n. '\n\nN.I.l.L. V. N.I.N.H.L. 713\n\nThe right of renunciation is tentamount to an invitation to the public to\n\n- A subscribe for the shares in the company and can violate the provision in regard to the limitation on number of members. Article 11, by reason of its clause (iv) prevails over the provisions of all other Articles if there is inconsistency between it and any other Article. (821 CJ\n\n28. Clause (c) of section 81(1) of the Companies Act apart from the consideration arising out of the opening words of that clause, can have no application to private companies which have become public companies by virtue of section 43A and which retain in their Articles the three matters referred to in section 3(1)(iii) of the Act. In so far as the opening words of clause (c) are concerned they do not require an express provision in the Articles of the Company which otherwise than what is provided for in clause (c). It is enough, in order to comply with the opening words of clause (c). that the Articles of the Company contain by necessary implication a provision which is otherwise than what is provided in clause (c).\n\nArticles 11 and 50 of NIIL's Articles of Associa tion negate the right of renunciation. (821 D-F]\n\n29. The right to renounce shares in favour of any other person, which is conferred by clause (c) has no application to a company like NHL and, therefore, its members cannot claim the right to renounce shares offered to them in\n\nfavour of any other member or members. The Articles of a company may well D provide for a right of transfer of shares by one member to another, but that right is very much different from the right of renunciation, properly so called. (821 G-H]\n\nRe Poat Shipping Co. Ltd. [1920] I Ch. 251 referred to.\n\n30. A change in the pro rata method of offer of new shares is necessarily violative of the basic characteristics of a private company which becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A. To this limited extent only, but not beyond it, the provisions of sub-section (IA) of section 81 can apply to such companies. (822 Fl\n\n31. The following propositions emerge out of the discussions of the provisions of FERA, Sections 43A and 81 of the Companies Act and of the Articles of association of NHL:\n\n(I) The Holding Company had to part with 20% out of the 60% equity capital held by it in NHL; [822 H]\n\n(2) The offer of Rights shares made to the Holding Company as a result of the decision taken by; Board of Directors in their meeting of April 6, 1977 could not have been accepted by the Holding Company ;\n\n[822 H; 823 A]\n\n(3) The Holding Company had no right to renounce the Rights shares offered to it in favour of any other person, member or non-mem ber; and (823 BJ\n\n(4) Since the offer of Rights Shares could not have been either accepted or renounced by the Holding Company, the former for one reason and\n\nthe latter for another, the shares offered to it could, under artick 50 of the articles of association, be disposed of by the directors, consistently with the articles of NHL, particularly article 11, in such manner as they thought most beneficial to the Company. (822 B-CJ\n\n32. These propositions afford a complete answer to the respondents' contention that what truly constitutes oppression of the Holding Company is not the issue of Rights Shares to the existing Indian shareholders only but !he offer of Rights Shares to all existing shareholders and the issue thereof to existing Indian shareholders only.\n\n(823 DJ\n\n33. It was neither fair nor proper on the part of NIIL's officers not to ensure the timely posting of the notice of the meeting for 2nd May so as to enable Sanders to attend that meeting. But there the matter rests. Even if Sanders were to attend the meeting, he could not have asked either that the Holding Company should be allotted the rights shares or alternatively, that it should be allowed to \"renounce\" the shares in favour of any other person, including the Manoharan group. The charge of oppression arising out of the central accusation of non-allotment of the right> shares to the Holding Company must, therefore fail. [823 H; 824 A-BJ\n\nCIVIL APHLLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2139, 2483 and 2484 of 1978.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th October, 1978 of the Madras High Court in 0.S.A. No. 64 of 1978.\n\nF.S. Nariman, A.K. Sen, Dr. Y.S. Chita!ey, S.N. Kackar, ,._ T. Dalip Singh, K.J. John, Ravinder Narain, A.G. Menses and R. Narain for the Appellants.\n\nH.M. Seervai, Anil B. Divan, A.R. Wadia, S.N. Ta/war, I.N.\n\nShrojj and H.S. Parihar for Respondent No. I.\n\nD.N. Gupta for Respondents Nos. 2-7, 10-12, 15, 16, 18-22, 26 and 28·33.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.\n\nThese three appeals by special leave arise out of a judgment of a Division Bench of the mgh Court of Madras dated October 6, 1978 allowing an appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge, dated May 17, 1978 in Company Petition No. 39 of 1977.\n\nThe main contending parties in these appeals are : (i) the Needle Industries (India) Limited and (ii) the\n\n-...........---\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.l.N H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 715\n\nNeedle Industries-Newey (Indian Holdings) Limited. These two companies have often been referred to . in the proceedings as the Indian Company and the English Company respectively, but it would be convenient for us to refer to the former as 'NHL' and to the latter as the 'Holding Company'. The Holding Company has been referred to in a part of the proceedings as 'NINIH'.\n\nIn Civil Appeal 2139 of 1978, which was argued as the main appeal, NHL is appellant No. 1 while one T.A. Devagnanam is appellant No. 2. The latter figures very prominently in these proceedings and is indeed one of the moving spirits of this acrimonious litigation. He was appointed as a Director of NHL in 1956 and as its Managing Director in 1961.\n\nHe is referred to in the correspondence as 'TAD' or 'Theo' but we prefer to call him 'Devagnanam'. The Holding Company is Respondent 1 to the main appeal, the other respondents being some of the Directors and shareholders of NHL.\n\nCivil Appeal 2483 of 1978 is filed by some of the shareholders of NHL while Civil Appeal 2484 of 1978 is filed by some of its directors and-officers.\n\nThe Holding Company is the contesting respondent to these two appeals.\n\nWe wilL deal with the main appeal and our judgment therein will dispose of all the three appeals.\n\nThe NIIL was incorporated as a Private Company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 on July 20, 1949 with its Registered Office at Madras. Its factory is situated at Ketty, Nilgiris. At the time of its incorporation, NIIL was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries (India) Ltd., Studley, England (hereinafter called 'NI-Studley'). The authorised capital of NHL was Rs. 50,00,000 divided into 50,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each.\n\nIts issued and paid up capital prior to 1961 was Rs. 6,75,600 divided into 6,756 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. The issued and paid up capital was increased to Rs. I 1,09,000/- in 1961.\n\nIn that year, NI-Studley entered into an agreement with NEWEY\n\nBROS. LIMITED, Birmingham, England, (hereinafter called NEWEY), undef which NEWEY agreed to participate in the equity capital of NIIL to the extent of Rs. 4,33,400/-, consisting of 4,334 equity shares of Rs. 100/- each. Thus, fo 1961, the position of the share holding in NHL was that NI-Studley held approximately 60.85% of the issued capital and NEWEY held the balance of 39.14%. In 1963, NHL increased its share capital by issuing 2,450 additional shares to NI-Studley, as a result of which the latter became the holder of about 68% shares in NHL, the rest of the\n\n32% belonging to NEWEY. Later in the same year, NI-Studley and NEWEY combined to _form the Holding Company, of which the full official name. as stated earlier is the Needle Industries- Newey (Indian Holding) Ltd. The Holding Company was incorporated in the United Kingdom under the English Companies Ac:t, 1948 with its Registered Office at Birmingham, England. The entire share capital of NHL, held by NI-Studley and NEWEY, was transferred to the Holding Company in which NI-Studley and NEWEY became equal sharers.\n\nAs a result of this arrangement, the Holding Company came to acquire 99.95% of the issued and paid up capital of NHL. The balance of 0.05%, which consisted of 6 shares being the original nominal shares, was held by Devagnanam.\n\nThe NIIL, it shall have been noticed, was incorporated about two years after India attained independence. As a result of an undertaking given by it to the Government of India at thei time of its incorporation and pursuant to the subsequent directives given by the said Government for achieving Indianisation of the share capital of foreign companies, three issues of shares were made by NHL in the years 1968, 1969 and 1971, all at par. There was also an issue of Bonus shares in 1971: As a result of thesf: issues, about 40% of the share Capital of NHL came to be held by the Indian employees of the Company and their relatives while the balance of about 60% remained in the hands of the Holding Company.\n\nIn terms of the number of shares, by 1971-72 the Holding Company owned 18, 990 shares and the Indian shareholders owned 13,010 shares. Out of the latter block of shares, Devagnanam and his relatives held 9,140 shares while the remaining 3,870 shares were held by other employees and their relatives, amongst whom were N. Manoharan and his group who held 900 shares and D.P. Kingsley and his group who held 530 shares.\n\nThe total share capital of NIIL thus came to consist of 32,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each.\n\nIn or about 1972, a company called Coats Paton Limited, Glasgow, U.K. (hereinafter called 'Coats') becamean almost 100% ' owner of NI-Studley. The position at the beginning of the year 1973 thus was that 60% (to be exact 59.3%) of the share capital of NIIL came to be owned half and half by Coats and NEWEY, the remaining 40% being in the hands of the Indian group. The bulk of this 40% block of shares was held by Devagnanam's group, which came to about 28.5% of the total number of shares.\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 717\n\nThough NHL was at one time wholly owned by NI-Studley A and later, by NI-Studley and NEWEY, the affairs of NHL were managed ever since 1956 by an entirely Indian management, with Devagnanam as its Chief Executive and Managing Director with effect from the year 1961. The Holding Company which was formed in 1963, had only one representative on the Board of Directors of NIIL. He was N.T. Sanders. He resided in England and hardly B ever attended the Board meetings. The Holding Company reposed great confidence in the Indian management which was under the direction and control of Devagnanam.\n\nBut the acquisition of NI-Studley by Coats in 1972 and their consequent entry in NHL created in its wake a sense of uneasy quiet between the Coats on one hand, which came to own half of the 60% share capital held by the Holding Company, that is to say, 30% of the total share capital of NHL, and the Devagnanam group on the other hand, which owned 28.5% of that share capital. By the mere size of their almost equal holding in NIIL, Coats and Devagnanam developed competing interests in the affairs of NHL. Coats were in the same line of business as NHL, namely, manufacture and sale of needles for various uses, fish-hooks etc., and they had established trading centres far and wide, all over the world. It is plain business, involving no moral turpitude as far as business ethics go, that Coats could not have welcomed competition from NIIL with their world interests. Devagnanam was a man of considerable ability and foresight and in NIIL he saw an opportunity of controlling and dominating as industrial enterprise of enormous potential in a rapidly growing market.\n\nThe turnover of NIIL had increased from 2.80 lakhs in 1953 to 149.93 lakhs in 1972 and the profits ran as high as 19.4% of the turnover. Implicit confidence in the Indian management which was the order of the day almost till 1974 gradually gave way to an atmosphere of suspicion and cjistrust between Coats and Devagnanam.\n\nNEWEY apparently kept away from the differences which were gradually mounting up between the two but, evidently, they nursed a preference for Devagnanam. Coats are a giant multinational organization. NEWEY, comparatively, are small fish though, they too had their own independent business interests to protect and foster.\n\nNEWEY owned a flourishing business in Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Australia and from 1972 onwards they drew Devagnanam increasingly into the orbit of their Far Eastern\n\ninterests. In July, 1972 he was offered the office of Managing Director of a group of four companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan on a five year contract, with an annual salary of six thousand pounds. He had already been appointed to the Board of the\n\nNEWEY joint venture company in Osaka and Japan and acted as the liaison Director for that company.\n\nHe had also been asked to coordinate sales with NEWEY Brothers, Australia. Willing to accept these manifold responsibilities, Devagnanam became strenuously involved therein.\n\nHe and his wife began to reside in Hong Kong and he cogitated over resigning from his position in NIIL. Coats, on their part, were clear that Devagnanam should relinquish his responsibilities in NIIL, in view of the time his role in NEWEY's Far Eastern interests was consuming.\n\nThe question of appointing his successor as Managing Director in NIIL then began to be discussed, the Holding Company wanting to have Manoharan as a substitute. Devagnanam carried the feeling that he was already persona non grata with Coats, because of certain incidents which had taken place some years ago.\n\nThe Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, ('FERA'), 46 of 1973, which came into force on January I, 1974 provided to Coats and Devagnanam a legal matrix for fighting out their differences. The provisions of FERA, which was passed, inter alia, for the conservation of foreign exchange resources of the country and the proper utilisation thereof in the interests of the economic development of the country are stringent beyond words. Putting it broadly and briefly, section 29 (I) of FERA prohibits non-residents, non-citizens _ and non-banking companies not incorporated under any Indian Law or in which the non-resident interest is more than 40%, from carrying on any activity in India of a trading, commercial or industrial nature except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India. By section 29 (2) (a), if such a person or company is engaged in any such activity at the commencement of the Act, he or it has to apply to the Reserve Bank of India, for permission to carry on that activity, within six months of the commencement of the Act or such further period as the Reserve Bank may allow.\n\nSince the Holding Company is a non-resident and its interest in NIIL exceeded 40%, NIIL had to apply for the permission of the Rs:serve Bank for continuing to carry on its business. Section 29\n\n(4) (a) imposes a similar restriction on such person or company from holding shares in India of any company referre~ to in clause (b) of section 29 (1), without the permission of the Reserve Bank. Therefore, the Holding Company also had to apply for the permission of\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 719\n\nthe Reserve Bank for continuing to hold its shares in NHL. The A time for making application for the requisite permission under section 29 was extended by the Reserve Bank by two months generally, that is to say, until August 31, 1974. The need to comply with the provisions of section 29 of FERA is the pivot round which the whole case revolves.\n\nNHL applied to the Reserve Bank for the necessary permission through its Director and Secretary, D.P. Kingsley, on September 3, 1974 By its letter dated May 11, 1976, the Reserve Bank allowed that application on certain conditions. NIIL's application was late by three days but the delay was evidently ignored or condoned. One of the conditions imposed by the Reserve Bank on NHL was that it must bring down the non-resident interest from 60% to 40% within one year of the receipt of its letter. That letter having been received by NHL on May 17, 1976, the dead-line for reducing the non-resident interest to 40% was My 17, 1977.\n\nThe Holding Company applied to the Reserve Bank for a 'Holding Licence' under section 29(4)(a) of FERA, on September 18,\n\n1974. That application which was late by 18 days is, we are informed, still pending with the Reserve Bank. Perhaps, it will be disposed of after the non-resident interest in NHL is reduced to 40% in terms of section 29 (I) of FERA.\n\nDevagnanam was residing in Hong Kong to fulfil his commitment to NEWEY's far-eastern business interests. FERA had its implications for him too, especially since he could be regarded as a noaresident and did consider himself as such.\n\nHe obtained a holdin.:; licence dated March 4, 1975 from the Reserve Bank in respect of his shares in NJIL. But, his interest in the affairs of NHL began to flag for one reason or another and he started looking out for a purchaser who would buy his shares on convenient and attractive terms. In a note dated April 29, 1975 which he prepared 0:1 \"further Indianisation - Needle Industries (India) Ltd.\" he pointed out that Indianisation should be considered on the footing that the non-resident interest should be reduced to 40% and that, as between the two feasible methods of Indianisation, namely, (I) Going to public and (2) placement of shares, the latter was preferable.\n\nHe said:\n\nThere can be no question of my becoming in any way involved with Ketti and its future as I am committed to NEWEY. There appears to be no possibility of returning to India in what is left of my working life. I therefore have little choice but to sell my shares.\n\n('Ketty' in Nilgiris, is the place where NIIL' s factory is situated and is treated as synonymous with NHL). Devagnanam referred in his note to an inquiry from a Mr. Khaitan, the head of a powerful group with diverse interests and investment in industry, who was already involved in the manufacture of products allied to NIIL's.\n\nCoats were alarmed that Devagnanam was negotiating the sale of his shares \"to a Marwari, one Khaitan of Shalimar, a sewing needle C()mpetitor to Ketti\". In a letter dated August 6, 1975 addressed to Doraiswamy, a partner in a Madras firm of solicitors called 'King and Partridge' who was a Director of NHL, Sanders, a Director of the Holding Company on NIIL's Board, expressed his grave concern at the proposed deal thus :\n\nNo doubt Mr. Khaitan would pay the earth to acquire NHL and judging by what Theo (Devagnanam) had said about him in the past, he may be prepared to arrange or facilitate payment abroad, a most attractive possibility from Theo's point of view, since he has said clearly that he intends leaving India for good, finally settling in Australia.\n\nSanders added that the deal was so dangerous from the point of view of NIIL that the Holding Company \"would feel obliged to prevent it by whatever means were open\" to it.\n\nBy his reply dated August 12, 1975, Doraiswamy said that the news of the proposed sale came as no surprise to him and that he had heard that Silverston, a former Solicitor-partner of his, was acting as a \"go-between\" in Devagnanam's deal with Khaitan.\n\nOn September 16, 1975 Devagnanam wrote to M.M.C.\n\nNEWEY of NEWEY, Birmingham. pointing out the advantages that would accrue by the sale of the shares to Khaitan. Devagnanam reiterated his total identification with NEWEY' s Far Eastern interests and expressed his anxiety to free himself from all commitments to or involvement with NIIL, as early as possible.\n\nOn October 22, 1975 an important meeting was held in which Alan Machrael, a Director of the Holding Company, mad<: it clear\n\n~/ .l('\n\n~--\n\n4---·\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 721\n\non behalf of Coats that neither Khaitan nor any other single purchaser would be acceptable to the Holding Company if that meant the acquisition of 30% share holding.\n\nThe notes of the meeting record that Devagnanam had confirmed that the offer which he had received from Khaitan was at Rs. 360 per share, out of which a substantial proportion (perhaps 50%) would be payable outside India.\n\nMackrael stated at the meeting that the price in rupees could be matched but not the method of payment which was illegal and reiterated that the Holding Company would prevent any attempt by Devagnanam to sell his holding to Khaitan. The notes of the meeting were signed by Mackrael on October 30, 1975.\n\nOn that date, Sanders wrote a letter to Manoharan stating that the Holding Company was not prepared that 30% of the share capital should get into the hands of any one person, bearing in mind the problems that had arisen in allowing Devagnanam to acquire a holding of nearly that proportion.\n\nOn November 7, 1975 M.M.C. Newey wrote to Devagnanam making it clear beyond the manner of any doubt that Coats, will not accept Khaitan and that according to Bannatyne of Coats, they were put to considerable trouble in finding Indian residents who would match Khaitan's offer of 3.6 times par.\n\nNewey made it clear that in any event, the sale price would have to be paid in India and that they would not. be a party to any illicit currency deal.\n\nFinding that Coats were determined not to allow him to sell his shares to Khaitan, Devagnanam changed his mind and decided against disposing of his holding in Niil. On\n\nNovember 13, 1975, he wrote to Newey saying:\n\n\"I do not think any of us want to _see Coats dominate Ketti.\n\nHence there can be no question of selling any part of my shares to their nominee.\n\nAs they in turn will not approve of anyone we choose, there is no way of solving\n\nthe problem ............ The best thing to do, therefore, is for me to revert to the original basis and they should have no cause to complain. This will of course include effectively managing the Indian company. Let me however assure you that it will not be at the expense of Newey.\"\n\nAnd so did Devagnanam remain in NIIL, with the stage set for a battle between him and Coats for acquisition of control over the affairs (, f NHL.\n\nYet another statutory prov1s10n which has an important bearing on the issues arising in these appeals is the one contained\n\nin section 43 A of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, which was introduced in 1961 by Act 65 of 1960. NIIL was incorporated as a Private Company in 1949 under the Indian Companies Act, 1913.\n\nIt was a Private C<:Jmpany as defined in section 3 ( !) (iii) of that Act since, by its Articles of Association, it restricted the right to transfer its shares, limited the number of its members to fifty and prohibited any invitation to the public to subscribe to any of its shares or debentures. By section 43 A, it became a Public Company, since not less than twenty-five per cent of its paid-up share capital was held by a body corporate, namely, the Holding Company. But, under the first proviso to section 43A (1), it had the option to retain its Articles relating to matters specified in_ section 3 (!) (iii) of the Companies Act. NHL did not alter the relevant provisions of its Articles after it became a Public Company within the meaning of section 43A.\n\nOne of the points in controversy between the parties is whether, in the absence of any positive step taken by NIIL for exercising the option to retain its Articles relating to matters specified in section 3 (1) (iii) of the Companies Act, it can be held that NIIL had in fact exercised the option, which was available to it under the 1st proviso to section 43A, to include provisions relating to those matters in its Articles.\n\nTo resume the thread of events, on receipt of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated May 11, 1976 Kingsley, _as NIIL's Secretary, sent a reply on May 18, 1976 to the Bank confirming the acceptance of the various conditions under which permission was granted to NHL to continue its business.\n\nOn August 11, 1976 the term of Devagnanam's appointment as the Managing Director of NHL came to an end but in the meeting dated October 1, 1976 of NIIL's Board of Directors, that appointment was renewed for a further period of five years.\n\nOn being informed of the renewal of Devagnanam's appointment, NEWEY's Chairman, C Raeburn, who used to atter.d to the affairs of the Holding Company, did not object as such to the Board's decision (\"It may well be that the reappointment in itself is right\") but he demurred to the modality by which the decision was taken since, according to him, questions relating to appointments to senior positions in the Company ought to be decided in consultation with the U.K. Shareholders so that they could have an opportunity to express their views.\n\nSanders, it may be mentioned, had received the notice of the meeting duly.\n\nOn October 20 and 21. 1976, a meeting took place at Ketti between the U.K. shareholders and the Indian shareholders of NIIL.\n\nThe former were represented by Alan Mackrael, the Managing Director\n\nN.l.l.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 723\n\nof the Holding Company, and C. Raeburn, the Chairman of NEWEY the latter by Devagnanam and Kingsley. One Martin Henry, the Managing Director of 'Madura Coats', an Indian Company in which the Holding Company had substantial interest, also attended that meeting and took part in its deliberations. Silverston, an English man who was practising in India asa Solicitor, attended the meeting as an advisor to the Indian shareholders. C. Raeburn chaired the meeting. Para 2 of the note prepared by him of the discussions held at the meeting says that it was agreed that lndianisation should be brought about by May 1977, as requested by the Government, so as to achieve\n\n40% U.K. and 60% Indian shareholding. But the meeting vir tually ended in a stalemate because whereas the Holding Company wanted a substantial part of the share capital held by it in excess of 40% to be transferred to Madura Coats as an Indian shareholder, Devagnanam insisted that the existing Indian share-holders of NHL,\n\nalone bad the right, under its Articles 0f Association, to take up the shares which the Holding Company was no longer in a position to hold because of the directives issued by the Reserve Bank pursuant to FERA. Thus, the difference between the two groups who were fast falling out was not, as it could not be, whether the Holding Company had to reduce its share holding in NIIL from 60% to 40%, but as regards-the mode by which that reduction was to be brought about. The bone of contention was as to which Indian Party should take up the excess of 20%- the existing Indian shareholders of NHL or an outside Indian Company, the Madura Coats. Raeburn played the role of a mediator but did not succeed.\n\nOn the conclusion of the Ketty meeting, Silverston wrote a letter to Kingsley conveying his appreciation of the efforts made by Raeburn to bring the parties together and his distress at the attitude of Coats which, according to Silverston, showed that they were trying to circumvent the provisions of FERA. Raeburn too wrote a let_ter on October 23, 1976 to Devagnanam saying that Coats were not really interested in any independent Indians taking their excess shareholding. On December 11, 1976 Devagnanam wrote to Raeburn expressing the resentment of himself and his group at the attempts made by Coats to maintain their control over NHL by indirect means. On Decembe-r 14, Devagnanam offered a package deal under which the existing Indian shareholders would augment their holding to 60%, Mackrael and Raeburn would be on the Board of Directors but not Martin Henry, and even B.T. Lee, a Senior Executive of NI-Studley, could be appointed as a wholetime Director of NIIL to be in charge of its export programme. On January 20, 1977 the Reserve Bank sent a reminder to NIJL asking\n\n.,,\n\nit to submit at an early date the progress report regarding dilution non-resident interest. By its reply dated February 21, 1977 NHL confirmed its commitment to achieve the desired Indianisation by the stipulated date, viz., May 17, 1977. On March 9, 1977 Raeburn wrote to Devagnanam, saying that after a discussion with Mackrael and three other high-ranking persons of Coats, it was clear that Coats were not agreeable to allowoing the present Indian shareholders to acquire 60% of the equity capital of NIIL, since such a course carried in the long run too great a risk to their world trade. Raeburn made certain fresh proposals by his letter in the hope that they would be acceptable to Coats and invited Devagnanam to come to Birmingham for negotiations.\n\nOn March 18, 1977 a notice was issued by NIIL's Secretary, D.P. Kingsley, intimating that a meeting of the Board of Directors will be held on April 6, 1977.\n\nOne of the items on the agenda of the meeting was shown as \"Policy-Indianisation''. . Sanders received the notice of the meeting duly but did not attend the meeting.\n\nDevagnanam went to Birmingham in the last week of March 1977.\n\nBetween 29th and 31st March, he held discussions with four out of the six Directors of the Holding Company, namely NEWEY, Jackson, White-house and Raeburn.\n\nThe other two Directors, Mackrael and Sanders, did not take any part in those discussions. During his visit to Birmingham, Devagnanarn expended considerable time in discussing various matters with NEWEY, pertaining to their Far-Eastern business.\n\nOn April 4, 1977 NHL received a reminder letter dated ¥arch 30, 1977 from the Reserve Bank which pointed out that the Company had not yet submitted any concrete proposal for reduction of the non-resident interest and asked it to submit its proposal in that behalf without any further delay. The letter warned the Company that if it failed to comply with the directive regarding dilution of foreign equity within the stipulated period, the Bank would be constrained to view the matter seriously.\n\nRaeburn had written a letter to Devagnanam on 4th April on the question of the compromise formula and Devagnanam too had written a letter to Raeburn on the 5th, saying' that he would H place the formula before his colleagues!. These letters evidently crossed each other. The 6th April was then just at hand.\n\nN.I.J.L. v. NJ.N.H.L. (Chandrcuhud C.J.) 725\n\nThe meeting of NIIL's Board of Directors was held on April 6, J 977 as scheduled. Seven Directors were present at the meeting, with Devagnanam in the chair at the commencement of the proceedings. C. Doraiswamy, solicitor-partner of 'King and Partridge',\n\nwas one of the Directors present at the meeting. He had no interest in the proposal of \"lndianisation\" which the meeting was to discuss and was, therefore, considered to be an independent Director. In order to complete the quorum of two independent Directors, the other Directors apart from C. Doraiswamy being interested in the business of the meeting, Silverston, an ex-partner of Doraiswamy's firm of solicitors, was appointed to the Board as an additional Director under article 97 of the Articles of Association. Silverston chaired the meeting after his appointment as an additinal Director. The meeting resolved that the issued capital of NHL be increased to Rs. 48,00,000/- by a new issue of 16,000 equity shares of Rs. 100/- each, to be offered as rights shares to the existing shareholders in proportion to the shares held by them.\n\nThe offer was to be made by a notice specifying the number of shares which each shareholder was entitled to, and in case the offer was not accepted within 16 days from the date on which it was made, it was to be deemed to have been declined by the concerned shareholder. The minues of the meeting recorded that as a matter of abundant caution, the Directors who were holding shares in NILL did not take part either in the discussions which took place in the meeting or in the voting on the resolution.\n\nAfter the aforesaid meeting of the Board dated April 6, 1977, Devagnanam wrote a Jetter bearing the date April 12 to Raeburn, explaining that every alternative proposal was discussed in the meeting and setting out the compelling circumstances arising out of the requirements of FERA which led to the _ passing of the particular resolution. It was stated in the letter that a copy of the Reserve Bank's letter of March 30, 1977 to NHL was enclosed therewith, but in fact it was not so enclosed. The letter of offer dated April 14, 1977 was prepared pursuant to the resolution passed in the meeting of 6th April, The envelope containing Devagnanam's letter dated April 12 (without the copy of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 30, 1977) and the letter of offer dated April 14 were received by Raeburn on May 2, 1977 in an envelope bearing the Indian postal mark of April 27; 1977, The letter of offer which was sent to one of the Indian shareholders; Man\"oharan, was posted in an envelope which also bore the postal mark of 27th April. !he next meeting of the Board was due to be\n\n726 SUPREME :couRT REPORTS [1981] 3 s.c.R.\n\nheld on May 2, 1977 and it is on that date that Raeburn received the letter of offer dated April 14, which evidently, was posted at Madras on April 27, 1977. The Holding Company was thereby denied an opportunity to exercise its option whether or not to accept the offer of rights shares, assuming that any such option was open to it.\n\nWhether such an option was open to it and whether, if it could not or did not want to take the rights shares, it could transfer its rights, under NIIL's letter offering the rights shares, to a person of its choice depends upon the provisions of FERA, the necessity to Comply with the directives of the Reserve Bank the terms of NIIL's Articles of Association and the provisions of the Indian Companies Act.\n\nOn April 19, 1977 a notice was issued by NIIL's Secretary intimating that a meeting of the Board of Directors will be held on May 2, 1977.\n\nOne of the items of agenda mentioned in the notice was \"Policy-(a) lndianisation, (b) Allotment of shares\", The notice of the meeting was sent to the Holding Company in an envelope which also bore the Indian postal mark of April 27, 1977. The notice was received by Sanders in England on May 2, 1977 i.e. on tht< date when the meeting was due to be held in India. Even the fastest and the most modern means of transt:ort could not have enabled Sanders to attend the meeting.\n\nIn between, on April 26, 1977 Raeburn had written a letter to Devagnanam at Malacca, following a telex message which said:\n\nHAD HELPFUL DISCUSSIONS COATS YESTERDAY\n\nPLEASE MAKE NO DECISIONS RE INDIANISATION\n\nPENDING LETTER\"\n\nBy his letter of 26th April, which is said to have been received by Devagnanam on May 4, 1977, Raeburn stated that Coats were still unwilling to grant majority shareholding control to the existing Indian shareholders, but that they were equally not keen to do any thing which would be regarded as circumventing the proposal for lndianisation or the law bearing on the subject, since that would undermine the position of the Indian shareholders,\n\nA meeting of the Board of Directors was held on May 2, 1977 as scheduled. The minutes of that meeting show that Kingsley, the Secretary of NHL; pointed out in the meeting that applications for allotment of the rights shares offered as also the amounts payable\n\nlite /\n\n\\ N.J.I.L •. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 727\n\nalong with the acceptance of the offer had been received from all the shareholders except the U.K. shareholders and the Manoharan group.\n\nThe offer to Manoharan was sent at Virudh Nagar but Silverston pointed out to the meeting that Manoharan was working in Jaipur and that therefore, he should be given further time to participate in the rights issue. The Manoharan group was accordingly allowed twenty days' time from the date of the allotment letter for payment of the allotment amount. In the meeting of 2nd May, the whole of the new issue consisting of 16,000 rights shares was allotted to the Indian shareholders, including members of the Manoharan group.\n\nOut of these, the Devagnanam group was allotted 11, 734 shares.\n\nA dividend of 30%, subject to tax, amounting to Rs. 9,60,000/- was recommended by the Board, and it was resolved that the Annual General meeting of the Company be held on 4th June, 1977. Silver\n\nstone was appointed as an additional Director of the Company and his election as such at the Annual General meeting was recommended by the Board. Further, it was resolved that deposits be invited from the public. On the same day i.e. 2nd May, Devagnanam wrote a letter to Raeburn intimating to him that in a meeting held that morning the formalities relating to allotment of shares were completed, bringing the Company under the control of the Indian shareholders.\n\nDevagnanam reiterated by his letter the hope of a closer association with the NEWEY group.\n\nRaebum reacted sharply to Devagnanam's letter of April 12 and to the letter of offer dated April 14.\n\nAs stated earlier, he had received both of these on May 2 in an envelope which bears the postal mark of Madras dated April, 27.\n\nRaeburn sent a telex, message to Devagnanam on 2nd May and another to Kingsley on 3rd May. By the first telex, he complained about the inadequacy of the notice of the meeting and by the second, he conveyed that there was considerable doubt on the question whether the necessary disinterested quorum was available at the meeting of the Directors held on April 6.\n\nOn receipt of the telex message, Devagnanam wrote a letter to Raeburn on May 4 explaining the pressure of circumstances which compelled the Board to take the decision which it did in the meeting of May 2, 1977.\n\nRaeburn followed up his telex messages by a letter to Devagnanam on May 3.\n\nWhile expressing his distress and displeasure at the manner in which the decision regarding the issue of rights shares was taken and the allotment of the shares was made, Raeburn stated in his letter that the rights issue at par, which was considerably less than the fair value\n\nA of the shares, was most unfair to the shareholders who could not tak~\n\nup the rights issue.\n\nAfter making the allotment of shares in the meeting of May 2, NIIL sent a letter to the Reserve Bank reporting compliance with the requirements of FERA by the issue of 16,000 .rights shares and the allotment thereof the Indian shareholders which resulted in the reduction of the foreign holding to approximately 40% and increased that of the Indian shareholders to almost 60%. Reference was made in the letter to the fact that the allotment money of Rs. 1,10,700/- had yet to be received, which was obviously in reference to the amount due on the 1,107 rights shares which were allotted to the Manoharan group in the meeting of 2nd May. The Manoharan group did not evidence any interest even later in taking up those shares. M_anoharan, it may be stated, who was a Director and General Manager of NHL had resigned his post in April 1976, after serving the Company for nearly 17 years.\n\nBetween the 2nd and 9th May, there was an exchange of cables between Mackrael and Doraiswamy which led to the latter writing a letter on the 9th to the former.\n\nDoraiswamy stated in that letter that he had thoroughly investigated the position by perusing all available records placed before him by Devagnanam and Kingsley and that he was of the opinion that, in the meeting of the 6th April, there was the required quorum of two disinterested Directors consisting of Silverston and himself and, therefore, there could be no doubt wh8tsoever about the legality of the resolution passed in that meeting. He admitted that although the time-limit fixed by the Reserve Bank had expired on 17th May, 1977, \"it may have been possible for the Company to get further time from the Reserve Bank of India\". As regards the decision to issue the additional shares at par, he explained that if the issue had been made at a premium, it would have necessitated an approach to the Controller of Capital Issues, a process which was time-consuming and complicated. He pointed out that the authorities would not have allowed the Company to issue the rights shares at a premium and that even if they were to allow such a course, the premium permissible would have been only nominal. He asserted that the delay caused in the offer of new shares being received by the U.K. shareholders was of little consequence because they would not have been able to take up the shares in any event. He expressed the hope that Mackrael would agree that the decision regarding the issue of rights shares taken at the Board meeting on April 6, 1977 was bona fide and in the best interests\n\nN.1.1.L. Y. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 729\n\n0 ( the Company.\n\nHe concluded his letter by an assurance that A as regards the late despatch of the notice of the Board Meeting of 2nd May, further enquiries were being made.\n\nOn May 11, Devagnanam wrote to Raeburn apologising for the manner in which the foreign shareholding had been reduced and for good measure, he projected the various advantages which the NEWEY group would enjoy under the new Indian management and control of NIIL. As if to illustrate that it is better late than never, he enclosed with his letter a copy of the Reserve Bank's letter dated 30th March, 1977 which was to have been sent along with the letter dated April 12 but was in fact not so sent.\n\nOn May 17, 1977 Mackrael, acting on behalf of the Holding Company, filed a Company Petition in the Madras High Court under sections 397 and 398 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 out of which the present appeals arise.\n\nIt Is alleged in the petition that the Indian Directors abused their fiduciary position in the Company by deciding in the meeting of April 6 to issue the rights shares at par and by allotting them exclusively to the Indian sharesholders in the meeting of 2nd May,\n\n1977. In so doing, they acted malafide and in order to gain an illegal advantage for themselves. The Indian Directors, according to the company petition, either knew or ought to have known that the fair value of the shares of the Company was about Rs. 204 per share. By deciding to issue the rights shares at par, they conferred a tremendous and illegitimate advantage on the Indian shareholders. Devagnanam delayed deliberately the intimation of the proceedings of the 6th April to the Holding Company. By that means and by the late giving of the notice of the meeting of the 2nd May, the Devagnanam group presented afait accompli to the Holding Company in order to prevent it from exercising its lawful rights. Thus, according to the petition the conduct of the Indian Directors lacked in probity and fair dealing which the Holding Company was entitled to expect. By the Petition, the Holding Company asked for the following reliefs :-\n\n(a) That the Board of Directors of the Company be superseded and one or more Administrators be appointed to administer the affairs of the Company or, in the alternative, the Board of Directors be reconstituted so as to ensure that the Holding Company had adequate representation on it;\n\n(b) That the proceeding of the meeting of the Board of Directors held on April 6 and May 2, 1977 be declared illegal, void and inoperative;\n\n(c) That Silverston's appointment as an Additional Director of the Company be declared as void and inoperative and he be restrained from functioning as a Director of the Company;\n\n(d) That the purported allotment of 16,000 shares pursuant to the impugned resolution of the Board of May 2, 1977 be declared void; ~.\n\n(e) That the Indian group of shareholders to whom the rights shares were allotted be restrained from exercising any voting rights in regard to any part of those shares;\n\n(f) That the Company be restrained from giving effect to the allotment of the 16,000 rights shares and from making any payment of dividend on those shares;\n\n(g) That the Articles of Association of the Company be amended so as to permit the transfer of the shares to persons other than the existing members of the Company in order to enable the Holding Compa.ny to comply with the requirement of disinvestments without prejudice to its interest as a shareholder; and\n\n(h) That a special majority for decisions of the Board be prescribed in regard to all important matters and provision be made for the appointment of Directors by proportional representation.\n\nThe learned Acting Chief Justice who tried the Company Petition, found several defects and infirmities in the Board's meeting dated May 2, 1977 and concluded that appropriate relief should be granted to the Holding Company under section 398 of the Companies Act. The learned Judge was of the view that the average market value of the rights shares was about Rs. 190 per share on the crucial date and that, since the rights shares were issued at par, the: Holding Company was deprived unjustly of a sum of Rs, 8,54,550/- at the rate of Rs. 90/- per share on the 9,495 rights shares to which it was\n\n-~·\n\nN.l.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 731\n\nentitled. Exercising the power under section 398(2) of the Companies Act, the learned Judge directed NHL to make good that loss which, according to him, could have been avoided by it \"by adopting a fairer process of communication\" with the Holding Company and \"a consequential dialogue\" with them, in the matter of the issue of rights shares at a premium. The learned Judge directed NIIL to pay to the Holding Company the aforesaid sum of Rs. 8,54,550/- as a \"solatium\" in order to meet the ends of justice.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the Holding Company filed O.S.\n\nAppeal No. 64 of 1978 while NIIL filed crossobjections to the decree. The appeal and cross-objections were argued before the Division Bench of the High Court on the basis of affidavits, the correspondence that bad passed between the parties and certain additional documents which were filed before the Appellate Court by consent of parties. Though the Company Petition was filed under section 397 as also under. section 398 of the Companies Act and though the trial court had granted partial relief to the Holding Company under section 398, it was stated in the Appellate Court on its behalf that its entire case was based on section 397 and that it did not want to invoke the provisions of section 398.\n\nA similar statement was made before us also.\n\nOn a consideration of the matters and material before it, the Division Bench formulated its view in the form of 18 conclusions on various aspects of the case. They may be summed up thus :\n\n(a) As soon as Devagnanam became involved in the fareastern ventures of NEWEY, he decided to sell his shareholding in NIIL to an Indian concen or party from which he expected to receive at least a part of the consideration in a foreign country.\n\n(b} Seeing that Coats were opposed to his receiving any part of the consideration for the sale of his shares in a foreign country, Devagnanam decided not to part with his shares but to obtain the control of the Company.\n\n(c) The directives of the Reserve Bank of India on the question of Indianisation were exploited by Devagnanam for compelling the Holding Company to part H with its shares in favour of the Indian shareholders.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981] 3 S.C.JR.\n\n( d) Coats were willing to carry out the directives of the Reserve Bank but they did not want to transfer their shares to the existing Indian shareholders because thereby, the latter would have acquired a controlling interest in NIIL which Coats wanted to prevent. Coats were willing to part with their excess shares in favour of other Indian residents.\n\n(e) Though Coats originally contemplated the transfer of\n\n15% of their excess 20% shares to Madura Coats, or the incorporation of a company to take over their excess 20% shares, they were ultimately agreeable that the existing Indian shareholders should get 9% out of that 20% so as to have a 49% holding in the share capital of NrIL and that 11% should go to new, in dependent, Indian Institutional shareholders. The object of Coats was that any one group of shareholders should not have a dominating position in the affairs of\n\nNIIL.\n\n(f) At the Ketti meeting held on October 20 and 21, 1976,\n\nthe issue of rights shares was considered as an alternative to disinvestment, but that was subject to two conditions : one, that it should be shown that there was a viable development plan which required additional funds which the existing cash flow of NIIL could not meet, and two, that the value of the U.K. equity interest required to be transferred would be no less favourable than what would be achieved by a direct sale of that interest.\n\n(g) Though by his letters of December 11 and 14, 1976\n\nDevagananam had informed Raeburn of the decision of the Indian shareholders to acquire 60% shares for themselves, he did not ever say one word about the issue of rights shares in any of the numerous communications which he sent to Raeburn. No reference was made to the issue of rights shares even in the memorandum of discussions which took place during the visit of Devagnanam to U.K. from March 29-31, 1977. Thus, the issue of rights shares was sprung as a surprise on the U.K. shareholders.\n\n' ' \"i-\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 733\n\n(h) The notice dated March 13, 1977 for the meeting of A the Board of Directors held on April 6, 1977 referred to the main item on the agenda in ambiguous terms as : \"Policy\" lndianisation\". In the context of the discussions which had taken place until then between the parties, N. T. Sanders who represented the Holding Company on the B9ard had no means or opportunity B of knowing that the particular item on the agenda involved the question of the issue of rights shares.\n\n(i) Since every major decision was taken by the Board of Directors in consultation with the Holding Company and since there was lio agenda for the appointment of an additional Director under article 97 of Articles of Association of NHL, the decision taken by the Board in its meeting of April 6 on the issue of rights shares and the appointment of Silverston as an Additional Director constituted a departure from established practice and showed want of good faith and Jack of fair play on the part of the Board of Directors of NHL.\n\n(j) The letter dated April 12, the letter of offer dated April 14 and the notice for meeting of the Board of Directors\n\nto be held on May 2, were all got posted by Devagnanam as late as on April 27, 1977 at Madras, so as to ensure that these important documents should not reach the Holding Company in time to enable it to participate in the all important meeting of the 2nd.\n\nDavagnanam wanted to present a fait accompli to the Holding Compay so as to prevent it from taking any pre-emptive action.\n\n(k) Whenever NIIL wrote to the Reserve Bank alleging that the Holding Company was not willing to carry out the directives of the Bank or to comply with the provisions of FERA, its object was to prejudice the Bank against the Holding Company by drawing a red-herring across the track.\n\n(1) The directives or the Reserve Bank of India had the\n\nprov1S1ons of FERA were not concerned with who ff should be tho Indian shareholders of NIIL.\n\nAll that they were concerned with was that 60% of the shareholding must be with the Indian residents. For the purpose of achieving that result, three courses were available to NIIL : (I) Disinvestment by foreign shareholders in favour of Indian shareholders; (2) Issue of rights shares pursuant to section 81 of the Companies Act, and (3) Action under section 81 (1 -A) of the Companies Act for issuing additional shares to Indian residents other than the existing Indian shareholders by passing an appropriate spedal resolution, or if no special resolution was passed, then, by a majority of the shareholders approving such a course with the consent of the Central Government.\n\nThe first course was ruled out since Coats had taken a definite stand that they will not allow the existing Indian shareholders to obtain the excess shares. As far as the second alternative was concerned, the Holding Company had the right to renounce shares offered to it in favour of any other person under section 81 (I)\n\n(c) of the Companies Act, which right was denied to it because, the letter of offer dated April 14 did not contain a statement regarding renunciation of the right to take shares and also because that letter was not posted in time. As regards the third course, if the Holding Company were given adequate notice of the proposal to issue rights shares, it might have taken appropriate action under section 81 (I-A) of the Companies Act.\n\n(m) The object of the Directors of NIIL in deciding upon the issue of rights shares, and that too in the manner in which they did so, was clearly to obtain control of the Company and to eschew and eliminate the controlling power which the Holding Company had over NIIL.\n\nThe conversion of the existing minority of Indian shareholders into a majority, far from being a matter of statutory compulsion, was an act of self-aggrandizement on the part of the exisiting Indian shareholders.\n\n(n) The action taken by the Indian shareholders was against the interest of the Company itself because the rights shares were issued at par which was far below\n\ntheir market price.\n\n(o) The true motivation of the various steps taken by the Devagnanam-NEWEY Combination was the furtherence\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 735\n\nof the interest of NEWBY's Far-Eastern enterprises, A coupled with the personal interest of Devagnanam himself.\n\nDevagnanam was receiving Rs. 96,000/- per annum in addition to substantial fringe benefits as the Managing Director of NIIL. He was also getting a large salary from NEWEY which was £10,000 in 1075 £11,000 in 1976 and £12,000 for the Year ending B July 31, 1977.\n\n(p) The fact that NIIL informed the Holding Company on May 21, 1977 which was after the Company Petition was filed, that the Holding Company could not exercise and will not be allowed to exercise , any rights in respect of the whole of 18,990 shares held by it since its application under section 29 (4) of FERA was not granted by the Reserve Bank shows that the object of the Board of Directors in taking the impugned decision was to exclude the Holding Company from all contrul over NHL. That is why NHL advised the Reserve Bank of India by its letter dated May 24, 1977 that no application for holding any shares by a non-resident should be allowed by the Bank without the knowledge and consent of NIIL. That also is the reason why NHL conveyed to the Reserve Bank by its letter of September 20, 1977 that until such time as the Company Petition was finally disposed of, no licence should be issued to non-resident shareholders and no remittance of dividend out of India should be permitted with out the non-resident share-holders reducing their holding in NHL to less than 40%.\n\nThe two other conclusions are comprehended within the 16 set out above.\n\nOn the basis of the aforesaid formulations, the Division Bench concluded that the affairs of NIIL were being conducted in a manner oppressive, that is to say, burdensome, harsh and wrongful to the Holding Company. After referring to certain passages from Palmer's Company Law and Gore-Browne on Companies, and the decisions of the House of Lords, ths Privy Council, and our own Courts including the Supreme Court, the Division Bench held that since the action of the Board of Directors of NIIL was not in the interest of the Company but was taken merely for the purpose of\n\nwelding the Company into 1NEWEY's Far Eastern complex, it was just and equitable to wind up the Company.\n\nNHL had filed cross-objections in the High Court appeal contending that, in any event, the learned Acting Chief Justice was in error in directing it to pay the sum of Rs. 8, 54,550/- to the Holding Company. While dealing with the cross-objections, the Division Bench held that the injury suffered by the Holding Company on account of the oppression practised by the Board of Directors of NHL could not be remedied by the award of compensation and, therefore, the action of the Board of Directors in issuing the rights shares had to be quashed. Having found that the Holding Company was entitled to relief under section 397 of the Companies Act and the award of solatium made by the trial Court was not the appropriate relief to grant, the Division Bench allowed the appeal fired by the Holding Company, dismissed the cross-objections in substance and adjourned the appeal for a fortnight for hearing further\n\narguments on the nature of the relief to be granted in the case ..\n\nD Eventually, by its order dated October 26, 1978 the Division Bench granted the following reliefs :\n\n(a) Devagnanam was removed forthwith both as the Managing Director and Director of NHL and was asked to vacate the bungalow occupied by him, by E November 1, 1978. He was paid one Year's remuneration as compensation foi the termination of his appointment as the Managing Director.\n\n(b) The Board of Directors was superseded and an interim Board consisting of nine directors proposed by the Holding Company was constituted, with Shri M.M.\n\nSabharwal as an independent Chairman.\n\n(c) Harry Bridges, an executive of COATS, was appointed as the Managing Director for a period of four months.\n\n(d) The rights issue made on 6th April, 1977 and the allot\n\nment of shares made on 2nd May, 1977 at the Board meetings were set aside and the Interim Board was directed to make a fresh issue of shares at a premium to the existing shareholders, including the Holding H Company which was to have a right of renunciation.\n\nThe new Board was directed to apply to the Controller\n\n-~-·\n\nN.I.J.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 737\n\nof Capital Issues for determining the amount of pre- A mi um.\n\n(e) The Articles of Association were to be altered by appropriate additions and deletions in order to provide for election of Directors by proportional representation; B\n\n(f) Devagnanam was asked to pay to the Holding Company ithe costs of appeal and cross-objections. quantified at Rs. 25,000/-. He was also asked personally to reimburse the expenses incurred by NIIL in the appeal and cross-objections.\n\nThese appeals were heard in the first instance by Justice Untwalia and Justice Pathak. In view of the importance of the questions arising therein, on some of which our learned Brothers, it seems, were unable to agree, they desired that the appeals be heard by a larger Bench. That is how the appeals are now before us.\n\nThe petition of the Holding Company out of which these appeals arise sought relief under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956.\n\nThe case under section 398 not having been\n\npressed except before the learned trial Judge, we are only concerned E with the question whether the Holding Company is entitled to relief under section 397 which reads thus :\n\n\"397(1 )-Any members of a company who complain that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner oppressive to any member or members (including any one or more of themselves) may apply to the Court for an order under this section : provided _such members have a right so to apply in virtue of section 399.\n\n(2) If, on any application under sub-section (I) the sourt is of the opinion :\n\n(a) that the company's affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner oppressive to any member or members; and\n\n(b) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice such member or members, but that otherwise the facts would justify the making of a windingup order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up; the Court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit.\"\n\nSection 398 provides for relief in cases of mismanagement. Section 399(1) restricts the right to apply under sections 397 and 398 to persons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (I)\n\n. It is necessary to refer briefly to the relevant part of the plead ings before examining the charge of oppression made by the Hold ing Company against a group of the minority shareholders of NIIL After tracing the history of formation and composition of NIIL, the company petition states that the management of NHL was in the hands of the Board of Directors in which the Indian group had a large majority. The Holding Company had implicit trust in them and was content to leave the management in their hands.\n\nAfter referring to the impact of section 43A of the Companies Act, the compay petition says that in the wake of FERA, discussions and negotiations were held between the representatives of the Holding Company and the Management of NIIL amongst themselves as well as with the Reserve Bank of India, in order to enable NIIL to obtain the requisite permission for carrying on its business.\n\nParagraph 13 of the company petition states that the Reserve Bank of India by its letter dated May 11, 1976 granted to NHL the necessary permission subject to the condition, inter alia, that it re, duced non-resident shareholding to 40 per cent on or before May 17, 1977.\n\nThe case of the Holding Company in regard to its own attitude is stated succinctly in paragraph 14 of the company petition which may with advantage be reproduced :\n\n\"Discussions were thereafter held on a number of occasions between the petitioner and the management of the Company to effectuate the aforesaid condition imposed by the Reserve Bank of India which the petitioner was at all times ready and willing to comply with. The petitioner did not, however, desire to dilute its holding of shares in the company by a further issue of capital and preferred to effectuate the said intention by disinvesting or selling 20% of its holding in the company.\n\nThe Reserve Bank of India was agreeable to such dilution taking place by the petitioner selling a part of its holding to an Indian resident or Indian residents. The Reserve Bank had indicated that\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 739\n\nthey would be willing for such dilution taking place by a further. issue of shares provided that additional capital was required for purposes of expansion. The petitioner was not willing to sell a part of its holding to the Indian group as such a sale would result in ti1e Indian group acquiring an absolute majority interest. Further more under the Articles of Association of the Company the consent of the existing shareholders would be required (apart from the approval of the Reserve Bank) before the petitioner sold any ofits shares to an Indian party, other than to a member.\"\n\nAccording to the Holding Company, the various steps which culminated in the allotment of rights shares to the existing Indian shareholders were vitiated by ma/a fide, their dominant object being to convert an existing minority into a majority. The decision taken in the meeting of the Board on April 6, 1977 was taken deliberately in haste and hurry in order to pre-empt any action by the Holding Company to restrain the Board from taking the desired decision.\n\nTlie Reserve Bank, according to the company petition, would not have been so unreasonable as not to extend the time for complying with its directive, especially since the Holding Company had agreed in principle to dilute its holding and the only difference between the parties was as regards the method by which such dilution was to be effected.\n\nIn Paragraph 27 of the company petition it is stated that the Devagnanam group decided to issue the rights shares with a view to securing an illegal and unjust advantage for itself, for improving its own position in the Company and in order to deprive the Holding Company of its lawful rights as majority shareholders. In this behalf, reliance is placed on the following facts and circumstances, inter alia:\n\n(a) The Holding Company was never informed of any specific proposal to make the rights issue.\n\n(b) The notice of the Board meeting of April 6, 1977 did not refer to the said proposal.\n\n(c) The notice offering rights shares to the Holding Company was not prepared till April 14 and was not posted till April 27, 1977.\n\nBy the time the notice was received\n\nby the Holding Company, the Board of NIIL had met H to allot the rights shares.\n\n(d) The time given in the notice was much less than was\n\ncustomary.\n\n(e) The notice did not contain a statement relating to the right of the shareholders to renounce the rights shares.\n\n(f) The notice of the Board meeting of May 2, although dated 19th April 1977, was posted to Sanders on 27.4.1977, thereby ensuring that it would reach him only after the date of the meeting.\n\n(g) By issuing shares at par, though their value was much higher than Rs. 100/- per share, existing Indian shareholders were enabled to acquire the shares at a gross undervalue and the Company was put to a he:avy loss.\n\n(i) The Reserve Bank of India had indicated that dilution of the foreign holding by a rights issue could be considered if the Company required further capital for expansion.\n\nAt the discussions and negotiations held between the Holding Company and the Indian group it was inter alia agreed that the rights issue would be made only if there was a viable development plan requiring further funds.\n\nThe rights issue was made even though no such need for expansion or dev, elopment existed or was referred to.\n\n(j) Though the Reserve Bank had inter alia stipulated that the said dilution should be effectuated on or before 17th May, 1977, the time-schedule is never strictly insisted upon. There have been numerous instances when the Reserve Bank has granted reasonable extension of time to comply with such conditions. The Board of NHL never requested the Reserve Bank to grant further time. C. Doraiswamy, the 8th respondent stated in his letter dated 9.5.1977 to Mackrael, a Director of the Holding Company, that it would have been possible for the Company to get further time from the Reserve Bank of India.\n\nH The Holding Company contends further that M.J. Silverston was not a disinterested person, that his vote on the resolution for the\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.-H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 741\n\nissue of rights shares had therefore to be ignored in which case there was no quorum of two disinterested directors and that his appointment as an Additional Director was not valid since the notice for the meeting of the Board of Directors to be held on 6.4.1977 did not contain in the agenda any subject regarding appointment of an additional Director under Article 97 of the Company's Articles of Association.\n\nIn answer to these contentions, Dvagnanam filed an elaborate counter-affidavit on his behalf as well as on behalf of NIIL. In that counter-affidavit, every one of the material contentions put forward by the Holding Company has been denied or disputed.\n\nDevagnanam contends that it was the Holding Company w:hich wanted to retain its control over NIIL contrary to the directive of the Reserve Bank of India, the national policy of the .:central Government and the provisions of FERA. According to Devagnanam, every action taken in the Board meetings of 6.4.1977 and 2.5.77 was in accordance with law, that Sanders never used to attend the meetings of the Board, being a non-resident he was not entitled to have notice of the Board meetings, that there was no violation of section 81 of the Companies Act at all, tliat section 81 (c) of the Companies Act did not apply to the preent case and that, in view of the attitude adopted by Coats, NIIL, in order to comply with the restrictions imposed by the Reserve Bank and to carry out its directive, had no option but to decide upon the issue of rights shares to bring about the reduction in the non-resident shareholding.\n\nDevagnanam repudiates emphatically the charge of mala jides or of conduct in breach of the fiduciary duty of NIIL's Board of Directors.\n\nHaving regard to these pleadings, the main question for consideration is whether the decisions taken in the meetings of the Board of Directors of NIIL on April 6 and May 2, 1977 constitute acts of oppression wit!Un the meaning of section 397 of Companies Act, 1956. The High Court has answered this question in the affirmative and has issued consequential directions in regard to the management of NHL's affairs. The findings recorded by the High Court in appeal have been challenged before us with 'Vehemence and ability in an equal measure, matched eqully in both respects on either side. Learned counsel who led the arguments on the rival sides, Shri F.S. Nariman for the appellants and Shri H.M. Seervai for the respondents, have drawn our attention in jcopious details to\n\nthe correspondence that transpired between the parties, the correspondence with the Reserve Bank of India, the discussions at Ketty and Birmingham which preceded the impugned decisions, the conduct of Devagnanam as a man and a Managing Director, the attitude of Coats stated to arise out of their world-wide business interests and the predicament of NEWEY which was willing to strike but was afraid to wound its partner Coats. We have also been taken through several decisions and texts bearing particularly on :\n\n(a) The meaning of 'oppression' of the members of a Company within the terms of section 397 and the circumstances in which a Company can be wound up under the just and equitable clause under section 433.\n\n(f) of the Companies Act, 1956;\n\n(b) The approach which the court should adopt in cases wherein mala fides and abuse of power on the part of Directors are alleged but no oral evidence is led;\n\n(c) The fiduciary powers of Directors in issuing shares;\n\n(d) The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 with particular reference to\n\nsecion 2 (p), (q) and (u) and section '.<9;\n\n(e) The question as to whether it is necessary to issue a prospectus under section 81 (l) (c) of the Companies Act;\n\n(f) The constraints on public and private companies under the Companies Act, and their duties and obligations, with particular reference to sections 2 (35), 2(37), 3 (l)\n\n(iii) and (iv) and sections 43A and 81 of the Companies Act;\n\n(g) The relationship of partnership between the Indian shareholders, Coats and NEWEY who owned respectively 40%, 30%, and 30% of the shareholding in NIIL;\n\n(h) The question whether Silverston was an 'interested' Director within the meaning of section 300 of the .\n\nCompanies Act; and\n\n(i) Whether Silverston's appointment as an Additional Director in the meeting of the Board held on April 6, 1977 was, in the circumstances, valid.\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 743\n\nComing to the Jaw as to the concept of 'oppression' section 397 of our Companies Act follows closely the language of section 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948.\n\nSince the decisions on section 210 have been followed by our Court, the English decisions may be considered first.\n\nThe leading case on 'oppression' under section 210 is the decision of the House of Lords in Scottish Co-op.\n\nWhofrsale Society Ltd. v. Meyer. (1) Taking the dictionary meaning of the wo(d 'oppression', Viscount Simonds said at page 342 that the appellant society could justly be described as having behaved towards the miuority shareholders in an 'oppressive' manner, that is to say, in a manner \"burdensome, harsh and wrongful\". The learned Law Lord adopted, as difficult of being . bettered, the words of Lord President Cooper at the first hearing of the case to the effect that section 210 \"warrants the court in looking at the business realities of the situation and does not confine them to a narrow legalistic view\".\n\nDealing with the true character of the company, Lord Keith said at page 361 that the company was in substance, though not in law, a partnership, consisting of the society, Dr.\n\nMeyer and Mr. Lucas and whatever may be the other different legal consequences following on one or other of these forms of combination, one result followed from the method adopted, \"which is common to partnership, that there should be the utmost good faith between the constituent members\". Finally, it was held that the court ought not to allow technical pleas to defeat the beneficent provisions of section 210 (page 344 per Lord Keith; pages 368-369 per Lord Denning).\n\nIn Meyer (supra) above referred to, the House of Lords was dealing with a case in which the appellant coinpany was accused of having committed acts of oppression against its subsidiary. In that context it was held that the parent company must, if it is engaged in the same class of business, accept as a result of having formed such a subsidiary an obligation so to conduct, what are in a sense its own affairs, as to deal fairly with its subsidiary. In Re Associated Tool Industries Ltd. (2) of which judgment a photographic copy was supplied to us, Joske J. held that th.e rule in Meyer (supra) involved the consequence that the subsidiary companies must also exercise good faith to the holding company asd not merely that the latter should so act to the former.\n\n(I) (1959] AC. 324.\n\n(2) [1964] Argus Law Reports, 75.\n\nIn an application under section 210 of the English Companies Act, as under section 397 of our Companies Act, before granting relief the court has to satisfy that to wind up the company will unfairly prejudice the members complaining of oppression, but that otherwise the facts will justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company should be wo4nd up. The rule as regards the duty of utmost good faith, on which stress was laid by Lord Keith in Meyer, (supra) received further and closer consideration in Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd.,(1) wherein Lord Wilberforce considered the scope, nature and extent of the 'just and equitable' principle as a ground for winding up a company. The business of the respondent company was a very profitable one and profits used to be distributed among the directors in the shape of fees, no dividends being declared. On being removed as a director by the votes of two other directors, the appellant petitioned for an order under section 210.\n\nAllowing an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it was held by the House of Lords that the words 'just and equitable' which occur in section 222\n\n(f) of the English Act, corresponding to our section 433 (f), were not to be construed ejusdem generis with clauses (a) to (e) of section 222 corresponding to our clauses. (a) to (e) of section 433.\n\nLord Wilberforce observed that the 'words' just and equitable' are a recognition of the fact that a limited company is more' than a mere legal entity, with a personality in law of its own; and that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure :\n\n\"The 'just and equitable' prov1s1on does not, as tbe respondents suggest, entitle one party to disregard the obligation he assumes by entering a company, nor the court to dispense him from it. It does, as equity always does, enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of a personal character arising between one individual and another, which may make it unjust or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in 'a particular way\". (p 379)\n\n(I) (1973] A.C. 360 (H L.).\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 745\n\nObserving that the description of companies as \"quasi-partnerships\" A or \"in substance partnerships\" is confusing, though convenient, Lord Wilberforce said :\n\n\"company, however small, however domestic, is a company not a partnership or even a quasi-partnership and it is through the just and equitable clause that obligations, common to partnership relations, may come in\". (p 380)\n\nFinally, it was held that it was wrong to confine the application of the just and equitable clause to proved cases of mala fides, because to do so would be to negative the generality of the words. As observed by the learned Law Lord in the same judgment, though in another context :\n\n\"Illustrations may be used, but general words should remain general and not be reduced to the sum of particular\n\ninstances.\" (pp 374-375) D\n\nIn his judgment in Re Westbourne Galleries (supra) Lord Wilberforce bas referred at two places to the decision in Blissett v.\n\nDaniel, (1) which is recognised as the leading authority in the Law of Partnership on the duty of utmost good faith which partners owe to one another. Lindley on Partnership (14th Edition, pages 194-95) E cites Blissett v. Daniel (1) as an authority for the proposition that :\n\n\"The utmost good faith is due from every member of a partnership towards every other member; and if any dispute arise between partners touching any transaction by which one seeks to benefit himself at the expense of the firm, he will be required to show, not only that he has the law on his side, but that his conduct will bear to be tried by the highest standard of honour\".\n\nThe fact that the company is prosperous and makes substantial profits is no obstacle to its being wound up if it is just and equitable to do so. This position was accepted in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Yenidge Tobucco Co. (2) and of the Privy Council in Loch v. John Blackwood (3).\n\n(1) 68 E.R. 1024.\n\n(2) [1916] 2 Ch. 426.\n\n(3) [1924] A.C. 783.\n\nThe question sometimes arises as to whether an action in contravention of law is per se oppressive. It is said, as was done by one of us, N.H. Bhagwati J. in a decision of the Gujarat High Court in S.M. Ganpatram v. S:iyaji Jubilee Cotton & Jute Mills Co., (1) that \"a resolution passed by the directors may be perfectly legal and yet oppressive, and conversely a resolution which is in contravention of the law may be in the interests of the shareholders and the company\". On this question, Lord President Cooper observed in Elder v. Elda (2):\n\n\"The decisions indicate that conduct which is techni cally legal and correct may nevertheless be such as to justify the application of the 'just and equitable' jurisdiction, and, conversely, that conduct involving illegality and contraven tion of the Act may not suffice to warrant the remedy of winding up, especially where alternative remedies are available. Where the 'just and equitable' jurisdiction has been applied in cases of this type, the circumstances have always, I think, been such as to warrant the inference that there has been, at least, an unfair abuse of powers and an impairment of confidence in the probity with which the company's affairs are being 'conducted, as distinguished from mere resentment on the part of a minority at being outvoted on some issue of domestic policy\".\n\nNeither the judgment of Bhagwati J. nor the observations in Elder are capable of the construction that every illegality is per se oppressive or that the illegality of an action does not bear upon its oppressiveness. In Elder a complaint was made that Elder had not received the notice of the Board meeting. It was held that since it was not shown that any prejudice was occasioned thereby or that Elder could have bought the shares had he been present, no complaint of oppression could be entertained merely on the ground that the failure to give notice of the Board meeting was an act of illegality. The true position is that an isolated act, which is contrary to law, may not necessarily and by itself support the inference that the law was violated with a ma/a fide intention or that such violation was burdensome, harsh and wrongful. But a series of illegal acts following upon one another can, in the context, lead justifiably to the conclusion that they are a part of the same transaction, of which\n\n(1) [1964] 34 Company Cases 830-31.\n\n(2) (1952] s.c. 49.\n\n. ..,.\n\nN.J.J.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 747\n\nthe object is to cause or commit the oppression of persons against A whom those acts are directed. This may usefully be illustrated by reference to a familiar jurisdiction in which a litigant asks for the transfer of his case from one Judge to another.\n\nAn isolated order passed by Judge which is contrary to law will not normally support the inference that he is biassed; but a series of wrong or illegal orders to the prejudice of a party are generally accepted as suppor- B ting the inference of a reasonable apprehension that the Judge is biassed and that the party complaining of the orders will not get justice at his hands.\n\nIn England, after the decision of the House of Lords in Meyer,\n\n(supra) a restricted interpretation has been given to section 210 by the Court of Appeal in re Jermyn St. Turkish B; ahs, (1) which has adversely criticised by writers on Company Law (see Palmer's Company Law, 22nd ed., page 613, paras 57-06, 57-07; Gore Brown on Companies, 43rd ed., para 28-12). In India, this restrictive development has no place, for, .in S.P. Jain v. Kalinga Tubes, (2) Wanchoo J. accepted the broad and liberal interpretation given to the C')urt's powers in Meyer.\n\nIn Kalinga Tubes, Wanchoo J. referred to certain decisions under section 210 of the English Companies Act including Meyer\n\n(supra) and observed :\n\n\"These observations from the four cases referred to above apply to section 397 also which is almost in the same words as section 210 of the English Act, and the question in each is whether the conduct of the affairs of the company, by the majority shareholders was oppressive to the minority shareholders and that depends upon the facts proved in a particular case. As has already been indicated, it is not enough to show that there is just and equitable cause for winding up the company, though that must'be shown as preliminary to the application of section 397. It must further be &hown that the conduct of the majonty\n\nshareliolders was oppressive to the minority as members and this requires that events have to be considered not in isolation but as a part of a consecutive story. There must be continuous acts on the part of the majority shareholders,\n\n(!) (1971) 3 All ER. 184.\n\n(2) [1965j 2 S.C.R. 720, 737,\n\ncontinuing upto the date of petition, showing that the affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members. The conduct must be burdensome, harsh [and wrongful and mere lack of confidence between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders would not be enough unless the lack of confidence springs from oppression of a minority by a majority in the management of the company's affairs, and such opperssion must involve at least an element of lack of probity of fair dealing to a member in the matter of his proprietary rights as a shareholder. It is in the light of these principles that we have to consider the facts ........ . with reference to section 397''.\n\n(page 737)\n\nAt pages 734-735 of the judgment in Kalinga Tubes, Wanchoo J. has reproduced from the judgment in Meyer, the five points which D were stressed in Elder. The fifth point reads thus :\n\n\"The power conferred on the Court to grant a remedy in an appropriate case appears to envisage a reasonably wide discretion vested in the Court in relation to the order sought by a complainer as the appropriate equitable E alternative to a winding-up order\".\n\nIt is clear from these various decisions that on a true construction of section 397, an unwise, inefficient or careless conduct of a Director in the performance of his duties cannot give rise to a claim for relief under that section.\n\nThe person complaining of oppression must show that he has been constrained to submit to a conduct\n\nwhich lacks in probity, conduct which is unfair to him and which causes prejudice to him in the exercise of his legal and proprietary rights as shareholder. It may be mentioned that the Jenkins Committee on Company Law Reform had suggested the substitution of the word 'Oppression' in section 210 of the English Act by the words 'unfairly prejudical' in order to make it clear that it is not necessary to show that the act complained of is illegal or that it constitutes an invasion of legal rights (see Gower's Company Law, 4th edn., page 668).\n\nBut that recommendation was not accepted and the English Law remains the same as in Meyer and in Re H.R.\n\nN.I.I.L. v. NJ.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 749\n\nHarmer Ltd., (1) as modified in Re Jermyn St. Turkish Baths.\n\n(supra) We have not adopted that modification in India.\n\nHaving seen the legal position which obtains in cases where a member or members of a company complain under section 397 of the Companies Act that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to him or them, we can proceed to consider the catena of facts and circumstances on which reliance is placed by the Holding Company in support of its case that the conduct of the Board of Directors of NIIL constitutes an act of oppression against it.\n\nThere is, however, one matter which has to be dealt with before adverting to facts, namely, the provisions of FERA their impact on the working of NIIL and on the right of the Holding Company to continue to hold its shares in NIIL. This we consider necessary to discuss before an appraisal of the factual situation since, without a proper understanding of the working of FERA, it would be impossible to appreciate the turn of intertwined events.\n\nIt is in the setting of FERA that . the significance of the various happenings can properly be seen.\n\nThe Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 46 of 1973, is \"An Act to consolidate and amend the law regulating certain payments, dealings in foreign exchange and securities, transactions indirectly affecting foreign exchange and the import and export of currency and bullion, for the conservation of the foreign exchange resources E of the country and the proper utilisation thereof in the interests of the economic development of the country\". It repealed the earlier Act, namely, The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and came into force on January 1, 1974.\n\n\"Person resident in India\" is defined in clause (p) of section 2 to mean:\n\n(i) a citizen of India, who has, at any time after the 25th day of March 1947, been staying in India, but does not include a citizen of India who has gone out of, or stays outside, India, in either case-\n\n(a) for or on taking up employment outside- India, or\n\n,, ·~~~\"'\n\n(b) for carrying on outside India a!business ot'Jvocation outside India, or\n\n(1) [1959] WLR 62.\n\n(c) for any other purpose, in such circumstances as would indicate his intention to stay outside India for an uncertain period;\n\n(ii) a citizen of India, who having ceased by virtue of paragraph (a} or paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of subclause (i) to be resident in India, returns to or stays in India, in either case-\n\n(a) for or on taking up employment in India, or\n\n(b) for carrying on in India a business or vocation in India, or\n\n(c) for any other purpose, in such circumstances as would indicate his intention to stay in India for an uncertain period.\n\n\"Person resident outside India\" according to clause (q) means \"a person who is not resident in India\". Under clause (u) \"security\" means \"shares, stocks, bonds,\" etc.\n\nSection 19 (1) provides :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in section 81 of the Companies Act, 1956, no person shall, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank.\n\n(a) take or send any security to any place outside India;\n\n(b) transfer any security, or create or transfer any interest in a security, to or in favour of a person resident outside India;\n\n(d) issue, whether in India or elsewhere, any security which is registered or to be registered in India, to a person resident outside India;\"\n\nSection 29 which is directly relevant for our purpose reads thus :\n\n., •. .,..,.\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.)\n\n\"29. {I) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 28 and section 47 and notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, a person resident outside India (whether a citizen of India or not) or a person who is not a citizen of India but is resident in India, or a company (other than a banking company) which is not incorporated under any law in force in India or in which the non-resident interest is more than forty per cent, or any branch of such company, shall not, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank,-\n\n{a) carry on in India, or establish in India a branch, office or other or other place of business for carrying on any activity of a trading, commercial or industrial nature, other than an activity for the carrying on of which permission of the Reserve Bank has been obtained under section 28; or\n\n(2) {a) where any person or company (including its branch) referred to in sub-section (I) carries on any :ictivity referred to in clause( a) of that sub-section at the commencement of this Act or has established a branch, office or other place of business for the carrying on of such activity at such commencement, then, such person or company (including its branch) may make an application to the Reserve Bank within a period of six months from such commencement or such further period as the Reserve Bank may allow in this behalf for permission to continue to carry on such activity or to continue the establishment of the branch, office or other place of business for the carrying on of such activity, as the case may be.\n\n(b) Every application made under clause (a) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be specified by the Reserve Bank.\n\n(c) Where any application has been made under\n\nclause (a), the Reserve Bank may, after making\n\nsuch inquiry as it may deem fit, either allow the H application subject to such conditions, if any, as\n\nthe Reserve Bank may think fit to impose or reject the application :\n\n(4) (a) Where at the commencement of this Act any person or company (including its branch) referred to in subsection (I) holds any shares in India of any company referred to in clause (h) of that sub-section, then, such person or company (including its branch) shall not be entitled to continue to hold such shares unless before the expiry of a period of six months from such commencement or such further period as the Reserve Bank may allow in this behalf such person or company (including its branch) has made an application to the Reserve Bank in such form and containing such particulars as may be specified by the Reserve Bank for permission to continue . to hold such shares.\n\n(b) Where an application has been made under clause (a) the Reserve Bank may, after making such inquiry as it may deem fit, either allow the application subject to such conditions, if any, as the Reserve Bank may think fit to impose or reject the application :\"\n\nIt is clear from these provisions that NIIL, being a Company in which the non-resident interest of the Holding Company was more than 40%, could not carry on its business in India except with the permission of Reserve Bank of India. An application for permission to continue to carry on such business had to be filed within a period of six months from the commencement of the Act or such further period as the Reserve Bank may allow.\n\nThe time for filing the application was extended in all cases by two months and, therefore, it could be filed by August 31, 1974. NIIL filed its application three days late on September 3, 1974, and the application was granted by the Reserve Bank on certain condi tions, by its letter dated May 10, 1976. Under the terms and conditions imposed by the Reserve Bank, the non-resident interest of the Holding Company, which came to about 60%, had to be brought down to 40% within one year of the receipt of the letter dated May JO, 1976, that is to say before May 17, 1977.\n\nN.l.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 753\n\nBy reason of section 29 (4) of FERA, the Holding Company too had to apply for permission to hold its shares in NIIL. It applied to the Reserve Bank for a Holding licence on September 18, 1974.\n\nThe application which was filed late by . I 8 days is still pending with the Reserve Bank and is likely to be disposed of after the non-resident interest of the Holding Company in NIIL is reduced to 40%.\n\nThere is a sharp controversy between the parties on the question as to whether May 17, 1977 was a rigid dead-line by which the reduction of the non-resident interest had to be achieved or whether NIIL could have applied to the Reserve Bank before that date for extension of time to comply with the Bank's directive, in which case, it is urged, no penal consequences would have flown.\n\nWe will deal later with this aspect of the matter, including the question of business prudence involved in applying to the Reserve Bank for such an extension of time.\n\nShri Nariman raised at the outset an objection to a finding of mala fides or abuse of the fiduciary position of Directors being recorded on the basis merely of affidavits and the correspondence, against the NHL' S Board of Directors or against Devagnanam and his group. He contends: Under the Company Court Rules framed by this Court, petitions, including petitions under section 397, are to be , heard .in the open court (Rules I I (12) and Rule 12 (I), and the practice and procedure of the Court and of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to such petitions (Rule 6).\n\nUnder Order XIX Rule 2 of the Code, it is open to a party to request the Court that the deponent of an affidavit should be asked to submit to cross-examination.\n\nNo such request was made in the Trial Court for the cross-examination of Devagnanam who, amongst all those who filed their affidavits, was the only person having personal knowledge of everything that happened at every stage.\n\nWhy he did or did not do certain things and what was his attitude of mind on crucial issues ought to have been e.licited in cross-examination. It is not permissible to rely argumentively on inferences said to arise from statements made in the correspondence,\n\nunlss such inferences arise irresistibly from admitted or virtually admitted facts.\n\nThe verification clause of Mackrael's affidavit\n\nshows that he had no personal knowledge on most of the material points. Raeburn who, according to Mackrael, was the Chief H negotiator on behalf cf the Holding Company in the Birmingham meeting did not file any affidavit at all.\n\nWhitehouse, the Secretary\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the Holding Company and N.T. Sanders who was the sole repre\n\nsentative of the Holding Company n NTIL's Board of Directors, did file affidavits but they are restricted to the question of the late receipt of the letter of offer of shares and the notice for the Board meeting of May 2, 1977.\n\nTheir affidavits being studiously silent on all other important points and the affidavit filed on behalf of the Holding Company being utterly inadequate to support the charg1~ of ma/a fides or abuse of the Directors' fiduciary powers, it was absolutely essential for the Holding Company to adduce oral evi dence in support of its case . or at least to ask that Dev agnanam should submit himelf for cross-examination. This, according to Shri Nariman, is a fundamental.infirmity from which the case of the Holding Company suffers and therefore, this Court ought not to record a finding of ma/a fides or of abuse of powers, especially when such findings are likely to involve grave consequences, moral and material, to Devagnanam and jeopardise the very functioning of NIIL itself.\n\nIn support of his submission, Shri Nariman has relied upon many a case to show that issues of ma/a fides and abuse of fiduciary powers are almost always decided not on the basis of affidavits but on oral evidence.\n\nSome of the case> relied upon in this connection are : Re. Smith & Fawcett Ltd.,(1) Nana/al Zaver v. Bombay Life Assurance,(') Plexcy v. Mitis(') Hogg v. Cramphorn(4) Mills\n\nv. Mills, (5) Harlowe's Nominees(6) and Howard Smith v. Amphol.C)\n\nWe appreciate thatit is generally unsatisfac_tory to record a finding involving grave consequences to a person on the basis of affidavits and documents without asking that person to submit to cross-examination. It is true that men may lie but documents will not and often, documents speak louder than words.\n\nBut a total reliance on the written word, when probity and fairness of conduct are in issue, involves the risk that the person accused of wrongful conduct is denied an opportunity to controvert the inferences said to arise from the documents.\n\nBut then, Shri Nariman's objection seems to us a belated attempt to avoid an inquiry into the\n\n(1) [1942] l All ER 542, 545.\n\n(2) [1950) S.C.R. 390, 394.\n\n(3) [1920) l Chancery 77.\n\n(4) [1967) l Chancery 254, 260.\n\n(5) 60 C.L.R. 150, 160.\n\n(6) 121 CLR .483, 485.\n\n(7) [1974) A.C. 821, 831.\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 755\n\nconduct and motives of Devagnanam. The Company Petition was argued both in the Trial Court and in the Appellate Court on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties, the correspondence and the documents.\n\nThe learned Appellate Judges of the High Court have observed in their judgment that it was admitted, that before the learned trial Judge, both sides had agreed to proceed with the matter on the basis of affidavits and correspondence only and neither party asked for a trial in the sense of examination of witnesses.\n\nIn these circumstances, the High Court was right in holding that, having taken up the particular attitude, it was not open to Devagnanam and his group to cont'i:nd that the allegation of ma/a fides could not be examined, on the basis of affidavits and the correspondence only.\n\nThere is ample material on the record of this case in the form of affidavits, correspondence and other documents, on the basis of which proper and necessary inferences can safely and legitimately be drawn.\n\nBesides, the cases on which counsel relies do not all support his submission that from mere affidavits or correspondence, ma/a fides or breach of fiduciary poVI er ought not to be inferred. In Re Smith & Fa wee// Ltd., (supra) Lord Greene, after stating that he strongly disliked being asked on affidavit evidence alone to draw up inferences as to the bona fides or mala fides of the actors, added that this did not. mean that it is illegitimate in a proper case to draw inferences as to bona fides or ma/a fides in cases, where there is on the face of the affidavits, sufficient justification for doing so.\n\nIn Nana/al Zaver, (supra) the judgment of Kania C.J. contains.a statement at page 394 that 'Considerable evidence was led in the triai Court on the question of bona fides' but it is not clear what kind of evidence was so led and besides, the fact that oral evidence was led in some cases does not mean that it must be ·\n\nled in all cases or that without it, the matter in issue cannot be found upon.\n\nWe may mention that in Punt v. Symons,(1) Fraser v.\n\nWhalley(') and Hogg v. Cramphorn, (supra) the breach of fiduciary duty was inferred from affidavit evidence.\n\nWe have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the submission that we ought not to record a finding of ma/a jides or abuse of fiduciary power on the basis of the affidavits, correspondence and the\n\n (1) [1903) 2 Ch. 506. (2)\n\n71 E.R. 361.\n\n756 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 s.c.R.\n\nother documents which are on the record of the case.\n\nMay it be said that these are on the record by consent of parties. Not merely that, but more documents were placed on the record, mostly by consent of parties, as the case progressed from stage to stage.\n\nA very important document, namely, Devagnanam's telex to Raeburn dated May 25, 1977 was put on the record for the first time before us since Shri Nariman himself desired it to be produced, waiving the protection of the caveat \"without prejudice\". That shows that the parties adopted willingly a mode of trial which they found to be most convenient and satisfactory.\n\nThat takes us to the question as to whether on the basis of the material which is on the record of the case, it can be said that the decision taken by NIIL's Board of Directors in their meetings of April 6 and May 2, 1977 constitute acts of oppression as against the Holding Company. The case of the Holding Company as put forward by Shri Seervai is like this :\n\n(i) Devagnanam kept Raebum and Coats under the impressiqn that negotiations were still going on and were not to be treated as concluded while, in reality, he had made up his mind to treat the matter as at an end.\n\n(ii) He kept the Holding Company in total ignorance of the steps which he was taking in behalf of the issuance and allotment of the rights shares. The copy of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 30, 1977 which is said to have spurred the decision taken in the meetings of April 6 was not sent to the Holding Company though Devagnanam had stated in his letters dated April 12 to Raeburn that the said copy was being enclosed along with that letter.\n\nDeliberately and designedly, the letter of offer dated April 14, 1977 meant for the Holding Company in England was not posted until April 27.\n\nSimilarly, the notice calling a meeting of the Board on May 2 was not posted till April 27. The notice to Manoharan too was posted as late as on April 27, since he was believed to be: siding with Coats. The letter of offer and the notice of meeting of May 2 which were posted at Madras on April 27 were received by the Holding Company on May 2, after the Board's meeting for allotment of rights shares was held.\n\nN.J.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 757\n\n(iii) The Reserve Bank of India was not informed of the proposal to issue right shares to the existing shareholders although it was the most obvious thing to do, in response to its Jetter dated March 30, 1977, calling upon NHL to submit its proposal for reducing its non-resident interest without delay.\n\n(iv) No application was made to the Controller of Capital Issues for fixing the premium on rights shares, notwithstanding that the Reserve Bank had informed NHL, that if necessary, an application to that effect may be made to the Cont-roller of Capital Issues.\n\n(v) The whole idea was to cut off all sources of information from Raeburn and Coats and to confront them with the fait accompli of the allotment of rights shares to the Indian shareholders, including the shares formally offered to the Holding Company which were not allotted to it on the ground of its non-compliance with the letter of offer.\n\n(vi) The agenda of the meetings of April 6 and May 2, 1977 was purposely expressed in vague terms : 'Policylndianisation', in order that the Holding Company E should not know that the reduction of the non-resident interest was proposed to be effected by the issue of rights shares.\n\nBy suppressing from the knowledge of the Holding Company what was its right to know, and what was the duty of the Board's Secretary to convey to it, Devagnanam succeeded in achieving his F purpose on the sly and pre-empted any action by the Holding Company to restrain the holding of the meeting, the issue of rights shares and the allotment thereof exclusively to the existing shareholders (barring Manoharan).\n\n(vii) Silverston was appointed as an additional Director in the meeting of April 6 to make up the quorum of two \"disinterested\" directors even though he was in the true sense not a disinterested person in the decision taken in thaf meeting. The appointment of additional directors was not even an item on the agenda of the meeting.\n\nA (viii) Devagnanam was emboldened to take this course because he believed that no matter how wrongful his conduct, he could count upon the support of NEWEY\n\nto see that he was not brought to book in a court of justice for his wrongful conduct. He even attempted to thwart the Company Petition and render it infru- B ctuous by persu_adiug NEWEY to withdraw the power of attorney executed by them, authorizing the filing of the petition.\n\n(ix) In these machinations, Devagnanam was actuated by the sole desire to acquire the control of NHL for his personal benefit, by ousting the Holding Company from its control over the affairs of NHL.\n\n(x) In fact, the rights shares were issued at par, though their market value was far greater, as a measure of personal aggrandisement in the supposition and fore- D thought that such shares will inevitable go, to Devagnanam and his group, This was blantantly in breach of the fiduciary obligation of the Directors.\n\n(xi) By these means and methods, which totally lacked in probity, Devagnanam succeeded in converting the existing majority into a minority and the minority into a majority, a conduct which is burdensome, harsh and unlawful, qua the existing majority.\n\nAccording to Shri Seervai, the question before the Com:t is not whether the issue of rights shares to the existing Indian shareholders only, amounted to oppression but whether, the offer of rights shares to all existing shareholders of NIIL but the issue of rights shares to existing Indian shareholders only, constituted oppression of the Holding Company on the facts and circumstances disclosed in the case. This argument raises questions regarding the interpretation of sections 43A and 81 of the Companies Act, 1956.\n\nThese contentions of the Holding Company have been controverted by Shri Nariman, according to whom, the appellate Court has taken a one-sided view of the matter which is against the weight of evidence on the record.\n\nCounsel contends that Devagnanam had done all that lay in his power to persuade the Holding Company to disinvest so as to reduce its holding in NIIL to 40%, that the Direc-\n\nN.I.N.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 759\n\ntors of NIIL were left with no option save to decide upon the issue of rights shares, since disinvestment was a matter of the Holding Company's volition, that the wording of the agenda of the meetings of April 6 and May 2 conveyed all that there was to say on the subject since, in the background of the negotiations which had taken place between the parties, it was clear that what was meant by 'Policy-Indianization' and 'Allotment of Shares' was the allotment of rights shares in order to effectuate the policy of the Reserve Bank that the Indianization of the Company should be achieved by the reduction of the non-resident holding to 40%, that Coats refused persistently, both actively and passively, either to disinvest or to consider the only other alternative of the issue of rights shares, and that the impugned decisions were taken by the Board of Directors objectively in the larger interests of the Company.\n\nAccording to Shri Nari man, Coats left no doubt by their attitude that their real interest lay in their worldwide business and they wanted to bring the working of NIIL to a grinding halt with a view to eliminating an established competitor from their business. It is denied by counsel that important facts or circumstances were deliberately suppressed from the Holding Company or that the letter of oJer and the notice of the Board's meeting of May 2 were deliberately posted late on April 27. It is contended that neither by the issue of rights shares nor by the failure to give the right of renunciation to the Holding Company was any injury caused to its proprietary rights as a shareholder in NHL. As a result of the operation of FERA, the directives issued by the Reserve Bank thereunder and because of the fact that NIIL had retained its old Articles after becoming a public company under section 43A of the Companies Act, the Holding Company could neither have participated in the issue of rights shares nor could it have renounced the rights shares offered to it in favour or'an outsider, not even in favour of a resident Indian Company like Madura Coats. It is denied that Silverston was not a disinterested Director or that his appointmant as an additional Director was otherwise invalid. Counsel sums up his argument by saying that the Board of Directors of NHL had in no manner abused its fiduciary position and that far from their conduct being burdensome, harsh and wrongful, it was the attitude of Coats which was unfair, unjust and obstructive. Coats having come into an equitable jurisdiction with unclean hands, contends Shri Nariman, no relief should be granted to them assuming for the sake of argument that Devagnanam from the position of Managing Director, are characterised by counsel as wholly uncalled for, transcending the exigencies of the situation.\n\nIt seems to us unquestionable that Devagnanam played a key role in the negotiations with the Holding Company and ultimately master-minded the issue of rights shares.\n\nHe occupied a pivotal position in NIIL, having been its Director for over twenty years and a Managing Director over fifteen years, in which capacity he held an undisputed sway over, the affairs of NHL. The Holding Company had nominated only one Director on the Board of NIIL, namely, N.T. Sanders, who resided in England and hardly ever attended the Board's meetings.\n\nDevagnanam was thus a little monarch of all that he surveyed in Ketty.\n\nHe had a large personal stake in NIIL's future since he and his group held neady 30% shares in it, the other Indian shareholders owning a mere 10%.\n\nIn the 60% share capital owned by the Holding Company, Coats and NEWEY were equal sharers with the result that Coats, NEWEY and Devagnanam each held an approximately 30% share capital in NIIL. This equal holding created tensions and rivalries betwee11 Coats and Devagnanam, NEWEY preferring to side with the latter in a silent, unspoken manner. Eventually. after the filing of the Company Petition, Coats bought over NEWEY's interest in NHL sometime in July 1977.\n\n-The picture which Devagnanam ha~ drawn of himself as a person deeply committed to Ketty, and as having built up the business with scrupulous regard to the observance of Foreign Exchange Regulations and Indian Laws in contradistinction to Coats who, he alleged, wanted to contravene the Foreign Exchange Regulations of our country is not borne out by the correspondence.\n\nIn fact, the letter which he wrote to Shread of Newey-Goodman Ltd. on August 11, 1973 (which was filed by consent in the Appeal Court) shows that he wanted to dispose of his shares at a large premium by officially receiving the par value in Rupees in India and obtaining the balance in foreign currency outside India. Nevertheless, he stated on oath in para 13 of his rejoinder affidavit that \"it is not true that in selling my shares, I wanted a part of the consideration in foreign exchange\". The said letter discloses that over and above proposing to make a large profit in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulations and the tax laws of India by receiving money outside India, Devagnanam proposed to take away from Ketty its \"select key personnel and technicians\" to Malacca and to manufacture competitively, products which were then ma°:ufactured by Needle Industries, U.K. The foot note to the letter to Shread asked him to keep these matters secret from Coats till the shares had been sold, and till the deed had been done.\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 761\n\nThere is another aspect of Devagnanam's conduct to which reference must be made. The statement made by him in para 15 of his reply affidavit denying that he was a non-resident is not entirely true because at least between August 26, 1974 and June 9, 1976 he was a non-resident within the meaning of section 2 (p) (i) (a) of FERA. By his letter dated August 26, 1974 to the Reserve Bank, he asked, though out of abundant caution, for permission under section 29 (4) of FERA to hold his shares in NIIL. He referred in that letter to his contract with Newey and Taylor under which he was to be a full-time Managing Director of that Company for five years from August 1, 1974 to July 31, 1979 and asked the Reserve Bank to determine his status. On September 3, 1975 he wrote to the Reserve Bank contending that he was a 'resident', referring this time not to his contract with Newey-Taylor but to the agreement between NILL and Newey Goodman Ltd., a Company about to be formed, under which he was to be on deputation with it as an employee of NIIL.\n\nDevagnanam's letter dated August 11, 1973 to Shread of Newey-Goodman, the gloss which he put on his status as a resident in his letters to the Reserve Bank dated August 26, 1974 and September 3, 1975 and the clever manner in which he had his status determined as a resident, cast a cloud on his conduct and credibility.\n\nAnd though, as contended by Shri Seervai, we do not propose to apply to Devagnanam's affidavit-evidence the rule of 'corroboration in material particulars' which is generally applied in criminal law to accomplice evidence, we shall have to submit Devagnanam's conduct to the closet scrutiny and statements made by him, from time to time, to the most careful examination.\n\nWe shall have to look to something beyond his own assertion in order to accept his claim or contention.\n\nShri Nariman attacked the conduct of Coats almost as plausibly as Shri Seervai attacked that of Devagnanam, though in terms of a saying in a local language we may say that 'a brick is softer than a stone', Coats being the brick. Coats, as will presently appear, are not to be outdone by Devagnanam in the matter of lack of business ethics. But that is no wonder because when the dominant motivation is to acquire control of a co.mpany, the sparring groups of shareholders try to grab the maximum benefit for themselves. If one decides to stay on in a company, one must capture its control.\n\nIf one decides to quit, one must obtain the best price for one's\n\nholding, under and over the table, partly in rupees and partly in foreign exchange. Then, the tax Jaws and the foreign exchange regulations look on helplessly, because law cannot operate in a vacuum and it is notorious that in such cases evidence is not easy to obtain.\n\nAlan Mackrael says in paragraph 20 of his reply affidavit in the Company Petition that it was made clear to Devagnanam that neither Coats nor the Needle Industries (U.K.) would ever be a party to any transaction which was illegal under the Indian law. In a letter dated May 24, 1976 to Devagnanam, A.D. Jackson of NEWEY has this to say :-\n\n•Jn broad terms the proposition is that Alan Mackrael, Martin Henry and myself should meet with you in Malacca during September to discuss arrangements whereby an Indian gentleman known to Coats would purchase both your shares and our own share of the -NINTH holding in the manner which I outlined to you on the telephone. In order to provide a base for the calculations, Kingsley is to be asked to obtain the government approved price but, of course, the basis of our discussions has been that the actual payment will be higher than this\".\n\nIn the same letter Jackson, after warning that Coats/Needle Industries (U .K.) are \"certainly not going to relinquish control of Ketty without a major struggle\", proceeds to describe the helpless condition of NEWEY by saying that in the financial position in which they found themselves, they were \"in no state to do battle with this particular giant\". Leaving aside the determination of Coats to enage in a major struggle with NIIL's Board of Directors, Jackson's letter leaves no doubt that Coats were willing to be a party to the arrangement whereby the shares of Devagnanam and NEWEY would be sold to an 'Indian gentleman', under which the actual payment would be higher than the government approved price ascertained by Kingsley, .the Secretary of Nill. This is doubtful ethics which justifies Shri Nariman's argument that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands; if he does not, he cannot ask for relief on the ground that the other man's hands are unclean. The\n\n\"Notes on further Indianization\" made by Devagnanam on April 29, 1975, at a time when the relations between the parties were not under a strain, show that N.T. Sanders who was nominated by the Holding Company as a Director of NIIL was \"aware of an inquiry from a Mr. Khaitan\". This shows that Devagnanam was not trying\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 763\n\nto dispose of his shares secretly to Khaitan and Coats were aware of A that move.\n\nIn para 20 of his reply affidavit, Alan Mackrael says that none of the proposals put forward by the Holding Company for achieving Indianization to comply with the requirements of FERA would have given the control of NHL to the Holding Company. This is falsified by Raeburn's letter dated October 25, 1976 to Devagnanam, in which he says that the idea of an outside independent party holding J 5% of the share capitat of NIIL was raised, but this did not appear to be acceptable to Coats since \"they want to achieve not only that the present Indian shareholders hold a minority but that they (Coats) hold and influence a substantial block, thereby hoping to influence NEWEY to their views\". Thus, there is a wide difference between what Coats practised earlier and pleaded later. Towards the end of paragraph 21, Mackrael asserts that the shareholders of the Holding Company, namely, Coats and NEWEY, were unanimous in the filing of the Company Petition and the prosecution of the proceedings following upon it, which is said to be clear from the fact that two powers of attorney were attested by the Directors of the Holding Company, both of whom were Directors of NEWEY also. The fact that Coats and NEWEY were not of one mind is writ large on the face of these proceedings and, in fact, the charge against NEWEY is that because of their Far-Eastern interests in which Devananam was a great.asset to them, they were supporting Devagnanam. We may in this connection draw attention to a Jetter dated June 8, 1977 by Raeburn to Mackrael, saying that the insistence of Coats ('Glasgow') to hold on to the 60% shareholding in NIIL or at least to ensure that 60% did not get into the hands of the Indian shareholders will involve a long a11d costly legal battle. Raeburn proceeds to say :\n\n\"We, as Neweys, have neither the will nor the means to participate in that battle, nor do we think it right to do so bearing in mind the legal position regarding Indianisation, the provision in the Articles and the fact that substantially the modern business of N.I.I.L. has been built up by the efforts of the present Indian shareholders\".\n\nIn paragraph 5 of the aforesaid letter, Raeburn clarifies the attitude of NEWEY by saying that if Coats were unable to agree to the\n\narrangement suggested by NEWEY, then, NEWEY will be compelled H to notify to those concerned in India that they can no longer be parties to the power of attorney granted hy the Holding Company\n\nto Mackrael or to any other proceedings in the Indian Courts. In spite of this letter of Raeburn (dated June 8, J 977), Mackrael had the temerity in his reply affidavit dated July 8, 1977, to say that Coats and NEWEY were unanimous in the prosecution of the proceedings consequent upon the filing of the Company Petition.\n\nThere was no agreement between Coats and NEWEY either in regard to lndianisation of NIIL or in regard to the legal proceedings instituted to challenge the issue of rights shares.\n\nThere are many other contradictions on material points between the actual state of affairs and what Coats represented them to be, but we consider it unnecessary to cover the whole of that field.\n\nWe will refer to one of these only, in order to show how difficult it is to choose between Coats and Devagnanam. In paragraph 19 of the Company Petition, which is sworn by Mackrael, it is stated that Devagnanam was in U.K. sometime towards the end of March 1977 and that he held several discussions with the representatives of the Holding Company. In paragraph 40 of bis reply affidavit, Mackrael says that as to the contents of paragraph 19 of the Company Petition, be himself was not present at such meeting, since it was a meeting between Devagnanam and the officials of NEWEY for the purpose of discussing matters concerning NEWEY's Far-Eastern interests. The verificat10n clause of Mackrael's affidavit in support of the Company Petition shows that the contents of paragraph 19 are based on information which be believed to be true. A clearer contradiction between the parent petition and the reply affidavit is difficult to imagine. It would appear that it was not until quite late that Coats realised that they had to plead all ignorance of the discussions which were held in U.K. towards the end of March 1977 between Devagnanam and the representatives of the Holding Company.\n\nWe will now shift our attention to another scene in order to show how unethical the Coats are.\n\nCoats' subsidiary called the Central Agency Ltd., who were sole-selling agents of NIIL's products in various markets in the world, ceased to be so after NHL put an end to the agreement with them. The Central Agency never applied during the time that they were sole-selling agents of NIIL's products for registration of the Indian Company's Trade Marks as a protective measure. The learned Trial Judge, Ramaprasada Rao, Acting C.J., delivered the judgment in the Company's Petition on May 17,\n\n1978. Immediately thereafter, Application No. 34991 of 1978 was filed by the Japanese Trade Marks Agents of Needle Industries,\n\n. / -\\'\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 765\n\nU.K., for registration of the Trade Marks 'Pony' and 'Rathna', which were the registered Indian Trade Marks of NHL. That application was made under the authority of a Power of Attorney signed by Alan Marckrael. In June 1978, Application No. 102987 was filed in Thailand on behalf of the Needle Industries U.K. as -0wners of the Trade Mark 'Pony' which is clear from the Trade Mark Attorney's letter dated January 22, 1979. In October 1978, Coats Patons, Hong Kong, got the Indian Company's Trade Mark 'Pony' registered. In November 1978, the Trade Mark Agents and Solicitors of NIIL in Hong Kong had to give a notice to Coats Patons, Hong Kong, that the latter had registered the 'Pony' Trade Mark in Hong Kong with the full knowledge that NIIL was the legal owner of that Trade Mark and threatening legal action. As a result of that notice, the Indian Company's Trade Mark 'Pony' which was registered by Coats Patons in Hong Kong as their own Trade Mark, was assigned to the Indian Company on December 21, 1978 for a nominal sum of 10 dollars. Items 7 and 8 of the minutes dated March 28, 1979 of the meeting of the interim Board of Directors of NIIL refer to the registration in Hong Kong by Coats Patons of the Indian Trade Mark of NIIL and subsequent assignment thereof to NHL when legal action was threatened. Harry Bridges, who was appointed as a temporary Managing Director by the High Court, has stated in his counter affidavit dated March 27, 1980 that the application for registration of the 'Pony' Trade Mark was made in Hong Kong and other places in order to protect that Trade Mark from its improper use by other traders. This is a lame explanation of an act of near piracy. Were this explanation true, the application for registration of the Trade Mark would have mentioned that it was being filed on behalf of NIIL, and that 'Pony was in fact the Trade Mark of NIIL. It is quite amazing that any -0ne should claim that the registration of the Trade Mark was being sought as a protective measure when a battle royal was raging between the Holding Company and NHL and after the Trial Court had delivered its judgment. We may mention that by a letter dated June 15, 1977 Mackrael had informed Devagnanam that he was removed from the Board of Directors of the Holding Company and M.D.P. Whiteford was appointed in the vacancy. The fact that Needle Industries, U.K., had surreptitiously made an application for the registration of NIIL s Trade Mark 'Pony' came to light fortuitously in January 1979 when NIIL applied for the registration\n\n-0f the 'Pony' Trade Mark in Thailand and Japan. NIIL's Trade Mark Agents there found, on inspection of the registers, that certain\n\nA applications made by Needle Industries, U.K., claiming the same mark as their own pending consi.deration.\n\nThe decision, in appeal, of the High Court appointing Harry Bridges as a Managing Director for 4 months was pronounced on October 26, 1978. As a Managing Director appointed by the Court, Bridges called a Board meeting of their members of the Board appointed by the Appellate Court, for November 2, 1978. Bridges took away many files, documents and statements from the NIIL's factory at Ketty on October 28, 1978, his explanation being that he wanted to carry these documents to Madras where the Board meeting was to be held.\n\nA little before Bridges left Ketty for Madras, be was informed that this Court had passed an interim order on November 1, 1978. iConsequently, the meeting of the 2nd November 'did not take place.\n\nBridges says that when it became clear that he was no longer required to act as a Managing Director of NIIL, he took the earliest opportunity of returning the documents which he had taken from the office of the factory at Ketty.\n\nIt is understandable that Bridges wanted to take with him certain documents to help him perform his functions as a Managing Director in the meeting of November 2, 1978.\n\nBut it is surprising that, in addition to the documents which Bridges returned on November 8, he had taken with him several other documents which he returned when pressed to do so.\n\nHe took away with him (!) Design drawing (2) Statistical Returns (3) the Master Budget summary, 1978 (4) Cash forecast for 1978-79 (5) Detailed Projet Report with cash flow forecast (6) Details of Project Investment\n\n(7) Note on activity upto October 1978 and one or two other documents. These were eventually returned by the Holding Company's Advocate, Shri Raghavan. When NIIL wrote on November 21, 1978 to Shri Raghavan asking him to call upon Bridges to confirm that he had not retained copies of any of the documents which he had removed from Ketty, Bridges replied by his letter dated November 29, 1978 that he had taken copies of such documents which he considered relevant and that he proposed to retain such copies since \"as director of the Company, I am entitled to peruse and take copies of whatever records I choose\". This is a wee bit high and mighty.\n\nThe Design drawing is not the drawing of a bungalow (with a swimming pool) which was being built for Devagnanam but it is a 'Ring spring fastener tool design'. The other documents which Bridges had taken away and of which he got copies made in assertion of his Directorial right, contain important matters like details\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 767\n\nof production, sales and exports of NIIL's products, orders outstanding and sales, the proposed additional turnover and the working capital requirements, etc.\n\nThe fact of Harry Bridges's taking away these documents and making copies thereof for his own use leaves not the slightest doubt that the motivation of Coats at all times was to advance their own world interests at the expense of NHL. In the background of such conduct, it becomes difficult to appreciate the Holding Company's contention, so strongly pressed upon us, that Coats, NEWEY and Devagnanam being in the position of partners, the greatest good faith and probity were expected to be displayed by them. The contention, as a bald proposition of law is sound.\n\nThe snag is : who should harp upon it? Not Devagnanam, we agree. But, not Coats either, we think.\n\nWe have said, while discussing the conduct of Devagnanam, that it would be difficult to accept his word unless there is support forthcoming to it from other circumstances on the record.\n\nWe feel the same about Coats. It would be equally unsafe to accept their word unless it finds support from the other facts and circumstances on the record of the case. It is true that in saying this, we have partly taken into account facts which came into existence after the\n\nCompany Petition was filed.\n\nBut those facts do not reflect a new trend or a new thinking on the part of Coats, generated by success in the litigation. Finding that they had succeeded in the High Court, Coats took courage to pursue relentlessly their old attitude with the added vigour which success brings.\n\nOn the question of oppression, there is a large mass of correspondence and other documentary evidence on the record before us.\n\nWe shall have to concentrate on the essentials by separating the chaff from the grain. In the earlier part of this judgment we have already referred to the course of events generally, which culminated in the meetings of NIIL's Board of Directors, held on April 6 and May 2, 1977. We propose now to refer to these events selectively.\n\nFERA having come into force on January I, 1974, D.P.\n\nKingsley, the Secretary-Director of NHL, applied on September 3, 1974 to the Reserve Bank for the necessary permission under section 29 (2) of that Act. The Reserve Bank intimated to NIIL by its letter dated November 5, 1975 that permission would be accorded to NIIL under section 29 (2) (a) read with section 29 (2) (c) of FERA to carry on its activities in India subject to the conditions enumerated\n\nin paragraph 2 of the letter. One of the conditions mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph was that the non-resident interest in the equity capital must be reduced to a level not exceeding 40%, within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the letter.\n\nThe Reserve Bank asked NHL to submit a scheme within a period of three months, showing how it proposed to achieve the required reduction in the non-resident interest : \"(a) whether by disinvestment by non-resident shareholders, or (b) whether by issue of additional equity capital to Indian residents to the extent necessary to finance any scheme of expansion/diversification, or (c) by both\".\n\nKingsley wrote a Jetter to Mackrael on November 19, 1975, enclosing therewith a copy of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated November 5.\n\nOn February 4, 1976 Kingsley wrote to the Reserve Bank that NHL was prepared to agree to reduce the non-resident interest in the equity capital to a level not exceeding 40% and that the Company was proposing to bring this about by disinvestment though, depending upon future developments, the Company reserved its right to reduce the non-resident interest by issue of additional equity capial to Indian shareholders.\n\nKingsley requested the Bank to extend th(~ stipulated time one year in case NHL was not able to comply with the Bank's directive by reason of circumstances beyond its control.\n\nA copy of this Jetter dated February 4, 1976 was sent by Kingsley to Whitehouse, the Secretary of the Holding Company. It is significant that there was no response as such to this communication, from the Holding Company. On May 11, 1976 the Reserve Bank oflndia sent a Jetter to NHL granting permission to it under FERA to carry on its business on certain .conditions, one of them being that the non-resident interest in the equity capital had to be reduced to a level not exceeding 40% within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the letter. The Reserve Bank stated in the aforesaid Jetter that until such time as the non-resident interest was not reduced to 40%, the manufacturing activity of the Company shall not exceed such capacity as was validly approved or recognised by the appropriate authority on December 31, 1973 and that the Company shall not expand its manufacturing activities beyond the level so approved or recognised. It is clear from this letter that all developmental activities of NHL stood frozen as of the date December 31, 1973, until the non-resident interest was reduced to 40%.\n\nThe Reserve Bank stated further in the letter that NIIL should submit quarterly reports to it indicating the progress made in implementing the reduction of the non-resident interest and that the transfer of shares from non-residents to Indian residents would be required to be confirmed by the Reserve Bank under section 19 (5) of FERA.\n\n.._ ,./. -~\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.J.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 769\n\nThe letter of the Reserve Bank was received by NIIL on May 17, 1976, which meant that tht reduction of the non-resident interest had to be achieved by May 17, 1977.\n\nIt shall have been seen that by the time the permission was granted by the Reserve Bank to NIIL in May 1976, FERA had been in force for a period of about 2l years. A period of one year and eight months had gone by since the filing by NHL of the application for dilution of the non-resident interest.\n\nOver and above that, the Reserve Bank had granted a long period of one year for bringing about the dilution of the non-resident interest. It is true that public authorities are not generally averse, in the proper exercise of their discretion,. to extending the time limit fixed by them, as and when necessary.\n\nBut an elementary sense of business prudence would dictate that the time schedule fixed bythe Reserve Bank had to be complied with.\n\nThe firm tone of the Reserve Bank's letter conveyed that it would not be easy to obtain an extension of time for complying with its directive, while the stringent conditions imposed by it1 particularly in regard to future developmental activities, dictated an early compliance with the directive.\n\nKingsley sent a letter to the Reserve Bank on May 18, 1976, confirming the acceptance of the various conditions under which permission was granted to NIIL to carry on its business. Kingsley pointed out a difficulty in implenting one of the conditions regarding the sale of petroleum products, but the Reserve Bank by its letter dated May 29, 1976 informed him that after a careful consideration of the request, the Bank regretted its inability to enhance the ceiling on the turnover from the Company's trading activity, as stipulated in the letter dated May 11, 1976.\n\nIn the meeting of the Board held on October i, 1976, Devagnanam's appointment as Managing Director was renewed for a further period of five years.\n\nRaeburn, Chairman of NEWEY who was looking after the affairs of the Holding Company, wrote to Devagnanam on October 4, 1976, complaining that it was necessary that the Holding Company should be kept informed in ample time of the Board's meetings on important organisational matters.\n\nRaeburn and Mackrael came to India to discuss the question of dilution of the non-resident holding in NHL. A meeting was\n\nheld at Ketty on October 20 and 21, 1976 in which the U.K. share- H holders were represented by Mackrael and Raeburn and the Indian shareholders by Devagnanam and Kingsley.\n\nSilverston took part\n\nin the meeting as an adviser to the Indian shareholders. Martin Henry, the Managing Director of Madura Coats which is an Indian company in which the Needle Industries (U.K.) and Cotas have substantial interest, attended the meeting and took part in the discussions.\n\nA note of the discussions which took place at Ketty on October 20 and 21 was prepared by Raeburn and forwarded along with a Jetter dated November JO, 1976 to Devagnanam, with copies to Mackrael, Newey, Jackson and Whitehouse.\n\nParagraph 2 of this note, which is important, says:\n\n\"It was agreed that Indianization should be brought about by May, 1977, as requested by Government, so as to achieve a 40% U.K. and 60% Indian shareholding\".\n\nThe main features of the discussions which took place in the Ketty meeting are these:\n\n(I) Mackrael and Martin Henry suggested acceptibility of Madura Cotas as holding part of the 60% of the equity to be held by Indian shareholders. The latter \"saw no reason to give up the right which the Indianization legislation, combined with the Company's Articles, conferred upon them and, therefore they insisted on taking up the whole of their entitlement to 60% of the\n\nequity\". Silverston who was an Englishman by nationality and a Solicitor by profession in India and was acting as an Adviser to the Indian shareholders in the Ketty meeting plainly and rightly pointed out that Government's approval of a holding by Madura Coats of 15% of NHL shares would be unlikely, because by that method Coats would indirectly and effectively with NEWEY hold over 40%, approximately 46%, share in NHL. It is apparent that this would have been a clear violation of FERA.\n\n(2) To allay the concern of U.K. shareholders when they became in minority by the Indian shareholders coming to hold 60%, some safeguards were suggested which, amongst others, were, (i) the Articles of the Company could be altered only by a special resolution which requires a 75% majority of the members voting in person or by proxy. Thus, either group of the share holders could prevent the sale of shares to any one not\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.l.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 771\n\napproved, (ii) the Board could be reconstructed as mentioned in para 4.3 of the note to give U.K. shareholders sufficient safeguards and hand in the management of the Indian Company.\n\n(3) The preferred method of transferring 20% of the equity to Indian shareholders was thought to be by sale by U.K. members of the appropriate number of shares at the price to be determined by the Government and the advice to be taken from Price Waterhouse in this regard. As an alternative it was suggested that a rights issue, with the Tndi°an shareholders taking up the U.K.\n\nMembers' rights would also be considered, provided it was demonstrated by Ketty that there was a viable development plan requiring funds that the expected NIIL cash flow could not meet. The value of the U. K. equity interest thus transferred was not to be Jess favourable than by a direct sale of shares.\n\n( 4) Approval was given in principle to the renewal of contract of Devagnanam as Managing Director of NIIL.\n\nDevagnanam agreed to devote adequate time to the affairs of Ketty and was authorised to ontinue to supervise the NEWEY affairs in Hong Kong and Malacca.\n\nAt the resumed discussion on October 21, 1976, both sides stuck to their stand. Devagnanam was insistent that he will \"not accept on behalf of the Indian shareholders anything less than the full entitlement of 60% of the shares\", while Mackrael, equally insistent, \"could not accept on behalf of NI/Coats that the full 60% be held by the present Indian shareholders, even with the safeguards and assurances discussed previously\".\n\nThe Ketty meeting thus ended in a stalemate, both sides insisting on what, what they considered to be their right and entitlement. Raeburn attempted to play the role of a mediator but failed.\n\nIn this situation, the parties decided to give further consideration to the matter and to adhere to the following time-table :\n\n\"Mid-December\n\nTAD (Devagnanam) to submit to the U.K. shareholders\n\nboth the decisions reached by the Indian shareholders as regards the 60% and the case, if any, for a Rights Issue.\n\nM id-January\n\nU.K. shareholders to decide on their reaction to the Indian shareholders' decision\".\n\nSilverston conveyed to Kingsley his regret that the Ketty meeting could product no outcome because of the attitude of Coats who wanted to put pressure on the Directors of NHL by g1vmg 15% of the shareholding to Madura Coats and thereby avoiding the provisions of FERA. This reaction of Sil verston finds support in. the reacthn of Raeburn himself, which he descrij:>ed in his letter dated October 23, 1976 to Devagnanam.\n\nRaeburn says in that letter that he had learnt from Martin Henry that Coats were keen to introduce Prym technology in India in their Madura Coats factory.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the Prym technology when introduced in Madura Coats would have created a direct competi-· tion between it and NIIL. It would also appear from Devagnanam's letter of October 21, 1976 to Jackson that Coats were intending to start an Engineering Division at Bangalore for the manufacture of Dynecast and Prym products with an investment of the tune of Rs. 3,00,00,000 (Rupees three crores).\n\nCompared with that, the interest of Coats in NIIL was just about Rs. 10 lakhs, even if the shares of NHL were to be valued at Rs. 190/- per share.\n\nDevagnanam wrote a Jetter dated December 11, 1976 to Raeburn, informing him that they had just closed the Board's meeting in which the principal subject of discussion was \"Indianiza .. tion\". Devagnanam expressed resentment of himself and his colleagues that after they had faithfully served the Holding Company for almost the whole of their working Jives, the Holding Company should be unwilling to accept them as partners, especially when they were legally entitled to be so considered.\n\nDevagnanam made it clear in this Jetter that any attempt by Coats to retain an indirect control in the management of NIIL will not be acceptable to the Indian shareholders.\n\nThen comes the important letter of December 14, 1976, which was written by Devagnanam to Raeburn. Devagnanam informed H Raeburn by that letter that he had further discussions with his colleagues and was able to persuade them to agree to a kind of\n\nPackage deal. The terms of the deal so suggested were : \"(!)\n\nN.1.1.l.. v. N.l.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 773\n\nIndianization should take place with the existing Indian shareholders acquiring 60% of the stock; (2) Mackrael and Raeburn should be taken on NIIL's Board as Directors, but in no event Martin Henry who was connected with Madura Coats which had a powerful plan of development of Prym technology; (3) the Indian shareholders were prepared to take B.T. Lee, a senior executive of Needle Industries/Coats, Studley, as a permanent wholetime Director of NIIL to be put specificalJy in charge of exports\". Some other suggestions were made by Devagnanam to show the bona fides of the Indian shereholders and to alJeviate the apprehensions in the minds of the U. K. shareholders.\n\nDevagnanam asked Raeburn to convey his reactions in the matter. This letter has been gravely commented upon by the Holding Company on the ground that it did not contemplate the issue of rig'1 ts shares. We are unable to see the validity of this criticism. There is not the slightest doubt that the Indian shareholders were insisting all along that they should become the owners of 60% of the equity capital of NHL. A simple method of bringing this about was the transfer by the Holding Company of 20% of its shareholding to the existing Indian shareholders. It was only when this plain method of bringing about reduction in the equity holding failed and the deadline fixed by the Reserve Bank was drawing nearer, that the Board of NHL decided upon the issue of rights shares, which was the only other alternative that could be conceived of for reducing the non-resident interest. The issuance of rights shares, after all, was not like a bolt from the blue.\n\nIn any event, it was mentioned in the Ketty meeting.\n\nOn Dec; ember 20, 1976 Silverston wrote a letter to Raeburn saying that he would be proceeding to U.K. early in January in connection with his personal matters and that he would then visit Rae burn also.\n\nSilverston stated candidly in t be letter that the situation which was developing between the U.K. and the Indian shareholders, if allowed to continue, could do much damage to the British interests and \"as one who is still concerned with the interests of British industry, I feel I cannot sit by and allow matters to deteriorate to their detriment, without making some attempt towards bringing the issues between the parties to a fair con clusion.\" Raeburn wrote to Kingsley on January 14,1977 stating that he had a discussion with- Silverston a couple of days back, during which Silverston had stated clearly the legal position and given his advice upon it. In the last paragraph of this letter, Rae burn said:\n\n\"We have now put our views quite clearly to Mr. Makrael and we are awaiting the reaction of Needle Industries and Coats.\n\nTherefore, I am hoping but I cannot be sure of this, to be able to let you know fairly soon what the formal decision of the U.K. shareholders is.\n\nIt needs to be emphasised, especially since its importance was not fully appreciated by the Appellate Bench of the High Court, that the Indian point of view was communicated with the greatest clarity to Raeburn in Devagnanam's letter dated December 14, 1976, which was within the time schedule which was agreed to be adhered to in the Ketty meeting.\n\nThe views of the U. K. shareholders were most certainly not communicated to the Indian shareholders by the middle of January 1977 as was clearly agreed upon in the Ketty meeting. In fact, they were never communicated.\n\nOn January 20, 1977, the Reserve Bank sent a reminder to\n\nNHL.\n\nAfter referring to the letter of May 11, 1976, the Reserve Bank asked NHL to submit at an t1arly date the progress report regarding dilution of the non-resident interest. In reply, a letter dated February 21, 1977 was sent by NIIL to the Bank, stating:\n\n\"We confirm that we are following up the matter regarding dilution of non-resident interest and we confirm our commitment to achieve the desired Indianization by the stipulated date, i.e. 17th May,\n\n1977.\"\n\nIt is very important to note that a copy of this letter was for· warded both to Whitehouse and Sanders. They must at least be' assumed to know that not only was Indianization to be achieved by May J 7, 1977, but that NHL had committed itself to do so by that date.\n\nIt is contended by Shri Seervai that the negotiations with Coats had in fact not come to an end and that Coats were never told that the compromise talks will be regarded as having failed. It is urged that Coats were all along labouring under the impression, and rightly, that the compromise proposals which were discussed with Raeburn in the meeting of March 29-31, 1977 in U.K. would be placed by Devagnanam before the Indian shareholders, and the\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 775\n\nU.K. shareholders apprised whether or not the proposals were acceptable. •\n\nShri Seervai relies strongly on a letter dated March 9, 1977 written by Raeburn to Devagnanam. After saying that on the Friday preceding the 9th March, he had discussions with Mackrael and three high-ranking personnel of Coats, Raeburn says in that letter that Coats had refused to agree that the Indian shareholders should acquire a 60% shareholding in NHL that this had created a new situation and that he was appending to the letter an outline of what he believed, but could not be sure, would be agreeable to Coats/Needle Industries.\n\nRaeburn stated further in that Jetter :\n\n\"[ know that all this will be difficult for you and your fellow Indian shareholders, but I urge you to support this view and get their acceptance, and to come here to be able to negotiate. If these or similar principles can be agreed during your visit, I have no doubt that the detailed method can be quickly arranged.\"\n\nRaeburn stated that the proposal annexed to the letter had not been agreed with Coats but he, on his own part, believed that Coats could be persuaded to agree to it. Stated briefly, the proposal\n\nannexed by Raeburn to his letter aforesaid involved (i) the existing 1£ Indian shareholders holding 49% of the sh!lres, (ii) new Indian independent institutional shareholders holding 11 % of the shares, and (iii) the existing U.K. shareholders, either directly or indirectly, holding 40% of the shares. The proposed Board of Directors was to consist of representatives of the shareholders appointed by them\n\n~~· F\n\n\"Existing Indian shareholders 3, New independent Indian shareholders 1, existing U.K. shareholders 2, and an independentlndian Chairman acceptable to all parties.\"\n\nIt is contended by Shri Seervai that these proposals are crucial for more than one reason since, in the first place, the proposal to increase the holding of the existing Indian shareholders to 49% and the offer of 11 % to new Indian independent institutional shareholders was inconsistent with the charge that Coats wanted to retain control over NHL, directly or indirectly. The second reason why it is said that the proposal is crucial is that Raeburn's letter of\n\nMarch 9 must have been received by Devagnanam before March 14 since it was replied to on the 14th. Therefore, contends Shri Seervai, the negotiations between the parties were still not at an end.\n\nCounsel says that it was open to Devagnanam to refuse to negotiate on the terms suggested and insist that the Indian shareholders must have 60 % of the shares.\n\nInstead of conveying his reactions to the proposal Devagnanam, it is contended, went to the United Kingdom to discuss the question. The minutes of discus sions which took place in U.K., Mackrael and Sanders not taking any part therein, show that NEWEY continued to plead that thi: Indian snareholders and Coats should consider the compromisi: formula and that Devagnanam undertook to put to the Indian shareholders further proposals for compromise and to consider what other proposals or safeguards they might suggest.\n\nReliance is also placed by counsel on a letter which Devagnanam wrote to Raebnm on April 5, in support of the submission that the negotiations were still not at an end.\n\nThe last but one paragraph of that letter_ reads thus :\n\n\"As undertaken, I shall place the compromise formula, very kindly suggested by you, before my colleagues later today. We shall discuss it fully at the Board Meeting tomorrow and I shall communicate . the outcome to you shortly thereafter.\"\n\nWe are unable to agree that the proposal annexed to Raeburn's letter of March 9, 1977 was either a proposal by or on behalf of Coats or one made with their knowledge and approval. Were it so, it is difficult to understand how Raeburn could write to Mackrael on June 8, 1977 that Coats were still insistent on the entire 20% of the excess equity holding not going to the existing Indian shareholders.\n\nThere is also no explanation as to why, if the proposal annexed to Raeburn's letter of March 9 was a proposal by or on behalf of Coats, Raeburn said at the U.K. meeting of March 29-31, 1977 that it was better to 'let Coats declare their hand'. It is indeed impossible to understand why Coats, on their own part, did not at time communicate any compromise proposal of theirs to the Indian shareholders directly. They now seem to take shelter behind the proposal made by Raeburn in his letter of March 9 adopting it as their own. Even in the letter which Crawford Bayley & Co., wrote on June 21, 1977 on behalf of Sanders to the Reserve Bank of India, no reference was at all made to any proposal by or on behalf of Coats to the Indian shareholders. The vague statement\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 777\n\nmade in that letter is that 'certain proposals' were being considered and would be submitted 'shortly' before the authorities.\n\nNo such proposals were ever made by the Solicitor or their client to anyone.\n\nThese letters and events leave no doubt in our mind that the negotiations between the parties were at an end that there were no concrete proposals by or on behalf of Coats which remained outstanding to be discussed by the Indian shareholders.\n\nTo repeat, Devagnanam declared his hand in his letter of December 14, 1976 by reiterating, beyond the manner of doubt, that nothing less than 60% share in the equity capital of NIIL would be acceptable to the Indian shareholders. Coats never replied to that letter nor indeed did they convey their reaction to it in any other form or manner at any time. In fact, it would be more true to say that Coats themselves treated the matter as at an end since, they were wholly opposed to the stand of the Indian shareholders that they must have 60% share in the equity capital of NHL. What happened in the meeting of April 6, 1977 has to be approached in the light of the finding that the negotiations between the parties had fallen through, that Coats had refused to declare their hand and that all that could be inferred from their attitude with a fair amount of certainty was that they were unwilling to disinvest.\n\nOn March 18, 1977 NIIL's Secretary gave a notice of the Board meeting for April 6, 1977.\n\nThe notice was admitttedly received by Sanders in U.K., well in time but did not attend the meeting. The explanation for his failure to attend the meeting is said to be that the item on the agenda of the meeting, 'Policy- Indianisation' was vague and did not convey that any\" matter of importance was going to be discussed in the meeting, like for example, the issue of rights shares. We find it quite difficult to accept this explanation. Just as a notice to quit in landlordtenant matters cannot be allowed to split on a straw, notices of Board meetings of companies have to be construed resonably, by considering what they mean to those to whom they are given.\n\nTo a stranger, 'Policy-Indianisation' may not convey much but to Sanders and the U.K. shareholders it would speak volumes.\n\nBy the time that Sanders received the notice, the warring camps were clearly drawn on two sides of the battle-line, the Indian group insisting that they will have nothing less than a 60% share in the equity capital of NIIL and the U.K. shareholders insisting with equal determination that they will not allow the existing Indian\n\n\n(1981) 3 S.C.ll.,\n\nshareholders to have anything more than 49%.\n\nIn pursuance of a resolution passed by the Board, a letter had already been written to the Reserve Bank confirming the commitment of NHL to achieve the required lndianisation by May J 7, 1977.\n\nA copy of NII L's Jetter to the Reserve Bank was sent to Sanders and Whitehouse.\n\nJn view of the fact that to the common knowledge of the two sides there were only two methods by which the desired Indianisation could be achieved, namely, either disinvestment by the Holding Company in favour of the existing Indian shareholders or a rights issue, tl:e particular item on the agenda should have left no doubt in the mind of the U. K. shareholders as to what the Board was likely to discuss and decide in the meeting of the 6th.\n\nDisinvestment stood ruled out of consideration, a fact which was within the special knowledge of the Holding Company, since whether to disinvest or not was a matter of their volition.\n\nAfter the despatch of the notice dated March 18, 1977 two important events happend. Firstly, Devagnanam went to Birmingham, where discus ions were held from March 29-31, 1977 in which lndianisation of NIIL was discussed, as shown by the minutes of that discussion. NEWEY were willing to accept lndianisation, by the existing Indian shareholders acquiring a 60~~ interest in the share capital of NIIL while \"COATS were adamantly opposed\" to that view.\n\nlt is surprising that during the time that Devagnanam was in Birmingham, Sanders did not meet him to seek an explanation of what the particular item on the agenda of the meeting of April 6 meant Sanders had received the notice of March 18 before the Birmingham discussions took place, and significantly he has ma.de no affidavit at all on the question as to why he did not meet Devagnanam in Birmingham, or why he did not attend the meeting of April 6 or what the particular item on the agenda meant to him.\n\nThe second important event which happened after the notice of March 18 was issued was that on April 4, 1977 NHL received a letter dated March 30, 1977 fro.m the Reserve Bank. The letter which was in the nature of a stern reminder left no option to NIIL's Board except to honour the commitment which it had made to the Reserve Bank.\n\nBy the letter the Reserve Bank wamed NHL : \"Please note that if you fail to comply with our directive regarding dilution of foreign equity within the stipulated period, we shall be constrained to view the matter seriously.\"\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 779\n\nWe do not see any substance in the contention of the Holding A Company that despite the commitment which NIIL had made to the Reserve Bnnk, the long time which had elapsed in the meaqwhile and the virtual freezing of its developmental activities as of December 31, 1973, NHL should have asked for an extension of time from the Reserve Bank. In the first place, it could not be assumed or predicated that the Bank would grant extension, and B secondly, it was not in the interest of NHL to ask for such an extension.\n\nThe Board meeting was held as scheduled on April 6, 1977.\n\nThe minutes of the meeting show that two directors, Sanders and\n\nM.S.P. Rajes, asked for leave of absence which was granted to them.\n\nC Sanders, as representing the U.K. shareholdes on NIIL's Board, did . not make a request for the adjournment of the meeting on the ground that negotiations for a compromise had not yet come to an end or that the Indian shareholders had not yet conveyed their response to the \"Coats' compromise formula\".\n\nNor did he communicate to the Board his views on 'Policy-Indianisation', whatever D it may have meant to him.\n\nSeven Directors were present in the me.eting, with Devagnanam in the chair at the commencement of the meeting.\n\nC. Doraiswamy, a Solicitor by profession and admittedly an independent Director, was amongst the seven. In order to complete the quorum of two \"independent\" directors, other directors being interested in the issue of rights shares, Silverston was E appointed to the Board as an Additional Director under article 97 of NIIL' s Articles of Association. Silverston then chaired the meeting, which resolved that the issued capital of the Company be increased to Rs. 48,00,000/- by the issue of 16,000 equity shares of Rs. 100/- each to be offered as rights shares to the existing shareholders in proportion to the shares held by them. The offer was decided to be F made by a notice specifying the number of shares which each shareholders was entitled to, and in case the offer was not accepted within 16 days from the date of the offer, it was to be deemed to have been declined by the shareholder concerned,\n\nThe aforesaid resolution of the Board raises three important G questions, inter alia, which have been passed upon us by Shri Seervai on behalf of the Holding Company : (1) Whether the Directors of NIIL, in issuing the rights shares, abused the fiduciary power which ' they possessed as directors to issue shares; (2) Whether Silverston was a 'disinterested Director'; and (3) Whether Siverston's appoint- H ment was otherwise invalid, sine~ there was no item on the agenda\n\nA of the meeting for tb.e appointment of an Additional Director. If Silverston 's appointment as an Additional Director is bad either because he was not a disinterested director or because there was no item on the agenda under which his appointment could be mad(:, the resolution for the issue of rights shares which was passed in the\n\nBoard's meeting of April 6 must fall because then, the necessary quorum of two disinterested directors would be lacking.\n\nOn the first of these three questions, it is contended by Shri Seervai that notwithstanding that the issues of shares is intra vires the Directors, the Directors' power is a fiduciary power, and although an exercise of such power may be formally valid, it may be attacked on the gound that it was not exercised for the purpose for which it was granted. It is urged that the issue of shares by Directors which is directed to affect the right of the majority of the shar1eholders or to defeat that majority and convert it into a minority is unconstitutional, void and in breach of the fiducia7y duty of Directors, though in certain situations' it may be ratified by the Company in the General Meeting.\n\nAny reference by the Company to a general meeting in the prrsent case, it is said, would have been futile since, without the impugned issue of rights shares, the maj_ority was against the issue. It was finally argued that good faith and honest belief that in fact the course proposed by the Directors was for the benefit of the shareholders or was bona fide believed to be for their benefit is irrelevent because, it is for the majority of the shareholders to decide as to what is for their benefit, so long as the majority does not act oppressively or illegally.\n\nCounsel relies in support of these and allied contentions on the decision of the Privy Council in Howard Smith Ltd. and of the English Courts in Fraser, Punt, Piercy and Hogg. (supra)\n\nIn Punt v. Symons, (supra) which applied the principle of Fraser v. Whalley, (supra) it was held that :\n\nWhere shares had beeen issued by the Directors. not for the general benefit of the company, but for the purpose of controllipg the holders of the greater number of shares by obtaining a majority of voting power, they ought to be restrained from h0lding the meeting at which the votes of the new shareholders were to hi.ve been used.\n\nBut Byrne J. stated :\n\nN.1.1.L. v, N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 781\n\nThere may be occasions when Directors may fairly A and properly issue shares in the case of a Company constituted like the present for other reasons. For instance it would not be at all an unreasonable thing to create a sufficient number of shareholders to enable statutory powers to be exercised.\n\nIn the instant case, the issue of rights shares was made by the Directors for the purpose of complying with the requirements of FERA and the directives issued by the Reserve Bank under that Act.\n\nThe Reserve Bank had fixed a deadline and NHL had committed itself to complying with the Bank's directive before that deadline ..\n\nPeterson J. applied the principle enunciated in Fraser and in Punt in the case of Piercy v. S. Mills & (Company Ltd. (supra) The learned Judge observed at page 84 :\n\n\"The basis of both cases is, as I understand, that Directors are not entitled to use their powers of issuing shares merely for the purpose of maintaining their control or the control of themselves and their friends over the affiairs of the company, or merely for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority of shareholders.\"\n\nThe fact that by the issue of shares the Directors succeed, also or incidep.tally, in maintaining t!ieir control over the Company or in newly acquiring it, does not amount to an abuse of their fiduciary power.\n\nWhat is considered objectionable is the use of such powers merely for an extraneous purpose like maintenance or acquisition of control over the affairs of the Company.\n\nIn Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., (supra) it was held that if the power to issue shares was exercised from an imporoper motive, the issue was liable to be set aside and it was immaterial that the issue was made in a bona fide belief that it was in the interest of the Company. Buckley J. reiterated the principle in Punt and in Piercy, (Supra) and observed :\n\n\"Unless a majority in a company is acting oppressively towards the minority, this Court should not and will not itself interfere with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights or embark upon an iuquiry into the respective merits of the views held or policies\n\nfa; oured by the majority and the minority.\n\nNor will this Court permit directors to exercise powers, which have been delegated to them by the company in circumstances which put the directors in a fiduciary position when exercising those powers, in such a way as to interfere with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights; and in a case of this kind also, in my judgment, the court should not investigate the rival merits of the views or policies of the parties.\" (p. 268)\n\nApplying this principle, it seems to us difficult to hold that by the issue of rights shares the Directors of NHL interfered in any manner with the legal rights of the majority. The majority had to disinvest or else to submit to the issue of rights shares in order to comply with the statutory requirement of FERA and the Reserve Bank's directives.\n\nHaving chosen not to disinvest, an option which was open to them, they did not any longer possess the legal right to insist that the Directors shall not issue the rights shares.\n\nWhat the Directors did was clearly in the larger interests of the Company and in obedience to their duty to comply with the law of the land.\n\nThe fact tliat while discharging that du_ty they incidentally trenched upon the interests of the majority cannot invalidate their action.\n\nThe conversion of the existing majority into a majority was a con - sequence of what the Directors were obliged lawfully to do. Such conversion was not the motive force of their action.\n\nBefore we advert to the decision of the Privy Chuncil in Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd., (supra) we would like to refer to the deeision of the High Court of Australia in Harlowe's Nominees Pty. Ltd v.\n\nWoodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Company No Liability and another, (supra) and to the Canadian decision of Berger J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, in the case of Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Miller et a/(1), both of which were consi .. dered by Lord Wilberfore in Howard Smith.\n\nOn a consideration of the English decisions, including those in Punt and Piercy, Barwick C.J. said in Harlowe' s Nominees (supra) :\n\n\"The principle is that although primarily the power is given to enable capital to be raised when required for the purposes of the company, there may be occasions when the directors may fairly and properly issue shares for other reasons, so long as those reasons relate to a\n\n(I) 33 D.L.R. (3d), 288.\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.)\n\npurpose of benefiting the company as a whole, as distinguished from a purpose, for example, of maintaining control of the company in the hands of the directors themselves or their friends.\n\nAn inquiry as to whether additional capital was presently required is often most relevant to the ultimate question upon which the validity or the invalidity of the issue depends; but that ultimate question must always be whether in truth the issue was made honestly in the interests of the company.\" (p. 493)\n\nWe agree with the principle so stated by the Australian High Court and, in our opinion, it applies with great force to the situation in the present case.\n\nIn Teck Corporation, (supra) the Court examined several decisions of the English Courts and of other Courts, including the one in Hogg. (supra) The last headnote of the report at page 289 reads thus :\n\n\"Where directors of a company seek, by entering into an agreement to issue new shares, to prevent a majority shareholder from exercising control of the company, they will not be held to have failed in their fiduciary duty to the company if they act in good faith in what they believe. on reasonable grounds, to be the interests of the company. If the directors' primary purpose is to act in the interests of the company, they are acting in good faith even though they also benefit as a result''.\n\nIn Howard Smith, no new principle was evolved by Lord Wilberforce who, distinguishing the decisions in Teck Corporation and Harlowe' s Nominees, (supra) said :\n\n\"By contrast to the cases of Harlowe and Teck, the present case, on the evidence, does not, on the findings of the trial judge, involve any consideration of management, within the proper sphere of the directors. The purpose found by the judge is simply and solely to dilute the majority voting power held by Ampol and Bulkships so as to enable a then minority of shareholders to sell their shares more advantageously. So far as authority goes, an issue of shares rurely for the purpose of creating voting power has repeatedly been condemned\". (page 837)\n\nA The dictum of Byrne J. in Punt (supra) that \"there may be reasons other than to raise capital for which shares may be issued\" was approved at page 836 and it was observed at page 837\n\n\"Just as it is established that directors, within their management powers, may take decisions against the wishes of the majority of shareholders, and indeed that the majority of shareholders cannot control them in the exercise of these powers while they remain in office (Automatic Self- Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cuninghams, (1906) 2 Ch. 34), so it must be unconstitutional for directors to use their fiduciary powers over the shares in the company purely for the purpose of destroying an existing majority, or creating a new majority which did not previously exist.\n\nTo do so is to interfere with that element of the company's constitution which is separate from and set against their powers. If there is added, moreover, to this immediate purpose, an ulterior purpose to enable an offer for shares to proceed which the existing majority was in a position to block, the departure from the legitimate use of the fiduciary power becomes not Jess, but all the greater. The right to dispose of shares at a given price is essentially an individual right to be exercised on individual decision and on which a majority, in the absence of oppression or . similar impropriety, is entitled to prevail\".\n\nIn our judgment, the decision of the Privy Council in Howard Smith,\n\n(supra) instead of helping the Holding Company goes a long way in favour of the appellants. The Directors in the instant case did not exercise their fiduciary powers over the shares merely or solely for the purpose of destroying an existing majority or for creating a new majority which did not previously exist. The expressions 'merely', 'purely', 'simply' and 'solely' virtually lie strewn all over page 837 of the report in Howard Smith. The Directors here exercised their power for the purpose of preventing the affairs of the Company from being brought to a grinding halt, a consummation devoutly wished for by Coats in the interest of their extensive world-wide business.\n\nIn Nana/ala Zaver and another v. Bombay Life Assurnnce Co.\n\nLtd., (supra) Das J., in his separate but concurring judgment deduced the following principle on the basis of the English decisions :\n\n. / 1\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 785\n\n\"It is well established that directors of a company are in a fiduciary position vis-a-vis the company and must\n\nexercise their power for the benefit of the company. If the power to issue further shares is exercised by the directors not for the benefit of the company but simply and solely for their personal aggrandisement and to the detriment of the company, the Court will interfere and prevent the directors from doing so.\n\nThe very basis of the Court's interference in such a case is the existence of the relationship of a trustee and of cestui que trust as between the directors and the company\".\n\n(pp. 419-420)\n\nIt is true that Das J. held that Singhanias were complete strangers to the company and consequently the Directors owed no duty, much less a fiduciary duty, to them.\n\nBut we are unable to agree with the contention that the observations extracted above from the judgment of Das J. are obiter.\n\nThe learned Judge has set forth the plaintiffs' contentions under three sub-heads at page 415.\n\nAt the bottom of page 419 he finished discussion of the 2nd sub-head and said : \"This leads me to a consideration of the third sub-head on the assumption that ...... the additional motive was a bad motive\". The question was thus argued before the Court and was squarely dealt with.\n\nBefore we leave this topic, we would like to mention that the mere circumstance that the Directors derive benefit as shareholders by reason of the exercise of their fiduciary power to issue shares, will not vitiate the exercise of that power. As observed by Go\\Yer in Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th edn., p. 578 :\n\n\"As it was happily put in an Australian case they are F 'not required by the law to live in an unreal region of detached altruism and to act in a vague mood of ideal abstraction from obviou~ facts which must be present to the mind of any honest and intelligent man when he exercises his power as a director\". ' G The Australian case referred to above by the learned author is Mills v. Mills, (supra) which was specifically approved by Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith.\n\nIn Mana/a Zaver (supra) too, Das J. stated at page 425 that the true principle was laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hirsche v. Sims(1), thus : H\n\n(1) [1894] A.C. 654, 660-661.\n\n._,.,,,.·'\n\n\"If the true effect of the whole evidence is, that the defendants truly and reasonably believed at the time that what they did was for the interest of the company they are not chargeable with do/us ma/us or breach of trust merely because in promoting the interest of the company they were also promoting their own, or because the afterwards sold shares at prices which gave them large profits\".\n\nWhether one looks at the matter froin the point of view expressed by this Court in Nana/a Zaver or from the point of view expressed by the Privy Council in Howard Smith, (supra) the test is the same, namely, whether the issue of shares is simply or solely for the benefit of the Directors. If the shares are issued in the larger interest of the Company, the decision to issue shares cannot be struck down on the ground that it has incidentally benefited the Directors in their capacity as shareholders. We must, therefore, reject Shri Seervai's argument that in the instant case, the Board of Directors abused its fiduciary power in deciding upon the issue of rights shares.\n\nThe second of the three questions arising out of the proceedings of the Board's meeting dated April 6, 1977 concerns the validity of the appointment of Silverston as an Additional Director.\n\nUnder section 287(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 the quorum for the said meeting of Directors was two. There can be no doubt that a quorum of two Directors means a quorum of two directors who are competent to transact and vote on the business before the Board. (see Greymouth\n\nv. Greymouth and Palmer's Company Precedents,(1) 17th Edn.: p. 579, f.n.3). , The contention of the Holding Company is that Silverston was a Director \"directly or indirectly concerned or interested\" in the arrangement or contract arising from the resolutions to offer and allot rights shares and consequently, the resolutions were invalid : fistly on the ground that they were passed by a vote of an interested director without which there would. be no quorum and secondly because, Silverston's appointment as an Additional Director was for the purpose of enabling' the said resolution to be passed for the benefit of interested directors. Relying upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. ,(2) Shri Seervai contends that section JOO of the Companies Act embodies the general rule of equity that no person who has to discharge duties on behalf of a corporate body shall be\n\n(I) [1904] l Ch. 32.\n\n(2) [1971] 41 Company Cas, 377.\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 787\n\nallowed to enter into engagements in which he has a personal interest A conflicting, or which may possibly conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect.\n\nThe reason why it is said that Silverston was interested in or concerned with the allotment of the rights shares to the existing shareholders is, firstly because at the Ketty meeting held in October B 1976 he had acted as an 'Advisor to the Indian shareholders' and secondly, because on October 25, 1976 he had written a letter to Kingsley purporting to convey his advice to the Board of Directors.\n\nThat letter contains allegations against the Needle Industries, U.K. and of Coats. In other words, it is contended, Silverston was hostile to Needle Industries, U.K., and to Coats, and no person in his position could possibly bring to bear an unbiassed or disinterested judgment on the question which arose between the Holding Company and the Indian shareholders as regards the issue of rights shares. It is also said that certain other aspects of Silverston's conduct, including his attitude in the meeting of the 6th April, show that he was an interested director.\n\nWe are unable to accept the contention that Silverston is an 'interested' director within the meaning of section 300 of the Companies Act.\n\nIn the first place, it is wrong to attribute any bias to Silverston for having acted as an adviser to the Indian shareholders in the Ketty meeting. Silverston is by profession a solicitor and we suppose that legal advisers do not necessarily have a biassed attitude to questions on which their advice is sought or tendered. The fact that Silverston was received cordially in U.K. both by Raeburn and Mackrael when he ent there in January 1977 shows that even after he had acted as an adviser to the Indian shareholders it was not thought that he was in any sense biassed in their favour. Silverston's alleged personal hostility to Coats cannot, within Jhe meaning of section 300(1) of the Companies Act, make him a person \"directly or indirectly, concerned or interested in the contract or arrangement\" in the discussion of which he had to participate or upon which he had to vote. Section 300(1) disqualifies a Director from taking part in the discussion of or voting on any contract or arrangement entered into or on behalf of the company, if he is in any way concerned or interested in that contract or arrangement. Under section 299(1) of the Companies Act, \"Every director of a Company who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, concerned or interested in a contract or arrangement or proposed contract or arrangement, entered into or to be entered into, by or on behalf of the company, shall disclose the nature of his concern or interest at a meeting of the Board\n\nof Directors.\" The concern or interest of the Director which has to be disclosed at the Board meeting must be in relation to the contrait or arrangement entered into or to be entered into by or on behalf of the company. The interest or concern spoken of by sections 299(1) and 300(1) cannot be a merely sentimental interest or ideological concern. Therefore, a relationship of friendliness with the Directors who are interested' in the contract or arrangement or even the mere fact of a lawyer-client relationship with such directors will not disqualify a person from acting as a Director on the ground of his being, under section 300(1), an \"interested\" Director. Thus, howsoever one may stretch the language of section 300(1) in the interest of purity of company administration, it is next to impossible to bring Silverston's appointment within the framework of that provision. In the Firestone\n\n(supra) the Solicitor-Director was held to be concerned or interested in the agreement for the appointment of Kilachands as selling agents, as he had a substantial shareholding in a private limited company of Kilachands. Besides, he was also a shareholder-director in various other concerns ot Kilachands.\n\nWe must, accordingly, reject the argument that Silverston was an interested airector, therefore his appointment as a Additional Director was invalid and that consequently, the resolution for the issue of rights shares was passed without the necessary quorum of two disinterested directors. We have already held that the resolution was not passed for the benefit of the Directors. There is therefore no question of Silverston's appointment having been made for the purpose of enabling such a resolution to be passed.\n\nThe third .contention, arising out of the proceedings of the meeting of 6th April, to the effect that Silverston's appointment as an Additional Director is invalid since there was no item on the agenda of the meeting for the appointment of an Additional Director is equally without substance. Section 260 of the Companies Act preserves the power of the Board of Directors to 'appoint additional Directors if such a power is conferred on the Board by the Articles of Association of the Company.\n\nWe are not concerned with the other conditions laid down in the section, to which the appointment is subject. It is sufficient to state that Article 97 of NIIL's Articles of Association confers the requisite power on the Board to appoint additional Directors.\n\nH We do not see how the appointment of an additional Director could have been foreseen before the 6th April, on which date the meeting of the Board was due to be held. The occasion to\n\nN.I.l.L. v. N.l.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 789\n\nappoint Silverston as an Additional Director arose when the Board met on 6th April, with Devagnanam in chair. Sanders was absent and no communication was received from or on behalf of the Holding Company that they had decided finally not to disinvest.\n\nThey always had the right to such a locus penitentia. Were they to intimate that they were ready to disinvest, there would have been no occasion to appoint an additional Director. That occasion arose only when the picture emerged clearly that the Board would have to consider the only other alternative for reduction of the non-resident holding, namely, the issue of rights shares. It is for this reason that the subject of appointment of an additional Director could not have, in the then state of facts, formed a part of the Agenda. Silverston's appointment is, therefore, not open to challenge on the ground of want of agenda on that subject.\n\nIt is necessary to clear a misunderstanding in regard to the Directors to issue shares. It is not the law that the power to shares can be used only if there is need to raise additional capital. It is\n\ntrue that the power to issue shares is given primarily to enable D capital to be raised when it is required for the purposes of the company but that power is not conditioned by such need.\n\nThat power can be used for other reasons as, for example, to create a sufficient number of share-holders to enable the company to exercise statutory powers (Punt v. Symons and Co.), (Supra) or to enable it to comply with legal requirements as in the instant case. In Hogg v.\n\nE Cramphorn (supra). Buckley J. (p 267) agreed with the law of Byrne J. in Punt. And so did Lord Wilberforce (pp 83 5-836) in Howard\n\nSmith (supra) where he said :\n\n\"It is, in their Lordships' opinion, too narrow an approach to say that the only valid purpose for which shares may be issued is to raise capital for the company.\n\nThe discretion is not in terms limited in this way : the law should not impose such a limitation on Directors' powers.\n\nTo define in advance exact limits beyond which directors 'must not pass is, in their Lordships' view, impossible. This clearly cannot be done by enumeration, since the variety of different types of Company in different situations cannot be anticipated\".\n\nThe Australian decision in Harlowe Nominees (supra) took the same view of the directors' power to issue shares. It was said therein :\n\n\"The principle is that although primarily the power is given to enable capital to be raised when required for the\n\npurposes of the company, there may be occasions when the directors may fairly and properly issue shares for other reasons, so long as those reasons relate to a purpose of benefiting the company as a whole, as distinguished from a purpose, for example, of maintaining control of the company in the hand of the directors themselves or their friends\".\n\nWe have already expressed our view that the rights share were issued in the instant case in order to comply with the legal requirements, which, apart from being obligatory as the only viable course open Lto the Directors, was for the benefit of the company since, otherwise, its developmental activities would have stood frozen as of December 31, 1973.\n\nThe shares were not issued as a part of takeover war between the rival groups of shareholders.\n\nThe decision to issue rights shares was assailed on the ground also that the company did not, as required by the Reserve Bank's letter dated May 11, 1975 submit any scheme indicating whether the:\n\nreduction in the non-resident interest was proposed to be brought about by issue of additional equity capital to Indian residents to the extent necessary to finance any scheme of expansion or diversification.\n\nIt is true that by the aforesaid letter, the Reserve Bank had asked NHL to report to it as to how the Company proposed to reduce the non-resident interest: whether by disinvestment by:non-resident shareholders, or by issue of additional equity capital to Indian residents to the extent necessary to finance any scheme of expansion/diversifl1cation, or by both.\n\nWe are, however, unable to read the Bank's letter as requiring or asking the Company not to issue the additional capital unless it was necessary to do so for financing a scheme of expansion or diversification.\n\nThe Reserve Bank could not have intended to impose any such condition by way of a general direction in face of the legal position, which we have 5et out above, that the power of the Directors to issue shares is not conditioned by the need for additional capital. We are not suggesting that the Reserve Bank, in the exercise of its statutory functions, cannot ever impose su1; h\n\nconditions as it deems appropriate, subject to which alone a new issue may be made.\n\nBut neither the wording of the Bank's letter nor the true legal position justifies the stand of the Holding Company. The minutes of the Ketty meeting of October 20-21, 1976 saying that it was agreed that the rights issue, with the Indian share-holders taking up the U.K. members' rights, would be considered provided it was demonstrated by NIIL that \"there is a viable development plan requiring funds that the expected NIIL cash flow\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 791\n\ncannot meet\", cannot also justify the argument that the p)Wer of the company to issue rights shares was, by agreement, conditioned by the need to raise additional capital for a development plan. In fact, the occasion for consideration by the Holding Company of NIIL's proposal to issue rights shares did not arise, since the Holding Company virtually boycotted the meeting of April 6.\n\nAssuming for the sake of argument that there was any such understanding between the parties, the minutes of the meeting of April 6 show that the Company needed additional capital for its expan sion. The minutes say :\n\n\"As per the final budget for the year 1977, the working capital requirements amounted to nearly Rs. 100 lakhs and even after tapping the facilities that we will be entitled to obtain from the Banking sector, we will be left with a gap of about Rs. 25 lakhs which can be met by only in• creasing equity capital and attracting deposits from public''.\n\nThere is no reason to believe that this statement does not accord 1\n\nwith the economic realities of the situation as assessed by the Directors of the Company.\n\nFinaily, it is also not true to say, as a statement of law, that Directors have no power to issue .shares at par, if their market E price is above par. These are primarily matters of policy for the Directors to decide in the exercise of their discretion and no hard and fast rule can be laid down to fetter that discretion. As obverved by Lord Davey in Hilder and others v. Dexter(1).\n\n\"I am not aware of any law which obliges a company F to issue its shares above par because they are saleable at a premium in the market. It depends on the circumstances of each case whether it will be prudent or even possible to do so, and it is a question for the directors to decide\".\n\nWhat is necessary to bear in mind is that such discretionary powers in company administration are in the nature of fiduciary powers and must, for that reason, be exercised in good faith.\n\nMala fides vitiate the exercise of such discretion. We may mention that in the past, whenever the need for additional capital was felt, or for other reasons, NHL issued shares to its members at par.\n\n(I) [1902) A.C. 474, 480.\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that Devagnanam and his group acted in the best interests of NIIL in the matter of the issue of rights shares and indeed, the Board of Directors followed in the meeting of the 6th April a course which they bad no option but to adopt and in doing which, they were solely actuated by the consideration as to what was in the interest of the company. The shareholder-Directors who were interested in the issue of rights shares neither participated in the discussion of that question nor voted upon it. The two Directors who, forming the requisite quorum, resolved upon the issue of rights shares were Silverston who, in our opinion, was a disinterested Director and Doraiswamy, who unquestionably was a disinterested Director.\n\nThe latter has been referrred to in the company petition, Mackrael's reply affidavit and in the Holding Company's Memorandum of Appeal in the High Court as \"uninterested\", \"disinterested\" and \"independent\". At a crucial time when Devagnanam was proposing to dispose of his shares to Khaitan, Sanders asked for Doraiswamy's advice by his letter dated August 6, 1975 in which he expressed \"complete confidence\" in Doraisway in the knowledge that the Holding Company could count on his guidance. Disinvestment by the Holding Company, as one of the two courses which could be adopted for reducing the non-resident interest in NHL to 40% stood ruled out; on account of the rigid attitude of Coats who, during the period between the Ketty meeting of October 20-21, 1976 and the Birmingham discussions of March 29-31, 1977 clung to their self-interest, regardless of the pressure f FERA, the directive of the Reserve Bank of India and their transparent impact on the future of NHL. Devagnanam and the disinterested Directors, having acted out of legal compulsion precipitated by . the obstructive attitude of Coats and their action being in the larger interests of the company, it is impossible to hold that the resolution passed in the meeting of April 6 for the issue of rights shares at par to the existing shareholders of NIIL constituted an act of oppression against the Holding Company.\n\nThat cannot, however, mark the end of the case because 2nd May has still to come and Shri Seervai's argument is that the true question before the Court is whether the offer of rights shares to all existing shareholders of NHL but the issue of rights shares to existing Indian shareholders only, constitutes oppression of the Holding Company.\n\nThat takes us to the significant, and if we may so call them, sordid, happenings between April 6 and May 2, 1977.\n\nDevagnanam wrote a letter to Raeburn on April 12, 1977 stating that a copy of\n\n. / \\\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 793\n\nthe Reserve Bank's letter dated March 30, 1977 was enclosed therewith. It was in fact not enclosed. Pursuant to the decision taken in the Board's meeting of April 6, a letter of offer dated April 14 was prepared by NIIL. Devagnanam's letter to Raeburn dated April 12, (without a copy of the Reserve Bank's letter da!ed March\n\n30) and the letter of offer dated April 14 were received by Raebum on May 2, 1977 in an envelope bearing the postal mark of Madras dated April 27, 1977. The letter of offer which was posted to the Holding Company also bore the postal mark of Madras dated April 27, 1977 and that to was received in Birmingham on May 2,\n\n1977. The letter of offer which was posted to one of the Indian shareholders, Manoharan, who was siding with Coats, was also posted in an envelope which bore the postal mark of Madras dated April 27, 1977. On April 19, 1977, a notice of the Board's meeting for May 2, 1977 was prepared. One of the items on the Agenda of the meeting was stated in the notice as \"Policy-(a) Indianisation\n\n(b) Allotment of shares\". The notice dated April 19 of the Board's meeting for May 2 was posted to Sanders in an envelope which bore the postal mark of Madras dated April 27, 1977 and was received by him in Birmingham on May 2, 1977, after the Board's meeting fixed for that date had already taken place.\n\nIt puts a severe strain on one's credulity to believe that the letters of offer dated April 14 to the Holding Company, to Raeburn and to Manoharan were posted on the 14thitse If but that somehow they rotted in the post office until the 27th, on which date they took off simultaneously for their respective destinations. The affidavit of Selvaraj, NIIL's senior clerk in the despatch Department and the relevant entry in the outward register are quite difficult to accept on this point since they do not accord with the ordinary course of human affairs. Not only the three letters of offer abovesaid, but even the notice dated April 19, of the Board meeting for May 2, was received by Sanders at Birmingham in an envelope bearing the Madras postal mark of April 27.\n\nSelvaraj's affidavit, apparently supported by an entry in the outward register, that the envelope addressed to Sanders containing the notice of 19th April was posted on the 22nd is also difficult to accept. It takes all kinds to make the world and we do not know whether the NIIL's staff was advised astrologically that 27th April was an auspicious date for posting letters. But if only they had sought a little legal advice which, at least from Doraiswamy and Silverston, was readily available to them, they would have seen the folly of indulging in such behaviour.\n\nAdd to that the circumstance that Devagnanam's letter to Raeburn dated April 12 was put in the same envelope in which the letter of\n\noffer dated April 14 was enclosed and the envelope containing these two important documents bore the postal mark of Madras dated. 27th April. These coincidences are too tell-tale to admit of any doubt that someone or the other, not necessarily Devagnanam, unduly solicitous of the interest of NIIL and of the Indian share .. holders manipulated to delay the posting of the letters of offer anC. the notice of the Board meeting for 2nd May, until the 27th April.\n\nWhat is naively sought to be explained as a mere coincidence reminds one of the 'Brides in the Bath Tub' case : The death or the first bride in the bath tub may pass off as an accident and of the: second as suicider but when, in identical circumstances, the third bride dies of asphyxia in the bath tub, the conclusion becomes com· pelling, even applying the rule of circumstantial evidence, that she died a homicidal death.\n\nThe purpose behind the planned delay in posting the letter:; of offer to Raeburn and to the Holding Company, and in posting the notice of the Board's meeting for May 2 to Sanders, wa:; palpably to ensure that no legal proceeding was. taken to injunct l> the holding of the meeting. The object of withholding these important documents, until it was quite late to act upon them, wa:; to present to the Holding Company a fait accompli in the shape of the Board's decision for allotment of rights shares to the existing Indian shareholders.\n\nWe are, however, unable to share the view expressed in the '12th Conclusion' in the appellate judgment of the High Court that Devagnanam and \"his colleagues in the Board of Directors''' arranged to ensure the late posting of the letters of offer and the notice of the meeting.\n\nWe do not accept Shri Nariman's argument that Devagnanam must be exonerated from all responsibility il this behalf because he was away in Malacca from April 13 to 26.\n\nIn the first place, to be in a place on two dates is not necessarily to be there all along between those dates and therefore we cannc t infer that Devagnanam was in Malacca from 13th to 26th sinc:e he was there on the 13th and the 26th.\n\nBeides, it was easy for a man of Devagnanam's importance and ability to pull the strings from a distance and his physical presence was not necessary to achieve the desired result.\n\nThat is how puppets are moved.\n\nBut there is no evidence, at least not enough, to justify the categorical finding recorded by the appellate Bench of the High Court. T 11e fact that Devagnanam stood to gain by the machination is a relevant factor to be taken into account but even that is not the whole truth: NIIL, not Devangnanam was the real beneficiary, a thei:is\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 795\n\nwhich we have expounded over the last many pages.\n\nAnd the involvement of the other Directors by calling them Devagnanam's colleagues is less than just to them. There is not a shred of evidence to justify the grave charge that they were willing tools in Devagnanam' s hands and lent their help to concoct evidence.\n\nWe clear their conduct, expressly and categorically.\n\nIn so far as Devagnanam himself is concerned, there is room enough to suspect that he was the part-author of the late postings of important documents, especially since he was the prime actor in the play of NIIL's Indianisation. But even in regard to him, it is difficult to carry the case beyond the realm of suspicion and 'room enough' is not the same thing as 'reason enough'. Section 15 of the Evidence Act which carries the famous illustration of a person obtaining insurance money on his houses which caught fire successively, the question being whether the fire was accidental or intentional or whether the act was done with a particular knowledge or intention, will not help to fasten the blame on Devagnanam because, it is not shown that he was instrumental or concerned in any of the late postings complained of.\n\nWere his complicity shown in any of these, it would have been easy to implicate him in all of them.\n\nOn the contrary, there is an admitted act, described as a lapse, on Devagnanam's part which shows that he failed to do what was to his advantage to do. It may be recalled that in his letter dated April 12 to Raeburn, Devagnanam stated that he was enclosing therewith a copy of the Reserve Bank's letter dated March 30, 1977 but that was not enclosed.\n\nNothing was to be gained by suppressing the Reserve Bank's letter from Raeburn who was always sympathetic to the Indian shareholders. If anything, there was something to gain by apprising Raeburn of the mgency of the matter in view of the Reserve Bank's letter.\n\nThe strongest point in favour of the Indian shareholders was the last para of the Reserve Bank's letter which they would have liked the U.K. shareholders to know.\n\nRaeburn's response of 2nd May to Devagnanam's letter of 12 April and the letter of offer was without the knowledge of Reserve Bank's letter of March 30. When the Bank's letter was sent to Raeburn along with Devagnanam's letter of May 11, Raeburn categorially supported the stand of the Indian shareholders, as is clear from paragraph 4 of the letter dated June 8, 1977 by Raeburn to Mackrael, a copy of which was sent by Raeburn to Devagnanam along with his letter dated June 17, 1977.\n\nThe inferences arising from the late posting of the Jetter of offer to the Holding Company as also of the notice of meeting for May 2 to Sanders and the impact of inferences on the conduct and intentions of Devagnanam are one thing : we have already dealt with that aspect of the matter. Their impact on the legality of the offer and the validity of the meeting of May 2 is quite another matter, which we propose now to examine. In doing this, we will keep out of consideration all questions relating to the personal involvement of Devagnanam and his group in the delay caused in sending the letters of offer and the notice of meeting for iv1ay 2.\n\nFirst, as to the letter of offer : The letter of offer dated April 14, 1977 sent to the Holding Company at Birmingham, like all other letters of offer, mentions, inter alia that it was resolved in the meeting of April 6 to increase the issued capital of the company from 32,000 shares of Rs. 100 each to 48,000 shares of Rs. JOO\n\neach by issuing Rights Shares to the existing shareholders on the five conditions mentioned in the letter.\n\nThe second condition reads thus : \"If the offer is not accepted within 16 days from the date of offer, it shall be deemed to have been declined by the\n\nshareholder\". The Holding Company was informed by the last paragraph of the letter of offer that in respect of its holding of 18,990 shares, it was entitled to 9495 rights shares and that its acceptance of the offer together with the application money (at Rs.50/- per share) should be forwarded so as to reach the registered office of NHL on or before April 30, 1977. A postal communication by air between U.K. and Mardas, which is the normal mode of communication, generally takes five days to reach its destination.\n\nIf the letter of offer were to be posted on the 14th itself in Mardas, it would have reached the Holding Company in Birimingham, say, on the 19th. Even assuming that the 16 days' period allowed for communicating the acceptance of offer is to be counted from the 14th and not from the 19th, it would expire on 30th April, To that has to be added the period of five days which the Holding Company's letter would take to reach Madras. That means that the Holding Company would be within its rights if its acceptance reached NHL on or before May 5, 1977. The Board of Directors had, however, met in Madras three days before that and had allotted the entire issue of the rights shares to the Indian shareholders, on the ground that Holding Company had not applied for the allottment\n\nof the shares due to it.\n\nJn these circumstances, it is quite clear that the rights shares offered to the .Holding Company could not have been allotted to anyone in the meeting of May 2, for the supposed failure of the Holding Company to communicate its acceptance before April 30. The meeting of May 2, of which the\n\n-~-\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 797\n\nmain purpose was to consider 'Allotment' of the rights shares must, therefore, be held to be abortive which could produce no tangible result. The matter would be worse if April 27, and much worse if May 2, were to be taken as the starting point for counting the period of 16 days.\n\nExcept for circumstances, hereinafter appearing the allotment to Indian shareholders of the rights shares which were offered to the Holding Company would have been difficult to accept and act upon.\n\nThe objection arising out of the late posting of the notice dated April 19 for the meeting of 2nd May goes to the very root of the matter. That notice is alleged to have been posted to N.T .\n\nSanders, Studley, Warwickshire, U.K. on April 22. But we have already held that in view of the fact that the envelope in which the notice was sent bears the postal mark of Madras dated April 27, 1977, this latter date must be taken to be the date on which:i the notice was posted. The notice was received by Sanders on May 2, on which date the Board's meeting for allotment of rights shares was due to be held and was, in fact, held. The utter inadequacy of the notice to Sanders in terms of time stares in the face and needs no further argument to justify the finding that the holding of the meeting was illegal, at least in so far as the Holding Company is concerned. It is self-evident that Sanders could not possibly have attended the meeting. There is, therefore, no alternative save to hold that the decision taken in the meeting of May 2 cannot, in the normal circumstances, affect the legal rights of the Holding Company or create any legal obligations against it.\n\nThe next question, and a very important one at that on which there is a sharp controversy between the parties, is as to what is the consequence of the finding which we have recorded that the objection arising out of the late position of the notice of the meeting for 2nd May goes to the root of the matter. The answer to this question depends upon whether the Holding Company could have accepted the offer of the rights shares and if, either for reasons of volition or of legal compulsion, it could not have accepted the offer, whether it could have at least renounced its right under the offer to, a resident Indian, other than the exisiting Indian shareholders. The decision of this question depends upon the true construction of the provisions of FERA and of sections 43A and 81 of the Companies Act, 1956.\n\nWe have already reproduced the relevant provisions of FERA, namely, section 2(p), (q) and (u); section 19(1)(a), (b) and (d);\n\nA section 29(1}(a); section 29(2)(a), (b) and (c) ; and section 29(A)(a) and (b).\n\nSection 29(1) provides that :\n\n... notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 a company which is not incorporated under any law in force in 'India or in which B the non-resident interest is more than forty per cent shall not, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank carry on in India any trading, commercial or industrial activity other than the one for which permission of the Reserve Bank has been obtained under section 28. c\n\nThe other provisions are of ancillary and consequential nature, following upon the main provision summarised above.\n\nNIIL had applied for the necessary permission, since the nonresident interest therein was more than 40%, the Holding Company owing nearly 60% of its share capital. That permission was accorded by' the Reserve Bank on certain conditions which, inter alia, stipulated that the reduction in the non-resident holding must be brought down to 40% within one year of the receipt of its letter, that is, before May 17, 1977 and that until then, the manufacturing and business activities of the Company shall not be extended beyond the approved level as of December 31, 19!3\n\nIt is contended by Shri Seervai that non-compliance with the condition regarding the dilution of non-resident interest within the stipulated period could not have resulted in the RBI directing NHL to close down its business or not to carry on its business. It is also argued that non-complaince with the conditions imposed for permission to carry on its business would not have exposed the Indian directors to any penalties or liabilities and that, in the absence of a power to revoke the permission already granted (as in other sections like sections 6 and 32), the RBI had no power to revoke the permission granted to NIIL even if the conditions ubject to which the permission was granted were breached.\n\nAccording to counsel, closing down a business which the RBI had allowed to be continued by granting permission would have such grave consequences -public and private-that the power to direct the business to be discontinued was advisably not conferred, even if the conditions are breached.\n\nSection 29(4)(c), it is urged, which enables the RBI to direct nonresidents to sell their shares or cause them to be sold where an application under section 29(4)(a), for permission to continue to\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 799\n\nhold shares, was rejected is the only power givea to the Reserve A Bank where a condition imposed under section 29(2) is breached.\n\nWe are unable to accept these conte;1tions. The Reserve B1nk granted permission to NIIL to carry on its business, \"subject to) the conditions\" mentioned in the letter of May 11, 1976.\n\nIt may be that each of those conditions is not of the same rigour or importance as e.g. the condition regarding the progress made in implementing the other conditions, which could reasonably be relaxed by condonation of the late filing of any particular quarterly report.\n\nBut the dilution of the non-resident interest in the equity capital of the Company to a level not exceeding 40% \"within 'a period of l(one) year from the date of the receipt of'' the let er was of the very essence of the matter. A permission granted subject to the condition that such dilution shall be effected would cease automatically on the non-compliance with the condition at the end of the stipulated period or the extended period, as the case may be. The argument of the Holding Company would make the granting of a conditional permission an empty ritual since, whether or not the company performs the conditions, it would be free to carry on its business, the only sanction available to the Bank being, as argued, that ; it can\n\ncompel or cause the sale of the excess non-resident interest in the equity holding of the Company, under section 29(4)(c) of FERA.\n\nThis particular provision, in our opinion, is not a sanction for the enforcement of conditions imposed on a Company under clause (c) of section 29(2).\n\nSection 29(4)(c) provides for a situation in which an application for holding shares in a Company is not made or is rejected. The sanction for enforcement of a conditional permission to carry on business, where conditions are breached, is the cessation, ipso facto, of the permission itself on the non-performance of the conditions at the time appointed or agreed. This involves no element of surprise or of unjustness because permission is granted, as was done here, only after the applicant agrees to perform the conditions within the stipulated period. When NHL wrote to the Bank on Februrary 4, 1976 binding itself to the performance of certain conditions, it could not be heard to say that the permission will remain in force despite its non-performance of the conditions. Having regard to the provisions of section 29 read with sections 49, 56(1) and (3) and section 68 of FERA, the continuance of business after May 17, 1977 by NHL would have been illegal, unless the condition of dilution of non-resident equity was duly complied with. It is needless, once again, !to dwell upon the impracticability of NHL applying for extension of the period of one year allowed to it by the\n\nA Bank. Coats could be optimistic about such an extension'being granted especially, since thereby they could postpone Vthe evil day. For NIIL, the wise thing to do, and the only course open to it, was to comply with the obligation imposed upon it by Jaw, without delay or demur.\n\nIt seems to us quite clear, that by reason of the provisions of section 29(1) and (2) of FERA and the conditional permission granted by the RBI by its letter dated May 11, 1976, the offer of rights shares made by NIIL to the Holding Company could not possibly have been accepted by it. The object of section 29, inte;· alia, is to ensure that a company (other than a banking company) in which the non-resident interest is more than 40% must reduce it to a level not exceeding 40%.\n\nThe RBI allowed NHL to carry on its business subject to the express condition that it shall reduce its non-resident holding to a level not exceeding 40~~. The offer of rights shares was made to the existing shareholders, including the Holding Company, in proportion to the shares held by them.\n\nSince the issued capital of the Company which consisted of 32,000 shares was increased by the issue of 16,000 rights shares, the Holding Company which held 18,990 shares was offered 9495 shares. The acceptance of the offer of rights shares by the Holding Company would have resulted in a violation of the provisions of FERA and the directive of the Reserve Bank. Were the Holding Company to accept the offer of rights shares, it would have continued to hold 60% share capital in NHL and the Indian shareholders would have continued to bold their 40% share capital in the Company. It would indeed be ironical that the measure which was taken by NIIL's Board of Directors for the purpose of reducing the non-resident holding to a level not exceeding 40% should itself become an instrument of perpetuating the ownership by the Holding Company of 60% of the eci.uity capital of NIIL.\n\nWe are not suggesting that the offer of rights shares need not have been made to the Holding Company at all.\n\nBut the question is whether the offer when made could have been accepted by it. Since the answer to this question has to be in the negative, no grievance can be made by the Holding Company that, since it did not receive the offer in time, it was deprived of an opportunity to accept it.\n\nWe see no substance in Shri Nariman's contention that the letter of offer could not have been sent to the Holding Company without first obtaining the RBl's approval under section 19 of FERA. Counsel contends that under section 19(1)(b), notwithstanding anything contained in section 81 of the Companies Act, no person can, except with\n\n. --r-\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 801\n\nthe general or special permission of the Reserve Bank, create 'any - A interest in a security' in favour of a person resident outside India.\n\nThe word \"security\" is defined by section 2(u) to shares, stocks, bonds, etc.\n\nWe are unable to appreciate how an offer of shares by itself creates any interest in the shares in favour of the person to whom the offer is made. An offer of shares undoubtedly creates\n\n\"fresh rights\" as said by this Court in Matha/one v. Bombay Life B Assurance Co.(1) but, the right which it creates is either to accept the offer or to renounce it, it does not create any interest in the shares in respect of which the offer is made.\n\nBut though it could not have been possible for the Holding Company to accept the offer of rights shares made to it, the question still remains whether it had the right to renounce the offer in favour of any resident Indian person or company of its choice, be it an existing shareholder like Manoharan or an outsider like Madura Coats. The answer to this question depends on the effect of section 43A and 81 of the Companies Act, 1956.\n\nWe will first notice the relevant parts of sections 3, 43A and 81 of the Companies Act.\n\nSection 3(l)(iii) defines a \"private com~ pany\" thus :\n\n\"private company\" means a company which, by its\n\narticles :-- E\n\n(a) restricts the right to transfer its shares, if any ;\n\n(b) limits the number of its members to fifty and\n\n(c) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares in, or debentures of, the company.\n\nClause (iv) of section 3(1) define a \"public company\" to mean a company which is not a private company.\n\nSection 43A of the Companies Act, which was inserted by Act 65 of 1960, reads thus :\n\n43A.\n\n(1) Save as otherwise provided in this section, where not less than twenty-five per cent of the paid-up share capital of a private company having a share capital, is held by one. or more\n\nbodies corporate, the private, company shall...\n\n(I) [ 1954] S.C.R. 117.\n\nSU\\>REME COURT REPORTS [ 1981] 3 s.c.R.\n\nbecome by virtue of this section a public company:\n\nProvided that even after the private company has so become a public company, its articles of association may include provisions relating to the matter specified in clause (iii) of sub-section (I) of section 3 and the number of its member.s may be, or may at any time be reduced, below seven :\n\n(2) Within three months from the date on which a private company becomes a public company by virtue of this section, the company shall inform the Registrar that it has become a public company as aforesaid, and. thereupon the Registrar shall delete the word \"Private\" before the word \"Limited\" in the name of the company upon the register and shall also make\n\nthe necessary alterations in the certificate of incorporation issued to the company and in its memorandum of association.\n\n(4) A private company which has become a public\n\ncompany by virtue of this section shall continue to be a public company until it has, with the approval of the Central Government. and in accordance with the provisions of this Act, again become a private company.\n\nSection 81 of the Companies Act reads thus :\n\n81. (I) Where ......... it is proposed to increase the subscribed capital of the company by allotment of further shares, then, ·\n\n(a) such further shares, shall be .offered to the persons who at the date .. of the offer, are holders of the equity shares of the company in proportion, as nearly as circumstances admit, to the capital paid up on those shares at that date ;\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I N.H.L. ( Chandrachud, C.J.) 803\n\n(b} the offer aforesaid shall be made by notice A specifying the number of shares offered and limiting a time not being Jess than fifteen days from the date of the offer within which the offer, if not accepted, will be deemed to have been declined ;\n\n(c} unless the articles of the company otherwise provide, the offer aforesaid shall be deemed to include a right exercisable by the person concerned to reoounce the shares offered to him or any of them in favour of any other person, and the notice referred to in clause\n\n(b) shall contain a statement of this right ;\n\n( d) after the expiry of the time specified in the notice aforesaid, or on receipt of earlier\n\nintimation from the person to whom such D notice is given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the Board of directors may dispose of them in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company.\n\n(IA} Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection\n\n(I} the further shares aforesaid may be offered to any persons (whether or not those persons include the persons referred to in clause (a} of sub-section (I} ) in any manner whatsoever-\n\n(a) if a special resolution to that effect is passed by the company in general meeting, or\n\n(b) where no such special resolution is passed if the votes cast ........ .in favour of the proposal ......... exceed the votes, if any, cast against the proposal ......... and the Central Government is satisfied, on an application made by the Board of directors in this behalf that the proposal is most beneficial to the company.\n\n(3) Nothing in this section shall apply -\n\n(a) to.a private company.\n\nWhile interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act, it would be necessary to have regard to the relevant Articles of Association of NIIL, especially since Section 81 (l)(c) of that Act, which is extracted above, is subject to the qualification : \"Unless the articles of the Company otherwise provide\". The relevent Articles are Articles 11, 32, 38 and 50 and they read thus :\n\nArticle 11 : In order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the following provisions shall have effect, namely :-\n\nArticle 32\n\nArticle 38\n\n(i) No invitation shall be issued to the public to subscribe for any shares, debentures, or debenture stock of the Company.\n\n(ii) The number of the members of the Company (Exclusive of persons in the employment of the Company) shall be limited to fifty, provided that for the purposes of this Article where two or more persons hold one or more shares in the Company jointly, they shall be trea.ted as a single member.\n\n(iii) The right to transfer shares of the Company is restricted in manaer hereinafter provided.\n\n(iv) If there shall be any inconsistency between the provisions of this Article and the provisions of any other Article the provisions of this Article shall prevail.\n\nA share may. subject to article 38 be transferred by a member or other person entitled to transfer to any member selected by the transferor; but, save as aforesaid, no share shall be transferred to a person who is not a member so long as any member is willing to purchase the same at the fair value.\n\nSuch value to be ascertained in manner hereinafter mentioned.\n\nThe Directors may refuse to register any transfer of a share (a) where the Company has a lien on the share, or (b) in case of shares not fully paidup, where it is not proved to their satisfaction\n\n. r Article 50\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.J.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C, J.) 805\n\nthat the proposed transferee is a responsible person, or (c) where the Directors are of opin10n that the proposed transferee (not being already a member) is not a desirable person to admit to membership, or (d) where the result of such registration would be to make the number of members exceed the above mentioned limit. But clauses (b) and (c) of this Article shall not apply where the proposed transferee is already a member .\n\nWhen the Directors decide to increase the capital of the Company by the issue of new shares such shares shall be offered to the shareholders in proportion to the existing shares to which they are entitled. The offer shall be made by notice specifying the number of shares offered and limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted, will be deemed to be declined and after the expiration of such time, or on the receipt of an intimation from the person to whom the offer is made that he declines to accept the shares offered, the Directors may dispose of the same in such manner as they think most beneficial to the Company. The Directors may likewise so dispose of any new shares which (by reason of the ratio which the new shares bear to the shares held by persons entitled to an offer of new shares) cannot, in the opinion of the Directors, be conveniently offered under this Article.\n\nIt is contendended by Shri iariman that by reason of the articles of the Company and on a true interpretation of section 81, the right of renunciation of the shares offered by NHL was not available to the Holding Company since NHL was not a full-Jledged public company in the sense of being incorporated as a public company but had become a public company under section 43A(l) • and had, under the first proviso to that section, retained its articles relating to matters specified in section 3(1) (iii).\n\nAccording to Shri Nariman, section 81(1A) can have no application to a 'section 43A (1) proviso company' (for short, the 'proviso company') because it contemplates issue of shares to the public and to persons other than members of the company, which cannot be done in the case of a company which falls under the proviso to section 43A(l).\n\nA Section 81 (IA), it is urged, is complementary to section 8 l and since the latter cannot apply to the 'proviso company', the former too cannot apply to it.\n\nIn any event, according to counsel, section 81 (I) (c) cannot apply in the instant case since the articles of NHL provide, by necessary implication at any rate, tht the members of company shall have no right to renounce the shares in B favour of \"any\"' other person, because such a right would iuclude the right to renounce in favour of persons who are not members of the company, and NJIL had retained its articles under which, shares could not be transferred or renounced in favour of outsiders.\n\nShri Seervai has refuted these contentions, his main argument being that the definitions of 'public company' and 'private company' are mutually exclusive and, between them,· are exhaustive of all categories of companies.\n\nThere .is, according1 to the learned counsel no third category of companies recognised by the Companies Act, like the 'proviso company'. Shri Seervai further contends :\n\n(a) The right of renunciation is not a 'transfer' and therefore the directors' power to refuse to register the shares under the articles does not extend to renunciation;\n\n(b) .Before considering Section 43A, which was inserted for theJ first time in the Act of 1956 by the amending Act of 1960, it should be noted that Section 81 as enacted in the Act of 1956 contained three sub-sections (I),· 2 and 3, and sub-section 3 provided that \"nothing in this section shall apply to a private company\". The opening words of Section 81, as they now stand, were substituted by the Amending Act of 1960, and sub-section (IA) was inserted by the said Amending Act, and sub-section (3) was substituted by the Amending Act of 1963. But sub- ' section 3 (a) reproduced sub-section (3) of the Act of 1956, namely, \"nothing in this section shall apply to a private company\". It is clear therefore that the rights conferred by Section 81 (I) and (2) do not apply to a private company, and this provision in the Act of 1956 was not connected with the insertion of Section 43A for the first time in 1960.\n\n(c) 1 he provisos to Section 43A (1), (1 A) and (IB) are very important in connection with Section 81 of the\n\n~.\n\nN.I.I.L. v. NJ.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 807\n\nAct of 1956. Just as the crucial words in Section 27(3) are \"shall contain\", the crucial words in the provisos are \"may include\" (or may retain). The words \"shall contain\" are mandatory and go to the constitution of a private company. The words \"may include\" are permissive and they do not go to the constitution of a company which has become a public company by virtue of Section 43A because whether the articles include (or retain) those requirements or do not include those requirements, the constitution of the company as a public company remains unaffected ;\n\n(d) No statutory consequence follows, as to the company being a public company, on the retention of the three requirements or one or more of them, or in not complying with those requirements.\n\nBut in the case of a private company which does not comply with the requirements of Section 3 (l)(iii) serious consequences follow under Section 43, and in tlie case of a private company altering its articles so as not to include all the matters referred to in Section 3 (I) (iii) serious consequences follow under Section 43, and in the case of a private company altering its articles so as not to include all the matters referred to in Section 3 (1) (iii) serious consequences follow under Section 44.\n\nIn short, the inclusion, or retention, of all the matters referred .to in Section 3(1) (iii) has a radically different part of function in a private company. which becomes a public company by virtue of Section 43A from that which it has in a private company.\n\nMore particularly the non-compliance with the three requirements of Section 3 (!)(iii). included, or retained, in the articles of a private company which has become a public company by virtue of Section 43A, involves no statutory consequences or disabilities, since such a company is a public company and Section 43 is not attracted.\n\n(e) It is wrong to contend that the whole of Section 81(1) does not apply to a 'proviso company' because it is a private company entitled. to the protection of subsection 3 (a). Section 81(3) (a) applies to a private\n\ncompany ; a 'proviso company' is one which has become, and continues to remain, a public company ;\n\n(f} Section 81 (I) (c) applies to all companies other than private companies. The articles of a public company may include all of the matters referred to in Section 3 (I) (iii), or may include one or two of the matters referred to therein without ceasing to be a public company. A public company which has become such by virtue of Section 43A can delete all the matters referred to in Section 3 (I) (iii) or may delete one or two of them or may include (or retains) all the three matters referred to in Section 3 (1) (iii).\n\nThe retention of the three matters mentioned in Section 3(1) (iii) does not in any way affect the constitution of the company because it has become and continues to be a public company;\n\n(g) Section 81 when enacted in 1956 consisted of 3 subsections. The need to exempt private companies arose from Section 81 (c), for the right to renounce in favour of any person might, (not must), conflict with the limitation on the number of members to 50 and since that was one of the matters which went to the constitution of a company as a private company, private companies were expressly exempted.\n\nNo such exemption was necessary in the case of a 'proviso company' which retains in its articles all the three matters referred to in Section 3(1) (iii), because an increase in the number of its members above 50 will not affect the constitution of the company which remains that of a public company ;\n\n(h) Section 81 as enacted in 1956 did not contain subsection (IA) which was. inserted for the first time by the Amending Act of 1960, which Amending Act also iserted Section 43A.\n\nAfter the insertion of subsection (I A) the effect of the exemption of private companies from the operation of section 81 became even more necessary for the provisions of sub-section\n\n(IA) (a) and (b) override the whole of Section 81 (!) and shares need not be offered to existing shareholders.\n\nSection 81 (IA) also overrides Article 50 of NIIL ;\n\nI N.1.1.L. v. N.l.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 809\n\n(i) The Articles of NIIL provide for the transfer of shares, and Article 38 sets out the circumstances under which the directors may refuse to transfer the shares.\n\nHowever, since renunciation of shares is not a transfer, the restriction in Article 11 (iii) is not violated by an existing member of NHL renouncing his share in favour of any other person ;\n\nU) The opening words of Sections 81 (1) (c) are \"unless the articles of the company otherwise provide\". Section 81 (1) (c) contains no reference to \"expressly provide\"\n\nor \"expressly or by necessary implication provide\".\n\nAccording to the plain meaning of the words \"otherwise provide'', there must be a provision in the Articles which says that the offer of shares to existing members does not entitle them to renounce the shares in favour of any person. Article 11 of NIIL merely states the matters necessary to constitute a company a private company. Such companies are exempt from Section 81-and so, the questions of its 'otherwise providing' does not arise.\n\nArticle 50 refers to the rights shares but it makes no other provision with regard to the right of renunciation than is made in Section 81(l)(c).\n\nUnless such other provision is made, the opening words of Section 81 (I)(c) are not attracted. Secondly, Section 8l(J)(c) provides that unless the articles otherwise provide \"the offer aforesaid shall be deemed to include a right exercisable by the person concerned to renounce the shares offered to him or any of them in favour of any person\". The right conferred by the deeming clause can be taken away only by making a provision in the Articles to prevent the deeming provision from - taking effect. The deeming provision cannot be avoided by implications ; and\n\n(k) The Holding Company could have renounced the rights shares offered to it at least in favour of the Manoharan *group and the fact that after the shares were allotted, the Manoharans stated that they were not interested in subscribing to the shares offered does not affect the question of the legal right.\n\nBesides, it was one thing to refuse to subscribe to the shares offered; it was another thing to accept the renunciation of merely 6, 190 shares\n\nwhich would have given the Manoharans a substanial stake in the affairs of the company.\n\nShri Seervai relies upon many a text and authority in support of the proposition that the classification of companies into private and public is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.\n\nHe relies upon a decision in Park v. Roya1ty Syndicates(1) in which Hamilton J. (later Lord Sumner) observed that a public company is simply one which is not a private company and that there is no \"intermediate state or tertium quid\". In support of the proposition that the right to 'renunciation of shares is not a transfer, counsel relies upon a decision in Re Pool Shipping Co. Ltd.(').\n\nReliance is also placed in this behalf on the statement of law in Halsbury (Vol. 7, 4th edition, p. 218), Palmer's Company Law Vol.I, 22nd edition p. 393), Palmer's Company Precedents (Part l, 17th edition, p. 688), Gore-Brown on Companies (43rd edition, para 16.3) and Buckley on Companies Act (13th edition, p. 815).\n\nWhile indicating his own reasons as to why the legislature enacted identical provisos to sub-sections (1),(1 A) and (IB) of section 43A, counsel mentioned that no light is thrown for enacting these provisos, either by the Shastri Committee Report which led to the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960 or by the Notes on clauses, or by the Report of the Joint Select Committee. In regard to the opening words of section 81 (l )(c) ; \"Unless the articles of the company otherwise provide\", counsel cited the Collins English Dictionary, the Random House Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary.\n\nAn interesting instance of the use of the word \"provide' is to be found in the Random House Dictionary, 1967, p. 1157, to this effect: \"The Mayor's wife of the city provided in her will that she would be hurried without any pomp or noise\".\n\nIt shall have been noticed that the entire superstructure of Shri Seervai's argument rests on the foundation that the definitions of 'public company' and 'private company' are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive of all categories of companies, that is to say, that there is no third kind of company recognised by the Companies Act, 1956. The argument merits close examinations since it finds support, to an appreciable extent, from the very text of the Companies Act. The definition of 'private company' and the manner in which a 'public company' is defined (\"public company means a company which is not a private company\") bear out the argument that these\n\n(1) [1912] I K.B. 330.\n\n(2) [1920] 1 Ch. 251.\n\n~-\n\nN.J.l.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 811\n\ntwo categories of companies are mutually exclusive. If it is this it cannot be that and if it is that it cannot be this.\n\nBut, it is not true to say that between them, they exhaust the universe of companies.\n\nA private company which has become a public company by reasoµ of section 43A, may include, that is to say, may continue to retain in its articles, matters which are specified in section 3 (I )(ii), and the number of its members may at any time be reduced below 7.\n\nThis provision itself highlights the basic distinction between, on one hand, a company which is incorporated as a public company or a private company which is converted into a public company under section 44, and on the other hand, a private company which has become a public company by reason M the operation of section 43A.\n\nIn the first place, a section-43A company may include in its articles, as part of its structure, provisions relating to restrictions on transfer of shares, limiting the number of its members to 50, and prohibiting an invitation to the public to subscribe for shares, which are typical characteristics of a private company.\n\nA public company cannot possibly do so because, by the very definition, it is that which is not a private company, that is to say, which is not a company which by its articles contains the restrictions mentioned in section 3 (!)(iii). Therefore, the expression 'public company' in section 3(1)\n\n(iv) cannot be equated with a 'private company which has become a public company by virtue of section 43A'.\n\nSecondly, the number of members of a public company cannot fall below 7 without attracting the serious consequences provided for by section 45 (personal liability of members for the company's debts) and section 433(d) (winding up in case the number of its members falls below 7).\n\nA section 43A company can still maintain its separate corporate identity qua debts even if the number of its members is reduced below seven and is not liable to be wound up for that reason.\n\nThirdly, a section 43A, company can never be incorporated and registered as such under the Companies Act. It is registered\n\n\"( as a private company and becomes, by operation of law, a public company.\n\nFourthly, the three contingencies in which a private company becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A (mentioned in sub-sections (1), (IA) and (IB) read with the provisions of subsection ( 4) of the section) show that it becomes and continues to be H a public company so long as the conditions in sub-sections (1), (IA) or (IB) are applicable.\n\nThe provisos to each of these sub-sections\n\nclarify the legislative intent that companies may retain their registered corporate shell of a private company but will be subjected to the discipline of public companies. When the necessary conditions do not obtain, the legislative device in section 43A is to permit them to go back into their corporate shell and function once again as private companies, with all the privileges and exemptions applicable to private companies. The proviso to each of the subsections of section 43A clearly indicates that although the private company has become a public company by virtue of that section, it is permitted to retain the structural characteristics of its origin, its birth marks, so to say.\n\nAny provision of the Companies Act which would endanger the corporate shell• of a 'proviso company' cannot be applied to it because, that would constitute an infraction of one or more of the characteristics of the 'proviso company' which are statutorily allowed to be preserved and retained under each of the three provisos to the three sub-sections of section 43A.\n\nA right of renunciation in favour of any other person, as a statutory term of an offer of rights shares, would be repugnant to the integrity of the Company and the continued retention by it of the basic characteristics under section 3(J)(iii).\n\nFifthly, section 4.3A, when introduced by Act 65 of 1960, did not adopt the language either of section 43 or of section 44.\n\nUnder section 43 where default is made in complying with the provisions of section 3(1)(iii), a private company \"shall cease to be entitled to the privileges and exemptions conferred on private companies by or under this Act, and this Act shall apply to the company as if it were not a private company\". Under section 44 of the Act, where a private company alters its Articles in such a manner that they no longer include the provisions which under, section 3(l)(iii) are required to be included in the Articles in order to constitute it a private company, the company \"shall as on the date of the alteration cease to be a private company\". Neither of the expressions, namely, \"This Act shall apply to the company as if it were not a private company\" (section 43) or that the company\n\n\"shall ... cease to be a private company (section 44) is used in section 43A. If a section 43A company were to be equated in aU respects with a public company, that is a company which does not have the characteristics of private company, Parliament would have used language similar to the one in section 43 or section 44, between which two sections, section 43A was inserted. If the intention was that the rest of the Act was to apply to a section 43A company \"as if it were not a private company\" nothing would have been easier\n\n. 1-\n\n. ·-1\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 813\n\nthan to adopt that language in section 43A, and if the intention was that a section 43A company would for all purposes \"cease to be a private company\", nothing would have been easier than to adopt\n\ntlhat language in section 43A.\n\nSixthly, the fact that a private company which becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A does not cease to be for all purposes a \"private company\" becomes clear when one compares and contrasts the provisions of section 43A with section 44 : when the Articles of a private company no longer include matters under section 3(1)(iii), such a company shall as on the date of the alteration cease to be a private company (section 44(i)(a)). It has then to file with the Registrar a prospectus or a statement in lieu of prospectus under section 44(2).\n\nA private company which becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A is not required Ito file a prospectus or a statement in lieu of a prospectus.\n\nThese considerations show that, after the Amending Act 65 of 1960, three distinct types of companies occupy a distinct place in the scheme of our Companies Act : (I) private companies (2) public companies and (3) private companies which have become public companies by virtue of section 43A, but which continue to include or retain the three characteristics of a private company. Sections I 74 and 252 of the Companies Act which deal respectively with quorum for meetings and minimum number of directors, recognise expressly, by their paranthetical clauses, the separate existence of public companies which have become such by virtue of section 43A. .we may also mention that while making an amendment in sub-clause (ix) of Rule 2 of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975, the Amendment Rules, 1978 added the expression : \"Any amount received...... by a private company which has become a public company under section 43A of the Act and continues to include in its Articles of Association provisions relating to the matteni specified in clause (iii) of sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Act\", in order to bring deposits received by such companies within the Rules.\n\nThe various points discussed above will facilitate a clearer perception of the position that under the Companies Act, there arc three kinds of companies whose rights and obligations fall for consideration, namely, private companies, public companies and companies which have become public companies under section 43(1) but which retain, under the first proviso to that section, the three characteristics of private companies mentioned in section 3(1)(iii)\n\nof the Act, private companies enjoy certain exemptions and privileges which are peculiar to their constitution and nature. Public companies are subjected severely to the discipline of the Act. Companies of the third kind like NIIL, which become public companies but which continue to include in their articles the three matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of section 3(1)(iii) are also, broadly and generally, subjected to the rigorous discipline of the Act.\n\nThey cannot claim the privileges and exemptions to which private companies which are outside section 43A are entitled. And yet, there are certain provisions of the Act which would apply to public companies but not to section 43A companies. Is section 81 of the Companies Act one such provision ? and if so, does the whole of it not apply to a section 43A company or only some particular part of it ? These are the questions which we have now to consider.\n\nOn these two questions, both the learned counsel have taken up extreme positions which, if accepted, may create confusion and avoidable inconvenience in the administration of section 43A companies like NHL. Shri Nariman contends that a section 43A company becomes a public company qua the outside world, as e.g. in matters of remuneration of directors, disclosure, commencement of business, information to be supplied but it remains a private company qua its own shareholders. Therefore, says counsel, no provision of the Companies Act can apply to such companies, which. is inconsistent with or destructive of the retention of the three essential features of private companies as mentioned in section 3(1) (iii). Section 81, it is said, is one such provision and in so far as private companies go, it can apply only to (a) such companies which become public companies under section 43A but which do not retain the three essential features and to\n\n(b) private companies which are duly converted into public companies. It is urged that even assuming that the expression \"private company\" occuring in the various provisions of the Companies Act (including section 81 (3)(a)) does not include a section 43A proviso Company, that does mean that section 81 would be applicable to a 43A Proviso Company, because~ (a) The proviso to section 43A(I) and section 81 are both substantive provisions and neither is subordinate to the other ; in fact section 43A was introduced later in 1960 ; and (b) An offer of rights shares to a member in a section 43A proviso company cannot include a right to renounce the shares in favour of any other person, because such a right would be inconsistent with the article of the company limiting the number of its members to 50 and with the article prohibiting invitation to the public to subscribe for shares in the company. The fact that the statute overrides the\n\nN.I.l.L. v. N.1.N:H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.} 815\n\narticles is not a sufficient ground for redering the provisions of S(:ction 81 applicable to a section 43A(l) proviso company since the~ right to continue to include provisions in its articles. specified in section 3(l)(iii) is itself a statutory right. Counsel says that in these circumstances-and this iil without taking the assistance of the - words \"unless the articles of the comyany otherwise provide\" in section 8l(l)(c)-the provision regarding the right of renunciation cannot apply to section 43A proviso company.\n\nThe answer of Shri Seervai to this contention flows from what truly is the sheet anchor of his argument, namely, that the definitions of 'public company' and 'private company' are mutually exclusive and between them, they are exhaustive of all categorie of companies.\n\nCounsel contends that section 81 (IA) overrides section 81(1) ; that by reason of sub-section (3) of section 81, section 81 is not applicable to a \"private company\" but NHL is not a \"private company ' since it became a public company by virtue of section 43A ; and that, therefore, the offer of rights shares made by NHL can be renounced by the offerees in favour of any other person.\n\nNeither of the two extreme positions for which the counsel c:ontend commends itself to us.\n\nThe acceptance of Shri Nariman's argument involves tinkering with clause (a) of section 81 (3), which shall have to be read as saying that \"Nothing in section 81 shall apply to a 'private company' and to a company which becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A and whose Articles of Association include provisions relating to the matters specified in dause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 3\". Section 81(1) does not contain a non obstante clause. But, if Shri Nariman is right, there would be no alternative save to exclude the applicability of all of its provisions to a company like NHL, by reading into it an overriding provision which alone can achieve such result.\n\nOn the other hand, to accept wholesale the argument of Shri Seervai would render the first proviso to section 43A(l) nugatory.\n\nThe right to retain in the Articles the provision regarding the restriction on the right to transfer shares, the limitation on the number of members to fi(ty and 1the prohibition of any invitation to the public to subscribe for the shares or debentures of the Company will then be washed off.\n\nThe truth seems to us to lie in between the extreme stands of the learned , counsel for the two sides.\n\nThere is no difficulty in giving full effect to clauses (a) and\n\n(b) of section 81 (!) in the case of a company like NHL, even after it\n\nbecomes a public company under section 43A. Clause (a) requires that further shares must be offered to the holders of equity shares of the Company in proporation, as nearly as circumstances admit, to the capital paid up on those shares, while clause (b) requires that the offer of further shares must be made by a notice specifying the number of shares offered and limiting the time, not being less than fifteen days from the date of the offer, within which the offer, if not accepted, will be deemed to have been declined. The real difficulty arises when one reaches clause (c) according to which, the offer shall be deemed to include the right of renunciation of shares or any of them in favour of any other person.\n\nWe will keep aside for the time being the opening words of clause (c) : \"unless the articles of the company otherwise provide\". Clause (c) further requires that the notice referred to in clause (b) must contain a statement as to the right of renunciation provided for by clause (c).\n\nHaving given to the matter our most anxious consideration, we are of the opinion that clause (c) of section 81 (I) cannot apply to the earthwhile private companies which have become public companies under section 43A and which include, that is to say which retain or continue to include, in their articles of association the matters specified in section 3(1 )(iii) of the Act, as specified in the first proviso to section 43A. If clause\n\n(c) were to apply to the section 43A-proviso companies, it would be open to the offerees to renounce the shares offered to them in favour of any other person or persons. That may result directly in the infringement of the article relating to the matter specified in section 3(l)(iii)\n\n(b) because, under clause (c) of section 81(1), the offeree is entitled to spilt the offer and renounce the shares in favour of as many persons as he chooses, depending partly on the number of shares offered by the company to him. The right to renounce the shares in favour of any other person is also bound to result in the infringement of the article relating to the matter specified in section 3(l)(iii)(c), because an offer which gives to the offeree the right to renounce the shares in favour of a non-member is, in truth and substance, an invitation to the public to subscribe for the shares in the company.\n\nAs stated in Palmer's Company Law (22nd Ed., Vol. I, para 21-18):\n\n\"Where the Company issues renounceable letters of allotment the circle of original allottees can easily be broken by renunciation of those rights and complete strangers may become the allottees ; here the offer will normally be held to be made to the public.\"\n\nThere is statement to the same effect in Gower's Company Law 4th Ed., page 351) :\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.l.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 817\n\n\"It is therefore clear that an invitation by or on behalf of a private company to a few of the promoter's friends and relations will not be deemed to be an offer to the public.\n\nNor, generally, will an offer which can only be accepted by the shareholder of a particular company. On the other hand it is equally clear that an offer of securities in a public company even to a handful people may be an offer to the public if it is calculated (which presumably means \"Likely\" rather than \"intended\") to lead to the securities being subscribed (i.e. applied for on original allotment) or purchased (i.e. bought after. original allotment) by persons other than those receiving the initial offer. In particular, if securities to be issued under renounceable allotment letter or letter of right the invitation to take them up must be deemed to be made to the public, since these securities are obviously liable to be subscribed or purchased by others.\"\n\nThe learned author says at page 430 that in the case of a private placing-an issue by a private company-allotment letters will probably be dispensed with, \"in any case they cannot be freely\n\nr•nounceable\". In foot-note (22) the author points out that the real danger is that if renounceable allotment letters are issued, the company may be regarded as having made an offer to the public.\n\nWe cannot construe the provision contained in clause (c) in a manner which will lead to the negation of the option exercised by the company to retain in its articles the matters referred to in section 3 (!)(iii). Both these are statutory provisions and they are contained in the same statute. We must harmonise them, unless the words of the statute are so plain and unambiguous and the policy of the statute so clear that to harmonise will be doing violence to those words and to that policy. Words of the statute, we have dealt with. Its policy, if anything, points in the direction that the integrity and structure of the section 43A provisio companies should, as far as possible, not be broken up.\n\nThe exemption in favour of private companies would appear to have been inserted in section 81 (3)(a) because of the right of renunciation conferred by section 81(I)(c).\n\nSection IOSC of the Companies Act 1973 which contained substantially all the provisions that are to be found in section 81(1)(a), (b) and (d) applied to all companies. The right of renunciation in favour of any other person was conferred for the first time by the Act of 1956.\n\nThat led to the insertion of the exception in favour of private companies since, a\n\nright of renunication in favour of other persons is wholly inconsistent\n\nwith the structure of a private company, which has to contain the three characteristics mentioned in section 3(l)(iii). When section 43A was introduced by Act 65 of 1960, the legislature apparently overlooked the need to exempt companies falling under it, read with its first proviso, from the operation of clause (c) of section 81(1)._ That the legislature has overlooked such a need in regard to other matters, in respect of which there can be no controversy, is clear from the provisions of sections 45, and 433 (d) of the Companies Act.\n\nUnder section 45, if at any time the number of members of a company is reduced, in the case of a public Company below seven, or in the case of a Private Company below two, every member of the company becomes severally liable, under the stated circumstances, for the payment of the whole debt of the company and can be severally sued therefor. No exception h~.s yet been provided for in section 45 in favour of the section 43A-proviso companies, with the result that a private company having, say, three members which becomes a public company under section 43A and continues to function with the same number of members, will attract the rigour of section\n\n45. Similary, under section 433(d), such a company would automatically incur the liability of being wound up for the same reason. If and when these provisions fall for consideration, due regard may have to be given to the principle of harmonious construction, in order to exclude section 43A proviso companies from the application of those provisions. We hope that before such and occasion arises, the Legislature will make appropriate amendments in the relevant provisions of the Companies Act.\n\nSuch amendments have been made in sections 174(1), clause (iii) of the second proviso to sub-section (!) of section 220, and section 252(1) in order to accord separate treatment to private companies which become public companies by virtue of section 43A, as distinguished from public companies of the general kind.\n\nIn coming to the conclusion that clause (c) of section 81 {I) cannot apply to section 43A-proviso companies, we have not taken into consideration the impact of the opening words of clause (c) : \"Unless the articles of the company otherwise provide\". The effect of these words is to subordinate the provisions of clause (c) to the provisions of the articles of association of the company. In other words, the provisions that the offer of further shares shall be deemed to include the right of renunciation in favour of any other person will not apply if the articles of the company \"otherwise provide\".\n\nSimilarly the requirement that the notice of offer must contain a statement of the right of renunciation will not apply if the articles of\n\n. )\n\n---.o\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.l.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 819\n\nthe company otherwise provide. The question which we have to consider under this head is whether the articles of association of NIIL provide otherwise than what is provided by clause (c) of section 81(1). We have already extracted the relevant articles, namely, articles 11, 32, 38 and 50. To recapitulate, article 11, which has an important bearing on the subject now under discussion, provides that in order that the company may be a private company,\n\n(i) no invitation shall be issued to the public to subscribe for any shares, debentures, etc; (ii) the number of members of the company shall be limited to 50; and (iii) the right to transfer shares of the company will be restricted in the manner provided in the articles .\n\nBy article 32, a share may be transferred, subject to article 38, by a member to any member selected by the transferor but no share shall oltherwise be transferred to a person who is not a member so long as any member is willing to purchase the same at a fair value. Article 38 confers upon the directors the power to refuse to register the transfer of a share for four reasons, the last of which is that the transfer will make the number of members exceed the limit of 50. Article\n\n50, which also, is important, provides that the offer of new shares shall be made by a notice specifying the number of shares offered and limiting the time within which the offer, if not accepted, will be deemed to have been declined. If the offer is declined or is not accepted, before the expiration of the time fixed for its acceptance, the directors have power to dispose of the shares in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company.\n\nIt is urged by Shri Seervai that none of the articles of the company provides otherwise than what is provided in clause -(c) of section 81(1) and therefore, clause (c) must have its full play in the case of NHL. On the other hand, it is contended by Shri Nariman that the opening words, of clause (c) do not require or postulate that the articles of the company must contain an \"express\"\n\nprovision, contrary to what is contained in clause (c). The contention, in other words, is that if the articles of a company contain a provision which, by necessary implication, is otherwise than what is provided in clause (c); that clause can have no application. In view of our finding that keeping aside the opening words of clause (c), the provisions of that clause cannot apply to section 43Aproviso companies, it is academic to consider whether the word \"provide\" in the opening part of clause (c) postulates an express provision on the subject of renunciation or whether it is sufficient compliance with the opening words, if the articles contain by necessary implication a provision which is otherwise than what is provided in clause\n\nA (c). We would, however, like to express our considered conclusion on this point since the point has been argued fully by both the counsel and needs to be examined, as it is likely to arise in other cases.\n\nIn the first place, while construing the opening words of section 81 (l)(c), it has to be remembered that .section 43A companies are entitled under the proviso to that section to include provisions in their Articles relating to matters specified in section 3(l)(iii). The right of renunciation in favour of any other person is wholly inconsistent with the Articles of a private company. If a private company becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A and retains or continues to include in its Articles matters referred to in section 3(1 )(iii), it is difficult to say that the Articles do not provide something which is otherwise than what is provided in clause (c). The right of renunciation in favour of any other person is of the essence of clause (c).\n\nOn the other hand, the absence of that right is of the essence of the structure of a private company. It must follow, that in all cases in which erstwhile private companies become public companies by virtue of section 43A and retain their old Articles, there would of necessity be a provision in their Articles which is otherwise than what is contained in clause (c).\n\nConsidered from this point of view, argument as to whether the word \"provide\" in the opening words of clause (c) means \"provide expressly\" loses its significance.\n\nOn the question whether the word \"provide\" means \"provide expressly\", we are unable to accept Shri Seervai's submission that the Articles must contain a provision which is expressly otherwise than what is provided in clause (c). In the context in which a private company becomes a public company under:section 43A and by reason of the option available to it under the proviso, the word \"provide\" must be understood to mean \"provide expressly or by necessary\n\nimplication\". The necessary implication of a provision has the same effect and relevance in law as an express provision has, unless the relevance of what is necessarily implied is excluded by the use of clear words.\n\nConsidering the matter from all reasonable points of view, particularly the genesis of section 43A-proviso companies, we are of the opinion that in order to attract the opening words of clause (c) of section 81 (!), it is not necessary that the Articles of the Company must contain an express provision otherwise than what is contained in clause (c).\n\nWe do not think it necessary to consider the decision of the H Privy Council in Shanmugam v. Commissioner for Registration(1),\n\n(I) [1962) A.C. 515.\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 821\n\ncited by Shri Nariman, which says that to be an \"express provision\"\n\nwith regard to something it is not necessary that the thing should be specially mentioned; it is sufficient that it is directly covered by the language, however broad the language may [be which covers it, so long as the applicability arises directly from the language used and not by inference therefrom.\n\nWe may only mention that though Articles of NIIL do not contain an express provision that there shall be no right of renunciation, the right is wholly inconsistent with the Articles.\n\nWe have already stated above that the right of renunciation is tantamount to an invitation to the public to subscribe for the shares in the company and can violate the provision in regard to the limitation on the number of members.\n\nArticle 11, by reason of its clause (iv), prevails over the provisions of all other Articles if there is inconsistency between it and any other Article.\n\nFor these reasons we are of the opinion that clause (c) of section 81 (!) of the Companies Act, apart from the consideration arising out of the opening words of that clause, can have no application to private companies which have become public companies by virtue of section 43A and which retain in their Articles the three matters referred to in section 3(1 )(iii) of the Act. In so for as the opening words of clause(c) are concerned, we are of the opinion that they do not require an express provision in the Articles of the Company which is otherwise than what is provided for in clause (c). It is enough, in order to comply with the opening words of clause (c), that the Articles of the CompaRy contain by necessary implication a provision which is otherwise than what is provided in clause (c).\n\nArticles 11 and 50 of NIIL's Articles of Association negate the right of renunciation.\n\nThe question immediately arises, which is of great practical importance in this case, as to whether members of a section 43Aproviso company have a limited right of renunciation, under which they can renounce the shares offered to them in favour of any other member or members of the company.\n\nConsistently with the view which we have taken of clause (c) of section 81(1) our answer to this question has to be in the negative. The right to renounce shares in favour of any other person, which is conferred by clause (c) has no application to a company like NHL and therefore, its members cannot claim the right to renounce shares offered to them in favour of any other member or menibers. The Articles of a company may\n\nwell provide for a right of transfer of shares by one member to another, but that right is very much different from the right of\n\nrenunciation, properly so called. In fact, learned counsel for the Holding Company has cited the decision in Re Pool Shipping Co.\n\nLtd., (supra) in which it was held that the right of renunciation is not the same as the right of transfer of shares.\n\nComing to sub-section (IA) of section 81, it provides, stated briefly, that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the further shares may be offered to any persons in any manner whatsoever, whether or not those persons include a person referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1). That can be done under clause\n\n(a) of sub-section (I A) by passing a special resolution in the General Meeting of the company or under clause (b), where no such special resolution is passed, if the votes cast in favour of the proposal exceed the votes cast against it and the Central Government is satisfied that the proposal is most beneficial to the company. For reasons similar to those which we have come to the conclusion that clause (c) of section 81 cannot apply to a section 43A-proviso company, we must hold that sub-section (IA) can, also have no application to such companies. To permit the further shares to be offered to the persons who are not members of the company will be clearly contrary to the Articles of Association of a section 43A-proviso company, in regard to the three matters which bear on the structure of such companies. At the highest, the method provided for in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (IA) may be resorted to by a section 43A-proviso company for the limited purpose of offering the new shares to its members otherwise than in proportion to the capital paid up on the equity shares of the company.\n\nThat course may be open for the reason that sub-section (IA) permits the further shares to be offered \"in any nianner whatsoever\". A change in the pro rata method of offer of new shares is not necessarily violative of the basic characteristics of a private company which becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A. To this limited extent only, but not beyond it, the provisions of sub-section (IA) of section 81 can apply to such companies.\n\nThe following proposition emerge out of the discussion of the provisions of FERA, sections 43A and 81 of the Companies Act and of the articles of association of NIIL :\n\n(1) The Holding Company had to part with 20% out of the 60% equity capital held by it in NIIL ;\n\n(2) The offer of Rights Shares made to the Holding Company as a result of the decision taken by Board of\n\n. .....\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 823\n\nDirectors in their meeting of April 6, 1977 could not A have been accepted by the Holding Company ;\n\n(3) The Holding Company had no right to renounce the Right Shares offered to it in favour of any other person, member or non-member ; and\n\n(4) Since the offer of Rights Shares could not have been either accepted or renounced by the Holding Company, the former for one reason and the latter for another, the shares offered to it could, under article 50 of the articles of association, be disposed of by the directors, consistently with the articles of NIIL, particularly article 11, in such manner as they thought most beneficial to the Company.\n\nThese proposition afford a complete answer to Shri Seervai's contention that what truly constitutes oppression of the Holding\n\nCompany is not the issue of Rights Shares to the existing Indian D shareholders only but the offer of Rights Shares to all existing shareholders and the issue thereof to existing Indian shareholders only.\n\nThe meeting of 2nd May, 1977 was unquestionably illegal for reasons already stated. It must follow that the decision taken by the Board of Directors in that meeting could not, in the normal circumstances, create mutual rights and obligations between the parties. But we will not treat that decision as non-est because a point of preponderating importance is that the issue of Rights Shares to existing Indian shareholders only and the non-allotment thereof to the Holding Company did not cause any injury to the proprietary rights of the Holding Company as shareholders, for the simple reason that they could not have possibly accepted the offer of rights shares because of the provisions of FERA and the conditions imposed by the Reserve Bank in its letter dated May 11, 1976, nor indeed could they have renounced the shares offered to them in favour of any other person at all because section 8I(l)(c) has no application to companies like NHL which were once private com panies but which become public companies by virtue of section 431\\ and retain in their articles the three matters referred to in section 3(1 )(iii) of the Act\n\nIt was neither fair nor proper on the part of NIIL's officers not H to ensure the timely posting of the notice of the meeting for 2nd May so as to enable Sanders to attend that meeting.\n\nBut there the\n\nmatter rests.\n\nEven if Sanders were to attend the meeting, he could not have asked either that the Holding Company should be allotted the rights shares or alternatively, that it should be allowed to \"renounce\" the shares in favour of any other person, including the Manoharan group._ The charge of oppression arising out of the central accusation of non-allotment of the rights shares to the Holding Company must, therefore, fail.\n\nWe must mention that we have rejected the charge of oppression after applying to the conduct of Devagnanam and his group the standard of probity and fairplay which is expected of partners in a business venture. And this we have done without being influenced by the consideration pressed upon us by Shri Nariman that Coats and NEWEY, who were two of the three main partners, were not of one mind and that NEWEY never complained of oppression: They may or they may not. That is beside the point.\n\nSuch technicalities cannot be permitted to defeat the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction conferred by section 397 of the Companies Act.\n\nShri Seervai drew our attention to the decision in Blissett v. Daniel (supra) the facts of which as they appear at pp 1036-37, bear, according to him, great resemblance to the facts before us. The following observa- - tions in that case are of striking relevance ;\n\n\"As has been well observed during the course of the argument, the view taken by this Court with regard to morality of conduct amongst all parties-most especially amongst those who are bound by the ties of pattnershipis one of the highest degree. The standard by which parties are tried here, either as trustees or as co-partners, or in various other relations which may be suggested, is a standard, I am thankful to say so, far higher than the standard of the world ; and, tried by the standard, I hold it to be impossible to sanction the removal of this gentleman under these circmstances\". (p 1040)\n\nNot only is the Jaw on the side of Devagnanam but his conduct cannot be characterised as lacking in probity, considering the extremely rigid attitude adopted by Coats, They drove him into a tight corner from which the only escape was to allow the law to have its full play.\n\nEven though the company petition fails and the appeals succeed on the finding that the Holding Company has failed to make out a case of oppression, the court is not powerless to do substantial justice between the parties and place them, as nearly as it may, in the same\n\n-~--.\n\nN.J.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 825\n\nposition in which they would have been, if the meeting of 2nd May were held in accordance with Jaw.\n\nThe notice of the meeting was recdved by Sanders in U.K. on the 2nd May when everything was over, bar the post-meeting recriminations which eventually led to this expensive litigation. If the notice of the meeting had reached the Holding Company in time, it is reasonable to suppose that they would have attended the meeting, since one of the items on the Agenda was '\"Policy-(a) Indianisation, (b) allotment of shares\". Devagnanam and his group were always ready and willing to buy the excess shares of the Holding Company at a fair price as clear from the correspondence to which our attention has been drawn. Jn the affidavit dated May 25, 1977, Devagnanam stated categorically that the Indian shareholders were always ready and willing to purchase one-third of the shareholding of the non-resident shareholders, at a price to be fixed in accordance with the articles of Association by the Reserver Bank of Jndia.\n\nOn May 27, he sent a cable, though 'without prejudice', offering to pay premium if the Holding Company were to adopt disinvestment as a method of dilution of their interest. In the Trial Court, counsel for the Indian shareholders to whom the rights shares were allotted offered to pay premium on the 16,000 rights shares.\n\nThe cable and the offer were mentioned before us by Shri Nariman and were not disputed by Shri Seervai. There is no reason why we should not call upon the Indian shareholders to do what they were always willing to do, namely, to pay to the Holding Company a fair premium on the shares which were offered to it, which it could neither take nor renounce and which were taken up by the Indian shareholders in the enforced absence of the Holding Company.\n\nThe willingness of the Indian shareholders to pay a premium on the e:xcess holding or the rights shares is a factor which, to some extent, has gone in their favour on the question of oppression. Having had the benefit of that stance, they must now make it good.\n\nBesides, it is only meet and just that the Indian shareholders, who took the rights shares at par when the value of those shares was much above par, should be asked to pay the difference in order to nullify unjust unjustifiable enrichment at the cost of the Holding Company. We must make it clear that we are not asking the Indian shareholders to pay the premium as a price of oppression. We have rejected the plea of oppression and the course whieh we are now adopting is intended primarily to set right the course of justice, in so far as we may.\n\nThe question then is as to what should be takent to be the H reasonable value of the shares which were offered to the Holding Company but taken over by the bulk of the Indian shareholders. In\n\nhis letter dated December 17, 1975 to M.M.C. Newey, D.P. Kingsley, the Secretary of NHL, had assessed the value of NHL's shares at Rs. 175 per share. That value was arrived at by averaging the break-up value, the yield and the average market price in the case of quoted shares. Citing a paragraph from a book on the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, Kingsley says in his letter that the method which was adopted by him far valuing the shares was also followed by the Controller of Capital Issues. Copies of Kingsley's letter were sent to Alan Mackrael and Devagnanam. On June 9, 1976 Price\n\nWaterhouse, Peat & Co., Chartered Accountants, Calcutta wrote a letter to Mackrael in response to the latter's cable, valuing the shares of NIIL at Rs. 204 per share. Thai letter shows that while valuing the shares, they had taken into account various factors including \"the average of the net asset value and the earnings basis\", which, according to them, are considered as relevant factors by the Controller of Capital Issues while valuing the shares of companies.\n\nThe Chartered Accountants applied \"the CCI formula\" and after making necessary adjustments to the fixed assets, the proposed dividend and the gratuity liabilities for 1975, they valued NHL's business, on a net asset basis, at Rs. 50 lakhs. On an earnings basis, the valuation of the Company based on the past three years' net profits capitalized at I 5%, was Rs. 80 lakhs. That gives an average valuation of Rs. 65 lakhs for the business or Rs. 204 per share. The purported offer to Devagrianan by Khaitan \"a sewing needle competitor to Ketti'', at 3.6 times par, cannot afford any criterion for valuing NHL's shares. Khaitan, purportedly, had competitive business interests and was therefore prepared to \"pay the earth to acquire NHL\".\n\nAccording to the learned trial Judge, one thing which appeared to be certain was that the market value of the shares of NHL at or about the time when disputes arose between the parties, and particularly during the period when the controversial meetings of the Board of Directors were held, ranged between Rs. 175 and Rs. 204.\n\nWe agree with the learned Judge and hold that it would be just and reasonable to take the average market value of the rights shares on the crucial date at Rs. 190 per share. The learned trial Judge awarded a sum of Rs. 90 per share on 9495 shares to the Holding Company by way of \"solatium\", which, with respect, is not an acccurate description of the award and is likely to confuse the basis and reasons for directing the payment to be made. Since the average market price of NIIL's shares in April-May 1977 can be taken to be Rs. 190 per, share, the Holding Company, which was offered 9495 rights shares, will be entitled to receive from the Indian shareholders\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 827\n\nan amount equivalent to that by which they unjustifiably enriched A themselves, namely, Rs. 90x9495 which comes to Rs. 8,54,550. We direct that Devagnanam, his group and the other Indian shareholders who took the rights shares offered to the Holding Company shall pay, pro rata, the sum of Rs. 8,54,550 to the Holding Company. The amount shall be paid by them to the Holding Company from their own funds and not from the funds or assets of NHL.\n\nAs a further measure of neutralisation of the benefit which the Indian shareholders received in the meeting of 2nd May, 1977, we direct that the 16,000 rights shares which were allotted in that meeting to the Indian shareholders will be treated as not qualifying for the payment of dividend for a period of one year commencing from January l, 1977, the Company's year being the Calendar year.\n\nThe interim dividend or any further dividend received by the Indian shareholders on the 16,000 rights shares for the year ending December 31, 1977 shall be repaid by them to NHL, which shall distribute the same as if the issue and allotment of the rights shares was not made until after December 31, 1977. This direction will not be deemed to affect or ever to have affected the exercise of any other rights by the Indian shareholders in respect of the 16,000 rights shares allotted to them.\n\nWe have not considered the possibility of Manoharans taking up the rights shares offered to them because, by a letter dated May 11, 1977 to NHL's Secretary, N. Manoharan bad declined the offer on the ground that he was \"not in a position to take those shares\".\n\nFinally, in order to ensure the smooth functioning of NHL, and with a view to ensuring that our directions are complied with expeditiously, we direct that Shri M.M. Sabharwal who was appointc:d as a Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors under the Orders of this Court dated November 6, 1978 will continue to fonction as such until December 31, 1982.\n\nThe Company will take all effective steps to obtain the sanction or premission of the Reserve Bank of India or the Controller of Capital Issues, as the case may be; if it is necessary to obtain such sanction or premission for giving effect to the directions\n\n!~Ven by us in this judgment.\n\nIn the result, the appeals are allowed with the directions above mentioned and the judgments of the learned single Judge and of the H Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. We make no c>rder as to costs since both the sides are, more or less, equally to\n\nA blame, one for creating an impasse and the other for its unjust enrichment.\n\nAll parties shall bear their own costs throughout.\n\nThe interim orders passed by this Court are vacated.\n\nThe amount of Rs. 8,54,550 which the Indian shareholders have been directed to pay to the Holding Company shall be paid in two instalments, the first of which shall be paid before August 31, 1981 and the second before November 30, 1981.\n\nThe interim Board of Directors shall forthwith hand over charge to the Board which was superseded, but with Shri M. M. Sabharwal as a Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors.\n\nAfter taking the charge from the interim Board, the Board of Directors will take expeditious steps for convening an Annual General Meeting for the year 197 6-77 and the years thereafter for the purpose of passing the accounts, declaring dividends electing all Directors and for dealing with other necessary or incidental matters.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 941, "entities": [{"text": "698\n\nNEEDLE INDUSTRIES (INDIA) LTD.,\n\n& ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEEDLE INDUSTRIES (INDIA) LTD., & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NEEDLE INDUSTRIES NEWEY (INDIA)\n\nHOLDING LTD. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEEDLE INDUSTRIES NEWEY (INDIA) HOLDING LTD. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Companies Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act 1956", "statute": "Companies Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 272, "end_char": 308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "S. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "S. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1237, "end_char": 1242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "S. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1256, "end_char": 1262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1451, "end_char": 1481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd. (NHL), the appellant was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a Private Company on 20.7.1949 with its Registered office at Madras and at the time of its incorporation it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries {India) Ltd., Studley, England {NI-Studley)."}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1530, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "20.7.1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1580, "end_char": 1589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd. (NHL), the appellant was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a Private Company on 20.7.1949 with its Registered office at Madras and at the time of its incorporation it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries {India) Ltd., Studley, England {NI-Studley)."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1620, "end_char": 1626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd. (NHL), the appellant was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a Private Company on 20.7.1949 with its Registered office at Madras and at the time of its incorporation it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries {India) Ltd., Studley, England {NI-Studley)."}}, {"text": "Needle Industries {India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd. (NHL), the appellant was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a Private Company on 20.7.1949 with its Registered office at Madras and at the time of its incorporation it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries {India) Ltd., Studley, England {NI-Studley)."}}, {"text": "Studley", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1732, "end_char": 1739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd. (NHL), the appellant was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a Private Company on 20.7.1949 with its Registered office at Madras and at the time of its incorporation it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries {India) Ltd., Studley, England {NI-Studley)."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1741, "end_char": 1748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Needle Industries (fndia) Ltd. (NHL), the appellant was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a Private Company on 20.7.1949 with its Registered office at Madras and at the time of its incorporation it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries {India) Ltd., Studley, England {NI-Studley)."}}, {"text": "NI-Studley", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1772, "end_char": 1782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1961, NI-Studley entered into an agreement with Newey Bros.\n\nLtd., Birmingham, England (Newey) to invest in the Indian Company."}}, {"text": "Newey Bros.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1814, "end_char": 1831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1961, NI-Studley entered into an agreement with Newey Bros.\n\nLtd., Birmingham, England (Newey) to invest in the Indian Company."}}, {"text": "Birmingham", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1833, "end_char": 1843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1961, NI-Studley entered into an agreement with Newey Bros.\n\nLtd., Birmingham, England (Newey) to invest in the Indian Company."}}, {"text": "Newey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1963, NI-Studley and Newey combined to form the Holding Company in England M/s Needle Industries-Newey (India) Holding Ltd., the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Newey"}}, {"text": "Needle Industries-Newey (India) Holding Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1976, "end_char": 2020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1963, NI-Studley and Newey combined to form the Holding Company in England M/s Needle Industries-Newey (India) Holding Ltd., the respondent."}}, {"text": "NHL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2066, "end_char": 2069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire share capital of NHL held by NI Studley and Newey was transferred to the Holding Company in which NI-Studley and Newey became equal shares."}}, {"text": "NI Studley", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2078, "end_char": 2088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire share capital of NHL held by NI Studley and Newey was transferred to the Holding Company in which NI-Studley and Newey became equal shares.", "canonical_name": "NI Studley"}}, {"text": "NI-Studley", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2147, "end_char": 2157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire share capital of NHL held by NI Studley and Newey was transferred to the Holding Company in which NI-Studley and Newey became equal shares.", "canonical_name": "NI Studley"}}, {"text": "NIIL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2341, "end_char": 2345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. V. N.I.N.H.L. 699\n\nAs a result of this arrangement, the Holding Company came to acquire A 99.95 per cent of the issued and paid up capital of NIIL."}}, {"text": "Devagnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2450, "end_char": 2460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The balance of 0.05 cent, which consisted of six share& being the original nominal shares, was held by Devagnanam the managing director of NHL.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2525, "end_char": 2536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act 1913"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2557, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 43(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2754, "end_char": 2767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2842, "end_char": 2859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2867, "end_char": 2880, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Holding Company NINIH Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3205, "end_char": 3231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NIIL did not alter the relevant provisions of its articles after it became a public company within the meaning of section 43A. By 1971 about 40 per cent of the share capital of NHL came to be held by the Indian employees of the company and their relatives and the balance of about 60 per cent remained in the hands of the Holding Company NINIH Ltd.\n\nIn 1972 Coats Paton Ltd. became an almost 100% owner of NI-Studley."}}, {"text": "Coats Paton Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3241, "end_char": 3257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NIIL did not alter the relevant provisions of its articles after it became a public company within the meaning of section 43A. By 1971 about 40 per cent of the share capital of NHL came to be held by the Indian employees of the company and their relatives and the balance of about 60 per cent remained in the hands of the Holding Company NINIH Ltd.\n\nIn 1972 Coats Paton Ltd. became an almost 100% owner of NI-Studley."}}, {"text": "Coats", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position at the beginning of the year 1973 was that 60% (to be exact 59.3%) of the share capital of NHL came to be owned half and half by Coats and NEWEY, the remaining 40% being in the hands of the Indian Group of which 28.5% was held by the Devagnanam's group."}}, {"text": "NEWEY", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3454, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position at the beginning of the year 1973 was that 60% (to be exact 59.3%) of the share capital of NHL came to be owned half and half by Coats and NEWEY, the remaining 40% being in the hands of the Indian Group of which 28.5% was held by the Devagnanam's group."}}, {"text": "NI Studley", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3637, "end_char": 3647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though NHL was at one time wholly owned by NI-Studley and later by NI Studley and Newey, the affairs were managed ever since 1956 by an entirely Indian Management with Devagnanam as its Chief Executive and Managing Director with effect from the year 1961."}}, {"text": "N.T. Sanders", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3941, "end_char": 3953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was N.T. Sanders, who resided in England and hardly ever attended E the Board Meetings.", "canonical_name": "N. T. Sanders"}}, {"text": "Hong Kong", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4259, "end_char": 4268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In July 1972 Mr. Devagnanam was offered by the office of Managing Director of group of four companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan and his family began to reside in Hong Kong and he cogitated over resigning from his position in NIIL."}}, {"text": "Taiwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In July 1972 Mr. Devagnanam was offered by the office of Managing Director of group of four companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan and his family began to reside in Hong Kong and he cogitated over resigning from his position in NIIL."}}, {"text": "NIIL. Coats", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4377, "end_char": 4388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In July 1972 Mr. Devagnanam was offered by the office of Managing Director of group of four companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan and his family began to reside in Hong Kong and he cogitated over resigning from his position in NIIL."}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Junuary 1,\n\n1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4617, "end_char": 4633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973, came into force on Junuary 1,\n\n1974."}}, {"text": "S. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4635, "end_char": 4643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "Indill", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4845, "end_char": 4851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 29(1) prohibited non-residents, non-citizens and non-banking companies not incorporated under any Indian law or in which the non-resident interest was more than 40 per cent, from carrying on any activity in Indill of a trading, commercial or Industrial nature except with the general or special permission of the Rese1ve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "Rese1ve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 29(1) prohibited non-residents, non-citizens and non-banking companies not incorporated under any Indian law or in which the non-resident interest was more than 40 per cent, from carrying on any activity in Indill of a trading, commercial or Industrial nature except with the general or special permission of the Rese1ve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4977, "end_char": 4990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5104, "end_char": 5125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 29(2) (a) if such person was engaged in any such activity at the commencement of the Act, he or it had to apply to the Reserve Bank of India, for permission to carry on that activity, within six months of the commencement of the Act or such further period the Reserve Bank may allow."}}, {"text": "S. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5269, "end_char": 5274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5362, "end_char": 5367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 29 (4) (a) imposed a simiiar restriction on such person or company from holding shares in India, of any company referred to lcni ause (b) of section 29(1), without the permission of the Reserve Bank."}}, {"text": "section 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5546, "end_char": 5556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973", "statute": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973"}}, {"text": "August 31, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nA time for making the application for the requisite permission under section 29 was extended by the Reserve Bank until August 31, 1974."}}, {"text": "S. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reerve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5982, "end_char": 5993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NHL appplied to the Reerve Bank for the necessary perm1ss1on on September 3, 1974."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6026, "end_char": 6043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NHL appplied to the Reerve Bank for the necessary perm1ss1on on September 3, 1974."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6065, "end_char": 6077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its letter dated May 11, 1976 the Reserve Bank condoned the delay and allowed the application and imposed conditions on NITL that it must bring down the non-rsident interest from 60% to 40% within one year of the receipt of its letter."}}, {"text": "NITL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its letter dated May 11, 1976 the Reserve Bank condoned the delay and allowed the application and imposed conditions on NITL that it must bring down the non-rsident interest from 60% to 40% within one year of the receipt of its letter."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6319, "end_char": 6331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Holding Company applied to the Reserve Bank for a Holding Licence under section 29 (4) (a) of FERA, on September 18, 1974; which application was late by 18 days and was still pending with the Reser.ve Bank."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 18, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6391, "end_char": 6409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Holding Company applied to the Reserve Bank for a Holding Licence under section 29 (4) (a) of FERA, on September 18, 1974; which application was late by 18 days and was still pending with the Reser.ve Bank."}}, {"text": "Reser.ve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Holding Company applied to the Reserve Bank for a Holding Licence under section 29 (4) (a) of FERA, on September 18, 1974; which application was late by 18 days and was still pending with the Reser.ve Bank."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devagnanam who was residing in Hong Kong obtained a holding licence dated March 5, 1975 from the Reserve Bank in respect of his shares in NHL."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6691, "end_char": 6705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 11, 1976 NIIL's secretary sent a reply on May 18, 1976 to the Bank confirming the acceptance of the various conditions under which permission was granted to NHL to continue its business."}}, {"text": "May 18, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6739, "end_char": 6751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 11, 1976 NIIL's secretary sent a reply on May 18, 1976 to the Bank confirming the acceptance of the various conditions under which permission was granted to NHL to continue its business."}}, {"text": "Angust 11, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Angust 11, 1976 the term of Devagnanam's appointment as the Managing Director of NlIL came to an end but in the meeting dated\n\nOctober I, 1976 of NIIL's Board of Directors bis appointment was renewed for a further period of 5 years."}}, {"text": "NlIL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6968, "end_char": 6972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Angust 11, 1976 the term of Devagnanam's appointment as the Managing Director of NlIL came to an end but in the meeting dated\n\nOctober I, 1976 of NIIL's Board of Directors bis appointment was renewed for a further period of 5 years."}}, {"text": "October I, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7014, "end_char": 7029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Angust 11, 1976 the term of Devagnanam's appointment as the Managing Director of NlIL came to an end but in the meeting dated\n\nOctober I, 1976 of NIIL's Board of Directors bis appointment was renewed for a further period of 5 years."}}, {"text": "October 20th and 21st, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7123, "end_char": 7150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20th and 21st, 1976 a meeting took place between the U.K. shareholders and the Indian shareholders of NHL; But the meeting ended in a stalemate because whereas the Holding Company wanted a substantial part of the share capital held by it in excess of 40 per cent to be transferred to Madura Coats an Indian company in which the Holding Company had substantial interest as an Indian shareholder."}}, {"text": "U.K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7184, "end_char": 7188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20th and 21st, 1976 a meeting took place between the U.K. shareholders and the Indian shareholders of NHL; But the meeting ended in a stalemate because whereas the Holding Company wanted a substantial part of the share capital held by it in excess of 40 per cent to be transferred to Madura Coats an Indian company in which the Holding Company had substantial interest as an Indian shareholder."}}, {"text": "Madura Coats", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20th and 21st, 1976 a meeting took place between the U.K. shareholders and the Indian shareholders of NHL; But the meeting ended in a stalemate because whereas the Holding Company wanted a substantial part of the share capital held by it in excess of 40 per cent to be transferred to Madura Coats an Indian company in which the Holding Company had substantial interest as an Indian shareholder."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As negotiations were going on between the competing groups regarding the Indianisation of NHL, on April 4, 1977 NHL received a reminder letter dated March 30, 1977 from the Reserve Bank which pointed out that the com pany had not submitted any concrete proposal for reduction of the non-resident interest and asked it to submit its proposal in that behalf without any further delay and that failure to comply with the directive regarding dilution or foreign equity within the stipulated period would be viewed seriously."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7952, "end_char": 7966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As negotiations were going on between the competing groups regarding the Indianisation of NHL, on April 4, 1977 NHL received a reminder letter dated March 30, 1977 from the Reserve Bank which pointed out that the com pany had not submitted any concrete proposal for reduction of the non-resident interest and asked it to submit its proposal in that behalf without any further delay and that failure to comply with the directive regarding dilution or foreign equity within the stipulated period would be viewed seriously."}}, {"text": "April 6, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8378, "end_char": 8391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H A meeting of NIIL's Board of Directors was held on April 6, 1977."}}, {"text": "C. Doraiswamy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8512, "end_char": 8525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. C. Doraiswamy, solicitor-partner of\n\nN.I.L. V. N.J.N.I.L. 701\n\nKing and Partridge was one of the directors present at the meeting.", "canonical_name": "C. Doraiswamy"}}, {"text": "King", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8575, "end_char": 8579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. C. Doraiswamy, solicitor-partner of\n\nN.I.L. V. N.J.N.I.L. 701\n\nKing and Partridge was one of the directors present at the meeting.", "canonical_name": "Kingsley"}}, {"text": "Partridge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. C. Doraiswamy, solicitor-partner of\n\nN.I.L. V. N.J.N.I.L. 701\n\nKing and Partridge was one of the directors present at the meeting."}}, {"text": "Silverston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8887, "end_char": 8897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to complete the quorum of two independent directors, the other directors apart from C. Doraiswamy being interested in the business of the meeting, Silverston an ex-partner of Doraiswamy's firm of solicitors, was appointed to the board as an additional director under article 97 of the Articles of Association.", "canonical_name": "Sil verston"}}, {"text": "Doraiswamy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8915, "end_char": 8925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to complete the quorum of two independent directors, the other directors apart from C. Doraiswamy being interested in the business of the meeting, Silverston an ex-partner of Doraiswamy's firm of solicitors, was appointed to the board as an additional director under article 97 of the Articles of Association.", "canonical_name": "C. Doraiswamy"}}, {"text": "article 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9007, "end_char": 9017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 14, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9684, "end_char": 9698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance to the aforesaid resolution a letter or offer dated April 14, 1977 was prepared."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9938, "end_char": 9949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The envelope containing Devagnanam's explanatory' letter dated April 12 (without the copy of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 30, 1977) and the letter of offer dated April 14 were received by the Holding Company on May 2, 1977 in an envelope bearing the Indian postal mark of April 27, 1977."}}, {"text": "Manoharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10085, "end_char": 10094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of offer which was sent to one of the Indian shareholders, Manoharan was posted in an envelope which also bore the postal mark of 27th April.", "canonical_name": "Man\"oharan"}}, {"text": "Manoharan group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10626, "end_char": 10641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The meeting of the Boaard of Directors was held an May 2, 1977 as scheduled and in the meting the whole of the new issue consisting of 16,000 rights share was allotted to the Indian shareholders including members of the Manoharan group."}}, {"text": "Devagnanam group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10660, "end_char": 10676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of these the Devagnanam group was allotted 11,734 shares."}}, {"text": "F.E.R.A.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10834, "end_char": 10842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After marking the allotment of shares a letter was sent to the Reserve Bank by NHL reporting compliance with the requirements of F.E.R.A. by the issue of 16,000 rights shares and the allotment thereof to the Indian shareholders which resulted in the reduction of the foreign holding to approximately 40% and increased that of the Indian shareholders to almost 60%."}}, {"text": "section 397 and 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11140, "end_char": 11159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11167, "end_char": 11193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "2nd May, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11427, "end_char": 11440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Holding Company filed a company petition in the High Court under section 397 and 398 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 alleging that the Indian Directors abused their fiduciary position in the Company by deciding in the meeting of April 6 to issue the rights shares at par and by allotting them exclusively to the Indian shareholders in the meeting of 2nd May, 1977."}}, {"text": "section 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12598, "end_char": 12609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12621, "end_char": 12634, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "6th April, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14200, "end_char": 14215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It accordingly allowed the appeal filed by the Holding Company and dismissed the cross-objections of the appellant and directed that the Board of Directors be suspended and an interim Board consisting of nine directors proposed by the Holding Company be constituted and that the rights issue made on 6th April, 1977 and the."}}, {"text": "April 6 and May 2, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14612, "end_char": 14635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the appeals to this Court, on the question whether the decisions taken at the meetings of the Boards of Directors of NIIL on April 6 and May 2, 1977 constitute acts of oppression within the meaning of S. 397 of the Companies Act 1956."}}, {"text": "S. 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14688, "end_char": 14694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14702, "end_char": 14720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "January 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17063, "end_char": 17078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a further measure of neutralisation of the benefit which the Indian shareholders received in the meeting of 2nd May, 1977, it is directed that the\n\n16,000 rights shares which were allotted in that meeting to the Indian shareholders will be treated as not qualifying for the payment of dividend for a period of one year commencing from January 1, 1977 the Company's year being the Calendar year."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17252, "end_char": 17269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The interim dividend or any further dividend received by the Indian shareholders on the 16,000 rights shares for the year ending December 31, 1977 shall be repaid by them to NHL, which shall distribute the same as if the issue and allotment of the rights shares was not made untill after December 31, 1977."}}, {"text": "M.M. Sabharwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17783, "end_char": 17797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to ensure the smooth functioning of NHL and with a view to ensuring that the directions are complied with expeditiously, it is directed that Shri M.M. Sabharwal who was appointed as a Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors under the orders of this Court dated November 6, 1978 will continue to function as such until December 31, 1982. [", "canonical_name": "M.M.\n\nSabharwal"}}, {"text": "November 6, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17906, "end_char": 17922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to ensure the smooth functioning of NHL and with a view to ensuring that the directions are complied with expeditiously, it is directed that Shri M.M. Sabharwal who was appointed as a Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors under the orders of this Court dated November 6, 1978 will continue to function as such until December 31, 1982. ["}}, {"text": "December 31, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17963, "end_char": 17980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to ensure the smooth functioning of NHL and with a view to ensuring that the directions are complied with expeditiously, it is directed that Shri M.M. Sabharwal who was appointed as a Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors under the orders of this Court dated November 6, 1978 will continue to function as such until December 31, 1982. ["}}, {"text": "October 20-21, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disinvestment by the Holding Company, as one of the two courses which could be adopted for reducing the non-resident interest in NHL to 40% stood ruled out, on account of the rigid attitude of Coats who, during the period between the Ketty meeting of October 20-21, 1976 and the Birmingham discussions of March 29-31, 1977 clung to their self interest, regardless of the pressure of FERA, the directive of the Reserve Bank of India and their transparent impact on the future of NHL. ["}}, {"text": "March 29-31, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19267, "end_char": 19284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disinvestment by the Holding Company, as one of the two courses which could be adopted for reducing the non-resident interest in NHL to 40% stood ruled out, on account of the rigid attitude of Coats who, during the period between the Ketty meeting of October 20-21, 1976 and the Birmingham discussions of March 29-31, 1977 clung to their self interest, regardless of the pressure of FERA, the directive of the Reserve Bank of India and their transparent impact on the future of NHL. ["}}, {"text": "Raeburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20290, "end_char": 20297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purpose behind the planned delay in posting the letters of offer to Raeburn and to the Holding Company, and in posting the notice of the Board's meeting for May 2 to Sanders, was palpably to ensure that no legal proceeding was taken to injunct the holding of the meeting.", "canonical_name": "C. 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Devagnanam is appellant No."}}, {"text": "NIIL was incorporated as a Private Company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53026, "end_char": 53105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "July 20, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53109, "end_char": 53122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The NIIL was incorporated as a Private Company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 on July 20, 1949 with its Registered Office at Madras."}}, {"text": "Ketty", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53188, "end_char": 53193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its factory is situated at Ketty, Nilgiris."}}, {"text": "Nilgiris", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53195, "end_char": 53203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its factory is situated at Ketty, Nilgiris."}}, {"text": "Needle Industries (India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53277, "end_char": 53307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of its incorporation, NIIL was a wholly owned subsidiary of Needle Industries (India) Ltd., Studley, England (hereinafter called 'NI-Studley')."}}, {"text": "NI-Studley", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53662, "end_char": 53672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that year, NI-Studley entered into an agreement with NEWEY\n\nBROS.", "canonical_name": "NI Studley"}}, {"text": "NEWEY\n\nBROS. 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The Holding Company was incorporated in the United Kingdom under the English Companies Ac:t, 1948 with its Registered Office at Birmingham, England."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55179, "end_char": 55198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of an undertaking given by it to the Government of India at thei time of its incorporation and pursuant to the subsequent directives given by the said Government for achieving Indianisation of the share capital of foreign companies, three issues of shares were made by NHL in the years 1968, 1969 and 1971, all at par."}}, {"text": "N. Manoharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56049, "end_char": 56061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the latter block of shares, Devagnanam and his relatives held 9,140 shares while the remaining 3,870 shares were held by other employees and their relatives, amongst whom were N. Manoharan and his group who held 900 shares and D.P. Kingsley and his group who held 530 shares."}}, {"text": "D.P. Kingsley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56100, "end_char": 56113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the latter block of shares, Devagnanam and his relatives held 9,140 shares while the remaining 3,870 shares were held by other employees and their relatives, amongst whom were N. Manoharan and his group who held 900 shares and D.P. Kingsley and his group who held 530 shares.", "canonical_name": "D.P.\n\nKingsley"}}, {"text": "Coats Paton Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56280, "end_char": 56299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In or about 1972, a company called Coats Paton Limited, Glasgow, U.K. (hereinafter called 'Coats') becamean almost 100% ' owner of NI-Studley."}}, {"text": "Glasgow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56301, "end_char": 56308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In or about 1972, a company called Coats Paton Limited, Glasgow, U.K. (hereinafter called 'Coats') becamean almost 100% ' owner of NI-Studley."}}, {"text": "Coats", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56536, "end_char": 56541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position at the beginning of the year 1973 thus was that 60% (to be exact 59.3%) of the share capital of NIIL came to be owned half and half by Coats and NEWEY, the remaining 40% being in the hands of the Indian group."}}, {"text": "Malaysia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59136, "end_char": 59144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NEWEY owned a flourishing business in Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Australia and from 1972 onwards they drew Devagnanam increasingly into the orbit of their Far Eastern\n\ninterests."}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59165, "end_char": 59170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NEWEY owned a flourishing business in Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Australia and from 1972 onwards they drew Devagnanam increasingly into the orbit of their Far Eastern\n\ninterests."}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59175, "end_char": 59184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NEWEY owned a flourishing business in Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Australia and from 1972 onwards they drew Devagnanam increasingly into the orbit of their Far Eastern\n\ninterests."}}, {"text": "Osaka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59556, "end_char": 59561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had already been appointed to the Board of the\n\nNEWEY joint venture company in Osaka and Japan and acted as the liaison Director for that company."}}, {"text": "NEWEY Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59673, "end_char": 59687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had also been asked to coordinate sales with NEWEY Brothers, Australia."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60848, "end_char": 60858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61195, "end_char": 61205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61687, "end_char": 61697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61836, "end_char": 61846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62144, "end_char": 62154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62294, "end_char": 62304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 17, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62903, "end_char": 62915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That letter having been received by NHL on May 17, 1976, the dead-line for reducing the non-resident interest to 40% was My 17, 1977."}}, {"text": "My 17, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62981, "end_char": 62992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That letter having been received by NHL on May 17, 1976, the dead-line for reducing the non-resident interest to 40% was My 17, 1977."}}, {"text": "section 29(4)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63073, "end_char": 63089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 18,\n\n1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63102, "end_char": 63121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Holding Company applied to the Reserve Bank for a 'Holding Licence' under section 29(4)(a) of FERA, on September 18,\n\n1974."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63325, "end_char": 63335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 4, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63622, "end_char": 63635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "licence dated March 4, 1975 from the Reserve Bank in respect of his shares in NJIL."}}, {"text": "NJIL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63686, "end_char": 63690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "licence dated March 4, 1975 from the Reserve Bank in respect of his shares in NJIL."}}, {"text": "April 29, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63892, "end_char": 63906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a note dated April 29, 1975 which he prepared 0:1 \"further Indianisation - Needle Industries (India) Ltd.\" he pointed out that Indianisation should be considered on the footing that the non-resident interest should be reduced to 40% and that, as between the two feasible methods of Indianisation, namely, (I) Going to public and (2) placement of shares, the latter was preferable."}}, {"text": "Ketti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64336, "end_char": 64341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said:\n\nThere can be no question of my becoming in any way involved with Ketti and its future as I am committed to NEWEY.", "canonical_name": "Ketti"}}, {"text": "NEWEY", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64378, "end_char": 64383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said:\n\nThere can be no question of my becoming in any way involved with Ketti and its future as I am committed to NEWEY."}}, {"text": "Khaitan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64699, "end_char": 64706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devagnanam referred in his note to an inquiry from a Mr. Khaitan, the head of a powerful group with diverse interests and investment in industry, who was already involved in the manufacture of products allied to NIIL's."}}, {"text": "Shalimar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64967, "end_char": 64975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coats were alarmed that Devagnanam was negotiating the sale of his shares \"to a Marwari, one Khaitan of Shalimar, a sewing needle C()mpetitor to Ketti\"."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65034, "end_char": 65048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a letter dated August 6, 1975 addressed to Doraiswamy, a partner in a Madras firm of solicitors called 'King and Partridge' who was a Director of NHL, Sanders, a Director of the Holding Company on NIIL's Board, expressed his grave concern at the proposed deal thus :\n\nNo doubt Mr. Khaitan would pay the earth to acquire NHL and judging by what Theo (Devagnanam) had said about him in the past, he may be prepared to arrange or facilitate payment abroad, a most attractive possibility from Theo's point of view, since he has said clearly that he intends leaving India for good, finally settling in Australia."}}, {"text": "Theo (Devagnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65363, "end_char": 65379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a letter dated August 6, 1975 addressed to Doraiswamy, a partner in a Madras firm of solicitors called 'King and Partridge' who was a Director of NHL, Sanders, a Director of the Holding Company on NIIL's Board, expressed his grave concern at the proposed deal thus :\n\nNo doubt Mr. Khaitan would pay the earth to acquire NHL and judging by what Theo (Devagnanam) had said about him in the past, he may be prepared to arrange or facilitate payment abroad, a most attractive possibility from Theo's point of view, since he has said clearly that he intends leaving India for good, finally settling in Australia."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65819, "end_char": 65834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his reply dated August 12, 1975, Doraiswamy said that the news of the proposed sale came as no surprise to him and that he had heard that Silverston, a former Solicitor-partner of his, was acting as a \"go-between\" in Devagnanam's deal with Khaitan."}}, {"text": "September 16, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66056, "end_char": 66074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 16, 1975 Devagnanam wrote to M.M.C.\n\nNEWEY of NEWEY, Birmingham."}}, {"text": "M.M.C.\n\nNEWEY of NEWEY, Birmingham", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66095, "end_char": 66129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 16, 1975 Devagnanam wrote to M.M.C.\n\nNEWEY of NEWEY, Birmingham."}}, {"text": "NEWEY", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66267, "end_char": 66272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devagnanam reiterated his total identification with NEWEY' s Far Eastern interests and expressed his anxiety to free himself from all commitments to or involvement with NIIL, as early as possible.", "canonical_name": "Newey"}}, {"text": "October 22, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66416, "end_char": 66432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 22, 1975 an important meeting was held in which Alan Machrael, a Director of the Holding Company, mad<: it clear\n\n~/ .l('\n\n~--\n\n4---·\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 721\n\non behalf of Coats that neither Khaitan nor any other single purchaser would be acceptable to the Holding Company if that meant the acquisition of 30% share holding."}}, {"text": "Alan Machrael", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66472, "end_char": 66485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 22, 1975 an important meeting was held in which Alan Machrael, a Director of the Holding Company, mad<: it clear\n\n~/ .l('\n\n~--\n\n4---·\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 721\n\non behalf of Coats that neither Khaitan nor any other single purchaser would be acceptable to the Holding Company if that meant the acquisition of 30% share holding.", "canonical_name": "Alan Marckrael"}}, {"text": "Mackrael", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66997, "end_char": 67005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mackrael stated at the meeting that the price in rupees could be matched but not the method of payment which was illegal and reiterated that the Holding Company would prevent any attempt by Devagnanam to sell his holding to Khaitan.", "canonical_name": "Mackrael"}}, {"text": "October 30, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67282, "end_char": 67298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notes of the meeting were signed by Mackrael on October 30, 1975."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67596, "end_char": 67612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 7, 1975 M.M.C. Newey wrote to Devagnanam making it clear beyond the manner of any doubt that Coats, will not accept Khaitan and that according to Bannatyne of Coats, they were put to considerable trouble in finding Indian residents who would match Khaitan's offer of 3.6 times par."}}, {"text": "M.M.C. Newey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67613, "end_char": 67625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 7, 1975 M.M.C. Newey wrote to Devagnanam making it clear beyond the manner of any doubt that Coats, will not accept Khaitan and that according to Bannatyne of Coats, they were put to considerable trouble in finding Indian residents who would match Khaitan's offer of 3.6 times par."}}, {"text": "Niil", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68199, "end_char": 68203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finding that Coats were determined not to allow him to sell his shares to Khaitan, Devagnanam changed his mind and decided against disposing of his holding in Niil."}}, {"text": "November 13, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68209, "end_char": 68226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nNovember 13, 1975, he wrote to Newey saying:\n\n\"I do not think any of us want to _see Coats dominate Ketti."}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69041, "end_char": 69051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69061, "end_char": 69087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69198, "end_char": 69224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69268, "end_char": 69277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69527, "end_char": 69537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69730, "end_char": 69741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69822, "end_char": 69831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69849, "end_char": 69862, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69977, "end_char": 69988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70188, "end_char": 70197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70215, "end_char": 70228, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70340, "end_char": 70351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kingsley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70515, "end_char": 70523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To resume the thread of events, on receipt of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated May 11, 1976 Kingsley, _as NIIL's Secretary, sent a reply on May 18, 1976 to the Bank confirming the acceptance of the various conditions under which permission was granted to NHL to continue its business.", "canonical_name": "Kingsley"}}, {"text": "August 11, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70712, "end_char": 70727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 11, 1976 the term of Devagnanam's appointment as the Managing Director of NHL came to an end but in the meeting dated October 1, 1976 of NIIL's Board of Directors, that appointment was renewed for a further period of five years."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70837, "end_char": 70852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 11, 1976 the term of Devagnanam's appointment as the Managing Director of NHL came to an end but in the meeting dated October 1, 1976 of NIIL's Board of Directors, that appointment was renewed for a further period of five years."}}, {"text": "C Raeburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71029, "end_char": 71038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On being informed of the renewal of Devagnanam's appointment, NEWEY's Chairman, C Raeburn, who used to atter.d to the affairs of the Holding Company, did not object as such to the Board's decision (\"It may well be that the reappointment in itself is right\") but he demurred to the modality by which the decision was taken since, according to him, questions relating to appointments to senior positions in the Company ought to be decided in consultation with the U.K. Shareholders so that they could have an opportunity to express their views.", "canonical_name": "C. Raeburn"}}, {"text": "October 20 and 21. 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71572, "end_char": 71595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20 and 21."}}, {"text": "Ketti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 71621, "end_char": 71626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1976, a meeting took place at Ketti between the U.K. shareholders and the Indian shareholders of NIIL."}}, {"text": "Alan Mackrael", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71726, "end_char": 71739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The former were represented by Alan Mackrael, the Managing Director\n\nN.l.l.", "canonical_name": "Alan Marckrael"}}, {"text": "C. Raeburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71839, "end_char": 71849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud C.J.) 723\n\nof the Holding Company, and C. Raeburn, the Chairman of NEWEY the latter by Devagnanam and Kingsley.", "canonical_name": "C. Raeburn"}}, {"text": "Martin Henry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71916, "end_char": 71928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Martin Henry, the Managing Director of 'Madura Coats', an Indian Company in which the Holding Company had substantial interest, also attended that meeting and took part in its deliberations."}}, {"text": "Articles 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72832, "end_char": 72842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 23, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73841, "end_char": 73857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raeburn too wrote a let_ter on October 23, 1976 to Devagnanam saying that Coats were not really interested in any independent Indians taking their excess shareholding."}}, {"text": "December 11, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73981, "end_char": 73998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 11, 1976 Devagnanam wrote to Raeburn expressing the resentment of himself and his group at the attempts made by Coats to maintain their control over NHL by indirect means."}}, {"text": "Decembe-r 14", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74165, "end_char": 74177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Decembe-r 14, Devagnanam offered a package deal under which the existing Indian shareholders would augment their holding to 60%, Mackrael and Raeburn would be on the Board of Directors but not Martin Henry, and even B.T. Lee, a Senior Executive of NI-Studley, could be appointed as a wholetime Director of NIIL to be in charge of its export programme."}}, {"text": "B.T. Lee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74381, "end_char": 74389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Decembe-r 14, Devagnanam offered a package deal under which the existing Indian shareholders would augment their holding to 60%, Mackrael and Raeburn would be on the Board of Directors but not Martin Henry, and even B.T. Lee, a Senior Executive of NI-Studley, could be appointed as a wholetime Director of NIIL to be in charge of its export programme."}}, {"text": "January 20, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74520, "end_char": 74536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 20, 1977 the Reserve Bank sent a reminder to NIJL asking\n\n.,,"}}, {"text": "NIJL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 74573, "end_char": 74577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 20, 1977 the Reserve Bank sent a reminder to NIJL asking\n\n.,,"}}, {"text": "February 21, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74702, "end_char": 74719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its reply dated February 21, 1977 NHL confirmed its commitment to achieve the desired Indianisation by the stipulated date, viz.,"}}, {"text": "March 9, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74833, "end_char": 74846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 9, 1977 Raeburn wrote to Devagnanam, saying that after a discussion with Mackrael and three other high-ranking persons of Coats, it was clear that Coats were not agreeable to allowoing the present Indian shareholders to acquire 60% of the equity capital of NIIL, since such a course carried in the long run too great a risk to their world trade."}}, {"text": "March 18, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75354, "end_char": 75368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 18, 1977 a notice was issued by NIIL's Secretary, D.P. Kingsley, intimating that a meeting of the Board of Directors will be held on April 6, 1977."}}, {"text": "29th and 31st March,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75747, "end_char": 75767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 29th and 31st March, he held discussions with four out of the six Directors of the Holding Company, namely NEWEY, Jackson, White-house and Raeburn."}}, {"text": "Jackson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75861, "end_char": 75868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 29th and 31st March, he held discussions with four out of the six Directors of the Holding Company, namely NEWEY, Jackson, White-house and Raeburn."}}, {"text": "Devagnanarn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 76019, "end_char": 76030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During his visit to Birmingham, Devagnanarn expended considerable time in discussing various matters with NEWEY, pertaining to their Far-Eastern business.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "arch 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76198, "end_char": 76211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 4, 1977 NHL received a reminder letter dated ¥arch 30, 1977 from the Reserve Bank which pointed out that the Company had not yet submitted any concrete proposal for reduction of the non-resident interest and asked it to submit its proposal in that behalf without any further delay."}}, {"text": "article 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77724, "end_char": 77734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NILL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 78476, "end_char": 78480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The minues of the meeting recorded that as a matter of abundant caution, the Directors who were holding shares in NILL did not take part either in the discussions which took place in the meeting or in the voting on the resolution."}}, {"text": "Man\"oharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79552, "end_char": 79562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of offer dated April 14, 1977 was prepared pursuant to the resolution passed in the meeting of 6th April, The envelope containing Devagnanam's letter dated April 12 (without the copy of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated March 30, 1977) and the letter of offer dated April 14 were received by Raeburn on May 2, 1977 in an envelope bearing the Indian postal mark of April 27; 1977, The letter of offer which was sent to one of the Indian shareholders; Man\"oharan, was posted in an envelope which also bore the postal mark of 27th April. !", "canonical_name": "Man\"oharan"}}, {"text": "April 27, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79868, "end_char": 79882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nheld on May 2, 1977 and it is on that date that Raeburn received the letter of offer dated April 14, which evidently, was posted at Madras on April 27, 1977."}}, {"text": "Articles of Association and the provisions of the Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80396, "end_char": 80466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 19, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80472, "end_char": 80486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 19, 1977 a notice was issued by NIIL's Secretary intimating that a meeting of the Board of Directors will be held on May 2, 1977."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81100, "end_char": 81114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In between, on April 26, 1977 Raeburn had written a letter to Devagnanam at Malacca, following a telex message which said:\n\nHAD HELPFUL DISCUSSIONS COATS YESTERDAY\n\nPLEASE MAKE NO DECISIONS RE INDIANISATION\n\nPENDING LETTER\"\n\nBy his letter of 26th April, which is said to have been received by Devagnanam on May 4, 1977, Raeburn stated that Coats were still unwilling to grant majority shareholding control to the existing Indian shareholders, but that they were equally not keen to do any thing which would be regarded as circumventing the proposal for lndianisation or the law bearing on the subject, since that would undermine the position of the Indian shareholders,\n\nA meeting of the Board of Directors was held on May 2, 1977 as scheduled."}}, {"text": "Malacca", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 81161, "end_char": 81168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In between, on April 26, 1977 Raeburn had written a letter to Devagnanam at Malacca, following a telex message which said:\n\nHAD HELPFUL DISCUSSIONS COATS YESTERDAY\n\nPLEASE MAKE NO DECISIONS RE INDIANISATION\n\nPENDING LETTER\"\n\nBy his letter of 26th April, which is said to have been received by Devagnanam on May 4, 1977, Raeburn stated that Coats were still unwilling to grant majority shareholding control to the existing Indian shareholders, but that they were equally not keen to do any thing which would be regarded as circumventing the proposal for lndianisation or the law bearing on the subject, since that would undermine the position of the Indian shareholders,\n\nA meeting of the Board of Directors was held on May 2, 1977 as scheduled."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81392, "end_char": 81403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In between, on April 26, 1977 Raeburn had written a letter to Devagnanam at Malacca, following a telex message which said:\n\nHAD HELPFUL DISCUSSIONS COATS YESTERDAY\n\nPLEASE MAKE NO DECISIONS RE INDIANISATION\n\nPENDING LETTER\"\n\nBy his letter of 26th April, which is said to have been received by Devagnanam on May 4, 1977, Raeburn stated that Coats were still unwilling to grant majority shareholding control to the existing Indian shareholders, but that they were equally not keen to do any thing which would be regarded as circumventing the proposal for lndianisation or the law bearing on the subject, since that would undermine the position of the Indian shareholders,\n\nA meeting of the Board of Directors was held on May 2, 1977 as scheduled."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82053, "end_char": 82064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The minutes of that meeting show that Kingsley, the Secretary of NHL; pointed out in the meeting that applications for allotment of the rights shares offered as also the amounts payable\n\nlite /\n\n\\ N.J.I.L •. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 727\n\nalong with the acceptance of the offer had been received from all the shareholders except the U.K. shareholders and the Manoharan group.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 82335, "end_char": 82341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The offer to Manoharan was sent at Virudh Nagar but Silverston pointed out to the meeting that Manoharan was working in Jaipur and that therefore, he should be given further time to participate in the rights issue."}}, {"text": "4th June, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82976, "end_char": 82990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9,60,000/- was recommended by the Board, and it was resolved that the Annual General meeting of the Company be held on 4th June, 1977."}}, {"text": "NEWEY group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83544, "end_char": 83555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devagnanam reiterated by his letter the hope of a closer association with the NEWEY group."}}, {"text": "Raebum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83558, "end_char": 83564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raebum reacted sharply to Devagnanam's letter of April 12 and to the letter of offer dated April 14.", "canonical_name": "C. Raeburn"}}, {"text": "M_anoharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85539, "end_char": 85549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M_anoharan, it may be stated, who was a Director and General Manager of NHL had resigned his post in April 1976, after serving the Company for nearly 17 years.", "canonical_name": "Man\"oharan"}}, {"text": "17th May, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86384, "end_char": 86398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admitted that although the time-limit fixed by the Reserve Bank had expired on 17th May, 1977, \"it may have been possible for the Company to get further time from the Reserve Bank of India\"."}}, {"text": "Y. N.I.N.H.L.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87360, "end_char": 87373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He expressed the hope that Mackrael would agree that the decision regarding the issue of rights shares taken at the Board meeting on April 6, 1977 was bona fide and in the best interests\n\nN.1.1.L. Y. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 729\n\n0 ( the Company."}}, {"text": "30th March, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87963, "end_char": 87979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As if to illustrate that it is better late than never, he enclosed with his letter a copy of the Reserve Bank's letter dated 30th March, 1977 which was to have been sent along with the letter dated April 12 but was in fact not so sent."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 88174, "end_char": 88191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17, 1977 Mackrael, acting on behalf of the Holding Company, filed a Company Petition in the Madras High Court under sections 397 and 398 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 out of which the present appeals arise."}}, {"text": "sections 397 and 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88198, "end_char": 88218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88226, "end_char": 88252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "2nd May,\n\n1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88549, "end_char": 88563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It Is alleged in the petition that the Indian Directors abused their fiduciary position in the Company by deciding in the meeting of April 6 to issue the rights shares at par and by allotting them exclusively to the Indian sharesholders in the meeting of 2nd May,\n\n1977."}}, {"text": "section 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91300, "end_char": 91311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91319, "end_char": 91332, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 398(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91759, "end_char": 91773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91781, "end_char": 91794, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92691, "end_char": 92702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92718, "end_char": 92729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92737, "end_char": 92750, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92834, "end_char": 92845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92932, "end_char": 92943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92997, "end_char": 93008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NrIL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94648, "end_char": 94652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(e) Though Coats originally contemplated the transfer of\n\n15% of their excess 20% shares to Madura Coats, or the incorporation of a company to take over their excess 20% shares, they were ultimately agreeable that the existing Indian shareholders should get 9% out of that 20% so as to have a 49% holding in the share capital of NrIL and that 11% should go to new, in dependent, Indian Institutional shareholders."}}, {"text": "October 20 and 21, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94889, "end_char": 94912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) At the Ketti meeting held on October 20 and 21, 1976,\n\nthe issue of rights shares was considered as an alternative to disinvestment, but that was subject to two conditions : one, that it should be shown that there was a viable development plan which required additional funds which the existing cash flow of NIIL could not meet, and two, that the value of the U.K. equity interest required to be transferred would be no less favourable than what would be achieved by a direct sale of that interest."}}, {"text": "Devagananam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95415, "end_char": 95426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(g) Though by his letters of December 11 and 14, 1976\n\nDevagananam had informed Raeburn of the decision of the Indian shareholders to acquire 60% shares for themselves, he did not ever say one word about the issue of rights shares in any of the numerous communications which he sent to Raeburn.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "N. T. Sanders", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96246, "end_char": 96259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the context of the discussions which had taken place until then between the parties, N. T. Sanders who represented the Holding Company on the B9ard had no means or opportunity B of knowing that the particular item on the agenda involved the question of the issue of rights shares.", "canonical_name": "N. T. Sanders"}}, {"text": "article 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96634, "end_char": 96644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Davagnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97354, "end_char": 97364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Davagnanam wanted to present a fait accompli to the Holding Compay so as to prevent it from taking any pre-emptive action.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98212, "end_char": 98222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98230, "end_char": 98243, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98266, "end_char": 98276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98291, "end_char": 98304, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 98572, "end_char": 98590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the purpose of achieving that result, three courses were available to NIIL : (I) Disinvestment by foreign shareholders in favour of Indian shareholders; (2) Issue of rights shares pursuant to section 81 of the Companies Act, and (3) Action under section 81 (1 -A) of the Companies Act for issuing additional shares to Indian residents other than the existing Indian shareholders by passing an appropriate spedal resolution, or if no special resolution was passed, then, by a majority of the shareholders approving such a course with the consent of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98901, "end_char": 98911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98928, "end_char": 98941, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99312, "end_char": 99322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99336, "end_char": 99349, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Devagnanam-NEWEY Combination", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 100077, "end_char": 100105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(o) The true motivation of the various steps taken by the Devagnanam-NEWEY Combination was the furtherence\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 735\n\nof the interest of NEWBY's Far-Eastern enterprises, A coupled with the personal interest of Devagnanam himself."}}, {"text": "NEWBY", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 100194, "end_char": 100199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(o) The true motivation of the various steps taken by the Devagnanam-NEWEY Combination was the furtherence\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 735\n\nof the interest of NEWBY's Far-Eastern enterprises, A coupled with the personal interest of Devagnanam himself."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 100606, "end_char": 100618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(p) The fact that NIIL informed the Holding Company on May 21, 1977 which was after the Company Petition was filed, that the Holding Company could not exercise and will not be allowed to exercise , any rights in respect of the whole of 18,990 shares held by it since its application under section 29 (4) of FERA was not granted by the Reserve Bank shows that the object of the Board of Directors in taking the impugned decision was to exclude the Holding Company from all contrul over NHL."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100840, "end_char": 100850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 24, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101111, "end_char": 101123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why NHL advised the Reserve Bank of India by its letter dated May 24, 1977 that no application for holding any shares by a non-resident should be allowed by the Bank without the knowledge and consent of NIIL."}}, {"text": "September 20, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101336, "end_char": 101354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That also is the reason why NHL conveyed to the Reserve Bank by its letter of September 20, 1977 that until such time as the Company Petition was finally disposed of, no licence should be issued to non-resident shareholders and no remittance of dividend out of India should be permitted with out the non-resident share-holders reducing their holding in NHL to less than 40%."}}, {"text": "Palmer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101962, "end_char": 101968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to certain passages from Palmer's Company Law and Gore-Browne on Companies, and the decisions of the House of Lords, ths Privy Council, and our own Courts including the Supreme Court, the Division Bench held that since the action of the Board of Directors of NIIL was not in the interest of the Company but was taken merely for the purpose of\n\nwelding the Company into 1NEWEY's Far Eastern complex, it was just and equitable to wind up the Company."}}, {"text": "Gore-Browne", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 101987, "end_char": 101998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to certain passages from Palmer's Company Law and Gore-Browne on Companies, and the decisions of the House of Lords, ths Privy Council, and our own Courts including the Supreme Court, the Division Bench held that since the action of the Board of Directors of NIIL was not in the interest of the Company but was taken merely for the purpose of\n\nwelding the Company into 1NEWEY's Far Eastern complex, it was just and equitable to wind up the Company.", "canonical_name": "Gore-Browne"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 102106, "end_char": 102119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to certain passages from Palmer's Company Law and Gore-Browne on Companies, and the decisions of the House of Lords, ths Privy Council, and our own Courts including the Supreme Court, the Division Bench held that since the action of the Board of Directors of NIIL was not in the interest of the Company but was taken merely for the purpose of\n\nwelding the Company into 1NEWEY's Far Eastern complex, it was just and equitable to wind up the Company."}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102998, "end_char": 103009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103017, "end_char": 103030, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "October 26, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 103397, "end_char": 103413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having found that the Holding Company was entitled to relief under section 397 of the Companies Act and the award of solatium made by the trial Court was not the appropriate relief to grant, the Division Bench allowed the appeal fired by the Holding Company, dismissed the cross-objections in substance and adjourned the appeal for a fortnight for hearing further\n\narguments on the nature of the relief to be granted in the case ..\n\nD Eventually, by its order dated October 26, 1978 the Division Bench granted the following reliefs :\n\n(a) Devagnanam was removed forthwith both as the Managing Director and Director of NHL and was asked to vacate the bungalow occupied by him, by E November 1, 1978."}}, {"text": "M.M.\n\nSabharwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103899, "end_char": 103914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) The Board of Directors was superseded and an interim Board consisting of nine directors proposed by the Holding Company was constituted, with Shri M.M.\n\nSabharwal as an independent Chairman.", "canonical_name": "M.M.\n\nSabharwal"}}, {"text": "Harry Bridges", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103948, "end_char": 103961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c) Harry Bridges, an executive of COATS, was appointed as the Managing Director for a period of four months."}}, {"text": "COATS", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 103979, "end_char": 103984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c) Harry Bridges, an executive of COATS, was appointed as the Managing Director for a period of four months."}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105011, "end_char": 105019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals were heard in the first instance by Justice Untwalia and Justice Pathak."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105032, "end_char": 105038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals were heard in the first instance by Justice Untwalia and Justice Pathak."}}, {"text": "sections 397 and 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105362, "end_char": 105382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105390, "end_char": 105409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105427, "end_char": 105438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105601, "end_char": 105612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 399", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105986, "end_char": 105997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106581, "end_char": 106592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 399(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106640, "end_char": 106654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 397 and 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106690, "end_char": 106710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107320, "end_char": 107331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107339, "end_char": 107352, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 109072, "end_char": 109084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was not willing to sell a part of its holding to the Indian group as such a sale would result in ti1e Indian group acquiring an absolute majority interest."}}, {"text": "Tlie Reserve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 109894, "end_char": 109911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlie Reserve Bank, according to the company petition, would not have been so unreasonable as not to extend the time for complying with its directive, especially since the Holding Company had agreed in principle to dilute its holding and the only difference between the parties was as regards the method by which such dilution was to be effected."}}, {"text": "27.4.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 111375, "end_char": 111384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) The notice of the Board meeting of May 2, although dated 19th April 1977, was posted to Sanders on 27.4.1977, thereby ensuring that it would reach him only after the date of the meeting."}}, {"text": "C. Doraiswamy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 112573, "end_char": 112586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Doraiswamy, the 8th respondent stated in his letter dated 9.5.1977 to Mackrael, a Director of the Holding Company, that it would have been possible for the Company to get further time from the Reserve Bank of India.", "canonical_name": "C. Doraiswamy"}}, {"text": "9.5.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 112634, "end_char": 112642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Doraiswamy, the 8th respondent stated in his letter dated 9.5.1977 to Mackrael, a Director of the Holding Company, that it would have been possible for the Company to get further time from the Reserve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "M.J. Silverston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112837, "end_char": 112852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Holding Company contends further that M.J. Silverston was not a disinterested person, that his vote on the resolution for the\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.-H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 741\n\nissue of rights shares had therefore to be ignored in which case there was no quorum of two disinterested directors and that his appointment as an Additional Director was not valid since the notice for the meeting of the Board of Directors to be held on 6.4.1977 did not contain in the agenda any subject regarding appointment of an additional Director under Article 97 of the Company's Articles of Association."}}, {"text": "6.4.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113229, "end_char": 113237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Holding Company contends further that M.J. Silverston was not a disinterested person, that his vote on the resolution for the\n\nN.1.1.L. v. N.I.N.-H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 741\n\nissue of rights shares had therefore to be ignored in which case there was no quorum of two disinterested directors and that his appointment as an Additional Director was not valid since the notice for the meeting of the Board of Directors to be held on 6.4.1977 did not contain in the agenda any subject regarding appointment of an additional Director under Article 97 of the Company's Articles of Association."}}, {"text": "Article 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113334, "end_char": 113344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dvagnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 113420, "end_char": 113429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to these contentions, Dvagnanam filed an elaborate counter-affidavit on his behalf as well as on behalf of NIIL.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "2.5.77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113953, "end_char": 113959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Devagnanam, every action taken in the Board meetings of 6.4.1977 and 2.5.77 was in accordance with law, that Sanders never used to attend the meetings of the Board, being a non-resident he was not entitled to have notice of the Board meetings, that there was no violation of section 81 of the Companies Act at all, tliat section 81 (c) of the Companies Act did not apply to the preent case and that, in view of the attitude adopted by Coats, NIIL, in order to comply with the restrictions imposed by the Reserve Bank and to carry out its directive, had no option but to decide upon the issue of rights shares to bring about the reduction in the non-resident shareholding."}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114159, "end_char": 114169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114177, "end_char": 114190, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114205, "end_char": 114215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114227, "end_char": 114240, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114924, "end_char": 114935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114939, "end_char": 114958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "F.S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 115348, "end_char": 115360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel who led the arguments on the rival sides, Shri F.S. Nariman for the appellants and Shri H.M. Seervai for the respondents, have drawn our attention in jcopious details to\n\nthe correspondence that transpired between the parties, the correspondence with the Reserve Bank of India, the discussions at Ketty and Birmingham which preceded the impugned decisions, the conduct of Devagnanam as a man and a Managing Director, the attitude of Coats stated to arise out of their world-wide business interests and the predicament of NEWEY which was willing to strike but was afraid to wound its partner Coats.", "canonical_name": "F.S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116066, "end_char": 116077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116177, "end_char": 116188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116202, "end_char": 116221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116450, "end_char": 116519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116670, "end_char": 116680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973", "statute": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116696, "end_char": 116709, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116774, "end_char": 116787, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116852, "end_char": 116862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973", "statute": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "sections 43A and 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116902, "end_char": 116921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973", "statute": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116929, "end_char": 116942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117188, "end_char": 117199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973", "statute": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117210, "end_char": 117223, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117478, "end_char": 117489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973", "statute": "The impact of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117497, "end_char": 117510, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117543, "end_char": 117554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117570, "end_char": 117583, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117617, "end_char": 117628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117749, "end_char": 117760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viscount Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117912, "end_char": 117928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) Taking the dictionary meaning of the wo(d 'oppression', Viscount Simonds said at page 342 that the appellant society could justly be described as having behaved towards the miuority shareholders in an 'oppressive' manner, that is to say, in a manner \"burdensome, harsh and wrongful\"."}}, {"text": "Cooper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118232, "end_char": 118238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bettered, the words of Lord President Cooper at the first hearing of the case to the effect that section 210 \"warrants the court in looking at the business realities of the situation and does not confine them to a narrow legalistic view\"."}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118291, "end_char": 118302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118487, "end_char": 118492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the true character of the company, Lord Keith said at page 361 that the company was in substance, though not in law, a partnership, consisting of the society, Dr.\n\nMeyer and Mr. Lucas and whatever may be the other different legal consequences following on one or other of these forms of combination, one result followed from the method adopted, \"which is common to partnership, that there should be the utmost good faith between the constituent members\"."}}, {"text": "Meyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118611, "end_char": 118616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the true character of the company, Lord Keith said at page 361 that the company was in substance, though not in law, a partnership, consisting of the society, Dr.\n\nMeyer and Mr. Lucas and whatever may be the other different legal consequences following on one or other of these forms of combination, one result followed from the method adopted, \"which is common to partnership, that there should be the utmost good faith between the constituent members\"."}}, {"text": "Lucas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 118625, "end_char": 118630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the true character of the company, Lord Keith said at page 361 that the company was in substance, though not in law, a partnership, consisting of the society, Dr.\n\nMeyer and Mr. Lucas and whatever may be the other different legal consequences following on one or other of these forms of combination, one result followed from the method adopted, \"which is common to partnership, that there should be the utmost good faith between the constituent members\"."}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119012, "end_char": 119023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 119073, "end_char": 119080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, it was held that the court ought not to allow technical pleas to defeat the beneficent provisions of section 210 (page 344 per Lord Keith; pages 368-369 per Lord Denning)."}}, {"text": "Associated Tool Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 119541, "end_char": 119572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Re Associated Tool Industries Ltd. (2) of which judgment a photographic copy was supplied to us, Joske J. held that th.e rule in Meyer (supra) involved the consequence that the subsidiary companies must also exercise good faith to the holding company asd not merely that the latter should so act to the former."}}, {"text": "Joske", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119635, "end_char": 119640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Re Associated Tool Industries Ltd. (2) of which judgment a photographic copy was supplied to us, Joske J. held that th.e rule in Meyer (supra) involved the consequence that the subsidiary companies must also exercise good faith to the holding company asd not merely that the latter should so act to the former."}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119930, "end_char": 119941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119957, "end_char": 119970, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119981, "end_char": 119992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120000, "end_char": 120013, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120929, "end_char": 120940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121089, "end_char": 121100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121147, "end_char": 121158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121232, "end_char": 121243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121288, "end_char": 121299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wilberforce", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 121307, "end_char": 121318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Wilberforce observed that the 'words' just and equitable' are a recognition of the fact that a limited company is more' than a mere legal entity, with a personality in law of its own; and that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure :\n\n\"The 'just and equitable' prov1s1on does not, as tbe respondents suggest, entitle one party to disregard the obligation he assumes by entering a company, nor the court to dispense him from it.", "canonical_name": "Wilberforce"}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 123413, "end_char": 123420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lindley on Partnership (14th Edition, pages 194-95) E cites Blissett v. Daniel (1) as an authority for the proposition that :\n\n\"The utmost good faith is due from every member of a partnership towards every other member; and if any dispute arise between partners touching any transaction by which one seeks to benefit himself at the expense of the firm, he will be required to show, not only that he has the law on his side, but that his conduct will bear to be tried by the highest standard of honour\"."}}, {"text": "N.H. Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124417, "end_char": 124430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said, as was done by one of us, N.H. Bhagwati J. in a decision of the Gujarat High Court in S.M. Ganpatram v. S:iyaji Jubilee Cotton & Jute Mills Co., (1) that \"a resolution passed by the directors may be perfectly legal and yet oppressive, and conversely a resolution which is in contravention of the law may be in the interests of the shareholders and the company\"."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 124455, "end_char": 124473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said, as was done by one of us, N.H. Bhagwati J. in a decision of the Gujarat High Court in S.M. Ganpatram v. S:iyaji Jubilee Cotton & Jute Mills Co., (1) that \"a resolution passed by the directors may be perfectly legal and yet oppressive, and conversely a resolution which is in contravention of the law may be in the interests of the shareholders and the company\"."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125649, "end_char": 125657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither the judgment of Bhagwati J. nor the observations in Elder are capable of the construction that every illegality is per se oppressive or that the illegality of an action does not bear upon its oppressiveness."}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127495, "end_char": 127506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gore Brown", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 127691, "end_char": 127701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "page 613, paras 57-06, 57-07; Gore Brown on Companies, 43rd ed.,", "canonical_name": "Gore-Browne"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127833, "end_char": 127840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India, this restrictive development has no place, for, .in S.P. Jain v. Kalinga Tubes, (2) Wanchoo J. accepted the broad and liberal interpretation given to the C')urt's powers in Meyer."}}, {"text": "C')urt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127903, "end_char": 127909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India, this restrictive development has no place, for, .in S.P. Jain v. Kalinga Tubes, (2) Wanchoo J. accepted the broad and liberal interpretation given to the C')urt's powers in Meyer."}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127995, "end_char": 128006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128022, "end_char": 128035, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128144, "end_char": 128155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128198, "end_char": 128209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128629, "end_char": 128640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129696, "end_char": 129707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalinga Tubes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129760, "end_char": 129773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(page 737)\n\nAt pages 734-735 of the judgment in Kalinga Tubes, Wanchoo J. has reproduced from the judgment in Meyer, the five points which D were stressed in Elder."}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130239, "end_char": 130250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 210", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130787, "end_char": 130798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131429, "end_char": 131440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131448, "end_char": 131461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132816, "end_char": 132853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 1, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 132878, "end_char": 132893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It repealed the earlier Act, namely, The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and came into force on January 1, 1974."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132951, "end_char": 132960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "25th day of March 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 133026, "end_char": 133048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Person resident in India\" is defined in clause (p) of section 2 to mean:\n\n(i) a citizen of India, who has, at any time after the 25th day of March 1947, been staying in India, but does not include a citizen of India who has gone out of, or stays outside, India, in either case-\n\n(a) for or on taking up employment outside- India, or\n\n,, ·~~~\"'\n\n(b) for carrying on outside India a!business ot'Jvocation outside India, or\n\n(1) [1959] WLR 62."}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134068, "end_char": 134078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134134, "end_char": 134144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134152, "end_char": 134171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134590, "end_char": 134600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134763, "end_char": 134773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134778, "end_char": 134788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Act or the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134859, "end_char": 134907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank,-", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 135309, "end_char": 135323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 28 and section 47 and notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, a person resident outside India (whether a citizen of India or not) or a person who is not a citizen of India but is resident in India, or a company (other than a banking company) which is not incorporated under any law in force in India or in which the non-resident interest is more than forty per cent, or any branch of such company, shall not, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank,-\n\n{a) carry on in India, or establish in India a branch, office or other or other place of business for carrying on any activity of a trading, commercial or industrial nature, other than an activity for the carrying on of which permission of the Reserve Bank has been obtained under section 28; or\n\n(2) {a) where any person or company (including its branch) referred to in sub-section (I) carries on any :ictivity referred to in clause( a) of that sub-section at the commencement of this Act or has established a branch, office or other place of business for the carrying on of such activity at such commencement, then, such person or company (including its branch) may make an application to the Reserve Bank within a period of six months from such commencement or such further period as the Reserve Bank may allow in this behalf for permission to continue to carry on such activity or to continue the establishment of the branch, office or other place of business for the carrying on of such activity, as the case may be."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135606, "end_char": 135616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "Act or the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "May 10, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 138425, "end_char": 138437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NIIL filed its application three days late on September 3, 1974, and the application was granted by the Reserve Bank on certain condi tions, by its letter dated May 10, 1976."}}, {"text": "May JO, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 138655, "end_char": 138667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the terms and conditions imposed by the Reserve Bank, the non-resident interest of the Holding Company, which came to about 60%, had to be brought down to 40% within one year of the receipt of the letter dated May JO, 1976, that is to say before May 17, 1977."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138766, "end_char": 138776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 139710, "end_char": 139717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nariman raised at the outset an objection to a finding of mala fides or abuse of the fiduciary position of Directors being recorded on the basis merely of affidavits and the correspondence, against the NHL' S Board of Directors or against Devagnanam and his group.", "canonical_name": "Nariman"}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140077, "end_char": 140088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Whitehouse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141292, "end_char": 141302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whitehouse, the Secretary\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the Holding Company and N.T. Sanders who was the sole repre\n\nsentative of the Holding Company n NTIL's Board of Directors, did file affidavits but they are restricted to the question of the late receipt of the letter of offer of shares and the notice for the Board meeting of May 2, 1977."}}, {"text": "NTIL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 141458, "end_char": 141462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whitehouse, the Secretary\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the Holding Company and N.T. Sanders who was the sole repre\n\nsentative of the Holding Company n NTIL's Board of Directors, did file affidavits but they are restricted to the question of the late receipt of the letter of offer of shares and the notice for the Board meeting of May 2, 1977."}}, {"text": "Dev agnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 142013, "end_char": 142024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or at least to ask that Dev agnanam should submit himelf for cross-examination.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145020, "end_char": 145026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Re Smith & Fa wee// Ltd., (supra) Lord Greene, after stating that he strongly disliked being asked on affidavit evidence alone to draw up inferences as to the bona fides or mala fides of the actors, added that this did not."}}, {"text": "Nana/al Zaver", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145400, "end_char": 145413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nana/al Zaver, (supra) the judgment of Kania C.J. contains.a statement at page 394 that 'Considerable evidence was led in the triai Court on the question of bona fides' but it is not clear what kind of evidence was so led and besides, the fact that oral evidence was led in some cases does not mean that it must be ·\n\nled in all cases or that without it, the matter in issue cannot be found upon."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145439, "end_char": 145444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nana/al Zaver, (supra) the judgment of Kania C.J. contains.a statement at page 394 that 'Considerable evidence was led in the triai Court on the question of bona fides' but it is not clear what kind of evidence was so led and besides, the fact that oral evidence was led in some cases does not mean that it must be ·\n\nled in all cases or that without it, the matter in issue cannot be found upon."}}, {"text": "May 25, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 146573, "end_char": 146585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A very important document, namely, Devagnanam's telex to Raeburn dated May 25, 1977 was put on the record for the first time before us since Shri Nariman himself desired it to be produced, waiving the protection of the caveat \"without prejudice\"."}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 147208, "end_char": 147215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the Holding Company as put forward by Shri Seervai is like this :\n\n(i) Devagnanam kept Raebum and Coats under the impressiqn that negotiations were still going on and were not to be treated as concluded while, in reality, he had made up his mind to treat the matter as at an end."}}, {"text": "Raeburn", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 149139, "end_char": 149146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(v) The whole idea was to cut off all sources of information from Raeburn and Coats and to confront them with the fait accompli of the allotment of rights shares to the Indian shareholders, including the shares formally offered to the Holding Company which were not allotted to it on the ground of its non-compliance with the letter of offer."}}, {"text": "sections 43A and 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152126, "end_char": 152145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 152153, "end_char": 152172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 153553, "end_char": 153557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Shri Nari man, Coats left no doubt by their attitude that their real interest lay in their worldwide business and they wanted to bring the working of NIIL to a grinding halt with a view to eliminating an established competitor from their business.", "canonical_name": "Nariman"}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154430, "end_char": 154441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 154449, "end_char": 154462, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ketty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 156719, "end_char": 156724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The picture which Devagnanam ha~ drawn of himself as a person deeply committed to Ketty, and as having built up the business with scrupulous regard to the observance of Foreign Exchange Regulations and Indian Laws in contradistinction to Coats who, he alleged, wanted to contravene the Foreign Exchange Regulations of our country is not borne out by the correspondence.", "canonical_name": "Ketti"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 156806, "end_char": 156834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Newey-Goodman Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157056, "end_char": 157074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the letter which he wrote to Shread of Newey-Goodman Ltd. on August 11, 1973 (which was filed by consent in the Appeal Court) shows that he wanted to dispose of his shares at a large premium by officially receiving the par value in Rupees in India and obtaining the balance in foreign currency outside India."}}, {"text": "August 11, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 157078, "end_char": 157093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the letter which he wrote to Shread of Newey-Goodman Ltd. on August 11, 1973 (which was filed by consent in the Appeal Court) shows that he wanted to dispose of his shares at a large premium by officially receiving the par value in Rupees in India and obtaining the balance in foreign currency outside India."}}, {"text": "Needle Industries, U.K.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157869, "end_char": 157892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said letter discloses that over and above proposing to make a large profit in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulations and the tax laws of India by receiving money outside India, Devagnanam proposed to take away from Ketty its \"select key personnel and technicians\" to Malacca and to manufacture competitively, products which were then ma°:ufactured by Needle Industries, U.K. The foot note to the letter to Shread asked him to keep these matters secret from Coats till the shares had been sold, and till the deed had been done."}}, {"text": "Shread", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 157924, "end_char": 157930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said letter discloses that over and above proposing to make a large profit in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulations and the tax laws of India by receiving money outside India, Devagnanam proposed to take away from Ketty its \"select key personnel and technicians\" to Malacca and to manufacture competitively, products which were then ma°:ufactured by Needle Industries, U.K. The foot note to the letter to Shread asked him to keep these matters secret from Coats till the shares had been sold, and till the deed had been done."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158393, "end_char": 158402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158544, "end_char": 158554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taylor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 158653, "end_char": 158659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred in that letter to his contract with Newey and Taylor under which he was to be a full-time Managing Director of that Company for five years from August 1, 1974 to July 31, 1979 and asked the Reserve Bank to determine his status."}}, {"text": "August 1, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 158751, "end_char": 158765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred in that letter to his contract with Newey and Taylor under which he was to be a full-time Managing Director of that Company for five years from August 1, 1974 to July 31, 1979 and asked the Reserve Bank to determine his status."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 158769, "end_char": 158782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred in that letter to his contract with Newey and Taylor under which he was to be a full-time Managing Director of that Company for five years from August 1, 1974 to July 31, 1979 and asked the Reserve Bank to determine his status."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 158838, "end_char": 158855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, 1975 he wrote to the Reserve Bank contending that he was a 'resident', referring this time not to his contract with Newey-Taylor but to the agreement between NILL and Newey Goodman Ltd., a Company about to be formed, under which he was to be on deputation with it as an employee of NIIL."}}, {"text": "Newey-Taylor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 158967, "end_char": 158979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, 1975 he wrote to the Reserve Bank contending that he was a 'resident', referring this time not to his contract with Newey-Taylor but to the agreement between NILL and Newey Goodman Ltd., a Company about to be formed, under which he was to be on deputation with it as an employee of NIIL."}}, {"text": "Newey Goodman Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 159018, "end_char": 159036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, 1975 he wrote to the Reserve Bank contending that he was a 'resident', referring this time not to his contract with Newey-Taylor but to the agreement between NILL and Newey Goodman Ltd., a Company about to be formed, under which he was to be on deputation with it as an employee of NIIL."}}, {"text": "Newey-Goodman", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 159195, "end_char": 159208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devagnanam's letter dated August 11, 1973 to Shread of Newey-Goodman, the gloss which he put on his status as a resident in his letters to the Reserve Bank dated August 26, 1974 and September 3, 1975 and the clever manner in which he had his status determined as a resident, cast a cloud on his conduct and credibility."}}, {"text": "August 26, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 159302, "end_char": 159317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devagnanam's letter dated August 11, 1973 to Shread of Newey-Goodman, the gloss which he put on his status as a resident in his letters to the Reserve Bank dated August 26, 1974 and September 3, 1975 and the clever manner in which he had his status determined as a resident, cast a cloud on his conduct and credibility."}}, {"text": "Needle Industries (U.K.)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 161012, "end_char": 161036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alan Mackrael says in paragraph 20 of his reply affidavit in the Company Petition that it was made clear to Devagnanam that neither Coats nor the Needle Industries (U.K.) would ever be a party to any transaction which was illegal under the Indian law."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 161136, "end_char": 161148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a letter dated May 24, 1976 to Devagnanam, A.D. Jackson of NEWEY has this to say :-\n\n•Jn broad terms the proposition is that Alan Mackrael, Martin Henry and myself should meet with you in Malacca during September to discuss arrangements whereby an Indian gentleman known to Coats would purchase both your shares and our own share of the -NINTH holding in the manner which I outlined to you on the telephone."}}, {"text": "A.D. Jackson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 161164, "end_char": 161176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a letter dated May 24, 1976 to Devagnanam, A.D. Jackson of NEWEY has this to say :-\n\n•Jn broad terms the proposition is that Alan Mackrael, Martin Henry and myself should meet with you in Malacca during September to discuss arrangements whereby an Indian gentleman known to Coats would purchase both your shares and our own share of the -NINTH holding in the manner which I outlined to you on the telephone."}}, {"text": "Nill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 162501, "end_char": 162505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leaving aside the determination of Coats to enage in a major struggle with NIIL's Board of Directors, Jackson's letter leaves no doubt that Coats were willing to be a party to the arrangement whereby the shares of Devagnanam and NEWEY would be sold to an 'Indian gentleman', under which the actual payment would be higher than the government approved price ascertained by Kingsley, .the Secretary of Nill.", "canonical_name": "NILL"}}, {"text": "FERA", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 163359, "end_char": 163363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 20 of his reply affidavit, Alan Mackrael says that none of the proposals put forward by the Holding Company for achieving Indianization to comply with the requirements of FERA would have given the control of NHL to the Holding Company."}}, {"text": "October 25, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 163468, "end_char": 163484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is falsified by Raeburn's letter dated October 25, 1976 to Devagnanam, in which he says that the idea of an outside independent party holding J 5% of the share capitat of NIIL was raised, but this did not appear to be acceptable to Coats since \"they want to achieve not only that the present Indian shareholders hold a minority but that they (Coats) hold and influence a substantial block, thereby hoping to influence NEWEY to their views\"."}}, {"text": "Devananam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 164550, "end_char": 164559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that Coats and NEWEY were not of one mind is writ large on the face of these proceedings and, in fact, the charge against NEWEY is that because of their Far-Eastern interests in which Devananam was a great.asset to them, they were supporting Devagnanam.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "June 8, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 164679, "end_char": 164691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may in this connection draw attention to a Jetter dated June 8, 1977 by Raeburn to Mackrael, saying that the insistence of Coats ('Glasgow') to hold on to the 60% shareholding in NIIL or at least to ensure that 60% did not get into the hands of the Indian shareholders will involve a long a11d costly legal battle."}}, {"text": "N.I.I.L.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 165227, "end_char": 165235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raeburn proceeds to say :\n\n\"We, as Neweys, have neither the will nor the means to participate in that battle, nor do we think it right to do so bearing in mind the legal position regarding Indianisation, the provision in the Articles and the fact that substantially the modern business of N.I.I.L. has been built up by the efforts of the present Indian shareholders\"."}}, {"text": "June 8, J 977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 165738, "end_char": 165751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of this letter of Raeburn (dated June 8, J 977), Mackrael had the temerity in his reply affidavit dated July 8, 1977, to say that Coats and NEWEY were unanimous in the prosecution of the proceedings consequent upon the filing of the Company Petition."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 165809, "end_char": 165821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of this letter of Raeburn (dated June 8, J 977), Mackrael had the temerity in his reply affidavit dated July 8, 1977, to say that Coats and NEWEY were unanimous in the prosecution of the proceedings consequent upon the filing of the Company Petition."}}, {"text": "Central Agency Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 167644, "end_char": 167663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coats' subsidiary called the Central Agency Ltd., who were sole-selling agents of NIIL's products in various markets in the world, ceased to be so after NHL put an end to the agreement with them."}}, {"text": "Central Agency", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 167815, "end_char": 167829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Agency never applied during the time that they were sole-selling agents of NIIL's products for registration of the Indian Company's Trade Marks as a protective measure."}}, {"text": "Ramaprasada Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168017, "end_char": 168032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Trial Judge, Ramaprasada Rao, Acting C.J., delivered the judgment in the Company's Petition on May 17,\n\n1978."}}, {"text": "May 17,\n\n1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 168099, "end_char": 168112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Trial Judge, Ramaprasada Rao, Acting C.J., delivered the judgment in the Company's Petition on May 17,\n\n1978."}}, {"text": "Alan Marckrael", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 168488, "end_char": 168502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was made under the authority of a Power of Attorney signed by Alan Marckrael.", "canonical_name": "Alan Marckrael"}}, {"text": "Coats Patons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 168913, "end_char": 168925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November 1978, the Trade Mark Agents and Solicitors of NIIL in Hong Kong had to give a notice to Coats Patons, Hong Kong, that the latter had registered the 'Pony' Trade Mark in Hong Kong with the full knowledge that NIIL was the legal owner of that Trade Mark and threatening legal action."}}, {"text": "Indian Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 169139, "end_char": 169153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of that notice, the Indian Company's Trade Mark 'Pony' which was registered by Coats Patons in Hong Kong as their own Trade Mark, was assigned to the Indian Company on December 21, 1978 for a nominal sum of 10 dollars."}}, {"text": "December 21, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 169287, "end_char": 169304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of that notice, the Indian Company's Trade Mark 'Pony' which was registered by Coats Patons in Hong Kong as their own Trade Mark, was assigned to the Indian Company on December 21, 1978 for a nominal sum of 10 dollars."}}, {"text": "March 28, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 169373, "end_char": 169387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Items 7 and 8 of the minutes dated March 28, 1979 of the meeting of the interim Board of Directors of NIIL refer to the registration in Hong Kong by Coats Patons of the Indian Trade Mark of NIIL and subsequent assignment thereof to NHL when legal action was threatened."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 169735, "end_char": 169749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harry Bridges, who was appointed as a temporary Managing Director by the High Court, has stated in his counter affidavit dated March 27, 1980 that the application for registration of the 'Pony' Trade Mark was made in Hong Kong and other places in order to protect that Trade Mark from its improper use by other traders."}}, {"text": "June 15, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 170462, "end_char": 170475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may mention that by a letter dated June 15, 1977 Mackrael had informed Devagnanam that he was removed from the Board of Directors of the Holding Company and M.D.P. Whiteford was appointed in the vacancy."}}, {"text": "M.D.P. Whiteford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 170584, "end_char": 170600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may mention that by a letter dated June 15, 1977 Mackrael had informed Devagnanam that he was removed from the Board of Directors of the Holding Company and M.D.P. Whiteford was appointed in the vacancy."}}, {"text": "Needle Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 170645, "end_char": 170662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that Needle Industries, U.K., had surreptitiously made an application for the registration of NIIL s Trade Mark 'Pony' came to light fortuitously in January 1979 when NIIL applied for the registration\n0f the 'Pony' Trade Mark in Thailand and Japan."}}, {"text": "Thailand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 170871, "end_char": 170879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that Needle Industries, U.K., had surreptitiously made an application for the registration of NIIL s Trade Mark 'Pony' came to light fortuitously in January 1979 when NIIL applied for the registration\n0f the 'Pony' Trade Mark in Thailand and Japan."}}, {"text": "Bridges", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 171271, "end_char": 171278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a Managing Director appointed by the Court, Bridges called a Board meeting of their members of the Board appointed by the Appellate Court, for November 2, 1978."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 171370, "end_char": 171386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a Managing Director appointed by the Court, Bridges called a Board meeting of their members of the Board appointed by the Appellate Court, for November 2, 1978."}}, {"text": "October 28, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 171479, "end_char": 171495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bridges took away many files, documents and statements from the NIIL's factory at Ketty on October 28, 1978, his explanation being that he wanted to carry these documents to Madras where the Board meeting was to be held."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 171720, "end_char": 171736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A little before Bridges left Ketty for Madras, be was informed that this Court had passed an interim order on November 1, 1978."}}, {"text": "Raghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 172748, "end_char": 172756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These were eventually returned by the Holding Company's Advocate, Shri Raghavan."}}, {"text": "NIIL", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 172763, "end_char": 172767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When NIIL wrote on November 21, 1978 to Shri Raghavan asking him to call upon Bridges to confirm that he had not retained copies of any of the documents which he had removed from Ketty, Bridges replied by his letter dated November 29, 1978 that he had taken copies of such documents which he considered relevant and that he proposed to retain such copies since \"as director of the Company, I am entitled to peruse and take copies of whatever records I choose\"."}}, {"text": "November 21, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 172777, "end_char": 172794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When NIIL wrote on November 21, 1978 to Shri Raghavan asking him to call upon Bridges to confirm that he had not retained copies of any of the documents which he had removed from Ketty, Bridges replied by his letter dated November 29, 1978 that he had taken copies of such documents which he considered relevant and that he proposed to retain such copies since \"as director of the Company, I am entitled to peruse and take copies of whatever records I choose\"."}}, {"text": "November 29, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 172980, "end_char": 172997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When NIIL wrote on November 21, 1978 to Shri Raghavan asking him to call upon Bridges to confirm that he had not retained copies of any of the documents which he had removed from Ketty, Bridges replied by his letter dated November 29, 1978 that he had taken copies of such documents which he considered relevant and that he proposed to retain such copies since \"as director of the Company, I am entitled to peruse and take copies of whatever records I choose\"."}}, {"text": "D.P.\n\nKingsley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 175732, "end_char": 175746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FERA having come into force on January I, 1974, D.P.\n\nKingsley, the Secretary-Director of NHL, applied on September 3, 1974 to the Reserve Bank for the necessary permission under section 29 (2) of that Act.", "canonical_name": "D.P.\n\nKingsley"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 175863, "end_char": 175873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 5, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 175946, "end_char": 175962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Reserve Bank intimated to NIIL by its letter dated November 5, 1975 that permission would be accorded to NIIL under section 29 (2) (a) read with section 29 (2) (c) of FERA to carry on its activities in India subject to the conditions enumerated\n\nin paragraph 2 of the letter."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176011, "end_char": 176021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176040, "end_char": 176050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 19, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 176836, "end_char": 176853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kingsley wrote a Jetter to Mackrael on November 19, 1975, enclosing therewith a copy of the letter of the Reserve Bank dated November 5."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 177771, "end_char": 177791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 11, 1976 the Reserve Bank oflndia sent a Jetter to NHL granting permission to it under FERA to carry on its business on certain .conditions, one of them being that the non-resident interest in the equity capital had to be reduced to a level not exceeding 40% within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the letter."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178962, "end_char": 178972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "FERA", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 179323, "end_char": 179327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shall have been seen that by the time the permission was granted by the Reserve Bank to NIIL in May 1976, FERA had been in force for a period of about 2l years."}}, {"text": "May 29, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 180591, "end_char": 180603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kingsley pointed out a difficulty in implenting one of the conditions regarding the sale of petroleum products, but the Reserve Bank by its letter dated May 29, 1976 informed him that after a careful consideration of the request, the Bank regretted its inability to enhance the ceiling on the turnover from the Company's trading activity, as stipulated in the letter dated May 11, 1976."}}, {"text": "October i, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 180862, "end_char": 180877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meeting of the Board held on October i, 1976, Devagnanam's appointment as Managing Director was renewed for a further period of five years."}}, {"text": "October 4, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 181082, "end_char": 181097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raeburn, Chairman of NEWEY who was looking after the affairs of the Holding Company, wrote to Devagnanam on October 4, 1976, complaining that it was necessary that the Holding Company should be kept informed in ample time of the Board's meetings on important organisational matters."}}, {"text": "Needle Industries (U.K.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 181725, "end_char": 181748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Martin Henry, the Managing Director of Madura Coats which is an Indian company in which the Needle Industries (U.K.) and Cotas have substantial interest, attended the meeting and took part in the discussions."}}, {"text": "October 20 and 21", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 181898, "end_char": 181915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A note of the discussions which took place at Ketty on October 20 and 21 was prepared by Raeburn and forwarded along with a Jetter dated November JO, 1976 to Devagnanam, with copies to Mackrael, Newey, Jackson and Whitehouse."}}, {"text": "November JO, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 181980, "end_char": 181997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A note of the discussions which took place at Ketty on October 20 and 21 was prepared by Raeburn and forwarded along with a Jetter dated November JO, 1976 to Devagnanam, with copies to Mackrael, Newey, Jackson and Whitehouse."}}, {"text": "Madura Cotas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182426, "end_char": 182438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main features of the discussions which took place in the Ketty meeting are these:\n\n(I) Mackrael and Martin Henry suggested acceptibility of Madura Cotas as holding part of the 60% of the equity to be held by Indian shareholders."}}, {"text": "U.K. shareholders", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 183264, "end_char": 183281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) To allay the concern of U.K. shareholders when they became in minority by the Indian shareholders coming to hold 60%, some safeguards were suggested which, amongst others, were, (i) the Articles of the Company could be altered only by a special resolution which requires a 75% majority of the members voting in person or by proxy."}}, {"text": "Price Waterhouse", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 184132, "end_char": 184148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The preferred method of transferring 20% of the equity to Indian shareholders was thought to be by sale by U.K. members of the appropriate number of shares at the price to be determined by the Government and the advice to be taken from Price Waterhouse in this regard."}}, {"text": "U. K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 184474, "end_char": 184479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The value of the U. K. equity interest thus transferred was not to be Jess favourable than by a direct sale of shares."}}, {"text": "October 21, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 184869, "end_char": 184885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the resumed discussion on October 21, 1976, both sides stuck to their stand."}}, {"text": "Sil verston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 186162, "end_char": 186173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This reaction of Sil verston finds support in.", "canonical_name": "Sil verston"}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 186734, "end_char": 186743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would also appear from Devagnanam's letter of October 21, 1976 to Jackson that Coats were intending to start an Engineering Division at Bangalore for the manufacture of Dynecast and Prym products with an investment of the tune of Rs."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 187715, "end_char": 187732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then comes the important letter of December 14, 1976, which was written by Devagnanam to Raeburn."}}, {"text": "H Raeburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 187798, "end_char": 187807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devagnanam informed H Raeburn by that letter that he had further discussions with his colleagues and was able to persuade them to agree to a kind of\n\nPackage deal.", "canonical_name": "C. Raeburn"}}, {"text": "Needle Industries/Coats, Studley", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 188416, "end_char": 188448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 773\n\nIndianization should take place with the existing Indian shareholders acquiring 60% of the stock; (2) Mackrael and Raeburn should be taken on NIIL's Board as Directors, but in no event Martin Henry who was connected with Madura Coats which had a powerful plan of development of Prym technology; (3) the Indian shareholders were prepared to take B.T. Lee, a senior executive of Needle Industries/Coats, Studley, as a permanent wholetime Director of NIIL to be put specificalJy in charge of exports\"."}}, {"text": "20, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 189737, "end_char": 189745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Dec; ember 20, 1976 Silverston wrote a letter to Raeburn saying that he would be proceeding to U.K. early in January in connection with his personal matters and that he would then visit Rae burn also."}}, {"text": "January 14,1977 stating", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 190406, "end_char": 190429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raeburn wrote to Kingsley on January 14,1977 stating that he had a discussion with- Silverston a couple of days back, during which Silverston had stated clearly the legal position and given his advice upon it."}}, {"text": "Rae", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190625, "end_char": 190628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the last paragraph of this letter, Rae burn said:\n\n\"We have now put our views quite clearly to Mr. Makrael and we are awaiting the reaction of Needle Industries and Coats."}}, {"text": "Makrael", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190689, "end_char": 190696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the last paragraph of this letter, Rae burn said:\n\n\"We have now put our views quite clearly to Mr. Makrael and we are awaiting the reaction of Needle Industries and Coats.", "canonical_name": "Mackrael"}}, {"text": "U. K. shareholders", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 191278, "end_char": 191296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The views of the U. K. shareholders were most certainly not communicated to the Indian shareholders by the middle of January 1977 as was clearly agreed upon in the Ketty meeting."}}, {"text": "17th May,\n\n1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 191986, "end_char": 192001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply, a letter dated February 21, 1977 was sent by NIIL to the Bank, stating:\n\n\"We confirm that we are following up the matter regarding dilution of non-resident interest and we confirm our commitment to achieve the desired Indianization by the stipulated date, i.e. 17th May,\n\n1977.\""}}, {"text": "May J 7, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 192198, "end_char": 192211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They must at least be' assumed to know that not only was Indianization to be achieved by May J 7, 1977, but that NHL had committed itself to do so by that date."}}, {"text": "Coats/Needle Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 193357, "end_char": 193380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After saying that on the Friday preceding the 9th March, he had discussions with Mackrael and three high-ranking personnel of Coats, Raeburn says in that letter that Coats had refused to agree that the Indian shareholders should acquire a 60% shareholding in NHL that this had created a new situation and that he was appending to the letter an outline of what he believed, but could not be sure, would be agreeable to Coats/Needle Industries."}}, {"text": "Raebnm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 195938, "end_char": 195944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance is also placed by counsel on a letter which Devagnanam wrote to Raebnm on April 5, in support of the submission that the negotiations were still not at an end.", "canonical_name": "C. Raeburn"}}, {"text": "Crawford Bayley & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 197287, "end_char": 197308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the letter which Crawford Bayley & Co., wrote on June 21, 1977 on behalf of Sanders to the Reserve Bank of India, no reference was at all made to any proposal by or on behalf of Coats to the Indian shareholders."}}, {"text": "June 21, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 197319, "end_char": 197332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the letter which Crawford Bayley & Co., wrote on June 21, 1977 on behalf of Sanders to the Reserve Bank of India, no reference was at all made to any proposal by or on behalf of Coats to the Indian shareholders."}}, {"text": "NII L's Jetter", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 200392, "end_char": 200406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of NII L's Jetter to the Reserve Bank was sent to Sanders and Whitehouse."}}, {"text": "U. K.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 200809, "end_char": 200814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn view of the fact that to the common knowledge of the two sides there were only two methods by which the desired Indianisation could be achieved, namely, either disinvestment by the Holding Company in favour of the existing Indian shareholders or a rights issue, tl:e particular item on the agenda should have left no doubt in the mind of the U. K. shareholders as to what the Board was likely to discuss and decide in the meeting of the 6th."}}, {"text": "M.S.P. Rajes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 203303, "end_char": 203315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The minutes of the meeting show that two directors, Sanders and\n\nM.S.P. Rajes, asked for leave of absence which was granted to them."}}, {"text": "C Sanders", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 203372, "end_char": 203381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Sanders, as representing the U.K. shareholdes on NIIL's Board, did .", "canonical_name": "C Sanders"}}, {"text": "article 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204205, "end_char": 204215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Siverston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 205191, "end_char": 205200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The offer was decided to be F made by a notice specifying the number of shares which each shareholders was entitled to, and in case the offer was not accepted within 16 days from the date of the offer, it was to be deemed to have been declined by the shareholder concerned,\n\nThe aforesaid resolution of the Board raises three important G questions, inter alia, which have been passed upon us by Shri Seervai on behalf of the Holding Company : (1) Whether the Directors of NIIL, in issuing the rights shares, abused the fiduciary power which ' they possessed as directors to issue shares; (2) Whether Silverston was a 'disinterested Director'; and (3) Whether Siverston's appoint- H ment was otherwise invalid, sine~ there was no item on the agenda\n\nA of the meeting for tb.e appointment of an Additional Director.", "canonical_name": "Sil verston"}}, {"text": "Howard Smith Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 207103, "end_char": 207120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relies in support of these and allied contentions on the decision of the Privy Council in Howard Smith Ltd. and of the English Courts in Fraser, Punt, Piercy and Hogg. ("}}, {"text": "Fraser", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 207150, "end_char": 207156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relies in support of these and allied contentions on the decision of the Privy Council in Howard Smith Ltd. and of the English Courts in Fraser, Punt, Piercy and Hogg. ("}}, {"text": "Punt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 207158, "end_char": 207162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relies in support of these and allied contentions on the decision of the Privy Council in Howard Smith Ltd. and of the English Courts in Fraser, Punt, Piercy and Hogg. (", "canonical_name": "Punt"}}, {"text": "Piercy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 207164, "end_char": 207170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relies in support of these and allied contentions on the decision of the Privy Council in Howard Smith Ltd. and of the English Courts in Fraser, Punt, Piercy and Hogg. (", "canonical_name": "Piercy"}}, {"text": "Hogg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 207175, "end_char": 207179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relies in support of these and allied contentions on the decision of the Privy Council in Howard Smith Ltd. and of the English Courts in Fraser, Punt, Piercy and Hogg. ("}}, {"text": "Byrne", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 207633, "end_char": 207638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Byrne J. stated :\n\nN.1.1.L. v, N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 781\n\nThere may be occasions when Directors may fairly A and properly issue shares in the case of a Company constituted like the present for other reasons."}}, {"text": "Peterson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 208326, "end_char": 208334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Reserve Bank had fixed a deadline and NHL had committed itself to complying with the Bank's directive before that deadline ..\n\nPeterson J. applied the principle enunciated in Fraser and in Punt in the case of Piercy v. S. Mills & (Company Ltd. (supra) The learned Judge observed at page 84 :\n\n\"The basis of both cases is, as I understand, that Directors are not entitled to use their powers of issuing shares merely for the purpose of maintaining their control or the control of themselves and their friends over the affiairs of the company, or merely for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority of shareholders.\""}}, {"text": "Buckley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 209485, "end_char": 209492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Buckley J. reiterated the principle in Punt and in Piercy, (Supra) and observed :\n\n\"Unless a majority in a company is acting oppressively towards the minority, this Court should not and will not itself interfere with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights or embark upon an iuquiry into the respective merits of the views held or policies\n\nfa; oured by the majority and the minority."}}, {"text": "Punt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 209524, "end_char": 209528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Buckley J. reiterated the principle in Punt and in Piercy, (Supra) and observed :\n\n\"Unless a majority in a company is acting oppressively towards the minority, this Court should not and will not itself interfere with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights or embark upon an iuquiry into the respective merits of the views held or policies\n\nfa; oured by the majority and the minority.", "canonical_name": "Punt"}}, {"text": "Piercy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 209536, "end_char": 209542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Buckley J. reiterated the principle in Punt and in Piercy, (Supra) and observed :\n\n\"Unless a majority in a company is acting oppressively towards the minority, this Court should not and will not itself interfere with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights or embark upon an iuquiry into the respective merits of the views held or policies\n\nfa; oured by the majority and the minority.", "canonical_name": "Piercy"}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 211486, "end_char": 211509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we advert to the decision of the Privy Chuncil in Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd., (supra) we would like to refer to the deeision of the High Court of Australia in Harlowe's Nominees Pty."}}, {"text": "Berger", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 211649, "end_char": 211655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd v.\n\nWoodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Company No Liability and another, (supra) and to the Canadian decision of Berger J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, in the case of Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Miller et a/(1), both of which were consi .. dered by Lord Wilberfore in Howard Smith."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of British Columbia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 211666, "end_char": 211699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd v.\n\nWoodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Company No Liability and another, (supra) and to the Canadian decision of Berger J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, in the case of Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Miller et a/(1), both of which were consi .. dered by Lord Wilberfore in Howard Smith."}}, {"text": "Wilberfore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 211800, "end_char": 211810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd v.\n\nWoodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Company No Liability and another, (supra) and to the Canadian decision of Berger J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, in the case of Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Miller et a/(1), both of which were consi .. dered by Lord Wilberfore in Howard Smith.", "canonical_name": "Wilberforce"}}, {"text": "Howard Smith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 211814, "end_char": 211826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd v.\n\nWoodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Company No Liability and another, (supra) and to the Canadian decision of Berger J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, in the case of Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Miller et a/(1), both of which were consi .. dered by Lord Wilberfore in Howard Smith.", "canonical_name": "Howard\n\nSmith"}}, {"text": "Barwick", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 211910, "end_char": 211917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a consideration of the English decisions, including those in Punt and Piercy, Barwick C.J. said in Harlowe' s Nominees (supra) :\n\n\"The principle is that although primarily the power is given to enable capital to be raised when required for the purposes of the company, there may be occasions when the directors may fairly and properly issue shares for other reasons, so long as those reasons relate to a\n\n(I) 33 D.L.R. (3d), 288."}}, {"text": "Harlowe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 211931, "end_char": 211938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a consideration of the English decisions, including those in Punt and Piercy, Barwick C.J. said in Harlowe' s Nominees (supra) :\n\n\"The principle is that although primarily the power is given to enable capital to be raised when required for the purposes of the company, there may be occasions when the directors may fairly and properly issue shares for other reasons, so long as those reasons relate to a\n\n(I) 33 D.L.R. (3d), 288."}}, {"text": "Australian High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 212852, "end_char": 212873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 493)\n\nWe agree with the principle so stated by the Australian High Court and, in our opinion, it applies with great force to the situation in the present case."}}, {"text": "Teck Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 212965, "end_char": 212981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Teck Corporation, (supra) the Court examined several decisions of the English Courts and of other Courts, including the one in Hogg. ("}}, {"text": "Hogg", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 213092, "end_char": 213096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Teck Corporation, (supra) the Court examined several decisions of the English Courts and of other Courts, including the one in Hogg. ("}}, {"text": "Teck", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 213764, "end_char": 213768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Howard Smith, no new principle was evolved by Lord Wilberforce who, distinguishing the decisions in Teck Corporation and Harlowe' s Nominees, (supra) said :\n\n\"By contrast to the cases of Harlowe and Teck, the present case, on the evidence, does not, on the findings of the trial judge, involve any consideration of management, within the proper sphere of the directors."}}, {"text": "Ampol", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 214130, "end_char": 214135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purpose found by the judge is simply and solely to dilute the majority voting power held by Ampol and Bulkships so as to enable a then minority of shareholders to sell their shares more advantageously."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 216594, "end_char": 216597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nana/ala Zaver and another v. Bombay Life Assurnnce Co.\n\nLtd., (supra) Das J., in his separate but concurring judgment deduced the following principle on the basis of the English decisions :\n\n. /"}}, {"text": "Go\\Yer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 218317, "end_char": 218323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Go\\Yer in Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th edn.,"}}, {"text": "Mana/a Zaver", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 218854, "end_char": 218866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mana/a Zaver (supra) too, Das J. stated at page 425 that the true principle was laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hirsche v. Sims(1), thus : H\n\n(1) [1894] A.C. 654, 660-661."}}, {"text": "Nana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 219546, "end_char": 219550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether one looks at the matter froin the point of view expressed by this Court in Nana/a Zaver or from the point of view expressed by the Privy Council in Howard Smith, (supra) the test is the same, namely, whether the issue of shares is simply or solely for the benefit of the Directors."}}, {"text": "section 287(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220336, "end_char": 220350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220358, "end_char": 220377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 221277, "end_char": 221294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. ,(2) Shri Seervai contends that section JOO of the Companies Act embodies the general rule of equity that no person who has to discharge duties on behalf of a corporate body shall be\n\n(I) [1904] l Ch."}}, {"text": "Shri Seervai contends that section JOO of the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 221362, "end_char": 221421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222891, "end_char": 222902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 222910, "end_char": 222923, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 300(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 223593, "end_char": 223607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 223615, "end_char": 223628, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 300(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 223808, "end_char": 223822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224051, "end_char": 224065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224073, "end_char": 224086, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 299(1) and 300(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224663, "end_char": 224689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 300(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225029, "end_char": 225043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 300(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225119, "end_char": 225133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kilachands", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 225414, "end_char": 225424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Firestone\n\n(supra) the Solicitor-Director was held to be concerned or interested in the agreement for the appointment of Kilachands as selling agents, as he had a substantial shareholding in a private limited company of Kilachands."}}, {"text": "Section 260", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226421, "end_char": 226432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 226440, "end_char": 226453, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226764, "end_char": 226774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Howard\n\nSmith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 228809, "end_char": 228822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And so did Lord Wilberforce (pp 83 5-836) in Howard\n\nSmith (supra) where he said :\n\n\"It is, in their Lordships' opinion, too narrow an approach to say that the only valid purpose for which shares may be issued is to raise capital for the company.", "canonical_name": "Howard\n\nSmith"}}, {"text": "Harlowe Nominees", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 229414, "end_char": 229430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Australian decision in Harlowe Nominees (supra) took the same view of the directors' power to issue shares."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 230578, "end_char": 230590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision to issue rights shares was assailed on the ground also that the company did not, as required by the Reserve Bank's letter dated May 11, 1975 submit any scheme indicating whether the:\n\nreduction in the non-resident interest was proposed to be brought about by issue of additional equity capital to Indian residents to the extent necessary to finance any scheme of expansion or diversification."}}, {"text": "Davey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 233823, "end_char": 233828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As obverved by Lord Davey in Hilder and others v. Dexter(1)."}}, {"text": "Doraisway", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 235736, "end_char": 235745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a crucial time when Devagnanam was proposing to dispose of his shares to Khaitan, Sanders asked for Doraiswamy's advice by his letter dated August 6, 1975 in which he expressed \"complete confidence\" in Doraisway in the knowledge that the Holding Company could count on his guidance.", "canonical_name": "C. Doraiswamy"}}, {"text": "NHL. Devagnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236294, "end_char": 236309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disinvestment by the Holding Company, as one of the two courses which could be adopted for reducing the non-resident interest in NHL to 40% stood ruled out; on account of the rigid attitude of Coats who, during the period between the Ketty meeting of October 20-21, 1976 and the Birmingham discussions of March 29-31, 1977 clung to their self-interest, regardless of the pressure f FERA, the directive of the Reserve Bank of India and their transparent impact on the future of NHL.", "canonical_name": "NIIL. Devagnanam"}}, {"text": "NIIL. Devagnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 237517, "end_char": 237533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the decision taken in the Board's meeting of April 6, a letter of offer dated April 14 was prepared by NIIL.", "canonical_name": "NIIL. Devagnanam"}}, {"text": "May 2,\n\n1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 237940, "end_char": 237952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of offer which was posted to the Holding Company also bore the postal mark of Madras dated April 27, 1977 and that to was received in Birmingham on May 2,\n\n1977."}}, {"text": "Selvaraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 238979, "end_char": 238987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of Selvaraj, NIIL's senior clerk in the despatch Department and the relevant entry in the outward register are quite difficult to accept on this point since they do not accord with the ordinary course of human affairs."}}, {"text": "Devangnanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 242720, "end_char": 242731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T 11e fact that Devagnanam stood to gain by the machination is a relevant factor to be taken into account but even that is not the whole truth: NIIL, not Devangnanam was the real beneficiary, a thei:is\n\nN.I.I.L. v. N.I.N.H.L. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 795\n\nwhich we have expounded over the last many pages.", "canonical_name": "Devagnanarn"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243566, "end_char": 243576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 12 to", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 244307, "end_char": 244318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be recalled that in his letter dated April 12 to Raeburn, Devagnanam stated that he was enclosing therewith a copy of the Reserve Bank's letter dated March 30, 1977 but that was not enclosed."}}, {"text": "June 17, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 245361, "end_char": 245374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Bank's letter was sent to Raeburn along with Devagnanam's letter of May 11, Raeburn categorially supported the stand of the Indian shareholders, as is clear from paragraph 4 of the letter dated June 8, 1977 by Raeburn to Mackrael, a copy of which was sent by Raeburn to Devagnanam along with his letter dated June 17, 1977."}}, {"text": "April 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 246968, "end_char": 246982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Holding Company was informed by the last paragraph of the letter of offer that in respect of its holding of 18,990 shares, it was entitled to 9495 rights shares and that its acceptance of the offer together with the application money (at Rs.50/- per share) should be forwarded so as to reach the registered office of NHL on or before April 30, 1977."}}, {"text": "Mardas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 247031, "end_char": 247037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A postal communication by air between U.K. and Mardas, which is the normal mode of communication, generally takes five days to reach its destination."}}, {"text": "Birimingham", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 247251, "end_char": 247262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the letter of offer were to be posted on the 14th itself in Mardas, it would have reached the Holding Company in Birimingham, say, on the 19th."}}, {"text": "May 5, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 247673, "end_char": 247684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That means that the Holding Company would be within its rights if its acceptance reached NHL on or before May 5, 1977."}}, {"text": "Studley", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 248967, "end_char": 248974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanders, Studley, Warwickshire, U.K. on April 22.", "canonical_name": "NI Studley"}}, {"text": "Warwickshire", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 248976, "end_char": 248988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanders, Studley, Warwickshire, U.K. on April 22."}}, {"text": "sections 43A and 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250694, "end_char": 250713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 250721, "end_char": 250740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(p)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250811, "end_char": 250823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 19(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250838, "end_char": 250854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 29(1}(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250872, "end_char": 250888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 29(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250890, "end_char": 250906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 29(A)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250926, "end_char": 250942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250953, "end_char": 250966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 251048, "end_char": 251067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251431, "end_char": 251441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "December 31, 19!3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 252111, "end_char": 252128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That permission was accorded by' the Reserve Bank on certain conditions which, inter alia, stipulated that the reduction in the non-resident holding must be brought down to 40% within one year of the receipt of its letter, that is, before May 17, 1977 and that until then, the manufacturing and business activities of the Company shall not be extended beyond the approved level as of December 31, 19!3\n\nIt is contended by Shri Seervai that non-compliance with the condition regarding the dilution of non-resident interest within the stipulated period could not have resulted in the RBI directing NHL to close down its business or not to carry on its business."}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 252673, "end_char": 252690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29(4)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253127, "end_char": 253143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29(4)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253276, "end_char": 253292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253477, "end_char": 253490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29(4)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254806, "end_char": 254822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254969, "end_char": 254982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29(4)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254985, "end_char": 255001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Februrary 4, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 255571, "end_char": 255588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When NHL wrote to the Bank on Februrary 4, 1976 binding itself to the performance of certain conditions, it could not be heard to say that the permission will remain in force despite its non-performance of the conditions."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255798, "end_char": 255808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 49, 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255819, "end_char": 255837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255850, "end_char": 255860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256515, "end_char": 256528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256751, "end_char": 256761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258678, "end_char": 258688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258726, "end_char": 258742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258782, "end_char": 258792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 258800, "end_char": 258813, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(u)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 259075, "end_char": 259087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43A and 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 259946, "end_char": 259964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 259972, "end_char": 259991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 3, 43A and 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260037, "end_char": 260059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 260067, "end_char": 260080, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3(l)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260083, "end_char": 260100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260435, "end_char": 260447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260525, "end_char": 260536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 260544, "end_char": 260557, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 261171, "end_char": 261180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262012, "end_char": 262022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 262030, "end_char": 262043, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264090, "end_char": 264157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Association of NIIL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 264224, "end_char": 264243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act, it would be necessary to have regard to the relevant Articles of Association of NIIL, especially since Section 81 (l)(c) of that Act, which is extracted above, is subject to the qualification : \"Unless the articles of the Company otherwise provide\"."}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264262, "end_char": 264272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act", "statute": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Articles 11, 32, 38 and 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264435, "end_char": 264461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act", "statute": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264484, "end_char": 264494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act", "statute": "While interpreting these and allied provisions of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264500, "end_char": 264600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264657, "end_char": 264667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "In order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Article 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264669, "end_char": 264679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "In order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "article 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 265388, "end_char": 265398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "In order that the Company may be a private Company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Article 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 265929, "end_char": 265939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "iariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 267345, "end_char": 267352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contendended by Shri iariman that by reason of the articles of the Company and on a true interpretation of section 81, the right of renunciation of the shares offered by NHL was not available to the Holding Company since NHL was not a full-Jledged public company in the sense of being incorporated as a public company but had become a public company under section 43A(l) • and had, under the first proviso to that section, retained its articles relating to matters specified in section 3(1) (iii).", "canonical_name": "Nariman"}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 267431, "end_char": 267441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 267680, "end_char": 267694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 267802, "end_char": 267814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 267850, "end_char": 267864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 267895, "end_char": 267906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 268146, "end_char": 268160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 268165, "end_char": 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Manoharan bad declined the offer on the ground that he was \"not in a position to take those shares\"."}}, {"text": "November 30, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 325312, "end_char": 325329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,54,550 which the Indian shareholders have been directed to pay to the Holding Company shall be paid in two instalments, the first of which shall be paid before August 31, 1981 and the second before November 30, 1981."}}, {"text": "M. M. Sabharwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 325445, "end_char": 325460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The interim Board of Directors shall forthwith hand over charge to the Board which was superseded, but with Shri M. M. Sabharwal as a Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors.", "canonical_name": "M.M.\n\nSabharwal"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_81_83_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "SHIV PRASAD BHATNAGAR\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.\n\nMarch 5, 1981\n\n( 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ]\n\nNational Security Act-Section 12 ( 1)-Scope of-Staleness and irrelevance of grounds of detention-If would vitiate the order of detention.\n\nThe petitioner was detained under section 12 (I) of the National Security Act on the grounds that he, alongwith his friends, in the second week of November, 1980 indulged in filthy abuse of Muslims, threatened their lives and performed \"marpeet\" and that he and his associates terrorised the common man in the area by their various criminal acts which caused disturbance to the public peace and public safety.\n\nIn support of the petition it was contended' on behalf of the petitioner that\n\nthe reference to associates without naming even one rendered the ground vague D and, therefore, vitiated the order of detention and (2) that the incidents enumerated in the second ground related to the years 1974, 1975, 1977 and 1978 which could not be said to be proximate enough to sustain the order of detention.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : The detenu is entitled to be released.\n\nIt is now well settled that grounds of detention must be pertinent and not irrelevant, proximate and not stale, precise and not vague. Irrelevance, staleness and vagueness are vices any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. [83 DJ\n\nIn the instant case the incidents enumerated to substantiate the second ground show that apart from the vice of staleness from which they suffer, they were related to \"law and order\" and not to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThey are stale because of the passage of time since the happening of some of the incidents; they are irrelevant because they related to law and order and not to maintenance of public order. [83 El\n\nIn Re: Sushanta Goswami and Ors., [1969] 3 S.C:R. 138 followed.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 397 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, M. S. Mann, S Shukhar, Miss Raj Shree and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Petitioner.\n\nS. K. Gambhir and Vijay Hansario for the Respondent.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY J.\n\nShiv Prasad Bhatnagar is under preventive detention pursuant to an order made by the District Magistrate, Vidisha, Madhya Pradesh. The order and the grounds of detention were served on him on November 28, 1980.\n\nThe District Magistrate made a report of the order to the State Government and the latter approved the detention order on December 2, 1980.\n\nThe approval was communicated to the detenu on December 5, 1980.\n\nA representation was submitted by the detenu on December 13, J 980. The Advisory Board constituted by the State Government met on January 3, 198 J, considered the material placed before it by the detaining authority as well as the representation and the written arguments submitted by the detenu. The detenu was also given a personal hearing. The Advisory Board submitted its report to the State Government on January 4, 1981. 4' Thereafter the State Government confirmed the order of detention on February 3, 1981 under Sec. 12 (1) of the National Security Act.\n\nThe period of detention was stipulated as one year from the date of the order of detention. The order confirming the detention was communicated to the detenu on February 12, 1981 and he was also informed that the Advisory Board had opined that there was sufficient cause for his detention.\n\nSmt. Shyamla Pappu, learned counsel for the detenu made a number of submissions.\n\nIn the view that we are taking of one of the primary submissions, we do not think it necessary to consider the rest of the submissions.\n\nThe primary submission that we have in mind is that the grounds of detention suffer from the vice of either vagueness or staleness.\n\nThe first ground mentions that the detenu alongwith his friends, in the second week of November, 1980, indulged in filthy abuse of Muslims, threatened their lives and performed \"mar pit\". Details of incidents were given to substantiate the ground. As many as six incidents were mentioned and in everyone of them it was said that the detenu alongwith his associates had indulged in this or that violent action.\n\nNo mention was made of the name of even a single associate.\n\nThe argument was that the reference to 'associates' without naming even one rendered the ground vague and, therefore, vitiated it.\n\nSimilarly, it was said the second ground also referred to the detenu and his accociates without naming even a single associate and for that reason the second ground also was vague. The further submission was that the incidents enumerated in second ground were of the years 1974, 1975, 1977 and 1978 and could by no means be said to be proximate\n\n' J\n\nS.P. BHATNAGAR v. MADHYA PRADESH (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 83\n\nenough to sustain an order of preventive detention. The second ground was to the effect that the detenu and his associates had terrorized the common man in the Vidisha area by their various criminal acts which caused disturbance to public peace and public safety.\n\nSeveral incidents were narrated to substantiate this ground. The first incident was of the year 1974, the second incident was of the year 1975, the next three incidents were of the year 1977 and the rest of the incidents barring the last one were of the year 1978. A perusal of the incidents enumerated to substantiate the second ground show that apart from the vice of staleness from which they appear to suffer, the incidents are related to \"law and order\" and not to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThe incidents appear to bear a striking resemblance to the grounds of detention which were considered Jn Re: Sushanta Goswami & Ors., (') particularly in the cases of Debendra Nath Das, Abdul Wallah, Anil Das, Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and Ashoka Kumar Mukhe1jee.\n\nIt is now well settled that grounds of detention must be pertinent and not irrelevent, proximate and not stale, precise and not vague.\n\nIrrelevance, staleness and vagueness are vices any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate a ground of detention.\n\nAnd, a single vicious ground is sufficient to vitiate an order of detention.\n\nIn the present case we are satisfied that the second ground of detention suffers both from the vice of staleness, because of the passage of time since the happening of some of the incidents and the vice of irrelevance because they relate to 'law and order' and not to 'the maintenance of public order'. The detenu is entitled to be released.\n\nHe is directed to be released forthwith.\n\nThe petition is allowed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\n(!) [:%9] 3 S.C.R. 138.", "total_entities": 36, "entities": [{"text": "SHIV PRASAD BHATNAGAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIV PRASAD BHATNAGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 5, 1981\n\n( 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "National Security Act", "statute": "National Security Act"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288, "end_char": 298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "National Security Act", "statute": "National Security Act"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 331, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sushanta Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1828, "end_char": 1844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "83 El\n\nIn Re: Sushanta Goswami and Ors., [", "canonical_name": "Sushanta Goswami"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1949, "end_char": 1959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyamala Pappu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 2001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, M. S. Mann, S Shukhar, Miss Raj Shree and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Shyamala Pappu"}}, {"text": "M. S. Mann", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2003, "end_char": 2013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, M. S. Mann, S Shukhar, Miss Raj Shree and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "S Shukhar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2015, "end_char": 2024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, M. S. Mann, S Shukhar, Miss Raj Shree and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Raj Shree", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, M. S. Mann, S Shukhar, Miss Raj Shree and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Indra Sawhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2050, "end_char": 2063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, M. S. Mann, S Shukhar, Miss Raj Shree and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2085, "end_char": 2098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir and Vijay Hansario for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Vijay Hansario", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2103, "end_char": 2117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir and Vijay Hansario for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Shiv Prasad Bhatnagar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2243, "end_char": 2264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY J.\n\nShiv Prasad Bhatnagar is under preventive detention pursuant to an order made by the District Magistrate, Vidisha, Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "SHIV PRASAD BHATNAGAR"}}, {"text": "December 2, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2577, "end_char": 2593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate made a report of the order to the State Government and the latter approved the detention order on December 2, 1980."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2643, "end_char": 2659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The approval was communicated to the detenu on December 5, 1980."}}, {"text": "December 13, J 980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2710, "end_char": 2728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A representation was submitted by the detenu on December 13, J 980."}}, {"text": "January 3, 198 J", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2792, "end_char": 2808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Advisory Board constituted by the State Government met on January 3, 198 J, considered the material placed before it by the detaining authority as well as the representation and the written arguments submitted by the detenu."}}, {"text": "January 4, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3072, "end_char": 3087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Advisory Board submitted its report to the State Government on January 4, 1981."}}, {"text": "February 3, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3160, "end_char": 3176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4' Thereafter the State Government confirmed the order of detention on February 3, 1981 under Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3223, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3387, "end_char": 3404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order confirming the detention was communicated to the detenu on February 12, 1981 and he was also informed that the Advisory Board had opined that there was sufficient cause for his detention."}}, {"text": "Shyamla Pappu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyamla Pappu, learned counsel for the detenu made a number of submissions.", "canonical_name": "Shyamala Pappu"}}, {"text": "Vidisha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5043, "end_char": 5050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second ground was to the effect that the detenu and his associates had terrorized the common man in the Vidisha area by their various criminal acts which caused disturbance to public peace and public safety."}}, {"text": "Sushanta Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5761, "end_char": 5777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incidents appear to bear a striking resemblance to the grounds of detention which were considered Jn Re: Sushanta Goswami & Ors., (')", "canonical_name": "Sushanta Goswami"}}, {"text": "Debendra Nath Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5819, "end_char": 5836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "particularly in the cases of Debendra Nath Das, Abdul Wallah, Anil Das, Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and Ashoka Kumar Mukhe1jee."}}, {"text": "Abdul Wallah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5838, "end_char": 5850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "particularly in the cases of Debendra Nath Das, Abdul Wallah, Anil Das, Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and Ashoka Kumar Mukhe1jee."}}, {"text": "Anil Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "particularly in the cases of Debendra Nath Das, Abdul Wallah, Anil Das, Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and Ashoka Kumar Mukhe1jee."}}, {"text": "Dilip Kumar Chakraborty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "particularly in the cases of Debendra Nath Das, Abdul Wallah, Anil Das, Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and Ashoka Kumar Mukhe1jee."}}, {"text": "Ashoka Kumar Mukhe1jee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5890, "end_char": 5912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "particularly in the cases of Debendra Nath Das, Abdul Wallah, Anil Das, Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and Ashoka Kumar Mukhe1jee."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_829_838_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "829 A\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nKRISHNA BHIMA WALVAKAR & ANR.\n\nMay 7, 1981\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND\n\nBAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]\n\nEssential Commodities Act, 1957-Sections 6A, 6B & 6C-Scope of-Consignment moved on a Sunday-Whether exonerates the consignee from making the requisite declaration before the specified authority.\n\nInterpretation-Power coupled with public duty-Whether use of word 'may' in an order makes the power discretionary.\n\nClause 3(2)(a) of the Edible Oil, Edible Oil Seeds and Oil Cakes (Declaration\n\nof Stocks) Order, 1976 enjoins that before a consignment of oil leaves a place a D stock holder who transports edible-oils shall make a declaration in Form II to the specified officer of the place (in this case the Tehsildar of the) Taluk from where such edible oils are transported. Clause (b) enjoins that the declaration shall be shown at every check post on the route immediately after arrival there.\n\nA police officer seized in transit a truck carrying a large quantity of groundnut oil on the ground that the requisite declaration in Form II had not been furnished to the Tehsildar of the place of despatch of the consignment.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner, after issuing a notice to the respondent under section 6B of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, released the truck and the consignment on taking from him an indemnity bond and a bank guarantee towards the price of oil. The respondent however produced before the Deputy Commissioner a copy of the invoice issued by the seller and a declaration in Form 39 prescribed under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner ordered confiscation of the truck and the oil on the view that the respondent had contravened the provisions of clause 3(2) (a) and (b) of the Order. On appeal the Sessions Judge affirmed this order.\n\nA single Judge of the High Court in revision held that there was no contravention of the requirement of the Order because the day on which the goods were despatched being a Sunday, it was impossible for the respondent to deliver on that day to Tehsildar the declaration in Form II and that the law would not expect a citizen to do the impossible.\n\nThe respondent in the State's appeal to this Court contended that: (I) the\n\n'onfiscation of the entire consignment was arbitrary and excessive in that the use H of the word \"may\" in section 6A made exercise of that power discretionary; (2) Bince there was nothing to show that the goods had been seized, the power of\n\nA confiscation under section 6A had not been properly exercised and (3) the order of confiscation was a nullity in that the Deputy Commissioner had not issued a proper show cause notice under section 6B of the Act.\n\nAllowing the State's appeal\n\nHELD : l (a) The word 'may\" used in section 6A does not mean that the Deputy Corn.missioner could not order confiscation of the entire consignment of an essential commodity l where he found contravention of any of the orders issued under section 3 of the Act. The power conferred on the Deputy Commissioner under section 6A is a power coupled with public duty. [834 H]\n\n(b) In difecting confiscation of the entire consignment which was being transported without furnishing the declaration I in Form II the Deputy Commissioner acted in public interest. The whole purpose of the control order was to maintain control over the stock of essential commodities at a place with a view to securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. The require\n\nrnents of clause 3 (2) (a) and (b) are mandatory. [835 C-Dl\n\n(c) \"Stock bolder\" as defined in the Order includes the purchaser of oil who is in possession or control thereof. By a legal fiction the explanation treats the owner to have control over the oil in transit. Respondent 4 being the purchaser fell within the definition of \"stock holder\". Moreover there was nothing to show that the consignor had reserved the jus disponendi by the terms of the contract or appropriation and, therefore, the property in the goods passed to respondent 4 (purcha£er) on delivery to a common carrier under section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. [836 A-Bl\n\n(d) The peputy Commissioner was right in holding that the declaration in Form II was required to be filed before the specified officer before the goods left a place and that the declaration should be produced at every check post in transit as required by law. The respondent having contravened the provisions of clause 3 (2) (a} and (b) of the order the truck and the consignment of oil were rightly confiscated. [837 A-Cl\n\n(e) It is not correct to say that since the date of despatch of the goods was a Sunday there was no need to comply with the requirements of clause 3 of the Order. If the consignment had to be despatched on Sunday nothing prevented the parties from furnishing the declaration a day earlier. In a transaction of such a magnitude a duty was cast on the party to comply with the requirements of the\n\nOrder before the consignment left the place. [834 A-Bl\n\n2. The very fact that the seized groundnut oil was released only after the respondent furnished the requisite bank guarantee clearly showed that the consignment had been seized. Therefore power under section 6A had been correctly exercised. [837 E-F]\n\n3. There was no breach of the requirement of section 6B. In response to the show cause notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner respondent 4 appeared before him and filed a copy of the invoice and declaration in Form 39 H of the Mysore Sales Tax Act. The Deputy Commissioner gave a hearing to the parties. That being so, validity of the confiscation under section 6C could not be challenged. [837 G-H]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 669 A of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 2nd February, 1979 of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 320 of 1978.\n\nB.R.L. Iyengar and N. Nettar for the Appellant.\n\nA.L. Wahi and K.C. Dua for Respondent Nos. 1-3.\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for Respondent No.4.\n\nThe Judgment oft he Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. In this appeal, by special leave, from the judgment of the Karnataka High Court, the only issue between the parties is as to the legality and propriety of the order of confiscation passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum, of a consignment of 7,200 kg.\n\nD of groundnut oil seized for contravention of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Edible Oil, Edible Oil Seeds and Oil Cakes (Declaration of Stocks) Order, 1976 (hereinafter called the Order).\n\nBriefly stated the facts are these: On 6.61977 at about 11.30 a.m., the Sub Inspector of Police, Hukeri, intercepted a truck bearing registration No. MHL 2675 laden with 40 barrels of ground nut oil weighing 7,200 kg. which were being transported from Kampli to Nippani, without furnishing a declaration in Form II to Tahsildar, Hospet, as required under sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl.3 of the Order. The Sub Inspector of Police, after seizing the vehicle and the oil registered a case and thereafter reported the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum.\n\nHe forwarded the report together with the seized vehicle and the oil to the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum for taking action under s. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act). The truck was released to the owner on his executing an indemnity bond, and the groundnut oil released to the Respondent 4, Gopinath Manikchand Dharia, Proprietor, Messrs Anant Oil Mills, Nippani on his furnishing a bank guarantee for Rs. 70,000/- towards the price thereof.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner gave notices as required under s. 6-B of the Act to the parties concerned. During the enquiry, the respondent No. 4 produced before him a copy of the invoice dated 5.6.1977 issued by Sri Satyanarayana Oil Mills, Bellary Road, Kampli, show-\n\nA ing the sale of 7,200 kg. of groundnut oil to Messrs Anant Oil Mills, Nippani. He also produced a copy of the declaration in Form No. 39 prescribed under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957. The Deputy Commissioner, after affording the parties an opportunity of hearing, held that the respondents had contravened the provisions of sub-cl. (2) (a) and (b) of cl.3 of the Order and accordingly confiscated B 40 barrels of groundnut oil and the truck bearing registration No.\n\nMHL 2675.\n\nThe respondents preferred an appeal under s. 6-C of the Act before the II Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum, who was the Appellate Authority. But he, by his well-considered judgment, confirmed the order of confiscation passed by the Deputy Commissioner un, der s. 6-A of the Act.\n\nThereupon, the respondents preferred a revision before the High Court and a learned Single Judge has, by his judgment, set aside the order of the Appellate Authority as' well as the Deputy Commissioner on the ground that there was substantial compliance of the requirements under sub-els.\n\n(2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Order inasmuch as the respondents had sent the prescribed declaration in Form II to the Tahsildar, Hospet on 7.6.1977.\n\nAccording to the High Court, no such declaration could be furnished on 5.6.1977 as it was a holiday being Sunday.\n\nUpon that view, the High Court set aside the order of confiscation passed by the. Deputy Commissioner under s. 6-A of the Act and directed restoration of all the properties to the persons concerned.\n\nHence this appeal by special leave.\n\nThe State was not interested in the confiscation of the truck and, therefore, special leave is confim:d to the question of the legality and' propriety of the order of confiscation passed by the Deputy Comn:iissioner under s. 6-A of the Act in respect of the seized groundnut oil.\n\nOn the admitted facts, there can be no doubt whatever that there was a contravention of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl.3 of the order.\n\nSub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 are as follows :\n\n3. (2) A stock holder who transports Edible-Oils, Edible Oil Seeds and Oil Cakes shall make a declaration in Form II to the Officer specified in Sub-Clause (1) in respect of such Edible Oils, Edible Oil Seeds and Oil\n\nCakes,-\n\n(a) at the place from where such Edible Oils, Edible Oil\n\nSeeds and Oil Cakes are transported, before such\n\nEdible Oils, Edible Oil Seeds and Oil Cakes leave the A said place; and\n\n(b) at every check post on the route, immediately after their arrival there;\n\nProvided that the declaration at a check post shall be made B in person by the stock holder or by the person in charge of such Edible Oils, Edible Oil Seeds and Oil Cakes to such Officer, as the Government may by special or general order specify.\n\nThe expression 'stock-holder' has been defined in the Order as meaning \"Every person who is in possession or control of 150\n\nkilograms or more of groundnut oil. ........ (b) 15 quintals or more of groundnut oil or cake ......... (c) 15 quintals or more of groundnut seeds ......... and (d) 20 quintals of groundnut shell. The Explanation thereto provides that edible oil, edible oil seeds and oil cakes in transit shall be presumed to be under the control of the owner thereof.\n\nThe order passed by the High Court setting aside the order of confiscation made by the Deputy Commissioner under s. 6-A of the Act can hardly be supported. In reaching the conclusion that it did, the High Court observes that 5.6.1977 being Sunday, the declaration in Form II could not be delivered to the Tahsildar since the Taluka Office was closed. Nor could it be sent by registered post acknowledgment due as the Post Office could not have been working on that day. It then goes on to observe:\n\nThen, the question is, whether a stock-holder should not at all transport his stock on a Sunday, though the contractual terms of his business of such transaction required that it should be dorie, as the stock should reach the consignee on a particular date. It is impossible to conceive that .law expects any citizen to perform what is impossible to be performed in law. Now the fact that Form II has been received in the office of the Tahsildar on 7.6.1977, clearly indicates that it must have been sent by registered post on 6.6.1977. Anyhow, when once it is seen that it was impossible for the stock-holder (petitioner-4) to submit Form-II on 5.6.1977 before transporting groundnut-oil in that truck on that day, it cannot at all be said that petitioner-4 has committed any breach of the provisions of the order.\n\n834 SUPREME COURT lltEPORTS [1981] 3 s.c:a.\n\nIt is difficult to subscribe to the view expressed by the High Court.\n\nWhen the parties were entering into a transacti.on of such magnitude there was a duty cast on them to comply with the requirements of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Order before the consignment left the place. If the consignment was to be loaded on 5.6.1977 which was a Sunday, nothing prevented the parties from furnishing a declaration on 4.6.1977.\n\nThe High Court appears to be labouring under a belief that there need be no strict observance of the laws on a Sunday.\n\nThere is no warrant for this view.\n\nFaced with the situatiop. that it was rather difficult, if not impossible, to support the view taken by the High Court, Shri Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 made a valiant effort to avert the order of confiscation passed under s.6-A of the Act, by advancing the following thrt:e contentions: (I) The poer conferred on the Deputy1Commissioner under s. 6-A of the Act, by the use of the word 'may', makes it a discretionary power which had to be used according to sound judicial principles. It is urged that Messrs Anant Oil Mills to whom the groundnut oil belonged had committed no breach of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl.3 of the order and therefore, the order of confiscation of the entire consignment passed by the Deputy Commissioner was wholly arbitrary and excessive.\n\n(2) The power of confiscation entrusted to the Deputy Commissioner under s.6-A of the Act is exercisable in relation to an essential commodity seized in pursuance of an order made under s. 3. There was nothing to show that the groundnut oil in question had been seized or that a report of such seizure had been made without unreasonable delay to the Deputy Commissioner under the Order and, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner had no power to direct its confiscation under s. 6-A of the Act. (3) It is not established that the Deputy Commissioner had complied with the statutory requirements of s. 6 B of the Act, by giving a show cause notice to the persons concerned against the action proposed to be taken or afforded them an opportunity of hearing and, therefore, the order of confiscation passed by him under s. 6-A was a nullity.\n\nWe are afraid, none of these contentions can prevail.\n\nAs to point No. (!), it is axiomatk that the power of confiscation of an essential commodity seized for contravention of an order issued under cl.3, is a discretionary power. The use of the word 'may', however, does not necessarily mean that the Deputy Com- . missioner cannot, in the given circumstances of a particular case, direct the confiscation of the entire consignment of an essential commodity in relation to which there is a contravention of any of the orders issued under s.3 of the Act. It all depends on the facts\n\nand circumstances of each case whether the confiscation should be A of an entire consignment or part of it, depending upon the nature of the .contravention. The power conferred on the Deputy Commissioner under s.6-A of the Act, by the use of the word 'may', makes the power coupled with a public duty. Sometimes it may be in the public interest to direct confiscation of the entire consignment of an essential commodity when there is deliberate contravention of B the provisions of an order issued under s.3 of the Act.\n\nIn the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be doubted for a moment that the Deputy Commissioner acted in the public interest to direct confiscation of the entire consignment of the groundnut oil, as it was being transported from one place to another without furnishing the requisite declaration in Form II. AU systems of control, supply and distribution of essential commodities would fail unless the various control orders issued by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Act in relation thereto are strictly observed. These control orders are issued under s. 3 when the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of essential commodities or for securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices etc. Sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Order enjoin that the stock-holder shall make a declaration in From II in relation to movement of edible oil, edible oil seeds and oil cakes, to the Tahsildar in-charge of the taluka of the place from where such edible oil, edible oil seeds and oil cakes are transported before such edible oil, edible oil seeds or oil cakes, leave the place. The whole purpose is to maintain a control over the stock of such essential commodities at a place with a view to secure their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices.\n\nThe requirements of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the the Order are clearly mandatory.\n\nWe fail to comprehened the contention that there was only a technical breach.\n\nUnder sub-els. (2)(a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the order, a stock-holder is required to furnish a declaration in Form II in relation to movement of edible oil, edible oil seeds and cakes, to the Tahsildar in-charge of the taluka at the place from where such commodity is sought to be transported before sucb commodity leaves the place. The definition of 'stock-holder' certainly means the consignor who holds such stock of edible oil, oil seeds and cakes and also may include a purchaser of such oil, seeds and cakes who is in possession or control thereof. Explanation to the definition of\n\n'stock-holder', by a legal fiction, treats the owner to have control over the edible oil, edible oil seeds and cakes, in transit.\n\nThe respondent No. 4, being the purchaser, also comes within the definition of 'stock-holder' by reason of the said Explanation. There is nothing to show that the consignor had reserved the }us disponendi by the terms of the contract or appropriation and, therefore, the property in the goods passed to the respond1mt No. 4 on their delivery to a common carrier under s. 25 of the SaJe of Goods Act, 1930.\n\nThe allegation in the complaint is that 40 barrels of groundnut oil weighing 7,200 kg. were being transported by the truck bearing No. MHL 2675 without furnishing the requisite declaration in Form U and it was intercepted at the Hukeri check-post by the Sub- Inspector of Police. In response to a notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner under s. 6-B of.the Act, the respondent No. 4 produced before him the documents of title in relation to the goods. From these documents, it is clear that the consignor was Sri Satyanarayana Oil Mills, Kampli and the consignee was Messrs Anant Oil Mills, Nippani and that the truck was laden with the consignment.\n\nThese facts were also borne out by the particulars furnished in the declaration in Form 39 under the Mysore Sa]es Tax Act, 1957.\n\nIt appears from these documents that Sri Satyanarayana Oil Mills, after despatching the consignment, purported to furnish 'the declaration in Form II to the Tahsildar, Hospet, which was received by him on 7.6.1977, requesting for the release of the groundnut oil in question. The respondent No. 4 contended before the Deputy Commissioner that there was substantial compliance of the requirements of sub-els. (2)(a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the_ Order and, therefore, the seized groundnut oil be released, but he re]epted the contention on the ground that the declaration in Form II was required to be filed before the specified officer before the goods left the place. The Deputy Commissioner requisitioned the form produced before the Tahsildar, but it did not bear any date. He was of the view that the declaration was not sent by registered post on 6.6.1977 as asserted, but had apparently been handed over in the Taluka office and acknowledgment obtained for the same.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner observed that the requirement of law was that the declaration in Form II had to be produced at every check-post during transit, and this was not done. The driver of the truck did not have a copy of the declaration in Form II, but only the declaration in Form 39 which could not be taken to be in compliance of law.\n\nObviously, the stock-holder, Sri Satyanarayana Oil Mills, after despatching the\n\nconsignment of groundnut oil, purported to furnish the declaration A in Form II. This was in complete breach of the requirements of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Order. The Deputy Commissioner, therefore, held that the respondents having con•ravened the provisions of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Order, the seized truck alongwith the entire consignment of the groundnut oil was liable to be confiscated under s. 6-A of the Act. The learned Sessions B Judge, in our opinion, rightly confirmed the order of confiscation passed by the Deputy Commissioner under s. 6-A of the Act as it was unassailable.\n\nAt no point of time was there a contention raised that the Deputy Commissioner had failed to exercise his discretion as to the quantity of the groundnut oil liable to be seized. It is now too .late in the day to urge the point before this Court.\n\nAs to point No. (2), there is no warrant for the submission that there was nothing to show that the groundnut oil had been seized and, therefore, the power of confiscation was not exercisable by the Deputy Commissioner under s. 6-A of the Act. It is manifest from the order of the Deputy Commissioner that there was a contravention of sub-els. (2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Order and that the Sub Inspector of Police seized both the truk and the consignment of groundnut oil, an.d forwarded the same to him along with his report for taking action under s. 6-A of the Act.\n\nThe contention of the Public Prosecutor before the Deputy Commissioner was that the seized truck and the groundnut oil were liable to be confiscated. The very fact that the seized groundnut oil was released to the respondent No. 4 on his furnishing a bank guarantee for Rs. 70,000 for the price of the consignment ofthe groundnut oil clearly shows that it had been seized. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the power of confiscation under s. 6-A of the Act was not exercisable for want of seizure.\n\nAs to point No. (3), from the narration of facts above, it is amply clear that there was no breach of the requirements of s. 6-B of the Act on the part of the Deputy Commissioner. The record shows that the Deputy Commissioner, on receipt of the report of the Sub\n\nInspector of Police mentioning the fact of contravention of sub-els.\n\n(2) (a) and (b) of cl. 3 of the Oroer and forwarding the seized true!<\n\nand the consignment of groundnut oil, issued notice to the parties concerned under s. 6-B of the Act'to show cause against their confiscation. In response to the notice, the respondent No. 4 appeared before the Deputy Commissioner and filed a copy of the invoice together with a copy of the declaration in Form 39 under the Mysore\n\nA Sales Tax Act, 1957.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner sent for the declaration in Form II as furnished to the Tahsildar which did not bear a date. He also gave a hearing to the parties. That being so, the validity of the order of confiscation under s. 6-C cannot be challenged on the ground that the requirements of s. 6-B had not been fulfilled.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum, upholding the order of confiscation passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum, is restored, insofar as it relates to the confiscation of the consignment of groundnut oil weighing 7,200 kg. under s. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 105, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KRISHNA BHIMA WALVAKAR & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KRISHNA BHIMA WALVAKAR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 7, 1981\n\n(0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 6A, 6B & 6C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1957", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Clause 3(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439, "end_char": 453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1957", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 6B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1224, "end_char": 1234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1719, "end_char": 1730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2338, "end_char": 2348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2495, "end_char": 2505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 6B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2666, "end_char": 2676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2957, "end_char": 2966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3032, "end_char": 3042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3494, "end_char": 3502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4078, "end_char": 4088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4096, "end_char": 4119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4444, "end_char": 4452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4696, "end_char": 4704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "section 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5305, "end_char": 5315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B.R.L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5890, "end_char": 5904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.R.L. Iyengar and N. Nettar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5909, "end_char": 5918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.R.L. Iyengar and N. Nettar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.L. Wahi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5939, "end_char": 5948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.L. Wahi and K.C. Dua for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "K.C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5953, "end_char": 5961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.L. Wahi and K.C. Dua for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5988, "end_char": 6002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for Respondent No.4.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6012, "end_char": 6027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for Respondent No.4.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment oft he Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. In this appeal, by special leave, from the judgment of the Karnataka High Court, the only issue between the parties is as to the legality and propriety of the order of confiscation passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum, of a consignment of 7,200 kg."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6433, "end_char": 6438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6.61977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6597, "end_char": 6604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Briefly stated the facts are these: On 6.61977 at about 11.30 a.m., the Sub Inspector of Police, Hukeri, intercepted a truck bearing registration No."}}, {"text": "Hukeri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6655, "end_char": 6661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Briefly stated the facts are these: On 6.61977 at about 11.30 a.m., the Sub Inspector of Police, Hukeri, intercepted a truck bearing registration No."}}, {"text": "Kampli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6810, "end_char": 6816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which were being transported from Kampli to Nippani, without furnishing a declaration in Form II to Tahsildar, Hospet, as required under sub-els. ("}}, {"text": "Nippani", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6820, "end_char": 6827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which were being transported from Kampli to Nippani, without furnishing a declaration in Form II to Tahsildar, Hospet, as required under sub-els. ("}}, {"text": "cl.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Belgaum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7108, "end_char": 7115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sub Inspector of Police, after seizing the vehicle and the oil registered a case and thereafter reported the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7261, "end_char": 7292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gopinath Manikchand Dharia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7447, "end_char": 7473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The truck was released to the owner on his executing an indemnity bond, and the groundnut oil released to the Respondent 4, Gopinath Manikchand Dharia, Proprietor, Messrs Anant Oil Mills, Nippani on his furnishing a bank guarantee for Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7654, "end_char": 7658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Anant Oil Mills, Nippani", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7919, "end_char": 7943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of groundnut oil to Messrs Anant Oil Mills, Nippani."}}, {"text": "Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8024, "end_char": 8050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8219, "end_char": 8223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8388, "end_char": 8392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "II Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8417, "end_char": 8454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents preferred an appeal under s. 6-C of the Act before the II Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum, who was the Appellate Authority."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8608, "end_char": 8612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8937, "end_char": 8942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "7.6.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9059, "end_char": 9067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of the Order inasmuch as the respondents had sent the prescribed declaration in Form II to the Tahsildar, Hospet on 7.6.1977."}}, {"text": "5.6.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9141, "end_char": 9149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the High Court, no such declaration could be furnished on 5.6.1977 as it was a holiday being Sunday."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9293, "end_char": 9297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9644, "end_char": 9648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9819, "end_char": 9823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9867, "end_char": 9872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11217, "end_char": 11221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6.6.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12130, "end_char": 12138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the fact that Form II has been received in the office of the Tahsildar on 7.6.1977, clearly indicates that it must have been sent by registered post on 6.6.1977."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12698, "end_char": 12703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4.6.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12887, "end_char": 12895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the consignment was to be loaded on 5.6.1977 which was a Sunday, nothing prevented the parties from furnishing a declaration on 4.6.1977."}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that it was rather difficult, if not impossible, to support the view taken by the High Court, Shri Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13306, "end_char": 13309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13427, "end_char": 13431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anant Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13592, "end_char": 13607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged that Messrs Anant Oil Mills to whom the groundnut oil belonged had committed no breach of sub-els. ("}}, {"text": "cl.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13698, "end_char": 13702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13927, "end_char": 13930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14040, "end_char": 14044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14326, "end_char": 14330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14448, "end_char": 14452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14667, "end_char": 14671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14888, "end_char": 14892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15228, "end_char": 15231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15483, "end_char": 15486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15777, "end_char": 15780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16251, "end_char": 16269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AU systems of control, supply and distribution of essential commodities would fail unless the various control orders issued by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Act in relation thereto are strictly observed."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16276, "end_char": 16280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16373, "end_char": 16377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16631, "end_char": 16636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17219, "end_char": 17224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17378, "end_char": 17383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18431, "end_char": 18436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SaJe of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18444, "end_char": 18467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18814, "end_char": 18818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the SaJe of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the SaJe of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Oil Mills, Kampli", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18984, "end_char": 19015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From these documents, it is clear that the consignor was Sri Satyanarayana Oil Mills, Kampli and the consignee was Messrs Anant Oil Mills, Nippani and that the truck was laden with the consignment."}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19236, "end_char": 19249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19293, "end_char": 19316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from these documents that Sri Satyanarayana Oil Mills, after despatching the consignment, purported to furnish 'the declaration in Form II to the Tahsildar, Hospet, which was received by him on 7.6.1977, requesting for the release of the groundnut oil in question."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19678, "end_char": 19683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Taluka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20164, "end_char": 20170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was of the view that the declaration was not sent by registered post on 6.6.1977 as asserted, but had apparently been handed over in the Taluka office and acknowledgment obtained for the same."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20802, "end_char": 20807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20949, "end_char": 20954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21075, "end_char": 21079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21224, "end_char": 21228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21739, "end_char": 21743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21877, "end_char": 21882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22069, "end_char": 22073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22533, "end_char": 22537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22715, "end_char": 22719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22946, "end_char": 22951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23082, "end_char": 23086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23333, "end_char": 23352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23574, "end_char": 23578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore\n\nA Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore\n\nA Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23641, "end_char": 23645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore\n\nA Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore\n\nA Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24036, "end_char": 24040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore\n\nA Sales Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore\n\nA Sales Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24050, "end_char": 24081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_839_848_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "839 A\n\n..,\n\nJAGRUP SINGH\n\nv •\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nMay 7, 1981\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nPenal Code-Section 300, clause Thirdly-When applicable-Accused hit the deceased in the heat of moment, without premeditation, resulting in death-Whether falls under Exception 4 to section 300 J.P. C.\n\nThe appellant and the deceased were collaterals. On the death of his brother,\n\n~ the deceased was looking after the affairs of his brother's wife and children.\n\nSome while before on the day of occurrence, the deceased attended the marriage of bis brother's daughter.\n\nThe prosecution case against the appellant was that he nursed a grievance against the deceased that it was he who induced his sister-in-law not to invite him, (the appellant) and his brothers to the marriage and incensed by such insult he wanted to teach the deceased a lesson. After the marriage, armed with a gandhala (a common agricultural implement with a flat, rectangular iron strip with three sides blunt, embedded in a wooden handle which is used for digging holes) the appellant and his brothers emerged suddenly and in a joint assault the appellant struck a blow on the head of the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala.\n\n_., The Sessions Judge held that the appellant struck the blow on the head with intent to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that, therefore, he was guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under section 302 I.P.C.\n\nAffirming the conviction and sentence the High Court was of the view that there was no specific and positive evidence as to the motive for the murder but that it was more probable that the accused had joined the marriage and that \"something happened on the spur of the. movement'', which resulted. in the infliction of the injury leading to the death of the deceased.\n\nIn appeal it was contended that the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under section 304 part II I.P.C. because all that could be attributed to the appellant was knowledge that a blow struck on the head with the blunt side of the gandhala would cause an injury, which\n\nwas likely to cause death but that in any event when be struck the blow he could not be attributed with intention to cause death.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The appellant having been found to have struck the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala in the heat of the moment without premeditation\n\nand in a sudden fight all the requirements of Exception 4 to section 3(0 are met.\n\nHaving held that it was more probable that the appellant had also atte.nded the marriage but that something had happened on the spur of the moment resulting in the infliction of the injury and eventual death of the deceased the High Court erred in applying clause Thirdly of section 300.\n\nGiving a solirary blow on a vital part of the body resulting in death cannot always necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under section 304 part II of the Code. If a man deliberately struck another on the head with a heavy log or an iron rod or a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, in the absence of any circumstances negativing the presumption, he must be deemed to have intended to cause death or such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force employed and the circumstances attendant upon death. [843 B-C]\n\nUnder clause Thirdly of section 300 culpable homicide is murder if the act which causes death is done with intention of causing a bodily injury and that -1 injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death i.e. the injury found was one that was intended to be inflicted. [844 F-G)\n\nVirsa Singh v. State of Punjab [1958] S.C.R. 1495 at 1503 applied.\n\nGudur Dusadh v. State of Bihar [1972] 3 S.C.R. 505, Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana, A.LR. 1972 S.C. 2574, Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.LR. 1954 S. C. 652, Willie (Williams) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1955) 2 S.C.R. 1140, Harjinder Singh (alias Jinda) v. Delhi Admn. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 246 & Lakshman Ka/u Nikalje v. State of Maharashtra [1968) 3 S.C.R. 685 referred to.\n\nIn the instant case the genesis of the quarrel was not known. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and his brothers had a grouse against the deceased and that they went to the marriage armed with weapons to teach the deceased a lesson. The defence version, on the other hand, was that they were invited to the marriage. In a controversy of such a nature the prosecution should have examined the sister-in-law of the deceased who was a material witness to ascertain the truth, failure to do which made the prosecution case infirm. [847 BC)\n\nSecondly when the appellant struck a blow with blunt side of the gandha/a it could not be said that he intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If a man is hit with the blunt side on the head with sufficient force it is .bound to cause death. The fact that the gandhala was used with sufficient force was not by itself sufficient to raise an inference that lhe appellant intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient to cause death. He could only be attributed with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Therefore, the case does not fall within clause Thirdly of section 300 J.P.C. [845 E-H]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 403 of 1981.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 10th October, 1980 A of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl. A. No. 954 of 1979.\n\nSushi! Kumar for the Appellant.\n\nK.C. Bhagat and R.N. Poddar for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. The short point involved in this appeal is whether the appellant is guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under s. 302, Indian Penal Code, or only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under s. 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called 'the Code'). It is not disputed that the appellant, Jagrup Singh, struck a blow with the blunt side of a gandhala on the bead of the deceased, Chanan Singh, who was his uncle, resulting in his death. It appears that after the death of Joginder Singh, the deceased Chanan Singh was looking after the family of his brother, Joginder Singh consisting of his widow Mst.\n\nDalip Kaur and her children. He had settled the betrothal and marriage of Mst. Dalip Kaur's daughter, Tej Kaur. The prosecution case is that the appellant Jagrup Singh and bis brothers, Billaur Singh, Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh, co-accused, although they were collaterals of Joginder Singh, were not invited by Mst. Dalip Kaur to the marriage of her daughter Tej Kaur, at the instance of the deceased Chanan Singh. On account of this, there was ill-feeling between the parties.\n\nOn the fateful evening, i.e. on 20.3.1978, at 5.15 p.m. the marriage of Tej Kaur was performed. It is alleged that shortly thereafter, the appellant Jagrup Singh armed with a gandhala, his brothers Billaur Singh armed with.a gandasa and Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh armed with lathis emerged suddenly and made a joint assault on the deceased Chanan Singh and the three eyewitnesses, Gurdev Singh, PW 10, Sukhdev Singh, PW 11 and Makhan Singh, PW 12.\n\nThe deceased along with the three eye-witnesses was rushed to the Rural Dispensary, Rori where they were examined at 6 p.m by Dr. Bishnoi, PW 3, who found that the deceased had a lacerated wound 9cm x Hem bone deep on the right parietal region, 9 cm away from the tip of right pinna; margins of wound were red, irregular and were bleeding on touch; direction of wound was anterior-posterior. The deceased was in a serious condition and, therefore, he was referred by Dr. Bishnoi to the Civil Hospital, Sirsa, where he died on the morning of 21.3.1978 at 2.10 a.m.\n\nDr. Karan Singh, Senior Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sirsa, PW 1, performed an atopsy on the dead body of the deceased. He found the following external injuries :\n\nA stitched contused wound 9! cm long situated on right side of the head; 9 cm above the top of pinna and 9 cm above the eye brow.\n\nSkull deep.. direction anterioposterior.\n\nOn dissection, he found the following internal injury :\n\nA fracture line running starting from the lower and the anterior part of parietal bone injuring the middle meningeal artery near its entrance into the , skull and traversing medially across the base of right middle fossa, crossing the mid-line and extending slightly to the left of mid-line.\n\nThere was a dark red haemotoma (extra-dural) 3\" 2x3\"\n\noverlying the parietal ahd temporal lobes of brain on right side and the area was compressed.\n\nIn his opinion, the death of the deceased was due to cerebral compression as a result of the head injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nhe High Court of Punjab and Haryana, agreeing with the E Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa, held that the appellant struck a blow on the head of the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala with the intent of causing such bodily injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that being so, the appellant was guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under s. 302 of the Code.\n\nIn assailing the' conviction, learned counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant having struck a solitary blow on the head of the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala, can be attributed with the knowledge that it would cause an injury which was likely to cause death and not with any intention to cause the death of the deceased. The offence committed by the appellant, therefore amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under s. 304, Part IT of the Code.\n\nHe further contends, in the alternative, that there could be no doubt that the appellant acted in the heat of the moment when he hit the deceased and is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Exception of s. 300 of the Code.\n\nOn the other hand, learned counsel for the State contends that the matter\n\nsquarely falls within Clause Thirdly of s. 300 of the Code. He A submits that merely because the appellant rendered a solitary blow with the blunt side of the gandhala on the head would not necessarily imply that the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under s. 304, Part II of the Code.\n\nThere is no justification for the assertion that the giving of a solitary blow on a vital part of the body resulting the death must always necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable 'under s. 304, Part II of the Code.\n\nIf a man deliberately strikes another on the head with a heavy log of wood or an iron irod or even a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, he must, in the absence of any circumstances negativing the presumption, be deemed to have intended to cause the death of tbe victim or such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The whole thing depends upon the intention to cause death, and the case may be covered by either Clause Firstly or Clause Thirdly. The nature of intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force employed and the circumstances attendant upon the death.\n\nThe ingredients of Clause Thirdly of s. 300 of the Code were brought out by Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1) in his terse language :\n\n\"To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300 \"3rdly\".\n\nFirst, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;\n\nSecondly, the nature of the injury must be proved.\n\nThese are purely objective investigations.\n\nThirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.\n\nOnce these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,\n\n(!) [1958] SCR 1495 at 1503.\n\nFourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.\n\nThis part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender\".\n\nB The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words:\n\nThe question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present.\n\nIf he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inferencr, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved.\n\nBut if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it.\n\nWhether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there.\n\nThe question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is . proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.\n\nThese observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus.\n\nThe test laid down in Virsa Singh' s case (supra) for the applicability of Clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law.\n\nUnder Clause Thirdly of s. 300 of the Code, culpable homicide is murder if both the following conditions are satisfied : (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causmg a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nIt must .be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.\n\nH The decision in Virsa Singh's case (supra) has throughout been followed as laying down the guiding principles. The decisions\n\n....\n\nare too numerous and we may notice only two of them : Gudur Dusadh v. State of Bihar (1) and Chahal Khan v. State of Haryana. (2)\n\nIn Gudur Dusadh' s case, the day before the occurrence, the accused had killed a goat and on the advice of the deceased, the complainant lodged a report. On the next morning, while the deceased was returning from his fields along with his son, they were assaulted by the accused persons who had been hiding on the route. Thereafter, the accused set fire to the hut of the deceased. On these facts it was held that the act of the accused who had waylaid the deceased was a pre-meditated act, and, therefore, the accused had the necessary intention to commit murder. In Chahat Khan's case also, the deceased was waylaid by the accused who were armed with lathis. That case is destructive of the theory that a solitary blow on the head reduces the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under s. 304, Part II. From the evidence it emerged that the accused had both gun and a lathi, and he made full use of the lathi by using both the hands and struck a blow on the head of the deceased with sufficient force.\n\nThe solitary blow with the lathi was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death, and there was no occasion for using the gun which was hanging on his shoulders. Both these cases fell within Clause Thirdly as there was clear intention to cause such bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature waS' sufficient to cause death.\n\nLooking at the totality of the evidence, it would not be possible to come to the conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala, he intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nA gandhala is a common agricultural implement consisting of a flat, rectangular iron strip, three sides of which are blunt, embedded in a woodden handle. The length of the iron strip is in continuation of the woodden handle and the end portion is sharp, which is used to dig holes in the earth to set up fencing on embankments in the field.\n\nIf a man is hit with the blunt side on the head with sufficient force, it is bound to cause, as here, death. There can be no doubt that it was used with certain amount of force because there was cerebral compression. But that by itself is not sufficient to raise an inference that the appellant intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient to cause death.\n\nHe could only be attributed with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was\n\n(1) [1972] 3 SCR 505. (2)\n\nAIR 1972 SC 2574.\n\nA likely to cause the death. The matter, therefore, does not fall within Clause Thirdly of s. 300 of the Code.\n\nIn Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1) in somewhat similar circumstances, where there was exchange of abuses between the two parties both of whom were armed with lathis, they came to blows and in the course of the fight that ensued, the accused struck a lathi b!ow on the head of the deceased which caused a fracture of the skull resulting in the death. In view of the fact the accused had given only one blow in the heat of the moment, it was held that all that can be said was that he had given the blow with the knowledge that it was likly to cause death and, therefore, the offence fell under s. 304, Part II of the Code.\n\nIn Willie (Williams) Slaney v.\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh (2) there was, as here, a sudden quarrel leading to an exchange of abuses and in the heat of the moment a solitary blow with a hockey-stick had been given on the head. The court held that the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under s. 304, Part II.\n\nAt this stage, we think, it desirable to refer to two other decisions in Harjinder Singh (alias Jinda) v. Delhi Admn. (3) and Lakshman Kalu Nikalje v. State of Maharashtra (4), where the court, relying upon the principles enunciated by Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh's case (supra), excluded the application of Clause Thirdly, E because the third ingredient laid down, viz. the intention to cause the particular injury which was likely to cause death, was not\n\npresent. ,\n\nIn Harjinder Singh's case (supra) there was a sudden commotion when the accused took out a knife and stabbed the deceased who intervened in a fight.\n\nAt this stage, the deceased was in a crouching position presumably to intervene and separate the two persons fighting. It could not, therefore, be said with any definiteness that the accused aimed a blow at a particular part of the thigh that it would cut the femoral artery which would result in the death of the. deceased. It was, therefore, not possible to apply Clause Thirdly of s. 300 of the Code. In Laxman Kalu Nikalje's case (supra) there was a sudden quarrel and the accused lost his temper and whipped out a knife and gave one blow.\n\nAlthough it was given on the chest,\n\n(1) AIR 1954 SC 652 .\n\n. (2) [1955] 2 SCR 1140.\n\n(3) [1968] 2 SCR 246.\n\n(4) [1968] 3 SCR 685.\n\nit was not on a vital part of the chest and but for the fact that the A knife cut the auxiliary artery, death might not have ensued.\n\nIn the present case, there is no doubt that there was a sudden 'quarrel and the appellant assaulted the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhafa on the head in the heat of the moment.\n\nWhat actually was the immediate cause for the assault by the appellant on the deceased at the marriage ceremony of Tej Kaur, is nnt clear.\n\nThe genesis of the quarrel resulting in the head injury to the deceased is not known.\n\nThe prosecution came with a positive\"\"case that the appellant, together with his three brothers,. who had not been imited to the marriage of Tej Kaur by Mst. Dalip Kaur at the-· instigation of deceased Chanan Singh, came armed with different weapons to teach the deceased a lesson.\n\nBut the prosecution has failed to examine Mst. Dalip Kaur and the defence version is that the appellant and his brothers had been invited to the marriage of Tej Kaur by Mst. Dalip Kaur.\n\nIn view of these infirmities in the prosecution case, the High D Court was constrained to observe :\n\nIn the absence of any specific and positive evidence whether oral or documentary, it is not possible to arrive at any positive conclusion that this circumstance furnished any motive for the accused to attack Chanan Singh [(deceased) and three other prosecution witnesses.\n\nAfter a careful perusal of the entire prosecution evidence, it appears more probable that the accused had also joined in the marriage as the collaterals, but something happened on the spur of the moment which resulted in the infliction of injury by Jagrup Singh on the person of Chanan Singh which resulted into his death. In the first information report, it had not been disclosed, as was subsequently made out at the trial, that the accused had come from the house of Jarmail Singh, accused, armed with weapons.\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nIn our judgment, the High Court having held that it was more probable that the appellant Jagrup Singh had also attended the marriage as the collateral, but something happened on the spur of the moment which resulted in the infliction of the injury by Jagrup Singh on the person of the deceased Chanan Singh which resulted in his death, manifestly erred in applying Clause Thirdly of s. 300\n\nof the Code. On the finding that the appellant when he struck the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala in the heat of the moment, '.}'itbout pre-meditation and in a sudden fight; the case was covered by Exception 4 to s. 300. It is not suggested that the appellant had taken undue advantage of the situation or bad acted in a cruel or unusual manner.\n\nThus, all the requirements of Exception 4 are clearly met.\n\nThat being so, the conviction of the appellant Jagrup Singh, under s. 302 of the Code cannot be sustained.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the conviction of the appellant under s. 302 is altered to one under s. 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. For the altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "JAGRUP SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGRUP SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. 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Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5738, "end_char": 5750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushi!"}}, {"text": "K.C. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Bhagat and R.N. Poddar for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5787, "end_char": 5798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Bhagat and R.N. Poddar for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5865, "end_char": 5868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. The short point involved in this appeal is whether the appellant is guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under s. 302, Indian Penal Code, or only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under s. 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called 'the Code')."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6006, "end_char": 6012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6014, "end_char": 6031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6103, "end_char": 6109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jagrup Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6210, "end_char": 6222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the appellant, Jagrup Singh, struck a blow with the blunt side of a gandhala on the bead of the deceased, Chanan Singh, who was his uncle, resulting in his death.", "canonical_name": "JAGRUP SINGH"}}, {"text": "Chanan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6301, "end_char": 6313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the appellant, Jagrup Singh, struck a blow with the blunt side of a gandhala on the bead of the deceased, Chanan Singh, who was his uncle, resulting in his death."}}, {"text": "Joginder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6393, "end_char": 6407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that after the death of Joginder Singh, the deceased Chanan Singh was looking after the family of his brother, Joginder Singh consisting of his widow Mst."}}, {"text": "Dalip Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6525, "end_char": 6535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalip Kaur and her children."}}, {"text": "Tej Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6627, "end_char": 6635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalip Kaur's daughter, Tej Kaur."}}, {"text": "Billaur Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6711, "end_char": 6724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that the appellant Jagrup Singh and bis brothers, Billaur Singh, Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh, co-accused, although they were collaterals of Joginder Singh, were not invited by Mst."}}, {"text": "Jarmail Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6726, "end_char": 6739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that the appellant Jagrup Singh and bis brothers, Billaur Singh, Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh, co-accused, although they were collaterals of Joginder Singh, were not invited by Mst."}}, {"text": "Waryam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6744, "end_char": 6756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that the appellant Jagrup Singh and bis brothers, Billaur Singh, Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh, co-accused, although they were collaterals of Joginder Singh, were not invited by Mst."}}, {"text": "20.3.1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7040, "end_char": 7049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the fateful evening, i.e. on 20.3.1978, at 5.15 p.m. the marriage of Tej Kaur was performed."}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7393, "end_char": 7405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that shortly thereafter, the appellant Jagrup Singh armed with a gandhala, his brothers Billaur Singh armed with.a gandasa and Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh armed with lathis emerged suddenly and made a joint assault on the deceased Chanan Singh and the three eyewitnesses, Gurdev Singh, PW 10, Sukhdev Singh, PW 11 and Makhan Singh, PW 12."}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7414, "end_char": 7427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that shortly thereafter, the appellant Jagrup Singh armed with a gandhala, his brothers Billaur Singh armed with.a gandasa and Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh armed with lathis emerged suddenly and made a joint assault on the deceased Chanan Singh and the three eyewitnesses, Gurdev Singh, PW 10, Sukhdev Singh, PW 11 and Makhan Singh, PW 12."}}, {"text": "Makhan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7439, "end_char": 7451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that shortly thereafter, the appellant Jagrup Singh armed with a gandhala, his brothers Billaur Singh armed with.a gandasa and Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh armed with lathis emerged suddenly and made a joint assault on the deceased Chanan Singh and the three eyewitnesses, Gurdev Singh, PW 10, Sukhdev Singh, PW 11 and Makhan Singh, PW 12."}}, {"text": "Rori", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7545, "end_char": 7549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased along with the three eye-witnesses was rushed to the Rural Dispensary, Rori where they were examined at 6 p.m by Dr. Bishnoi, PW 3, who found that the deceased had a lacerated wound 9cm x Hem bone deep on the right parietal region, 9 cm away from the tip of right pinna; margins of wound were red, irregular and were bleeding on touch; direction of wound was anterior-posterior."}}, {"text": "Bishnoi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7591, "end_char": 7598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased along with the three eye-witnesses was rushed to the Rural Dispensary, Rori where they were examined at 6 p.m by Dr. Bishnoi, PW 3, who found that the deceased had a lacerated wound 9cm x Hem bone deep on the right parietal region, 9 cm away from the tip of right pinna; margins of wound were red, irregular and were bleeding on touch; direction of wound was anterior-posterior."}}, {"text": "Bishnoi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7932, "end_char": 7939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased was in a serious condition and, therefore, he was referred by Dr. Bishnoi to the Civil Hospital, Sirsa, where he died on the morning of 21.3.1978 at 2.10 a.m.\n\nDr. Karan Singh, Senior Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sirsa, PW 1, performed an atopsy on the dead body of the deceased."}}, {"text": "Civil Hospital, Sirsa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased was in a serious condition and, therefore, he was referred by Dr. Bishnoi to the Civil Hospital, Sirsa, where he died on the morning of 21.3.1978 at 2.10 a.m.\n\nDr. Karan Singh, Senior Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sirsa, PW 1, performed an atopsy on the dead body of the deceased."}}, {"text": "21.3.1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8002, "end_char": 8011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased was in a serious condition and, therefore, he was referred by Dr. Bishnoi to the Civil Hospital, Sirsa, where he died on the morning of 21.3.1978 at 2.10 a.m.\n\nDr. Karan Singh, Senior Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sirsa, PW 1, performed an atopsy on the dead body of the deceased."}}, {"text": "Karan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8030, "end_char": 8041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased was in a serious condition and, therefore, he was referred by Dr. Bishnoi to the Civil Hospital, Sirsa, where he died on the morning of 21.3.1978 at 2.10 a.m.\n\nDr. Karan Singh, Senior Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sirsa, PW 1, performed an atopsy on the dead body of the deceased."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9045, "end_char": 9077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he High Court of Punjab and Haryana, agreeing with the E Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa, held that the appellant struck a blow on the head of the deceased with the blunt side of the gandhala with the intent of causing such bodily injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that being so, the appellant was guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under s. 302 of the Code."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9452, "end_char": 9458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part IT of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9952, "end_char": 9971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10179, "end_char": 10185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IT of the Code", "statute": "Part IT of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10315, "end_char": 10321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IT of the Code", "statute": "Part IT of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10571, "end_char": 10577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IT of the Code", "statute": "Part IT of the Code"}}, {"text": "Part II of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10834, "end_char": 10840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Code", "statute": "Part II of the Code"}}, {"text": "Part II of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10842, "end_char": 10861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11542, "end_char": 11548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Code", "statute": "Part II of the Code"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11581, "end_char": 11592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ingredients of Clause Thirdly of s. 300 of the Code were brought out by Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1) in his terse language :\n\n\"To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300 \"3rdly\".", "canonical_name": "Vivian Bose"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11760, "end_char": 11766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Code", "statute": "Part II of the Code"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13641, "end_char": 13652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus.", "canonical_name": "Vivian Bose"}}, {"text": "Virsa Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13709, "end_char": 13720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The test laid down in Virsa Singh' s case (supra) for the applicability of Clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law."}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13879, "end_char": 13885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gudur Dusadh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14699, "end_char": 14711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2)\n\nIn Gudur Dusadh' s case, the day before the occurrence, the accused had killed a goat and on the advice of the deceased, the complainant lodged a report."}}, {"text": "Chahat Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15264, "end_char": 15275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Chahat Khan's case also, the deceased was waylaid by the accused who were armed with lathis."}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15511, "end_char": 15517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 SCR 505", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17172, "end_char": 17188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1972 SC 2574", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17195, "end_char": 17211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17305, "end_char": 17311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17932, "end_char": 17938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part II of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17940, "end_char": 17959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18289, "end_char": 18295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Code", "statute": "Part II of the Code"}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18783, "end_char": 18798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Harjinder Singh's case (supra) there was a sudden commotion when the accused took out a knife and stabbed the deceased who intervened in a fight."}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19314, "end_char": 19320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laxman Kalu Nikalje", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19337, "end_char": 19356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Laxman Kalu Nikalje's case (supra) there was a sudden quarrel and the accused lost his temper and whipped out a knife and gave one blow."}}, {"text": "AIR 1954 SC 652", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19516, "end_char": 19531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 SCR 1140", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19541, "end_char": 19558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 246", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19565, "end_char": 19581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 SCR 685", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19588, "end_char": 19604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jagrup Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21250, "end_char": 21262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a careful perusal of the entire prosecution evidence, it appears more probable that the accused had also joined in the marriage as the collaterals, but something happened on the spur of the moment which resulted in the infliction of injury by Jagrup Singh on the person of Chanan Singh which resulted into his death.", "canonical_name": "JAGRUP SINGH"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21920, "end_char": 21926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22154, "end_char": 22160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22415, "end_char": 22421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22525, "end_char": 22531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22556, "end_char": 22562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part II of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22564, "end_char": 22596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_849_863_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "--\"--,--\n\nJAMNAPRASAD KANHAIYALAL\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nM.P., BHOPAL\n\nMay 8, 1981\n\n( R.S. PATHAK, A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nVoluntary Disclosure Scheme under section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965, Scope and effect of-Whether the acceptance of a disclosure statement made\n\nby a declarant under section 24 of the Finance Act, 1965 confers immunity on another person from tax liability in respect of the same sum of money-Whether section 24 has an overriding effect over section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961-Bar of double taxation-Section 18 of the Voluntary Disclosures of Income and Wealth Act, 1976 (Act 8of1976).\n\nDuring the course of the assessment proceedings of the assessee-firm for the assessment year 1967-68, the Income Tax Officer\"noticed cash credits of Rs. 9,250 each in the names of five sons of the Managing Partner, in the books of the assessee. The Income Tax Officer found that these creditors, who were minors, had no independent source of income. The assessee contended before the ITO that the five creditors had voluntarily disclosed the credits under section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 and that the disclosures were accepted by the Commissioner. The ITO rejected the contention of the assessee and held that the cash credits in question were unexplained cash credits, that they represented the income of the assessee from undisclosed source, and accordingly made an addition of Rs. 46,250. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the acceptance of the voluntary disclosures under section 24(3) of the Act and the payment of tax thereon precluded the Department from disputing the fact that the income belonged to the creditors, and, as the same income could not be taxed twice once in rhe hands of the creditors and again in the hands of the assesseee, set aside the order of the ITO. The Tribunal disagreed with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and upheld the order of the ITO. Hence the reference at the instance of the assessee under section 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.\n\nAnswering the reference against the itssessee, the Court\n\nHELD : Per Sen, J.\n\nl. Section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 cannot be construed as conferring any benefit, concession or immnnity on any , person other than the person making the qeclaration under the provisions of the Act. The scheme of the Act makes it abundantly clear that it was to protect only those who preferred H to disclose the income they themselves bad earned in the past and which they had failed to disclose at the proper time. The scheme only permitted the bringing\n\nforward or income to tax; it did not require investigation of the claim of the declarant. The Act granted immunity only to the declarant and not to other persons to whom the income really belonged. [859 G-H, 860 A]\n\nThe legal fiction created by sub-s. (3) or s. 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 by virtue of which the amount declared by the declarant had to be charged to income-tax \"as if such amount were the totalincome of the declarant\", was limited in scope and it cannot be invoked in assessment proceedings relating to any person other than the person making the declaration, and did not take away the power vested in the ITO under section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to reject the explanation of an assessee for a cash credit on the ground that the explanation was not satisfactory in the case of such other person. (861 F-G]\n\n3. The finality under sub-s. (8) of section 24 or the Act was to the order of the Central Board of Revenue under sub-s. (6) thereof and not to the assessment of tax made on the basis of a declaration made by the creditors under the scheme. There was, therefore, nothing to prevent an investigation into the true nature and source of the cash credits. (861 B, DJ\n\nThe acceptance or voluntary disclosures under s 24 of the Act and the payment of tax thereon by the creditors could not, in law, justify the deletion of the amount of Rs. 46,250 as_it represented the assessee's income from undisclosed sources. In a case of this description, there was no question of double taxation which was a situation of assessee's own making in getting false declarations made in the names ot the creditors with a view to avoid higher slab of taxation.\n\nOnce it was found that the income declared by the creditors did not belong to them, there was nothing to prevent the same being taxed in the hands of the assessee to which it acrnally belonged. [ 861 H, 862 A-B, 863 CJ\n\nManila! Gafoorbhai Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1974) 95 I.T.R. 624 Gujarat; Badri Prasad & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1975) 98 I.T.R. 657 Allahabad; Pioneer Trading Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow, (1979) 120 J.T.R. 5 (Full Bench Allahabad) and Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sa111arathmal Santoshchand, (1980) 124 I.T.R. 297 Madhya Pradesh, approved.\n\nRattan Lal & Ors. v. Income Tax Officer, 98 IT.R. 681 Delhi; Shakunta/a Devi & Ors. v. C.I.T., (1980) 125 I.T.R. 18 Delhi and Mohd. Ahsan Wani v. C.I.T.,\n\n(1977) 106 I.T.R. 84 Jammu & Kashmir, overruled.\n\n5. The declaration marle under sub-s. (2) of s.24 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 bad to relate to income actually earned by the assessee. It did not require any investigation into the correctness of the declarations or any determination of the amounts belonging to the declarant. The mere charge to tax on the amounts under the Voluntary Pisclosure Scheme could not have the effeet or converting the money from the deductions from the books of the assessee into the income of the declarants if it did not belong to it. It was, therefore, open to the Income Tax Officer to investigate into the source of the cash credit amounting to Rs. 46,250 standing in the books of the assessee in the names or the sons of the Managing Partner. (859 C-D, 860 F-G]\n\nPer Pathak. J.\n\nl. The making of an assessment against a declarant on his disclosure atatement under section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 caMot dprive Income Tax Officer of jurisdiction to assess the same receipt in the hands of another person if, in a properly constituted assessment l'roceeding under the Income Tax Act, the receipt can be regrded as the taxable income of such other person. [852 G-H, 853 A]\n\n2. The liability imposed under section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, J 965 is identifiable with the income tax liability under the Income Tax Act.\n\nThe scheme for voluntary disclosure of income and its taxation is only another mode provided by law for imposing income tax and recovering it. Consequently the general principles which apply to assessments made under the Income Tax Act would, except for provision to the contrary, be applicable to assessments m;, de under section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965. Accordingly when the assessment to income tax is made under the latter enactment, it will be governed by the general principle that a finding recorded therein governs only the particuler person assessed. [852 B-D]\n\n3. The finality enacted by subs. (8) of section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 attaches to the assessment of the declarant only. It cannot in law operate in favour of or against any' other person. [852 F]\n\n3:1. The jurisdidion of an Income Tax Officer when making an assessment is concerned primarily with the issue whether the receipt under conside: ration constitutes the income of the assessee before him. Any finding reached by the Income Tax Officer touching a person not the assessee in the process of determining that issue cannot be regarded as an operative finding in favour of or against such person. The only exception of this rule centres on the limited class, and for the limited purpose, defined by the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Mur/idhur Bhagwan Das, 52 I.T.R. 335 at 346. [852 D-F]\n\nAhmed Ibrahim S. Dhoraji v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax Gujarat, [1981] 3 SCR p. 402 and Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das, 52 ITR 335 at 346, applied.\n\nC1vIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Tax Reference Case No. 19 of 1975.\n\nTax Reference u/s. 256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, Jabalpur in R.A. No. 221/Jab/73-74 arising out ofl.T.A. No. 1560 (Jab)/1972-73 decided on IO-l-1974; Aseessment Year 1957-68.\n\nS. T. De.•ai, B.L, Noma and K.J. John for the Petitioner.\n\n852 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA V.S. Desai, Champat Rai and Miss A. Subhashtni for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of A.P. Sen and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ. was delivered by Sen, J~ R.S. Pathak, J. gave a separate Opinion.\n\nPATHAK, J: I agree.\n\nThe acceptance of a disclosure statement made by a declarant under s.24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 cannot confer immunity on another person from tax liability in respect of the same sum of money.\n\nAs was held by this Court in Ahmed Ibrahim S. Dhoraji v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax Gujarat (1) the liability imposed under s.24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 is identifiable with the income tax liability under the Income-tax Act. The scheme for voluntary disclosure of income and its taxation is only another mode provided by law for imposing income tax and recovering it.\n\nConsequently, the general principles which apply to assessments made under the Income-Tax Act would except for the provision to the contrary, be applicable to assessments made under s.24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965. Accordingly, when the assessment to income tax is made under the latter enactment, it will be governed by the general principle that a finding recorded therein governs only the particular person assessed.\n\nThe jurisdiction of an Income Tax Officer when making an assessment is concerned primarily with the issue whether the receipt under consideration constitutes the income of the assessee before him.\n\nAny finding reached by the Income Tax Officer touching a person not the assessee in the process of determining that issue cannot be regarded as an operative finding in favour of or against such person. The only exception to this rule centres on the limited class, and for the limited purpose, defined by this Court in Income-Tax Officer, A-\n\nWard Sitapur v. Murl.d/wr Bhagwan Das.\\') Viewed in the light of that principle it is apparent that the finality enacted by sub-section\n\n(8) of section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 attaches to the assessment of the declarant only. It cannot in law operate in favour of or against any other person.\n\nI am of opinion that the making of an assessment against a declarant on his disclosure statement under s.24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 cannot deprive an Income Tax Officer of jurisdiction to assess the same receipt in the hands of another person if, in\n\n(I) (1981] 3 S.C.R. 402.\n\n(2) 52 T.T.R. 335, 346.\n\na properly constituted assessment proceeding under the Income Tax A Act, the receipt can be regarded as the taxable mcome of such other person. I would answer the first question in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.\n\nThat being so, no answer is necessary to the second question. The Commissioner of Income-Tax is entitled to his costs of the reference.\n\nSEN, J. This is a direct reference under s. 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 made by the Income Tax . Appellate (Tribunal, Jabalpur, for short, The Appellate Tribunal), at the instance of the assessee. The reference is necessitated due to divergence of opinion, as reflected in the various decisions of different High Courts, with respect to the scope and effect of the Voluntary Discosure Scheme under s. 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 (the 'Act', for short).\n\nThe assessee, Messrs. Jamnaprasad Kanhaiyalal, is a partnership firm. The firm consists of 4 partners, namely, Kanhaiyalal and his 3 major sons, Rajkumar, Swatantrakumar and Santoshkumar D with his minor son Satishkumar admitted to the benefits of the partnership. In the course of assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1967-68, the relevant accounting year of which was the year ending Diwali, 1966, the Income Tax Officer (ITO, for short) noticed in the books of account of the asssesee five Cash credits of Rs. 9,250 each in the names of five sons of Kanhaiyalal, as detailed br, low :\n\nRs.\n\nSailendrakumar 5 yrs. 9,250/-\n\nSatishkumar _ 9 yrs. 9,250:'-\n\nSunilkumar 7 yrs. 9,250/-\n\nSwatantrakumar 16 yrs. 9,250/-\n\nSantoshkumar 18 yrs. 9,250/- ---- 46,250/- ----\n\nThe ITO accordingly called upon the assessee to explain the genui11eness as well as the source of the cash credits. On being questioned, Kanhaiyalal the Managing Partner, disavowed all knowledge as to the capacity of the creditors to advance the amounts in question.\n\nA On the contrary, he admitted that the creditors had no independent source of income of their own. In fact, he further stated that he could not explain the source of the cash credits.\n\nIt was contended before the ITO that the creditors having made voluntary disclosures under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme and the disclosures made by them having been accepted by the Commissioner of Income Tax and tax paid thereon, the amount of Rs. 46,250 could not be treated as income of the assessee from undisclosed sources.\n\nThe ITO, however, held that the disclosures made under the scheme granted immunity from frutper taxation only to the declarant, and not to person to whom the income actually belonged.\n\nHe further held that the assessee having failed to prove the genuineness and source of the cash credits, the amount of Rs. 46,250 credited in the books of account of the assessee in the names of the creditors, who had no income of their own must be treated as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources.\n\nAccording to him, such cash credits were treated in their names after making false declarations under the Scheme, with a view to avoid a higher rate of taxation. He accordingly made an addition of Rs. 41;,250 as assessee's inpome from undisclosed sources.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed with the ITO, holding that when an amount was disclosed by a person under s. 24 of the Act, there was an immunity not only as regards the declarant, but there was also a finality as to the assessment.\n\nIn his [view, the entire statement of Kanhaiyalal had to be ignored, as it was not clear in what capacity the questions were put to him and the answers elicited because any investigation into the source of the deposits was prohibited and illegal under the Act. He accordingly held that the acceptance of the voluntary disclosures made by the creditors in question to the Commissioner and the payment of tax thereon precluded the Department from disputing that the income belonged to the said creditors and as the same income cannot be taxed twice, once in the hands of the creditors and again in the hands of the assessee, the order passed by the ITO in that behalf was unsustainable. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, therefore, directed the deletion of Rs. 46,250.\n\nThe Department went up in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal, however, disagreed with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and upheld the decision of the ITO. It was of the opinion that the ITO was justified in treating the cash credits appearing in the books of account of the assessee in the names of\n\n- - --,.-\n\nthe creditors as unexplained cash credits, since it was found that the income declared by the creditors did not belong to them, and there was nothing to prevent the same being taxed in the hands of the\n\n- assessee to which it actually belonged.\n\nAccording to the Tribunal the immunity under s. 24 of the Act was conferred on the declarant only, and there was nothing to preclude an investigation into the true nature and source of the credits. The Appellate Tribunal, after taking into consideration the statement of Kanhaiyalal, and having regard to the age of the creditors and the fact that none of them had any independent source of income at any time, held that the ITO was jus tilled in holding that the asssessee failed to discharge the burden of proof under s. 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in regard to the nature and source of the cash credits and, therefore, it had to be treated as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources.\n\nThereupon, the assessee applied to the Appellate Tribunal under s. 256 of the Income Tax Act, l96l to refer the question of law arising out of its order, to the Madhya Pradesh High Court for its opinion.\n\nThere being a conflict of opinion between the different High Courts as to the true nature of the immunity granted under s. 24 of the Act, the Appellate Tribunal has made a reference under s. 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to this Court, of the following questions of law, for its opinion, namely:\n\nI. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it was open to the Revenue authorities to investigate into the genuineness of the five credits aggregating to Rs. 46,250 and records a finding in regard thereto, when the Disclosure petitions made by the five creditors under Section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965, had been acted upon by the Revenue authorities ?\n\nIf the answer to the first question is in the negative and in favour of the assessee, whether the addition of Rs. 46,250 to the income of the assessee as representing its income from undisclosed sources, for the assessment years 1967-68, is valid and justified in law?\n\nThe main question in controversy lies within a narrow compass. The question, in fact, is whether the provisions of s. 24 of the Act can be construed as conferring any benefit, concession or\n\nimmunity on any person other than the person making the declaration under the provisions of the Act. It may be mentioned that to avoid any room for doubt, the legislature has introduced s. 18 in the Voluntary Disclosures of Income and Wealth Act, 1976 (Act No. 8 of 1976) which specifically provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, nothing contained in the Act shall be construed as conferring any benefit, concession or immunity on any person other than the person making the declaration under the pro-. visions of the Act. The question for consideration is whether the absence of such a provision as is found in Act No. 8 of 1976 leads to the consequence that' acceptance of a declaration under s. 24 of the Act confers a benefit which is not provided by the Act on a person other than the declarants and takes away the power of the ITO under s. 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to make an investigation as to the nature and source of a cash credit appearing in the books of the assesssee to reject the explanation offered by the assessee as unsatisfactory and to treat it as his income from undisclosed sources.\n\nSection 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 provided for the making of voluntary disclosures in respect of amounts rep resenting income chargeable _to tax under the Income Tax Act, 1922 or the Income tax Act, 1961, for any assessment year commencing on or before April 1, 1964. On such disclosure being made under sub-s. (1) thereof, in the manner provided by sub-s. (2) the amount was to be charged to Income tax in accordance with sub-s. (3) which provided by a legal fiction that income tax shall be charged on the amounts of voluntarily disclosed income at certain specified rates \"as if such amount were the total income of the declarant\". There was a safeguard provided in sub-s. (4) that the benefit under the scheme would be available only in respect of the voluntarily disclosed income and not in respect of the amount detected or deemed to have been detected by the ITO before the date of declaration. When the Commissioner of Income Tax passed an order under sub-s. (4) there was an appeal provided to the Central Board of Revenue under sub-s. (5) and the Board was empowered under sub-s. (6) to pass such orders thereon as it deemed fit.\n\nThere was a finality attached to the order of the Board under su b-s. (8)\n\nIn support of the reference, learned counsel for the assessee has, in substance, put forth a three-fold contention.\n\nIt is submitted, firstly, that the ITO could not have treated the cash credits standing\n\nin the names of the sons of Kanhaiyalal, the Managing Partner as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources, having regard to the fact that each one of them had made a declaration under sub-s. (I) and paid tax thereon under sub-s. (3).\n\nThe submission is that it is not permissible for the Department to go into the question of the nature and source of the amount so declared in a voluntary disclosure under s.24 of the Act, and to say that it does not represent the income of the declarant.\n\nSecondly, it is urged that sub-s. (I) read with sub-s. (3) of s.24 of the Act has an overriding effect over s.68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and, therefore, the ITO could not make any investigation as to the nature and source of the cash credits, and thirdly, it is submitted that there cannot be double taxation of the same income, once in the hands of the creditors and again in the hands of the assessee.\n\nThese submissions proceed on a wrongful assumption that there is a finality attached under sub-s. (8) to the legal fiction created by sub-s. (3) for which there i~ no basis whatever.\n\nThe contentions cannot, in our opinion, prevail.\n\nFor an appreciations of the contentions raised, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of s.24 of the Act.\n\nSub-s. (I), insofar as relevant reads :\n\n(I) Subject to the provisions of this section, where any person makes, on or after the 19th day of August, 1965, and before the 1st day of April, 1966, a declaration in accordance with sub-section (2) in respect of the amount representing income chargeable to tax under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or the Income-tax Act; 1961 (43 of 1961), for assew ment year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 1964-\n\n(a) for which he has failed to furnish a retlirn within the time allowed under section 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (IJ of 1922), or section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43of1961), or\n\n(b) which he has failed to disclose iri a return of income filed by him on or before the 19th day of August, 1965, under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (I I of 1922) or the Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), or\n\n(c) which has escaped assessment by reason of the omission or failure on the part of such person to make a return under either of the said Acts to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment.\n\nhe shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Acts, be charged income-tax in accordance with sub-section (3) in respect of the amount so declared or if more than one declaration has been made by a person the aggregate of the amounts declared therein, as reduced by any amount specified in any order made under sub-section (4) or, if such amount is altered by an order of the Board under sub-section (6), then such altered amount .............. .\n\nSub-s. (3) containing the legal fiction reads as follows :\n\n(3) Income-tax shall be charged on the amount of the voluntarily disclosed income-\n\n(a) where the declarant is a person other than a company, at the rates specified in paragraph A, and\n\n(b) where the declarant is a company, at the rates specified in Paragraph F,\n\nof Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act (X of 1965) as if such amount were the total income of the declarant ........ .\n\nSub-s. (8) on which strong reliance is placed, runs thus :\n\n(8) An order under sub-section (6) shall be final and shall not be called in question before any Court of law or any other authority.\n\nThe crux of the matter is whether the provisions of s.24 of the Act can be construed as conferring any benefit, concession or immunity on any person other than the person making the declaration under the provisions of the Act. The question is whether the non-obstente clause contained in sub-s. (I) of s. 24 of the Act precludes the Department from proceeding against the person to whom the income actually belonged. The contention that there was an immunity not only as regards the declarant, but there was also a finality as to the assessment under s.24 of the Act stems from a misconception of the nature and scope of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme.\n\nUnder sub-s. ( 1) of s.24, a person was required to make a voluntary disclosure in respect of the amount representing the income chargeable to tax under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 or the Income Tax Act, 1961 for any assessment year commencing on or before April l, 1964.\n\nSubs. (I) makes it clear that the declarations, which were expected to be made in the manner provided by sub-s. (2), were with regard to the income which was chargeable to tax under the Income Tax Acts of 1922 or 1961, but which was not disclosed at the proper time.\n\nNeither under the Act of 1922 nor under the Act of 1961, was a person required to submit a return with regard to the income which was either not earned or deemed to have been earned by him. It, therefore, follows that the declarations under sub-s. (2) of s.24 had to relate to income actually earned by him. The scheme only permitted the bringing forward of income to tax it did not require investigation of the claim of the declarant. If a person made a declaration, the Commissioner was under an obligation to assess him to tax.\n\nIn respect of the voluntary disclosures made, a declarant acquired an immunity from further investigation as to the nature and source of the income.\n\nHe also acquired certain benefits. One of the distinct.ive features of the scheme was that tax was chargeable on the whole of the disclosed income taken as a single block at rates prescribed for personal income or for corporate income under the Act, and not at an ad hoc concessional rate.\n\nFurther, facilities were allowed to payment of tax in appropriate instalments extending over a period not exceeding four years, subject to a down payment of not less than 10% of the tax due and furnishing a security in respect of the balance. Income which had already been detected on the material available prior to the date of disclosure, was, however, to be assessed under the regular provisions of the Income Tax Act and not under the scheme.\n\nAny admissions made by a person in the declarations filed by him under the scheme in respect of such income were not to be used in assessing that income under the Income Tax Act.\n\nUnder the scheme, the disclosed icome was not to be subject to any further proceedings of assessment.\n\nThe identity of the declarant was not to be revealed and he was also immune from penalty and prosecution for the past concealment of the disclosed income. It is, therefore, obvious that the Act granted immunity only to the declarant alone and not to other persons to whom the income really belonged.\n\nThe scheme of the Act makes it abundantly clear that it was to protect only those who preferred to disclose the income they\n\nA themselves had earned in the past and which they had failed to disclose at the appropriate time. It is undoubtedly true that the Act was brought on the statute book to unearth the unaccounted money.\n\nBut there is no warrant for the proposition that by enacting the\n\nsame, the legislature intended to permit, or connive at, any fraud sought to be committed by making benami declarations. If the B contentions were to be accepted, it would follow that an assessee in the higher income group could, with imunity, find out a few near relatives who would oblige him by filing returns under s.24 of the Act disclosing unaccounted income of the assessee as their own and claiming that the said income was kept by them in deposit with the assessee. c\n\nThat takes us to the contention based on the legal fiction contained in sub-s. (3) of s.24 of the Act and the finality of the assessment, by virtue of sub-s. (8) thereof.\n\nThe legal fiction contained in sub-s. (3) of s.24 of the Act, construed in the light of the other provisions; must mean that the income voluntarily disclosed shall be deemed to be the income of the declarant. The words \"as if such income were the total income of the declarant\" can only mean that even though the income did not actually belong to the declarant It would be treated to be his income for purposes of payment of income tax under the scheme. If, therefore, a person made a false declaration with regard to income not earned by him, it is difficult to comprehend how the Department c;:iuld be prevented from proceeding against the person to whom the income actually belonged and during the course of whose assessment the concealed income is detected. It, therefore, logically follows that on a disclosure being made, the amount was not to be charged : to income tax in accordance with sub-s. (3) of s.24 of the Act, taking the disclosed income as the taxable income of the declarant.\n\nThe immunity under s. 24 of the Act was conferred on the declarant only, and there was nothing to preclude an investigation into the true nature and source of the credits. The ITO was, therefore, justified in treating the cash credits in the books of account of of the assessee in the names of the creditors as unexplained cash credits.\n\nThe finality under sub-s. (8) is :o the order of the Central Board of Revenue under sub-s. (6).\n\nUnder sub-s. (4) the Commissioner of Income Tax was required, within thirty days, if satisfied that the whole or any part of the income declared had been detected or deemed to have been detected by the ITO prior to the\n\nIAMNAPRASAD V. CIT, M.P. (Sen, J.) 861\n\ndate of declaration, to make an order in writing to that effect and A forward a copy thereof to the declarant.\n\nAny person who objected to such an order could appeal under sub-s. (5) to the Central Board\n\nof Revenue stating the grounds for such an objection. The Board was empowered to pass suc_h orders as it thought fit under subs.\n\n(6). This order of the Board under sub-s. (6) was final and con- . elusive by reason of sub-s. (8) •. Thus, the finality under sub-s. (8) B. was to the order of the Board under sub-s. (6) of s. 24 and not to the assessment of tax made on the declarations furnished by the creditors under the scheme, by virtue of the legal fiction contained in sub-s. (3) of s. 24 of the Act.\n\nThe next question that calls for determination is whether the non-obstante clause contained in sub-s. (I) of s. 24 of the Act precludes the Department from proceeding against the person to whom the income actually belonged. Under sub-s. (1) of s. 24 the declaration was required to be made in respect of the amount which represented the income of the declarant. The declaration could not be made in respect of an amount which was not the income of the declarant. If, therefore,:.:a person made a false declaration with respect to an amount which was not his income, but was the income of somebody else, then there was nothing to prevent an investigation into the true nature and sources of the said amount. There was nothing in s. 24 of the Act which prevented the ITO, if he was not satisfied with the explanation of an assessee about the genuineness or source of an amount found credited in his books, in spite of its having already been made the subject of a declaration by the creditor and then taxed under the scheme. We find no warrant for the submission that s. 24 had an overriding effect over s. 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, insofar as the persons other than the declar- ' ants were concerned.\n\nIn our judgment, the legal fiction created by sub-s.\" (3) of s. 24 of the Act by virtue of which the 'amount dclared by the declarant was to be charged to income tax \"as if/ such amount were the total income of the declarant\" was limited 'in its scope, and it cannot be invoked in assessment procedings relating to any person other than the person making the delcaration under the Act so as to rule out\n\nthe applicability of s. 68 of the Income Tax Act; 1961.\n\nThe last question that remains is whether the same income • cannot be taxed twice, once in the hands of the creditors and again H in the hands of the assessee. In a case of this description, there is\n\nno question of double taxation. The situation is of the assessee's own making in getting false declarations filed in the names of the creditors with a view to avoid higher slab of taxation.\n\nOnce It was found that the income declared by the creditors did not belong to them, there was nothing to prevent the same being taxed in the hands of the assessee to which it actually belonged.\n\nIt follows that the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in Manila{ Gafoorbhai Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1), of the Allahabad High Court in Badri Prasad & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2) and Poineer Trading Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow (3) and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Addi. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Samrathmal Santoshchand(4J which lay down the true scope of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme under s. 24 of the Act must be upheld. The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Rattan Lal & Ors v. Income Tax Officer (5) and Shakuntala Devi & Ors. v. C.I.T. (6) and of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Mohd. Ahsan Wani v. C.I.T. (7), taking a view to the contrary, are overruled.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer was entitled to determine whether the amount disclosed was or was not the income of the declarant, while dealing with the case of another assessee under s. 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The legal fiction created by sub-s. (3) of s. 24 was restricted to the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme itself. The protection enjoyed by the declarant under that scheme extended only to the amounts so declared being not liable to be added, in any assessment, of the declarant. There was no absolute finality attached to the declaration especially when the nature and source of the sum declared was being determined for the purpose of its inclusion in the.income of an assessee other than the declarant. There was, therefore, nothing which prevented the Income Tax Officer from investigating into the nature and source of the sums credited in the books of account of an assessee and reject his explanation to the effect that\n\n. (1) [I 674] 95 ITR 624. ..f.2) (1975] 98 !TR 657.\n\n(3) (1979] 120 ITR 5 (FB. All).\n\n(4) (1980] 124 !TR 297.\n\n(5) [1975] 98 ITR 681.\n\n(6) [1980] 125 ITR 18.\n\n(7) [I 977] ITR I 06 ITR 84.\n\nthe sums belonged to the persons who had made declarations about A them under s. 24 of the Act.\n\nAccordingly, the reference must be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Our answer to the first question is that the legal fiction created by sub-s. (3) of s.24 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 1965 by virtue of which the amounts disclosed by the declarants had to be charged to income tax \"as if such amount were the total income of the declarants\" was limited in its scope and could not be invoked in the assessment proceedings relating to the assessee in whose books of account the cash credits appear. The answer to the first question is sufficient to dispose of the second. On the con\n\nstruction placed on subs. (3) of s. 24 of the Act, it must also be held that the ITO was justified in treating the cash credits appearing in the books of account of the assessee, amounting to Rs. 46, 250 as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources, since the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proof placed upon him under s. 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner of Income Tax shall be entitled to his costs of the reference.\n\nS.R.", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "JAMNAPRASAD KANHAIYALAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAMNAPRASAD KANHAIYALAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nM.P., BHOPAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, M.P., BHOPAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. 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(I), insofar as relevant reads :\n\n(I) Subject to the provisions of this section, where any person makes, on or after the 19th day of August, 1965, and before the 1st day of April, 1966, a declaration in accordance with sub-section (2) in respect of the amount representing income chargeable to tax under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or the Income-tax Act; 1961 (43 of 1961), for assew ment year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 1964-\n\n(a) for which he has failed to furnish a retlirn within the time allowed under section 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (IJ of 1922), or section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43of1961), or\n\n(b) which he has failed to disclose iri a return of income filed by him on or before the 19th day of August, 1965, under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (I I of 1922) or the Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), or\n\n(c) which has escaped assessment by reason of the omission or failure on the part of such person to make a return under either of the said Acts to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21988, "end_char": 21998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22006, "end_char": 22033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22051, "end_char": 22062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22070, "end_char": 22090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22232, "end_char": 22259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22281, "end_char": 22301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23356, "end_char": 23399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23728, "end_char": 23732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act", "statute": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23978, "end_char": 23983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act", "statute": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24227, "end_char": 24231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act", "statute": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24352, "end_char": 24356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act", "statute": "Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24488, "end_char": 24515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24523, "end_char": 24543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25131, "end_char": 25135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27593, "end_char": 27597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27838, "end_char": 27842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27969, "end_char": 27973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28834, "end_char": 28838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28939, "end_char": 28944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IAMNAPRASAD V. CIT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29575, "end_char": 29593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under sub-s. (4) the Commissioner of Income Tax was required, within thirty days, if satisfied that the whole or any part of the income declared had been detected or deemed to have been detected by the ITO prior to the\n\nIAMNAPRASAD V. CIT, M.P. (Sen, J.) 861\n\ndate of declaration, to make an order in writing to that effect and A forward a copy thereof to the declarant."}}, {"text": "Central Board\n\nof Revenue", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29805, "end_char": 29830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any person who objected to such an order could appeal under sub-s. (5) to the Central Board\n\nof Revenue stating the grounds for such an objection."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30141, "end_char": 30146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30308, "end_char": 30313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30436, "end_char": 30441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30571, "end_char": 30576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31055, "end_char": 31060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31393, "end_char": 31398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31429, "end_char": 31434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31442, "end_char": 31462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31595, "end_char": 31600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31959, "end_char": 31964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court in Manila", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32619, "end_char": 32647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It follows that the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in Manila{ Gafoorbhai Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1), of the Allahabad High Court in Badri Prasad & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2) and Poineer Trading Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow (3) and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Addi."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32707, "end_char": 32727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It follows that the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in Manila{ Gafoorbhai Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1), of the Allahabad High Court in Badri Prasad & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2) and Poineer Trading Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow (3) and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Addi."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33033, "end_char": 33038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33087, "end_char": 33103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Rattan Lal & Ors v. Income Tax Officer (5) and Shakuntala Devi & Ors."}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33202, "end_char": 33228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. C.I.T. (6) and of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Mohd."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33487, "end_char": 33492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33500, "end_char": 33520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33565, "end_char": 33570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34510, "end_char": 34515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34708, "end_char": 34712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35170, "end_char": 35175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35473, "end_char": 35478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35486, "end_char": 35506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_84_91_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "P.C. WADHWA\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA & ORS\n\nMarch 5, 1981\n\n[ S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ. ]\n\nAll India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960- Rule 2{b)-Scope of-1.P.S. Officers on deputation, if entitled to get deputation allowance-Absence of provision for payment of deputation allowance in Pay and Cadre Rules, whether amounts to a bar to the receipt of deputation allowance.\n\nRule 2 of the All Jndia Services (Conditions of Service--Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960 empowers the Central Government to make regulations to regulate any matters relating to conditions of service of persons appointed in an All India Service for which no provision is made in the rules under the All Jndia Services Act, 1951; and until such regulations are made, such matters shall be regulated, in the case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of a State, by the rules applicable' to officers of the State Civil Service, Class I. By an order issued in 1963 the then Punjab Government ordered that officers of the State holding Class I posts would be entitled to deputation allowance at the rates mentioned in para (i) (c) (ii) of the Order. By the application of the Punjab Reorganisation Act this order became applicable to officers 'erving in the State of Haryana.\n\nThe appellant was an officer belonging to the Indian Police Service. His services were placed at the disposal off the State Electricity Board to work as a Vigilance Officer, a post which was declared equivalent in status and responsibilities to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police, held by him under the State Government. The order of deputation passed by the Governor, while protecting the pay and other allowances received by him in the cadre post, did not however mention anything about the payment of deputation allowance to him.\n\nThe appellant claimed deputation allowance under Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules. But his representation had been rejected by the State Government.\n\nHe then moved the High Court for the issue of a writ; but that petition was dismissed in limine.\n\nBefore this Court the appellant contended that he had a statutory right to get deputation allowance as provided in Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules.\n\nAllowing the appeal\n\nHELD : Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules expressly applies to officers of All India Services on deputation. [87 GJ\n\nP.C. WADHWA v. HARYANA (Pazal Ali, J.) 85\n\nI. The substratum of Rule 2(b) is that an officer of the All India Services on deputation would be entitled to deputation allowance equivalent to:'.that given to Officers of the State Civil Service Class I. This Rule, read in'conjunctioniwith para (i) (c) (ii) of the Order issued by the erstwhile Punjab Government, manifestly entitles the appellant to draw deputation allowance at the rates mentioned in the Order. [87 H]\n\n2. There is nothing in either Rule 6 of the IPS (Cadre) Rules, 1954 or in Rule 9 of the IPS (Pay) Rules, 1954 which debars an I.P.S. Officer from getting any deputation allowance when he was on deputation to any of the authorities mentioned in Rule 2(i) of the Cadre Rules. The mere absence of a provision for payment of deputation allowance in the Cadre Rules or Pay Rules cannot be interpreted to mean an absolute bar to the receipt of such deputation allowance if other rules permit such a course of action. Rule 9 of the Pay Rules only protects the salary admissible to I.P.S. Officers on deputation.\n\nSub-rules 1 to 6 of Rule 9 of the Pay Rules do not prohibit payment of deputation allowance to officers. What the proviso to sub-rule 6 does is that it protects the pay and allowances of an officer on deputation so that he is not adversely affected in his emoluments while on deputation. In the absence of any express rules made by the Central Government on the subject the Residuary Rules would apply. [89D-G]\n\n3. There is no substance in the argument of the Board that since the terms of deputation sanctioned by the Governor did not speak of payment of deputation allowance to the appellant, the order of deputation should be read as a modification made by the Central Government to Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules.\n\nRule 2(b) makes an exception only if the Central Government makes an order in consultation with the State Gowrnment modifying the rules. There is no evidence to show that the Central Government consulted the State Government to take away the effect of Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules.\n\nMoreover the order of the Governor cannot be construed as an order passed by the Central Government. [90E-F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1475/1972.\n\nAppeal by special lea\\'.e from the Judgment and Order dated 30.3.1972 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. I 034 .of 1972.\n\nP, C. Wadhwa in person (Appellant.)\n\nK.G. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for Rsepondent No. I\n\nK.K, Jain, Bishamber Lal, S.K. Gupta and P. Dayal for Respondent No. 2.\n\nK. S. Gurumoorthy for Union of India.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against an order dated March 30, 1972 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant in limine. ·\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and may be stated thus :\n\nThe appellant was an IPS officer allotted to the Haryana State and before his services were placed at the disposal of the Haryana State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), he was holding a substantive rank of Deputy Inspector-General of Police and was Commandant General, Home Guards and Director, Civil Defence. On April 15, 1969 the appellant was sent on deputation and his services were placed at the disposal of the Board where he was to work as Deputy Inspector General of Police for Vigilance Work. On July 10, 1970 the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police in the Board was declared equivalent in status and responsibility to the IPS Cadre post of Deputy Inspector General of Police in order to protect the pay and salary and other allowances of the appellant which he was getting in his post before his deputation to the Board. In the Board, the appellant was designated as Vigilance Officer.\n\nBy an order dated August 14, 1970 the appellant's terms of deputation to the Board were finalized by the Haryana Government and the same were communicated to the appellant on August 26, 1970.\n\nThe terms and conditions on which the appellant was sent on deputation to the Board are contained in the order passed by the Governor of Haryana (Annexure B to SLP It would be seen that the order of the Governor, while protecting the pay and emoluments that the appellant was getting, did not mention anything about any deputation allowance being given to him. The appellant made a representation to the Central Government for payment of deputation allowance in accordance with rule 2 (b) of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter refefred to as the Residuary Rules) and submitted that he should be given the same deputation allowance as was admissible to the officers of the Haryana State Civil Service holding posts of Class I when they were sent on deputation to some other department or local body. The representation filed by the appellant to Central Government was rejected. The appellant then filed the writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed in limine, as indicated above.\n\nHence this appeal.\n\n. 'r\n\nP.C. WADHWA v. HARYANA (Fazctl Ali, J.) 87\n\nAfter hearing the appellant in person and counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal must succeed on a short point, and we are really surprised why the High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine when the matter merited serious scrutiny and ,\n\ndeep examination. The appellant, who has argued in person, submitted that being an officer of the Indian Police Service, he was governed under All India Services Act, 1951 and Rules made therein and in so for as deputation allowance was concerned, by the Residuary Rules.\n\nHe had thus a statutory right to get deputation allowance, as provided for in Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules. Relevant portion of Rule 2 may be extracted thus :\n\n\"2. Power of the Central Government to provide for residuary matters.-The Central Government may, after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, make regulations to regulate any matters relating to conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service, for which there is no provision in the rules made or deemed to have been made under the All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951); and until such regulations are made, such matters shall be regulated :-\n\n(a) in the case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Union, by the rules, regulations and orders applicable to officers of the Central Services, Class I;\n\n(b) in the case of persons serving in connection with the Affairs of a State by the rules, regulations and orders applicable to officers of the State Civil Services, Class I, subject to such exceptions and modifications as the Central Government may, after consultation with the State GovernmeJ t concerned, by order in writing, make;\" (Emphasis supplied)\n\nIt would be seen that rule 2(b) expressly applies to the appellant or for that matter to the officers of the All India Services. The substatum of the rule is that whenever any officer is sent on deputa tion, he would be entitled to a deputation allowance equivalent to that which is given to officers of the State Civil Service, Class I.\n\nIn the instant case, it appears that by virtue of the Order issued by\n\nth~ Punjab Government on January 28/31, 1963 which also applies H to Haryana by the application of Punjab Reorganization Act, it is clear that officers of the State concerned holding Class I posts would\n\nA be entitled to deputation allowance on certain rates mentioned in para (i) (c) (ii) of the order which runs thus :\n\n\"The deputation allowance shaU be at a uniform rate of 20 per cent of the employee's basic pay and shall be subject to a maximum of Rs. 300/- per mensem, provided that the basic pay plus the deputation allowance shall, at no time exceed Rs. 3,000/- per mensem.\n\nThis shall equally apply in cases of 'Foreign Service' where at present deputation allowance of 25 per cent of the basic pay is admissible under serial No. 40 of rule 15.1 of Punjab C.S.R. Vol. I Part I, 'Basic pay' for the above purpose shall mean the pay drawn in the scale of pay of the officiating appointment in an employee's parent cadre, provided that the officiating appointment so held was not in a tenure post and it is certified by the appointing authority that but for the deputation the employee would have continued to hold the officiating appointment indefinetely.\"\n\nIn other words, the maximum amount of deputation allowance under the order would not exceed a sum of Rs. 300/- per mensem.\n\nReading Rule 2(b) in conjunction with para (i) (c) (ii) of the order of the Punjab Government, it is manifest that the appeUant is doubtless entitled to deputation allowance at the rates mentioned in the order of the Punjab Government which fully applies to Haryana Government also. The argument advanced by the appellant therefore is unanswerable.\n\nMr. Bhagat, appearing for the State of Haryana, submitted that there is no provision either in Rule 6 of the JPS (Cadre) Rules, 1954 or in Rule 9 of the IPS (Pay) Rules 1954 regarding payment of deputation allowance and hence it should be held that any officer belonging to the JPS cadre was debarred from getting any deputation allowance unless there was an express provision in the said rules.\n\nRelevant part of rule 6 of the IPS (Cadre) Rules may be extracted thus:\n\n\"Deputation of Cadre Officers. -(1) A cadre officer may, with the concurrence of the State Government or the State Governments concerned and the Central Government be deputed for service under the Central Government or another State Government or under a company, association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controUed by the Central Government or by another State Government.\n\n.,_p·\n\n(2) A cadre officer may also be deputed for service under :- A\n\n(i) a company, association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by a State Government, a Municipal Corporation or a Local Body, by the State Government on whose cadre he is borne, and\n\n(ii)\n\nProvided that\n\nProvided further that no cadre officer shall be deputed under sub-rule (i) or sub rule (2) to a post carrying a prescribed pay which is less than or a pay scale, the maximum of which is less than, the basic pay he would have drawn in the cadre post but for his deputation.\"\n\nWe are unable to read in any of these rules any prohibition or bar to the payment of deputation allowance to an officer of the IPS Cadre on deputation to any of the authorities mentioned in rule 2(i) above.\n\nIn the instant case the appellant was sent on deputation to the Board which is a body 'Wholly or substantially owned by the State Government. The mere absence of the provision for payment of deputation allowance cannot be interpreted to mean an absolute bar to the receipt of such deputation allowance by an IPS Cadre officer, if other Rules permit such a course of action.\n\nSimilarly, Rule 9 of the IPS (Pay) Rules, 1954 contains various clau.ses which merely protect the Pay and salaries admissible to an IPS officer when sent on deputation. There is no reference to any allowance or other emoluments in the Rule, excepting pay which is clearly set out in Schedule III to those Rules. We have gone through Sub-Rules (I) to (6) of Rule 9 and are unable to find any limitation contained in these rules which could prevent the appellant from getting deputa. tion allowance.\n\nReliance was, however, placed on the proviso to sub-rule (6) which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"Provided that the pay allowed to an officer under this sub-rule and sub-rule (5) shall not at any time be less than what he would have drawn had he not been appointed to a post referred to in sub-rule (4).\"\n\nThe dominant object of the proviso is merely to protect the the pay and salary which an IPS officer was getting when he was\n\nsent on deputation, so that his being sent on deputation may not cause any prejudice to his career or emoluments. There being no Rules on the subject, it is manifest that in such cases the Residuary Rules would apply. We might mention that the Residuary Rules were made in 1960, about six years after the issuance of JPS (Cadre) Rules and JPS (Pay) Rules. It seems to us that the Central Government realised that, when other officers of the State Government on deputation were entitled to deputation allowance, there was no reason why this privilege should be denied to officers of the cadre of JPS. Perhaps it was with this essential object in view that Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules was enacted so as to enable JPS officers to get deputation allowance on .the same terms as officers of State Civil Service Class J were getting. This provision would naturally hold the field in the absence of any express Rules made by the Central Government, which have so far not been made.\n\nCounsel appearing for the Board submitted before us that the letter of the. Governor dated August 14; 1970 laying down the terms of deputation of the appellant does not contain any mention of deputation allowance to be given to the appellant and should therefore be read as a modification made by the Central Government, as contemplated by clause (b) of rule 2 of the Residuary Rules. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. In the first place, Rule 2 (b) of the Residuary Rules makes an exception only if the Central Government makes an order and that too after consultation with the State Government concerned modifying the Rule.\n\nThere is no evidence in this case to show that any order was passed by the Central Government after consulting the State Government to modify or take away the effect of rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules. The order of the Governor of Haryana cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as an order passed by the Central Government. For these reasons the contentions raised by the respondents must be overruled. For the reasons given above we hold that the appellant is legally entitled under the Statutory Rules as indicated above to get deputation allowance. The Board was therefore in law bound to pay the said deputation allowance to the appellant. The result is that the appeal is allowed and order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition in limine is quashed. A Writ of mandamus is issued to the Board to pay the deputation allowance to the appellant, to be calculated in terms of para (i) (c) (ii) of the order of the Punjab Government referred to in this judgment. The payment would be made for the period the appellant was on deputation to the Board. The entire amount shall be paid within three A months.\n\n r The appellant would be entitled to his costs, quantified\n\n/ '\n\nat Rs. 2,000/· which also should be paid to the appellant within three months.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "P.C. WADHWA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.C. WADHWA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. WADHWA\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA & ORS\n\nMarch 5, 1981\n\n[ S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Absence of provision for payment of deputation allowance in Pay and Cadre Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 287, "end_char": 366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 535, "end_char": 553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 2 of the All Jndia Services (Conditions of Service--Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960 empowers the Central Government to make regulations to regulate any matters relating to conditions of service of persons appointed in an All India Service for which no provision is made in the rules under the All Jndia Services Act, 1951; and until such regulations are made, such matters shall be regulated, in the case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of a State, by the rules applicable' to officers of the State Civil Service, Class I. By an order issued in 1963 the then Punjab Government ordered that officers of the State holding Class I posts would be entitled to deputation allowance at the rates mentioned in para (i) (c) (ii) of the Order."}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1015, "end_char": 1032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 2 of the All Jndia Services (Conditions of Service--Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960 empowers the Central Government to make regulations to regulate any matters relating to conditions of service of persons appointed in an All India Service for which no provision is made in the rules under the All Jndia Services Act, 1951; and until such regulations are made, such matters shall be regulated, in the case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of a State, by the rules applicable' to officers of the State Civil Service, Class I. By an order issued in 1963 the then Punjab Government ordered that officers of the State holding Class I posts would be entitled to deputation allowance at the rates mentioned in para (i) (c) (ii) of the Order."}}, {"text": "Punjab Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1216, "end_char": 1241, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1307, "end_char": 1314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the application of the Punjab Reorganisation Act this order became applicable to officers 'erving in the State of Haryana."}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1363, "end_char": 1384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was an officer belonging to the Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "Pazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2421, "end_char": 2430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "87 GJ\n\nP.C. WADHWA v. HARYANA (Pazal Ali, J.) 85\n\nI. The substratum of Rule 2(b) is that an officer of the All India Services on deputation would be entitled to deputation allowance equivalent to:'.that given to Officers of the State Civil Service Class I. This Rule, read in'conjunctioniwith para (i) (c) (ii) of the Order issued by the erstwhile Punjab Government, manifestly entitles the appellant to draw deputation allowance at the rates mentioned in the Order. ["}}, {"text": "P, C. Wadhwa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P, C. Wadhwa in person (Appellant.)"}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4833, "end_char": 4844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for Rsepondent No."}}, {"text": "R.N. Podar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and R.N. Podar for Rsepondent No."}}, {"text": "K.K, Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4882, "end_char": 4891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nK.K, Jain, Bishamber Lal, S.K. Gupta and P. Dayal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4893, "end_char": 4906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nK.K, Jain, Bishamber Lal, S.K. Gupta and P. Dayal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S.K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nK.K, Jain, Bishamber Lal, S.K. Gupta and P. Dayal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4923, "end_char": 4931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nK.K, Jain, Bishamber Lal, S.K. Gupta and P. Dayal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. S. Gurumoorthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Gurumoorthy for Union of India."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5038, "end_char": 5046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against an order dated March 30, 1972 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant in limine. ·"}}, {"text": "Haryana State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5437, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and may be stated thus :\n\nThe appellant was an IPS officer allotted to the Haryana State and before his services were placed at the disposal of the Haryana State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), he was holding a substantive rank of Deputy Inspector-General of Police and was Commandant General, Home Guards and Director, Civil Defence."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 15, 1969 the appellant was sent on deputation and his services were placed at the disposal of the Board where he was to work as Deputy Inspector General of Police for Vigilance Work."}}, {"text": "July 10, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 10, 1970 the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police in the Board was declared equivalent in status and responsibility to the IPS Cadre post of Deputy Inspector General of Police in order to protect the pay and salary and other allowances of the appellant which he was getting in his post before his deputation to the Board."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6262, "end_char": 6277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated August 14, 1970 the appellant's terms of deputation to the Board were finalized by the Haryana Government and the same were communicated to the appellant on August 26, 1970."}}, {"text": "Haryana Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6349, "end_char": 6367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated August 14, 1970 the appellant's terms of deputation to the Board were finalized by the Haryana Government and the same were communicated to the appellant on August 26, 1970."}}, {"text": "August 26, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated August 14, 1970 the appellant's terms of deputation to the Board were finalized by the Haryana Government and the same were communicated to the appellant on August 26, 1970."}}, {"text": "Fazctl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7536, "end_char": 7546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r\n\nP.C. WADHWA v. HARYANA (Fazctl Ali, J.) 87\n\nAfter hearing the appellant in person and counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal must succeed on a short point, and we are really surprised why the High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine when the matter merited serious scrutiny and ,\n\ndeep examination."}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7964, "end_char": 7992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8630, "end_char": 8658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "All India Services", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9387, "end_char": 9405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Power of the Central Government to provide for residuary matters.-The Central Government may, after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, make regulations to regulate any matters relating to conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service, for which there is no provision in the rules made or deemed to have been made under the All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951); and until such regulations are made, such matters shall be regulated :-\n\n(a) in the case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Union, by the rules, regulations and orders applicable to officers of the Central Services, Class I;\n\n(b) in the case of persons serving in connection with the Affairs of a State by the rules, regulations and orders applicable to officers of the State Civil Services, Class I, subject to such exceptions and modifications as the Central Government may, after consultation with the State GovernmeJ t concerned, by order in writing, make;\" (Emphasis supplied)\n\nIt would be seen that rule 2(b) expressly applies to the appellant or for that matter to the officers of the All India Services."}}, {"text": "January 28/31, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9713, "end_char": 9732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substatum of the rule is that whenever any officer is sent on deputa tion, he would be entitled to a deputation allowance equivalent to that which is given to officers of the State Civil Service, Class I.\n\nIn the instant case, it appears that by virtue of the Order issued by\n\nth~ Punjab Government on January 28/31, 1963 which also applies H to Haryana by the application of Punjab Reorganization Act, it is clear that officers of the State concerned holding Class I posts would\n\nA be entitled to deputation allowance on certain rates mentioned in para (i) (c) (ii) of the order which runs thus :\n\n\"The deputation allowance shaU be at a uniform rate of 20 per cent of the employee's basic pay and shall be subject to a maximum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Haryana by the application of Punjab Reorganization Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9757, "end_char": 9812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11332, "end_char": 11338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhagat, appearing for the State of Haryana, submitted that there is no provision either in Rule 6 of the JPS (Cadre) Rules, 1954 or in Rule 9 of the IPS (Pay) Rules 1954 regarding payment of deputation allowance and hence it should be held that any officer belonging to the JPS cadre was debarred from getting any deputation allowance unless there was an express provision in the said rules."}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11358, "end_char": 11374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhagat, appearing for the State of Haryana, submitted that there is no provision either in Rule 6 of the JPS (Cadre) Rules, 1954 or in Rule 9 of the IPS (Pay) Rules 1954 regarding payment of deputation allowance and hence it should be held that any officer belonging to the JPS cadre was debarred from getting any deputation allowance unless there was an express provision in the said rules."}}, {"text": "Schedule III to those Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13725, "end_char": 13752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "might mention that the Residuary Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "JPS", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15083, "end_char": 15086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Perhaps it was with this essential object in view that Rule 2(b) of the Residuary Rules was enacted so as to enable JPS officers to get deputation allowance on .the same terms as officers of State Civil Service Class J were getting."}}, {"text": "August 14; 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15439, "end_char": 15454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Governor dated August 14; 1970 laying down the terms of deputation of the appellant does not contain any mention of deputation allowance to be given to the appellant and should therefore be read as a modification made by the Central Government, as contemplated by clause (b) of rule 2 of the Residuary Rules."}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_864_874_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "S.S. DHANOA\n\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION, DELHI & ORS.\n\nMay 8, 1981\n\n[ 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, JJ. ]\n\nPublic servant-Services of an Officer belonging to the !11dian Administrative Service loa11ed to a Cooperative Society-Prior approval of Central Government under section 197, Cr. P.C. if required for prosecution under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act-Officer, whether a public servant withi11 the meaning of clause Twelfth of sec/ton 21, /.P.C.\n\nPenal Code-Clause Twelfth of section 21-Scope of-Services of a government servant loaned to a Cooperative Society-Governme11t servant, if continued to be a public servant.\n\nThe services of the appellant, a Member of Indian Administrative Service, were placed at the disposal of the Co-operative Store Ltd. for being appointed as the General Manager of the Super Bazaars run by the Co-operative Store.\n\nOn a complaint being filed against the appellant for commission of alleged offence punishable under section 7 read with s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 before the Metropolitan Magistrate Delhi the appellant contended that he was a public servant within the meaning of clause Twelfth of section 21 of the Penal Code, that the act complained of was done by him in the discharge of his duties a~ a public servant and that since, as required by section 197, Cr. P.C., previous sanction of the Central Government had not been obtained the court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence.\n\nThe Magistrate rejected all these contentions. He held that the appellant could not be regarded as a public servant within the meaning of clause Twelfth of section 21 and that at the relevant time he was neither in the service or pay of the Government nor was he employed \"in connection with the affairs of the Union\".\n\nThe High Court, on appeal, upheld the view of the Magistrate.\n\nBefore this Court it was contended that the term \"corporation\" used in clause Twelfth of section 21 is wide enough to include not merely a statutory corporation but also a body corporate such as the Cooperative Stores\n\nestablished under the State Act like the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 A and that as General Manager he was employed in connection with the affairs of the Union by reason of the fact that the Central Government had advanced a huge loan to the Society for carrying on commercial activities.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The appellant does not answer any of the essential requirements of B clause Twelfth of section 21 I.P.C. He was neither an officer in the service or pay of the Government nor of a local authority, a corporation established by or under an Act or a Government company. (869 DJ\n\nMere incorporation of a society under a Central or State Act does not make a body a corporation within the meaning of clause Twelfth of section 21. The expression \"corporation\" must, in the context, mean a corporation created by the legislature and not a body or society brought into existence by an act of a group of individuals. A cooperative society is, therefore, not a corporation established by or under an Act of the Central or State legislature. (870 BJ\n\nCorporation in its widest sense may mean any association of individuals entitled to act as an individual. But that is not the sense in which it is used in clause Twelfth of section 21. There is a well marked distinction between a body created by a statute and a body which, after coming into existence, is govered in accordance with the provisions of a statute. A corporation established by or under an Act of legislature can only mean a body corporate which owes its existence, and not merely its corporate status to the Act. An association of persons constituting themselves into a company under the Companies Act or a society under Societies. Registration Act owes its existence not to the Act of legislature but to acts of parties though it may owe its status as a body corporate to an Act of the legislature. (871 C-G]\n\nIn the instant case the Cooperative Society was a society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act. It is not a body created by a statute but a body created by an act of a group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of the statute. [872 Fl\n\nNor did the fact that the Central Government had advanced a huge Joan to F the Society and held major shares in the total shareholding of the Society make the Super Bazaars run by the Society an instrumentality of the State and the appellant \"employed in connection with the affairs of the Union\" within the meaning of section 197, Cr. P.C. [872 H-873 B]\n\nThe clause in the agreement advancing the Joan to the Society which provided that the General Manager and other important incumbents of key posts shall not be appointed or removed from their posts by the Society except with the prior approval of the Government in writing was merely incorporated to safeguard the interests of the Central Government. Legally the Super Bazaars were owned and managed by the Society and not by the Central Government.\n\n(873 E-F]\n\nExplanation to rule 2 (a) of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 which provides that a member of the services whose services were placed at the\n\nA disposal of any organisation by the Central Government shall, for the purposes of these rules, be deemed to be a member of the service serving in connection with the affairs of the Union notwithstanding that his salary is drawn from sources other than the Consolidated Fund of India serves a limited purpos~, that is, \"for the purposes of these Rules\". Similarly rule 2(c) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 is for the purposes of these Rules. These two Rules could not be pressed into service for improving the language of clause Twelfth of B section 21 of the Penal Code. [873 G, 874 DJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 520 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated the I 7th September, 1975 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Misc. (M) 212 of 1974.\n\nD. Mukhe1jee, and O.P. Sharma for the Appellant.\n\nP.R. Mridul, B.P. Mridul, B.P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Delhi High Court upholding an order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, raises a question of some public importance. The question is as to whether the appellant, who is a member of the Indian Administrative Service, and whose services were placed at the disposal of the Cooperative Store Ltd., a society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, )925 (hereinafter called the Society), was a public servant within the meaning of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for purposes of s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The question arises in this way.\n\nThe appellant is a member of the Indian Administrative Service.\n\nBy notification No. 27-942-Estt. I, dated 23rd April, 1972, issued by the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture (Department Agriculture), the services of the appellant, who was a Joint Commissioner (State Liaison) in that Ministry, were placed at the disposal of the Department for his appointment as the General Manager, Super Bazaar, Connaught Place, New Delhi with effect from April 7, 1972, on which date he took over charge as General Manager.\n\nAt the request of the Managing Committee of the Society, the Government of India extended the period of his deputation for a further period of one year with effect from April 7, 1973. On completion\n\nof his period of deputation, the appellant reverted as Joint Secretary A in the Ministry of Agriculture.\n\nOn October IO, 1973, the Food Inspector purchased a sealed bottle of honey from the Super Bazaar at the INA Market. The Public Analyst's report showed the honey to be adulerated. On April 5, 1974, the Municipal Corporation, Delhi, filed a complaint against the appellant and other officials of the Super Bazaar as also against the manufacturer of honey for having committed an offence punishable under s. 7 read withs. 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.\n\nOn being summoned by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, to appear before him as an accused, the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the taking of cognizance of the alleged offence by the Magistrate was barred under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for want of sanction of the Central Government, since the act complained of was nothing but an act done by him in the discharge of his duties as a public servant.\n\nThe Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, by his order dated October 9, 1974, rejected the objection, holding that the appellant, at the time of commission of the alleged offence, was not a public servant within the meaning of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, he was competent to take cognizance of the alleged offence.\n\nIn coming to that conclusion, the learned Magistrate held that the services of the appellant having been placed at the disposal of the Society, he was in foreign service under FR 9 (7) and, therefore, could not be regarded as a public servant within the meaning of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code for two reasons, namely: (a) as the General Manager,- he was not an officer in the service or pay of the Government, and (b) while functioning as General Manager, he was not employed in connection with the affairs of the Union. On appeal, the High Court confirmed the view of the learned Magistrate.\n\nThe short question that falls for our determination in this appeal is whether a member of the Indian Administrative service, whose services are placed at the disposal of an organisation which is neither a local authority, nor a corporation established by or undera Central, Provincial or State Act, nor a Government Company, by the Central Government or the Government of a State, can be treated to be a 'public servant' within the meaning of cl.\n\nTwelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code for purposes of s. 197 of\n\nthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The answer to the question turns on the construction of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ands. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which, so far as they are relevant, are as follows :\n\n21. The words 'p!!blic servant' denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:-\n\nTwelfth .' Every person-\n\n(a) in the service or pay of the Government or remu nerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government ;\n\n(b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956.\n\nS. 197.\n\nProsecution of Judges and public servants.\n\n{I) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction :-\n\n(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;\n\nIn support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has urged two grounds. The first is that the chain of Departmental Stores known as Super Bazaar at Connaught Place, New Delhi, together with 12 other super bazaars in the metropolitan city of Delhi, including the one at the INA market, is nothing but a commercial activity of the Central Government and, therefore, the A appellant was, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, employed in connection with the affairs of the Union. That being so, the prosecution could not be launched without sanction from the Central Government under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Proce• dure, 1973. The second is that the Cooperative Store Limited which runs the super bazaars, having been registered under s. IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, was a body corporate by virtue of s. 23 of that Act and, therefore, the appellant was a public servant within the meaning of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It is said that although the appellant may not be covered by sub-cl. (a), he falls within the ambit of sub-cl. (b) of\n\ncl. Twelfth.\n\nWe find it difficult to accept these submissions.\n\nClause Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code protects two classes of public servants, viz., (a) every person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government, and (b) every person in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant does not answer any of these descriptions.\n\nDuring his period of deputation, he was not an officer in the service or pay of the Government, nor was he in the service of a local authority, a corporation established by or under an Act or a Government company. It is, however, urged that the expression 'corporation' appearing in sub-cl. (b) of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code is wide enough to include not only a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, but also a body corporate. The submission proceeds on the basis of s. 23 of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, which reads :\n\n23. The registration of a society shall render it a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, with perpetual succession and a common seal, and with power to hold property, to enter into contracts, to institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes of its constitution. '\n\nClause Twelfth does not use the words \"body corporate\", and the\n\nquestion is whether the expression \"corporation\" contained therein,\n\n H taken in collocation of the words '!established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act\" would bring within its sweep a cooperative\n\nA society.\n\nIndubitably, the Cooperative Store Limited is not a corporation established by a Central or State Act. The crux of the matter is whether the word 'under' occurring in cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code makes a difference.\n\nDoes the mere act of incorporation of a body or society under a Central or a State Act make it a corporation within the meaning of cl. Twelfth of s. 21?\n\nB In our opinion, the expression 'corporation' must, in the context, mean a corporation created by the Legislature and not a body or society brought into existence by an act of a group of individuals.\n\nA cooperative society is, therefore, not a corporation established by or under an Act of the Central or State Legislature. c\n\nA corporation is an artificial being created by law having a legal entity entirely separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it with the capacity of continuous existence and succession, notwithstanding changes in its membership. In addition, it possesses the capacity as such legal entity of taking, holding and conveying property, entering into contracts, suing and being sued, and exerdsing such other powers and privileges as may be conferred on it by the Jaw of its creation just as a natural person may. (1) The following definition of corporation was given by Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated Dartmouth College case (2) :\n\nA corporation is an artificial being, invisibe, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.\n\nBeing the mere creature of law, it possesses only these properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence.\n\nThese are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual.\n\nThey enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It\n\n(I) Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol, 18, p. 136, para 1 : Words and Phrases,\n\nPermanent Edition, Vol. 9A, p. 420: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn, Vol. 9, p. 716 (para 1201) and p. 749 (para l245); Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd Edn, Vol. 1, p. 474 and Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn. p. 307.\n\n(2) Dartmouth College v. Woodward, N.H. 4 Wheat. .518, 636, 4 L. Edo 629 •.\n\nis chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use.\n\nBy these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being.\n\nThe term 'corporation' is, therefore, wide enough to include private corporations. But, in the context of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code, the expression 'corporation' must be given a narrow legal eonnotation.\n\nCorporation, in its widest sense, may mean any association of individuals entitled to act as an individual.\n\nBut that certainly is not the sense in which it is used here.\n\nCorporation established by or under an Act of Legislature can only mean a body corporate which owes its existence, and not merely its corporate status, to the Act. For example, a Municipality, a Zilla Parishad or a Gram Panchayat owes its existence and status to an Act of Legislature.\n\nOn the other hand, an association of persons constituting themselves into a Company under the Companies Act or a Society under the Societies Registration Act owes its existence not to the Act of Legislature but to acts of parties though, it may owe its status as a body corporate to an Act of Legislature.\n\nThere is a distinction between a corporation established by or under an Act and a body incorporated under an Act.\n\nThe distinction was brought out by this Court in Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v.\n\nBhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Ors. (1) It was observed :\n\nA company incorporated under the Companies Act is F not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nThere is thus a well-marked distinction between a body created by a statute and a body which, after coming into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of a statute. In Sabhajit Tewary\n\nv. Union of India and Ors (2) the question arose whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was a statutory body. It was\n\n(!) [1975] 3 SCR 619.\n\n(2) [1975] 3 SCR 616.\n\nA urged that because the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research had government nominees as the President of the body and derived guidance and financial aid from the Government, it was a statutory body.\n\nRepelling the contention, the Court observed :\n\nThe Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or ; Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate the membership will not establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches, establishment or development and assistance to special institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problems affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner.\n\nWhatever has been said with regard to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, equally applies to the Cooperative Store Limited, which is a society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925. It is not a statutory body because it is not created by a statute. It is a body created by an act of a group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of a statute. The Super Bazaar at Connaught Place together with its 12 branches in Delhi, is not an instrumentality of the State. In a welfare State like ours, there is greater participation by Government in various com\" mercial activities. Some times the Government directly engages itself in such commercial.activities by acquiring a monopoly in trade in the public interest. Or, it may, by an Act of Legislature, establish statutory corporations like the State Trading Corporation, Life Insurance Corporation of India, the Industrial Finance Corporation, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission etc., or it may set up Government companies under s. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, like the Hindustan Steel Limited etc.\n\nBy no stretch of imagination, could it be said that the appellant was employed in connection with the\n\n_ ..\n\n-\"T .\n\n~---\n\naffairs of the Union within the meaning of s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Super Bazaars are not owned by the Central Government. They are owned and managed by the Cooperative Store Limited. Pursuant to an agreement executed between the Cooperative Store Limited and the Union of India, the Central Government has advanced a loan of Rs. 40,00,000/- to the Society for establishment and management of the Super Bazaars, and the Central Government also holds more than 97% shares in the total share-holding of the Society. Clause 6 of the Agreement provides:\n\nThat the incumbents of supervisory and other key C posts including those of General Manager, Deputy General Manager, Finance Manager, Asst. General Manager, Purchase Manager, Sales Manager and Accounts Manager, by whatever other designation they may be known shall not be appointed or removed from their posts by the Debtor except with the prior approval of the Creditor in writing.\n\nThe Super Bazaar at Connaught Place and at various other places are run by the Cooperative Store Limited under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Cooperation).\n\nThe incumbents of supervisory and other key posts including that of the General Manager cannot be appointed or removed without the E prior approval of the Central Government. The whole purpose of\n\ncl. 6 of the Agreement in the matter of appointment of General Manager and other incumbents holding key posts is to safeguard interests of the Central Govarnment. Legally speaking, the Super Bazaars are owned and managed by the Society and not by the V Central Government and, therefore, the appellant was not employed F in connection with the affairs of the Union within the meaning of s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\n\nExplanation to r. 2 (a) of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and r. 2 (c) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, on which reliance was placed, can be of no G avail. Explanation tor. 2 (a) enlarges the meaning of the expression \"serving in connection with the affairs of the Union or in connection with the affairs of the State\". It provides that a member of the Service whose services are placed at the disposal of a company, corporation or other organisation or a local authority by the H Central Government or the Government of a State, shall, for the\n\nA purpose of those rules, be deemed to be a member of the Service serving in connection with the affairs of the Union or in connection with the affairs of the State, as the case may be, notwithstanding that his salary is drawn from the sources other than the Consolidated Fund of India or the Consolidated Fund of that State. The\n\nlegal fiction contained in Explanation to r. 2 (a), is for a limited purpose. This is evident by the use of the words \"for purposes of these rules\". Rule 2 (c) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 defines Government to mean (i) in the case of a member of the Service serving in connection with the affairs of a State, or who is deputed for service in any company, association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government of a State, or in a local authority set up by an Act of Legislature of a State, the Governinent of that State; and (ii) in any other case, the Central Government-.\n\nThat again is for purposes of these rules.\n\nThese provisions cannot be pressed into service for improving upon the language of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.\n\nBefore parting with the case, we would like to advert to one aspect. It is common ground that the honey in question was sold in a.sealed container bearing the manufacture's warranty as to quality as required under r. 12-A of the Prevention of Adulteration Rules, 1955. That being so, the learned Magistrate shall first determine whether or not the appellant was protected under s. 19 (2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.\n\nSubject to this observation, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nThere shall be no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "S.S. DHANOA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.S. DHANOA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, DELHI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, DELHI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 8, 1981\n\n[ 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283, "end_char": 294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 480, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 499, "end_char": 509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "Co-operative Store Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 752, "end_char": 775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The services of the appellant, a Member of Indian Administrative Service, were placed at the disposal of the Co-operative Store Ltd. for being appointed as the General Manager of the Super Bazaars run by the Co-operative Store."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 972, "end_char": 981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 992, "end_char": 997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1005, "end_char": 1045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Magistrate Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1057, "end_char": 1086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a complaint being filed against the appellant for commission of alleged offence punishable under section 7 read with s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 before the Metropolitan Magistrate Delhi the appellant contended that he was a public servant within the meaning of clause Twelfth of section 21 of the Penal Code, that the act complained of was done by him in the discharge of his duties a~ a public servant and that since, as required by section 197, Cr."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1180, "end_char": 1190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1198, "end_char": 1208, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1335, "end_char": 1346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1383, "end_char": 1401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C., previous sanction of the Central Government had not been obtained the court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1644, "end_char": 1654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954"}}, {"text": "established under the State Act like the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cooperative Stores\n\nestablished under the State Act like the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "the Cooperative Stores\n\nestablished under the State Act like the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2519, "end_char": 2524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mere incorporation of a society under a Central or State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2697, "end_char": 2757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2833, "end_char": 2843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "DJ\n\nMere incorporation of a society under a Central or State Act", "statute": "DJ\n\nMere incorporation of a society under a Central or State Act"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "DJ\n\nMere incorporation of a society under a Central or State Act", "statute": "DJ\n\nMere incorporation of a society under a Central or State Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3762, "end_char": 3775, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3822, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4569, "end_char": 4580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Registration Act owes its existence not to the Act of legislature but to acts of parties though it may owe its status as a body corporate to an Act", "statute": "Registration Act owes its existence not to the Act of legislature but to acts of parties though it may owe its status as a body corporate to an Act"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5812, "end_char": 5822, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "D. Mukhe1jee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6052, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mukhe1jee, and O.P. Sharma for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "O.P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mukhe1jee, and O.P. Sharma for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6102, "end_char": 6113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, B.P. Mridul, B.P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "B.P. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6115, "end_char": 6126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, B.P. Mridul, B.P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "B.P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, B.P. Mridul, B.P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, B.P. Mridul, B.P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6227, "end_char": 6230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. This appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Delhi High Court upholding an order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, raises a question of some public importance."}}, {"text": "Cooperative Store Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6560, "end_char": 6582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question is as to whether the appellant, who is a member of the Indian Administrative Service, and whose services were placed at the disposal of the Cooperative Store Ltd., a society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, )925 (hereinafter called the Society), was a public servant within the meaning of cl."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6746, "end_char": 6751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6759, "end_char": 6782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6800, "end_char": 6806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6814, "end_char": 6846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7021, "end_char": 7040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, dated 23rd April, 1972, issued by the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture (Department Agriculture), the services of the appellant, who was a Joint Commissioner (State Liaison) in that Ministry, were placed at the disposal of the Department for his appointment as the General Manager, Super Bazaar, Connaught Place, New Delhi with effect from April 7, 1972, on which date he took over charge as General Manager."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Agriculture (Department Agriculture)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, dated 23rd April, 1972, issued by the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture (Department Agriculture), the services of the appellant, who was a Joint Commissioner (State Liaison) in that Ministry, were placed at the disposal of the Department for his appointment as the General Manager, Super Bazaar, Connaught Place, New Delhi with effect from April 7, 1972, on which date he took over charge as General Manager."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7313, "end_char": 7322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, dated 23rd April, 1972, issued by the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture (Department Agriculture), the services of the appellant, who was a Joint Commissioner (State Liaison) in that Ministry, were placed at the disposal of the Department for his appointment as the General Manager, Super Bazaar, Connaught Place, New Delhi with effect from April 7, 1972, on which date he took over charge as General Manager."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7340, "end_char": 7353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, dated 23rd April, 1972, issued by the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture (Department Agriculture), the services of the appellant, who was a Joint Commissioner (State Liaison) in that Ministry, were placed at the disposal of the Department for his appointment as the General Manager, Super Bazaar, Connaught Place, New Delhi with effect from April 7, 1972, on which date he took over charge as General Manager."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7579, "end_char": 7592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the request of the Managing Committee of the Society, the Government of India extended the period of his deputation for a further period of one year with effect from April 7, 1973."}}, {"text": "October IO, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7718, "end_char": 7734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October IO, 1973, the Food Inspector purchased a sealed bottle of honey from the Super Bazaar at the INA Market."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7897, "end_char": 7910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 5, 1974, the Municipal Corporation, Delhi, filed a complaint against the appellant and other officials of the Super Bazaar as also against the manufacturer of honey for having committed an offence punishable under s. 7 read withs."}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation, Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7916, "end_char": 7944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 5, 1974, the Municipal Corporation, Delhi, filed a complaint against the appellant and other officials of the Super Bazaar as also against the manufacturer of honey for having committed an offence punishable under s. 7 read withs."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8117, "end_char": 8121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8140, "end_char": 8181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8209, "end_char": 8239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On being summoned by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, to appear before him as an accused, the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the taking of cognizance of the alleged offence by the Magistrate was barred under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for want of sanction of the Central Government, since the act complained of was nothing but an act done by him in the discharge of his duties as a public servant."}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8410, "end_char": 8416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8424, "end_char": 8456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "October 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8677, "end_char": 8692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, by his order dated October 9, 1974, rejected the objection, holding that the appellant, at the time of commission of the alleged offence, was not a public servant within the meaning of cl."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8858, "end_char": 8863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8871, "end_char": 8888, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9246, "end_char": 9251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9259, "end_char": 9276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Provincial or State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9852, "end_char": 9875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of a State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9936, "end_char": 9957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short question that falls for our determination in this appeal is whether a member of the Indian Administrative service, whose services are placed at the disposal of an organisation which is neither a local authority, nor a corporation established by or undera Central, Provincial or State Act, nor a Government Company, by the Central Government or the Government of a State, can be treated to be a 'public servant' within the meaning of cl."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10037, "end_char": 10042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial or State Act", "statute": "Provincial or State Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10050, "end_char": 10067, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10084, "end_char": 10090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial or State Act", "statute": "Provincial or State Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10099, "end_char": 10131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10204, "end_char": 10209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10217, "end_char": 10240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10258, "end_char": 10290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Provincial or State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 617", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10792, "end_char": 10803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial or State Act", "statute": "Provincial or State Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10811, "end_char": 10830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10833, "end_char": 10839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11717, "end_char": 11722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first is that the chain of Departmental Stores known as Super Bazaar at Connaught Place, New Delhi, together with 12 other super bazaars in the metropolitan city of Delhi, including the one at the INA market, is nothing but a commercial activity of the Central Government and, therefore, the A appellant was, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, employed in connection with the affairs of the Union."}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12073, "end_char": 12079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative Store Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12146, "end_char": 12171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second is that the Cooperative Store Limited which runs the super bazaars, having been registered under s. IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, was a body corporate by virtue of s. 23 of that Act and, therefore, the appellant was a public servant within the meaning of cl."}}, {"text": "IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12234, "end_char": 12282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12318, "end_char": 12323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12424, "end_char": 12429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12437, "end_char": 12454, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12658, "end_char": 12663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "IO of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12671, "end_char": 12688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Provincial or State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13002, "end_char": 13025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 617", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13064, "end_char": 13075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial or State Act", "statute": "Provincial or State Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13083, "end_char": 13102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13475, "end_char": 13480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13488, "end_char": 13505, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Provincial or State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13590, "end_char": 13613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial or State Act", "statute": "Provincial or State Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13695, "end_char": 13733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provincial or State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14300, "end_char": 14323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial or State Act", "statute": "Provincial or State Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14576, "end_char": 14593, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Does the mere act of incorporation of a body or society under a Central or a State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14615, "end_char": 14701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14761, "end_char": 14766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Does the mere act of incorporation of a body or society under a Central or a State Act", "statute": "Does the mere act of incorporation of a body or society under a Central or a State Act"}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15690, "end_char": 15698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) The following definition of corporation was given by Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated Dartmouth College case (2) :\n\nA corporation is an artificial being, invisibe, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."}}, {"text": "Dartmouth College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15717, "end_char": 15734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) The following definition of corporation was given by Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated Dartmouth College case (2) :\n\nA corporation is an artificial being, invisibe, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."}}, {"text": "Jowitt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16770, "end_char": 16776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9, p. 716 (para 1201) and p. 749 (para l245); Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd Edn, Vol."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17376, "end_char": 17381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17389, "end_char": 17406, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Zilla Parishad or a Gram Panchayat owes its existence and status to an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17847, "end_char": 17921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18033, "end_char": 18046, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18070, "end_char": 18096, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18533, "end_char": 18546, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18571, "end_char": 18584, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Council of Scientific and Industrial Research", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18921, "end_char": 18966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sabhajit Tewary\n\nv. Union of India and Ors (2) the question arose whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was a statutory body."}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19008, "end_char": 19034, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19070, "end_char": 19086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 616", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19093, "end_char": 19109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Oil and Natural Gas Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19427, "end_char": 19457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Repelling the contention, the Court observed :\n\nThe Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or ; Industrial Finance Corporation."}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19600, "end_char": 19626, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20522, "end_char": 20548, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20640, "end_char": 20678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21323, "end_char": 21358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Or, it may, by an Act of Legislature, establish statutory corporations like the State Trading Corporation, Life Insurance Corporation of India, the Industrial Finance Corporation, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission etc.,"}}, {"text": "s. 617", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21481, "end_char": 21487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21495, "end_char": 21514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21525, "end_char": 21548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or it may set up Government companies under s. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, like the Hindustan Steel Limited etc."}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21720, "end_char": 21726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21734, "end_char": 21766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21968, "end_char": 21982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to an agreement executed between the Cooperative Store Limited and the Union of India, the Central Government has advanced a loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22218, "end_char": 22226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Cooperation)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22769, "end_char": 22820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Super Bazaar at Connaught Place and at various other places are run by the Cooperative Store Limited under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Cooperation)."}}, {"text": "cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23020, "end_char": 23025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govarnment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23163, "end_char": 23181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of the Agreement in the matter of appointment of General Manager and other incumbents holding key posts is to safeguard interests of the Central Govarnment."}}, {"text": "V Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23271, "end_char": 23291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Legally speaking, the Super Bazaars are owned and managed by the Society and not by the V Central Government and, therefore, the appellant was not employed F in connection with the affairs of the Union within the meaning of s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23407, "end_char": 23413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23421, "end_char": 23453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government-", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25044, "end_char": 25063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 2 (c) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 defines Government to mean (i) in the case of a member of the Service serving in connection with the affairs of a State, or who is deputed for service in any company, association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government of a State, or in a local authority set up by an Act of Legislature of a State, the Governinent of that State; and (ii) in any other case, the Central Government-."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25208, "end_char": 25213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25221, "end_char": 25244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Adulteration Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25476, "end_char": 25514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25625, "end_char": 25630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Adulteration Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Prevention of Adulteration Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25642, "end_char": 25683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_875_911_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "S.S. MOGHE & ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nMay 8, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., A.P. SEN AND\n\nV. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Articles 14, 16, 32 and 309.\n\nPetitioners in 1979 assailing validity of promotion given to respondents between 1968 and 1975-No valid explanation for delay in filing petition-Denial of relief.\n\nNo regular cadre and hierarchy of posts-No rules laying down modes of appointment/promotion to posts-Government whether competent to fill posts by securing services of suitable persons.\n\nConstitution of a new service-Method of appointment to various posts-\n\nPresident whether competent to prescribe the methods by which vacancies in the D different categories are to be filled.\n\nAviation Research Centre (Technical) Service Rules, 1976, Rules, 6. 7, 8 and 12-Va/idity of.\n\nCivil Service Regulations, Article 26(7)(iii)-lnitia/ constitution of service- Absorption of deputationists-Whether appointment by transfer.\n\nThe Aviation Research Centre was a temporary and ad hoc Organisation set up in 1962 for carrying out the work of collecting intelligence by the use of highly sophisticated techniques. For manning this Task Force, persons with experience in the specialised nature of the work were taken on deputation basis from different sources, such as the Intelligence Bureau, the Departments of Defence Science, Wireless Planning 'and Coordination, the Directorate-General of Civil Aviation and the Police Cadres of different States and they were grouped together to form the ARC. To supplement the man power some persons were also directly recurited to the Organisation on a purely ad hoc basis. The ARC\n\nOrganisation was initially treated as an extension of the Intelligence Bureau. In February 1965, it was brought under the control of the Director-General of Security. The administrative control over the Organisation which was originally vested in the Ministry of Exterml Affairs and later with the Prime Minister's Secretariat was transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat in 1965. The sanction for continuance of the temporary Organisation was accorded by the Government from year to year till the year 1971 when a decision was taken by the Government to make the ARC a permanent Department. The finalisation of the principles to be adopted for constitution of the new permanent Department took considerable time and it was only on April 26, 1976 that the President of India promulgated the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service Rules 1976 providing for the constitution of a new service the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service.\n\nRule 6 of the said Rules dealt with the initial constitution of the new ARC permanent Service and provided that all persons holding, as on the appointed day, any one of the categories of posts specified in rule 4, whether in a permanent or tempoarary or officiating capacity or on deputation basis, shall be eligible for appointment to the service at the initial constitution thereof. Rule 7 laid down the principles to be applied for fixation, of seniority of those appointed to the various posts at the time of its initial constitution, while Rule 8 dealt with the filling up of vacancies in various grades remaining unfilled immediately after the initial constitution of the service and all vacancies that may subsequently arise in the Department. Rule 12 provided that in regard to matters not specifically covered by the rules or by order issued by the Government, the members of the service shall be governed by general rules, regulations and orders applicable to persons belonging to the corresponding Central Civil Service.\n\nThe petitioners, who were persons recruited directly to the ARC Organisation during the period between 1965 and 1971 challenged in their writ petition, the validity of the promotion given to respondent nos. 8 to 67 from the year 1968 onwards officers whose services were borrowed on deputation. They contended that the deputationists were occupying the posts in the Department. only on an ad hoc basis and such ad hoc appointees who were having the benefit of lien in their parent departments and were getting promotions in those departments had no claim whatever to seniority or promotions in the borrowing department viz. A.R.C.\n\nThey also assailed the Aviation Research Centre {Technical) Service Rules as cantering arbitrary powers on the controlling authority to equate the ad hoc service rendered by the deputationists in the ARC with the regular service rendered by persons like the petitioners who had been directly recruited to the Department on a regular basis which resulted in permanently blocking all the future chances of the petitioners in matters of promotion and other service benefits. The rules were highly arbitrary and infringed Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution since it was based on illegal treatment of unequals as equals by equating persons functioning on a mere ad hoc basis with those holding posts in the Organisation on a regular basis.\n\nRule 6(2) confered arbitrary and unfettered powers on the Screening Cammi ttee and suffered from the vice of excessive delegation. Rule 7 in so far as it empowered the Department to reckon the\n\nsniority of the deputationists by giving them the benefit of the ad hoc service rendered by them in the ARC as well as the prior service put in by them in their parent departments was arbitrary. Rule 8(1) enabled the deputationists to con solidate the illegal advantage gained by them at the initial constitution by further promotions/appointments to still higher posts in the ARC, and by specifying the method of recruitment to the various posts in the Service and fixing a quota as between the vacancies to be filled up by promotions and those to be fill, ed up by direct recruitment/deputation or re-employment in Schedule II of the rules, the deputationists have been treated on a par with regular departmental personnel and this involved a clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was further contended that the positiOn of the deputationists being that of persons permanently transferred from the parent departments to the ARC, under Article 26 of the Civil Service Regulations, such persons appointed by transfer shall be ranked below all the direct recruits as well as the promotees already functioning in the Department and the seniority list dated November 6, 1978 having been drawn up in contravention of the aforesaid principle laid down in Article 26, the said list should be declared to be illegal and void.\n\nS.S. MOGHE V. UNION OF INDIA 877\n\nThe case of the petitioners was resisted by respondent No. 1, who contended that the appointments made by direct recruitment were merely temporary and ad hoc in character.\n\nWhile the deputationists were persons with rich experience and Jong years of service, the direct recruits were inexperienced and new to the job. The delay in promulgation of the rules was due to the fact that because of the special features of the Department and the sensitive nature of the functions to be discharged by it, various circumstances and factors had to be taken into account before the draft rules were finally cleared by the several Ministries concerned. There is no principle of Jaw prohibiting the absorption in a newly constituted Department of persons who are functioning on deputation in a temporary Organisation which was later constituted into a permanent service. The Service Rules extend equal treatment to all categories of employees who were in position on the crucial date viz., April 26, 1976 in the matter of absorption as well as determination of seniority at the intitial constitution, irrespective of whether they were direct recruits or deputationists.\n\nThe Screening Committee prepared the seniority list of the persons found suttable for absorption in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 6(2) read with Rule 7. The Rules cannot be said to be arbitrary or violative of the principles of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16.\n\nDismissing the writ petition,\n\nHELD: l(i) A party seeking the intervention and aid of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of his fundamental rights, should exercise due diligence and approach this Court within a reasonable time after the cause of action arises and if there has been undue delay or !aches on his part, this .Court has the undoubted discretion to deny him relief. [900 H-901 A]\n\n(ii) The challenge raised by the petitioners against the validity of the promotions given to respondent nos. 8 to 67 during the period between 1968 and 1975 is liable to be rejected on the preliminary ground that it is most highly belated. Thero is no valid explanation from the petitioners as to why they did not approach this Court within a reasonable time after those promotions were made. This writ petition has been filed only in the year 1979 and after such a Jong lapse of time the petitioners cannot be permitted to assail before this Court the promotionr that were effected during the years 1968 to 1975. [900F-G)\n\n(iii) There is also no satisfactory explanation from the petitioners as to why no action at all was taken to challenge the validity of the promotions given to respondents nos. 8 to 67 for a period of nearly seven years subsequent to the judgment of the High Court in 1972. [901 Fl\n\nRabindra Nath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1970) 2 S.C.R. 697 referred to.\n\nSo long as there was no regular cadre and hierarchy of posts and no rules laying down the mode of appointmont/pro:notioa to '.those posts, it was perfectly open to the Govern:nent to fill up the po3ts by)ecuring the] services of\n\npersons who in its opinion were by virtue of their experience iand qualifications, H best suited for being entrusted with the spocialised kinds. of functions attached to the various posts. [902 E]\n\nA In the instant case the petitioners had been appointed as ACIOsH only on a temporary and ad hoc basis. Such appointments did not confer on them any rights even to the posts of DFOs. It had also been categorically made clear to them in the letters containing the offers of appointmenr that such appointments will not confer on them any right to be permanently. absorbed in the post if and when it was made permanent. There was also not even any executive order or administrative instruction declaring the post of DFO as the feeder category for B appointment to the higher posts. The petitioners, therefore, had no legal right or claim for being appointed by promotion to the higher posts of ACI0-1\n\n(FO), ATO, etc. (902 F-G]\n\n3(i) When a new service is proposed to be constituted by the Government, it is fully within the competence of the Government to decide as a matter of policy the sources from which the personnel required for manning the service are to be drawn. (903 Fl\n\n(ii) It is in the exercise of the said power, that provision has been made by sub-rule (I) of Rule 6, that all the persons who, as on the appointed day, were already working in the ARC Organisation on a temporary and ad hoc basis and had thereby acquired valuable experience in the specialised kinds of work would be eligible for appointment to the new service at the stage of its inititial constitution. Equal opportunity was given to all to get permanently appointed in the new ARC (Technical) Service subject to their being found fit by the Screening Committee under sub-rule (2) of Rule 6. The provision cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 16. (903 G, 904 A]\n\n4(i) The provision for Constitution of a Screening Committee for adjudging the suitability of the persons in the field of eligibility for permanent appointment to the service is absolutely reasonable. [904 DJ\n\n(ii) The power conferred on the controlling authority to issue general or special instructions to a Screening Committee is really in the nature of a safeguard for ensuring that the rules relating to the initial constitution of the service were applied fairly and justly. The controlling authority is the \"Secretary Department of Cabinet Affairs\". When supervisory powers are entrusted to such a high and responsible official, it is reasonable to assume that they will be exercised fairly and judiciously and not arbitrarily. The contention that the provisions of subrule (2) of Rule 6 suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or excessive delegation therefore, fails. (904 E]\n\n5(i) When recruitment to the new Service was being made from two different classes of sources, it was necessary for the Government to evolve a fair and reasonable principle for regulating the inter se seniority of the personnel appointed to a new Department. What has been done under Rule 6 is to give credit to the full length of continuous service put in by all the appointees in the concerned grade, whether such service was rendered in the temporary ARC Organisation or in other departments of the Government.\n\nThe criterion applied, namely the quantum of previous experience possessed by the appointees measured in terms of the length of continuous service put in by them in the concerned or equivalent grade is perfectly relevant to the purpose underlying the framing of the rule. The principle laid down in rule 6(2) for determination of\n\nS.S. MOGHE v. UNION OF INDIA 879\n\ninter se seniority was quite reasonable and fair and did not involve any arbitrary A or unfair discrimination against the petitioners. (905 C-E]\n\nIn the instant case while the petitioners had no substantive lien in respect of or title to any post in any department, the deputationists were having a lien on the posts held by them in their parent departments. The petitioners, therefore, formed a different class consisting of persons who were virtually being recruited for the first time into regular Government service, as distinct from respondents 8 to 67 who had been holding posts in their parent departments for several years on regular basis who formed a separate class. (905 BJ\n\n6. The provisions contained in Rule 7 that the seniority of persons appointed on permanent basis in each grade at the initial constitution of the service shall be in the order in which they are shown in the relevant list prepared by the Screening Committee in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6 was upheld as perfectly valid and constitutional. [905 F-G]\n\n7. At the time of constituting a new service and laying down the mode of appointment to the various posts it is fully within the powe1 s of the President of India to prescribe the methods by which vacancies arising in the different categories of posts in the department should be filled up. In the instant case this is precisely what has been done by Rule 8 and the provisions of Schedule II.\n\n(906 Bl\n\n8. The draft rules were prepared by the Directorate of ARC and submitted to the Government in 1972 itself but on a detailed scrutiny being made it was found that the said draft required substantial modification in several respects. Revised rules were, therefore, drafted and submitted to the Government late in 1974. The time taken in finalising the rules was due to the fact that\n\nintei:isive examination of all the relevant aspects had to be done by the various E concerned Ministries before the draft rules could be finally approved and issued.\n\nThe plea of ma/a fides put forward by the petitioners is not €stablished.\n\n[906 H-907 BJ\n\n9. Article 26(7)(iii) of the Civil Services Regulations applies to cases \"where a person is appointed by transfer in accordance with a provision in the recruitment rules providing for such transfer in the event of non-availability of candidates by direct recruitment or promotion\". The absorption of the erstwhile deputationists in the ARC (Technical) Service at the time of its initial constitution was not by such transfer. The provisions of Article 26(7)(iii) are, therefore, not attracted. [909 F-G)\n\n10. The provisions of Rule 6(3) and Rule 7 will be strictly conformed, to both in letter as well as in spirit, by respondents nos. 1 to 7. In case it is found on examination that the ranking assigned to any of the petitioners in the impugned seniority list dated November 6, 1978 is not consistent with the principles laid down _in the aforementioned rule, necessary action should be immediately taken to rectify the said defect. If the promotional chances of any of the petitioners have been adversely affected by reason of any defect in the seniority list, such !promotions should also be reviewed after following the requisite procedure. The petitioners may bring to the notice of the first respondent specific instances, if any, of deviation from the principles enunciated in Rule 6(3) and Rule 7 resulting in incorrect assignment of seniority and rank by sub-\n\nmilting representations. Such representations, if received, will be duly examined and appropriate orders passed thereon as expeditiously as possible. [910 F-911 A]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 119 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nB V.M. Tarkunde, G.L. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashree Wad, G.D. Gupta\n\nand Miss Anita for the Petitioners.\n\nK. Parasaran, Solicitor General and Miss. A. Subhashini for Respondents 1-2 and 4·7.\n\nDr. Y.S. Chita/e, A.T.M. Sampath and P.N. Ramalingam for the other appearing Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. In this petition filed under Article 32] of the Constitution, the petitioners-31 in number-who are all officers serving in the Aviation Research Centrej(for short, the 'ARC') have challenged the constitutionality of Rules 6 to 8 of the \"Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service Rules, 1976\" issued by the President of India under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, as also the legality and validity. of the \"absorption\" of respondents Nos. 8 to 67 in the said Department pursuant to the impugned Rules. There is a further prayer in the writ petition to declare the Seniority List dated November 6, 1978 (Annexure 'G') published by the the Department as illegal, unconstitutional and void. Yet another relief claimed by the petitioners is that all the promotions granted to respondents Nos: 8 to 67 in the ARC service from 1968 till 1978 should be declared by this Court as illegal and void, and that a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction should be issued to respondents Nos. 1 to 7 the Union of India, the C'lbinet Secretary, the Director of Department of Personnel, the Director General of Security, the Director of ARC and the Adviser (Technical), A.R.C., respectively-to constitute the ARC afresh in accordance with law and to rearrange the seniority in the Service in conformity with law.\n\nThe petitioners' case is that shortly after the formation of the ARC in 1963 the petitioners were directly recruited to the said department on a regular basis during the period between 1963 and 1966 in the category of Assistant Central Intelligence Officers Graden, (whic\\l has since been redesignated as Deputy Field Officers (Tech.)\n\n(for short DFO) under the impugned Rules while respondents Nos. 8 to 67 are officers whose services have been borrowed on deputation to the ARC from some departments of Central Government and from the Police Cadre of State Governments.\n\nThe petitioners contend that by virtue of their regular appointments in the ARC, they were, as of right, entitled to be promoted to the higher posts of Assistant Central Intelligence\n\nOfficer, Grade-I-now called the Field Officer (Tech.)-Deputy Central Intelligence Officer (Tecb.)/Assistant Technical Officer subject only to the right of the Department to supersede those found unsuitable for such promotions. However, instead of promoting the petitioners to the vacancies that arose in such higher categories of posts, the Department filled up those vacancies by granting promotions to the deputationists, thereby illegally denying to the petitioners the opportunities legitimately due to them for promotion in the Department. It is contended by the petitioners that the deputationists were occupying the posts in the Department only on ad hoc basis and such ad hoc appointees who were having the benefit of lien in their parent departments and were getting promotions in those departments had no claim whatever to seniority or promotions in the borrowing Department, namely, the ARC. On this basis the petitioners have raised a ...... challenge in this writ petition against the legality of the various promotions given to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 in the year 1968 and thereafter.\n\nA draft combined seniority list of Assistant Central Intelligence Officers Grade-II (Tech.) working in the ARC was publihed in March 1971 (Annexure 'A'), wherein the officers on deputation as well as those who are directly recruited in the ARC had all been included and the seniority of the deputationists had been fixed by taking into account the total length of service put in by them in the rank of ACIO in their parent departments as well as in the ARC.\n\nAccording to the petitioners, the said list had been prepared in violation of the principle that the same period of service of a Government servant cannot be legally considered twice over for service benefits in two Departments, namely, the parent department and the borrowing department.\n\nA Writ Petition-Civil Writ Petition No. 1020 of 1971-was\n\nfiled in the Delhi High Court by three of the present petitioners complaining against the promotions given to the deputationists and challenging the validity of the combined seniority list published by H the Department in 1971. During the pendency of that writ petition the impugned seniority list of 1971 was substituted by two separate\n\nlists-one consisting of the direct recruits and the other consisting of deputationists. Thereupon. the writ petition before the Delhi High Court was got amended by the petitioners therein by incorporating objections against the new seniority lists published by the Department.\n\nWhen the case came up for hearing, counsel appearing on behalf of the Union oflndia submitted before the High Court that statutory rules governing the Service were then under preparation, that the arrangements till then made were all purely on ad hoc basis and the whole question will eventually be finalised after the rules were framed. In the light of the said submission, the High Court dismissed that writ petition observing that since no rules governing the Service had been framed and the appointments in question had all been made on purely ad hoc basis, the petitioners did not have at that point of time any legitimate grievance and the writ petition was, therefore, premature. It is submitted by the petitioners that, contrary to the assurance given to the Delhi High Court, the Department did not take early action for framing the rules but instead continued to confer on the deputatiOnists the benefit of further illegal promotions and it was only after all the higher posts were filled by promoting deputationists that the Department ultimately promulgated the impugned statutory Service Rules on April 26, 1976.\n\nStrong reliance has been placed by the petitioners on Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Annexure 'C') laying down certain general principles for determining seniority of various categories of persons employed in Central Services.\n\nAccording to the petitioners, in the absence of statutory rules governing the conditions of service of personnel in the ARC, the principles laid down in the aforesaid Office Memorandum were applicable to the said Department. It is urged that under clause (viii) of the said Office Memorandum, it was incumbent on the authorities to replace all the deputationists who, according to the petitioners, were holding the posts in the Department only on ad hoc basis, by persons approved for regular appointment by direct recruitment, and until the deputationists were so replaced the deputationists had to be placed en bloc below person directly recuited to the grade. The petitioners have sought to derive support from Annexure 'D' which is a letter dated October 15, 1971 addressed by the Department of Personnel, Cabinet Secretariat to the Director General of Security, wherein it is pointed out that persons appointed to a grade on deputation basis are appointed for a specific period, after the expiry of which they are required to revert back to their parent departments and since the said deputationists do not have any locus stand; in the borrowing departments, they are not entitled to\n\npromotions/confirmations in the borrowing departments. The letter proceeds to state that the question of fixation of their inter se seniority of such deputationists vis-a-vis other categories of officers of a particular grade by preparing a combined seniority list does not, therefore, arise. However, it was also added in the next paragraph of the letter that though deputationists are not entitled to promotion to a higher grade, yet they can be considered for appointment on deputation to the higher grades, if the Recruitment Rules of the higher grade provide for appointment on deputation basis, and in the absence of the Recruitment Rules, it is for the appointing authority to decide whether a person already serving as a deputationist in the lower grade should be considered for appointment on deputation to the higher po>ts. According to the petitioners,\n\non the basis of the principle enunciated in this letter, perso1s serving on deputation in the ARC should all have been repatriated to their parent departments as soon as direct recruits became available in sufficient number and the action taken by the Department in filling up the vacancies in the higher categories, namely, ACIOs Grade I (Field Officers) and Assistant Technical Officers by granting promotions to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 was totally illegal. The petitioners have alleged that some of the deputationists were holding posts in their parent departments which were inferior in rank in comparison with the posts of DFOs.\n\nIt is contended by the petitioners that the grant of such promotions to the deputationists amounted to conferment of double benefits on them since they were simultaneously earning promotions in their parent departments.\n\nSome of the petitioners who had joined the ARC in 1963 as DFOs became eligible for promotions in 1968 by completing the five years' qualifying period, but instead of promoting them to the category of Field Officers, the Department filled up the vacancies which became available in 1968 and subsequent years by promoting some of the respondents who were only deputationists.\n\nThe petitioners contend that the deputationists were serving in the A RC only on ad hoc basis and hence they were not eligible under the terms of the Memorandum dated December 27, 1959 (Annexure 'C') for the grant of any promotions in the borrowing department. It is alleged that while eF.ccting such irregular promotions, the petitioners were not even co:'.sidered and they were illegally denied the opportunity of competing with the respondents for promotions to the posts of Field Officers.\n\nIn 1975, a further injustice is said to have been done to the petitioners when twenty of the deputationists functioning as Field Officers were promoted as Assistant Technical Officers (for short, ATOs).\n\nWrit-petitioners Nos. I and 4 made representations\n\ncomplaining against those promotions, but those representations were rejected by the Director, ARC by his Memorandum dated September 8, 1975 (Annexure 'E'). On December 1, 1975, seven more deputationists were promoted as ATOs. The petitioners have raised the plea that the aforesaid promotions of the deputationists were illegal and discriminatory since the Department had fixed an arbitrary date, namely, December 1972 for computing the qualifying period of three years for eligibility to be considered for promotions.\n\nIt was only after most of the posts in the higher categories of A TOs and FOs had come to be occupied by the deputationists as a consequence of such irregular promotions that the impugned Rules were promulgated by the President of I1:dia on April 26, 1976. Through the said Rules, the Department has purported to absorb all the deputationists/respondents Nos. 8 to 67 in the ARC Service as TOs/ A TOs/FOs and thereby legalised all the illegal promotions granted to those deputationists. This, according to the petitioners, has been done with the ma/a fide intention of giving favoured treatment to a deputationist at the expense of the direct recruits like the petitioners. The petitioners have put forward the contention that the impugned Rules are arbitrary and discriminatory and are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is their further plea that the wholesale absorption of the drputationists is a colourable and unconstitutional exercise of power and the impugned Rules in so far as they provide for such absorption are in the nature of a fraud on the powers conferred on the President by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The petitioners point out that even after the constitution of the Service by the impugned Rules, no seniority list was published for more than two years, but promotions to the posts of FOs were, in the meantime, granted to several of the deputationists. It is contended by the petitioners that Rule 6 of the impugned Rules confers arbitrary powers on the controlling authority to equate the ad hoc service rendered by the deputationists in the ARC with the 'regular' service rendered by persons like petitioners who had been directly recruited to the Department on a regular basis and this has resulted in permanently blocking all the future chances of the petitioners in matters of promotion and other servicelbenefits. According to the petitioners the \"initial constitution\" of the Service purported to be brought about under the Rules is itself highly arbitrary and it infringes Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution since it is based on illegal treatment of unequals as equals by equating persons functioning on a mere ad hoc basis with those holding posts in be Organisation on a regular basis. Another ground of attack put forward by\n\nthe petitioners is that Rule 6(2) confers arbitrary and unfettered powers on the Screening Committee and hence it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. It is also urged that the said sub-rule is unconstitutional because it enables the controlling authority to retain to itself an arbitrary power to control the decision-making of the Screening Committee by means of \"general or special instructions ' thereby rendering it impossible for the Screening Committee to function in an independent and objective manner. According to the petitioners, Rule 6(2) enables the controlling authority to impose its will and whims on the Screening Committee. The petitioners allege that the controlling authority had imposed its favoured treatment to deputationists and displayed a discriminatory attitude against the regular departmental personnel like the petitioners by treating the ad hoc service of the deputationists in the ARC as regular service and absorbing them in the posts or grades to which they have been granted illegal promotions. The petitioners have urged that Rule 6(2) in so far as it vaguely uses the words \"continuous . appointment in the grade\" has vested an arbitrary power in the Department to take into consideration the ad hoc service rendered by the deputationists in grades to which they have no right in law and hence the said provision is highly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Alternatively, it is submitted by the petitioners that the aforesaid words \"continuous appointment in the grade\" should be reasonably construed to mean \"continuous appointment on regular basis in the grade\" in which event alone the rule can be regarded as free from the vice of arbitrariness. Rule 6(6) has also been attacked by the petitioners as infringing Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on the ground that it enables the Screening Committee to discriminate against the direct recruits by treating them on a par with the deputationists. It is contended by the petitioners that the said subrule confers power on the Screening Committee to absorb such of the deputationists in a lower grade who were found to be unsuitable for absorption in a higher grade and thereby completely blocks the chances of persons like the petitioners to get promotions into such lower grades despite their being found suitable for such promotions.\n\nAnother point raised by the petitioners is that it was incumbent on the Screening Committee before it took its final decision regarding the absorption of personnel in the various grades to give an opportunity to the petitioners to represent their case, and inasmuch as this procedure was not followed, the decisions taken by the Screening Committee were in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioners have also voiced a grievance that\n\nA even though the Screening Committee had prepared a list of the officers whom it had decided to absorb in the various grades, the Department did not disclose the contents of the said list to personnel working in the ARC but kept the matter secret.\n\nReiterating their contention that the promotions given to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 during the period from 1968 to 1978 were all illegal on the ground that these promotions had been made without considering the cases of the petitioners, the petitioners have put forward further plea that the publication of the impugned Seniority List was deliberately delayed by the Department till November 6, 1978, with intent to favour the deputationists, some of whom were promoted as ATOs on November 5, 1978.\n\nOn this basis, it is contended that the action taken by the Department in publishing the Seniority List dated November 6, 1978 was ma/a fide.\n\nAnother argument advanced by the petitioners is that Rule 7 in so far as it empowers the Department to reckon the seniority of the deputationists by giving them the benefit of the ad hoc service rendered by them in the ARC as well as the prior service put in by them in their parent departments is arbitrary. The petitioners contend that this deviation from the principle uniformly followed for fixing the seniority in all other departments of the Government of India namely those laid down in the Home M nistry's Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 was wholly unjustified and. as a result thereof the direct recruits in the ARC are subjected to a differential treatment resulting in gross prejudice to them without there being any rational basis for separate classification.\n\nThere is also an allegation that in fixing the seniority of personnel as per the impugned gradation list dated November 6, 1978, even service rendered by the deputationists in non-comparable and lower ranks has been wrongly taken into account.\n\nRule 8(1) has beea attacked by the petitioners as empowering the controlling authority to enable the deputationists to consolidate the illegal advantage gained by them at the intial constitution by further promotio.1s/appointmeats to stiII higher posts in the ARC. It is pointed out by the petitioners that while specifying the method of recruitment to the various posts in the Service and fixing a quota as between the vacancies to be filled up by promotions and those to be filled up by direct recruitment/deputation or re-employment in Schedule II of the rules the deputationists have been treated on a par with regular departmental personnel, and this involves a clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nLastly, it is contended that even if it is to be assumed that the A decision taken by respondents 1 to 7 to retain the deputationists in the Department at the time of the intial constitution of the ARC was valid, the position of the deputationists would, in law, be only that of persons permanently transferred from the parent departments to the ARC and under Article 26 of the Civil Service Regulations, such persons appointed by transfer shall be ranked below all the B direct recruits as well as the promotees already functioning in the Department. The petitioners contend that since the Seniority List dated November 26, 1978 has been drawn up in contravention of the aforesaid principle laid down in article 26, the said list should be declared to be illegal and void.\n\nDetailed counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 and respondents Nos. 13 to 16, 22, 25, 28 and\n\n31. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, by the Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, it is stated that the A via ti on Research Centre was initially set up as a Sensitive Security Organisation in the year 1963 on a purely temporary basis by way of an extension of the Intelligence Bureau. In Feburary !965, the ARC, along with two other schemes, was brought under the control of the Director General of Security. The Department was continued by the Government on temporary basis from year to year till 1971 when the Government, after reviewing all the relevant factors, took a decision to make the ARC permanent. The administrative control over the ARC was originally vested in the Ministry of External Affairs and later with the Prime Minister's Secretariat till 1965 when it was transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat. The re were no Recruitment and Carde Rules for the ARC during the period when the Department was functioning on a temporary and purely experimental basis and a number of officers, including respondents Nos. 8 to 67, were taken on deputation from other Central and State Government Departments to man the various posts in the Organisation. Some persons, like the petitioners, were also directly recruited as ACIOs-II on a purely temporary and ad hoc basis against temporary posts in the ARC. The contention of the petitioners that they were regularly recruited as DFOs in the ARC is denied by the Governmentrespondents. It is submitted in the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 1 that the appointments given to the petitioners were merely '\"ad hoc )n character and this had been clearly specified in the Memos issued to them containing the offer of appointment that the appointments were temporary and would not confer on them any right for permanant appointment if and when the posts were made permanent. It is stated that the Memos issued\n\n to all the petitioners were on identical terms and a specimen copy of the Memo issued to the petitioners has been appended to the counter affidavit of respondent No. 1, as Annexure 'R-1 '. The further submission made in the counter-affidavit of the first respondent is that in the ARC there was no regular cadre nor any Reruitment Rules prior to 1976 and as and when posts in the various categories in the grades were sanctioned, they were filled up by getting suitable hands with the requisite qualifications and some experience from other departments on deputationand some vacancies were also filled up by direct recruitment.\n\nBriefly sketching the history of the formation of the ARC, the first respondent has stated that the ARC Organisation was set up in the wake of Chinese aggression that took place in the winter of 1962 and its primary role was to collect intelligence by employing the most modern highly sophisticated techniques and to furnish it to other Agencies like the Special Frontier Force and the Special Security Bureau which were in need of such intelligence in order to give better protection to our borders against external aggression. For manning such an Organisation, it was absolutely essential to secure the services of persons possessing the requisite experience, technological skill, special attitude and ability. Initially, therefore, the various posts in the ARC Organisation, which was started on a mere experimental basis, were filled up by taking on deputation officers from the intelligence Bureau and other departments which had the expertise in related fields, such as, the Department of Defence Science, Wireless Planning and Coordination and Directorate General of Civil Aviation.\n\nWith the gradual expansion in the activities of the ARC, it was found that the aforesaid Departments could not supply on deputation basis enough hands for meeting the needs of ARC and hence, the direct recruitments from the open market bad also to be made. However, all the appointments made by direct recruitment were merely temporary and ad hoc in character.\n\nWhile the deputationists were persons with rich experience and long years of service, the direct recruits were inexperienced and new to the job. In the circumstances, the higher posts of FOs, ATOs and Assistant Directors had to be filled up by ad hoc appointments from amongst the deputationists who by virtue of their long experience in the particular . type of work were considered suitable for those posts.\n\nAs and when direct recruits gained adequate experience, several of them were also given ad hoc appointments to such higher posts. It is further averred in the counter affidavit that in making such appointments to the higher posts, only considerations of public interest and maintenance of efficiency in the\n\nfunctioning of the Department had weighed with the appointing authority. The allegation put forward by the petitioners that the direct recruits were discriminated against has been denied by the first respondent as totally unfounded, and it is stated that all such appointments to the various technical posts in the higher categories of FOS, ATOS and Assistant Directors were made by the Department on the recommendations of the duly constituted DPCs/Selection Committees. Some of the deputationists were also appointed to the higher post when they got promotions to the corresponding ranks in their parent departments.\n\nThe Department treated both the direct recruits as well as the deputationists as ad hoc apponintees in the ARC with equal rights, and equal weightage was given to both categories of employees in respect of length of service in a given grade irrespective of whether or not it was rendered wholly in ARC. As regards the petitioners' contentions based on the MHA Memorandum dated December 22, 1959, it is pointed out in the counter-affidavit that the general principles laid down therein . had no application in the matter of filling up of temporary posts in a temporary department.\n\nStress -is laid in the counter-affidavit on the fact that simultaneously with the constitution of the ARC as a regular department, the ARC (Technical) Service Rules, 1976 were promul gated by the Government and it has been submitted that the principles laid down in the aforesaid Memorandum did not get attracted to the new service inasmuch as it is clearly specified in the Memo itself that the principles enunciated therein will not be applicable for such Services and posts for which seperate principles have been already issued or may be issued there.lfter by the Government, The allegation of the petitioners that they had not been considered for promotion at the time when the vacancies in the categories of DFOs were filled up during the year 1968 to 1975 has been denied by the first respondent and it is averred in the counter-affidavit that the direct recruits were given promotions in the higper posts when they were foun, d suitable by' the DPC for ad hoc promotions to the grades of FOs (Tech.), etc. Reliance is placed by the first respondent on the observations made by the Delhi High Court in its judgment in Civil Writ Petition No. 1020 of 1971, filed by three of the present petitioners, that no discrimination could be said to have been made against the direct recruits either in drawing up the seniority list of 1971 or in the action taken by the authorities to filling up some of the higher posts by appointing deputationists. Though a decision was taken by the Government in 1971 to make the ARC a permanent department, and steps to frame rules were also immediately initiated, the draft rules could be . finalised after intensive examination by\n\nvarious concerned Ministeries only by April 1976 when the Rules were\n\nA promulgated. The allegation made by the petitioners that the promulgation of the rules was deliberately delayed in order to confer an undue advantage on the deputationists who were granted promotions to the higher grades in the meantime, has been categorically denied by the first respondent in its counter-affidavit. The delay in promulgation of the rules was due to the fact that because of the soecial B features of the Department and the sensitive nature of the funtions to be discharged by it, various circumstances and factors had to be taken into account before the draft rules were finally cleared by the several Ministries concerned.\n\nThe first respondent has stated in the counter-affidavit that equal treatment had been meted out to the direct recruits and the deputationists in the matter of promotion/appointment from the grade of ACI0-1 to that of ATO. The allegation of the petitioners that the DPC had fixed the crucial date for eligibility for promotion from the category of ACIO-I to the grade of ATO in an arbitrary manner so as to exclude the petitioners from consideration, has been denied by the first respondent and it is averred that the crucial date was determined by the DPC on each occasion by taking into consideration the number of vacancies likely to be available for promotion/selection and the number of persons who could reasonably be considered for such pr0motions/selection. It is pointed out by the first respondent that when deputationists were selected by the DPC, they were 'appointed' to the higher posts on deputation and it was not a process of promotion as wrongly. contended by the petitioners.\n\nln reply to the challenge made by the petitioners against Rule 6 of the impugned Rules which provides for the initial constitution of the new service to be known as the Aviation Resc!arch Centre (Technical) Service it is submitted by the first respondent that there is no principle of law prohibiting the absorption in a newly constituted Department of persons who are functioning on deputation in a temporary Organisation which was later constituted into a permanent service. It is also submitted by the first respondent that the provision in the impugned rules for absorption of the deputationists in the ARC (Technical) Service was made in public interest since it was found that the continued retention of the deputationists who possessed valuable experience and had long association with the Organisation was absolutely necessary for the efficient functioning of the Department.\n\nThe first respondent states that the impugned rules extend equal treatment t0 all categoies of employees who were in position on the crucial date, namely, April 26, 1976, in the matter of absorption as\n\nwell as determination of seniority at the initial constitution, irrespective of whether they were direct recruits or deputationists. Since the direct recruits were all occupying the posts in the ARC only on a purely ad hoc basis, they had no legal right to be appointed in the new Department and merely by reason of their temporary appointments as ACIO-II (Tech.) in the ARC Organisation they could not automatically become members of the new ARC (Technical) Service which was constituted for the first time with effect from April 26, 1976. All persons working in the ARC in various temporary posts as on April 26, 1976, were given the option to express their willingness or otherwise to be absorbed in the new Department.\n\nThe petitioners as well as the direct recruits were treated alike in the matter of the assessment of their suitability for absorption by the . Screening Committee and on being found suitable, they were absorbed either in the same posts which they were occupying immediately prior to April 26, 1976 or in a lower post, subject to availability of permanent posts. The Screening Committee prepared the seniority list of the persons found suitable for absorption in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 6 (2) read with Rule 7 of the impugned Rules.\n\nThe counter-affidavit of the first respondent goes on to state that the seniority list published on November 6, 1978 had been prepared strictly in accordance with the provisions of the impugned Rules, the names of the officers having been arranged with reference to the dates of their continuous appointment to the concerned grade. Pointing out that the benefit of the ad hoc service rendered in a particular grade has been given not only to the former deputationists but also to the direct recruits in the matter of determining their inter se seniority in the grade of FOs, it is submitted by the first respondent that there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the seniority list of November 6, 1978 has been prepared in a discriminatory manner so as to violate Article 16 of the Constitution. The first respondent has further submitted that the charge of discrimination has been made by the petitioners on the basis of an erroneons assumption that the petitioners were in regular service in the ARC prior to the promulgation of the impugned Rules and that hence they had .a\n\nsuperior claim for promotion to a higher post in comparison with the deputationists. The petitioners had been appointed/promoted to various grades in the ARC only on ad hoc basis prior to April, 26 1979 and the benefit of such ad hoc service rendered by them had been given to the petitioners in the same way and to the same extent as service rendered by the former deputationists on deputation.\n\nThe first respondent, therefore, submits that the provisions of Rule 6\n\nA cannot be said to be 'arbitrary or violative' of the principle of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nRepelling the contention of the petitioners that the principle for fixation of seniority laid down in the impugned Rules is illegal for the reason that it is inconsistent with the guidelines and general principles for determination of seniority in the Central Services enunciated in MHA Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 (Annexure 'C') the first respondent has submitted in the counteraffidavit that there is no substance in this plea since it has been specifically stated in the Memorandum (Annexure 'C') itself that the principles contained therein will not apply to \"such services and posts for which separate principles have already been issued or may be\n\nrereafter issued by Government\".\n\nThe allegation made by the petitioners that the framing of the rules and the constitution of the ARC (Technical) Service was deliberately delayed with a view to give u1:due advantage to the deputationists has been denied by the first respondent as baseless and untrue.\n\nPrior to 1971, there were no permaPent.! posts at all in the ARC because the Department was temporary and all the temporary posts were being sanctioned on a year to year basis.\n\nAction to frame the rules was initiated shortly after the decision was taken in 1971 to make the ARC a permanent Department. The first set of draft rules was prepared and submitted to Government in 1972. Since it was found to be defective in certain aspects, a revised draft was prepared in 1974.\n\nSince the whole matter had to be subjected to extensive and intensive examination by various Ministries taking into account all relevant factors, the finally approved rules could be promulgated only in April 1976.\n\nThe first respondent has submitted that Rule 6 of the impugned Rules provides equal treatment to all the officers in position in the ARC on the crucial date in the matter of absorption and determination of inter se seniority at the time of intitial constitution of the service.\n\nThe service rendered by the former deputationists in various grades prior to their absorption in the ARC could not be ignored, as their services were required by the Department in public interest.\n\nIt is pointed out that if the contention of the petitioners that only persons who are regularly appointed in the ARC could be absorbed in the service is to be accepted, then none of the petitioners could have been permanently appointed in the ARC (Technical) Service, as the appointments held by the petitioners prior to the constitution of the ARC Service in 1976 were purely temporary and ad hoc in character.\n\n> -\n\nS.S. MOGHE v. UNION OF INDIA (B:ilakrishna Eradi, J.) 893\n\nThe further plea put forward by the petitioners that Rule 6(2) of the impugned Rules suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of power has been stoutly denied by the first respondent.\n\nThe Screening Committee was required to act within the frame-work of the scheme of absorption envisaged in the Rules and the Committee had followed proper guidelines which had been approved by the controlling authority, namely, the Secretary, Department of Cabinet Affairs, Cabinet Secretariat. The provision enabling the controlling auth0rity to issue general instructions was incorporated in the rules for the purpose of ensuring that the rules relating to the initial constitution of the service were applied uniformly and judiciously.\n\nThe contention put forward by the petitioners that the said provision renders the functioning of the Screening Committee nugatory, is refuted by the first respondent as being devoid of any merit. The allegation made by the petitioners that the deputationists were given illegal promotions from time to time has also been denied in the first respondent's counter-affidavit as totally baseless. It is admitted that during the period when the ARC was functioning as a temporary Department, some of the deputationists who were initially appointed as ACIO-II (Tech.) were subsequently appointed to higher posts on deputation basis but the first respondent submits that there could be no valid objection to such appointments, as they had all been made in the public interest and in accordance with the general instructions-on the subject.\n\nReferring to the provisions contained in Rule 6(3) of the impugned Rules regarding the exercise of option by officers willing to be absorbed on permanent basis in the ARC, it is submitted in the counter-affidavit that the said provision was equally applicable to direct recruits as well as the erstwhile deputationists.\n\nSince the temporary appointments of the direct recruits in the post of ACIO-II (Tech.) did not confer on them any right of confirmation and the ARC (Technical) Service was altogether a new service, the first respondent states that the petitioners were rightly asked to exercise their option in terms of Rule 6(3).\n\nDealing with the attack levelled by the petitioners against the validity of Rule 6(6), it is pointed out in the counter-affidavit that the spirit and content of the rule is that persons who were holding higher posts on the crucial date and were considered suitable for permanent appointment in the said posts but could not be appointed substantively to such posts for want of vacancies, may be given permanent posts in the ower grade. It is pointed out in the counterafliidavit that the said rule was applicable to direct recruits as well as to the deputationists and that, as a matter of fact, some of the petitioners got the benefit of this rule inasmuch as they were\n\nappointed substantively in the grade of DFO(T) with effect from April 26, 1976, while they are holding posts of FO(T) on the said date.\n\nThe charge of discrimination levelled by the petitioners is, therefore, denied by the first respondent as being devoid of any foundation.\n\nWith reference to the grievance put forward by the petitioners that they were denied an opportunity to represent their case before the Screening Committee, it is submitted by the first respondent that under the scheme of the impugned Rules, the Screening Committee was not expected to entertain any representations from any quarter and, in fact, no representations were received. The Committee had acted strictly in accordance with the provisions contained in the Rules in determining the suitability of the persons concerned for absorption in the new Department and the principles of natural justice have no applicability in such a context. The allegation of ma/a fides put forward by the petitioners has been stoutly denied by the first respondent. After the seniority list was prepared by the Screening Committee in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 6(2) read with Rule 7 of the impugned Rules, certain formalities had to be gone through before orders regarding sub stantive appointments of the officers to the various grades could be issued. It was only . after the issue of substantive appointment orders to persons who had opted for absorption into the service, that the Department could publish the seniority list. The formalities aforementioned included obtaining the options from all the employees, getting the approval of the parent departments of the erstwhile deputationists for their permanent absorption in the ARC Service, medical examination of employees, etc.\n\nIt was on account of the delay involved for completing the said procedure that the seniority list could be finally published only on November 6, 1978.\n\nThe counter-affidavit proceeds to state that promotions in the Department were effected in the meantime strictly on the basis of the seriority list of officers recommended for absorption which the Screening Committee had prepared. It is further pleaded by the first respondent that no illegality whatever was involved in adopting the principle of reckoning the seniority in a paricular post on the basis of total length of continuous service put in by the concerned officers in the particular grade in the ARC or in the equivalent grade in the parent department. The said rule was framed keeping in view the special requirements of the new Department. If the deputationists had not been given the benefit of the service put in by them in the equivalent grade in their parent departments, they\n\nT , .\n\n--- ._,..\n\nwould have all opted for their reversion to their parent departments A and that would have resulted in:complete dislocation of the functioning in the ARC. The first respondent states that !in formulating or applying the seniority rule there has not been any arbitrary dis- . crimination as between direct recruits and deputationists and hence neither the rules nor the seniority list can be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nDealing with the contention put forward by the petitioners on the basis of article 26 of the Civil Service Regulations, it is sub~ mitted by the first respondeut that the said article, which deals with appointments by transfer \"in accordance with a provision in the Recruitment Rules providing for such transfers\" had no applicability at all in the matter of taking persons on deputation to the ARC when it was a purely temporary Department which had no Recruitment Rules.\n\nThe subsequent absorption of such deputationists andother categories of employees has been done strictly in accordance with the provisions contained in the impugned Rules which are statutory. in origin.\n\nIn the absence of any Recruitment Rules, there was no legal bar whatever preventing the competent authority from borrowing persons from other departments on deputation basis to man the various posts in the ARC during the period prior to the introduction of the impugned Rules with effect from April 26,\n\n1976. The former deputationists had occupied a larger percentage of the higher posts during the aforesaid period because they had put in more years of service in different grades and had much greater experience in carrying out the functions which were of a highly specialised nature when compared to the direct recruits whose induction in the ARC started only from 1965.\n\nOn the basis of the aforesaid averments cont11ined in his F counter-affidavit, the first respondent has submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this writ petition and that the petition should be dismissed.\n\nIn the separate counter-affidavit filed on bd1alf of respondents 13, 16, 22 etc., they have put forward more or less the same contentions in defence of the writ petition as have been taken by the first respondent.\n\nFrom the averments contained in counteraffidavit of the first\n\nrespondent and the documents produced before us, it is seen that U the Aviation Research Centre was a temporary and ad hoc Organisation set up late in 1962, on an emergency basis, when the country\n\nwas threatened with the Chinese agression for carrying out the work of collecting intelligence by the use of highly sophisticated techniques. For manning this Task Force, persons with experience in the specialised nature of the work were taken on deputation basis from different sources, such as the Intelligence Bureau, the Departments of Defence Science, Wireless Panning and Coordination, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation and the Police\n\nof different States and they were grouped together to form the ARC.\n\nSubsequently, to supplement the man power, some persons were also directly recruited to the Organisation on a purely ad hoc basis. The ARC Organisation was initially treated as an extension of the intelligence Bureau. In February 1965, it was brought under the control of the Director General of Security. The administrative control over the Organisation which was originally vested in the Ministry of External Affairs and later with the Prime Minister's Secretariat was transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat in 1965. The sanction for continuance of the temporary Organisation was accorded by the Government from year to year till the year 1971 when decision was taken by the Government to make the ARC a permanent Department.\n\nBut, the finalisation of the principles to be adopted for constitution of the new permanent Department took considerable time and it was only on April 26, 1976 that the President of India promulagated the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service Rules providing for the constitution 0f a new service to be known as Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service and laying down the principles regulating the method of recruitment to the various posts in the said Service. Till 1976, there was no regularly constituted cadre of posts in the temporary ARC Organisation and there were also no rules or even executive orders laying down any principles regulating the method of appointment to the various posts in the Organisation.\n\nClause 6 of the impugned Rules deals with the initial constitution of the new ARC permanent Service. That clause is in the following terms :\n\n\"6. Initial Constitution-\n\n(1) All persons holding, as on the appointed day, any one of the categories of posts specified in rule 4, whether in a permanent or temporary or off.ciating capacity or on deputation basis, shall be eligible for appointment to the service at the initialconstitution thereof.\n\nT ,-\n\n-~--i\n\n(2) The controlling authority shall constitute a Screening\n\nCommittee in respect of each grade for adjudging the suitability of persons, who, being eligible to be appointed to the service under sub-rule (I) were serving in any grade immediately before the initial constitution of the cadre for permanent appointment therein and every committee so constituted shall, subject to such general or special instructions as the controlling authority may give and after following such procedure as the committee may deem fit, prepare lists of persons considered suitable for such appointment in each grade with the names of such persons arranged in the order of seniority based on the date of continuous appointment in the grade in which they are to be absorbed or in an equivalent grade;\n\nProvided that if the controlling authority deems it necessary so to do, the same committee may be constituted to function in relation to two or more grades.\n\n(3) An intimation shall be sent to every person considered suitable for appointment on a permanent basis to a post in any grade giving him an opportunity to express, within thirty days of the receipt of intimation by him his willingness to be so appointed on a permanent basis and the option once exercised shall be final.\n\n(4) Persons who are willing to be appointed on a permanent basis shall be so appointed in the order of seniority against permanent posts available as on the appointed day.\n\n(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in subrules (2) to (4), every person holding, as on the appointed day, a permanent post in any one of the categories specified in rule 4 in the Aviation Research Centre shall, without prejudice to his being considered for appointment to a permanent post in the higher grade or to his continuance in such higher grade in officiating or temporary capacity, be absorbed in his respective substantive grade against the permanent posts available as on the appointed day.\n\n(6) The Screening Committee may recommend for permanent appointment in a lower grade any person who\n\n898 SUPREME COlTRT REPORTS\n\n(1981] 3 S.C.R,\n\nis serving in a higher grade irrespective of whether he is deputationist or a direct recruit and every appointment made on such recommendation shall be without prejudice to his continuing to serve in the higher grade.\n\n(7) Persons holding posts, as on the appointed day, in any grade of the service who are not found suitable for permanent appointment under sub-rules (2) to (6), may be continued in posts in the same grade of the service in a temporary or officiating capacity as the case may be.\"\n\nRule 7 lays down the principles to be applied for fixation of seniority of those appointed to the various posts in the ARC at the time of its initial constitution. That rule reads :\n\n\"7. Seniority of persons appointed on permanent basis in each grade at the initial constitution of the service shall be in the order in which they are shown in the relevant list prepared in accordance with provisions of rule 6.\"\n\nThe next rule under challenge by the petitioners is Rule 8 which deals with the topic of filling up of vacancies in various grades remaining unfilled immediately after the initial constitution of the service and all vacancies that may subsequently arise in the Department. That rule is in the following terms :\n\n\"8. Maintenance-\n\n(!) Subject to the initial Constitution of the various grades in the service, every post remaining unfilled and every vacancy that may arise thereafter shall be filled in accordance with the provisions contained in Schedule II, by appointment on promotion, deputation/ transfer, re-employment after retirement or direct recruitment as the case may be.\n\n(2) For a period not exceeding three years from the date of commencement of these rules, notwithstanding the limits specified in column 7 of Schedule II, the controlling authority may, if it considers it necessary so to do, exceed the percentage specified for filling up of vacancies by deputation and decrease the percentage\n\n'T }\n\nprescribed for filling up of vacancies by promotion, A direct recruitment of re-employment after retirement, as it may deem fit.\"\n\nThe only other rule which requires to be referred to for the purpose of the present case is Rule 12 which states that \"in regard to matters not specifically covered by these rules or by orders issued by the B Government, members of the service shall be governed by general rules, regulations and orders applicable to persons belonging to the corresponding Central Civil Service\".\n\nThe petitioners are some amongst the persons recruited directly to the ARC Organisation during the period between 1965 and 1971. The basic premise on which the petitioners have rested their challenge against the validity of the promotions given to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 from the year 1968 onwards as well as of the provisions contained in the impugned Rules is that they (petitioners) had all been regularly appointed to the ARC at the time of their initial appointment itself and that by virtue of.such regular appointments, they had acquired vested rights for seniority, promotions etc .. in the said Organisation.\n\nAs already noticed, during the period between 1965 and 1971, the ARC Organisation was a purely temporary one, the continuance of which, on an experimental basis, was being sanctioned from year to year.\n\nThere was no regular cadre of i: osts in the Organisation nor was there any set of rules regulating the method of appointment to the various posts that had created on a mere temporary and ad hoc basis.\n\nAnnexure 'R'-1• produced along with the first respondent's counter-affidavit is a copy of the Jetter issued by the Directorate General of Security to one of the petitioners, communicating the offer of appointment to the temporary post of ACI0-11 (Tech.).\n\nIt was on the basis of the acceptance of that offer by the said petitioner that he was appointed in the Department of ARC. It is stated in the counter-affidavit of the first respondent that the appointments of all the remaining writ-petitioners to the cadre of ACI0-11 (DFO) were made on identical terms and this averment has not been controverted by the petitioners.\n\nIt is expressly recited in Ex. R-1 that what was being offered thereunder was a temporary appointment to a temporary post and that the perm anent appointment of the person concerned to the post, if and when the post was made permanent, would depend upon various factors governing permanent appointment in such posts in force at the time, and that the temporary appointment will not\n\nconfer on him the title of permanency from the date the post is converted. It is further stipulated in the letter that the appointment was liable to be terminated at any time by a notice given by either side, namely, the appointee or the appointing authority without assigning any reason. There is also a further condition that the services of the appointee were liable to be terminated within a period of six months from the date of his appointment without any notice and without any reason being assigned. Since the petitioners are shown to have been appointed to the cadre of ACIO-II on the aforementioned conditions, it is difficult to see how they can successfully contend that they had been regularly appointed to the ARC . with effect from the dates of their initial recruitment. They were holding merely ad hoc appointments which did not confer on them any entitlement for permanent absorption in the posts if and when the posts were made permanent.\n\nThe basic premise on which the petitioners have sought to build up their case of arbitrariness and discriminations, namely, that the petitioners had all been initially recruited directly to the ARC on a regular basis while the deputationists were holding posts only on ad hoc basis, is thus seen to be contrary to facts. The correct position which obtained as on the date of the promulgation of the impugned Rules was that the petitioners as well as the deputationists were all working in the temporary ARC Organisation only on a purely ad hoc basis. It is against this factual background that we have to examine the contentions put forward by the petitioners in support of the challenge levelled by them against the impugned Rules as well as against the seniority list of 1968 and the various promotions given to respondents Nos. 8 to 67.\n\nAt this stage, it will be convenient to first dispose of the contentions urged by the petitioners, against the validity of the promotions given to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 during the period between 1968 and 1975. In our opinion, the challenge raised by the petitioners against those promotions is liable to be rejected on the preliminary ground that it is most highly belated.\n\nNo valid explanation is forthcoming from the petitioners as to why they did not approach this Court within a reasonable time after those promotions were made, in case they really did feel aggrieved by the said action of the Department. This writ petition has been filed only in the year 1979, and after such a long lapse of time the petitioners cannot be permitted to assail before this Court the promotions that were effected during the years 1968 to 1975.\n\nA party seeking the intervention and aid of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of his fundamental rights,\n\n-----·\n\nshould exercise due diligence and approach this Court within a A reasonable time after the cause of action arises and if there has been undue delay or !aches on his part, this Court has the undoubted discretion to deny him relief. [See Rabindra Nath Bose & Ors v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors.(1)]\n\nIn this case before us, many of the impugned promotions had been effected during the year 1968-69 onwards. Three of the present petitioners had challenged the validity of some of the promotions granted to various deputationists as well as the ranking given to them in a seniority list of ARC personnel published in 1971 by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 1020 of 1971 in the Delhi High Court.\n\nThough the High Court by its judgment dated April 7, 1972 dismissed that writ petition on the ground that it was premature inasmuch as it had been submitted before it by the counsel for the Union of India that all the existing arrangements in the ARC were purely ad hoc and that service rules would be framed shortly, the High Court has recorded clear findings in the judgment that the principle adopted for the preparation of the combined seniority list of 1971 could not be said to have violated Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution and that it had not been shown by the writ-petitoners in that case that the impugned promotions had been effected in violation of any \"statutory rules, constitutional or statutory limitations or even administrative\n\ninstructions\".\n\nIf the petitioners were dissatisfied with the aforementioned findings entered by the Delhi High Court, one should have expected them to approach this Court at least soon after that decision was rendered by that High Court in April 1972-we are not suggesting that the findings of the High Court operate as res judicta against the petitioners in these proceedings. There is no satisfactory explanation forthcoming from the petitioners as to why no action at all was taken by them to challenge the validity of the impugned promotions given to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 from 1968 onwards for a p.eriod of nearly seven years subsequent to the aforesaid pronouncement by the Delhi High Court.\n\nQuite apart from what has been stated above on the aspect of '!aches', on the merits also we do not find any substance in the contentions urged by the petitioners against the legality of the promotions granted to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 during the period between 1968 and 1975. At that time, as already, noticed, the ARC was a\n\n(!) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 697.\n\npurely temporary Organisation which was being continued on a year to year basis. There was no regular cadre of posts in the said Organisation, nor were there any rules governing the mode of recruitment etc.\n\nAll the appointments made in the Organisation, whether of direct recruits like the petitioners or of deputationists like respondents Nos. 8 to 67, had been made only on an ad hoc basis.\n\nSince there was no regularly constituted service, the principles contained in the Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Annexure 'C'), on which strong reliance was placed by the petitioners, could have no application at all to the temporary ARC Organisation. It is clear from a reading of the said Memorandum (Annexure 'C') that its provisions will get attracted only in relation to Government servants appointed to the Central Services.\n\nDuring the period aforementioned, the ARC was just a Task Force set up on an ad hoc and experimental basis for the purpose of carrying out certain functions of a highly specialised and sensitive nature. Quite naturally, the personnel required for manning the Organisation had to be picked and grouped together in the manner best suited to effectuate the object and purpose underlying the creation of the Organisation. So long as there was no regular cadre and hierarchy of posts and no rules laying down the mode of appointment/promotion to those posts it was perfectly open to the Government to fill up the posts by securing the services of persons who, in its opinion, were, by virtue of their experience and qualifications, best suited for being entrusted with the specialised kinds of functions attached to the various posts.\n\nWe have already seen that the petitioners had been appointed as ACIOs-II (DFOs) only on a temporary and ad hoc basis. Such appointments did not confer on them any rights even to the posts of DFOs. It had also been categorically made clear to them in the letters containing the offers of appointment that such appointments will not confer on them any right to the permanently absorbed in the post if and when it was made permanent. There was also not even any executive order or administrative instruction declaring the post of DFO as the feeder category for appointment to the higher posts. In such circumstances, it has to be held that the petitioners had no legal right or claim for being appointed by promotion to the higher posts of ACI0-1 (FO), ATO, etc.\n\nIt has been averred in the counter-affidavit that as and when vacancies arose in the higher posts of FO, ATO, etc, in the tern-\n\n-'T-'\n\nporary ARC Organisation in the early years after its formation, deputationists who, by virtue of their greater experience in the particular type of specialised work, were considered suitable for carrying out the duties attached to those posts on deputation basis to the category of FO, ATO, etc. Subsequently, after the direct recruits had gained sufficient experience, sonie of them who were found suitable, were also appointed as ACIOs-1, ATOs, etc. No illegality of any kind was involved in the action so taken by the concerned authorities to fill up the vacancies in the higher posts by ad hoc appointments of persons possessing the requisite ability and experience.\n\nWe have, therefore, no hesitation to reject the contention put forward by the petitioners that the promotions granted to respondents Nos. 8 to 67 during the period between 1968 and 1975 were illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nWe shall now proceed to deal with the challenge raised by the petitioners against the provisions contained in the impugned rules.\n\nIt is under Rule 3 of the Rules that the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service was constituted for the first time. The composition of the service has been described in Rule 4, wherein the designations, classifications and scales of pay of the various posts included in the Service have been set out.\n\nRule 6 provides for the initial constitution of the Service. The petitioners have challenged the validity of sub-rule (1) of this Rule which declares that all persons holding, as on the appointed day, any one of the categories of posts specified in Rule 4, whether in a permanent or temporary or officiating capacity or on deputation basis, shall be eligible for apointment to the service at the initial constitution thereof.\n\nWhen a new service is proposed to be constituted by the Government, it is fully within the competence of the Government to decide as a matter of policy the sources from which the personnel required for manning the Service are to be drawn. It is in the exercise of the said power vested in the Government, that provision has been made by sub-rule (I) that all the persons who, as on the appointed day were already working in the ARC Organisation on a temporary and ad hoc basis and had thereby acquired valuable experience in the specialised kinds of work would be eligible for appointment to the new service at the stage of its initial constitution. The writ-petitioners as well as the deputationists, namely, respondents Nos. 8 to 67 were all functioning in the temporary ARC Organisation on an ad hoc basis. Equal opportunity was given to all of them by subrule (I) of Rule 6 to get permanently appointed in the new ARC\n\n(Technical) Service subject to their being found fit by the Screening Committee referred to in the sub-rule (2).\n\nWe fail to see how the said provision can be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The attack levelled by the petitioners against sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 is thus manifestly devoid of merit.\n\nThe next contention urged by the petitioners is that sub-rule\n\n(2) of Rule 6 confers arbitrary and uncanalised powers on the Screening Committee and is hence violative of the principles of equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution.\n\nAnother point urged is that the said sub-rule in so far as it provides that the Screening Committee should discharge its functions subject to such general or special instructions as the controlling authority may give, confers an arbitrary and unlimited power on the controlling authority and enables the controlling authority to impose its will and whims on the Screening Committee.\n\nWe see no force in either of the aforesaid contentions. The provision for constitutfon of a Screening Committee for adjudging the suitability of the persons in the field of eligibility for permanent appointment to the service is absolutely reasonable. The power conferred on the controlling authority to issue general or special instructions to a Screening Committee is really in the nature of a safeguard for ensuring that the rules relating to the initial constitution of the service were applied fairly and justly.\n\nThe 'controlling authority' is the \"Secretary, Department of Cabinet Affairs\". When supervisory powers are entrusted to such a high and responsible official, it is reasonable to assume that they will be exercised fairly and judiciously and not arbitrarily. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the petitioners that the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 suffer from the vice of the arbitrariness or excessive delegation.\n\nThe petitioners have also attacked the provisions contained in sub-Rule (2) of Rule 6 enjoining the Screening Committee to arrange the names of persons considered suitable for appointment in each grade in the order of seniority based on the date of continuous appointment in the grade in which they were absorbed or in an equivalent grade. We have already found that the basic assumption on which the petitioners have founded the attack against this provision, namely, that the petitioners were all holding regular appointments as DFOs in the ARC Organisation from the dates of their initial recruitment and that the deputationists (respondents Nos. 8 to 67) were functioning in their respective posts only on an ad hoc basis is incorrect and fallacious.\n\nAs on the date of the promulgation of the rules and the initial constitution of the ARC. (Technical) Service,\n\n_, '-,..\n\npetitioners as well as respondents Nos. 8 to 67 were all holding the various posts in the ARC Organisation only on a temporary and ad hoc basis. While the petitioners had no substantive lien in respect of or title to any post in any department, the deputationists were having a lien on the posts held by them in their parent departments. The petitioners, therefore, formed a different class consisting of persons who were virtually being recruited for the first time into regular Government service, as distinct from the respondents 8 to 67 who had been holding posts in their parent departments for several years on the regular basis who formed a separate class.\n\nWhen recruitment to the new Service was being made from two different classes of sources, it was necessary for the Government to evolve a fair and reasonable principle for regulating the inter se seniority of the personnel appointed to a new Department.\n\nWhat has been done under Rule 6 is to give credit to the full length of continuous service put in by all the appointees in the concerned grade, whether such service was rendered in the temp:irar y A RC Organisation or in other departments of the G1vernment. The criterion applied, namely the quantum of previous experience possessed by the appointees measured in terms of the length of continuous service put in by them in the concerned or equivale.1t grade is perfectly relevant to the purpose underlying the framing of the rule.\n\nIn our opinion, the aforesaid principle laid down ir1 rule 6(2) for determination of inter se seniority was quite reasonable and fair and it did not involve any arbitrary or unfair discrimination against the petitioners. The attack levelled by the petitio:ier> aJain>t the said provision contained in sub-rule (2) will, therefore, stand repelled.\n\nIn the light of what we have stated above, the prov1s10n contained in rule 7 that the seniority of persons appointed on permanent basis in each grade at the initial constitution of the service shall be in the order in which they are shown in the relevant list prepared by the Screening Committee in accordance with provisions of Rule 6 has also to be upheld as perfectly valid and constitutional.\n\nWe see no substance at all in the challenge raised by the petitioners against Rule 8 of the impugned rules and the provisions of Schedule II.\n\nUnder the said rule, the appointing authority is\n\nempowered to fill up every post remaining unfilled immediately after H the initial constitution of the various grades in the service as well as\n\nevery vacancy that subsequently arises by making appointments on promotion, deputation/transfer, re-employment after retirement or direct recruitment, in accordance with the provisions contained in Schedule II. At the time of constituting a new service and laying down the mode of appointment to the various posts, it was fully within the powers of the President of India to prescribe the methods by which vacancies arising in the different categories of posts in the department should be filled up and this is prescisely what has been done as per rule 8 and the provisions of Schedule II.\n\nThe petitioners have not been able to make out that the provisions of Rule 8 and Schedule II are tainted by illegality of any kind.\n\n•The next point urged by the petitioners is that the Screening Committee had acted in violation of the principles of natural justice in. as much as it had not afforded to the petitioners an opportunity to make their representations before the Committee.\n\nThe function entrusted to the Committee was to adjudge the suitability of person who were holding posts in the different grades in the temporary ARC Organisation for permanent appointment in the newely constituted ARC (Technical) Service on the basis of the records relating to their past performance in ARC Organisation, etc.\n\nWe do not see how the principles of natural justice can get attracted in such a context. The law does not cast any obligation on a Committee discharging such a function to invite representations from the persons in the eligible categories and consider those representations while adjudging their suitability for appointment into the new service.\n\nHence we do not find any substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that there was a violation of principles of natural justice by the Screening Committee.\n\nThe petitioners have put forward a further plea that the promulgation of the impugned rules was deliberately delayed till April 1976 with a view to confer an unfair advantage on the deputationists, several of whom were granted promotions to higher posts during the period between 1971 when the decision to make the department permanent was taken and April 26, 1976 when the impugned rules were finally issued. We find it stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent that the draft rules were prepared by the Directorate of ARC and submitted to the Government in 1972 itself, but, on a detailed scrutiny being made, it was found that the\n\n-•.........--\n\nsaid draft required substantial modification in several respects.\n\nRevised rules were, therefore, drafted and submitted to the government late in 1974. The first respodent has submitted that the time taken in finalisillg the rules was due to the fact that intensive examination of all the relevant aspects had to be done by various concerned Ministries before the draft rules could be finally approved and issued.\n\nWe are inclined to accept the explanation offered by the first respondent for the delay in promulgation of the Rules, and we hold that the plea of ma/a fides put forward by the petitioners is not established.\n\nAll the promotions given to the deputationists as well as to the direct recruits during the period between 1968 and 1976 had been effected only on a purely ad hoc basis. Even though temporary in character, those promotions had been made only on the basis of the recommendations made by the Departmental Promotion Committee which had effected the selections by applying uniform and relevant considerations, such as length of service in the lower grade and over-all experience and performance. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that, while making -such promotions for appointments to higher posts, no deputationists with' lesser years of service vis-a-vis direct recruits had been given ad hoc apponitment to any higher post. The first respondent has submitted that in making the promotions aforementioned, the auhtorities concerned were actuated only by considerations of the best interests of the department and the maintenance of a higher standard of efficiency in its function and there was no intention whatever to confer any ad vantage to the deputationists or to discriminate against the direct recruits.\n\nWe do not find any ground for not accepting as correct and true the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the first respondent.\n\nAccordingly we hold that in granting promotions to the deputationists during the period between 1971 and 1975 respondents 1 to 5 were not actuated by any intention to confer an unfair advantage on the deputationists.\n\nAnother argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that at the time of their initial appointment in the ARC, they had been given high expectations regarding their promotional prospects from the post of DFO, and that by bringing in large number of deputationists and fitting them into the higher posts, the Government had illegally gone back on the promise held out to the petitioners.\n\nWe see no merit in this contention. As already noticed, in the letters\n\nsent to the petitioners offering appointment to the category of ACI0- 11 (DFO), it had been made abundantly clear that their appointments would be purely temporary and ad hoc in nature and would not confer on them any claim for permanent absorption even in the post of DFO. No subsquent representation is shown to have been made to the petitioners by the Department at any time prior to 1976 holding out any prospects of Department permanent absorption in service or promotions to higher grades. The petitioners continued to function in the ARC Organisation only on ad hoc basis till the rules were promulgated and they were absorbed into the new ARC (Technical) Service at the stage of its initial constitution on the basis of the provisions contained in Rules 3 and 6. It is significant to note in this context that it was only after the petitioners had seen the impugned rules and had gained full knowledge of the provisions contained therein relating to absorption and seniority in the department, that they opted for absorption in the service in accordance with those rules and it was on the basis of the options so exercised by them that they were appointed in the new constituted service.\n\nThe petitioners have also put forward a case that despite the provision contained in rule 6 (3) there was, as a matter of fact, no adjudgment of the suitability of the various officers by the Screening Committee and, instead, there was a wholesale absorption of all the personnel in the posts which they were holding in the ARC Organisation as on April 26, 1976. This allegation has been strongly refuted in the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent wherein it has been stated that the Screening Committee has examined individually the cases of all the concerned officers before deciding about their suitability for permanent absorption in the service and prepared ranked lists strictly in accordance with the principle laid down in Rule 6 (2).\n\nTJ-, e learned Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, submitted before us that the files containing the minutes of the meetings of the Screening Committee and the ranked select lists prepared by the Committee for the different grdes were available with him in Court and he offered to place them before us for our perusal. In the circumstances, we see no reason not to accept as correct the aforesaid averments contained in the counter- _ affidavit of the first respondent. It then follows that this contention of the petitioners has also to fail.\n\nAnother point urged on behalf of the petitioners was that some of the deputationists were not holding in their parent departments posts equivalent in rank to those in which they were appointed on deputation in the ARC Organisation and such persons should not have been subsequently absorbed in the new ARC Service Jn those higher categories.\n\nWe are unable to uphold this contention.\n\nAt the time when the ARC was a mere temporary Organisation without any recruitment rules the posts in that Organisation could be filleq up by appointing suitable hands possessing the requisite specialised skill and experience drawn from any source irrespect of whatever was the position occupied by such appointees in their parent service, if any.\n\nLikewise, at the stage of the initial constitution of the new ARC (Technical) ervice the Government had the right and full freedom to decide from what all sources the personnel for the new Department should be drawn and there is no warrant in law for imposing a !imitation that in taking persons from other departments the field of choice should be restricted to persons holding any particular ranks in those other departments. The relevant consideration for appointment of personnel in a department of this nature has. necessarily to be the suitability of the person concerned for the specialised type of the work for adjudging which the experience and expertise that he possesses in carrying out such functions would be the most relevant criterion. Once appointments are made to the various grades in the new service the inter se seniority of the persons appointed in each category or grade is to be fixed under Rule 6 on the basis of the total length of service 'in the particular or equivalent Grade and this, in our opinion, is a perfectly reasonable principle.\n\nThe argument advanced by the petitioners that the semonty of the deputationists who have been absorbed into the ARC (Technical) Service is governed by the provisions of Article 26 (7)\n\n(iii) of the Civil Service Regulations is wholly devoid of merit.\n\nArticle 26 (7) (iii) applies to cases \"where a person is appointed by transfer in accordance with a provision in the recruitment rules providing for such transfer in the event of non-availability of candidates by direct recruitment or promotion\". The absorption of the erstwhile deputationists in the ARC (Technical) Servic~ at the time of its initial constitution was not by such transfer and hence the provisions of Article 26 (7) (iii) are not attracted .\n\nWe do not also see any merit in the argument put forward on H behalf of the petitioners that sub-rule (6) of Rule 6 of the impugned\n\nSUPREME COURT REFORTS [1981] 3 s.c.R,\n\nRules enables the Screening Committee to absorb in a lower grade such of the deputationists who were found unsuitable to be absorbed in the higher posts which they were holding as on April 26, 1976.\n\nFirstly, this is not a provision applicable only to the erstwhile deputationists. On the other hand, the sub-rule itself makes it very clear that its provisions apply equally to all the persons who are eligible for absorption in the service under sub-rule (1) irrespective of whether they are deputationists or direct recruits.\n\nSub-rule (6) comes into operation when a person in the eligible category holding a post in a higher grade ()n the appointed day, who has been found suitable for permanent appointment in such higher grade cannot, however, be absorbed in the said grade on account of non-availability 0' a vacancy therein. What the sub-rule lays oown is that in such eventuality the Screening Committee may recommend such a person for permanent appointment in a lower grade and thereby retain his services in the new Department.\n\nWe fail to see how this provision can be said to infringe any of the fund amen ta! rights of the petitioners.\n\nLastly, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that in preparing the impugned seniority list dated November 6, 1978, the principles laid down in Rule 6 (3) and Rule 7 have not been correctly observed, and that by reason of the deviation from those principles, the promotional prospects of some of the petitioners have been adversely affected.\n\nNo concrete instance of any such deviation from the principles set out in Rule 6 (3) and Rule 7 has been brought to our notice.\n\nAll the same, we think it necessary to observe that this Court exi:ects that the provisions of Rule 6 (3) and Rule 7 will be strictly conformed to, both , in letter as well as in spirit, by respondents Nos. I to 7, and that in case it is found on examination that the ranking assigned to any of the petitioners in the impugned seniority list dated November 6, 1978 is not consistent with the principles laid down in the aforementioned rule, necessary action should be immediately taken to rectify the said defect, and if the promotional chances of any of the petitioners have been adversely affected by reason of such defect in the seniority list, such promotions should also be reviewed after following the requisite procedure.\n\nWe direct that the petitioners may bring to the notice of the first respondent specific instances, if any, of deviation from the principles enunciated in Rule 6 (3) and Rule 7 resulting in incorrect assignment of seniority and rank to them by submitting representations before the first respondent within a period of six weeks from today. In\n\nS.S. MOGHE v. UNION OF INDIA (B; i/akrishna Eradi, J.) 911\n\ncase any such representations are received, they will be duly examined A by the first respondent and appropriate orders will be passed thereon in the manner indicated above as expeditiously as possible.\n\nSubject to the above observations and directions, we dismiss this writ petition. The parties will bear their respective costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "S.S. MOGHE & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.S. MOGHE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 8, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., A.P. SEN AND\n\nV. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 16, 32 and 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 760, "end_char": 779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Service Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 817, "end_char": 842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 26(7)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 844, "end_char": 862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Service Regulations", "statute": "Civil Service Regulations"}}, {"text": "ARC", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1522, "end_char": 1525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For manning this Task Force, persons with experience in the specialised nature of the work were taken on deputation basis from different sources, such as the Intelligence Bureau, the Departments of Defence Science, Wireless Planning 'and Coordination, the Directorate-General of Civil Aviation and the Police Cadres of different States and they were grouped together to form the ARC."}}, {"text": "ARC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1647, "end_char": 1650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ARC\n\nOrganisation was initially treated as an extension of the Intelligence Bureau."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Exterml Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1903, "end_char": 1930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The administrative control over the Organisation which was originally vested in the Ministry of Exterml Affairs and later with the Prime Minister's Secretariat was transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat in 1965."}}, {"text": "Cabinet Secretariat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2002, "end_char": 2021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The administrative control over the Organisation which was originally vested in the Ministry of Exterml Affairs and later with the Prime Minister's Secretariat was transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat in 1965."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2382, "end_char": 2396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The finalisation of the principles to be adopted for constitution of the new permanent Department took considerable time and it was only on April 26, 1976 that the President of India promulgated the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service Rules 1976 providing for the constitution of a new service the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2419, "end_char": 2424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The finalisation of the principles to be adopted for constitution of the new permanent Department took considerable time and it was only on April 26, 1976 that the President of India promulgated the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service Rules 1976 providing for the constitution of a new service the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service."}}, {"text": "Service Rules 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2478, "end_char": 2496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Civil Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 12 provided that in regard to matters not specifically covered by the rules or by order issued by the Government, the members of the service shall be governed by general rules, regulations and orders applicable to persons belonging to the corresponding Central Civil Service."}}, {"text": "ARC Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, who were persons recruited directly to the ARC Organisation during the period between 1965 and 1971 challenged in their writ petition, the validity of the promotion given to respondent nos."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5812, "end_char": 5823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 6, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6374, "end_char": 6390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further contended that the positiOn of the deputationists being that of persons permanently transferred from the parent departments to the ARC, under Article 26 of the Civil Service Regulations, such persons appointed by transfer shall be ranked below all the direct recruits as well as the promotees already functioning in the Department and the seniority list dated November 6, 1978 having been drawn up in contravention of the aforesaid principle laid down in Article 26, the said list should be declared to be illegal and void."}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8001, "end_char": 8019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1970) 2 S.C.R. 697", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9405, "end_char": 9424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14717, "end_char": 14728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 26(7)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15382, "end_char": 15400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 26(7)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15823, "end_char": 15841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16977, "end_char": 16987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 17016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17019, "end_char": 17034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nB V.M. Tarkunde, G.L. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashree Wad, G.D. Gupta\n\nand Miss Anita for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17036, "end_char": 17047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nB V.M. Tarkunde, G.L. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashree Wad, G.D. Gupta\n\nand Miss Anita for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Jayashree Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17054, "end_char": 17067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nB V.M. Tarkunde, G.L. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashree Wad, G.D. Gupta\n\nand Miss Anita for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "G.D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17069, "end_char": 17079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nB V.M. Tarkunde, G.L. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashree Wad, G.D. Gupta\n\nand Miss Anita for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Anita for the Petitioners.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17090, "end_char": 17116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nB V.M. Tarkunde, G.L. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashree Wad, G.D. Gupta\n\nand Miss Anita for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17118, "end_char": 17130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Solicitor General and Miss. A. Subhashini for Respondents 1-2 and 4·7."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17160, "end_char": 17173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Solicitor General and Miss. A. Subhashini for Respondents 1-2 and 4·7."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17208, "end_char": 17218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chita/e, A.T.M. Sampath and P.N. Ramalingam for the other appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "A.T.M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17222, "end_char": 17236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chita/e, A.T.M. Sampath and P.N. Ramalingam for the other appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "P.N. Ramalingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17241, "end_char": 17256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chita/e, A.T.M. Sampath and P.N. Ramalingam for the other appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17339, "end_char": 17356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. In this petition filed under Article 32] of the Constitution, the petitioners-31 in number-who are all officers serving in the Aviation Research Centrej(for short, the 'ARC') have challenged the constitutionality of Rules 6 to 8 of the \"Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service Rules, 1976\" issued by the President of India under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, as also the legality and validity."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17390, "end_char": 17400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17635, "end_char": 17654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17710, "end_char": 17721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Service Rules, 1976", "statute": "Service Rules, 1976"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18395, "end_char": 18409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 7 the Union of India, the C'lbinet Secretary, the Director of Department of Personnel, the Director General of Security, the Director of ARC and the Adviser (Technical), A.R.C., respectively-to constitute the ARC afresh in accordance with law and to rearrange the seniority in the Service in conformity with law.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21381, "end_char": 21397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1020 of 1971-was\n\nfiled in the Delhi High Court by three of the present petitioners complaining against the promotions given to the deputationists and challenging the validity of the combined seniority list published by H the Department in 1971."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23222, "end_char": 23246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Strong reliance has been placed by the petitioners on Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Annexure 'C') laying down certain general principles for determining seniority of various categories of persons employed in Central Services."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24142, "end_char": 24158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners have sought to derive support from Annexure 'D' which is a letter dated October 15, 1971 addressed by the Department of Personnel, Cabinet Secretariat to the Director General of Security, wherein it is pointed out that persons appointed to a grade on deputation basis are appointed for a specific period, after the expiry of which they are required to revert back to their parent departments and since the said deputationists do not have any locus stand; in the borrowing departments, they are not entitled to\n\npromotions/confirmations in the borrowing departments."}}, {"text": "December 27, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26845, "end_char": 26862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners contend that the deputationists were serving in the A RC only on ad hoc basis and hence they were not eligible under the terms of the Memorandum dated December 27, 1959 (Annexure 'C') for the grant of any promotions in the borrowing department."}}, {"text": "September 8, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27552, "end_char": 27569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 4 made representations\n\ncomplaining against those promotions, but those representations were rejected by the Director, ARC by his Memorandum dated September 8, 1975 (Annexure 'E')."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27589, "end_char": 27605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 1, 1975, seven more deputationists were promoted as ATOs."}}, {"text": "ARC Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28325, "end_char": 28336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 to 67 in the ARC Service as TOs/ A TOs/FOs and thereby legalised all the illegal promotions granted to those deputationists."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28750, "end_char": 28768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29079, "end_char": 29090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29994, "end_char": 30012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31652, "end_char": 31662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32043, "end_char": 32061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 5, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33812, "end_char": 33828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 to 67 during the period from 1968 to 1978 were all illegal on the ground that these promotions had been made without considering the cases of the petitioners, the petitioners have put forward further plea that the publication of the impugned Seniority List was deliberately delayed by the Department till November 6, 1978, with intent to favour the deputationists, some of whom were promoted as ATOs on November 5, 1978."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34422, "end_char": 34441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners contend that this deviation from the principle uniformly followed for fixing the seniority in all other departments of the Government of India namely those laid down in the Home M nistry's Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 was wholly unjustified and."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34512, "end_char": 34529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners contend that this deviation from the principle uniformly followed for fixing the seniority in all other departments of the Government of India namely those laid down in the Home M nistry's Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 was wholly unjustified and."}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35541, "end_char": 35552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35688, "end_char": 35706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36089, "end_char": 36099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 26, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36341, "end_char": 36358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners contend that since the Seniority List dated November 26, 1978 has been drawn up in contravention of the aforesaid principle laid down in article 26, the said list should be declared to be illegal and void."}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36434, "end_char": 36444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Feburary !965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36944, "end_char": 36957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Feburary !"}}, {"text": "Ministry of External Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37334, "end_char": 37362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The administrative control over the ARC was originally vested in the Ministry of External Affairs and later with the Prime Minister's Secretariat till 1965 when it was transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat."}}, {"text": "ARC Organisation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39245, "end_char": 39261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Briefly sketching the history of the formation of the ARC, the first respondent has stated that the ARC Organisation was set up in the wake of Chinese aggression that took place in the winter of 1962 and its primary role was to collect intelligence by employing the most modern highly sophisticated techniques and to furnish it to other Agencies like the Special Frontier Force and the Special Security Bureau which were in need of such intelligence in order to give better protection to our borders against external aggression.", "canonical_name": "ARC Organisation"}}, {"text": "Department of Defence Science, Wireless Planning and Coordination and Directorate General of Civil Aviation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40126, "end_char": 40233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Initially, therefore, the various posts in the ARC Organisation, which was started on a mere experimental basis, were filled up by taking on deputation officers from the intelligence Bureau and other departments which had the expertise in related fields, such as, the Department of Defence Science, Wireless Planning and Coordination and Directorate General of Civil Aviation."}}, {"text": "MHA", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42293, "end_char": 42296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the petitioners' contentions based on the MHA Memorandum dated December 22, 1959, it is pointed out in the counter-affidavit that the general principles laid down therein ."}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42669, "end_char": 42688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "DPC", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45456, "end_char": 45459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation of the petitioners that the DPC had fixed the crucial date for eligibility for promotion from the category of ACIO-I to the grade of ATO in an arbitrary manner so as to exclude the petitioners from consideration, has been denied by the first respondent and it is averred that the crucial date was determined by the DPC on each occasion by taking into consideration the number of vacancies likely to be available for promotion/selection and the number of persons who could reasonably be considered for such pr0motions/selection."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49044, "end_char": 49054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49917, "end_char": 49935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ARC (Technical) Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50750, "end_char": 50773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation made by the petitioners that the framing of the rules and the constitution of the ARC (Technical) Service was deliberately delayed with a view to give u1:due advantage to the deputationists has been denied by the first respondent as baseless and untrue."}}, {"text": "ilakrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52541, "end_char": 52557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-\n\nS.S. MOGHE v. UNION OF INDIA (B:ilakrishna Eradi, J.) 893\n\nThe further plea put forward by the petitioners that Rule 6(2) of the impugned Rules suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of power has been stoutly denied by the first respondent.", "canonical_name": "ilakrishna Eradi"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58587, "end_char": 58605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58703, "end_char": 58713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 26,\n\n1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59599, "end_char": 59614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of any Recruitment Rules, there was no legal bar whatever preventing the competent authority from borrowing persons from other departments on deputation basis to man the various posts in the ARC during the period prior to the introduction of the impugned Rules with effect from April 26,\n\n1976."}}, {"text": "U the Aviation Research Centre", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60557, "end_char": 60587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the averments contained in counteraffidavit of the first\n\nrespondent and the documents produced before us, it is seen that U the Aviation Research Centre was a temporary and ad hoc Organisation set up late in 1962, on an emergency basis, when the country\n\nwas threatened with the Chinese agression for carrying out the work of collecting intelligence by the use of highly sophisticated techniques."}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62668, "end_char": 62676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66673, "end_char": 66684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66952, "end_char": 66963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ARC Organisation", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 68342, "end_char": 68358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already noticed, during the period between 1965 and 1971, the ARC Organisation was a purely temporary one, the continuance of which, on an experimental basis, was being sanctioned from year to year.", "canonical_name": "ARC Organisation"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72389, "end_char": 72399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 7, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73201, "end_char": 73214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the High Court by its judgment dated April 7, 1972 dismissed that writ petition on the ground that it was premature inasmuch as it had been submitted before it by the counsel for the Union of India that all the existing arrangements in the ARC were purely ad hoc and that service rules would be framed shortly, the High Court has recorded clear findings in the judgment that the principle adopted for the preparation of the combined seniority list of 1971 could not be said to have violated Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution and that it had not been shown by the writ-petitoners in that case that the impugned promotions had been effected in violation of any \"statutory rules, constitutional or statutory limitations or even administrative\n\ninstructions\"."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73347, "end_char": 73361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the High Court by its judgment dated April 7, 1972 dismissed that writ petition on the ground that it was premature inasmuch as it had been submitted before it by the counsel for the Union of India that all the existing arrangements in the ARC were purely ad hoc and that service rules would be framed shortly, the High Court has recorded clear findings in the judgment that the principle adopted for the preparation of the combined seniority list of 1971 could not be said to have violated Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution and that it had not been shown by the writ-petitoners in that case that the impugned promotions had been effected in violation of any \"statutory rules, constitutional or statutory limitations or even administrative\n\ninstructions\"."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 to 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73655, "end_char": 73672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R. 697", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 74945, "end_char": 74964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78461, "end_char": 78479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 78674, "end_char": 78718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is under Rule 3 of the Rules that the Aviation Research Centre (Technical) Service was constituted for the first time."}}, {"text": "ARC\n\n(Technical) Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 80286, "end_char": 80310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Equal opportunity was given to all of them by subrule (I) of Rule 6 to get permanently appointed in the new ARC\n\n(Technical) Service subject to their being found fit by the Screening Committee referred to in the sub-rule (2)."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80474, "end_char": 80492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80847, "end_char": 80857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ARC. (Technical) Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83064, "end_char": 83088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As on the date of the promulgation of the rules and the initial constitution of the ARC. ("}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85428, "end_char": 85439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85835, "end_char": 85846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86214, "end_char": 86225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86309, "end_char": 86320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95199, "end_char": 95209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95282, "end_char": 95292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95700, "end_char": 95710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REFORTS [1981] 3 s.c.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 95875, "end_char": 95911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not also see any merit in the argument put forward on H behalf of the petitioners that sub-rule (6) of Rule 6 of the impugned\n\nSUPREME COURT REFORTS [1981] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "akrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98653, "end_char": 98667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\n\nS.S. MOGHE v. UNION OF INDIA (B; i/akrishna Eradi, J.) 911\n\ncase any such representations are received, they will be duly examined A by the first respondent and appropriate orders will be passed thereon in the manner indicated above as expeditiously as possible.", "canonical_name": "ilakrishna Eradi"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 99010, "end_char": 99016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed"}}]}
{"document_id": "1981_3_92_136_EN", "year": 1981, "text": "LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC.\n\nv •\n\n. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.\n\nMarch 9, 1981\n\n[S.' MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A.D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nEssential Commodities Act 1955, S. 3 and Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966, Clause 8-Notification by Cane Commissioner-1mpo$ition of a ban for a month and half on operation of power crushers of Khandsari units in reserved area of mill- Va/idity of-Exemption in favour of vertical power crushers-Whether dicrimina tory and justified.\n\n, In' the State of Uttar Pradesh, sugarcane was produced by the sugarmills through the 'hydraulic process' and by the power crushers through the 'open pan process'. Both the mills as also the crushers drew their raw material, namely sugarcane from sugarcane growers. In order to facilitate production by the sugar mills, most of which were controlled by the State, reserved area of. the fields growing sugarcane was fixed through out the State.\n\nD With a view to removing nation-wide shortage of sugar, enhancing sugar production and achieving an equitable distribution of the commodity so as to make it available to consumers at reasonable rates, the Cane Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (8) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 issued a notification dated 9th October, 1980 which directed that no power crusher other than vertical power crushers manufacturing gur or rab from sugarcane grown on their own fields or a Khandsari unit or any agent of such E owner in the reserved area of a mill could be worked until December I, 1980.\n\nThe petitioners who were owners of power crushers of Khandsari units and had taken out regular licences under the Uttar Pradesh Khandsari Sugar Manufacturers Licensing Order 1967, assailed the notification which limited the ban to work power crushers for a period of one month and a half i.e. from October 9.\n\n1980 to December 1, 1980 in writ petitions to this Court.\n\nThey contended: (I) The notification, as also the Control Order under which it was passed are violative of Article J 9(1)(g) and the restrictions contained therein do not contain the quality of reasonableness. (2) Clause 8 of the Control Order under which the notification had been issued suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers and is, therefore, voilative of Article 14 of the Constitution. lhe Notification seeks to establish a monopoly in favour of the sugar mills at the cost of the petitioners, and must be struck down as being violative of Article 14.\n\n(3) There is no rational nexus between the prohibition contained in the Notification preventing the crushers of petitioners from working them and the object sought to be achieved by it. (4) Clause 8 of the Control Order does not contemplate a comolete prohibition of the production of an article but envisages only a regulation of the period of hours of working.\n\n(5) The Notification violates the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it was passed without hearing the petitioners whose rights were curtailed as they were put completely out of production. (6) The impugned Notification by imposing a prohibition against the working of the power crushers amounts to a partial revocation of the licences granted to the petitioners under clause 3 of the\n\nI I\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. V, U; P, STATE 93\n\nLicensing Order and is, therefore violative of clause 11. (7) The impugned Notification goes against the very spirit and object of the Act of 1955 and in fact, frustrates the equal distribution and production of sugar which was the objective of the Notification. ·\n\nOn behalf of the respondent-State it was submitted that : (l) An _order passed under clause 8 of the Control Order is of a legislative character and \"there fore the question of the application of the principles of natural justice, does not arise.\n\n(2) The notification does not violate Article 14 or Article 19 because it is in public interest and aimed at maintaining and securing proper and equitable distribution of sugar.\n\n(3) The Notification is justified by the fact that the recovery of sugar from sugarcane in case of Khandsari units run . by power crushers is between 4 to 6 per cent whereas in the case of sugar factories it ranges between 9-1/2 to 11-1/2 per cent, so that utilisation of sugarcane in the case of mills is double of that of the power crusher.\n\n(4) The Khandsari produced by the crushers has got a very narrow sphere of consumption as it is used mostly by halwais or villagers, whereas sugar produced .by the sugar mills is consumed in far larger quantities by the public. The action taken in order to protect national interest and distribution of sugar to. the entire country on .rational basis cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction.\n\n(5) There is a marked difference between the quality of Khandsari and that of sugar produced by the mills in their character, specification, etc. (6) The question of natural justice does not arise because the crusher owriers were fully aware of the situation and had also knowledge of the conside1ations which prevailed with the Government in stopping crushers for a short period in order to boost production by the sugar mills and fix support price for the sugarcane supplied to the mills.\n\n(7) Clause 8 of the Control Order uses the words 'period or working hours' which are wide enough to embrace within their ambit a fixed period of time covering more than a day as also hours of work on any working day.\n\nDismissing the writ petitions and appeals,\n\nHELD : The impugned Notification cannot be said to contain the quality of unreasonableness but is per se fair and reasonable. In so far as the word 'vertical' used in the Notification is concerned, it must be struck down as being '\n\nviolative of Article 14. This, however, does not. render the entire Notification F void because the word 'vertical' is clearly severable. from the other portions of the Notification. All that has to be done is to read the Notification without the word 'vertical' as a result of which the exemptions from the ban will include all owners of power crushers whether vertical or horizontal which manufacture Gur or rab from sugarcane grown on their fields. As the Notification has already spent its force, if any order is passed in future, the Government will see that such an invidious discrimination is not repeated. [ 134F; 124H-125B] G\n\nl(i) Where a citizen complains of the violation of fundamental rights contained in any of sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19 the.onus is on the State to prove or justify that the frestraint or restrictions imposed on the fundamental rights under clauses 2 to 6 of the Article are reasonable.\n\n(104 CJ\n\nSaghir Ahmed v. The State of U.P. and Ors. (1955] 1 S.C.R. 707 and Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (1959] l S.C.C. 853.\n\n(ii) Fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are neither absolute nor unlimited but are subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the State in public interest under clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19.\n\nWhat are rearnnable restrictions would naturally depend on the nature and circumstances of the case, the character of the statute, the object which it seeks to serve, the existing circumstances, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied as also the nature of restraint or restriction placed on the rights of the citizen. No hard or fast rule of universal application can be laid down, but if the restriction imposed appear to be consistent with the Directive Principles of State Policy they would have to be upheld as the same would be in public interest and manifestly reasonable. [1050-E, G]\n\n(iii) Restrictions may be partial, complete, permanent or temporary but they must bear a close nexus with the object in the interest of which they are imposed.\n\nSometimes even a complete prohibition of the fundamental right to trade may be upheld if the commodity in which the trade is carried on is essential to the life of the community and the said restriction has been imposed for limited period in order to achieve the goal. Freezing of stocks of foodgrains in order to secure equitable distribution and availability on fair prices have been held to be a reasonable restriction. [105H-106A, CJ\n\nNarendra Knmar and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors. [1960] 2 S.C.R~ D 375, M/s. Diwan Sugar and General Mills {P) Ltd. and Ors. v. The Union of India, [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 123 and The State of Rajsthan v. Nath Mal and Mitha Mal, [1954] S.C.R. 982 referred to.\n\n(iv) In determining the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce, the mere fact that some of the persons engaged in a particular trade may incur loss due to the imposition of restrictions will not render them unreasonable because it is manifest that trade and industry pass through periods of prosperity and adversity on account of economic, social or political factors. In a free economy, controls have to be introduced to ensure availability of consumer goods, like food-stuffs, cloth or the like at a fair price and the fixation of such a price cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction. [107-A-B]\n\n(v) Where restrictions are imposed on a citizen carrying on a trade or commerce in an essential commodity, the aspect of controlled economy and fair and equitable distribution to the consumer at a reasonable price leaving an appreciable margin of profit to the producer is undoubtedly a consideration which does not make the restriction unreasonable. [107 Cl\n\nState of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 375, Mineral Development Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Anr., [1960] 2 S.C.R. 609, Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathe/la Sampathu Chetty and Anr. [1962]3 S.C.R. 786 and Mis. Diwan Sugar and General Mills ( P.) Ltd. and Ors. v. U.O.I. [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 123 referred to.\n\n(vi) A restriction on the right of a trader dealing in essential commodities, or fixation of prices aimed at bringing about distribution of essential commodities keeping the consumers interests as the prime consideration cannot be regarded as unreasonable. [110 Cl\n\nIn the instant case, the Petitioners by rushing to Court the moment the Notification was issued, deprived the State as also themselves of the ?.Ctual con-\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. V. U.P. STATE 95\n\nsequences of the notification and the prejudice which it really ritay have caused.\n\nA They did not at all show any patience in waiting for a while to find out if the experiment functioned successfully and in the long run paid good dividends. As the petitioners obtained stay orders the experiment died a natural death and the Notification remained ineffective. [1110-E] \\ Pratr lee and Oil Mills and Anr. etc. v. Union of India, [1978) 3 S.C.R. 293, referred to.\n\n(vii) In the case of essential commodities like sugar the question of the economic production and distribution thereof must enter the verdict of the Court in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions. In such cases even if the margin of profit left to the procedure is slashed that would not make the restric\n\ntion unreasonable. The reason is that such a trade or commerce is subject to rise and fall in prices and other diverse factors, and if any measure is taken to strike a just balance between the danger sought to be averted and the temporary deprivation of the right of a citizen to carry on his trade, it will have to be upheld as reasonable restriction. [112 G-113A]\n\nShree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. U.0.1. [1974) 2 S.C.R. 398 and Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. U.O.I. [1975) I S.C.R. 956 referred to.\n\n(viii) The restriction imposed by the Notification in stopping the crushers for the period 10th October to !st December, 1980 is in public interest and bears a reasonable nexus to the object which is sought to be achieved, namely, to reduce shortage of sugar and ensure a more equitable distribution of this commodity.\n\nTaking an overall picture of the history of sugar production it cannot be said that the stoppage of sugar crushers for a short period is more excessive than the\n\nsituation demanded.\n\nMadhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v. Union :of India and Anr. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 634 referred to.\n\n2(i) The Control Order has been .passed under the authority of section 3 of the Act of 1955 which has been held to be constitutionally valid and not in any way discriminatory so as to attract Article 14. The Control Order itself contains sufficient guidelines, checks and balances to prevent any misuse or abuse of the power. The Central Government under clause 8 on whom the power is conferred is undoubtedly a very high authority who must be presumed to act in a just and reasonable manner. [119 E-F]\n\n\n(ii) There was no question of creating auy monopoly to benefit the mills.\n\nA very large majority of the mills were controlled by the State or co-operative societies and only a small fraction of them were working in the private sector.\n\nIn view of tht low working cost of the crushers they sought to outcompete the mills and deprive them of the requisite amount of sugarcane which they should\n\nhave got. It was not only just but also essential to boost the production of the H factories so that while sugar may be produced on a large scale and sugarcane may not be wasted which would have been the case if most of the sugarcane went\n\nto the crusher. The recovery. of sugarcane juice by the mills is double that by the crushers and if the latter were allowed to operate the wastage would have been almost 50 per cent which could have been avoided if sugarcane was allowed to be utilised by the mills. [121 E-G]\n\n(iii) If in the larger public interest it becomes necessary to compel the sugarcane growers to supply sugarcane to the mills at a particular rate in order to meet a national crisis, no person can be heard to say that his rights are taken away in an unjust or discriminatory fashion. Personal or individual interests must . yield to the larger interests of conw1r1ity. This was the philoiophy behind the passing of the Act of 1955. [123 F-G]\n\n3. It has not been proved that there is any real distinction between a vertical and a horizontal power crusher. Both are regarded as falling in the same class. The Notification by exempting vertical power crushers and prohibiting horizontal power crushers is clearly discriminatory and the discrimination is not justified by any rational nexus between the prohibition and the object sought to be achieved. [124 G]\n\n4. (i) Clause 8 used the words 'period or hours to be worked'. A plain reading of this expression reveals that the words 'period' and 'hours' have been used to connote to_ different aspects. Clause 8 contemplates regulation of working D of the sugar by two separate methods-{!) Where only hours of work per day are to be regulated or fixed, and (2) the word 'period' which has nothing to do with the hours to be worked but it refers to another category of regulation, namely, whether a crusher is to run or not for a particular period of time. [125 D-E]\n\nIn the instant c; ise, the Notification has resorted to the first category, viz. the 'period' of the working of the crushers, that is about one and a half month, and has not at all touched or impinged upon the working hours of the crushers. If, however, the notification had fixed certain hours of the day during which only the crushers could work, then the Notification would have resorted to the alternative'mode of regulation, which obviously has not been done. The impugned Notification is, therefore, wholly consistent with the provisions contained in clause 8 of the Control Order. [125 G-126A]\n\n5. (i) Two prominent features exclude the rules of, natural justice in the instant case. Section 3 of the Act of 1955 under which the Control Order wa& passed really covers an emergent situation so as to meet a national crisis, involving the availability or distribution of any essential commodity which may make it necessary to restrict or control the business carried on by a citizen. There was an acute shortage of sugar which was not made available to consumers at reasonable rates and the situation caused serious dissatisfaction among the people.\n\nNothing short of immediate and emergent measures taken to solve this crisis. would have eased out the situation. If hearing was to be given to so may owners of power crushers, it would have completely defeated and frustrated the very object not only of the , Notification but also of the Act of 1955 and created complications which may have resulted in a further deterioration of an already serious situation. If the rules of natural justice were not applied in such an emerg ent case, the petitioners cannot be heard to complain. Afterall, the Notification directed stoppage of operation only for a very short period and the petitioners would have had an opportunity of recouping their loss after they were allowed to function because the proportion of consumption of Khandsari Sugar was limited.\n\n. .......,,.\n\n-,,.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. V. U.P. STATE 97\n\nThe petitioners were, thertfore, not seriously prejudiced but have rushed to this A Court rather prematurely.\n\n[128 B-C; F-129 A]\n\n\n(ii) The impugned Notification is a legislative measure. The rules of natural justice therefore stand completeli excluded ; and no question of hearing arises.\n\nThe passing of the notification was a trial and error method adopted to deal with a very serious problem. [129 G-H, 130 F]\n\n\nA revocation of licence means that the licence has not been suspended but cancelled for all times rto come entailing civil consequences and complete abolition of the right for the exercise of which the licence was granted. A tern porary suspension of the working of the crushers owned by the petitioners cannot amount to a revocation, either complete or partial. The proviso to sub-clause\n\n(2) of clause 11 of the Control Order does not at all envisage a partial or periodical revocation of a licence. The proviso ccrres into play only if a licence is revoked or cancelled once for all. The proviso is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. [132 C-D]\n\n\nThe Notification ex-facie cannot be said to have been passed without due care and deliberation. The impugned Notification having been passed under section 3 of the Act it fulfils all the conditions contained therein, viz. it is expedient for maintaining or increasing the supply of an essential commodity, namely sugar which is included in clause (e) of the section 3 of the Act of 1955 and it regulates the supply and distribution of the essential commodities of the trade and commerce. Neither the Control Order nor the impugned Notification is against the tenor and spirit of section 3. It is manifestly clear from the circumstances disclosed that it is in pursuance of the aim and object for which section 3 was enshrined in the Act of 1955 that the Control Order and the Notification were promulgated. [133E; H-134 CJ\n\n8. In case Government decides to impose a ban in future on the power crushers or other units, a bare minimum hearing not to all the owners of Khandsari units but to only one representative of the Association representing them, and getting their views, would help the Government in formulating its policy. Even if an emergent situation arises,· a representation against the proposed action may be called for from such Association and considered after giving the shortest possible notice. [135A-B]\n\nWhenever any steps for banning production is taken, the Government H has to evolve some procedure to detect the defaulters and ensure compliance of the baning order. [136 C]\n\nA ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 5637-41, 5643-45, 5646-47, 5649-51, 5597-98, 5553-67, 5609-11, 5516-20, 5623-28, 5657, 5673-74, 5702-23, 5668, 5659-67, 5733, 5740-42, 5782-84, 5763-64, 5762, 5747-52, 5779-81, 5745, 5785, 5737-39, 5841-43, 5786-5797, 5861-62 and 5863-64 of 1980.\n\nB (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)\n\nAND Civil Appeal No. 2734 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.1980 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P.No. 3115/80.\n\nR.A. Gupta for the Petitioners in WPs.5637-41/80, 5797, 5733/80 and CA No.2734180.\n\nA.P.S. Chauhan, Roopendra Singh. Gajraj Singh, and C.K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WP 5762/80.\n\nD B.S. Chauhan, Birj Bihari Singh Sridhar for the Petitioner in\n\nWP 5745/80.\n\nRameshwar Dial and Sarwa Mitter for the Petitioners in WPs 5782-84/80.\n\nR.K. Garg, S.N. Kacker, R.K. Jain and R.P. Singh for the Petitioners in WPs 5553-5567, 5616-5620, 5646, 5647, 5750-52, 5779-81, 5623-28, 5646-47, 5649-5651, 5643-45,5702 to 5723, 5673- 5674, 5659 to 5667, 5740-42, 5737-39 and 5841-43/80.\n\nR.P. Singh for the Petitioners in WPs 5609~1 l & 5597-98/80.\n\nSoli J.Sorabjee, Arvind Minocha and Mrs. Veena Minocha for the Petitioners in WP 5661 /70.\n\nMohan Behari Lal for the Petitioners in WPs 5785/80, 5786/80, and 5657/80.\n\nA.K. Gupta for the Petitioners in WPs 5763-64/80.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl., S.C. Maheshwari Addi. Advocate General (U.P.), O.P. Rana, Mrs.Shobha Dikshit for the Respondents in all the matters.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nFAZAL Au, J. Inspired by the objective of removing nation-wide shortage of sugar and for the purpose of enhancing sugar production\n\n...\n\n.. .,,\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. V. U.P. STATE (Faza/ Ali, J.) 99\n\nin order to achieve an equitable distribution of the commodity so as A to make it available to consumers at reasonable rates and thereby relieving the sugar famine, the Cane Commissioner, Government of Uttar Pradesh by virtue of a Notification dated 9th October, 1980, acting under clause 8 of the Sugarcane (Conrtol) Order, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Control Order') directed that no power crusher, with certain exceptions, of a khandsari unit or any B agent of such owner in the reserved area of a mill could be worked until December 1, 1980. The exact contents of the Notification may be extracted thus:\n\n\"Lucknow, Thursday 9th October 1980\n\nIn exercise of the powers under clause 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 read with the Central Government, Ministry of Food & Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation (Department of Food), Government of India Order No. GSR 122/Ess. Comm/Sugarcane dated July 16, 1966, I, Bhola Nath Tiwari, Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh hereby direct tha(no owner of power Crusher (other than those vertical power crushers which manufacture Gur or Rab from Sugarcane grown on their own fields) or a Khandsari Unit or any agent of such owner shall in any reserved area, of any\n\nSugar Mill work the Power Crusher, or the Khandsari Unit prior to December l, 1980 during the Year 1980-81.\n\nBy Order Bhola Nath Tiwari Cane Commissioner Uttar Pradesh\"\n\nThe Control Order was passed by the Central Govermment in exercise of the powers conferred on it by s.3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1955'). In order to understand the contentions raised. by the parties it may be necessary to analyse the prominent features of the above Notification with reference to the situation it was intended to meet.\n\nIt is not disputed that sugar was being produced in the State of U.P. by the sugar mills through hydraulic process and by the power crushers through what is known as the 'open pan process'. Both the mills as also the crushers drew their raw material, namely, sugarcane, from the sugarcane growers. In order to facilitate production by the sugar mills, most of whom were controlled by the State, a reserved area of the field~ growing sugarane was fixed throughout the State\n\nThe Notification applied only to the reserved areas of a mill and not to any other areas.\n\nJn other words, any area which fell outside the reserved area was not affected by the Notification and the power crushers situated in that area could still manufacture Khandsari by the open pan process.\n\nThus, it would be seen that the ban imposed by the notification was confined only to a particular arei. in the\n\nState of U.P.\n\nSecondly, the Notification limited the ban to work power crushers only to a short period of one month and a half i.e., from October 9, 1980 to December 1, 1980. Thirdly, (and it has also not been disputed) the owners of power crushers of khandsari units, who are the petitioners in these cases, had taken out regular licences under the U.P.\n\nKhandsari Sugar Manufacturers Licensing Order of 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Licensing Order'). It, therefore, logically follows that the power crushers owned or' worked by the conditions of the licences under which they were working the crushers.\n\nFourthly, what was prohibited by the Notification was only the manufacture of khandsari while the production of gur or rab from sugarcane grown in the fields belonging to the owners of the crushers was left out of the ambit of the Notification.\n\nWe have mentioned these essential features of the Notification because the most important argument put forward before us by the counsel for the petitioners has been that it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners under Art.19( l)(g) of the Constitution to carry on their trade namely, production of khandsari.\n\nA subsidiary argument buttressing the main contention was that the Notification intends to create a monopoly in favour of the sugar mills at the cost of the crushers owned by the petitioners and is, therefore, clearly violative not only of Art. 19(l)(g) but also of Art. 14 of the Constitution. We would, however, deal with this aspect of the matter when we examine the contentions raised by the counsel for the parties.\n\nThe Attorney-General, appearing for the Union of India, and Mr.\n\nMaheshwari, Additional Advocate-General appearing for the State of U.P., contended that, decision to ban the power crushers of the petitioners was taken as a part of a high powered policy to boost the production of sugar which had fallen during the year 1979-80 with the result that in the current year the country faced a great sugar famine. As the situation called for some positive action to increase the production, the matter having been discussed at the 34th Annual Convention of\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 101\n\nSugar Technologists of India, it was decided to ban the production of A khandsari by the power crushers for a limited period.\n\nA large number of documents in the nature of affidavits, counteraffidavits, reports and books have been filed by the counsel for both the parties in support of their respective contentions. We might also mention here that the Notification has since spent its force and, in fact, was not carried into effect because immediately after it was issued the present writ petitions were filed in this Court and the petitioners obtained stay of the operation of the Notification from this Court. The Attorney-General, however, insisted that the matter should be finally decided so. that if the Central Government wants to take any steps of this kind in future it may be aware of the correct constitutional or legal position. The petitioners also insisted that the constitutional and legal questions involved in these cases may be decided even though our decision may be more or less of an academic value.\n\nThis brings us now to the various contentions raised by counsel D for the petitioners and the respondents.\n\nAs the Notification has already spent its force, we propose to deal only with the important and relevant contentions that have been advanced before us.\n\nThe counsel for the petitioners headed by Mr.Garg, Mr. Mridul and others raised the following constitutional points before us :- E\n\n(1) The Notification, as also the Control Order under which it was passed are clearly violative of of Art. 19(1)(g) and the restrictions purported to be placed on the right of the petitioners not do contain the quality of reasonableness.\n\n(2) Clause 8 of the Control Order under which the impugned Notification has been inssued suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers and is, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. By the same token, as the impugned Notification seeks to establish a monopoly in favour of the sugar mills at the cost of the petitioners, invidious discrimination is writ large on the very face of the Notification which must be struck down as being violative of Art. 14 .\n\n. (3) There is absolutely no rational nexus between the probibitkm contained in the Notification preventing the crushers of the petitioners from working them and the object H sought to be achieved by it. Thus, the State had selected the petitioners for hostile discrimination between one segment\n\nand another of persons engaged in the purchase of sugarcane, its sale and production of sugar without striking a just balance between the manufacturers of gur, khandsari and sugar. India Jives in villages and it was not understandable why the Central Government was bent on reducing the support price of sugarcane which was adversely affecting the sugarcane growers because while the mills were not able to pay a reasonable price the crushers were able to pay a handsome price for the sugarcane supplied to them by the growers.\n\nWhen tested for reasonableness, therefore, the Notification\n\ncompletely fails.\n\n(4) Clause 8 of the Control Order does not contemplate a complete prohibition of the production of an article but envisages only a regulation of the period or hours of working.\n\n(5) The Notification violates the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it was passed without hearing the petitioners whose valuable rights were curtailed as they were put completely out of production even though for a short period.\n\n(6) The impugned Notification violative of clause 11 of the Control Order itself inasmuch as the prohibition against the working of the power crushers amounts to partial revocation of the licences of the petitioners granted to them under clause 3 of the Licensing Order. Clause 11 of the Control Order clearly provides that no adverse orders could be passed against any manufacturer without hearing him.\n\n(7) Even though the impugned Notification purports to have been passed under the Control Order which itself was passed under s. 3 of the Act of 1955 yet if the notification is properly considered and the mischief it causes is borne in mind, it goes against the very sprit and object of the Act of 1955 and, in fact, frustrates the , equal distribution and production of sugar which apparenly seems to be the objective of the impugned notification.\n\nThe Attorney-General and the Additional Advocate General appearing for the Union of India and the State of U.P. respectively countered the submissions made by the petitioners on the following grounds:\n\n(1) An order passed under clause 8 of the Control Order is of a legislative character and therefore the questsion of the\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 103\n\napplication of the principles of natural justice to it does not A arise.\n\n(2) The Notification does not violate Art. 14 or 19 because it is in great public interest and is aimed at maintaining and securing proper and equitable distribution of [sugar in view of the nation wide shortage of the commodity.\n\n(3) The Notification is justified by the fact that recovery of sugar from sugarcane in case of khandsari units run by power crushers is between 4 to 6 per cent whereas in the case of sugar factories it ranges between 9! to 11 t per cent, so that utilisation of sugarcane in the case of mills is double that of the power crushers. In these circumstances, khandsari units and mills belong to two different classes which cannot}be said to be similarly situate so as to attract Art. 14 (vi de pp. 69-70 of W.P .5565- 5567 of 1980 Bhagwati Sugar Industry's case).\n\n(4) The khandsari produced by the crushers has got a very narrow sphere of consumption as it is used mostly by halwais or villagers, whereas sugar produced by the sugar mills is consumed in far larger quantities by the public in India generally and in foreign countries after export. Therefore, the sugar mills fall within a special class and the question of hostile discrimination does not arise.\n\nSimilarly, the action taken in order to protect national interests and distribution of sugar to the entire country on a rational basis cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction.\n\n(5) There is a marked difference between the quality of khandsari and that of sugar produced by the mills in their character, specification, etc., which is evident from the various reports filed by the State.\n\n(6) The. question of natural justice does not arise because the crusher owners were fully aware of the situation and had also knowledge of the considerations which prevailed with the Government in stopping crushers for a short period in order to boost production by the sugar mills and fix support price for the sugarcane supplied to the mills. However, as the Notification has expired, if proper guidelines are laid down by the Court, before passing a fresh order the State will certainly hear the petitioners in order to know their point of view.\n\nA (7) Clause 8 of the Control Order uses the words 'period or working hours' which are wide enough to embrace within their ambit a fixed period of time covering more than a day as also hours of work on any working day.\n\nWe might also mention that some of the sugarcane growers B have supported the arguments advanced by the petitioners. We now proceed to scrutinise and examine the contentions of the counsel for the petitioners.\n\nOn the contention according to which the impugned notification is violative of Art. 19(1)(g), it may be necessary to dwell in some detail. It is no doubt well settled that where a citizen complains of the violation of fundamental rights contained in sub-clause (g) of clause (I) of Art.19 or for that matter in any of sub clauses (a) to (g) thereof, the onus is on the State to prove or justify that the restraint or restric- , tions imposed on the fundamental rights under clauses 2 to 6 of the Article are reasonable. In the instant case, we are mainly concerned with sub-clauses 4, 5 and 6 of Art.19. As far back as 1955 this Court . in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P, and Ors.(1) made this position very clear and observed as follows:-\n\n... There is undoubtedly a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a legislation.\n\nBut when the enactment on the face of it is found to violate a fundamental right guaranteed under article I 9(1) (g) of the Constitution, it must be held to be invalid unless those who support the legislation can bring it within the purview of the exception laid down in clause (5) of the article. If the respondents do not place any materials before the Court to establish that the legislation comes within the per missible limits of clause (6), it is surely not for the appellants to prove negatively that the legislation was not reasonable and was not conducive to the welfare of the community.\"\n\nA similar view was taken in Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.(2) where this Court,!speaking through Shah, J. reiterated the position mentioned above in the_ following words:\n\n\"When the validity of a law placing restriction upon the exercise of fundamental rights in Article 19(1) is challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon the State.\"\n\n\n(2) [1969] 1 s.c.c. 853.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. V. U.P. STATE 105\n\nWe, therefore fully agree with the contention advanced by the\n\n1 A petitioners that where there is a clear violation of Art. l 9(l)(g), the State has to justify by acceptable evidence, inevitable consequences or sufficient materials that the restriction, whether partial or complete, is in public interest and contains the quality of reasonableness.\n\nThis proposition has not been disputed by the counsel for the respondents, who have, however, submitted that from the circumstances and B materials produced by them the onus of proving that the restrictions are in public interest and are reasonable has been amply discharged by them.\n\nThis brings us to the main question as to the circumstances \\ under which restriction imposed by the State can be said to contain the quality of reasonableness.\n\nFor this purpose, almost all the decisions of this Court on the subject have been placed before us and it may be necessary to notice those of them which have a close bearing on the point at issue.\n\nIt is abundantly clear that fundamental rights enshrined in D Part III of the Constitution are neither absolute nor un.limited but are subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the State in public interest under clauses 2 to 6 of Art.19. As to what are reasonable restrictions would naturally depend on the nature and circumstances of the case, the character of the statute, the object which it seeks to serve, the existing circumstances, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied as also the nature of restraint or restriction placed on the rights of the citizen.\n\nIt is difficult to lay down any hard or fast rule of universal appplication but this Court has consistently held that in imposing such restrictions the State must adopt an objective standard amounting to a social control by restricting the rights of the citizens where the necessities of the situation demand.\n\nIt is manifest that in adopting the social control one of the primary considerations which should weigh with the Court is that as the directive principles contained in the Constitution aim at the establishment of an egalitarian society so as to bring about a welfare state within the frame-work of the Constitution, these principles also should be kept in mind in judging the question as to whether or not the restrictions are reasonable. If the restrictions imposed appear to be consistent with the directive principles of State policy they would have to be upheld as the same would be in public interest and manifestly reasonable.\n\nFurther, restrictions may by partial, complete, permanent or temporary but they must bear a close nexus . with the object in the\n\nA interest of which they are imposed. Sometimes even a complete prohibition of the fundamental right to trade may be upheld if the commodity in which the trade is carried on is essential to the life of the community and the said restriction has been imposed for a limited period in order to achieve the desired goal.\n\nAnother important consideration is that the restrictions must be in public interest and are imposed by striking a just balance between the deprivation of right and the danger or evil sought to be avoided. Thus freezing of stocks of food-grains in order to secure equitable distribution and availability on fair prics have been held to be a reasonable restriction in the cases of Narendra Kumar and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors.(1) M/s. Diw.m Sugar and General Mills (P) Ltd. and Ors v. The Union of India() and The State of Rajasthanv. Nath Mal and Mitha Mal(3).\n\nThese are some of the general principles on the basis of which the quality of reasonableness of a particular restriction can be judged and have ben lucidly adumberated in State of Madras v. V.G.\n\nRow' s(4) case. Another important test that has been laid down by this Court is that restrictions should not be excessive or arbitrary and the Court must examine the direct and immediate impact of the restrictions on the rights of the citizens and determine if the restrictions are in larger public interest while deciding the question that they contain the quality of reasonableness.\n\nIn such cases a doctrinaire approach should not be made but care should be taken to see that the real purpose which is sought to be achieved by restricting the rights of the citizens is subserved. This can be done only by examining the nature of the social control, the interest of the general public which is subserved by the restrictions, the existing circumstances which necessitated the imposition of the restrictions, the degree and urgency of the evil sought to be mitigated by the restrictions and the period during which the restrictions are to remain in force.\n\nAt the same time the possibility of an alternative scheme which might have been but has not been enforced would not expose the restrictions to challenge on the ground that they are not reasonable.\n\n\n(2) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 123.\n\n(3) [1954] S.C.R. 982.\n\n(4) [1952] S.C.R. 597.\n\nLAXMJ KHANDSARJ ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 107\n\nFinally, in determining the reasonableness of restrictions im-J posed by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce, the mere fact that some of the persons engaged in a particular trade may incur loss due to the imposition of restrictions will not render them unreasonable because it is manifest that trade and industry pass through periods of prosperity and adversity on accJu1t of economic, social or political factors.\n\nIn a free economy controls have be introduced to ensure availability of consumer goods like food-stuffs, cloth or the like at a fair price and the fixation of such a price cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction in the circumstances.\n\nThus, apart from the various other factors which we have referred to above where restrictions are imposed on a citizen carrying on a trade or commerce in an essential commodity, the aspect of controlled economy and fair and equitable distribution to the consumer at a reasonable price leaving an appreciable margin of profit to the producer is undoubtedly a consideration which does not make the restriction unreasonable.\n\nIn fact, the leading case decided by this Court which may justly be regarded as the locus classicus on the questions as to what\n\nare reasonable restrictions is V.G. Row's case (supra.) where Patanjali Sastri, C.J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:\n\n\"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, where ever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all .cases.\n\nThe nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby the disproportion of the imposition the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluatiag such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in\n\nauthorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.\"\n\nThis case was followed in a later decision of this Court in Mineral Development Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Anr.(1} where after quoting the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., as extracted above, Subba Rao, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"These observations, if we may say so with great respect, lay down the correct principle. It follows that it is the duty of this Court to decide, having regard to tne aforesaid considerations and such others whether a particular statute satisfies the objective test of 'reasonableness'.\"\n\nIn the case of Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathe/la Sampathu Chetty and Anr.(') the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., were endorsed by this Court when Ayyangar, J., speaking for the Court, made the following observations :\n\n\"There are several decisions of this Court in which the relevant criteria have been laid down. but we consider it sufficient to refer to a ;:passage in the judgment of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., in State of' Madras v. V.G. Row.\"\n\nIn M/s. Diwan Sugar and General Mills (Private) Ltd. and Ors.\n\nv. U.0.1.(3} which was also a case arising out !'of the Act of 1955 and the Sugar Control Order of 1955 promulgated by the Central Government under s. 3 of the said Act, a Constitution Bench of this Court while examining the nature of the restrictions imposed in that case took into accpunt the various circumstances and observed:\n\n\"Clause 5 of the Order lays down the factors which have to be taken into consideration in fixing prices. These factors include among other things a reasonable margin of profit for the producer and/or trade and any incidential charges. This was kept in mind when prices were fixed by the impugned notification...\n\nThe prices were prevalent in the free market and must certainly have taken account of a fair margin of profit for the producer, though in the case of an individual factory due to factors for which the producer might\n\n\n(3) [1959] 2 supp. S, C.R. 123.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 109\n\nhimself be responsible, the cost of production might have been A a little more. Therefore, the prices fixed by the Government by the impugned notification can on no circumstances be said to have been proved to be below the cost of production.\"\n\n\"In these circumstances if price is fixed in this area, price all over India is practically fixed, and it is not necessary to fix prices separately so far as factories in other States which are said to be mainly deficit, are concerned... There is, therefore, in our opinion, no discrimination in effect by the fixation of prices in these three regions.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that even though clause 5 had fixed prices, the Court upheld the !restrictions because a reasonable margin of profit for the producer was left and did not insist that the producer should be allowed to have full sway in the production of sugar to the maximum capacity possible. Similarly one of the important tests laid down by this Court was that the price prevailing in the free market must be taken into account in the formula of fixation of price for essential commodities secondly while dealing with the price control imposed on factories in various States, this Court held that the policy of fixation of price could not be challenged because States where they were fixed were deficit areas.\n\nWe might mention here that the sheet anchor of the argument of the Attorney-General is that the impugned Notification was passed in order to relieve the sugar famine by boosting the production of sugar by mills.\n\nSimiliarly, in Nath Mal and Mitha Mal's case (supra), which was also a case dealing with foodgrains, an order freezing the stocks of the commodity in order to secure its equitable distribution so as to make it available at a fair price to consumers was upheld by the Court with the following observations:\n\n\"The clause authorises the Commissioner and various\n\nothers authorities mentioned therein and such other officers as G may be authorised by the Commissioner to frreeze . any stock of foodgrains held by a a person...\n\nNor do we think that the the power to freeze'. the stocks of foodgrains is arbitrary or based on no reasonable basis.\n\nWe are clear, therefore, that the freezing of stocks of foodgrains is reasonably related to the object which the Act was in-\n\nA tended to achieve, namely, to secure the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices and to regulate transport, distribution, disposal and acquisition of an essential commodity such as f oodgrains.\" ·\n\nThe most material ratio .of this case is that even the freezing of B stocks of foodgrains, with a view to securing their equitable distribution and availability was held to be a reasonable restriction. Even if by seizing the food stocks the right of a citizen to trade in food grains was seriously impaired and hampered yet suc}l a State action was justified on the ground of public interest.\n\nOn a parity of reasoning, therefore, a restriction (on the right of a trader dealing in essential commodities) like the ban in the instant case or fixation of prices aimed at bringing about distribution of essential commodities keeping the consumers interests as the prime consideration, cannot be regarded as unreasonable.\n\nWe are fortified in our view by a decision of this Court in Prag Ice and Oil Mills and Anr. etc. v. Union of India(1) where Beg, C.J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"All the tests of validity of the impugned price control or fixation order are, therefore, to be found in section 3 of the Act. Section 3 makes necessity or expediency of a control order for the purpose of maintainting or increasing supplies of an Essential Commodity or for securing its equitable distribution at fair prices the criteria of validity. It is evident that an assessment of either the expediency necessity of a measure, in the light of all the facts and circumstances which have a bearings on the subjects of price fixation, is essentially a subjectives matter.\n\nIt is true that objective criteria may enter into determinations of particular selling prices of each kilogram of mustard oil at various time. But, there is no obligation to have to fix the price in such a way as~ to ensure reasonable profits to the producer or manufacturer. It has also to be remembered that the objective is to secure equitable distribution and availability at fair prices so that it is the interest of the consumer and not of the producer which is the determining factor in applying any objective tests at any particular time.\"\n\nThe observations extracted above, furnish a complete answer H to the contentions raised by the petitioners on contention No. I.\n\n\n--'.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARl ETC. ETC. v. u:P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 111\n\nFurthermore, we would like to reiterate what Chandrachud, C.J,, observed in that case regarding the history and the manner in which the petitioners rushed to this Court :-\n\n\"Before closing, we would like to mention that the petitioners rushed to this Court too precipitately on the heels of the Price Control Order. Thereby they deprived themselves of an opportunity to show that in actual fact, the Order causes them irreparable prejudice.\n\nInstead they were driven through their\n\nill. thought haste to rely on speculative hypotheses in order to buttress their grievance that their right to property and the right to do trade was gone or was substantiallyaffectl'.d. A little more patience, which could have been utilised to observe how the experiment functioned, might have paid better dividends.\"\n\nThis is exactly what the petitioners have done in this case by rushing to this Court the !fioment the notification was issued and thus depriving the State as also themselves of the actual consequences of the issuing of the notification and the prejudice which it really may have caused. They did not at all show any patience in waiting for a while to find out if the experiment functioned successfully and in the long run paid good dividends. As the petitioners obtained stay orders from this Court on filing these petitions, the experiment died a natural death and the notification remained ineffective.\n\nIt was vehemently contended by Mr. Garg that the Notification or the Control Order is in direct contravention of the Directive Principles of State policy contained in Art. 39 in part IV of the Constitution inasmuch as instead of developing small-scale industries like the crushers the Notification has curbed the rights of their owners in order to benefit the mills. It is true that one of the important considerations which must weigh with the Court in determining the reasonableness of a restriction is that it should not contravene the Directive Principles contained in Part IV of the Constitution which undoubtedly has a direct bearing on the question as held by this Court in the cases of Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Ors.(1) and The State of Bombay and Anr. v. F. N. Balsara(2) where this Court made the following observations :\n\n(!) [195 5] 1 S.C.R. 707.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 680.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 3 S.C.lt.\n\n\"The new clause in Article 19(6) has no doubt been introduced with a view to provide that a State can create a monopoly in its own favour in respect of any trade or business, but the amendment does not make the establishment of such monopoly a reasonable restriction within the meaning of the first clause of Article 19(6). The result of the amendment is that the State would not have to justify such action as reasonable at all in a Court of law and no objection could be taken to it on the ground that it is an infringement of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution\"\n\n(Saghir Ahmed's case)\n\n\"In judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the Act, one has to bear in mind the directive principles of State policy set forth in Article 47 of the Constitution.\" (Ba/sara's case)\n\nIn the instant case, however, if the argument of the Attorney General is to be accepted, there is\\ no violation of the Dir-ective Principles because the main object sought to be achieved by a temporary suspension of the business of the petitioners is to ensure large-scale production of white sugar and to make it available to the consumers at reasonable rates which is animplementation rather than a contravention of the Directive Principles particularly clauses (b) and\n\n(c) of Art. 39.\n\nWhether the State has been able to prove this fact or not would be considered when we deal with the facts and materials placed before us by the parties.\n\nAnother important aspect to which we may advert at this stage is the test which should be laid down to determine the reasonableness F of a restriction involving a citizen carrying on trade or business in an essential commodity. We have already seen that thi(Court has held that fixation of price of sugar or freezing of stock of foodgrains does not amount to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right Jto trade enshrined under Art. 19(l)(g). There are other cases in which this Court has clearly held that in the case of essential commodities G like sugar the question of the economic production and distribution thereof must enter the verdict of the Courts jn deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions .. In such cases even if the margin of profit left . to the producer is slashed that would not make the restriction unreasonable. The reason for this view ; s that such a trade or commerce is H subject to rise and fall in prices and other diverse factors which may destroy or prohibit one industry or the other so as to affect the general body of the consumers and if .any measure is taken to strike a just\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 113\n\nbalance between the danger sought to be averted and the temporary deprivation of the right of a citizen to carry on his trade, it will have to be upheld as a reasonable restriction.\n\nIn Shree Meenakshi Mills\n\nv. U.O.l. (1) Ray C.J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:\n\n\"If fair price is to be fixed leaving a reasonable margin of profit, there is never any question of infringement of fundamental right to carry on business by imposing reasonable restrictions.\n\nThe question of fair price to the consumer with reference to the dominant object and purpose of the legislation claiming equitable distribution and availability at fair price is completely lost sight of if profit and the producer's return are kept in the fore-front. .....\n\nIn determining the reasonableness of a restriction imposed j by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce, it has to be remembered that the mere fact that some of those who are engaged in these are alleging loss after the imposition of law will not render the law unreasonable. By its very nature, industry or trade or commerce goes through periods of pro§Perity and advetsity on account of economic and sometimes social and political factors.\n\nIn a largely free economy when control have to be introduced to ensure availability of consumer goods like foodstuff, cloth!and the like at a fair price it is an impracticable proposition to require the Government to go through the exercise like that of a Commission to fix the prices.\"\n\nAccording to the Attorney General by virtue of the impugned Notification this is exactly what the Central Government wants to achieve by banning the working of power crushers for a short period.\n\nThis case was followed in another decision of this Court in Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. U.0./.(2) which was also a case of a notification issued under clause 7 of the Control Order of 1966, where the following observations were made:\n\n\"It is a well-known fact that rationalisation of industry by the use of modern methods, reduces the amount of labour needed in more mechanised modes of manufacture. Therefore, we do not think that these assertions could prove any inequitable treatment meted out to the Haryana manufacturers of sugar. In any case no breach of a mandatory duty, which could justify the issue of writ of mandamus, was established.'\n\n\n(2) [1975] l S.C.R. 956.\n\nIn the light of the principles enunciated and the decisions dicussed above, we now proceed to examine the facts and circumstances placed before us by the Union of India to prove that the restric' tions imposed under the impugned Notification contain the quality of reasonableness and are not violative of Art. 19(1)(g).\n\nThe main pleas of the State of U.P. which have been adopted by the Union\n\nof India, are to be found in pargraphs 6 to 11 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents in writ petition Nos.5565-5567 of 1980. The respondents have taken the stand that there has been a very steep rise in the prices of sugar which is doubtless an essential commodity.\n\nIt has further been alleged that one of the major factors responsible for the present rise in the prices of sugar is that there is a sharp rise in the demand for consumption of sugar whereas its production has slumped to a very low level. In order to illustrate the point it has been averred that the demand of sugar in the country has increased to over 60 lakh tonnes whereas production of the commodity in the preceding year (1979-80) was 0:1ly about 39.5 lakh tonnes. In order to meet the demand the Central Government had to import for the first time after several years 2 lakh tonnes of sugar at a cost of about one hundred crores of rupees. One reason for the shortfall in production during 1979-80 was the poor availability of cane to the sugar factories. This in turn resulted from the worst drought conditions faced by our country particularly the State of U.P. which is one of the main suppliers of sugarcane. Yet another cause of the shortage was that the sugar famine led to the large scale diversion of cane to gur and khandsari manufacturers. The counter-affidavit then proceeds to give a chart of the production of sugar by the crushers and the mills.\n\nIt was further averred that unless the position was set right the stocks of 1979-80 would have been exhausted completely by the middle of November 1980. To meet this national crisis, the Government of India took various steps to increase the production of sugar in the country during the current season (1980-81). In the first place, the Government of India allowed rebate in the basic excise duty on excess sugar production in order to serve as an incentive to the sugar mills to start early cane crushing operation. This step however, could not possibly have the desired effect unless the suger factories got the raw material, viz., constant supply of sugarcane.\n\nIndisputably sugarcane is utilised for manufacture of sugar, gur, rab and khandsari and some of the quantity is also utilised for seed, feed and chewing. It was further alleged that the crushers particularly those producing gur were in an advantageous position so as to be able to purchase cane at a very high rate and outcompete the sugar\n\n' -\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 115\n\nfactories. It was possible for the crushers to pay a higher price because no excise duty or compulsory levy was imposed on them, on the other hand, the factories suffered from certain disabilities, namely, sixty five per cent of the sugar production was taken by the Government of India on levy process and excise duty on free sale sugar was very high as compared to khandsari sugar. Further, the Government required distribution of molasses at a fixed price of Rs 6/- per quintal to the mills whereas there was no such obligation on the power crushers. Finally, because of the monthly release system the factories could sell only released quantity during a particular month whereas there was no such restriction on khandsari units owned by the petitioners. These steps taken by the then Government resulted in an unhealthy competition causing diversion of cane from the sugar factories with the result that sugar factories could get only 61.5% of the bonded cane. It was further pointed out in the counter-affidavit that keeping in view the fact that the sugar stocks of 1979-80 were likely to be exhausted by the middle of November 1980, it was considered necessary to maintain an adequate supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories which would have started production earlier because of the incentives given to them by the Government of India.\n\nIn an additional affidavit filed by the respondents, sworn by Karan Singh, Joint Cane Commissioner, Government of U.P, it was pointed out that khandsari sugar could never be a substitute for sugar produced by sugar mills because khandsari sugar is not used for domestic purpose in preference to mill sugar as the former has higher molasses content and has unpleasant smell and taste.\n\nFurther, there is no gradation of khandsari sugar as its grain is not regular and bold. It was further alleged that in public distribution it is only the mill sugar which is supplied at fair price to the consumers at large and which also forms the bulk of the export.\n\nThe khandsari sugar, according to the respondents, was generally consumed for preparation of sweets, boora and batasha and was consumed mostly by the halwais.\n\nThere is no reliable evidence to .rebut the aforesaid facts detailed in the counter-affidavit of the respondents.\n\nThus, in view of the factors detailed above, it was contended by the Union of India that it was in public interest that with a view to remove shortage of sugar and achieve equal distribution of sugarcane to the mills the impugned notification was passed which seems to strike a just balance between the requirements of the country and those of the khandsari units.\n\nThe Attorney General contended that since the ban was imposed only for a very short period of about\n\none month and a half, there could be no appreciable loss to the khandsari units, and even if there was some loss it could be recouped after the ban was lifted because the working cost of the khandsari units was much less than that of the mills.\n\nIn other words, by virtue of the policy adopted by the Government in passing the impugned notification, a fair margin of profit was left to the khandsari units which were not completely closed. It was further stated that out of 89 sugar mills in the entire State of U.P., 18 sugar mills are owned by the U.P. State Sugar Corporation which is a Government company and controlled by the State. Sixteen sugar mills are under the cooperative sector in which the Government Investment is considerable and these mill are run by cooperative societies of which cane growers are shareholders. Thus, the ultimate benefit did undoubtedly go to the sugarcane growers also through the profits made by the cooperative societies.\n\nThe learned counsel, Mr. Garg, appearing for the petitioners countered the inferences drawn by the respondents with the submission tliat although the above facts may not be disputed yet it was not correct to say that the khandsari units had put the mills completely out of competition. It was suggested that the khandsari units were also, apart from paying a higher price to the sugarcane growers, prepared to be subjected to compulsory levies or excise duty levied on the mills or to such terms as the Government may like to put on the owners of ihe crushers. The argument is, no doubt, attractive but we are not sure if and when these harsher terms are imposed on the petitioners, it would be possible for them to run the crJshers and make the huge profits which they are making without the aforesaid impositions. At any rate, since the impugned notification has expired, the Government will certainly consider the desirability of a reappraisal of the situation after taking into account this aspect of the matter. It was further pointed out by the Union of India that only 39 sugar mills are in the private sector and ensuring actual availability of sugar at reasonable rates to the sugar mills was the prime consideration which formed the basis of impugned notification in conformity with the object of the Act of 1955 and the Control Order so as to maintain a fair price for the general public. Learning a lesson from the performance of the sugar market in the preceding year, the Government thought it more desirable to channelise the production of sugarcane so that the interests of neither the sugar mill owners nor of the khandsari units nor those of the cane-growers suffered.\n\nIt was then contended that the impugned notification far from causing any appreciable damage or loss to the petitioners serve a\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARHTC .. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 117\n\ntwo-fold purpose which ensures equitable production and:idistribution A of sugar.\n\nAnother important argument advanced by the Attorney-General which has impressed us most is one resulting from the use by the mills of the hydraulic process as distinguished from the open pan process employed by khandsari units for the production of sugar.\n\nThe consequence is the recovery of sugar from sugarcane in the case of khandsari units run by power crushers is between 4 to 6 per cent whereas in the case of sugar factories it ranges between 9t to 11 t per cent.\n\nThus, the overall positon is that the utilisation of sugarcane by the mills is double that by the crushers and if the crushers are not able to produce more than the existing 4 to 6 per cent, half.of the total quantity of sugarcane supplied to them goes waste which, if utilised by the factories, would have served for production of more sugar.\n\nThis solid distinction between the two processes of manufacture followed by the mills and the crushers is, in our opinion, a very D rational distinction which puts the mills in a different class and which also provides a reasonable nexus between the restrictions imposd on the crushers and the object sought to be achieved. The petititioner sought to falsify the figures quoted by the Union of India regarding the precentage of recovery of sugar by reference to a book written by Mr. Bepin Behari, and entitled 'Rural Industrialization in India'.\n\nE On page 100 of the book, the author has observed as follows :\n\n\"Originally, the percentage of recovery in traditional khandsari units did not go beyond 6. 5 per cent, but recent innovations have raised the recovery ratio to almost 9.5 per cent. Thereby the two processes have become almost competetive. In inversion loss, however, there is some difference. In the large-scale sugar mills, only ten per cent of the sugar is lost while in small khandsari plants the loss can be as much as 30 per cent.\"\n\nand great reliance has been placed on these observations of the author.\n\nIt may be noted, however, that the author has not cited any expert opinion as the foundation for his conclusion nor has he referred to any experiment carried out by him personally. In fact he has not even disclosed the source of his information. Apart from that the book fully supports the averments of the respondents that the percentage of recovery in traditional khandsari units did not go beyond 6.5 per cent. Besides, there is no evidence or allegation in any of the affidavits filed by the petitioners to the effect that any new methodo-\n\nA logy or innovation was adopted by any of the petitioners. In these circumstances, the extract from the book does not appear to be of any assistance to the petitioners.\n\nOn the other hand, the facts detailed by the respondents in the various counter-affidavits filed by them are based on the statistics maintained by the Government from year to year and reports of experts. One such report entitled 'studies on Specific Conductances of Indian Sugar' has been filed by the State before us and it gives the entire history and economics of sugar production.\n\nAfter a 'careful consideration of the arguments and documents produced :_by both the parties we are satisfied that the restriction imposed by the impugned notification in stopping the crushers for the period 10th October to 1st December 1980 is in public interest and bears a resonable nexus to the object which is sought to be achieved, namely, to reduce shortage of sugar and ensure a more equitable distribution of this commodity.\n\nOne of the tests that has been laid down to determine the reasonableness of a restriction is to find out if the restraint is more excessive than that warranted by the situation. In the instant case, taken an overall picture of the history of sugar production it cannot be said that the stoppage of sugar crushers for a short period is more excessive than the situation demanded.\n\nIn Madhya_ Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr.(1) while considering a restriction imposed for a short time, this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Further, cotton being a commodity essential to the life of the community, it is reasonable to have restriction which may, in certain circumstances, extend to total prohibition for a time, of all normal trading in the commodity. Accorrdingly, we are of opinion that Clause 4 of the Cotton Control\n\nOrder of 1950 does not offend Art. 19 (1 ( (g) of the Constitution because sub-clause (5) validates it.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nIn that \"case the restriction imposed on cotton was for a short period of on~ month in February 1954 and for another month in.\n\nH May 1954; and was held to be justified and a reasonable restraint so\n\n(I) A.LR. 1954 S.C. 634. ,\n\nJ-.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSAR• ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 119\n\nas not to be violative of Art 19 (I) (g).\n\nThe situation here is similar. Afterall, the petitioners were working their crushers under a licence granted to them under the Licensing Order and the impugned notification merely seeks to regulate the right and not to abolish the same.\n\nFor the above reasons the first contention put forward by the petitioners that the restrictions imposed by the impugned notification are unreasonable is hereby overruled and it is held that such restrictions clearly contain the quality of reasonableness and when tested on the touchstone of the principles laid down by the various authorities referred to above, they fully salsify all the requirments of a reasonable restriction.\n\nThis takes us to contention No. 2 raised by the petitioners. It was submitted before us that clause 8 of the Control Order under which the impugned notification has been issued suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers and is, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was argued that as the notification seeks to establish a monopoly in favour of the sugar mills at the cost of the petitioners it seeks to make per se an invidious discrimination which is writ large on the very face of the notification which is, therefore violative of Art. 14.\n\nAs regards first limb of the argument it may be necessary to state that the Control Order itself has been passed under the authority of s.3 of the Act of 1955 which has been held by this Court to be constitutionally valid and is not in any way discriminatory so as to attract Art. 14. The Control Order itself having been passed under s.3 contains sufficient guidelines, checks and balances to prevent any misuse or abuse of the power conferred on the authorities concerned under clause 8. Clause 8 runs thus:-\n\n\"8. Power to issue directions to producers of khandsari, sugar, power-crushers, khandsari units, crushers and cooperative societies.-The Central Government may, from time to time, by general or special order, issue directions to any producer of khandsari sugar or owner of a power-crusher, khandsari unit or crusher or the agent of such producer or owner or a cooperative society regarding the purchase of sugar or sugarcane juice, production, maintenance of stocks, storage, price, packing, payment disposal, delivery and distribution of sugarcane, gur gul, jaggery and rah or khandsari sugar or the period or hours to be worked.\"\n\nTo begin with it may be noticed that the power to issue orders or directions from time to time is conferred on the Central Government which is undoubtedly a very high authority an.d must be presumed to act in a just and reasonable manner. This point is well settled and concluded by several decisions of this Court as detailed below. In Chinta Lingam & Ors. v. Government of India Ors., (1) this Court made the following observations:\n\n\"At any rate, it has been pointed out in more than one decision of this Court that when the power has to exercised by one of the of the highest officers the fact that no appeal has been provided for is a matter of no moment. .. '\". It was said that though the power was discretionary but it was not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could not be easily assumed. There was moreover a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with rules of law.\"\n\nD This case was followed in V. C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.)(2) where one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) speaking for the Court observed as follows:\n\n\"Furthermore, as the power is vested in a very high authority, it cannot be assumed that it is likely to be abused.\n\nOn the other hand, where the power is conferred on such a high authority as the Central Government, the presumption will be thanhe power will be exercised in a bona fide manner and according to law.\"\n\nMoreover, the power cannot be said to be arbitrary or unguided because the impugned notification derives its source from s. 3 of the Act of 1955 which clearly lays down sufficient guidelines and the existence of certain conditions for proper distribution of an essential commodity. The said guidelines therefore, govern the authority passing the impugned notification.\n\nSecondly, clause 8 merely seeks to regulate and guide the conditions and the circumstances under which the manufacturers may exercise their rights. In other words, any order passed under clause 8 is prima facie purely of a regulatory nature. It was, however, submitted that the Notification has been passed by the Cane Commissioner, Government of U.P. and it does not contain any materials\n\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. V. U.P. STATE J 121\n\nor reasons why the ban was imposed on the crushers owned by the petitioners. As the Notification itself has been passed under clause 8 of the Control Order read with Government of India\n\nG.S.R. No. 1122 dated July 16, 1966 and under the Essential Commodities Act it was not necessary for the Cane Commissioner to have stated or detailed the reasons why the Notification was issued.\n\nIn fact, the Notification and the Control Order have to be read in the light of the main Act, viz., the Act of 1955, which itself provides the necessary guide lines, namely, that it is essential in public interest and to secure proper distribution of an essential commodity to pass orders by various authorities from time to time.\n\nThis is the scheme of s. 3 of the Act of 1955 which has not been challenged before us by the petitioners.\n\nIt was further argued in the same token that the impugned notification seeks to establish a monoply in favour of the sugar mills at the cost of the petitioners who have been selected for hostile discrimination as against the mills. While detailing and narrating the facts and the history of sugar production we have already shown that the State has placed cogent materials before us to show why the\n\nsugar mills had to be given a special treatment by temporarily stopping the production of sugar by the crushers. We have already dealt with the various factors while examining contention No. I of the petitioners and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same here.\n\nThere .... ' was no question of creating any monoply to benefit the mills particularly when a very large majority of the mills were controlled by the\n\nState or cooperative societies and only a small fraction of them were working in the private sector. Jn view of the low working cost of the --r·\n\ncrushers they sought to outcornpete the mills and deprive them of the requisite amount of sugarcane which they should have got. It was not only just but also essential to boost the production of the factories so that white sugar may be produced on a large scale and sugarcane may not be wasted which would have been the case if most of the sugar-cane went to the crushers. We have pointed out that the recovery of sugarcane juice by the mills is double that by crushers, and if the latter were allowed to operate the wastage of the sugarcane would have been almost 50 per cent which could have been avoided if sugar cane was allowed to be utilised by the mills.\n\nThe third limb of the argument on this point was that there was\n\nwas no rational nexus between the prohibition contained in the Notification preventing the petitioners from working their crushers, even though for a short period, and the object sought to be achieved by H it. This contention also must necessarily fail as we have already shown that 1mch nexus existed.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. Garg that as Irtdia lives in villages it was not understandable why the Central Government was bent on reducing the support price of sugarcane and thus causing loss to the sugarcane growers. It was true that the mills were not in a position to pay as high a price for sugarcane as the crushers but that was for so many reasons which we have discussed above, namely, the various liabilities which were imposed on the mills, e.g., the excise duties, the levy, etc.\n\nOnce a certain amount of stability was achieved in the sugarcane industry, the ultimate benefit would undoubtedly go to the sugarcane grower even though he may have to be paid a lesser support for supply of sugarcane to the mills. It was, therefore, in public interest that a lesser support price for sugarcane had been fixed.\n\nMoreover, it was for the Central Government who was in the know of the circumstances prevailing in the State or for that matter in the country to determine the support price of sugarcane.\n\nEven though the crushers may have paid a higher price, in. the long run, the sufferers would be the sugarcane growers. as also the consumers who would be deprived of the sugar produced by the mills which was undoubtedly superior to the khandsari sugar and has a vaster area of consumption in the country and is also meant for purposes of export.\n\nThe report entitled 'Studies on Specific Conductances of Indian Sugar' referred to above, details the distinctive features of the white. sugarproduced by the mills and the khandsari sugar where the various features of the nature and character of sugar are pointed out thus:\n\n\"This plantation sugar , is crystalline, white lustrous and has a purity of 99.8 per cent.\n\nThe size of the crystal of this. sugar varies from 0.3 to 2.5mm. This sugar is graded according to the' Indian Sugar standards: Sugar corresponding to 30A is very white sugar with grain size of aboui'2.5mm. While 27 E refers to\n\nless white sugar with grain size of about 0.4 mm. The numeral 30, 29 ahd 27 indicate the decreasing order of the whiteness oil the sugars and the letters A E to the grade of the grain size .....\n\nApart from these sugars produced in well established commer-' cial factories, the similar type of which are known in other countries, another kind of sugar produced perhaps only in India and nowhere else, is the khandsari sugar which is being manufactured in small scale industrial units ...... While, in the sulphitation factories the classified sugar syrups are boiled under vacuum, in khandsari units the same is carried out in the open pans. This sugar used to be palish yellow in colour .....\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 123\n\nNagaranjars and his co-workers studied the conductivity of A plantation white sugars and refined sugars and found distinctive difference in conductivity of plantation white sugar and refined sugar.\"\n\nIt has been clearly averred in para 15 of the couteraffidavit filed by Mr. Bhola Nath Tiwari, Cane Commissoner, Government of\n\nU.P. (who issued the impugned notification) that in year 1978-79 the production in the reserved.areas was 578.78 lakh tonnes out of which the percentage of cane utilised by the sugar mills was 27 .24 whereas it was 9.73% in the case of the khandsari manufactured by power crushers. It is also stated that out of the total quantiy of sugarcane only 45.23 per cent was utilised by gur manufacturrers and the remaining 17.5 per cent was used for seed, feed and chewing purposes etc. Similarly, in the year 1979-80 there was a steep fall in the production of sugarcane from 578.78 lakh tonnes -in the previous year to 471.11 lakh tonnes. Owing to this loss of production, there\n\nwas keen competition for purchase of sugarcane between the sugar mill owners and the khandsari units. As a result of thio, unhealthy competition sugar mills had to close down prematurely resulting in the loss of production of sugar.\n\nA very attractive argument was submitted before us by Mr.\n\nGupta, appearing for some of the owners of power crushers.\n\nIt was submitted that so far as the petitioners represented by him were concerned, they were growing sugarcane in their own fields and had installed power crushers in their own land though the said land fell within the reserved area. It was argued that these petitioners fell in a separate category and the Government could not compel them to supply sugarcane to the mills instead of using the sugarcane grown by them in their own crushers.\n\nAn apparent snag in this argument is that if in the larger public interest it becomes necessary to compel the sugarcane growers to lmpply sugarcane to the mills at a particular rate in order to meet a national crisis, no person can be heard to say that his rights are taken away in an unjust or discriminatory fashion ... Personal or individual interests must yield to the larger interests of the community. This 1s exaclly the philosophy behind the passing of the Act of 1955.\n\nMerely because the petitioners are growing sugarcane in their\n\nown fields and own power crushers, therefore, they cannot be treated H as a class separate from the others owners of power crushers situated within the reserved area of the the mills.\n\nSecondly, it was argued by Mr. Gupta and, in our opm10n, rightly that the impugned notification is ex-facie discriminatory inasmuch as it differentiates between vertical and horizontal power crushers without any rhyme or reason.\n\nHe submitted that no rational basis has been suggested by the State for making the distinction when both types of crushers produce almost the same quantity of khandsari and apply the same mechanical process (open pan process). What difference does it make, says Mr. Gupta, if a power crusher is vertical or horizontal ? In the case of a horizontal power crusher rollers are in a horizontal line situated on the surface whereas in the vertical power crusher the rollers instead of being on the surface are in a vertical position without there being any difference in the working of the two crushers.\n\nWe are of the opinion that this argument of Mr. Gupta is sound and must prevail.\n\nThe Additional Adocate-General, U.P. sought to draw several distinctions between a vertical power crusher and a horizontal one, name) y,\n\n(1) a vertical power crusher can crush 1500 quintals of sugarcane per month whereas a horizontal one crushes 5600 quintals of the commodity in the same period ; (2) vertical power crushers are non-· commercial and fall within the category of cottage industry whereas horizontal power crushers are included in the category of small-scale industry; (3) vertical power crushers are run by their owners themselves and draw supplies from sugarcane growers and ( 4) vertical power crusher do not require any licence. So far as the last part of the argument of the Additional Advocate-General of U.P. that vertical power crushers do not require a licence is concerned, it is factually wrong because all such crushers require a licence by virtue of the Orders passed by the Central Government under s.3 of the Act of 1955. Regarding the other distinctive features the mere ipse dfxit of deponent Gupta who has sworn an affidavit, there is absolutely no documentary evidence to support the features pointed out or relied upon by the Additional Advocate General. In these circumstances, it has not been pro\"ed to our satisfaction that there is any real distinetion between a vertical and a horizontal power crusher, and we regard both as falling in the same class. The notification by exempting vertical power crushers and prohibiting horizontal power crushers is clearly discriminatory and the discrimination is not justified by any rational nexus between the prohibition and the object sought to de achieved.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, we hold that in so far as the word 'vertical' used in the impugned Notification is concern<!d it must be struck down as being violative of Art. 14. This, however,\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 125\n\ndoes not render the entire notification void because the word 'vertical' used in the notification is clearly severable from the other portions of the notification. All that has to be done is to read the notification without the the word 'Vertical' as a result of which the exemptions from ban will include all owners of power crushers (whether vertical or horizontal) which manufacture gur or rab from sugarcane grown on their fields.\n\nAgain, as the notification has already spent its force, if any order is passed in future, theJGovernment will see to it that such an invidious discrimination is not repeated.\n\nWe now come to contention No.4 by which it was urged that the express language of clause 8 of the Control Order does not contemplate a complete prohibition of the production of an1article but envisages mere regulation of the period or hours of working.\n\nIt was argued that the words 'period or hours' used in clause 8 are relatable only to the number of actual hours in a day for which the crushers may be permitted to work from time to time and not a complete stoppage or prohibition of the crushers for a period of a month or two.\n\nClause 8, as extracted supra, uses the words 'period or hours to be worked.' A plain reading of this expression clearly reveals that the words 'period' and 'hours' have been used to connote two different aspects of the matter. In other words, clause 8 contemplates regulation of working of the sugar by two separate methods- ( I) where only hours of work per day are to be regulated or fixed, for instlfnce, where a crusher normally works for IO hours, a notification under this clause may provide that it should work only for 8 hours or 6 hours or IO hours a day or for a number of days. (2)The word 'period' however, has nothing to do with the hours to be\n\nf worked but it refers to another category of regulation viz., whether a crusher is to run or not for a particular period of time. We are unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Garg that the two words must be taken to have been used in clause 8 in the same sense. In fact, this interpretation , of the words will cause violence to the language of the statutory provision and instead of advancing its object it would frustrate the purpose which clause 8 seeks to subserve.\n\nIn the instant case, the notification has resorted to the first category, viz., the period of the working of the crushers, that is to say, about one and a half month, and has not at all touched or impinged upon the working hours of the crushers. If, however, the notification had fixed certain hours of the day during which only the crushers could work, then the notification would have resorted to the alternative mode of regulation, which obviously has not been done in this case We are unable to agree with the contention put forward by Mr.\n\nGarg and hold that the impugned notification is wholly consistent with the provisions contained in clause 8 of the Control Order.\n\nContention Nos. 5, 6 and 7 relate to the objection taken by the petitioners to the validity of the impugned notification on several grounds. In regard to contention No. 5, the notification has been attacked on the ground that the Central Order violates the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it was passed without hearing the petitioners whose valuable rights were involved and their trade was stopped and they were put completly out of production even though for a short period of about one and a half month. It was contended that though clause 8 does not expressly provide for a hearing yet even if it be considered to be an administrative order, the. rule of audi alteram partem fully applies and the Cane Commissioner should have\n\npaed the impugned notification only after hearing the petitioners.\n\nReliance was placed for this proposition on a large number of authorities: It is true that with the growth of law in our country, this Court has consistently held for the last few years that the rules of natural justice must apply even to an administrative order unless the same are expressly excluded.\n\nMr. Garg as also other counsel for the petitioners submitted that the mere fact that there is no express provision in clause 8 for hearing the petitioners before imposing any restrictions on their bussiness provides good reason to hold that the right to be heard was inherent in the very act of prohibition since the stoppage of the bussinss of the petitioners would entail civil consequences.\n\nThus, they argued, as no hearing was given to the petitioners, the notification was void and inoperative. Reliance was placed on the observations of Krishna Iyer, J., in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.(1) which may be extracted thus:-\n\n\"Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of Authority. It is the bone of healthy government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law ........ .\n\nThe dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial functions vis-avis the doctorine of natural justice is presumbly\n\n(J) [1978] 2 S.C, R. 272.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Pazal Ali, J.) 127\n\nobsolescent after Kraipak 1970 1 SCR 457 in [India and A Schmidt (1969 (2) Ch .. 149) in England.\n\nThe procedural pre-condition of fair hearing, however minimal, even post-decisional, has relevance to administrative and judicial gentlemanliness. The Election Commission is an_ B institution of central importance and enjoys far-reaching powers and the greater the power to affect others' right or liabilities\n\nthe more necessary the need to hear.\n\nWe consider it a valid point to insist on observance 'of natural justice in the area of administrative decision-making so as to avoid the devaluation of this principle by administrators already alarmingly insensitive to the rationale of audi alteram partem !\"\n\nStrong reliance was also placed on the observations of this D Court in Maneka Gandhi v. U. 0. /.(1) where Bhagwati, J., after full discussion of the entire subject, observed thus:-\n\n\"The law must, therefore now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be appli- E cable.\"\n\nSimiliary, in a very recent case S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan(2) this Court had taken an oppurtunity to emphasise the importance of rules of natural justice and reiterated as follows:\n\n\"The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away and we have been liberated from the psittacine incantation of \"administrative action\". Now from the time of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa\n\n\nA number of other decisions were also cited on the question <Jf natural justice and we agree with the propositions adumbrated by\n\n(I) (1978] 2 S.C.R. 621.\n\n(2) (1981] 1 S.C.R. 746.\n\nMr. Garg that normally where an administrative order adversely affects the valuable rights of the party affected, a reasonable oppor tunity of hearing must be given to the person affected. The instant case, however, contains two prominent features which exclude the rules of natural justice. Section 3 of the Act of 1955 under which the Control Order was passed really covers an emergent situation so as to meet a national crisis involving the availability or distribution of any essential commodity which may make it necessary to restrict or control the bussiness carried on by a citizen. It has already been pointed out by us while discussing the case of the respondent that there was an acute shortage of sugar which was not made available to consumers at reasonable rates and the situation caused serious dissatisfaction among the people.\n\nNothing short of immediate and emergent measures taken to solve this crisis would have eased out the situation. We are fortified in this opinion by a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Prag Ice and Oil Mills and Anr. v.\n\nU. 0. J.(1) where Chandrachud, C. J.. observed as follows:-\n\n\"The dominant purpose of these provisions is to ensure the availability of essential commodities to the consumers at a fair price. And though patent injustice to the producer is not to be encouraged, a reasonable return on investment or a reason able rate of profit is not the sine qua non of the validity of action taken in furtherance of the powers conferred by section 3 (1) and section 3 (2) (c) of the Essential Commodities Act.\n\nThe interest of the consumer has to be kept in the forefront and the prime consideration that an essential commodity ought to be made available to the common man at a fair price must rank in priority over every other consideration.\"\n\nIf hearing was to be givert to so many owners of power crushers, it would have completely defeated and frustrated the very object not only of the Notification but also of the Act of 1955 and created complications which may have resulted in a further deteroriation of an already serious situation. If the rules of natural justice were not applied in such an emergent case, the petitioners cannot be heard to complain. Afterall the notification directed stoppage of operation of the petitioners' crushers only for a very short period and they would have had an opportunity of recouping their Joss after they were allowed to function because the proportion of consumption of khandsari sugar was limited as indicated\n\n\n.LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 129\n\nabove. The petitioners were, therefore, not seriously prejudiced and A have rushed to this Court rather prematurely.\n\nThe Attorney General had, however, a much more effective answer to the contention raised by Mr. Garg on this point. It was submitted by the Attorney General that having regard to the circumstances, the background and the situation in which the impugned notification was issued under clause 8 of the Control Order, it had a statutory complexion and should be regarded as purely legislative in character. He added that no one had ever argued that before passing a legislation, the persons affected by the legislation should he heard, and that therefore, the question of hearing or complying with the rules of natural justice would not arise. The Attorney General placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. etc. (surpa) and particularly on the following observations made by Beg, J.,-\n\n\"Price fixation is more in the nature of a legislative measure even though it may be based upon objective criteria found in a report or other material. It could not, therefore, give rise to a complaint that a rule of natural justice has not been followed in fixing the price. Neverthless., the criterion adpoted must be reasonable.\n\nReasonableness, for purposes of judging whether there was an \"excess of power\" or an \"arbitrary\" exercise of it, is really the demonstration of a reasonable nexus between the matters which are taken into account in exercising a power and the purposes of exercise of that power.\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nHaving regard to the facts in the instant case, a temporary ban on F power crushers of a particular type was a measure governed by same, if not higher, considerations as an order of fixation of price.\n\n~ The Ia&( tmentioned case is an authority for the proposition that / an order like the impugned notification is a legislative measure. That G being the position, the rules of natural justice stand completely excluded and no question of hearing arises. Mr. Garg, however, submitted that in that case the petitioner did not urge that the price fixation required a quasi-judicial procedure. Even so, the Court clearly decided that a measure like the one we have in the instant case is purely of a H legislative character and there is no question of complying with the rules of natural justice in such cases.\n\nA In Ch:iirman, Board of Mining Examination and Am. v. Ramjee(1)\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court, pointed out that there may be cases where rules of natural justice can be dispensed with. In this connection he observed as follows :\n\n'; Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nIn Joseph Beauharnois v. People of the State of lllinois(2) the following observations were made which are apposite to the facts of the present case :-\n\n\"This being so, it would be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State's power. That the legislative remedy might not in practice mitigate the evil, or might itself raise new problems, would only manifest once more the paradox of reform. It is the price to be paid for the trial-and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal with obstinate social issues.\" J The passing of the notification in the instant case was an act of a legislative character and was really a trial-and-error method adopted to deal with a very serious social probiem ..\n\nIn Bates v. Lord HaJsham of St. Marlebone and Ors.(3) under similar circumstances a statutory committee had made an order in relation to powers to . licence hackney carriages. Commenting on this provision Megarry, J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"In the present case, the committee in questi-0n has an entirely different function : it is legislative rather than administrative or executive. The function of the committee is to make or refuse\n\n\n(2) 96 L. ed. 919 (at 930.\n\n(3) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1373 at 1378.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARJ ETC. ETC . . V. U.P. STATE (Faza/ Ali, J.) 131\n\nto make a legislative instrument under delegated powers. The order, when made, will lay down the remuneration for solicitors generally; and the termsof the order will have to be considered and construed and applied in number-less cases in the future ...\n\nMany of those affected by delegated legislation, and affected very substantially are never consulted in the process of enacting that legislation, and yet they have no remedy.\"\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of the Attorney General that the impugned notification having been passed to effectuate the object or ideal to be achieved in order to solve a national crisis cannot but be considered a legislative measure so as to exclude rules of natural justice. The contention raised by the petitioners on this ground is, therefore, overruled.\n\nIn contention No. 6 another infirmity pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the impugned notification D is clearly violative of clause 11 of the Control Order itself because the prohibition against the working of the power crushers even for a short period amounted to a partial revocation of the licences granted to the petitioners under clause 3 of the Licensing Order. In order to appreciate this contention it is necessary to extract clause 11 (2) of the Control Order which runs :- E\n\n\"(2) Where all or any of the powers conferred upon the Central Government by this Order have been delegated in pursuance of sub-clause (I) (b) to any officer or any authority of a State Government, every Order or direction issued by such officer or authority in exercise of that power may be amended, varied or rescinded by the State Government to whom the officer or authority is subordinate either suo motu, or on an application made within a period of thirty days from the date of the order or direction. ·\n\nProvided that no order revoking a licence or permit issued to a person shall be made without giving such person an opportunity to make representation.\"\n\nReliance was particularly placed on the proviso. extracted above.\n\nIt was contended that even a temporary suspension of the operation of power crushers amounted to a partial revocation of the licence H. granted to the petitioners and that therefore it was incumbent on the authorities concerned to give the petitioners an opportunity of being\n\nheard and making a representation before such revocation took effect. The Attorney General rightly pointed out that neither subclause (2) nor the proviso thereto is attracted in the instant case. It is true that the petitioners got licences under the Licensing Order which was also passed under the Act of 1955.\n\nA revocation of a licence means that the licence has not been suspended but cancelled for all times to come entailing civil consequences and complete abolition of the right for the exercise of which the licence was granted. A temporary suspension of the working of the crushers owned by the petitioners cannot amount to a revocation, either complete or partial.\n\nIn fact, in our opinion, the proviso to sub-clause (2) of clause I 1 of the Control Order does not at all envisage a partial or periodical revocation of a licence. The proviso would come into play only if a licence is revoked or cancelled once for all. Since a revocation or cancellation of the licence would operate to the serious prejudice of the licensee and affect him adversely, it was considered necessary and expedient to give him a hearing. We are fully satisfied that the impugned notification does not attract the conditions laid down in the proviso so as to confer upon the petitioners a right of hearing. The proviso is, therefore, wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case.\n\nIt was further submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that even if clause 11 did not apply because the notification is of a legislative character a hearing would have removed the apprehensions of the petitioners. This argument has no substance bcause once it is held that the notification is impressed with a legislative character, the question of hearing does not arise. It may be true that despite the fact that there is no necessity of hearing, the Govern ment could have evolved some method of giving a very short notice to the Association and taking its views.\n\nBut the ommission to do so would not vitiate the notification impugned. It is well settled that possibility of an alternative scheme which might have been but has not been designed, would not be sufficient to make a restriction unreasonable. In State of Maharashtra v. Mumbai Upnagar Gramodyog Sangh(1) this Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"Th~ legislature has designed a scheme by which reasonable restrictions are placed upon the right of a citizen to dispose of his property: possibility of an alternative scheme which might have been but has not been designed, will not justifiably expose\n\n(1) (1969] 2 S.C.R. 392.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 133\n\nthe first scheme to the attack that it imposes unreasonable A restrictions.\"\n\nLastly, on contention No. 7 it was urged that the impugned notification, which purports to have been passed under the Control Order (which itself was a subordinate legislation passed under s.3 of the Act of 1955) if properly considered along with the serious mis - chief it causes to the citizens, goes against the very spirit and object of the Act of 1955 and frustrates the equitable distribution and production of sugar which apparently seems to be the main object sought to be achieved. This argument has already been considered by us when we dealt with the various facts and materials produced before us to justify the impugned notification. We have already pointed out that in view of an extraordinary situation viz., the sugar famine and the increasing demand of sugar by the consumers, the interests of the consumers had to rank above all considerations. The notification, as stated by us earlier strikes a just balance between the needs of the consumers and the harm which may be done to the owners of the crushers. The degree and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied by a social control is the purport and the central theme of the impugned notification. Having regard to the various aspects which we have indicated above, it cannot be argued with any show of force that the remedy sought by the notification is in any way arbitrary or excessive. On the other hand, the report of the experts, stoppage of the production of sugar by the factories, the drought conditions and other factors have to enter into the decision of the Government in passing the impugned notification. The notification ex facie cannot be said to have been passed without due care and deliberation.\n\nRelevant portion of Section 3 of the Act of 195~ runs thus :-\n\n\"3. (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. (or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations) it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.\"\n\nThe impugned notification having been passed under s.3 of the\n\nAct, it fulfils all the conditions contained therein, viz., it is expedient H for maintaining or increasing the supply of an essential commodity namely, sugar, which is included in clause (e) of s.2 of the Act of\n\nA 1955 and it regulates the supply and distribution of that essential commodity and the trade and commerce therein.\n\nHaving regard, therefore, to the 1 facts and circumstances proved in this case, it cannot be said that either the Control Order or the the impugned notification is against the tenor and spirit of section 3. On the other hand, it is manifestly clear from the circumstances disclosed above that it is in pursuance of the aim and object for which s.3 was enshrined in the Act of 1955 that the Control Order and the notification were promulgated. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners on this score is accordingly overruled.\n\nMr. Rameshwar Dayal, appearing for some of the petitioners raised a novel argument which was to the effect that not only the notification impugned but also the Control Order was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that since the State\n\nhad already fixed rest; rved areas for the factories, the selection of khandsari units for banning or stopping their production amounted to a mini classification without any rational basis. We are, however, unable to accept this contention because in view of the various circumstances discussed above, the classification, if at all, was based on a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the notification.\n\nCertain other aspects were also raised by Mr.\n\nDayal which amount to almost a repetition , of the main arguments placed before us by Mr. Garg and the counsel following him.\n\nThus, on an overall consideration of the various aspects of -the matter we are fully satisfied that applying the well established tests of reasonableness, the impugned notification cannot be said to contain the quality of unreasonableness but is per se fair and reasonable and fully satifies the conditions laid down by this Court in determining whether or not a restriction is reasonable.\n\nBefore closing the ]µdgment we would like to lay down certain guidelines for any future policy that the Goverment may .consider fit to shape in the light of the discussion on the points raised before us in this case. In fact, both counsel for the petitioners and the Attorney General had requested us to Jay down certain guidelines so that the Government may benefit from the same. Although we have\n\nuphrld the impugned notification but having regard to the special features of the present case we are not quite satisfied that a better policy to control sugar or increase its production could not be followed which may satisfy the parties concerned, viz., the crushers, the mills, the sugarcane growers and the consumers.\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC. v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 135\n\nIn case the Government decides to impose a ban in future on the power crushers or other units, it may consider the desirability of giving a bare minimum hearing not to all the owners of khandsari units but to only one representative of the Association representing them all, and getting their views on the subject. It is possible that they might give some suggestions which the Government would like to incorporate in formulating its policy. Even if the Government thinks that an emergent situation has arisen and it may not be possible to give a hearing, atleast a representation against the proposed action may be called for from such Association and consider• ed after giving the shortest possible notice.\n\nNot that such action is a legal requirement but it will generate greater confidence of the persons who may be affected by any order to be passed against them. In the same token, we may mention that when in passing an order like the impugned one, the Government has adopted the trialand-error method, it would be in the fitness of things if the matter is carried to its logical end so that any future order passed contains the colour and quality of objectivity, ·\n\nSecondly, could it not be possible for the Government to allow the crushers to function by regulating th~ working hours or to fix a quota of sugarcane to be delivered to the mills and the crushers in the ratio of 60:40 or 70:30, as may be advised by the experts and to insist that both the crushers and the mills should pay a uniform price to the cane growers ? The counsel for the petitioners have brought to our notice a disturbing element in the entire case which is that in the past although the sugarcane growers supplied sugar~ cane on condition of payment to them of the support price fixed by the Government yet the mills did not pay the price to .the cane growers for a long time with the result that arrears accumulate running into lakhs of rupees. It would indeed be extremely desirable for the Government to take steps to see that payment of the price of the quantity of the cane supplied to the mills or the crushers is paid against delivery or, at any rate, within a reasonable time thereafter so as to provide a strong incentive to the farmers t~\n\nincrease their production and earn substantial profits by supplying the sugarcane to mills or crushers during the crushing season (October to May).\n\nLastly, it was represented to us by the petitioners that the crushers are used for the twin purpose of production of khandsari H sugar and gur, rah, etc., but as the crushers are sealed by the officers of the Government, the owners are not in a position to produce\n\neven gur or rab on the production of which not only no ban has been imposed by the impugned notification but the same has been completely exempted from the purview of the notification. Thus it was asserted that the owners of crushers who want to switch over to production of gur or rab, because of the ban imposed by the Government on the production of khandsari may be allowed to do so. The Attorney General, however, pointed out that if this course is adopted it will be difficult to detect as to how many crushers are producing khandsari sugar (in the garb of gur or rab. Wherever any stepfor\n\nbanning production is taken, the Government has to evolve some procedure to detect the defaulters and with the resources at its command, we cannot understand why a special staff cannot be appointed on a temporary basis for looking after the compliance of the order by the tcrushers and making surprise checks periodically.\n\nAnother method to prevent the abuse of the privilege of.production of gu r or rab by producing khandsari in a clandestine fashion may be to insert a condition. in the licences of the manufacturers of khandsari sugar that if they produce khandsari during the period of the ban their licences would be cancelled.\n\nThe result is that all the contentions raised by the petitioners j\"exCept the one raised by Mr. Gupta that the introduction of the word 'vertical' was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution are rejected. The word 'vertical' must be considered to have been deleted from the impugned notification. Since the impugned notification has alreaclY spent its force. no relief can be given even to the petitioners represented by Mr. Gupta. But, in future the Government will bear in mind the infirmity pointed out. The petitions, along with the Civil Appeal, are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetitions and Appeal dismiss€d.\n\n~-·---.'----.", "total_entities": 211, "entities": [{"text": "LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 9, 1981\n\n[S.' MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A.D. KOSHAL, JJ.J\n\nEssential Commodities Act 1955, S. 3 and Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966, Clause 8-Notification by Cane Commissioner-1mpo$ition of a ban for a month and half on operation of power crushers of Khandsari units in reserved area of mill- Va/idity of-Exemption in favour of vertical power crushers-Whether dicrimina tory and justified."}}, {"text": "S.' MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act 1955", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act 1955"}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act 1955", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act 1955"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 458, "end_char": 480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", In' the State of Uttar Pradesh, sugarcane was produced by the sugarmills through the 'hydraulic process' and by the power crushers through the 'open pan process'."}}, {"text": "9th October, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1238, "end_char": 1255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D With a view to removing nation-wide shortage of sugar, enhancing sugar production and achieving an equitable distribution of the commodity so as to make it available to consumers at reasonable rates, the Cane Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (8) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 issued a notification dated 9th October, 1980 which directed that no power crusher other than vertical power crushers manufacturing gur or rab from sugarcane grown on their own fields or a Khandsari unit or any agent of such E owner in the reserved area of a mill could be worked until December I, 1980."}}, {"text": "December I, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D With a view to removing nation-wide shortage of sugar, enhancing sugar production and achieving an equitable distribution of the commodity so as to make it available to consumers at reasonable rates, the Cane Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (8) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 issued a notification dated 9th October, 1980 which directed that no power crusher other than vertical power crushers manufacturing gur or rab from sugarcane grown on their own fields or a Khandsari unit or any agent of such E owner in the reserved area of a mill could be worked until December I, 1980."}}, {"text": "October 9.\n\n1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1813, "end_char": 1829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners who were owners of power crushers of Khandsari units and had taken out regular licences under the Uttar Pradesh Khandsari Sugar Manufacturers Licensing Order 1967, assailed the notification which limited the ban to work power crushers for a period of one month and a half i.e. from October 9."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1833, "end_char": 1849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1980 to December 1, 1980 in writ petitions to this Court."}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098, "end_char": 2106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2261, "end_char": 2271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2447, "end_char": 2457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2650, "end_char": 2658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3200, "end_char": 3208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3314, "end_char": 3323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3618, "end_char": 3626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5706, "end_char": 5716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6445, "end_char": 6455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1955] 1 S.C.R. 707", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6676, "end_char": 6695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 375", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9517, "end_char": 9536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 609", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9595, "end_char": 9614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1978) 3 S.C.R. 293", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10705, "end_char": 10724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974) 2 S.C.R. 398", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11460, "end_char": 11479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10th October to !st December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11655, "end_char": 11689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(viii) The restriction imposed by the Notification in stopping the crushers for the period 10th October to !"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12231, "end_char": 12240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12360, "end_char": 12370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12498, "end_char": 12516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government under clause 8 on whom the power is conferred is undoubtedly a very high authority who must be presumed to act in a just and reasonable manner. ["}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12523, "end_char": 12531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14447, "end_char": 14455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14631, "end_char": 14639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15552, "end_char": 15560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15686, "end_char": 15695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17828, "end_char": 17837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18246, "end_char": 18255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18457, "end_char": 18466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18678, "end_char": 18687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18801, "end_char": 18810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19898, "end_char": 19908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20086, "end_char": 20096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.A. Gupta for the Petitioners in WPs.5637-41/80, 5797, 5733/80 and CA No.2734180."}}, {"text": "A.P.S. Chauhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20170, "end_char": 20184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.P.S. Chauhan, Roopendra Singh."}}, {"text": "Roopendra Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20186, "end_char": 20201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.P.S. Chauhan, Roopendra Singh."}}, {"text": "Gajraj Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20203, "end_char": 20215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajraj Singh, and C.K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WP 5762/80."}}, {"text": "C.K.\n\nRatnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20221, "end_char": 20238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajraj Singh, and C.K.\n\nRatnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WP 5762/80."}}, {"text": "D B.S. Chauhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20275, "end_char": 20289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D B.S. Chauhan, Birj Bihari Singh Sridhar for the Petitioner in\n\nWP 5745/80."}}, {"text": "Birj Bihari Singh Sridhar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20291, "end_char": 20316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D B.S. Chauhan, Birj Bihari Singh Sridhar for the Petitioner in\n\nWP 5745/80."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Dial", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20353, "end_char": 20367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Dial and Sarwa Mitter for the Petitioners in WPs 5782-84/80.", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Sarwa Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20372, "end_char": 20384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Dial and Sarwa Mitter for the Petitioners in WPs 5782-84/80."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20425, "end_char": 20434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, S.N. Kacker, R.K. Jain and R.P. Singh for the Petitioners in WPs 5553-5567, 5616-5620, 5646, 5647, 5750-52, 5779-81, 5623-28, 5646-47, 5649-5651, 5643-45,5702 to 5723, 5673- 5674, 5659 to 5667, 5740-42, 5737-39 and 5841-43/80."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20436, "end_char": 20447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, S.N. Kacker, R.K. Jain and R.P. Singh for the Petitioners in WPs 5553-5567, 5616-5620, 5646, 5647, 5750-52, 5779-81, 5623-28, 5646-47, 5649-5651, 5643-45,5702 to 5723, 5673- 5674, 5659 to 5667, 5740-42, 5737-39 and 5841-43/80."}}, {"text": "R.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20449, "end_char": 20458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, S.N. Kacker, R.K. Jain and R.P. Singh for the Petitioners in WPs 5553-5567, 5616-5620, 5646, 5647, 5750-52, 5779-81, 5623-28, 5646-47, 5649-5651, 5643-45,5702 to 5723, 5673- 5674, 5659 to 5667, 5740-42, 5737-39 and 5841-43/80."}}, {"text": "R.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20463, "end_char": 20473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, S.N. Kacker, R.K. Jain and R.P. Singh for the Petitioners in WPs 5553-5567, 5616-5620, 5646, 5647, 5750-52, 5779-81, 5623-28, 5646-47, 5649-5651, 5643-45,5702 to 5723, 5673- 5674, 5659 to 5667, 5740-42, 5737-39 and 5841-43/80.", "canonical_name": "R.P. Singh"}}, {"text": "R.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20664, "end_char": 20674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.P. Singh for the Petitioners in WPs 5609~1 l & 5597-98/80.", "canonical_name": "R.P. Singh"}}, {"text": "Soli J.Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20726, "end_char": 20741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J.Sorabjee, Arvind Minocha and Mrs. Veena Minocha for the Petitioners in WP 5661 /70."}}, {"text": "Arvind Minocha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20743, "end_char": 20757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J.Sorabjee, Arvind Minocha and Mrs. Veena Minocha for the Petitioners in WP 5661 /70."}}, {"text": "Veena Minocha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20767, "end_char": 20780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J.Sorabjee, Arvind Minocha and Mrs. Veena Minocha for the Petitioners in WP 5661 /70."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20818, "end_char": 20834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Behari Lal for the Petitioners in WPs 5785/80, 5786/80, and 5657/80."}}, {"text": "A.K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20894, "end_char": 20904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Gupta for the Petitioners in WPs 5763-64/80."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20945, "end_char": 20961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Att."}}, {"text": "S.C. Maheshwari Addi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20974, "end_char": 20994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Maheshwari Addi."}}, {"text": "O.P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21021, "end_char": 21030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Advocate General (U.P.), O.P. Rana, Mrs.Shobha Dikshit for the Respondents in all the matters."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21036, "end_char": 21050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Advocate General (U.P.), O.P. Rana, Mrs.Shobha Dikshit for the Respondents in all the matters."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21137, "end_char": 21145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nFAZAL Au, J. Inspired by the objective of removing nation-wide shortage of sugar and for the purpose of enhancing sugar production\n\n...\n\n.. .,,", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "LAXMI KHANDSARI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21282, "end_char": 21297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC.", "canonical_name": "LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21624, "end_char": 21632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21962, "end_char": 21969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The exact contents of the Notification may be extracted thus:\n\n\"Lucknow, Thursday 9th October 1980\n\nIn exercise of the powers under clause 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 read with the Central Government, Ministry of Food & Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation (Department of Food), Government of India Order No."}}, {"text": "Thursday 9th October 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21971, "end_char": 21996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The exact contents of the Notification may be extracted thus:\n\n\"Lucknow, Thursday 9th October 1980\n\nIn exercise of the powers under clause 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 read with the Central Government, Ministry of Food & Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation (Department of Food), Government of India Order No."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22030, "end_char": 22038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhola Nath Tiwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22286, "end_char": 22303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comm/Sugarcane dated July 16, 1966, I, Bhola Nath Tiwari, Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh hereby direct tha(no owner of power Crusher (other than those vertical power crushers which manufacture Gur or Rab from Sugarcane grown on their own fields) or a Khandsari Unit or any agent of such owner shall in any reserved area, of any\n\nSugar Mill work the Power Crusher, or the Khandsari Unit prior to December l, 1980 during the Year 1980-81."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22324, "end_char": 22337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comm/Sugarcane dated July 16, 1966, I, Bhola Nath Tiwari, Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh hereby direct tha(no owner of power Crusher (other than those vertical power crushers which manufacture Gur or Rab from Sugarcane grown on their own fields) or a Khandsari Unit or any agent of such owner shall in any reserved area, of any\n\nSugar Mill work the Power Crusher, or the Khandsari Unit prior to December l, 1980 during the Year 1980-81."}}, {"text": "December l, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22644, "end_char": 22660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comm/Sugarcane dated July 16, 1966, I, Bhola Nath Tiwari, Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh hereby direct tha(no owner of power Crusher (other than those vertical power crushers which manufacture Gur or Rab from Sugarcane grown on their own fields) or a Khandsari Unit or any agent of such owner shall in any reserved area, of any\n\nSugar Mill work the Power Crusher, or the Khandsari Unit prior to December l, 1980 during the Year 1980-81."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22848, "end_char": 22851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22859, "end_char": 22890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23204, "end_char": 23208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that sugar was being produced in the State of U.P. by the sugar mills through hydraulic process and by the power crushers through what is known as the 'open pan process'."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24159, "end_char": 24174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the\n\nState of U.P.\n\nSecondly, the Notification limited the ban to work power crushers only to a short period of one month and a half i.e., from October 9, 1980 to December 1, 1980."}}, {"text": "Art.19( l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25127, "end_char": 25140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25459, "end_char": 25472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25485, "end_char": 25492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25706, "end_char": 25716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney-General, appearing for the Union of India, and Mr.\n\nMaheshwari, Additional Advocate-General appearing for the State of U.P., contended that, decision to ban the power crushers of the petitioners was taken as a part of a high powered policy to boost the production of sugar which had fallen during the year 1979-80 with the result that in the current year the country faced a great sugar famine."}}, {"text": "Sugar Technologists of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26254, "end_char": 26282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 101\n\nSugar Technologists of India, it was decided to ban the production of A khandsari by the power crushers for a limited period."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27584, "end_char": 27588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counsel for the petitioners headed by Mr.Garg, Mr. Mridul and others raised the following constitutional points before us :- E\n\n(1) The Notification, as also the Control Order under which it was passed are clearly violative of of Art.", "canonical_name": "Garg"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27594, "end_char": 27600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counsel for the petitioners headed by Mr.Garg, Mr. Mridul and others raised the following constitutional points before us :- E\n\n(1) The Notification, as also the Control Order under which it was passed are clearly violative of of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27773, "end_char": 27786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27914, "end_char": 27922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28087, "end_char": 28097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28382, "end_char": 28389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29303, "end_char": 29311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29758, "end_char": 29767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29953, "end_char": 29961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29986, "end_char": 29995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30245, "end_char": 30249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30644, "end_char": 30658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney-General and the Additional Advocate General appearing for the Union of India and the State of U.P. respectively countered the submissions made by the petitioners on the following grounds:\n\n(1) An order passed under clause 8 of the Control Order is of a legislative character and therefore the questsion of the\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC."}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30667, "end_char": 30680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney-General and the Additional Advocate General appearing for the Union of India and the State of U.P. respectively countered the submissions made by the petitioners on the following grounds:\n\n(1) An order passed under clause 8 of the Control Order is of a legislative character and therefore the questsion of the\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30797, "end_char": 30805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31066, "end_char": 31073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31733, "end_char": 31740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati Sugar Industry", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31785, "end_char": 31808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "69-70 of W.P .5565- 5567 of 1980 Bhagwati Sugar Industry's case)."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32048, "end_char": 32053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) The khandsari produced by the crushers has got a very narrow sphere of consumption as it is used mostly by halwais or villagers, whereas sugar produced by the sugar mills is consumed in far larger quantities by the public in India generally and in foreign countries after export."}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33170, "end_char": 33178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33674, "end_char": 33687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33877, "end_char": 33883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34191, "end_char": 34197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35148, "end_char": 35152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was taken in Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.(2) where this Court,!speaking through Shah, J. reiterated the position mentioned above in the_ following words:\n\n\"When the validity of a law placing restriction upon the exercise of fundamental rights in Article 19(1) is challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon the State.\""}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35314, "end_char": 35327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36769, "end_char": 36775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LAXMJ KHANDSARJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40503, "end_char": 40518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAXMJ KHANDSARJ ETC.", "canonical_name": "LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40544, "end_char": 40553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 107\n\nFinally, in determining the reasonableness of restrictions im-J posed by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce, the mere fact that some of the persons engaged in a particular trade may incur loss due to the imposition of restrictions will not render them unreasonable because it is manifest that trade and industry pass through periods of prosperity and adversity on accJu1t of economic, social or political factors.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "V.G. Row", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41819, "end_char": 41827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the leading case decided by this Court which may justly be regarded as the locus classicus on the questions as to what\n\nare reasonable restrictions is V.G. Row's case (supra.)"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41850, "end_char": 41866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Patanjali Sastri, C.J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:\n\n\"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, where ever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all .cases."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43388, "end_char": 43397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case was followed in a later decision of this Court in Mineral Development Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Anr.(1} where after quoting the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., as extracted above, Subba Rao, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"These observations, if we may say so with great respect, lay down the correct principle."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43899, "end_char": 43907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., were endorsed by this Court when Ayyangar, J., speaking for the Court, made the following observations :\n\n\"There are several decisions of this Court in which the relevant criteria have been laid down."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44410, "end_char": 44414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44595, "end_char": 44603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45855, "end_char": 45863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nath Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46763, "end_char": 46771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similiarly, in Nath Mal and Mitha Mal's case (supra), which was also a case dealing with foodgrains, an order freezing the stocks of the commodity in order to secure its equitable distribution so as to make it available at a fair price to consumers was upheld by the Court with the following observations:\n\n\"The clause authorises the Commissioner and various\n\nothers authorities mentioned therein and such other officers as G may be authorised by the Commissioner to frreeze ."}}, {"text": "Mitha Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46776, "end_char": 46785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similiarly, in Nath Mal and Mitha Mal's case (supra), which was also a case dealing with foodgrains, an order freezing the stocks of the commodity in order to secure its equitable distribution so as to make it available at a fair price to consumers was upheld by the Court with the following observations:\n\n\"The clause authorises the Commissioner and various\n\nothers authorities mentioned therein and such other officers as G may be authorised by the Commissioner to frreeze ."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48575, "end_char": 48578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Union of India(1) where Beg, C.J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"All the tests of validity of the impugned price control or fixation order are, therefore, to be found in section 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48715, "end_char": 48724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48737, "end_char": 48746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49977, "end_char": 49988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, we would like to reiterate what Chandrachud, C.J,, observed in that case regarding the history and the manner in which the petitioners rushed to this Court :-\n\n\"Before closing, we would like to mention that the petitioners rushed to this Court too precipitately on the heels of the Price Control Order."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51374, "end_char": 51378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was vehemently contended by Mr. Garg that the Notification or the Control Order is in direct contravention of the Directive Principles of State policy contained in Art.", "canonical_name": "Garg"}}, {"text": "Art. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51506, "end_char": 51513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52290, "end_char": 52303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52580, "end_char": 52593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52827, "end_char": 52840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saghir Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52868, "end_char": 52880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of the amendment is that the State would not have to justify such action as reasonable at all in a Court of law and no objection could be taken to it on the ground that it is an infringement of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution\"\n\n(Saghir Ahmed's case)\n\n\"In judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the Act, one has to bear in mind the directive principles of State policy set forth in Article 47 of the Constitution.\" ("}}, {"text": "Article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53039, "end_char": 53049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53076, "end_char": 53080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ba/sara's case)\n\nIn the instant case, however, if the argument of the Attorney General is to be accepted, there is\\ no violation of the Dir-ective Principles because the main object sought to be achieved by a temporary suspension of the business of the petitioners is to ensure large-scale production of white sugar and to make it available to the consumers at reasonable rates which is animplementation rather than a contravention of the Directive Principles particularly clauses (b) and\n\n(c) of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53570, "end_char": 53577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54172, "end_char": 54185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56765, "end_char": 56773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57595, "end_char": 57608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union\n\nof India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57678, "end_char": 57693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main pleas of the State of U.P. which have been adopted by the Union\n\nof India, are to be found in pargraphs 6 to 11 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents in writ petition Nos.5565-5567 of 1980."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59319, "end_char": 59338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To meet this national crisis, the Government of India took various steps to increase the production of sugar in the country during the current season (1980-81)."}}, {"text": "Karan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61615, "end_char": 61626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an additional affidavit filed by the respondents, sworn by Karan Singh, Joint Cane Commissioner, Government of U.P, it was pointed out that khandsari sugar could never be a substitute for sugar produced by sugar mills because khandsari sugar is not used for domestic purpose in preference to mill sugar as the former has higher molasses content and has unpleasant smell and taste."}}, {"text": "Government of U.P", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61653, "end_char": 61670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an additional affidavit filed by the respondents, sworn by Karan Singh, Joint Cane Commissioner, Government of U.P, it was pointed out that khandsari sugar could never be a substitute for sugar produced by sugar mills because khandsari sugar is not used for domestic purpose in preference to mill sugar as the former has higher molasses content and has unpleasant smell and taste."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Sugar Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63499, "end_char": 63527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further stated that out of 89 sugar mills in the entire State of U.P., 18 sugar mills are owned by the U.P. State Sugar Corporation which is a Government company and controlled by the State."}}, {"text": "Bepin Behari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67173, "end_char": 67185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petititioner sought to falsify the figures quoted by the Union of India regarding the precentage of recovery of sugar by reference to a book written by Mr. Bepin Behari, and entitled 'Rural Industrialization in India'."}}, {"text": "10th October to 1st December 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69124, "end_char": 69157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a 'careful consideration of the arguments and documents produced :_by both the parties we are satisfied that the restriction imposed by the impugned notification in stopping the crushers for the period 10th October to 1st December 1980 is in public interest and bears a resonable nexus to the object which is sought to be achieved, namely, to reduce shortage of sugar and ensure a more equitable distribution of this commodity."}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70160, "end_char": 70168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70222, "end_char": 70229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70639, "end_char": 70645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71418, "end_char": 71426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71590, "end_char": 71597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71890, "end_char": 71897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72036, "end_char": 72039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72176, "end_char": 72183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72235, "end_char": 72238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72380, "end_char": 72388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72390, "end_char": 72398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74570, "end_char": 74574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74829, "end_char": 74837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75006, "end_char": 75014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LAXMI KHANDSARI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 75211, "end_char": 75226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, submitted that the Notification has been passed by the Cane Commissioner, Government of U.P. and it does not contain any materials\n\nLAXMI KHANDSARI ETC.", "canonical_name": "LAXMI KHANDSARI ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75384, "end_char": 75392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 16, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75467, "end_char": 75480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1122 dated July 16, 1966 and under the Essential Commodities Act it was not necessary for the Cane Commissioner to have stated or detailed the reasons why the Notification was issued."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75495, "end_char": 75520, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75995, "end_char": 75999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Irtdia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78112, "end_char": 78118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Mr. Garg that as Irtdia lives in villages it was not understandable why the Central Government was bent on reducing the support price of sugarcane and thus causing loss to the sugarcane growers."}}, {"text": "Nagaranjars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80779, "end_char": 80790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 123\n\nNagaranjars and his co-workers studied the conductivity of A plantation white sugars and refined sugars and found distinctive difference in conductivity of plantation white sugar and refined sugar.\""}}, {"text": "Government of\n\nU.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 81091, "end_char": 81110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been clearly averred in para 15 of the couteraffidavit filed by Mr. Bhola Nath Tiwari, Cane Commissoner, Government of\n\nU.P. (who issued the impugned notification) that in year 1978-79 the production in the reserved.areas was 578.78 lakh tonnes out of which the percentage of cane utilised by the sugar mills was 27 .24 whereas it was 9.73% in the case of the khandsari manufactured by power crushers."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82074, "end_char": 82079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A very attractive argument was submitted before us by Mr.\n\nGupta, appearing for some of the owners of power crushers."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85144, "end_char": 85147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 85241, "end_char": 85246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regarding the other distinctive features the mere ipse dfxit of deponent Gupta who has sworn an affidavit, there is absolutely no documentary evidence to support the features pointed out or relied upon by the 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ETC . . V. U.P. 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